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
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Davit Hovhannisyan[1]

THE RESULTS OF WWI AND THE LOGIC OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars had been a century of peace based on equilibrium and sustained by common values. The aftermath of World War I was social upheaval, ideological conflict, and another world war.

Henry Kissinger[2]

Keywords: *WWI, Armenian genocide, Ottoman Empire, identity, Wilson's Fourteen Points, new system of values.*

The goal of this article is an attempt to analyze the consequences of the WW1 and their influence on the processes that have been emerged in our region[3] from the viewpoint of a researcher whose century long and detached distance from the mentioned events may help remaining within unbiased approach.

It should be noted, however, that a world war is known to be a large-scale phenomenon, which causes long-term dramatic changes not only in world setup and in *relations between* and among global *actors, but also in* the psychology and identity of nations, societies and individuals and therefore, even a solid time remoteness can hardly ensure completely impartial approach. The clearest evidence of the foregoing is not only actions and emotions of the millions of Armenians worldwide (the predecessors of the survivors of the Armenian genocide of Ottoman

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[2] Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy: 221 - https://archive.org/stream/kissingerdiplomacy2 /Henry%20Kissinger%20-%20Diplomacy_djvu.txt

[3] From the author's point of view, this mega-region includes states located in the basins of three seas - the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

Empire), but also the absence of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey.

In February 1915, the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire, Ismaail Enver Pasha, ordered the destruction of the Armenians serving in the Turkish army. On April 24, mass arrests of the Armenian elite living in Constantinople began, which led to the almost complete destruction of the most prominent representatives of the Armenian community. This brutal crime marked the beginning of mass slaughter and deportation of the Armenian population of Western Armenia in May 1915[4]. It was not merely the homeland that the survivors of the Genocide lost in 1915. They felt themselves thrown out of time and space. For them, the continuous course of history that had been underlying their identity for millennia was interrupted and torn apart. As a result, their defensive reaction led to the emergence of mythologemes defined as "Lost Paradise" and "Hai Dat" and based on the value of restoring justice and winning good over evil.

Armenians living in Eastern Armenia also have suffered huge losses. During the war years, thirteen out of every hundred Armenians of Russia were drafted into the military. As Winston Churchill puts it, "when Turkey attacked Russian Armenia, the Tsarist government, fearing that the defense of the Caucasus by the Armenians would fuel the nationalistic ambitions of the Armenian people, sent 150 thousand Armenian soldiers to the Polish and Galician Fronts and moved other Russian troops to the Caucasus to protect the Armenian population. Of these 150,000 Armenian soldiers, only a few survived the European battles and were able to return to the Caucasus until the end of the war. It was a harsh measure in relation to the Armenian people, but in the future, even greater woes awaited them".[5]

There is no doubt that the consequences of the Sykes-Picot Agreement[6] still affect the peoples and societies of the Middle East. It seems unlikely that the researchers representing any of the parties involved would reject the influence of those seemingly very distant events.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union transformed the world political situation. The destruction of the bipolar world order and the loss of the sustainable balance that existed due to two poles and assured the predictability of the events and processes; the emergence of numerous new states; the activation of many latent conflicts in different parts of the world, the growth of the importance and influence of a number of regional powers, as well as of the non-governmental players – to a certain extent, all these circumstances remind the situation after the World War I.

There is a great deal of research on the direct consequences of the war. Briefly, they include a loss of more than 20 million lives, the destruction of four empires, total humiliation of Germany[7], the emergence of new states, dissatisfaction of some winner countries with post-war acquisitions, the creation of the League of Nations, and many more, put in action by a set of agreements.

It seems no less important that thanks to the Fourteen Points outlined by the US President Woodrow Wilson,[8] a number of concepts were incorporated into the system of international relations including the right of nations to self-determination, complete freedom of navigation upon the seas, the establishment of free trade conditions, the prohibition of secret treaties, the reduction of national armaments, etc. It should be mentioned that these concepts were identified earlier but remained on the periphery of public political consciousness.[9]

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[4] For more information, see А.Дж.Киракосян.Очерки дипломатической истории и историографии армянского вопроса, М., 2016, pp.16-17.

[5] See in: Churchill W.S. The World Crisis 1918-1925. — London: Thorton Butterworth, 1923-27.

[6] See in Հովհաննիսյան Դ.:Սուննիականձայրահեղականությանդրսևորումները. «մերկան » և «ապական»: -Վերլուծականտեղեկագիր, h.7, Երևան, 2015, pp. 8-29:

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[7] Winston Churchill showed brilliantly how the vindictiveness of the masses in the victorious countries influenced the position of their leaders in formulating demands for Germany as the only, in their view, culprit of the unleashed world war. See in: Churchill W.S. The World Crisis 1918-1925, pp.147-150.

[8] For a noteworthy analysis of Wilson's Fourteen Points see: Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen points 100 years on: Rethinking the Liberal World Order. Center for Strategic Research, M., 2018.

[9] There is a vast literature on the main post-war negotiation event, the Paris Peace Conference, notable among which are the Max Gunzenhäuser's *Die Pariser Friedenskonferenz 1919 und die Friedensverträge 1919—1920. Literaturbericht und Bibliographie* (Frankfurt/M.: Bernard & Graefe, 1970) as well as The *Paris Peace Conference 1919: Peace Without Victory? by* J. Fisher and M. L. Dockrill (Palgrave

THE RESULTS OF WWI AND THE LOGIC OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE...

Davit Hovhannisyan

According to A.Kortunov, "the ideal of Willsonianism is to have universal norms and standards for all players. Norms can be mandatory or voluntary, fixed in contracts or based on precedent. They can be enforced by international organizations, multilateral regimes or directly in relations among individual states. But norms have to exist, and they have to be the same for everyone. There should be no games without rules or different sets of rules for individual regions. Wilson went even further. He was also deeply involved in the development of an institutional basis for the new world order — the League of Nations. The attack on the plans of the 28th President of the United States came from his fellow countrymen on Capitol Hill, who refused to share even a portion of the United States' sovereignty with a little-understood international organization. Since then, the struggle for the rule of law in global politics has had mixed success".[10]

Underlying norms and regulations outlined in Wilson's Fourteen Points, is the system of values on which the liberal world order was based. However, they have never been fully and successfully negotiated and set up as the basic principles to determine the life of the world community. Meanwhile, these very norms and regulations fully corresponded to the 20th century world context. This context was marked by unparalleled mobility and speed-up of information dissemination. This context demonstrated that the mere existence of WMD remains one of the paramount threats to humankind, and within this context sufficient conditions for the establishment of shared life and behavior standards were created.

The Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria, who refused to conduct electricity in his palaces and never took a car, can be considered one of the symbols of the 19th century. In 1914, the world of Franz Joseph ceased to exist.

Macmillan, 2014); and The *Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* by M.MacMillan (N.-Y., 2009).
[10] Kortunov A.Seven Debates OverThe Fourteen Points. -Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen - http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/seven-debates-over-the-fourteen-points/

As for the new system of values, on which the liberal world order is based, it began to exert its ever more tangible influence in the aftermath of the World War II, when the United States-led NATO and the Soviet Union –led Warsaw Pact blocs were established as to opposing camps. Under the "cold war" conditions, the camp, within which the gap and the conflict between the declared and actually existing value systems became increasingly tangible and disastrous, finally collapsed and ceased to exist.

As a result, the foundations of the balance of power, which ensured relative stability given the existence of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, were destroyed once again.

What we are witnessing today is a new geopolitical situation in which the mainstream processes are regulated by competition between globalization projects of both world powers and network structures.

ԱՌԱՋԻՆ ԱՇԽԱՐՀԱՄԱՐՏԻ ՀԵՏԵՎԱՆՔՆԵՐՆ ՈՒ ՄԻՋԻՆ ԱՐԵՎԵԼՔԻ ՆԵՐԿԱ ԶԱՐԳԱՑՈՒՄՆԵՐԻ ՏՐԱՄԱԲԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ

Դավիթ Հովհաննիսյան
(Ամփոփում)

Հոդվածը վերլուծում է Առաջին Աշխարհամարտի հետևանքները և դրանց ազդեցությունը մեր տարածաշրջանում տեղի ունեցած ու դեռ տեղի ունեցող զարգացումների վրա: Նշված իրադարձություններից մեկդարյա հեռավորությունից կատարվող այդ վերլուծությունը, հաշվի առնելով հեղինակի՝ այդ իրադարձություններից օտարվածությունը, նոր դիտանկյուն ունենալու հնարավորություն է տալիս:

Միաժամանակ, հոդվածում Աշխարհամարտը դիտարկվում է որպես համընդգրկուն մի ֆենոմեն, որ պատճառ է դառնում երկարաժամկետ ու դրամատիկ փոփոխությունների՝ ոչ միայն համաշխարհային մակարդակով ու խոշոր խաղացողների հարաբերությունների մեջ, այլ նաև ազգերի, հասարակությունների ու

անհատների հոգեբանության ու ինքնության մեջ, այսպիսով ակներև դարձնելով, որ անգամ մեծ հեռավորությունը ամբողջությամբ անwatu մոտեցման հնարավորություն չի տալիս։ Ասված գայտուն օրինակ է ոչ միայն աշխարհասփյուռ հայության (Օսմանյան կայսրության հայերի ժառանգների) գործողությունները ու զգացմունքները, այլ նաև Հայաստանի ու Թուրքիայի միջև դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների բացակայությունը։ Նմանապես Սայք-Պիկոյի պայմանագրի հետևանքները այսօր էլ ազդեցություն ունեն Միջին Արևելքի ժողովուրդների ու երկրների կյանքի վրա։ Ավելին, Սառը Պատերազմի ավարտը և Խորհրդային Միության փլուզումը ամբողջովին վերափոխել են համաշխարհային քաղաքական կարգը։ Բազում ավերածությունների ու մարդկային միլիոնավոր կյանքերի կորստից, չորս կայսրությունների փլուզումից ու բազում այլ արհավիրքներից զատ, Առաջին Աշխարհամարտի հետևանք են նաև ազգերի Լիգայի ստեղծումն ու Վիլսոնյան տասնչորս կետերի հիման վրա կառուցված լիբերալ աշխարհի արժեքային հենքի ուրվագծումը։

Ներկայում, սակայն, մենք ականատես ենք աշխարհաքաղաքական մի իրավիճակի, որտեղ մեյնսթրիմային իրադարձությունները կարգավորվում են համաշխարհային գերտերությունների ու ցանցային կառույցների գլոբալիզացիոն ծրագրերի մրցակցության միջոցով։

Sarah Irving[1]

EXCAVATING THE SUBALTERN: STUDYING THE LIVES OF PALESTINIAN PEASANT WOMEN PRE-WWI

This paper has twin origins. The first was the accidental discovery, whilst researching in an archive in London, that the records of excavations by Euro-American archaeologists in Late Ottoman Palestine contain surprising amounts of information about the people who provided their manual labour, including women. The second was my own wrestling with the ethics and methodologies of writing about the Palestinian subaltern; trying, in some sense, to move from the common reading of Gayatri Spivak's famous essay 'Can the Subaltern Speak?'[2] as completely foreclosing the possibility of writing effectively about oppressed and marginalised people, to a position of seeing Spivak's message as one of warning, not denial.[3] The subaltern can speak, in this formulation, but we must take care to pay attention to what she is saying and not force it into preconceived formats for our own purposes. Bringing together these two strands results in questions which are both ethical (how we write and represent peoples deprived of their own voices, traditionally Othered and constructed by social and intellectual processes outside their control) and methodological (of how we might piece together information from myriad

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[2] The version used was that included in the chapter 'History' in Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 198-310.

[3] This reading is suggested by readings of other Spivak writings, such as "Echo," (*New Literary History* 24 (1993), 17-43) and by other theorists of the problem of speaking for and writing about subaltern peoples, such as Linda Alcoff, "The Problem of Speaking for Others," *Cultural Critique* 20 (Winter 1991-92), 21-2. I also wish to thank the organisers and participants of various research seminars at the Linnaeus University Centre for Concurrences in Colonial & Postcolonial Studies for insightful discussions on this topic.

sources, many of them colonial in origin, to build any kind of meaningful understanding of lives in different times and places).

In the case of the Palestinian peasant woman, we encounter a figure who has been depicted by orientalists as the degraded remnant of Biblical civilisation, adding slight interest to a vista of the Holy Land but despised and silenced;[4] by imperialists and Zionists as a downtrodden figure, justifying forcible intervention by her need to be 'rescued' from patriarchal Islamic society;[5] and by Palestinian iconographers and nationalists as the pure, upstanding and resilient mother of the nation.[6] Rarely, if ever, does she get to speak in any of these formulations, and her daily life and personal reality are scantily if at all visible. The absence of writings by women from this social context until the second half of the twentieth century, after enormous upheavals including wars and mass displacement in Palestinians ways of life, also means that there is little on which we can draw which comes from such women themselves. If we want to understand anything of their lives, therefore, we need to embark on a delicate, difficult, ethically complex process of reading against grains, between lines, but also looking at what colonial archives tell us in their own terms, and understanding what is or is not included in this.[7] This can be placed alongside oral history, folklore and other sources deriving from rural Palestine – but these also need care, as they are also often mediated by academic 'gatekeepers' and/or come from women a number of decades and several generations later than those of the Ottoman period.[8] Whilst,

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[4] Eitan Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land in English Culture 1799–1917: Palestine and the Question of Orientalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 62-119.
[5] Lila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others," *American Anthropologist* 104,3 (September 2002), 784-85.
[6] Ted Swedenburg, "The Palestinian Peasant as National Signifier," *Anthropological Quarterly* 63, 1 (January 1990), 18-19.
[7] Ricardo Roque and Kim Wagner, "Introduction," in *Engaging Colonial Knowledge: Reading European Archives in World History,* ed. Roque and Wagner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 18-21, 28-32.
[8] There are many valuable examples of such scholarship, such as the work of Rosemary Sayigh, Julie Peteet, Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout and Falestin Naili. Abbad Yahya's 2017 article provides an important discussion of the pros and cons of some of these projects and approaches in terms of their choice of subjects, methodologies, and interaction with

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therefore, there may be commonalities, we must also be alive to the danger of ignoring the changes and differences in their experiences and outlooks – as replicating the tendency of orientalist writers to present eastern rural populations as static and possessed of an unchanging essence. Adopting these practices, the particular case I present in this article draws on comments by the Scottish archaeologist Duncan Mackenzie. The often hostile, patronising tone of these, and the inequalities and overtones of colonialism and class embedded within them, might seem to make them an unpromising place to start trying to understand some of the subjectivities of a Palestinian peasant woman. But some of the details that Mackenzie's complaints and insults open up opportunities to consider hitherto ignored aspects of women's lives.

Women's labour and the village of Artuf

On August 19, 1911, Mackenzie wrote to Sir Charles Watson, Chair of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, saying that:

On one occasion all our women vanished one fine day as if by magic. The reason was that they were able - or supposed themselves able - to earn 2 bishleks[9] a day instead of our one by gathering pebbles for the railway. Then again the Jewish distillery of oreganum spirit at Artuf every now and then draws away the women to collect the plant from which the spirit is distilled. Here again they are able to earn two or more bishleks according to the amount they are able to gather.

All this taken together makes the possibilities of labour fluctuate in the most capricious and unforeseen manner.[10]

This excerpt is in itself interesting and informative, even if the underlying attitude and language are patronising and hostile (Mackenzie, with the phrase "supposed themselves able," casts doubt on the women's knowledge of the labour conditions in the area, and he condemns them as "capricious," implying that they are not a rational or dependable

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hegemonic national narratives ("Oral History and Dual Marginalization: Palestinian Peasant Women and Nakba Narratives," 97, 106).
[9] An Ottoman currency unit.
[10] Letter from Mackenzie to Sir Charles Watson, August 19th 1911. Palestine Exploration Fund Archive document PEF/DA/Mack/546.

workforce). It tells us that, contrary to common perceptions, the women of the village of Artuf, in the hills south of Jerusalem, were accustomed to carrying out paid manual labour outside the extended family and the village's land. It also emphasises the shifting nature of this labour: gathering pebbles is work which took place when the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, opened in 1892, was being constructed or when maintenance was taking place, whilst gathering 'oreganum' – wild thyme, probably that known in Palestine as za'atar – would presumably have been seasonal work.

So, with this kind of information underlying our knowledge of the context of Mackenzie's comments about the women labourers from the village choosing to earn better wages by working for the railway company or by gathering za'atar for the Jewish colony's distillery, how might we gain a sense of moments in the lives of these Palestinian peasant women, unable to write or speak their own stories to us? Firstly, we witness a story of partial displacement from the land which is finalised completely with the Nakba of 1948, when the remaining villagers, the descendants of those at work here, became refugees from the foundation of the State of Israel. But the main force which displaces them to start with is the Ottoman Empire, not Zionist Jews, and indeed Jews are only the third set of owners of the land after the government sold it off to Christian buyers. So we can see an incremental process of dispossession which these women experienced as a result of the 'modernisation' of the Ottoman administration in the nineteenth century, in which Zionism plays only a later role.

We can only speculate about how the women of Artuf viewed the confiscation of the village's land by the Ottoman authorities, but drawing on later and other accounts of similar events we can make some informed guesses: they would first and foremost have been hit economically and in their capacity to feed themselves and their families, which necessitated strategies such as taking outside work. They may have been resentful of the Ottoman government; to see in this a seed of the Arab national awareness and sense of difference and criticism vis-a-vis the Ottomans may be stretching the point, as it is highly unlikely that any of the village women

were able to read the newspapers which started to discuss such issues in the decades after their dispossession,[11] but it may be that one or two literate men from the village were aware of these currents and that this fed into the rise of dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule amongst some Palestinians in the pre-WWI period. On an individual level they may also simply have been sad, cut off from sites places where they had grown up and worked and where, by the time Mackenzie arrives, they have reclaimed once and fought a legal battle to retain. Did they worry about their children's prospects for the future if they could not get the land back, and might they have been jealous when the Jewish settlers were given funds by an international organisation to run a school for their own children? Hegemonic narratives in Palestinian national history assume that these women, by 1912, would have understood their displacement as the result of Zionism and colonialism but, as Abbad Yahya's critique of oral history conducted in the context of Palestinian national histories notes, peasant women from Palestinian villages themselves did not always reduce their experiences or those of their female forebears to this standard line.[12]

What this article seeks to do is take the fragment of information about labour relations on a Palestine Exploration Fund excavation taken from Mackenzie's letter, and unpick its various clues, following what we *can* know about the different elements of Artufi life that it mentions. Drawing on sources from the writings of European travellers, from Ottoman and British official records, and from histories of Zionist colonisation in the area, and combining them with what later testimonies of Palestinian women about their lives and memories might suggest to us, it is possible to build up an image which, if not comprising the actual voices of the women involved, permits us to ask informed questions, and perhaps make meaningful speculations, about how they fit into recorded events.

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[11] A 1931 survey in Palestine put literacy amongst Muslim women at around 3% (25% for Muslim men, 44% for Christian women). In 1947 the figures were 7% for Muslim women, 35% for Muslim men and 65% for Christian women. The women of Artuf were Muslim. Ami Ayalon, *Reading Palestine: Printing and Literacy, 1900-1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 2, 16-17

[12] Yahya, "Dual Marginalization," 96, 99-107

Employment on Duncan Mackenzie's excavation seems to have been a widespread, if short-lived, experience for the villagers: if census results from 1922, a decade after Mackenzie's excavations at Artuf, can be taken as roughly representative of the village's population (with 96 "Mohammedan" men and 85 women, 65 Jewish men and 59 women at the nearby settlement of Hartuv included under the Artuf heading[13]), we can see that almost all of the working-age men and women of the Arab village were employed on the dig for at least some time. This was not the work of a few individuals, set apart from their society, but something which would have entered the group memory of the villagers. But the excavations were comparatively brief affairs, returning for perhaps two or three summers, when seen alongside other sources of work mentioned by Mackenzie, such as the "Jewish distillery." This latter was one of the economic initiatives of the small settlement of Hartuv, with which the villagers had maintained amicable, if sporadic, relations for almost three decades before Mackenzie arrived. Mackenzie's angry notes, placed in the context of the previous half-century's developments in the area, open up the story of the fluctuating economic situation of the village and its interactions with the newcomers. From a dismissive comment by an irritated archaeologist, we can unpick some of the influences which shaped the Artufi women's lives and the environment in which they made choices about where to place their labour. Mackenzie saw the changes in his labour supply as "capricious and unforeseen," but when considered in context, they reveal a pattern of comprehensible decision-making on the part of the women themselves.

Although in the late sixteenth century Artuf paid taxes on an apparently abundant range of agricultural produce, including wheat, barley, fruit, goats, beehives and vineyards,[14] by 1852 the American missionary-scholars Edward Robinson and Eli Smith described it as constituting "a

poor hamlet of a few houses."[15] Although the Survey of Western Palestine identified a spring, "Hŭfiret 'Artûf," in the valley below the hilltop village, from which water was drawn,[16] another travel account noted that it was "peu abondante," or scarce – perhaps a reason for the poor harvests.[17] As a result of this decline, in the 1860s the village was forced to forfeit a large part of its land to the Ottoman government in lieu of unpaid taxes, leaving it with only some olive groves and a few hundred dunums of arable land protected by waqf status.[18] 5,000 dunums of the confiscated land were bought, in the early 1870s, by the Spanish consul in Jerusalem, who upon his departure from Palestine sold it on to the London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews.[19] The loss of the vast bulk of Artuf's village land explains why the women were, in later years, keen to take up paid labour, whether it was for the railways, the archaeological excavations, or the nearby Jewish community now established on their former lands. The manner of this loss also highlights the fact that standard nationalist narratives -- of villagers displaced by foreign settlements, through the sale of land by absentee landlords such as the rich Beirut Sursuq family to Templer or Zionist groups – are often oversimplifications.[20] Indeed, the

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[13] J.B. Barron, *Report and general abstracts of the Census of 1922* (Jerusalem: Census Office, 1923), n.p.

[14] Wolf Dieter Hŭtteroth and Kamal Abdulfattah, *Historical geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the late 16th Century* (Erlangen: Frąnkische Geographische Gesellschaft, 1977), 152.

[15] Edward Robinson, Eli Smith, *Later Biblical Researches in Palestine and the Adjacent Regions: A Journal of Travels in the Year 1852* (London: John Murray, 1856), 155.

[16] C.R. Conder and Horatio Kitchener, *Survey of Western Palestine: Memoirs of the topography, orography, hydrography, and archaeology*, volume III (London: Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1883), 22.

[17] Honorü Victor Guйrin, *Description géographique, historique et archéologique de la Palestine, accompagnée de cartes détaillées* (Paris: Imprimerie Impйriale, 1868), 15.

[18] Yuval Ben-Bassat, "The challenges facing the First Aliyah Sephardic Ottoman colonists," *Journal of Israeli History*, 35:1 (2016), 5.

[19] Ruth Kark and Michal Oren-Nordheim, *Jerusalem and its Environs: Quarters, neighbourhoods, villages, 1800-1948* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2002), 303-4.

[20] The fate of the village of Aylut, in the Galilee, is another important example of the lengthy and complex process by which many Palestinian peasants were dispossessed of their land. The initial passage of their land from state to private ownership came, like that of the villagers of Artuf, in the wake of the Ottoman Land Law of 1859, when the Sursuqs acquired large tracts of the Marj Ibn Amer as an investment, seeking to 'modernise' agriculture there and turning former independent farmers into agricultural labourers, then attempting to sell the land on to German Templer colonists in 1902. Mahmoud Yazbak, "Left Naked on the Beach: the Villagers of Aylut in the Grip of the New Templers," in *Struggle and Survival in Palestine/Israel*, ed. Mark LeVine and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 34-37.

Jewish colonists of Hartuv mentioned by Mackenzie were only the third set of owners of the land after it was expropriated by the Ottoman government; prior to them came two sets of European Christians, illustrating the fragmented and variable nature of the imperial influences permeating Palestine in the Late Ottoman period.

The London Society, part of a significant trend in the second half of the nineteenth century of enthusiasm from Europe and North America for combining millenarian religious ideas with agricultural settlement,[21] sought to bring Jews to the Holy Land in order to hasten the Second Coming of Christ. Its opportunity arose in 1882, when pogroms in Eastern Europe brought Jewish refugees from Russia to Palestine; the Society decided to settle some of these on its lands at Artuf, away from the influence of the rabbis in Jerusalem who would support them in their Jewish faith and identity. In late 1883, 24 families moved there under the leadership of a Jewish convert to Christianity, each receiving 150 dunums, a yoke of oxen, a cow, and tools to work the land. Although as a condition of receiving the land they were required to attend church on Sundays, full conversion was not forced upon them, although the existing Jewish community in Palestine condemned them as a "community of inciters" for their collaboration with Christian missionaries. It seems, though, that difficulties which had forced the villagers to forfeit their estates were also too much for the newcomers: the water supply – perhaps still held by the villagers, or perhaps simply drying up – was inadequate, and the land hard to clear and break up.[22] The hardships were no doubt compounded by the location, far from other groups of First Aliyah Jewish migrants in Palestine, who preferred the fertile coastal plain, and from the existing communities in Jerusalem.[23] Some of the land was leased back to the village families, and the refugees slowly left;[24] by 1886 there were only ten settlement families remaining,

and by 1891 just two. The villagers of Artuf took the opportunity to reclaim the land they still regarded as, in some measure, theirs: they started farming the abandoned land but in 1895 it was sold to a group of Bulgarian Jews wanting to establish a Zionist community in Palestine.[25] One wonders how the villagers of Artuf viewed their changing Christian and Jewish neighbours, especially given how strongly both groups seemed to have defined and kept themselves separate from the Muslim Artufis along these religious lines. Extensive documentation suggests that, amongst the popular classes and peasantry, religious practice and communities in Ottoman Palestine often blurred and overlapped, with, for instance, worshippers of more than one faith commonly using the same site.[26]

The Bulgarian Sephardic Jewish settlers who replaced the refugees in 1896 were a very different group. Members of a proto-Zionist society called Agudat Ahim le-Yishuv Eretz Yisrael (Society of Brethren for the Settlement of Eretz Yisrael, possibly influenced by the Russian Hibbat Zion, or Lovers of Zion[27]), they aimed to send hundreds of settlers to Artuf, but initially managed only ten families from the cities of Sofia, Tatar Pazarjik, Pleven and Plovdiv. Initially the vanguard families were helped by those back home, but the ownership of the land remained divided between the original fifty families involved in the scheme, causing complications which were only resolved – by buying them out and distributing the land amongst those actually living on it – around the time that the women of Artuf were infuriating Duncan Mackenzie with their allegedly erratic labour habits.[28] The purchase was funded by a Zionist philanthropist from Vilna, Yitzhak Leib Goldberg;[29] at around the same time, in 1912, the community also received funds from the Jewish

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[21] Ruth Kark, "Millenarism and agricultural settlement in the Holy Land in the 19th century," *Journal of Historical Geography* 9,1 (1983), 47-50.

[22] Kark and Oren-Nordheim, "Jerusalem Environs," 304.

[23] Ben-Bassat, "First Aliyah," 4-5.

[24] Kark and Oren-Nordheim, "Jerusalem Environs," 304.

[25] Ruth Kark, "The impact of early missionary enterprises on landscape and identity formation in Palestine, 1820–1914," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 15:2 (2004), 221.

[26] Menachem Klein, *Lives in Common: Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Hebron*, trans. Haim Watzmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 36-42; James Grehan, *Twilight of the Saints: Everyday Religion in Ottoman Syria and Palestine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 58-63, 72; Salim Tamari, *Mountain Against the Sea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 72-86.

[27] N. M. Gelber, "Jewish Life in Bulgaria," *Jewish Social Studies* 8, 2 (April 1946), 120.

[28] Ben-Bassat, "First Aliyah," 5.

[29] Ibid.

Colonisation Association to support its school, which suggests that it was grasping its new-found freedom as an opportunity to develop its resources.[30] Mackenzie's complaint to the PEF, of course, also tells us that the settlement was distilling oreganum spirit and employing local Arab women to collect the herbs.

Indeed, a range of other sources highlight the unusual degree of interaction between the villagers of Artuf and the settlers of Hartuv. Although the latter were ideologically motivated, seeing themselves as rightful claimants to the land on religious and ethnic grounds, Yuval Ben-Bassat speculates that a common set of experiences as Ottoman citizens may have offered a bridge between them, and being Sephardic Jews, rather than the Ashkenazis who composed most of the First and Second *Aliyot*, may also have made it easier to build relations.[31] In addition, the settlers' notion (drawing from haskalah Jewish nationalism) of agriculture as a noble and honest pursuit, key to reviving Jewish peoplehood,[32] may well have instilled in them some respect for the existing farmers in the Arab village – who, indeed, they brought in to help them work the land, on a crop-sharing arrangement. Did the villagers experience this as a humiliating necessity, working as labourers on land they had once owned, or did they value the opportunity to return to places they knew well and to raise crops which they could themselves consume? Unlike most Second Aliyah settlements, those at Hartuv apparently developed strong social ties with the villagers of Artuf, spoke Arabic, baked bread like their neighbours, and dressed like them (a subject of concern to Ashkenazi Zionists who visited and reported on the colony).[33] As well as the za'atar distillation mentioned by Mackenzie, the settlers also exported dried wildflowers – again picked by Arab labourers, probably women – and bought olives and milk from the village to process into cheese, oil and soap for sale further afield. In turn, the settlement also generated an income by hiring its machinery, such as an oil press, to the village,[34] so they may have been able to make better use of the olive groves which they hadn't lost in the original land expropriation by the Ottoman government. The Jewish colony's mukhtar, Yitzhak Levi, also apparently gained status amongst the villagers for intervening to prevent the Ottoman authorities from enacting harsh punishments on local people (including execution, earning him the *laqab* of 'he who takes people down from the scaffold'), and as a mediator in confrontations.[35]

These apparently amicable and mutually beneficial interactions did not, however, prevent an ongoing legal dispute in the Ottoman and then the British Mandate courts, over the land which had been abandoned by the London Jewish Society, farmed for several years in the interim, and then bought by the Bulgarian settlers. The villagers still perceived themselves as having rights over it and at times went beyond their legal action, uprooting mulberry trees planted by the Bulgarians and stealing items from the settlement.[36] These disagreements over the fundamental issue of who owned the land taken from the village in the 1870s were never fully resolved and perhaps took on new resonances as tensions over Jewish immigration and Zionists claims to the whole land of Palestine rose during the Mandate period; the uneasy coexistence finally ended during the country-wide riots of 1929, when the colony at Hartuv was attacked and burnt – although whether the perpetrators were from Artuf or elsewhere is unknown.[37]

Conclusion: finding women in colonial histories

Aspects of the history of Artuf have been told in various ways and from different viewpoints – by travellers, Zionist activists, by historians researching the experiences of Christian and Jewish colonists. The vast majority of the sources these writings draw on are by men and generally

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[30] Anne Ussishkin, "The Jewish Colonisation Association and a Rothschild in Palestine," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9,3 (October, 1973), 356.

[31] Ben-Bassat, "First Aliyah," 6; Ruth Kark & Joseph B. Glass, "The Jews in Eretz Israel/Palestine: From traditional peripherality to modern centrality," *Israel Affairs* 5:4 (1999), 101.

[32] Yael Zerubavel, *Desert in the Promised Land* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 68-70.

[33] Ben-Bassat, "First Aliyah," 9-10.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.9.

[37] Michael J. Cohen, "The British Mandate in Palestine: The Strange Case of the 1930 White Paper," *European Journal of Jewish Studies* 10 (2016), 81-2.

talk about them, or speak from an implicitly male standpoint. The women of Artuf are thus doubly silenced, by reason of their status vis-a-vis colonisers and male producers of knowledge. Oral accounts from other villages in the area, such as those examined by Abbad Yahya, also suggest that female narratives of rural life and change may disrupt hegemonic versions of national history, highlighting hierarchies of class and gender which are often evaded. But a brief piece of information from one colonial source, the letters of Duncan Mackenzie, provides a small clue which enables us to parse some of the existing body of information in new ways, questioning it in a manner which exposes how it operates in a gendered way and how it may therefore have affected the women of the village in particular. We might not know these women's names or individual life-stories, but we can at least unpick some of the unspoken assumptions behind the ways in which history is usually written in order to at least understand what differentiated their experiences from their menfolk or from urban Palestinians.

In contrast with many accounts of rural life, in Palestine and elsewhere, this kind of approach allows us to consider peasant women as active subjects. We can see in their choices of labour the diverse coping strategies which the women of Artuf evolved to deal with the loss of most of their arable and pastoral land. Although on one level we might read them as having been forced to make this shift, to interpret the situation only in terms of compulsion is, I believe, the underestimate these women's agency. They apparently feel able – based perhaps on the short supply of available labour in the surrounding area, or on the skills they had built up – to annoy employers such as Mackenzie by choosing to work elsewhere when better pay was offered. They may also have made the decision based on a calculation that Mackenzie's archaeological excavations – though large and lasting several years, and providing daily work during the digging season – were less permanent than both the railway and the Jewish colony, sources therefore of ongoing and more lucrative, if more sporadic, work. Indeed, sporadic work may also have fit their lives more closely, as the village still retained some land and olive trees, and the women presumably also had

domestic roles to fulfil. Gathering za'atar in the hills may well have been a more attractive work option than carrying and sieving earth for Mackenzie, who in other notes complains about the women's gossiping and chatter, suggesting that he might have tried to stop talk and social interaction on the excavation site. Mackenzie saw the women of Artuf as "capricious" in their behaviour as his workers but, as a wider contextualisation of his comments and the women's years of manual labour shows, their decisions were far from lightly taken. Rather, they were embedded in a complex web of relations and in their own weighing-up of gendered, colonial and state influences on their lives, in a period of social, economic and political change.

ՀԵՏԱԶՈՏԵԼՈՎ «SUBLATERN». ԱՌԱՋԻՆ ՀԱՄԱՇԽԱՐՀԱՅԻՆ ՊԱՏԵՐԱԶՄԻ ՆԱԽՕՐԵԻՆ ՊԱՂԵՍՏԻՆՑԻ ԳՅՈՒՂԱԲՆԱԿ ԿԱՆԱՆՑ ԴՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՈՒՍՈՒՄՆԱՍԻՐՈՒՄԸ

Սառա Իրվինգ
(Ամփոփում)

Հոդվածում ներկայացված է Երուսաղեմից հարավ տեղակայված Արթուֆ գյուղում XX դարասկզբին ապրող պաղեստինցի կանանց կյանքը: Արթուֆ գյուղի վերաբերյալ իրականացված տարատեսակ ուսումնասիրությունները, որոնց հիմքում որպես կանոն ընկած են տղամարդկանց պատմությունները ու տղամարդկանց աշխարհայացցը, գրեթե չեն անդրադառնում կանանց խնդիրներին: Սույն հոդվածում այս հարցը քննության է առնվում շոտլանդացի հնագետ Դունկան Մաքքենզիի՝ իր կատարած պեղումներին մասնակցած պաղեստինցի կանանց մասին նամակ-գրառումերի համատեքստում: Թեև Մաքքենզիի նամակները հիմնականում գրված են զաղութատիրական, հաճախ կոպիտ ոճով, սակայն տողատակերում հանդիպող մանրամասնությունները թույլ են տալիս ուսումնասիրել պաղեստինցի կանանց կյանքի և, մասնավորապես, աշխատանքային առօրյայի գայսոր չյուսաբանված կողմերը: Անդրադարձ է կատարվում նաև կանանց մասին ուսումնասիրությունների իրականացման էթիկական և մեթոդաբանական խնդիրներին:

Mariam Elmasyan[1]

IBN AL-MUQAFA'A'S SYSTEM OF ETHICS ON THE BASIS OF
AL–ADAB AL-SAGHIR AND AL- ADAB AL-KABIR

Abstract: The mid-eight century appears as an important milestone in the history of Arab-Muslim Caliphate with the radical change and development in Arab-Muslim culture. The expansion of the Caliphate borders resulted in the formation of a new military-political and socio-economic system of the Arab-Muslim caliphate under the dominant ideology of Islam. The great conquests brought to the social and cultural evolution of Arabs. Communication with the population of the conquered non-Arab and non-Muslim states and the cultural assimilation resulted in formation of a certain value system in Islam. In this process, the merging of different values had created a common system of conduct within the Muslim community. These were the pre-Islamic values and customs, Quranic teachings, behaviors of the Prophet and his companions, the Persian and Greek model of moral perfection, and various strands of culture from population of the conquered states.

Abdallah ibn Al-Muqafa'a was the pioneer in the process of formation of new cultural values and ethical norms needed for the new multi-ethnic state. This article is an attempt to illustrate Ibn 'Al- Muqafa'a's system of ethics and its role in the formation of new cultural values and ethical norms in the context of historical and socio-cultural developments in the second half of eight century in the Arab-Muslim Caliphate. Based on content and textual analysis of "Al-Adab Al- Saghir" and "Al-Adab Al- Kabir" we try to reveal the main concepts of the ethical system of Ibn Al- Muqafa'a.

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The primary reason for the formulation of the Arab-Muslim culture was caliph Abd al-Malik's reform (685-705) concerning the Arabic language, which was proclaimed as the only official language in entire Caliphate. This fact appeared as a good impetus for the possibility of formation of the Arab-Muslim philological tradition, along with the collection and compilation of anthologies of pre-Islamic Arabic literature. With the rise of Islam, the philology had been engaged with the study of the Qur'an and its interpretation. With the proclamation of Arabic as the official language in the Caliphate, pre-Islamic poetry has also merged with the Muslim scholarship, making together the organic means of expressions within the Arab-Muslim culture that has developed in the framework of its scientific and philological tradition[2].

The gradual change in the cultural and political features of the caliphate, a shift from religious – based rule to a more secular, led to the fact that the form and the content of the religious texts has become irrelevant to the new trends of the Arab-Muslim culture. The newly created multi-ethnic state called for the development of new conceptual provisions that could regulate the socio-cultural relations in the caliphate. It became apparent that the existing prescriptions of Islam of the early Arab Muslim community ceased to fully meet the requirements for newly created of multiethnic state where the human factor appears principle. In this context, the emergence of *adab* obviously changed the structure and development of the spiritual and intellectual life of the Arabs alongside having a great influence on the forms and content of historical and philological works[3].

At the certain stages of its development, *adab*[4] had different interpretations. In pre-Islamic era, *adab* was considered as a set of norms of correct behavior inherited from ancestors. With the rise of Islam *adab* referred to the ethical and practical models that regulated the life of a good Muslim. One can say that while the term 'ilm in the mid- to late Umayyad

[2] Грюнебаум Г.Э. Становление и особенности исламской цивилизации от империи к цивилизации. Москва, 1999, стр. 340-343.

[3] Khalidi T. Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period. Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 83-84.

[4] Пелла Ш. Вариации на тему адаба, в кн. Арабская средневековая культура и литература, М., 1978, стр.60-68.

period appeared to refer to religious knowledge, that is *Hadith, Tafsir* and *Fiqh*, the term *adab* came to imply to secular knowledge namely philology, poetry and history.

With the stratification of the syncretic social system of the Arab-Muslim society and the formation of certain social strata, *adab appeared* to respond to the challenge of foreign cultures by defining the scope of necessary knowledge and to formulate the ethical norms and standards for the ruling elite and educated layers of society.

Abdallah ibn al-Muqafa'a is one of the iconic intellectuals of the eight century, as well as one of the prominent representatives of Arabic medieval literature, the founder of *adab* literature. Ibn al-Muqaffa'a was Persian of origin, a fact which has deeply affected on his ideas, actions and his literary and political writings. Due to his position as secretary to Marwan bin Mahmud, he could observe the conspiracies and defamation, which eventually led to the fall of the Umayyad dynasty. Through his experience, he learned how the sicknesses of nation state could have a negative impact on it. One of Ibn al-Muqaffa's chief concerns in life was moral behavior and he devoted himself in pursuit of moral values and right conduct and dedicated two of his major works: "*Al-Adab al-Saghir*" and "*Al-Adab al-Kabir*" to this subject. In these books, Ibn al-Muqaffa'a has transmitted and incorporated important elements and concepts of both Arabic and Persian cultural experiences. As the author stated *in "Al-Adab al-Saghir"*: "In this book I have presented the thoughts of men, who were concerned with the soul's perfection, and they proposed the ways of performing virtuous deeds"[5]. By saying this, the author emphasizes and values the knowledge and conduct of the ancestors as merely transmitting and giving the tribute to the virtuous human experience.

Ibn al-Muqafa' begins "Al adab al-Saghir" with the following words: "Each human being (*makhluq*) has needs (*haja*), and these needs are determined by the goal (*ghaya*) and the goal has its own path of implementation (*sabiyl*) and Allah has predetermined the time, goals and

the path for all to happen. Human needs and goals are the blessings of the earthly and heavenly life, and the only way to understand them is the right reason (*aql sahih*) and the main criteria for the right reason is ability to choose with prudence and its purposeful implementation".[6]

This passage appears as algorithm to understand and to reveal the main conceptual values of Ibn al-Muqafa'a's system of ethics. Hence the morality which Ibn al-Muqaffa'a offers aims to ensure the need of man in his earthly life. And the needs of a man can be fulfilled only based on human dignity and virtue, the purpose of which is to reach the salvation of the soul after the earthly life. A human being can achieve this fulfilment, only through self-consciousness and the perception of the world around him. This acquired knowledge will help him to identify the evil from the good, to choose and to act. Ibn al-Muqaffa'a emphasizes the role of *adab* in the development of the reason, as he states: "Adab trains, develops and flourishes the mind,… just as the seed cannot sprout and emerge on its soil with its flowers, so does the intellect lack the strength and the life to develop, and there is no benefit from it as long as it does not practice the *adab*, which is the basis for it, the fruit and the life"[7]. Ibn al-Muqaffa'a considers logic as the important part of the *adab*, which needs a learning.

For Ibn al-Muqaffa'a *adab* consists from two essential things: the educational process, by which reason is cultivated, and the moral character, which complements the reason. The man who practices *adab* is someone who learns good and worthy thoughts from others and is able to apply them properly and in his presence, And one should not treat him as a weak person, but should treat him as a person who has taken and preserved the words of the wise men and to follow the example of the virtuous people. And he is no longer obliged to add his knowledge to the purpose he has already achieved, so he can be considered an innovator who uses his mind to become rational person (*aqil*).

Moral behavior in interpersonal relations is in the center of Ibn al-Muqaffa'a's ethics. He suggests man to be "inquisitive and to distinguish between right and wrong", to be truthful so that one can trust what he says,

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⁵ ابن المقفع. الأدب الصغير والأدب الكبير. دار صادر، بيروت، بدون تاريخ. صـ. 15

⁶ ابن المقفع. الأدب الصغير والأدب الكبير. دار صادر، بيروت، بدون تاريخ. صـ. 11
⁷ ابن المقفع. الأدب الصغير والأدب الكبير. دار صادر، بيروت، بدون تاريخ. صـ. 12

to fulfill his obligations to others so that he will be treated in the same manner, to be grateful so that he can deserve more, to be generous so that he will deserve to be treated well, to be merciful to the injured not to be harmed, to be friendly not to adopt the character of the devil, to do his job not to be blamed for something which he has not done, to be modest so that others will be happy for him and not envy him, to be content so that he is satisfied with what he has, not to be malevolent not to cause himself permanent damage, to be modest no to be reported in a bad light to the learned. "The educated person's fear of being criticized by the learned is stronger than his fear of being punished by the Sultan"[8]. As a way to get rid of its own shortcomings, Ibn al-Muqaffa' suggests the practice of self-criticism (*al qada al-zatiya*) to evaluate and control his own actions, that will help him go the right way as the rational man must (*ala al-akil*) to know his flaws and omissions in the matters of religion, morality, and behavior[9].

The moral, philosophical, and theoretical thoughts in "Al-Adab al-Saghir" are presented as maxims and as wise words of ancestors, which Ibn al-Muqaffa'a tried to illustrate in accordance with a new socio-cultural environment.

In "Al-adab al-Kabir" Ibn al-Muqaffa'a presents the main issues, which face the newly created Arab-Muslims community and suggests the ways for their solution based on both the Sassanian experience and Islamic worldview within presenting the ideal model of Arab-Muslim society and introducing its basic layers: *ahl al-sultan* (ruling elite), *ahlal-din*,(men of religion), *ahl al-haq* (righteous men), *ahl al-iman (beleavers)*, *ahl 'ilm* (religious scholars), *ahl fadl* (privileged men),where the later is considered as an ideal social model, and the others were obliged to follow or achieve this standard of ideal men. There are two main components for *ahl al-fadl*: *al-mahasabat al-zatiya* (self-control) and *al-taalim al-zatiy* (self-education), which are versus *al-gharaiz* and *al-tabai'* (instincts). Ibn al-

Muqaffa'a considers a power as a great challenge for the leader, and he must have four important qualities that are the basis and support for any government: independent decision-making, aspiration, care and justice, honesty towards subordinates, who can appear as backbone for him. Man who proclaims himself imam for believers must educate himself and educate others by his behavior, which is more useful and valuable to them than just words.

In the preface of "Al- Adab al-Kabiyr", alike in "Adab al-Saghiyr", Ibn al-Muqaffa'a once more values an importance of knowledge and experience of ancestors:"One of the most important skills of our time scientist is to borrow, take on the knowledge and the experience of the ancestors, follow their path and try to fulfill our good intentions and deeds. We see that our ancestors had nothing to neglect, even the most versatile reproducer will not even find a theme they did not refer, so I write about their behavior in this book, as all this is necessary for people"[10].Then he continues: "If you are studying and studying in any science, learn its basics (*'usûl*) and its separate sections (*fusûl*) and if you can do it, it is best to choose the best. The basis of religion is the belief in virtue. Avoid haughtiness, follow what is written and if you become a faqih it is the best"[11].

While analyzing above mentioned, we can conclude, that Ibn al-Muqaffa'a's system of ethics is based on three essential interrelated concepts, which are the virtue, the knowledge and the action, where the virtue is a central one, as the main concept of the system, and the other two assure its implementation. Ibn al-Muqaffa'a believes that people can be thought to be virtuous, which can have important implication for moral education.

These two treatises of Ibn al-Muqaffa' are of a great significance in shaping and developing the ethical values of the Arab-Muslim state in the eight century and encompassed both the literary form and the good conduct. By their rhetoric and functional significance, they shaped the main

[8] ابن المقفع. الأدب الصغير والأدب الكبير. دار صادر، بيروت، بدون تاريخ. صـ. 39

[9] ابن المقفع. الأدب الصغير والأدب الكبير. دار صادر، بيروت، بدون تاريخ. صـ. 19

[10] ابن المقفع. الأدب الصغير والأدب الكبير. دار صادر، بيروت، بدون تاريخ. صـ. 64

[11] بن المقفع. الأدب الصغير والأدب الكبير. دار صادر، بيروت، بدون تاريخ. صـ. 65

moral vectors of the new Arab-Muslim state, as well as played an essential role in the development of the *adab* literature and culture.

ԱԲԴԱԼԼԱՀ ԻԲՆ ԱԼ-ՄՈՒԿԱՖՖԱՅԻ ԷԹԻԿԱՅԻ ՀԱՄԱԿԱՐԳԻ ՎԵՐԼՈՒԾՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ «ԱԼ-ԱԴԱԲ ԱԼ- ՍԱՂԻՐ» ԵՎ «ԱԼ- ԱԴԱԲ ԱԼ-ՔԱԲԻՐ» ՍՏԵՂԾԱԳՈՐԾՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ՀԻՄԱՆ ՎՐԱ

Մարիամ Էլմասյան
(Ամփոփում)

Ուղերորդ դարի կեսն արաբամուսուլմանական մշակույթի պատմության կարևորագույն փուլերից է, որը պայմանավորված է մշակույթի զարգացման մեջ այդ շրջանում տեղի ունեցող բեկումնային փոփոխություններով: Խալիֆայության սահմանների ընդլայնումը հանգեցրեց նոր ռազմաքաղաքական և սոցիալ-տնտեսական համակարգի ձևավորմանը և մեծապես նպաստեց արաբների հասարակական և մշակութային կյանքի զարգացմանը: Նվանված ժողովուրդների հետ մշակութային ասիմիլացիայի արդյունքում տեղի ունեցավ իսլամի արժեհամակարգի կայացումը: Ստեղծվեց մուսուլմանական համայնքի համար համընդհանուր մի համակարգ, որն իր մեջ ներառեց խալիֆայության սահմաններում ակտուալ նշանակություն ունեցող գիտելիքն ու արժեքային համակարգերը` նախախալամական արժեքներն ու սովորույթները, Ղուրանի դրույթները, Մուհամմադ մարգարեի և նրա զինակիցների վարքային օրինակները, բարոյական ինքնակատարելագործման իրանական և հունական մոդելները, նվանված ժողովուրդների բարոյաէթիկական նորմերը:

Արդալլահ իբն ալ-Մուկաֆֆան առաջինն էր, ով իր մեծ ներդրումն ունեցավ նորաստեղծ բազմամշակութային պետության համար անհրաժեշտ նոր արժեքների և բարոյական նորմերի ձևավորման գործում: Հոդվածում փորձ է արվում վերլուծել Իբն ալ-Մուկաֆֆայի էթիկայի համակարգը նոր մշակութային արժեքների և բարոյական նորմերի ձևավորման գործընթացում` ութերորդ դարի երկրորդ կեսին

արաբական խալիֆայությունում տեղի ունեցող պատմական, հասարակական և մշակութային զարգացումների համատեքստում: «Ալ-Ադաբ ալ-Քաբիր» և «Ալ- Ադաբ ալ-Մադիր» ստեղծագործությունների տեքստային վերլուծությամբ փորձ է արվում դուրս բերել Իբն ալ-Մուկաֆֆայի էթիկայի համակարգի հիմնական հասկացությունները:

Hayk Kocharyan[1]

ISLAMIC PROTECTION CONTRACTS SYSTEM AND THE ARMENIANS IN EARLY UMMAH

Keywords: ummah, dzimmi, ahd, sulh akd, protection contract, Armenian

This study is exploring the first Arab-Armenian contacts and the newly-fledging system of relationships brought about as a result of these contacts in the early Middle Ages,.

Islam came into being and took its shape in 7 century; as a result of activities of Prophet Mohammed and his followers (Caliphs), the religion was spread and adopted among numerous peoples and tribes extending over huge territories. In the period between 7 and 8 centuries, the Armenian highland was one part of the vast Arab Caliphate, while some of the Armenian Principalities periodically were either successful in gaining independence from the Caliphate or brought back into its confines.

One of the most important novelties of the time was the introduction by Islam and its Prophet Mohammed of a new mechanism of organization of society called Ummah, which was an unprecedented phenomenon for Arabia. In other words, the existing model of tribal and kinship organization was contradicted by a new system constructed around the axes of monotheism (Tauhid) according to which the world, instead of former "Banu of these" and "Banu of those" division, now consists of Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb, Muslims and non-Muslims.

From this point of view, the Arab (Muslim)-Armenian relations personify an interesting experience since the unique societal structure of Armenia (the country was ruled by Principalities and the cavalry of a

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significant number possessed by them; there were also peasants, namely, rank-and-file people) found its reflection in these relations as well.

Islam worked out a system of contracts (Ahd, Sulh, Akd, Aman) which once being signed between Muslims and non-Muslims would give the latter the opportunity to act in the status of the protected (Ahl Adh-Dhimma) as one part of the Ummah, in the meantime benefiting from and obeying the obligations and responsibilities specified by the status. Dhimmis were paying poll tax (Djiziya) and land tax (Kharadj) in return for acquisition of life and property immunity as well as the right to keep own religion.

First Arab campaign into the Armenian highland and Armenia itself occurred approximately in the year 19 of Hijra (640), starting from the capture of Diarbekir (Amid). This was not the first meeting between the Armenians and Arab troops. During the battle of Kadisia in 637, two Armenian contingents – one headed by Davit Mamikonyan's son Mushegh and the other by Prince Grigor of Syunik – fought Arabs as part of the Persian troops.[2] It is also known that Armenian regiments fought in the ranks of the Byzantine army, more particularly, at the battle of Yarmuk in 636[3].

Second wave of Arab campaign into Armenia came from Persia around 642-643 when victorious Arab troops spread up to the Caspian Sea. The third campaign took place at the time of Catholicos Yezr. This time Arabs came from Taron, spread along the western and eastern shores of the Lake Van, reached Kogovit through the Gorge of Berkri, entered the Ararat plain after which moved directly toward the capital Dvin.[4] Dvin was captured, plundered and turned into a scene of terrible destruction[5]. Thereafter, Arab campaigns in the direction of Armenia stopped for a while. As a matter of fact, these campaigns were of a reconnaissance

[2] Sebeos, History, New-Armenian translation, Introduction and notes by G.Khachatryan and V.Khazaryan. Yerevan, 2005 p. 203.

[3] Bolshakov O., History of Caliphate: the Epoch of Great Invasions (633-656), v. 2, Moscow, 1993, p. 56. (in Russian)

[4] Leo, Collection of Works, v. 2, Yerevan 1976, p. 305. (in Armeian).

[5] Ghevond, History, New-Armenian translation, Introduction and notes by A. Ter-Ghevondyan, Yerevan 1982, pp. 23-24.

character with the accompanying objective to make inroads and acquire booty.

In the first half of VII century serious processes were parallelly taking place in Armenia; Teodoros from the family of Rshtuni stood out due to his organization and leadership talent, assuming the position of Sparapet (Commander-in-chief of the Armenian army). Armenian troops registered their first success against Arabs in 651 when the latter entered the Armenian highland yet another time. However, two years later, around 653-654 Arabs came back; this time, however, instead of just few troops making inroads (Ghazu) on the territories neighboring the Caliphate, Arabs were organized into quite a large and well-trained army which arrived for the purpose of extending (Futuh) the confines of the Caliphate.

The Arab campaign was headed by a commander called Habib Ibn Maslama (617-662/671) who was to invade Armenia and the entire territory which is now called South Caucasus. At the initial stage, Habib Ibn Maslama subjugated Qaliqala (Karin) then he moved toward Khlat the Armenian governor of which showed up before Ibn Maslama with a document given by a Muslim according to which security (Aman) had been granted to him in return for paying poll tax.[6] This picture can be seen in the course of Ibn Maslama's whole campaign, when Armenian governors would appear before the Arab commander with an "Aman" or surrender to him obtaining it personally from him.[7] In 652-654 the Arab army headed by Maslama reaches Dvin (Dabil) and lays siege to it. His troops were armed with babas (stone throwing machines) which were critical in making Dvin defenders surrender.

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[6] Leo, Collection of Works, p. 309.

[7] Armenians and Arabs (Muslims) signed such contracts still during their first contacts. Different sources, mainly Armenian though, mention that the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem received the first contract of this kind personally from Prophet Mohammed. For more information on the issue see H.Papazyan, Persian Manifestos of Matenadaran, Yerevan, as well as G. Mkrtumyan, On the Issue of Permits Attributed to Prophet Muhammad // Issues of Oriental Studies, v. 4, Yerevan 2001.

According to Balazur, after having captured Dvin, Habib Ibn Maslama granted an "Aman" to the population of the town with the following content:

"In sake of the merciful and compassionate God, this is the script that Habib, son of Mesleme granted to the Christians, fire worshippers [Zoroastrians-H.K.] and Jews of Dabil both present and absent. I have granted you the security of your persons, wealth, churches, temples, and the walls of your town; and you are protected, and we shall keep this alliance unbreakable as long as you are loyal and pay the poll and land taxes.

The God is witness and his witnessing is enough.
Habib, son of Maslama, has signed this alliance with his own hand."[8]

It is noticeable from the agreement that the invaded population has to pay a poll tax (Djiziya); however, acoording to the VIII century Armenian chronicler Ghevond, in this period and up to the establishment of the Abbaside rule in 750, the Djiziya in Armenia was levied not on a per capita but per household (chimney) basis.[9] This situation can be characterized as an incomplete organization of the new tax system implemented on the basis of local peculiarities, as the Armenian highland was one of the first areas included in the expanding system of the Caliphate outside Arabia. According to Tabari, Habib Ibn Maslama granted an "Aman" to the population of Tiflis (Tbilisi) as well, appointing one Dinar Djiziya for each member of the household.[10]

There were cases in Arab-Armenian relations when Armenians themselves came forward with the initiative of signing a contract because of the new political realities they had to face. Catholicos Sahak's letter to the viceroy of Arminia Muhammad Ibn Mrwan (693-709) is an example of this. When the feudal families learned about Muhammad Ibn Mrwan's

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[8] A.Ter-Ghevondyan, The Land-owning Rights of the Armenian Feuadals in VII-IX centuries according to the Caliphate agreements. In Collection of Articles. Yerevan 2003, p. 295; Leo, Collection of Works, pp. 309-310.

[9] Ghevond, History, p. 105.

[10] تاريخ الأمم والملوك لأبو جعفر محمد بن جرير الطبري , بيروت,1387/1967, مجلد 4, ص 162

intentions to collect an army and make a campaign to Armenia, they authorized Catholicos Sahak to negotiate with him; however the Catolicos died halfway leaving a letter for Ibn Mrwan which by its nature was an Aman later accepted by the Arab viceroy.[11] Acception of the Aman meant granting a status of Dzimmi.

In the period at issue the Islamic Law system was in the process of formation and in spite of this, there was an established principle according to which Dzimmis (Ahl Al-Dzimma) did not have the right to serve in the Caliph army or possess their own armed military units.

In this regard, another interesting example is the contract signed between Armenia and Caliphate. According to Sebeos, that contract had the following content:

"Let this alliance of peace between me [Arab general-H.K] and you [Armenians-H.K] last for as many years as you wish. You will not be required to pay taxes for some three years. Then you will pay taxes under oath as much as you wish. Keep a cavalry of 15 thousand and feed it on the resources of your country; I will consider it to be a royal tax. I will not send the cavalry to Assyria; but it should be ready to carry out tasks at any other place I will order. I will not send either Amiras, or multiple cavalry, or even a single mounted Muslim warrior to fortresses. No enemy will enter Armenia; and if Rome attacks you, I will send you auxiliary troops as many as you wish. I swear by the God that I am not lying."[12]

The content of this contract shows that we are dealing with the Aman type contract, however the confusing moment is produced by the willingness of Arabs to allow the Armenians to keep their cavalry as well as indefinite formulations with regard to the collection of taxes.

A.Ter-Ghevondyan, who had a great contribution to the study of Arab sources, especially those related to Armenia, on the basis of his examination of Armenia-related data, came to a conclusion that during VII-

IX centuries Armenia did not stop being an independent (unique?) administrative unit being governed by Armenian governors called "Armenian prince."[13] Governance of Armenia in this way, i.e. by leadership of the Armenian prince and through the feudal families, was obviously beneficial for the Caliphate (except for the periods of uprising), as Armenia would mainly provide the security of its (hence the Caliphate's) frontiers on its own resources. The small yearly donation of 100 thousand silver coins to the Armenian cavalry bespeaks of its symbolic nature.[14]

It can be assumed that the Caliphate made a right evaluation of the situation and, because the system of governance through principalities and feudal families was quite institutionalized in Armenia, an attempt was made to preserve the status quo placing it within the frames of a system known to the Caliphate. Moreover, Armenian prince Teodoros Rshtuni was invited to Damascus and given "golden attires" and a "golden flag"[15] from the governor Muawia, something that reminds of the external features of an independent monarchy.

Ghevond mentions in his work that the Armenian prince and feudals were enjoying privileges unusual for ordinary Dhimmis. More specifically, Ghevond mentions that the governor of Arminia Mrwan Ibn Muhammad organized a campaign to the land of Huns with participation of Armenian feudals headed by Armenian prince Ashot Bagratuni, the campaign resulting in wide success and troops returning with rich booty. According to the established order, Mrwan Ibn Muhammad distributed the booty among his troops, after sending one-fifth of it to the Caliph; the Arab governor gave a share of the booty to the Armenian prince and feudals as well.[16]

Another issue related to the status of Dzimmi refers to the tax policy conducted in regard to Armenians and Arminia in general. Examination of the existing data makes it possible to conclude that in the period between

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[11] Ghevond, History, pp. 35-36.

[12] Sebeos, History, p. 263.

[13] A.Ter-Ghevondyan, "The Armenian Prince" in the Period of the Arab Rule // Collection of Articles. Yerevan, 2003, pp. 92-105.

[14] Ghevond, History, p. 95, and note 98, p. 157.

[15] Sebeos, History, p. 275. A.Ter-Ghevondyan mentions that it was received from the Caliph which is not so unambiguously clear from the text of the source. See A.Ter-Ghevondyan, Emergence of the Title of the Armenian Prince and the Armenian State in VII century // Collection of articles, Yerevan 2003, p. 194.

[16] Ghevond, History, p. 96.

the second half of 7 and first half of 8 centuries, the tax policy of the Caliphate differed from the same policy in other parts of the empire. In the preceding text we have already mentioned about the perception of the poll tax (Djiziya) as a household one.

Stepanos Asoghik mentions that during the governance of Muawia (661-680) Armenia was paying 500 golden coins each year.[17] Insignificance of the amount paid bespeaks of its symbolic nature. For sake of comparison it is noteworthy that in a later period Arminia province along with Georgia and Albania was paying 13 million Dirhems only in money. The tax also included carpets, jewelry, spices, fish and other items.[18] These data themselves show that symbolic collection of taxes in Armenia during the early Arab rule was a sign of Armenia's independence.

To conclude,

• Contracts between Armenians and Arabs were being signed at the initiative of both sides.

• Taxes specified by the contracts were of symbolic nature, and Djiziya was levied from households instead of individuals.

• According to the Islamic law, Armenians were considered Dzimmis. In spite of that, feudal families were enjoying the right of keeping their cavalries; moreover, they were participating in the military operations of the Caliphate and getting their share of booty. Preservation of the institute of the "Armenian prince" in the governance system of the Caliphate was an exceptional phenomenon in its history.

Based on the generalizations mentioned above, an inference can be made that Armenians were the full-fledged members of Umma. This was backed up by various contracts (mainly Aman and Sulh) providing their status of the protected (Dzimmi), notwithstanding the fact that activities of

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[17] Stepanos Taronetsi Asoghik, Universal History. Translation, introduction, and notes by V.H.Vardanyan, Yerevan 2000, p. 172. (in Armenian)

[18] This information is contained in Ibn Khaldun's Mukkadima which was referred to by H. Nalbandyan. See H. Nalbandyan, The Tax Policy of Arabs in Armenia, GI "Bulletin," № 2, 1954, pp. 73-84. (in Armenian)

Armenians were de facto in contradiction with established traditional understanding of rights and obligations of Dhimmis.

ՀՈՎԱՆԱՎՈՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՊԱՅՄԱՆԱԳՐԵՐԻ ԻՍԼԱՄԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՄԱԿԱՐԳԸ ԵՎ ՀԱՅԵՐԸ ՎԱՂ ՈՒՄՄԱՅՈՒՄ

Հայկ Քոչարյան
(Ամփոփում)

Սույն հետազոտությունը նվիրված է վաղ միջնադարում 7-րդ դարի երկրորդ կեսից 8-րդ դարի առաջին կեսն ընկած ժամանակահատվածում հայ-արաբական փոխառնչությունների նոր կազմավորվող համակարգի ուսումնասիրությանը:

Հայերի և Արաբների միջև կնքված պայմանագրերի (ամման սուլհ, ակդ) ուսումնասիրությունը ցույց է տալիս, որ այդ բնույթի պայմանագրերից, որոնք կնքվում էին խալիֆայության այլ ոչ մուսուլման հպատակների հետ, տարբերվում են նրանցում ամրագրված հողահարկի (խառաջ) և գլխավարկի (ջիզիա) չափով: Վերջինս գանձնվում է ոչ թե շնչից, այմ ծխից, ինչը եզակի երևույթ էր այդ ժամանակաշրջանի համար: Մյուս կարևոր հանգամանքը այն է, որ լինելով զիմմիներ, հայ իշխանները իրավունք էին ստանում պահպանել իրենց կայազորը և զգալի քանակությամբ զորք: Նրանք անգամ մասնակցում էին խալիֆաների վարած պատերազմներին և ստանում էին ավարի իրենց մասնաբաժինը: Այս իրավիճակը կարելի է բնութագրել որպես խալիֆայության սոցիալական համակարգում առկա Էլիտայի (խասսա) և հասարակ ժողովրդի (ամմա) հարաբերությունների արտացոլումն Արմինիայի իրականության վրա: Մեկ այլ կարևոր հանգամանք է խալիֆայության համարկարգում "Հայոց իշխանի" ինստիտուտի պահպանումը:

Հետազոտությունը հնարավորություն է տալիս եզրակացնել, որ հայերը եղել են ումմայի լիիրավ անդամներ, ինչն ապահովվել է տարբեր պայմանագրերով (հիմնականում ամման – սուլհ) նրանց հովանավորյալ (զիմմի) կարգավիճակը, չնայած որ նրանց գործունեությունը դե ֆակտո հակասել է իսլամում զիմմիների համար ամրագրված ավանդական պատկերացումներին:

***Alice Eloyan**[1]*

THE STRUCTURAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE KHABARS OF "ANSĀB AL-ASHRĀB"

This article is a textual analysis of the khabars of "Kitāb Ansāb al-Ashrāf," written by 9-th century Muslim historian and genealogist Aḥmad ibn Yahyāal-Balādhurī . It classifies the khabars based on to their content and structure into the following five types:

1. Khabars containing Biblical elements
2. Genealogical khabars
3. Biographical khabars
4. Military khabars
5. Khabars containing miraculous elements

The first type of khabars weave together Biblical tradition and the ancient Arab lore on the extinct legendary tribes. **The second type of khabars** are narrations about a famous person or persons, from this or that forefather, and sometimes have the form of a list. **The third type of khabars** are more narrative, more vivid as they are dedicated to the life or activities of one prominent personality often recalling rather interesting and memorable events from his life. **The fourth type of khabars** detail the military exploits of the Prophet Muhammad or his companions in chronological order. The structure of this type of khabars are more schematic than the former types, but sometimes they also contain poetic praises for the victory or heroic deed of a tribe or a person. **The fifth type of reports** containmiraculous elements in telling about their heroes. These stories typically do not contain poetic passages, nor impart genealogical

information since the key purpose is to record some sort of a miracle, an extraordinary phenomenon, or an event.

The Structural Classification of the khabars of "Ansāb al-ashrāb"

This article is a textual analysis of the work written by nineteenth century Muslim historian and genealogist Aḥmad ibn Yahyāal-Balādhurī (d. 279/892-893) entitled "Kitāb Ansāb al-Ashrāf" ("The Genealogies of Nobles") – hereafter referred to as "Ansāb[2]", to identify new semantic and functional characteristics and expression forms in the context of Arab Muslim written culture, and classify the historical reports,khabars,[3] of "Ansāb" according to their content and structure. I have classified them into five types, each of which uses a distinct set of images and cultural references in order to lend authority to its classification, and each serves a distinct purpose for its audience.

1. Khabars containing Biblical elements
2. Genealogical khabars
3. Biographical khabars
4. Military khabars
5. Khabars containing miraculous elements

The first type of khabars weave together Biblical tradition and the ancient Arab lore about the extinct legendary tribes, such as the Ād, Thamūd, Jurhum, etc. Khabars containing Biblical elements usually are not accompanied by poems: poetic couplets emerge for the first time in the lore about extinct Arabic tribes or pedigree Arabs. At times, these reports are used to lend authority to the lineage of this or that group, by showing that it is more ancient, hence more noble. Here is an example: "Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Jābir said: according to a group of learned men, Noah is the son of Lāniq, the son of Mutūshlakh, the son of Akhnūkh (who is Idrīs).

And it has been said: when Qāīn killed his brother Hābīl, Ādam had another son, named Shīth (Seth). AndĀdam said: this is the gift from Allāh,

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[2] Al-Bāladhurī, Ahmadb.Yahya, Ansābal-ashrāf, vols. XIV ed. M. Hamīdullah 1952-54.
[3] The medieval Arabian texts, as a rule, are not an indivisible narration, but are divided into relatively small sectiouskhabars (literally "news", "message", "information") and each of them is devoted to a separate event, saying, an idea and so on. Fordetailssee:Оганесян Д. А., Хабар в культурном сознании доисламской и раннеисламской Аравии. Всесоюзная конференция по проблемам арабской культуры, М., Наука, 1982.

and Allāh gave another generation instead of Hābīl (Abel), and he was called Seth – gift of Allāh. He told referring to Muhammed ibn Ishāq ibn Yasār, and said:Akhnūkh was called Idrīs, since he was the first to write by pen and study books. He said: and Anūsh was the first to plant a palm-tree and wheat and he spoke with wisdom. And some of Madina's people said: "He is the gift of Allāh for Noah ibn Salikān ibn Muthuba ibn Idrīs, peace upon him, Ibn al-Zāyid ibn Muhalhil ibn Qanān ibn al-Tāhir ibn HabaAllāh ibn Ādam, and it was assumed that it is taken from al-Zuhri. And what was said earlier is more trustworthy and more well-know[4]."

The second type of khabar are narrations not only about Arabs, but also notorious Jews. These khabars usually start with the origin of a famous person from a certain forefather. They are full of aesthetic detail and extraordinary events. They usually focus on man's environment, recording the most unusual, the most extraordinary, and the most rare things. Human characters are not the focus of the narration as they form part and parcel of the world that surrounds them, just as anything else. The protagonist is not focused on himself and is merely part of the larger picture. Here is an example: "The names of famous Jews: they are from Banīal-Nadīr – Hayyay, Mālik, Abū-Yāsir, Judī banuAkhtab. And for them this verse of Quran has been descended from above: "Indeed, those who disbelieve - it is all the same for them whether you warn them or do not warn them - they will notbelieve." To his saying "great punishment.[5]" (Q. 2:6-7).

The name of Sallam's wife is Zeynabbint al-Hārith. She gave to the Prophet of God a poisoned sheep. And Kināna, Rabī', and Rāfi', and AbūRāfi' (his name is Sallām) are the sons of Abūal-Haqīq. And Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf al-Tāī' is from the tribe of Nabhān,ally of the sons of al-Nadīr tribe, and his mother is AqīlabintAbī al-Haqīq.His father had shed the blood of his people and he came to al-Madina. Ka'b was tall in heights, huge, with big belly and a big head. He, who had said on the day of Badr [battle]: "The belly of earth is better than its spine: these are the kings of

men, i.e. the Qurayshits, who have already obtained nobility…"[6]

Such reports usually end in a poetic line which adds aesthetic value to it, while furnishing some additional details. Additionally, they usually contain the author's judgement towards this or that information source. For example: "The sons of Qurayzawere al-Zubayribn BātāIbn Wahb. Ka'abibn Asad. AzālibnShamūīl. Sahl ibn Zaid. Wahbibn Zaid. 'Alī ibn Zaid. Qardam ibn Ka'ab. Rafī' ibn Ramīla, Rafī' ibnHarīmla, he converted to Islam, and about whom the Prophet, may Allāh bless and greet him, said on day of his death: "The greatest of the hypocrites died today".

In my classification, I have used the term "genesis" as a synonym for "genealogy," which is better rendered by the term nasab, i.e. an agnatic genealogical chain expressed in the form of a list or a family tree. This kind of genealogies are of linear nature, expressing the kinship line deriving from the ancestor, while its branches are segmented.

Unlike the described genealogical narrations, "Ansāb" contain list-like genealogies bearing the following structure: "The sons of X – Y and Z." This form of kinship expressed in similar genealogies is traditionally called"external" vs. "internal", which has the following schematic structure: "X's son, Y's son". For example: "The sons of 'Akk ibn ad-Dīth (and the name of 'Akk is "al-Hārith") are al-Shāhid, and Suhār, and his name is Qālib, and Subī'Durj and Qarn, and they are in al-Azd. They say:Qarn ibn 'Akk ibn 'Adnān ibn 'AbdAllāh ibn al-Azd."

The sons of al-Shāhid ibn 'Akk are Ghāfiq and Sā'ida.

The sons of Ghāfiq are Li'sān, and Mālik, and Qiyāta, with al-ta'.

The sons of Suhār ibn 'Akk are al-Samanā, and 'Ans, and Baulān…

The sons of Li'sān ibn Ghāfiq are al-Hūtha, and Aslum, and Akram. And the sons of Akram are Wuā'il, and Riyyān, with al-ra' and Khidrān.

And the sons of Mālik ibn Ghāfiq are Rahna, and Suhār…"[7]

Biographical khabars are more full of narrative detail, more vivid as they are dedicated to the life or activities of a one prominent personality, often recalling rather interesting and memorable events from his life, or his outstanding sayings. These khabars are replete with poetic passages. From

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[4] SeeAnsāb, vol. I, page 3
[5] Qurān, 2:6-7

[6] Ibid, p.284
[7] Ibid, p.14

this perspective, the biographical khabar about AbdAllāh Ibn al-Muqaffa, found in Balādhurī's "Ansāb": "'Abd Allāh b. al-Muqaffa' was from a family of a noble Iranian. His father had entered the service of al-Ḥajjāj, but had gone against him because of money. For that, he was severely beaten and his arm was broken. Hence his nickname, "al-Muqaffa'", i.e. the cripple. He had outsmarted the person beating him and had borrowed money from him. His house was in the city of Basra. In order to educate his son 'Abd Allāh, he used to invite litterateurs, and used to take him to their gatherings. "... One night 'Abd Allāh Ibn al-Muqaffa' entered 'Īsā's house and told him: I want to convert to Islam as my heart has been captured by it, and I hate Zoroastrianism. 'Īsā told him: when the sun rises, I will gather my brothers and some notables, and they will witness your conversion. During the supper later that day, 'Īsā invited 'Abd Allāh to eat, but the latter refused – although he was a good eater – and just drank water. 'Īsā asked him: you are converting to Islam tomorrow, but you only drink water? 'Abd Allāh responded: "I don't want to pass another day following another religion. When the sun rose, he converted."[8]

The fourth type of khabars, military reports, detail the military exploits of the Prophet Muhammad or his companions in chronological order. In these type of khabars, the isnad, or the chain of transmitters, gradually loses its previous significance, which can probably be explained by the overpowering authority of the Prophet who is present in such traditions. These contain much less aesthetic elements. Their focus on minute, seemingly unimportant details seems to be serve the purpose of impressing upon the audience that the story is an accurate representation of the events that have taken place during Prophet's lifetime. "The Prophet, peace and blessing upon him, set out to the campaign of Abwā' in the month of Ṣafar, intending to travel among the Quraysh. He reached the two places, and there is a distance of six miles between them. Having encountered no resistance there, he returned. At this time the governor of Medina was Saʿd

ibn ʿAbada al-Khazrajī. He (the Prophet) was away for fifteen nights[9]."

It is followed by the campaign of Buwāṭ, the author of the story spends considerable time discussing the number of all of the eyewitnesses and the fallen at the battle of Badr each according to their tribal affiliation. Along with the Prophet's campaigns, al-Balādhurī separately lists the prophet's troops, their composition, number, and their accomplishments and respective dates.

The structure of this type of khabars reminds specific statistics since they are more schematic, than the former type of khabars despite that sometimes poetic effusions are found in respect with the victory or heroic deed of a tribe or person.

The fifth type of reports focus on miraculous events. These stories typically do not contain poetic passages, nor impart genealogical information since the key purpose is to record some sort of a miracle, an extraordinary phenomenon or an event. As an example, the following report narrates the events of the famous "Year of the elephant", when the Prophet Muhammad is said to have been born, and when Mecca was saved from an attack by a foreign army by a miraculous swarm of birds sent by God[10]: "Abraha received a giant elephant as a gift, and Abraha ibn al-Ashram set out toward the House (i.e. Kaaba), but when he approached it, the elephant kneeled and did not move. The people poked him with spears but he remained motionless. Then God dispatched birds upon the army, and each of the birds had three stones, which they threw upon the enemy army, killing everyone[11]."

The next khabar concerns the Prophet's miraculous night journey[12]: "It was said: the Prophet was transported by night from the Grand Mosque to the most remote mosque (al-masjid al-aqṣā), which is in Jerusalem, before the Hijra. And it has been reported: the Prophet said 'I was asleep in the mosque of Hijr (a mosque in Mecca), when Jibrail [Gabriel] appeared to me and took me on a journey. He had brought Buraq, and I mounted him. When the Prophet, may God bless and greet him, reached Jerusalem, he was greeted by Ibrahim, Musa, and Isa, peace upon them. He was presented with two cups, one full of

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[8] Ibid, vol.II, pp. 536-537.

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[9] Ibid, vol. I, page 287.

[10] It is detailed in the Qur'anic *Surat al-Fīl*, "the Sura of the Elephant" Quran (105)

[11] Ansāb, p.67-75

[12] See details - Тоникян С.А., Мифологические аспекты сюжетов Корана, Диссертация на соискание ученной степени кандитата филологических наук, Ереван, 2002, стр.100-106.

milk, the other full of wine, he looked at them, took the one with the milk and drank it. It has also been reported that the Quraysh did not believe him. But he stood and told them about the journey and its signs; they asked him questions and made sure that he was telling the truth. And it has been reported: the prophet's soul was transported by night, when he was asleep in his bed[13].

To sum up, al-Balādhūri' was familiar with all the main forms of historical reports developed by the historians of previous generations. Therefore, he did not classify the material of "Ansāb" in chronological order commonly found among Byzantine historians, nor according to royal genealogical trees. He opted for the principle of communicating the genealogical knowledge typical for Arabs. "Ansāb" is like the genealogical literary works with schematic, standard structure focusing primarily on the Prophet Muhammad, his family and the Quraish to which the Prophet himself belonged, and which was considered the elite of Arab noblemen. However, Ansāb also includes information about a number of agnatic noble families, the genealogies and biographies of high ranking officials along with the related events, as well as the genealogical lore on extinct Arab tribes.

«ԱՆՍԱԲ ԱԼ-ԱՇՐԱՖ»-Ի ԽԱԲԱՐՆԵՐԻ ԲՈՎԱՆԴԱԿԱՅԻՆ ՈՒ ԿԱՌՈՒՑՎԱԾՔԱՅԻՆ ԴԱՍԱԿԱՐԳՈՒՄԸ

Ալիս Էլոյան
(Ամփոփում)

Սույն հոդվածը նվիրված է 9-րդ դարի պատմիչ Ահմադ իբն Յահյա իբն Զաբիր ալ-Բալազուրիի *«Գիրք ազնվականների ծագումնաբանության մասին»* (*«Kitāb Ansāb al-Ashrāf»*)-ի խաբարների տեքստաբանական վերլուծությանը: Սույն հոդվածում փորձում ենք դասակարգել խաբարները՝ ըստ բովանդակության և կառուցվածքի՝ վեր հանելով ծագումնաբանական գիտելիքի իմաստային և գործառույթային նոր առանձնահատկություններն ու դրսևորման կերպերը: Մենք առաջարկում

[13] See Ansāb, vol. I, p. 255-257.

Արևելագիտության հարցեր, հ. 15, 2019

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ենք հետևյալ դասակարգումը. 1.Աստվածաշնչային տարրեր ունեցող խաբարներ, 2. Ծագումնաբանական խաբարներ, 3. Կենսագրական խաբարներ, 4. Ռազմական խաբարներ, 5. Հրաշապատումի տարրեր ունեցող խաբարներ:

Առաջին տեսակի խաբարներում ներհյուսված են բուն աստվածաշնչյան և հին արաբական անհետացած ցեղերի (Ադ, Սամուդ, Ջումհուր և այլն) մասին ծագումնաբանական ավանդազրույցները:

Երկրորդ տեսակը՝ ծագումնաբանական խաբարները, պատմումներ են ոչ միայն արաբների, այլ՝ նշանավոր իրեաններ մասին: Նշյալ բաժանումը կատարելիս ի նկատի ենք ունեցել ծագումնաբանական եզրույթի հոմանիշային տարբերակը՝ ծննդաբանություն, որն արդեն խաբար չէ, այլ՝ նասաբ, այսինքն՝ ազնատիկ ծագումնաբանական շղթա՝ արտահայտված ցուցակի կամ տոհմածառի տեսքով՝ արտահայտելով նախախորից եկող ազգակցական գիծը:

Կենսագրական տիպի խաբարները, ի տարբերություն նախորդ ծագումնաբանական խաբարների, պյուժետային են, առավել կենդանի, քանի որ պատմում են որևէ նշանավոր անհատի կյանքի կամ գործունեության մասին:

Չորրորդ տեսակի՝ ռազմական բովանդակությամբ խաբարներում նկարագրվում են Մուհամմադ մարգարեի արշավանքները ժամանակագրական հերթականությամբ (*Ghazawāt Rasūl Allah salā Allah 'alayhim wa salama: Ghazāt ul-Ābwā'*): Այս տիպի խաբարներն իրենց կառուցվածքով հիշեցնում են յուրօրինակ վիճակագրություններ, քանի որ ավելի սխեմատիկ են, արձանագրական, քան նախորդ տիպի խաբարները, թեև երբեմն հանդիպում են նաև բանաստեղծական զեղումներ՝ կապված որևէ ցեղի կամ անձի տարած հաղթանակի կամ հերոսական արարքի հետ:

Հինգերորդ իրաշքի տարրեր պարունակող խաբարներում ներկայացվում են հրաշապատում եղելություններ ու երևույթներ, որոնց կենտրոնում հայտնվում են տվյալ պատմմի հերոսները: Այս տիպի խաբարներին բնորոշ չէ բանաստեղծական ընդմիջարկումը, դրանք ծագումնաբանական տեղեկություններ չեն պարունակում, քանի որ բուն նպատակը որևէ հրաշքի, արտառոց երևույթի կամ իրադարձության արձանագրումն է:

Sona Tonikyan

ON THE PROBLEM OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION IN ISLAM ACCORDING TO YUSUF...

Sona Tonikyan[1]

ON THE PROBLEM OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION IN ISLAM ACCORDING TO YUSUF AL-QARADAWI'S FATWAS

Abstract: The development of science every day brings new challenges to the world, bringing about a variety of issues, including ethical problems which solution is more actual in the societies where the legislative norms are based on the sacred texts. Perhaps the solution of moral and legal problems in the Medicine, as a branch of science, is a priority, since they directly deal with the life and health of thousands of people. One of the most important achievements of the late 20-th and early 21-st centuries is the organ transplantation, that has raised a number of legal and moral issues, which are directly related to the religious norms of a particular society and, on this basis, receive extremely different solutions. In particular, Buddhism accepts only live donor's organ transplantation as a donation, Judaism permits only cadaver's organ transplantation, be condition, that the donor permitted it before his death, and his family has no objections. Most western churches allow transplantation from both living and dead person. The overwhelming majority of Muslim religious scholars permit the transplantation under the conditions that there be life-saving benefit to the recipient, no harm to the living donor, and no commercial exchange.

The article illustrates the subject based on shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi's fatwas, who is one of the prominent Muslim religious scholars, the cofounder and president of the International Association of Muslim Scholars and the European Council for Fatwa and Research.

Transplantation is widely used in various countries where Islamic law is in practice. In particular, Saudi Arabia had the highest reported living kidney donor transplant rate at 32 procedures per million population, followed by Jordan with 29 procedures[2]. The Islamic law considers the issue from different points of view, such as whether the donor is dead or alive, whether the organ to be transplanted is regenerable or not, if it is not regenerable what is the degree of its irreversibility for the donor's life, the degree of admissibility in terms of morality, etc.

Muslim religious scholars are divided into two groups by their position on this subject: negative and positive. The negative position is supported for example by Islamic scholar, former Egyptian minister of Endowments and Muslim jurist Mohamed Metwally Al-Shaarawy, the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman Sheikh Ahmad bin Hamad Al-Khalili, etc.

This article will deal mainly with the positive position supported by the overwhelming majority of individual jurists and juridical organizations. All the *'ulamâ'* of al-Azhar and Dᴀʀ al-Iftâ' have permitted organ transplantation under the conditions that there be life-saving benefit to the recipient, no harm to the living donor, and no commercial exchange[3].

In the fourth conference held in Jeddah in 1988, the Islamic Academy of Justice made a decision[4] that organ transplantation is permissible both from the living and from the dead donor, by the condition that the resulted benefit would be greater than its harm. The Academy's decision only references to the general provisions, emphasizing that the details would be a matter of further study. These details were further touched upon by many religious scholars, among them the shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is one of the most prominent and influential leaders of the centrist Islam ("wasatiyya"). He touched upon this subject in his fatwas[5] as well as in his

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[2] Horvat L.D., Salimah Z. Shariff, Amit X. G. Global trends in the rates of living kidney donation. *Kidney International*, Vol. 75, Issue 10, 2009; p.1088.

[3] Hamdy Sh, The Organ Transplant Debate in Egypt: a Social Anthropological Analysis. *Droit et cultures* [En ligne], 59 | 2010-1, mis en ligne le 06 juillet 2010, consulté le 16 février 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/droitcultures/2184

[4] The decision's text is cited from the following site: هل يجوز في الشريعة الإسلامية التبرع بأعضاء. الجسم عند الموت لمن هو في حاجة إليها ؟ https://islamqa.info/ar/107690

[5] القرضاوي. فتاوى معاصرة. الجزء 2. 2005، صـ.530-540.

book published in 2010 titled "Organ transplantation under the light of Islamic law."

Al-Qaradowi's main point is that saving a life is one of the most noble acts possible, as it is said in Qur'an: "Killing a soul is like the killing of the whole of humanity, and saving a soul is like saving the whole of humanity" (5:32). His views on the issue of transplantation can be summarized in the following paragraphs:

- Charity in Islam is not limited to money, it is also the donation of any part of the body to help others, and it is one of the highest and best types of charity, since the body has higher importance than money.

- Donation of any part of the body is a limited liability, and a person should not devote any part of his body if it would damage him. It follows from the fact that it is impossible to donate organs that are unique organs in the body, such as heart and liver, because human beings can not live without them. They can only be transplanted from the dead donor, except for the brain, its transplantation is forbidden even from dead donor, because the person is not considered dead unless his brain dies. Consequently, brain's transfer is equal to the killing of a man. It is also forbidden to donate external organs, such as eyes, hands, and legs, because the person in that situation eliminates the damage caused to others by causing permanent damage to himself, the latter results in disability and invalidity. The same applies to the inner organs of the body, if one pair does not work or is ill, because it is actually can be considered as a unique organ.

- Organ transplantation is permitted in cases when there is no alternative solution.

- The sale of organs is forbidden, since the human body is not a property to become a subject of trade. However, it is permissible and even commendable if a person who has taken advantage of a donor's body to give it as a gift or a help that has not been mentioned in advance or there was no arrangement on it.

- Prohibition of the sale of organs does not mean that one can not buy organs to transplant them in the patient's body. They are permitted to be purchased not from individuals, but from specialized medical institutions or organ banks.

- Donations can be made to a specific person or any special institution, such as a bank specifically reserved for the organs by its special means to use them if necessary.

- Donation can make an adult, conscious person. It can not make a teenager because he or she does not fully realize his or her own interests. The same applies to the insane people.

- If a person can donate any organ during his lifetime, it is not forbidden for him bequeath his organs' donation after his death.

- The heirs and relatives can also donate some of their dead relative's organs by doing charity instead of them if they did not forbid it during their lifetime. Not only permissible, but also desirable, when people donate the organs of the young infants who were born with diseases incompatible with life.

- It is permissible to donate organs to both Muslims and non-Muslims, but in equal conditions a Muslim has a priority. The organ donated by a Muslim should go first to a Muslim blood-relative, then to a Muslim non-relative and finally to a non-Muslim. One should not donate to a soldier who kills Muslims, who fights against them in the intellectual field, distorts Islam, as well as to a Muslim converted into other religion, who has explicitly declared his conversion.

- As for non-Muslim organ transplantation to the body of a Muslim, human organs appear as tools that he uses according to his faith and lifestyle. If an organ moves from an unbeliever's body to a Muslim's body, it becomes a part of his essence and a tool for fulfilling his mission. For this reason, there is no legal barrier that a Muslim can accept an organ from a non-Muslim body.

- It is also permissible to transplant organs into the human body from non-clean animals. In this regard, Al-Qaradawi notes that the Quranic ban on the pig is related to the eating of its meat, and the transplantation of a part of its body into the human body is not the same as to eat it, but to benefit from it. Meanwhile, the ban on pork in the Quran is comparable to the ban on the use of dead meat, which Prophet Mohammad permitted to benefit from their leather. Therefore, if it is lawful for them to benefit from

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them without eating them, then the same way is legal not to eat the pig, but to get benefits, to use any part of his body.

- It is not permissible to transplant the organs which have hereditary information, such as ovaries and testicles. The transplantation of such organs into someone else's body means that when his offspring are formed in the womb, they will carry the donor's attributes. This is considered a kind of mixed nasab (genealogy), which is prohibited by shari'a. Thus, the child should carry only his own parent's *nasab*.

- It's prohibited to transplant sexual organs as they are parts of the body,which are prohibited to look at and to touch as in the case of both a living and a dead person.

- The prohibition of brain transplantation is also linked to the moral side as the brain is the Organ which is responsible for the mental activity, logic, memoirs and imagination that are the basis of human identity. Consequently, this organ's transplantation in another person's head can lead to distortion of the individual's identity.

Summarizing the above mentioned, we should note that AL-Qaradawi's opinion, of course, is not the only one among the Muslim jurists. For example, there are some fatwas, which say that it is not permissible to transplant the non-renewable parts of the body, stating that all organs in the human body have their specific function even if they are not unique, otherwise God would not create them.

Al-Qaraadawi in his solutions is guided by the principle that the holiness of the human body is higher than the dead one, and as a result he minimizes the obstruction of organ transplantation. He gives positive solutions even to the questions that at first glance contradict the norms in Islam, such as the transplantation of pig's organs into the human body, or the donation of a Muslim's organ to an unbeliever.

ՕՐԳԱՆՆԵՐԻ ՏՐԱՆՍՊԼԱՆՏԱՑԻԱՅԻ ՀԻՄՆԱԽՆԴԻՐՆ ԻՍԼԱՄՈՒՄ ԸՍՏ ՅՈՒՍՈՒՖ ԱԼ-ԿԱՐԱԴԱՈՒԻԻ ՖԵԹՎԱՆԵՐԻ

Սոնա Տոնիկյան
(Ամփոփում)

Գիտության զարգացումն օրեցօր նորանոր մարտահրավերներ է ետևում աշխարհին՝ առաջ բերելով տարատեսակ, այդ թվում՝ նաև էթիկական խնդիրներ, որոնց լուծումն առավել ակտուալ է այն հասարակություններում, որոնց օրենսդրական նորմերն իրենց հիմքում պրրագան տեքստեր ունեն: Բժշկությունը, թերևս, գիտության այն ճյուղն է, որի զարգացման արդյունքում առաջացած բարոյական և իրավական խնդիրների լուծումն առաջնահերթ է, քանի որ դրանք անմիջականորեն կապված են հազարավոր մարդկանց կյանքի և առողջության հետ: 20-րդ դարավերջի և 21-րդ դարասկզբի կարևորագույն ձեռքբերումներից է օրգանների տրանսպլանտացիան, որն առաջ է բերել իրավական և բարոյական մի շարք խնդիրներ, որոնք անմիջականորեն կապված են կրոնքրեն հասարակության կրոնաբարոյական նորմերի հետ և, հենց դրանցից ելնելով, ծայրահեղ տարբեր լուծումներ են ստանում: Մասնավորապես, բուդդայականությունն ընդունում է միայն կենդանի դոնորից պատվաստումը, որն արվում է որպես ևվիրատվություն, հուդայականությունում թույլատրելի է միայն մահացած մարդու օրգանի փոխպատվաստումը, պայմանով, որ նախքան մահանալը նա թույլ է տվել դա անել, և նրա ընտանիքը չի առարկում, իսկ արևմտյան եկեղեցիների մեծամասնությունը դրական են վերաբերվում թե՛ կենդանի, թե՛ մահացած մարդուց որևէ օրգանի տրանսպլանտացիային: Մուսուլման կրոնագետ-իրավագետների ճնշող մեծամասնությունը թույլատրելի է համարում օրգանների փոխպատվաստումը ինչպես կենդանի, այնպես էլ մահացած դոնորից՝ պայմանով, որ դրա արդյունքում ստացված օգուտն ավելի մեծ է լինելու, քան հասցրած վնասը:

Հոդվածում սույն թեմայի ներկայացվում է ըստ մուսուլման նշանավոր կրոնագետ-իրավագետ, «Մուսուլման գիտնականների միջազգային ասոցիացիայի» և «Ֆեթվայի և հետազոտությունների եվրոպական խորհրդի» համահիմնադիր և նախագահ շեյխ Յուսուֆ ալ-Քարադաուիի ֆեթվաների:

Shushan Kyureghyan

"THE DEVIL'S DECEPTIONS IN THE RELEVANCE OF READING THE QURAN...

Shushan Kyureghyan[1]

"THE DEVIL'S DECEPTIONS IN THE RELEVANCE OF READING THE QURAN ACCORDING TO 'IBN AL-JAWZĪ'S "TALBĪS IBLĪS""

At the initial stage of the formation of Islam, a number of sciences were formed, with the need for complete preservation, reliable transmission, accurate reading and interpretation of the scripture. One of these sciences is Quran-reading which is the subject of this study.

The tradition of public reading of the Quran (qirā'ā) was formed during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. The reading was followed by an interpretation of the text, as the believers often came up with questions about the incomprehensible words and phrases in the revelation. In the middle of the 7th century the Quran had a written text, thus being the first book written in Arabic. However, the textual problems related to the Quran have not been met. In the middle of the 7th century, the Arabic writing was imperfect, which created many problems for the reading and understanding of the text, demanding a parallel reading tradition for the written text, which was very diverse in different centers of the Caliphate.

In order to better understand the issues related to the Quran-reading it is necessary to analyze the conversion from the oral knowledge to the written and the reaction of the reading tradition to the official stages of the text fixing process. While speaking about Quranic readings we should take into account that the meaning of this term has changed in between 7th and 13th centuries when Ibn al-Jawzi authored his work Talbīs Iblīs. The term *qirā'ā* was used to indicate both the particular reading of the entire Qur'ān

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(*qirā'ā = reading*) and a special reading of a word or of a single passage of the Qur'ān (*qirā'āt = variants*) and in general to indicate a recitation of single parts or the entire Qur'ān (*qirā'ā = recitation*). Muhammad was the first who recited the Quran. Thus, he was the first qāri and his sermons were the first readings.

The first step of the canonical redaction of Quran was in the mid-7th century after the promulgation of 'Uthmān codex,[2] which was intended to rectify the disagreements on different readings of the revealed text. The Quran's text collection and the distribution of manuscripts in the caliphate centers contributed to the important process of preserving the text. However, the 'Uthmān manuscripts did not have diacritic signs and vowels, which allowed various local readings to have superior position on the official manuscripts.

The next stage is the introduction of the diacritic signs and vowels dating to the late 7th century. Thus, the free choice on the qirā'ā was limited but not entirely forbidden as the complete unification was not achieved. After saving the Quran from physical extermination and the standardization of the text arose the problem of not distorting the scripture. In the first half of the 10th century, Ibn Mujahid (d. 936), the influential reader of Baghdad, brought this process to the logical conclusion by banning the further use of uncanonical readings and recognizing seven readings as canonical[3]. The readers henceforward had to use only the canonical readings. This, however, did not completely rule out the uncanonical deviant (shawādd) readings, which are touched upon by one of the most prominent theologian, preacher, legal scholar and historian 'Ibn al-Jawzī' in his work "Talbīs Iblīs (The devil's deceptions), one of the major works of Hanbali polemic. In this work he launched an attack not only on the various heretical sects, but also on everyone whom he considered responsible for introducing bid'a

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[2] When disputes regarding the correct text of the sacred book arose in the army, threatening the sense of Muslim unity, the caliph 'Uthmān (ruled 644/656) decided to commission an official edition of the Qur'ānic text. That recension came to be known as the 'Uthmānic codex. Gregor Schoeler, *The genesis of literature in Islam: From the Aural to the Read* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 32.

[3] Mustafa Shah, "The Early Arabic Grammarians' Contributions to the Collection and Authentication of Qur'anic Readings: The Prelude to Ibn Mujāhid's Kitb al-Saba," *Journal of Quranic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2004): 85.

(negative innovations) into Sunnism, and of these, particularly, the Muslim mystics.[4]

Devil's Deceptions is of particular importance due to the author's redress in enumerating some of the methods and means used by the devil in deceiving and misguiding mankind from the straight path. According to his explanation talbīs (deception) is to present falsehood in the image of the truth.[5] He has composed it to warn against Iblis's[6] disorder, to frighten people from his afflictions, to unveil what he has hidden and to expose him while he is disguised in his arrogance. The book consists of thirteen chapters (bāb). In this four-hundred-page book there are only two observations (ḏikr) about devil's deceptions on readings and readers. The first part on this topic is "The Devil's Deception of the Reciters" which is included in the chapter "The Devil's Deception of the Scholars" in different divisions of knowledge next to the devil's deceptions of jurists, preachers and storytellers, linguists, poets etc. The second part is called "The Devil's Deceptions regarding Quran Recitation," which is included in the chapter "The Devil's Deception of the Worshipers in their Devotions" next to Deceptions regarding ablution, performing prayer, al-Hajj, al-Saum, etc. Thus, according to the author the readers are considered as scholars, reading is considered as 'ibāda.

It is noteworthy that all the deceptions in both chapters are not systematized by the author. The deceptions on readers and readings can be classified in three main sections: deceptions regarding the reading content (1), reading order (2) and deceptions regarding the behavior and etiquette of the reader (3). The deceptions on the reading content are mainly related to the use of false, non-valid or irregular readings instead of using the agreed upon modes. These are readings that contradict the Uthman

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[4] Dapha Ephrat, "Ibn al-Jawzi", in *Medieval Islamic Civilization*, ed. Josef W. Meri (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 345.

[5] 'Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbīs Iblīs* (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam), 38.

[6] The devil is known under two designations in the Quran: Iblis, used always as a proper name, and *al-shaytan*, originally a generic designation but with the definite article used as a proper name as well. Stefan Wild, "Devil," in *The Quran: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 179.

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manuscripts, do not have a reliable chain of transmitters (isnād) and may have contradictions with arabiyya.[7] They (the reciters) spend most of their lives on collecting these versions, classifying and teaching them to others. They do this to the point that they miss out performing their obligations and responsibilities. Sometimes an Imam may be fluent at recitation but not well versed in what invalidates the prayer. The author also presents the necessary conditions to avoid irregular readings: Had these people (readers) contemplated, they would have realized that the objective is to memorize the Quran (1), to check its words (2), to realize it (3), then to act upon it (4), then accept what improves the soul and cleans morality (5), and then to move onto other Sharia sciences (6). [8] One of the worst deceptions is to waste time on something else. Thus, 'Ibn al-Jawzī indirectly presents the necessary preconditions or rules for valid readings.

The rest of the deceptions in this group refer to linguistic inaccuracies, as a result of which the content of the Quran can be distorted. One example is the reciting of the same word but from different versions: maliki, māliki and malāki. This is not permissible because it goes against the flow of the Quran. The recitation of all verses with unnecessary sajdas (performing an extra prostration at the recitation of certain quranic passages) and tahlilat (this is a form of dzikr by uttering sentence- lā ilāha illa llāh), and takbirat (saying *Allāhu akbar*) is also disliked.

The next group presents the inadmissible actions during a reading which are again performed under the devil's deceptions. The author mentions: "*Also, some of them burn many candles (to light up the place in which they are reciting Quran). This is a waste of money and imitation of the Zoroastrians, and a cause for women and men to gather in the night in a manner causing mischief*".[9] Iblis makes them think that this is a form of glorification of Islam, when, in fact, glorification of Islam is achieved by implementing its rules.

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[7] For the Arab-speaking community, the term al-'arabiyya expresses the commonality of Arabic and its related texts (luğāt, lahajāt). In this context it is used to show clear and pure Arabic (al-'arabiyya al-fusha). Yasir Suleiman, "Arabiyya," in *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, ed. Versteegh, Kees, (Leiden, Brill, Vol. 1, 2006), 604-606.

[8] Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbīs Iblīs*, (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam), 109.

[9] Ibid., 110.

Shushan Kyureghyan

"THE DEVIL'S DECEPTIONS IN THE RELEVANCE OF READING THE QURAN...

Some readers (muqri) also follow two and three reciters at the same time. It is impossible to comprehend all of these recitations simultaneously. Then he boastfully writes that he has read from one and the other. Here the term *"muqri'"* has been used instead of more applicable word *"qārī"*. The term *muqri* (pl. *muqri'un*) is used for a proficient and usually professional reciter of the Qur'an.[10]

Another example is that some reciters compete to see who recites more in one day. I (the author) have seen some of them reciting the entire Qur'an three times in one long day. Iblis deceives them to believe that there is reward in this and fault in not doing this[11]. In fact, recitation must be for Allah's sake not for being praised for it by others, and it must be done slowly. Here are two ayats from Quran which confirm this. Allah (the Mighty and the Majestic) said: "لتقرأه على الناس على مكث" which means "that you might recite it (Quran) to the people over a prolonged period (al-Isra' 17: 106). And said: "ورتل القرآن ترتيلا", i.e. "and recite the Qur'an with measured recitation (Al-Muzammil 73:4). The other evidence is that the Prophet said: "لا يفقه من قرأ القرآن في اقل من ثلاث" which means that no one properly understands who reads the Quran in less than three days.[12]

Another example of such errors is when some readers innovate methods of recitation according to melodious rhythms. Ahmad ibn Hanbal disliked this method of recitation. Al-Shafii said: Listening to the songs of desert Arabs is permissible, and so is its reciting in accordance with rhythms and a beautiful voice[13]. This does not mean that one can use musical rules during recitation. The closer the recitation goes to singing, the more disliked this action becomes. And if it becomes excessive to the point of taking the Quran outside of what it is meant for, then this is prohibited.

The third group of Devil's Deceptions toward the Reciters is more closely related to the reader's etiquette. One example is when some reciters

commit different sins, such as back-biting. They may even commit bigger sins thinking that memorization of the Qur'an would alleviate punishment. This is also from Devil's Deception of them, as the punishment of a knowledgeable person for committing sins will be more severe than that of an unknowledgeable person because the added knowledge increases a person's liability. Another example of the devil's deceptions is that some reciters climb on the minaret at night and start to recite the Quran with loud voices. They harm people by not letting them sleep well under the devil's deception.

Thus, even after the final standardization of the Quran there were questions and disagreements on how to read the revealed text and what should a good reciter do. The 13th century outstanding theologian 'Ibn al-Jawzī' as a defender of true faith has discussed this issue in his work "Talbīs Iblīs" by presenting reading and readers' mistakes as devil's deceptions. The analyzes of the given topic allowed us to classify the deceptions on readers and to define which readings are considered valid according to 'Ibn al-Jawzī'.

ՍԱՏԱՆԱՅԻ ԽԱԲԵՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ ՂՈՒՐԱՆԻ ԸՆԹԵՐՑՄԱՆ ՀԱՐՑՈՒՄ ԸՍՏ ԻԲՆ ԱԼ-ՋԱՈՒՉԻԻ «ԹԱԼԲԻՍ ԻԲԼԻՍ» ԱՇԽԱՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ

Շուշան Կյուրեղյան
(Ամփոփագիր)

Իսլամական համայնքի ընդլայնումն ու առկա գիտելիքի ծավալի մեծացումը 7-րդ դարի կեսից արդեն անխուսափելիորեն ազդում էին ինֆորմացիայի բանավոր տարածման վրա՝ դարձնելով այն գրեթե անվերահսկելի: Անիրաժեշտություն է առաջանում գրի առնել առկա գիտելիքը, ինչի արդյունքում ինֆորմացիայի հավաքման, մշակման, պահպանման և հաղորդման համակարգը փոխվում է: 7-րդ դարի կեսերին Ղուրանն ունեցավ գրավոր տեքստ, այդպիսով դառնալով արաբերենով գրի առնված առաջին գիրքը: Սրանով, սակայն, Ղուրանի հետ կապված տեքստաբանական խնդիրները չավարտվեցին

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[10] Asma Afsaruddin, "Qur'an, Reciters and Recitation," in *Medieval Islamic Civilization*, ed. Josef W. Meri (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 659.

[11] Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbīs Iblīs,* (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam), 110.

[12] Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbīs Iblīs,* (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam), 138.

[13] Ibid., 111.

և Ղուրանի ընթերցման միասնական ձև չամրագրվեց: Ղուրանի ընթերցման խնդիրները չվերացան նաև տեքստի վերջնական միօրինակացման և Ղուրանի ընթերցման հատակ գիտակարգի ('ilm al-qirā'āt) ձևավորումից հետո:

Հոդվածի նպատակն է ուսումնասիրել և վերլուծել վերոնշյալ խնդիրները և ստանձնայի խարդավանքները Ղուրանի ընթերցման հարցում ըստ սուննիական իսլամի հանրայիական դպրոցի ներկայացուցիչ Իբն ալ-Ջաուզիի «Թալբիս Իբլիս» ստեղծագործության: «Թալբիս Իբլիսը» հանրայիականության հիմնարար աշխատություններից է, որում հեղինակը պաշտպանում է Սուննան վնասակար նորարարություն ներմուծողներից: Հոդվածում նախ փորձ է արվում ուրվագծել ընթերցման ավանդույթի զարգացումը և դրա փոփոխությունները, ապա քննարկվում են Իբն ալ-Ջաուզիի՝ վստեր ընթերցման և վստահելի ընթերցողներին առաջադրվող պայմանները:

Svante Lundgren[1]

THE ASSYRIAN LOBBYING AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE – MYTHS AND REALITY

Keywords: Assyrians, Paris Peace Conference, Ottoman genocide, Assyro-Chaldean delegation

After the end of the First World War – during which some 300,000 Assyrians were killed in a genocide which the Assyrians today call *Seyfo* (the Syriac word for "sword") – Assyrians from different countries travelled to Paris in order to lobby the victorious powers at the Peace Conference on the subject of the compensation that should be paid to the Assyrian – or, as they put it, the Assyro-Chaldean – people for its losses. Their basic demand was a free Assyria under a mandatory power (France or Britain). In the end, nothing of what the Assyrians wanted was effected: no independence, no autonomy, no freedom from the "Muslim yoke".

There are some popular notions among Assyrians about what happened in Paris, which not exactly correspond with reality. Contrary to the popular conception of a unified effort to further a common cause, the lobbying suffered from internal division. There were not one, but several Assyro-Chaldean delegations present at the Paris Peace Conference and although they attempted to coordinate their activities and speak with one voice, there was serious division among them: geographical and denominational differences caused conflicts and the personal chemistry between the delegates was not good. The fact that the lobbying was not successful created among Assyrians much bitterness and a sense that they were betrayed by the Allies, especially by the British. In fact, however, the internal division contributed to the failure, and the promises about a free Assyria were not as unequivocal as many suggest. The claim that the British in 1917 promised independence for the Assyrians, its "smallest

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ally", is not supported by contemporary documents concerning these events.

The Ottoman genocide during the First World War did not affect the Assyrians of the Empire to the same extent as the Armenians, who undoubtedly were the primary target of the genocidal policies; nonetheless, Assyrians also suffered immense losses as a result of massacres and deportations. After the war, the Assyro-Chaldean delegations to the Paris Peace Conference calculated that 250,000 Assyrians lost their lives in what is nowadays called *Seyfo*, the Syriac word for "sword". Scholars have since shown that the delegations failed to count some victims and therefore the estimate of the total number of Assyrians killed has risen to about 300,000.[2] After the end of the war many Assyrians travelled to Paris in order to lobby the victorious powers at the Peace Conference for a free Assyria.

There are some popular notions, or maybe myths, among Assyrians about what happened in Paris. In this paper, I look at three claims in particular, and how they correspond with reality.

Was there an Assyro-Chaldean delegation at the Peace Conference?

It is a widely held belief that an Assyro-Chaldean delegation, led by Archbishop (later Patriarch) AphremBarsoum, was present at the Conference and lobbied the victorious powers at the Peace Conference on the subject of the compensation that should be paid to the Assyrian – or, as they put it, the Assyro-Chaldean – people for its losses.

This notion is not wrong, but neither is it correct. Firstly, there was not one, but several Assyrian or Assyro-Chaldean delegations at the Conference;[3] exactly how many is not easy to establish. The French historian Sébastien de Courtois, whose research focuses on church leaders,

claims that there were three delegations: a Syriac Orthodox, led by Barsoum, a Syriac Catholic, led by Patriarch Ignace Ephrem II Rahmani, and finally an Assyro-Chaldean "lay delegation" of people from the diaspora who also turned up.[4]

This is a very strange statement. Barsom and Rahmani were, indeed, present at the conference, but did not head any "delegations". What de Courtois calls a "lay delegation" were in fact four different delegations from the USA, Constantinople, Iran (Urmia) and the Caucasus respectively. Furthermore, while mentioning the "Syriac" clergymen at the Conference, de Courtois fails to note that the Patriarch of the Chaldean Church, Josef Emmanuel II Thomas, also spent some time at the Conference.[5]

Secondly, the Assyrian or Assyro-Chaldean delegates or delegations were not formally included in the Peace Conference as this right was assigned only to recognized states or political units which had been "received into the family of nations", as the expression went. This was also the case with the two Armenian delegations present at the Conference.[6] The Assyrian delegates therefore promoted the Assyrian cause in informal meetings with representatives of the Great Powers.

Did the different fractions among the Assyrians unite in Paris?

In modern times Assyrians have been internally divided, with different fractions opposing each other vehemently at times. The lobbying at the Paris Peace Conference has been seen as one occasion where the people stood united.

This notion also lies somewhere between truth and falsity. Undoubtedly there were declarations of unity. The delegation from Constantinople represented the Assyro-Chaldean National Council, which

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[2] David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia During World War I* (Piscataway, New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2006), 300-303.

[3] Even scholars who know the truth adjust their vocabulary to the established assumption. Donefuses the term "the Assyrian delegation" in the singular although he admits that it "was not a single cohesive entity". (RachoDonef, "The Assyrian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference", in *The Assyrian Genocide. Cultural and Political Legacies*, ed. Hannibal Travis (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 217.)

[4] Quoted from the Swedish translation: Sébastien de Courtois, *Det glömda folkmordet: Österns kristna, de sista araméerna* (Südertälje: Syrisk Ortodoxa Kyrkans Ungdomsfürbund, 2015), 256.

[5] It is in fact impossible to make a definitive list of Assyrians acting as representatives of their people, as numerous individuals visited Paris and London to promote the Assyrian cause during the Conference.Donef has given a list of 19 in total, but admits that there is some uncertainty concerning a few names.(Donef, "The Assyrian delegation", 221-223)

[6] Richard Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia. Volume I. The First Year, 1918-1919* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 255-257.

had been formed in February 1919 after Syriac-Orthodox, Chaldeans and Syriac Catholics had united and "declared their basic political and national unity under the name 'Assyro-Chaldeans'". In practice, however, the Assyro-Chaldean National Council in Istanbul was a Catholic organization.[7]

The delegates tried to coordinate their work; however, there was soon serious division among them. They tried to speak with one voice, representing the whole Assyro-Chaldean people but, ultimately, geographical and denominational differences caused conflicts. One source of division concerned the name of the people. Most, but not all, of the delegates preferred the term "Assyro-Chaldean". Another source of disagreement concerned which state should be Assyria's mandatory power: the Nestorians, who had strong ties to the Church of England, preferred Britain, and the Chaldeans, France. Some of the delegations, especially those from Caucasia and Persia, focused exclusively on the interests of Assyrians in their own region, whereas others tried to take into consideration the people in its entirety.[8]

There was a will to work together and a rhetorical unity. In reality, however, there was serious division among the delegates.

Did the Allies betray the Assyrians?

The Assyrian delegates demanded a free Assyria under a mandatory power (Britain or France). Although encountering a lot of sympathy from the delegates of the Great Powers, ultimately nothing of what the Assyrians wanted was effected. Among Assyrians, therefore, there is a strong sense of bitterness, of having been betrayed. This feeling is especially directed against the British.[9]

It is a fact that the Great Powers did not give the Assyrians what they wanted. This was mainly because the situation on the ground changed, and Britain and France had other plans for Iraq and Syria, but also because the Assyrians were not united in their claims and furthermore made claims that were unrealistic. They presented a map of the projected Assyria, insisting that there was an Assyrian majority in the population within this territory. The Allied delegates were skeptical about that, with good reason, and even Abraham K. Yoosuf, an Assyrian delegate from the USA, had to admit that "at present you cannot expect a majority after massacres, deportations and immigration".[10]

The bitterness against Britain is based on the assumption that British officials made promises in 1917 to the Nestorian Assyrians in Urmia, Persia, that if they fought alongside the British they would be granted freedom, autonomy or independence, after the war. The Assyrians fought bravely, but were betrayed by the British.[11] The British, however, deny ever having given such promises. They urged the Assyrians to fight for the Allied cause and promised to help them, but never promised independence or anything like that. The person who supposedly made the promise was Captain George Gracey, who twice visited Urmia in late 1917 in order to convince the Assyrians there to join the British war effort. He was instrumental in creating the Syrian Central National Committee. The committee wrote a petition to the Allies in May 1918 in which it reminded the Allies of the promise to arm the Assyrian battalion; the petition did not, however, say anything about any promise of autonomy or independence.

Nor is there any mention of such a promise in any Assyrian document dating from 1918 or 1919. Indeed, the first time it comes to light is in 1920. Gracey himself denied ever having given any promise about autonomy or independence, emphasizing that he did not have the authority to make such pledges.[12]

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[7] Claire Weibel Yacoub, *Le Rêve brisé des Assyro-Chaldéens. L'introuvable autonomie* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2011), 118-131.

[8] See, e.g., Abraham K. Yoosuf, *Assyria and the Paris Peace Conference*, ed. Tomas Beth-Avdalla (Mulndal: Nineveh Press, 2017), 92-95.

[9] The prominent American-Assyrian, David B. Perley, wrote that "the British broke every promise they had made and abandoned the Assyrians to their sad fate." (David B. Perley, *A Collection of Assyrian Writings*, ed. Tomas Beth-Avdalla (Mulndal: Nineveh Press, 2016), 537).

[10] Yoosuf, *Assyria*, 118.

[11] So, e.g., Sargon O. Dadesho, *The Assyrian National Question at the United Nations (A Historical Injustice Redressed)* (Modesto, California: own publishing, 1987), 52-57.

[12] Florence Hellot-Bellier, *Chroniques de massacres annoncés: Les Assyro-Chaldéens d'Iran et du Hakkari face aux ambitions des empires (1896-1920)* (Paris: Geuthner, 2014), 496-506.

Nevertheless, among Assyrians it has become a well-established truth that the British promised a free Assyria but later betrayed the Assyrians, their "smallest ally".

Conclusion

Many truths nurtured by our collective memory stand on not-so-solid ground. We tend to look at our own history in a glorified light in which the elements we want to remember are emphasized and the ones we want to forget are played down or forgotten. Assyrians have for almost a century told stories of being victims of genocide, of uniting to demand justice after the First World War, and of ultimately being betrayed by the Allies, especially the British. These stories are not wrong, but the reality was – as often is the case – more complex than these claims would have it.

ԱՍՈՐԱԿԱՆ ԼՈԲԲԻՆ ՓԱՐԻԶԻ ՎԵՀԱԺՈՂՈՎՈՒՄ. ՄԻՖԵՐ ԵՎ ԻՐԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ

Սվանտե Լունդգրեն
(Ամփոփում)

Հոդվածում ուրվագծվում է Առաջին համաշխարհային պատերազմի ավարտին կայացած Փարիզի վեհաժողովի ընթացքում ասորական լոբբիի գործունեությունը, մասնավորապես ներկայացվում են Առաջին համաշխարհային պատերազմի տարիներին 300 000 ասորիների կյանք խլած ցեղասպանության (Seyfo) վկաների փոխհատուցման պահանջները, որոնցից և ոչ մեկը չբավարարվեց: Ասորական լոբբի անհաջողության հիմնական պատճառների շարքում մատնանշվում են ասորական տարբեր պատվիրակությունների միջև առկա անհամաձայնությունները ու տարակարծությունները, միասնականության բացակայությունը: Պահանջների մերժման համատեքստում քննության են առնվում ասորական համայնքների մոտ վեհաժողովի և դրա որոշումների շուրջ ձևավորված ընկալումները, ուսումնասիրվում է դրանցում իրականության և միֆի միահյուսումը:

Lilit Safrastyan[1]

BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE READING OF THE EXILE EXPIRIENCE OF IRANIAN WRITER GOLI TARAGHI

Keywords: *Iran. exile, fiction, past, migration, culture, pain, expirience.*

Exile is not a particular recent phenomenon in Persian literature history. Long before the 1979 revolution many Iranian writers had been forced into or chosen exile (f.e., to name a few, Mirza Malkum Khan, Abdul-Rahim Talibuff and Muhammad Ali Jamalzadeh), but emergence of literature body, which is at once the product and the expression of Iranian exile is unique to the pastdecade[2].

After the Islamic Revolution like thousands of other emigrants, a famous writer Goli Taraghi has been expelled from the homeland. "Exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience. It is inhalable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home. Its essential sadness can never be surmounted. And while it is true that literature and history contain heroic, romantic, glorious, even triumphant episodes in an exile's life, there are no more efforts meant to overcome the crippling sorrow of estrangement"[3].

A new home for Goli Taraghi, the first shelter to live in far away from the motherland becomes the Ville d'Avray, a psychiatric clinic near Paris. "I am sick and I don't know the exact name of this sickness"[4].

It should be noted that Paris has become the last place for alienation and suffering for many Persian writers. Short before his death Sadegh Hedayat wrote to Jamalzadeh in 1947. "I'm very tired and luck of interest

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[2] Rahimieh N., The Quince-Orange Tree, or Iranian Writers on Exile.-World Literature Today, Vol. 66, No.1 (Winter, 1992), p. 39.
[3] Said E., Reflections on Exile and Other Essays, London: Granta, 2001, p. 173-174.
[4] Taraghi G., The First Day, Author's Note.-Words Without Borders, August 2008, http://www.wordswithoutborders.org/article/the-first-day (09.03.2019)

of everything ..."[5]. Paris is also the final place of suffering and illness for the famous playwright Gholam-Hossein Saedi.

"When I first arrived in Paris, ... exile was Janus-faced. It was not algia, It was in algia. It was nos "the yearning for home", pushing its way in to my life. I died in Paris in 1985. I lie in Pere-Lachaise cemetery exactly eleven graves away from Marcel Proust, and six graves away from Sadegh Hedayat, the founder of modern Persian fiction, who killed himself in Paris in 1951. He left his country, to kill himself in another country. No nos, no algia. The end of home, the end of exile"[6].

The story "The First Day" is dedicated to the problems of migration, extinction, contradictions of human existence, the definition for a place in a foreign world for a young ingenious woman and single mother. In the preface of thethe english translation of "The First Day"Taraghi writes:

"I left Iran in 1979, the year of the Islamic Revolution, and settled in Paris with my two small children. I was naïve enough to think that the chaotic upheaval of the beginning eventually would settle into normal life, and I could return. I was finally hospitalized in a psychiatric clinic. Taking the right medication restored my mental stability and helped me to overcome my dreadful anxieties, but what came to my rescue and pulled me out of the dark well of depression was the magical force of literature"[7].

As M. Hron remarks: "Translating pain considers how writers may create effective intersemiotic translations of their immigrant suffering, given the constraints of language culture, genre and the assumptions of the target audience. ...There is various rhetorical strategies that Taraghi might employ to convey her sufferings of exile. Although the rhetorical strategies .are idiosyncratic and certainly culturally contextual , the rhetoric of body ,

the cultural translation of beliefs, values or myths and the role of silence, humour and allusion-are germane to numerous texts"[8].

F. Milani writes: "The autobiographical narrative about the mental illness, depression is rare in Iranian literature, and Taraghi's description of her experience is unique. This list of depression, isolation, exile, suicide, death penalty and premature death is painful"[9]. The names of the authors that wrote about their depression and suicide attempts such as Tahereh Qurrat al Ayn, Zan Dhokht Shirazi, P. Etessami, Taj al -Saltanah, F. Sayahi, F. Farrokhzad, Gh. Alizade, P. Eskandari, as well as M. Amirshahi, G. Taraghi, Sh. Parsipur are mentioned.

The author's memoirs in the unity of happiness, painful and tragic days, remind the real characters, i.e. relatives, who are depicted in the dense colors of love and loss. Memoirs are one of the most recurrent forms to have emerged in the Iranian Diaspora, that J. Darznik calls "return narratives"[10].

"I wanted to write about my father, Shamirran street, our home, my pretty and gentle mother, who loved to dress like the European women, about my old-fashioned aunts who always were wearing the kerchiefs and praying honestly ... These were not sweet memories of the past, but the efforts to recreate the world that had not existed anymore"[11].

As rightly T. Bhabha remarks: "The imaginary of spatial distance - to live somehow beyond, the borders of our time - throws into relief, the temporal, social differences that interrupt our collusive sense of cultural contemporaneity"[12].

The collections of short stories, published in post-revolutionary years, "Scattered Memories" (1990), "Another Place"(2001) and "The Two Worlds"(2002) are distinguished with their exceptional thematic and ideological orientation. Here the author portrays the internal pain of a

[5] Katouzian H., Sadegh Hedayat: His Work and His Wondrous World, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 4.

[6] Baraheni R., Exilic Blindness: The Unwritten Autobiography of a Dramatist in Paris Posthumously Dictated to a Friend.-Modern Drama, Volume 46, Number 1, Spring, 2003, pp. 117- 118.

[7] Taraghi G., The First Day, Author's Note.-Words Without Borders, August 2008, http://www.wordswithoutborders.org/article/the-first-day (09.03.2019)

[8] Hron M., Translating Pain: Immigrant Suffering in Literature and Culture, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2009, p. xvii.

[9] Milani F., Words Not Swords: Iranian Women Writers and Freedom of Movement, New York: Syracuse, 2011, pp. 183- 184.

[10] Darznik J., The Perils and Seductions of Home: Return Narratives of the Iranian Diaspora - MELUS, 33(2), 2008, p. 56.

[11] Taraghi G., Do donya, Tehran: Nilufar, 2002, p. 11-27.

[12] Bhabha T., K., The Location of Culture, London and New York: The Routledge, 1994, pp. 6-7.

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Persian woman living away from her homeland, and the difficulties she meets protecting national, religious and cultural identity in the new reality. Taraggi's stories exhibit so many of the characteristic features of the Persian literature of exile and in such dense concentration, that they can be viewed as representative of the whole trend[13].

Many literary critics, including A. Dehbashi, n the articles devoted to G.Taraghi depict the writer's works as emigration literature[14].

"Goli Taraggi's fiction is singularly reflective of contemporary life in Iran or the lives of Iranians living abroad"[15]. According to Iranian literary critics, Iranian emigration literature is an inseparable part of the contemporary Iranian literature. A. Saifi in his article "The Iranian publication abroad" writes: "The history of modern Iran cannot be narrated without this branch of Iranian literature"[16].

In 1998 the outstanding movie master and director D. Mehrjui made the film "Derakhte Golabi"("The Pear tree") based on the homonymous story by G.Taraghi. In G.Taraghi's works of the pre-revolutionary period[17], women are absent, and the thematic emphasis is on the Middle Aged Tehcran inhabitants' joys and sufferings, which are perhaps universal though presented inside the Iranian circle[18].

In 2013 in the interview for the «NPR» American radio station while speaking about the English translation of "Anar banu va pesar-hayash" ("The Pomegranate Lady and her sons"), the writer mentions: "Usually, I go to Iran to find a story to write about. Because Iran is so absurd, so contradictory, whenever I go I find something to write about and I have a character... to enter into a new story. Anar Banu is one of them. I met her at the airport and she was asking everybody, "Where is Sweden? Where is Sweden?"[19].

In the works by Taraghi, always two worlds exist that connect the past with the present and the west with the east by their spiritual and physical presence:

"Most of my life I have lived between two worlds. I left Iran in 1979, at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution. And since then my life has become a perpetual journey between Paris and Tehran, from one reality to another. Naturally, this dual existence has marked my literary imagination. As an immigrant living in Paris I have come to know a lot of exiled Iranians who cannot go back home. Their longing and hidden anxieties have become a theme of several of my stories. "Exile" in itself, as a human condition, is a phenomenon that can be questioned from different angles"[20].

The only way to avoid the emptiness of emigration and alienation is to inhabit in the sweet embrace of the past where the memories of the childhood become newly comprehended. E. Saidi defines: "For a man who no longer has a homeland, writhing becomes a place to live"[21].

The exciting story "Shamirran's bus" is about a little girl, who during Tehran endless winter is waiting for the return of migrated birds. Parisian winter reality and Tehranian "lost paradised" thoughts are correlated with one another. Parisian snow outlined the grandmother's portrait with her

[13] Nanqutte L., Persian Literature of Exile in France: Goli Taraggi's Short Stories.- Familiar and Foreign: Identity in Film and Literature, ed., Manani M., Thomson V., Athabasca University Press, 2015, p. 174.

[14] Jafari A. M., Pourjafari F., The Study of Goli Taraghi's Fiction in the Light of Migration Literature Theory - Galaxy: International Multidisciplinary Research Journal, Vol. 2, Issue VI, November 2013, p. 7.

[15] Faridoun F., Ghanunparavar M. R,. "Portraits in Exile in the Fiction of Esma'il Fasih and Goli Taraghi".- Iranian Refugees and Exiles since Khomeini, ed. Fathi A., Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1997.- p. 293.

[16] Jafari A. M., Pourjafari F., The Study of Goli Taraghi's Fiction in the Light of Migration Literature Theory - Galaxy: International Multidisciplinary Research Journal, Vol. 2, Issue VI, November 2013, p. 2.

[17] Goli Taraghi began her writing career with a collection of short stories entitled I Am Che Guevara Too in 1969. Her first novel, Winter Sleep, was published in 1973 and has been translated into English and French.

[18] Farrokh F., Introduction - Taraghi G., A Mansion in the Sky, Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Univ., of Texas, 2003, p. 1.

[19] «Pomegranate Lady» Depicts the Comedy and Tragedy of Exile - NPR Books, December 07, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/12/07/249237327/pomegranate-lady-depicts-the-comedy-and-tragedy-of-exile (07.03.2019)

[20] Mozzafari N., Between Two Worlds: An Interview With Goli Taraghi.- Words Without Borders, November, 2013, http://www.wordswithoutborders.org/article/between-two-worlds-an-interview-with-goli-taraghi (09/03.2019)

[21] Said W. E., Intellectual Exile: Expatriates and Marginal - Representations of the Intellectual, The 1993 Reith Lectures, New York: Vintage Books, 1994, p. 58.

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misguided eyes, who used to say that "the angels are the sanctuaries of the house"[22].

Although the author avoids the experiment, her stories are full of stylistic freshness and deep emotion. Taraghi's stories, partly autobiographical, are knotted with controversial phenomena of sorrow and laughter, tradition and modernity, longing and forgetfulness.

The author continues the themes related to the ideological preservation of cultural and national identity in the story "Madame Gorg" ("The Wolf Lady"). It is an episode from Taraghi's life that depicts a difficult start of a young Persian woman and her two children who live in one of the Parisian districts to adapt to the European customs, mentality and the way of life.

"Life in emigration in Paris is full of troubles, as well as guilt that a foreigner has come from the other side of the world and seized the place of the aborigines ... and the inner mockery that bites and calls for revenge, and the selfishness that has the history of two thousand five hundred years...," the author meditates[23].

In this story, built on the principle of allegory and grotesque, G.Taraghi especially emphasized the character of the French landlady whom the author ironically calls "Madam Gorg". For Madam Gorg who differs a lot from the French buckish females the Eastern customs, mentality and warmth were wild. She was not capable to perceive the suffering and insatiable thirst of a young Persian woman for her native home and relatives.

The mass exodus of Iranians after the 1979 Islamic revolution has produced a diaspora burdened with certain cultural and national ambivalences... In the diaspora, not only they faced with the distance of their roots as well as the legacy of that glorious past, but also they suddenly found themselves and their country misrepresented[24]. The author describes a young woman who with her little children occur in an exile, longing for

human warmness, and who were seized from the "grandmother, aunt and a whole world of love and grooming and deported into this cold, sad and loveless world".

In the story "Madam Gorg", Taraghi focuses on the national pride and self-dignity of the Persian woman, who, in spite of the pain, was humbly trying to bear the ingrained odd customs of the new reality. As the author noted: "Especially me, an Iranian, is accused for unknown reasons and found guilty beforehand, have no right to protest"[25].

In Taraghi's narration, a particular attention is drawn to the theme of maternity, which is one of the manifestations of the author's exceptionally delicate creation. According to Taraghi: "I have one story which is not included in this collection, but I hope one day also will be included. It's called, "The Flying Mothers". A lot of Iranian mothers are the victims, the real victims, of the revolution because children — they had to leave. And they couldn't take the grandmothers or mothers with them"[26].

One of such stories is "A Mansion in the Sky", published in the collection "The Scattered Memoirs" in 1990. Here the author discusses the spiritual and physical problems of the exile of an old mother who has been expelled due to the selfish search of her children during the Iran-Iraq war nightmarish years. Mahin Banu like many other elderly people became a "wanderer gypsy" during Iran-Iraq war who would never again be destined to see her own dear home.

Like any Iranian mother, Mahin Banu with the maternal desire not to hurt her children and cause any inconvenience to them suffered much from not being able to adapt the foreign reality and from the longing for the native land. The old woman became a captive of her own memories: she often remembered her past, full of sacrifices for the sake of the national culture, the despotic husband and the beloved children.

In this story, Taraghi skillfully creates the character of the old mother, her inner drama, her love, her sacrifice, the inexhaustible miss towards her

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[22] Taraghi G., Khatereh-haye parakandeh,Tehran: Nilufar, 2004, pp. 2-3.

[23] Taraghi G., Khatereh-haye parakandeh,Tehran: Nilufar, 2004, p. 14.

[24] Fotouhi S., Unhomeliness and Transcultural Spaces: The Case of Iranian Writing in English and the Process of Re-Representation - Literature and the Aesthetics, 20(1) July, 2010, p. 81.

[25] Taraghi G., Khatereh-haye parakandeh,Tehran: Nilufar, 2004, p. 143.

[26] «Pomegranate Lady» Depicts the Comedy and Tragedy of Exile - NPR Books, http://www.npr.org/2013/12/07/249237327/pomegranate-lady-depicts-the-comedy-and-tragedy-of-exile (09.03.2019)

native land, and the reminiscence of her childhood, that became the companions and comfort of the wandering days for Mahin Banu. After the Islamic Revolution, the homeless woman finally finds a shelter in her son's house in France, then at her daughter's place in London and at last at her brother's home in Canada. Moreover, that long, lifetime flight becomes the last refuge for Mahin Banu. Her seat on board the plane, near the illuminator, has become a real home, so freely, so soft, like white snow, like the snow of her native Damaevend mountain"[27].

Forseeing her death, flying on the wings of the memories of childhood, Mahin Banu embraces her only place where she wonders, with the ambitious desire not to leave it at any time. In this big world, where she would never have her own corner, the only dream of Mahin Banu had been the heavenly shelter, where she would find her eternal spiritual tranquility.

Emphasizing the emigration, as well as the painful phenomenon of losing the national and cultural identity, the author criticizes the political situation in Iran. In this story, she calls a woman upon the life "with her complicated and contradictory emotions". In her modest mentality, the home has a complex infrastructure. The author exposes the intricate web of Iranian cultural norms that transforms a woman into a spiritually and legally incompetent creation to fulfil her own desires and preferences.

The maternal theme becomes especially important in Goli Taraghi's short story "The Pomegranate Lady and her sons". Here Taraghi reveals all the vivid colors of her original creation. The basis and the axis of this story are the author's memoirs.

In the vast expanse of the story, Taraghi converts the different destinies of two women in post-revolutionary Iranian society. The narrator left Iran in the 1990s and since then has lived with her two children in Paris. After her regular visit to Iran, she is trying to overcome the incomprehensible situation in the airport and the new laws that seemed to be so unbelievable among the Iranians living far away from the country.

In this nightmarish situation, she meets a unique elderly woman who was travelling from Yazdi to visit her sons in Sweden. Anar Banu and the narrator were born in different social and cultural worlds, but they both are the prisoners in the cradle of their fugitive fate. Anar Banu's children are the representatives of different strata of Iran's younger generation who share the same destiny of emigration and alienation.

Helpless Anar Banu Chinari, who could not even write her own name, asked for help from any passenger to help her to get her children. The longing of the mother who has lived far from her sons for twelve years made her go to an unknown place.

Anar Banu, a childishly plain, kind and delicate, dreams about her disobedient sons and about that lost icy world, where they had been looking for a decent life for already twelve years.

Frequently in the old woman's imagination, the pomegranate and lush trees that since her childhood replaced the figures of her father and mother were outlined. That is why her relatives renamed her "Anar Banu Chinari". There was an inexhaustible love for the human and the nature in the soul of this cheerful and illiterate elderly woman. Anar Banu reprimanded her children with great sorrow and motherly compassion.

The way leading to her dear sons has become fatal, the only and the last indicator. Being unable to move her legs, the old and sick woman is still staying in the helmless roads, wandering around the world in the waiting halls of the airports.

"She falls silent. She talks to herself, to her sons. I can no longer hear her, and her blurred and dusty image slowly recedes, like a faded picture, into the labyrinthine corridors of sleep"[28]. In G.Taraghi's story, the airport was an allegorical image of the place, where the fate of thousands of emigrants crossed, where people found and lost each other, where the most important part of the human life began and ended.

Focusing on the long separation between the sons and the mother in "The Pomegranate Lady and her sons", Taraghi emphasizes one of the most important issues of our days - the spiritual, psychological and moral foundations of human alienation.

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[27] Taraghi G., Khatereh-haye parakandeh,Tehra: Nilufar, 2004, p. 178.

[28] Taraghi G., Ja-ii digar, Tehran:Nilufar, 2000, p.53.

Tragedy, satire, dramaticism: here are the three ways in which Goli Taraghi is knitting her own writing-style about the post-revolutionary country, and the Iranian woman's suffering, her own exile experience: "In her short stories, Goli Taraghi deals with the portrayal of the problematics of self-space construction in her character's new and unfamiliar local positions after emigrations"[29].

Taraghi's each heroine inside the walls of her "new physical home" builds her heavenly dreamy home on the distant, uncertain, and indifferent helmless roads far from the homeland, where she will live forever embraced with her memories and longings for the native land. As Salman Rushdi points out: "It may be, that writers in my position, exiles or emigrants or expatriates, are haunted by some sense of loss, some urge of reclaim, to look back even at the risk being mutated in to pillars of salt ... our physical alienations from India almost inevitably means, that we will, in short, create fictions not actually in cities or villages but invisibly ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of my mind"[30].

The longing for the Homeland is a permanent melody in Goli Taraghi's soul of, she knits her dream with the longing for the native home and on the other real land she lives in that dream.

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[29] Ghardashkhani G., Another Space: Identity, Space and Transcultural Significations in Goli Taraggi's Fiction, Leiden: Brill, 2017. p.. 86.

[30] Rushdie S., Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism, 1981-1991, London: Penguin Books, 1992, p. 10.

ԵՐԿՈՒ ԱՇԽԱՐՀՆԵՐԻ ՄԻՋԵՎ ԸՆԹԵՐՑԵԼՈՎ ՊԱՐՍԻԿ ԳՐՈՂ ԳՈԼԻ ԹԱՐԱՂԻԻ ՎՏԱՐԱՆԴԻՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՓՈՐՁԱՌՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ

Լիլիթ Սաֆրաստյան
(Ամփոփում)

Իրանի իսլամական հեղափոխությունից հետո տասնյակ հազարավոր տարագիր հայրենակիցների նման հայտնվելով օտարության մեջ՝ հայտնի արձակագիր Գ. Թարադին իր հայացքը ասեղեց վտարանդիության ցավալի խնդիրներին։ Հետհեղափոխական տարիներին լույս ընծայված «Երված հուշեր» 1990թ., «Մեկ ուրիշ վայր» 2001թ. և «Երկու աշխարհ» 2002թ. պատմվածքների ժողովածուներում զետեղված հուշագրությունններն ու պատմվածքներն առանձնանում են իրենց բացատրիկ թեմատիկ-զգացափարական ուղղվածությամբ, որտեղ հեղինակը պատկերում է հայրենի տնից հեռու, օտարության մեջ բնակվող պարսիկ կնոջ ներքին ցավն ու նոր իրականության մեջ ազգային, կրոնական, մշակութային ինքնությունը պահպանելու նրա դժվարությունները։

Noonik Darbinian[1]

IRANIAN POST-MODERNISM: THE SAQQA-KHANEH ART MOVEMENT

Saqqa-khanehrefers to a special space in public areas, a sort of water fountain designed by Iranians with the intention of offering water to people who pass by. They are significant not only for theirsecular role, but also their religious symbolism.

In Shi'a culture, Saqqa-khanehare built in honor of Hazrat Abbas who was killed during the battle of Karbala, while bringing water from Euphrates River for Imam Hossein and his family who were deprived of water. The religious role of saqqa-khaneh paved the way for including them in the mourning ceremonies of Shi'a. After a while symbols were added to saqqa-khaneh and they became a place where the art of ornaments and symbols flourished.

There is another side to the art of saqqa-khaneh, which is not related to their architecture or the ornamental designs of them. Saqqa-khaneh were not only important for their architectural and cultural role, but also for inspiring a group of Iranian contemporary artists who started the Saqqa-khaneh Movement in 1950-60s.

The third Tehran Biennial took place in 1962 and art critic Karim Emami used the term Saqqa-khaneh for a group of artists who exhibited their works during that exhibition. He resembled their works to saqqa-khaneh both because of their symbols and for the visual forms. This was a look backward to the Iranian culture, which was faded in the shadow of

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elite art. The Saqqa-khaneh art was modern and meanwhile it contained decorative items, colors and iconography, which was specific to Iranian culture. This form of art was a mixture of calligraphy, colors, shapes, stamps and etc. The art was not art itself, but also contained political messages. Although, Saqqa-khaneh artists had similarities in their style and inspiration sources, but they had diverse imaginations and the mixture of secular and religious was what made them distinguished.

This paper examines saqqakhaneh, the architectural and ornamental characteristics and the Saqqa-khaneh Art Movement in the context of post-modernist art, starting from 1950s until the reflection of this art in Iranian contemporary art of today.

Iranian Postmodernism: The Saqqa-khaneh Art Movement

The contemporary art scene of Iran is brimming with new innovative forms of expressions and colors; some of them exact borrowings and imitations of western art and some of them so specific to Iranian culture. The roots of this cultural expression and freedom of forms and colors go into an art movement, which originated around 1960 in Tehran and bears the name of Saqqa-khaneh Art Movement. The importance of this movement resides in the artistic and ideological value that it holds. History shows that the crucial aspect of Iranian culture is the inner ideology, and art without ideology is rarely specific to Iranian culture.

Before analyzing the artistic characteristics of this movement the question rises about the etymology of the word "Saqqa-khaneh". The word saqqa-khaneh comes from the Arabic wordsaqqa (the one who gives water) and Persian khaneh (house).Saqqa has been coined with the most famous saqqa in Shiite religion, saqqaye-dasht-e-Karbala (The water-bearer of Karbala), Abbas ebneabi Taleb, who during Karbala battle, went to Euphrates to bring water. Although his thirst was unbearable, upon reaching the river he did not take any sip of the water,and on the way back to his peers, enemies cut his hands and he never managed to provide water to his friends. The emotional impact of Imam Hussayn and his 72 friends suffering from severe thirst is so great that the term saqqa has been conjoined with Islamic religious beliefs and terms.The incident gave an

idea to Iranians for building religious architectural structures called saqqa-khaneh, with the intention of giving water to the passengers, so the devoted Muslim-builder will receive eternal reward from God for remembering the martyrs of Karbala. This structure is very specific to Iranian culture. It is a small room or cave like structure, sometimes a tall building, in the wall of a public area, like bazaar, tekyeh (tent like temporary structures built during month of Moharram for Shiite mourning ceremonies), passages, mosques or even residential homes. So, the structure can be temporary, like the ones built inside or near tekyehfor the entire month of mourning, or permanent. There are elements, which are specific to Saqqa-khaneh, the sliding door made of wood or iron, and the artistic metalwork, which is similar to Jali structures seen mostly in Indian subcontinent. There is another element, which is the copper or brass bowl with religious inscriptions like "YaHusayn" (Oh Husayn) or "Laanat bar Yazid" (Curse upon Yazid), chained to the outside metal wall. The bowl usually contains a hand-like structure, which is a metaphor to the lost hands of Hazrat-e-Abolfazl-el-Abbas. The inside and outside walls of saqqa-khanah are decorated with religious paintings, Iranian tiles and calligraphy. In front of the structure candles are lit. The tradition of lighting candles comes from the idea that thirsty passengers will find their way to saqqa-khaneh during the night. Today, lighting candles has become more of a religious thing. As we see, in the span of time, saqqa-khaneh not only kept their water providing role, but also became a place of worship where people besides praying and lighting candles were attaching dakhils (Rags), locks, chains, religious puppets, and khamsa (hamsa).

The moral message of saqqa-khaneh builders, the devotion of the people, the beauty of midnight candles and decorations on the wall, the golden shining of the brass bowl and the movement of Arabic words under these lights, gave inspiration to a group of young Iranian artists, who were fascinated by modern art of the western world, but knew deep inside that they are not going to succeed in this scene, if they fail to bring their cultural heritage into it. This was a time of great change in the world. In western world people were stepping foot on moon, Peter Fechter was lying shot in no-man's land during a failed crossing attempt to west Germany (the inspiration to many artworks), it was a time when first computers were built, new forms of literature were being experimented (like the works of Beat Generation), it was the time of Vietnam war and all the consumerism tendencies, insurance and house building companies bringing new set of values to the western world.

In the other side of the world, 1962, was the year when Iranian prominent writer Jalal-al-Ahmad published his famous work "Occidentosis: A Plague From the West". The book was about the main concern of the nationalistic wing of intellectuals: the loss of Iranian identity through imitating the western culture, system of education, and lifestyle, all that seemed modern and western. Iran wasa scene of geo-political intrigues, where the colonial-national clash was manifesting in art and culture also. As Jalal-al-Ahmad mentioned in his work,in the way of surviving the westernization process,Iran was supposed to become a producer, not a consumer. He believed that "These cities are just flea markets hawking European manufactured goods"[2].Iranian modern artists knew that they should have their share of saying in this clash. They were convinced that the key to the cultural success was keeping western art culture and Iranian traditional side by side. In result, an Iranian wave of modernism in art started to flourish, mainly because artists came to the conclusion that Iranian modern art could not exist without an underlying meaning or keeping of the traditional values. This view was different from the previous traditional approaches to the art. The traditional elements of art existed in the Iranian artwork, but were never combined with western technics. The artists had a keen eye and found art in the vernacular culture, in theshops of blacksmith, miniaturists, calligraphists and goldsmiths, in flea markets and pawnshops. Pottery, jewelry designs, carpet designs, ancient metalwork, ethnic artwork all started to pave way into the art.

The pioneer artists were a group of students and lecturers of the "HonarkadehyeHonarhayeTazini" (Faculty of Art), who started experimenting with these vernacular cultural objects and forms. Around 1962, during the Third Tehran Biennale, Iranian art critic and lecturer

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[2] Mottahedeh R., The Mantle of the Prophet, Oneworld Publications, 2014, p. 298

KarimEmamifirst used the term Saqqa-khanehafter viewing their artworks. Art critics started applying this term to the works of artists both in painting and sculpture, which were mainly using elements of Shiite art in their works.[3]

Calligraphy, considered one of the highest points of Islamic art or the art of spoken word, was the first element, which these artists started to integrate into their artworks.One of the prominent artists of this movementCharles HosseinZanderoudi, started to use this form of art in his works. The alphabetical characters were not only the main subject of his pictures, they were also written in the background of his works or like the artwork named "The Golden Shower" spread on the canvas. His paintings contained also religious elements. One of his works shows the religious hand of Abolfazl in a brass bowl (the exact form derived from saqqa-khaneh) and again some calligraphy in the background, his other famous work represents a picture of saqqa-khaneh with locks on metalwork.

The point of using these symbols was because there was a tendency of engaging in a more universal art, pay attention, not "Lower" art and these symbols were intertwined with the lives of middle and lower classes in Iran. It is important to mention thatSaqqa-khaneh artists were emphasizing not the content of the texts used in their works, but the visual characteristics. They used letters and poems to fill the background of their pictures and by this they removed the semantic meaning of the words. Saqqa-khaneh art was full of religious texts and insights, e.g. in the works of Faramarz Pilaram, where the Nastaaligh and Shekasteh forms of calligraphy are arranged in a way that gives a three-dimensional feeling to the artwork, butit is important to mention that the use of words and letters in the works of art was not always done with the intention of giving a religious message;one of the artists, Naser Oveisi brought extracts of children fables or talismanic spells, which were scribbled on a surface, giving the work an abstract feeling. MassoudArabshahi went back into the

history and was inspired by pre-Islamic art of Persia and Assyrian rock carvings. His works are like territorial maps of ancient cities.

Internationally renowned Sculptor and one of the founding members of this movement Parviz Tanavoli indicates that he and H. Zanderoudi became fascinated with this form of art by observing talismanic seals, religious arts and posters.Tanavoli is considered an artist who created something out of nothing and his creation was sold for 2 million dollars in Christies. From 1970s the "Hich" (Nothing) sculptures, jewelry and ceramic works of Parviz Tanavoli was a nihilistic cry into Persian allegory.The creation of these sculptures was an artistic reaction to the commercialism of some elite artistic circles, where works of arts were valued based on their connection to the western standards. Tanavoli art was the materialization of the fact that the world has a spiritual dimension, eluding the theme of annihilation (fana), one of the important concepts in Sufism.God created everything out of nothingand Hich suggests a mystical condition behind nothingness, a moment when even "nothing" can be a creation and considered a work of art.

Besides sculptures, Tanavoli created several works on canvas. "Oh Nightingale!" canvas is a mixture of modernism and traditionalism. It is the picture of a robot kneeling in front of a desk holding a nightingale. The robot is a true example of what Jalal-al-Ahmad pointed as western machines, a silent machine, incapable of expressing itself. But nightingale is the bird that has adorned Persian poetry with the beautiful voice. This voice is the expressing nature of Iranian art, Iranian culture. On the canvas we see a calligraphy mentioning the name of God and Hazrate Ali. This work of art is a mixture of Islamic elements, Iranian literature, rugs, and calligraphy, which brings the core of the Iranian identity to the surface.

As we mentioned, the world was fascinated by contemporary modern art during 1960's; it was the heydays of pop art in the western world. Some academics gave rise to the idea that "The influence of pop art outside of the western world is what is considered the Saqqa-khaneh art movement"[4]. But lets oppose to this idea and mention that Saqqa-khaneh art movement has a spiritual meaning behind all the mass productions and everyday elements of

[3]اتینگهاوزن ریچارد، یارشاطر احسان، اوج های درخشان هنر ایران، ت. عبداللهیهرمز، پاکبازرونین، نشر آگاه، ۱۳۷۹، ص. ۸۲

[4] حسینی مهدی، سقاخانه یک جنبش ملی، فرهنگستان هنر، مؤسسه فرهنگی هنری و پژوهشی صبا، ۱۳۵۹، ص. ۱۲

life. The major problem is that pop art is concentrated on simple objects defined for the use of masses in the era of consumerism, but Saqqa-khaneh art movement is not using the consumerism object in the art.Although one of the main figures of Saqqa-khaneh Movement insists that Saqqa-khaneh art is a form of "spiritual pop-art"[5], we believe that coining Saqqa-khaneh art with pop art is one of the main mistakes, besides the exact differences of painting style and objects used, Saqqa-khananeh became prominent just after pop-art was losing it's place in the western art scene.[6] Pop art was a reaction to theideas of Abstract expressionism, although we see exact traces of this Abstract expressionism is Saqqa-khaneh Movement. Pop art was using the exact objects, which were currently used in advertisements, like logos, movie posters, but Saqqa-khaneh artists used objects and forms from the past. The main point of pop-art artists was destroying the hierarchy of "low" and "high" art; which was not the tendency in Saqqa-khaneh Movement.

Iranian artists, during1960s-1970s were engaged in the search for problem of culture under capitalism. In this conditions it was important for artists to reproduce art that was universal, Iranian, it hold traditions and brought a new idea into art. They brought books into canvas, words into visual art, included new artistic forms and sight in Iranian art, but also they started a school of art criticism, established art galleries and started to have exhibitions, which was new to Iran. The art galleries of Mahmoud Javadipour, Marcos Grigorian, and Sirak Melkonian were being used as the artistic hub of these people. These artists not only shared some similarities in the form of art, but they all had affiliation with Tehran College of Decorative Arts. The Honarkadeh had a strategy of encouraging students to find art in local sources and familiarize them with Iran's decorative heritage.

The voice of these artists was heard on an international level by the attempts of one of the main contributors to this movement MonirSahroudyFarmanfarmaian. She left Iran in 1950s for pursuing her education, established a precious friend circle, which included representatives of pop art Andy Warhol, Frank Stella, and etc. Although she returned to Iran in 1957 and started creating works with mirror mosaics, her connections opened the doors of western galleries for the rest of the artists in Saqqa-khaneh movement. Her friend Abby Weed Grey was the biggest collector of contemporary Iranian Art outside of Iran. Since then every year works from Grey's collection are chosen for exhibitions around the world, a practice, which still continues.

Parviz Tanavoli once said, "Before us people were proud to follow Picasso or Cezanne, but we were different, we had our own schools, our own art"[7]. Saqqa-khaneh art was a trigger, which gave rise to Iranian modern art on an international level. The movement started, because the national Iranian identity was growing among elites during that time.The artists never followed a mutual technic; there were no specific ideological similarities or a mutual manifest. It seems the only mutual aim was to evaluate Iranian art and bring it to the surface with whatever cost, with whatever items they found in the vernacular culture. Saqqa-khaneh art can be coined with postmodern art because of some specific characteristics like going back to the past cultures or the semiotics of the forms. This Movement was a national form of art, very specific, very local, which paved its way into the international art scene.

ԻՐԱՆԱԿԱՆ ՊՈՍՏ-ՄՈԴԵՌՆԻՋՄ ՍԱՂՂԱԽԱՆԵՀ ԱՐՎԵՍՏԻ ՇԱՐԺՈՒՄ

Նունիկ Դարբինյան
(Ամփոփում)

Սաղղախանեն հանրային շատրվան է` նախագծված իրանցիների ձեռամբ, որի նպատակն է ջուր մատակարարել անցորդներին: Տվյալ կառույցները կարևոր են ոչ միայն իրենց սեկուլար նշանակությամբ, այլ` կրոնական սիմվոլիզմի տեսանկյունից: Շիայական մշակույթում սաղղախանեհերը հիմնականում կառուցվում են Հազրաթ-ե-Աբբասի հիշատակին, ով նահատակվել է Քարբալայի ճակատամարտի ընթացքում ջրից

⁵ عابد دوستحسین، کاظم پور زیبا، جامعه شناسی مکتب نقاشی سقاخانه ای، کتاب ماه هنر، ۱۳۸۹، ش. ۱۶۶، ص. ۱۰

⁶ Keshmirshekan H., Neo-traditionalism and modern Iranian painting: The Saqqa-khaneh school in the 1960s. Iranian Studies, 2005, 38 (4), pp. 607-608.

⁷اعتمادی احسان، «سقاخانه» هنر های تجسی، شماره سوم، ۱۳۷۷، ص. ۲۹

գրկված Իմամ Հոսեյնի և նրա ընտանիքի համար Եփրատից ջուր բերելու ժամանակ: Սադդախսանեհների կրոնական դերը պատճառ դարձավ, որ վերջինները գաղափարական առումով ընդգրկվեն շիայական սգասածույան մեջ: Ժամանակի ընթացքում սադդախսանեհի բուն կառույցին ավելացան ուրիշ սիմվոլներ, որոնցից են մոմերը, կոդպեքներս, սրբերի նկարները, և սադդախսանեհները վերածվեցին մի վայրի, ուր դեկորատիվ և սիմվոլիկ արվեստը սկեց զարգանալ:

Մակայն սադդախսանեհր կարևոր է ոչ միայն զուտ ճարտարապետական և մշակությային առանձնահատկությունների առումով, այլ արժեորվում է իր ազդեցությամբ այն ժամանակակից արվեստտագետների վրա, որոնք սկսեցին «Մադդախսանեհ» արվեստի ջարժումր 1950-60-ականներին Իրանում: 1962 թվականին Թեհրանում կայացած արվեստի երրորդ բիենալե շրջանակներում արվեստի քննադատ Քարիմ Էմամին սադդախսանեհ բառը գործածեց նկարագրելու համար այն նկարիչներին, որոնց աշխատանքն օգտագործված սիմվոլների և պատկերների առումով նմանակում էր սադդախսանեհի կառույցը: Սա հետագարձ հայացք էր իրանական մշակույթին, որր երկար ժամանակ էր ինչ գտնվում էր «էլիտար արվեստի» ագդեցության ներքո:

«Մադդախսանեհ» արվեստր ժամանակակից էր և միաժամանակ պարունակում էր իրանական մշակույթի դեկորատիվ տարրեր, զույներ, և պատկերասյատումներ: Արվեստի այս ձևն իր մեջ պարունակում էր և՛ գեղագրություն, և՛ երկրաչափական պատկերներ, և՛ կրոնական տարրեր: Այն ոչ միայն արվեստ էր արվեստի համար, այլ նաև իր մեջ քաղաքական պատգամներ էր պարունակում: Չնայած սադդախսանեհ ոճում աշխատող արվեստագետներն ունեին եզակի և խորը երևակայություն, սակայն սեկուլար և կրոնականի համաձուլումն էր, որ նրանց դրեց արվեստի նոր հարթակի վրա: Սույն հոդվածում ուսումնասիրում ենք «Մադդախսանեհ» ջարժման ճարտարապետական և դեկորատիվ առանձնահատկությունները պոստմոդեռնիստական արվեստի կոնտեքստում սկսած 1950-ականներից մինչև այսօր:

***Gohar Iskandaryan**[1]*

THE UNITED STATES-IRAN POLICY DYNAMICS
IN 1993-2016

Keywords: *United States, Iran, D'Amato Act, axis of evil, Nuclear program, sanctions.*

The article discusses Iran-U.S. relations, presents the dynamics of those during presidencies of U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. At the same time the author draws parallels with the approaches of the Presidents of Iran Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, Mohammed Ahmadinejad and Hasan Rouhani towards normalization of relations with the USA and the process of coping with U.S. pressures. The article also examines the mechanisms of the implemented sanctions and changes of the attitudes of Iran towards the USA in the context of nuclear talks. Furthermore, the author discusses Iran-U.S. relations in the context of interests, objectives and approaches of two major parties in the USA, namely Republicans and Democrats. The article also looks at those insurmountable issues that currently hinder establishment of normal relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the USA.

Since 1979, the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America have seen rises and falls. After the Islamic revolution, once-allies not only severed relations but also turned into foes. *Death to America* or *Death to Big Satan* posters were common in Iran, whereas Iran was often labelled in the USA as *sponsor of terrorism* and *fraudulent state*. This over-tensed atmosphere reached its peak during hostage crisis at US embassy in Tehran and continued in the course of Iran-Iraq war when the United States provided military support to both sides thus procrastinating the war and weakening both. On 3 July 1988, the

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United States Ship Vincennes warship shot down Iranian A-300 Airbus killing 290 civilians including 65 children. This contributed to deepening of the gap between two countries especially in the last period of presidency of Jimmy Carter, and those of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

In addition to the fact that Washington and Tehran have not had official relations since 1979, the Islamic Republic's top leadership—namely Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—has arguably come to see opposition to America (and Israel) as an inextricable part of the revolutionary regime's identity. Iran's leadership is doubtful towards the normalization approaches of the US, as Khamenei believes Washington's underlying goal in Tehran is regime change, not finding solutions in regard to the nuclear programme.[2]

It is noteworthy that in the last decade of the 20th century the foreign policy of Iran tended to find modus vivendi with Western European countries. President of Iran HashemiRafsnajani's years in power shined with more liberal approaches both in domestic and foreign policy arenas.[3] The pragmatist policy of Rafsanjani had two pillars: (a) solving economic problems that Iran-Iraq war had caused, and (b) improving relations of Iran with other countries.[4]

During his first few years in office, Rafsanjani had again tried to explore the possibility of better relations with the United States. He had taken President Bush in his inaugural address at his word and tried to demonstrate some "goodwill". In 1990-1991, when all the remaining

American hostages in Lebanon were freed Rafsanjani commented in public that it was Iran that had freed them.[5]

It won't be an overstatement to claim that as of today, the whole international community follows the ups and downs of US-Iran relations that mostly influence the Near and Middle East countries.

Remarkably, as a rule of thumb, the Republicans adopt more hawkish policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran in contrast to the Democrats. And within this context it is noteworthy if the Iranian counterpart is more biased towards conservative or liberal wing. And the bilateral relations are more constructive when a US President from the Democratic Party is paired with a liberal or reformist from Iran. At the same time, there is an important reservation: not a single president of Iran can lead a foreign policy line independently of the Supreme Leader.

Bill Clinton's Administration and its Approaches to Iranian Problem: Time for Acknowledging the Own Mistakes of the Past

The first period of Bill Clinton's presidency (in office from 20 January 1993) had no changes in its policies towards Iran. In this period the policy of containing Iran is a new approach adopted by the Clinton administration. The US policy of containing Iran, apart of the so-called "Dual Containment" policy which has been applied to both Iran and Iraq, differs from the previous US government's approaches.[6] Along many factors, the negative attitude[7] of the State Secretary Christopher Warren was significant and influenced the continuing tough policy towards Iran. As a result of his

[2] Karim Sadjadpour and George Perkovich, *The Iranian Nuclear Threat, Global Ten*. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2012), 45.

[3] See Gohar Iskandaryan, "Iran-EU Relations in the End of 20th Century and the Beginning of 21st Century", *The Countries and Peoples of the Near and Middle East*: vol. 28, XXVIII (2011): 273 (in Armenian).

[4] Fakhreddin Soltani and Reza EkhtiariAmiri, "Foreign Policy of Iran after Islamic Revolution", *Journal of Politics and Law*: vol. 3, No. 2, (2010):202,http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.678.930&rep=repl&type=pdf(accessed on February 17, 2019)

[5] Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004), 252.

[6] M. Anadi, "Democratic Party of the U.S. and Islamic Republic of Iran". *Amu Darya: Iranian Journal of Central Asia and Caucasus Studies, No. 23* (2007):138 (in Russian); M.KazemSajjadpour, "Assessing the Policy of Dual Containment: Four Different Perspectives", *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol IX, N 1, Tehran (Special issue on UN Unilateral sanctions against Iran) (1977): 77.

[7] He had negative attitude since he was the chief negotiator during the Hostage Crisis. "The Iranian Hostage Crisis", *Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State,* https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises, accessed September 15, 2018; "Putting the hostages' lives first", *New York Times,* May 17, 1981, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/17/magazine/putting-the-hostages-lives-first.html?pagewanted=all.(accessed on February 14, 2019)

efforts, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12959 (6 May 1995), banning US trade with and investment in Iran.[8]

But that seemed not enough for Clinton's administration, and on 5 August 1996, the US Congress adopted Iran Foreign Oil Sanction Act[9] introduced by Senator D'Amato that sanctioned all those companies that make an "investment" of more than $20 million in one year in Iran's energy sector.[10]It concerned mostly non-US companies, since that prohibition had been in force for them since 1995. The activities of those companies non-abiding by the D'Amato Act would be strictly limited in the USA. Thus, numerous contracts between Western European countries and Iran were announced void.[11]

At the same time, in 1995, Tehran offered its first upstream oil deal since the revolution, and opted to put the offer to an American company in what Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani later described as 'a message to the United States that was not properly understood'.[12]

Quite interesting developments happened around investment projects of several European companies regarding the D'Amato Act. According to Iranian newspaper *Salam*, the president of French company Total refused to abide by the D'Amato Act and in one of his speeches told that his company was following all the international, UN and French laws and at the same time has no responsibility towards US domestic acts that are intended for

protection of the interests of a narrow circle. He indirectly hinted towards the Act and added that *Total* Company operates in 100 countries of the world and their operation in Iran is likewise rightful and exemplary: '*It is not up to them changing the regime and forcing policies*'.[13]

In parallel with the tougher economic sanctions, the White House considered making steps towards softening tensions. Thus, in contrast to the previous Republicans who never apologized for the 3 July 1988 tragic shooting down of an Iranian A-300 Airbus, the Clinton Administration agreed to make payments in the approximate amount of $131 million, with nearly $62 million going to the families of the victims in 1996.[14]

At the same time, the West considered that the probability of improving the relations with Iran during the presidency of Rafsanjani was very low[15] and hence pinned hopes on the next president of Iran taking into account that 1997 was an election year in Iran. In May, Seyed Mohammad Khatami from the reformist wing was chosen as the president of Iran. The top task of the newly elected president was rehabilitation of Iran's rating and normalization of foreign relations. Signing of the Convention on Chemical Weapons by Iran in 1997 was amongst several important steps towards that direction. Another big impression on international community was made by the speech of IRI president Mohammad Khatami at the UN General Assembly in December 1997 when he called for the Dialogue of Civilizations. In addition, Khatami's statement from the UN platform in 1998 that Iran will not implement the 1989 fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini

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[8] Kenneth Katzman, *The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)*, CRS Report for Congress, 2007, Order Code RS20871, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20871.pdf.(accessed on February 14, 2019)

[9] On September 8, 1995, Senator Alfonse D'Amato introduced the "Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act" to sanction foreign firms' exports (exceeding 20 mln USD) to Iran of energy technology. The bill passed the Senate on December 18, 1995 (voice vote) but, acknowledging the difficulty of monitoring all trade with Iran, sanctioned foreign investment in Iran's energy sector. The House passed its version of the bill, H.R. 3107, on June 19, 1996 (415-0), and then concurred on a slightly different Senate version adopted on July 16, 1996 (unanimous consent). It was signed on August 5, 1996 (Public Law 104-172 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-110/pdf/STATUTE-110-Pg1541.pdf). See: Katzman, ISA.

[10]Kenneth Katzman, *The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA,)* CRS Report for Congress, 2001, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/rs20871.pdf. (accessed on 14.02. 2019)

[11]Iskandaryan, Iran-EU Relations, 274-5.

[12] R. Takeyh, S. Maloney, "The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions", *International Affairs* 87:6 (2011):1302 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01037.x.(accessed on 14.02. 2019)

[13]*Salam*, 5 Oct. 1997: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Historical-diplomatic section (archive), Department of Near and Middle East, Iran section, list 2, case 169, p. 175 (in Armenian).

[14] James A. Beckman, "Nation-State Culpability and Liability for Catastrophic Air Disasters: Reforming Public International Law to Allow for Liability of Nation-States and the Application of Punitive Damages", *FIU Law Review:vol. 10, No. 2* (Spring 2015): 600. Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/15; Fred Kaplan, "America's Flight 17: The time the United States blew up a passenger plane— and tried to cover it up", *SLATE*, July 23, 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/07/the_vincennes_do wning_of_iran_air_flight_655_the_united_states_tried_to.html .(accessed on February 1, 2019)

[15]In 1997 during the Mykonos trial in Germany, it was declared that Rafsanjani, the then president of Iran, had a role in the assassination of four opposition activists of Kurdish origin in Europe on September 17, 1992. The Berlin court also condemned Iran labeling it as a terrorism-sponsoring state, and stated that this murder could not be implemented without knowledge of Iran's ruling elite.

regarding Salman Rushdie represented the cherry on the top. After these developments, a number of Western European countries as well as the US tried to bring their relations with Iran to a higher quality level.[16] US foreign policy towards Iran remarkably changed during the second term of Clinton. Some of the influencing factors worth to mention are change of US State Secretary, election of the new president of Iran and subsequently possibility of more discreet approaches towards regional issues, as well as serious lobbying of American oil and agriculture industry representatives on US government to end unilateral sanctions concerning Iran.[17]

Iranian decision makers think that unilateral sanctions have at best dubious legal character, while the imposition of unilateral primary and secondary sanctions by the US against Iran clearly constitute violations of international law.[18]

Madeleine Albright was appointed State Secretary after re-election of Bill Clinton in 1997 and she implemented more discreet policy towards Iran, even trying to retouch few mistakes and omissions. In November 1999, the United States made a step towards normalization of relations with Iran by proposing to establish an American consulate in Tehran. However, this was rejected by Iran. In November 1999, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei explained that Tehran rejected such a proposal because '*they [the Americans] want to open an intelligence-political site in Tehran to make contact with sold-out elements.*'[19]

It is noteworthy, Iran also tried to overcome the problems with small steps, however, Khatami's softer rhetoric often masked unchanged

positions. Khatami was able to create a perception of change that led to a less wary US stance—and he did this without conceding on any of points of substance. For instance, many were satisfied with his comment about the 1979 US embassy hostage crisis during his 7 January 1998, interview with CNN, which expressed regret for hurt feelings ('*I do know that the feelings of the great American people have been hurt, and of course I regret it*')[20], but not for the egregious violation of international law that the seizure of the embassy represented. Khatami reiterated Iran's rejection of government-to-government dialogue, but the United States persisted, breathing life into its long-standing offer to hold such a dialogue.

In a 17 June 1998, speech at the Asia Society in New York, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright welcomed '*signs of change*' in Iran, adding, '*We are ready to explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings*'[21]. And on 17 March 2000, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright both acknowledged and expressed regret for the role of the US President Eisenhower's administration played in Operation Ajax[22] which intervened in domestic affairs of Iran and overthrew Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh who enjoyed great sympathy from the population[23].

And not the least, neither State Secretary Albright, nor US President Clinton left the UN GA session during the speech of Iranian President Khatami in autumn 2000 although that was the traditional case by US leadership. This act further gave positive impetus to the future opportunities of normalization.

The major modifications to the ban came in 1999, with a lifting of a ban on commercial sales of food and medical products to Iran; and 2000, with a modification of the ban on imports to allow importation of Iranian luxury goods such as carpets, caviar, fruits and nuts, permitted supply of

[16]Iskandaryan, Iran-EU Relations,276-7.

[17] Because of the unilateral sanctions the representatives of US oil industry were not able to do any business with Iran. Iran kept buying grain from the US but after the unilateral sanction of 1995 that was also stopped resulting in yet another drop of their income. In 1999, Clinton administration permitted supply of food and medication to Iran.

[18]M.J. Zarif and S. Mirzaee, "US Unilateral Sanctions against Iran", *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol IX, N 1, Spring, Tehran, (Special issue on UN Unilateral sanctions against Iran), 6-7.

[19] Abbas William Samii, "Winning Iranian Hearts and Minds" in *Checking Iran's nuclear ambitions*, eds. Henri Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004), 90.

[20]"Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami", *CNN*, January 7, 1998, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html.(accessed on 14.02.2019)

[21] Patrick Clawson, "The Khatami Paradox" in *Iran under Khatami: A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment*, eds. P.L. Clawson et al. (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), 5.

[22] "Madeleine Albright on Operation Ajax", *AICBroadcast*, 2000, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5HYUtYa3wI (accessed on February 14, 2019).

[23]Ibid.

grain, medicine, medical equipment, and several types of parts for civic airplanes to Iran.[24]

Remarkably, Iranian ruling elite viewed Albright's regret and acknowledgement and the overall new approaches by the United States equivocally. The politicians who had liberal bias or were positive towards having somewhat better relations with the United States affirmed these approaches.

However, unfortunately, Iranian leadership was also not ready to continue dialogue with the United States and continuously anticipated clear steps confirming positive dynamics in the relations. The decision-makers in Iran believed that both the Democrats and the Republicans adopt same strategic approaches when it comes to the American image in the foreign policy or its national interests. At the same time their tactics might be totally different according to the issues.[25] It was also evident that during this period Iranian ruling circles were not ready to reciprocate to the United States' offer of discussions with no preconditions and were applying the old methods of spreading doubt and hatred.

The Approaches of George W. Bush towards Iranian Problem: Iran as the axis of evil state

George W. Bush from the Republican Party won the presidential election in 2000 and became the 43rd President of the United States. Few months after his inauguration, on 11 September 2001, America was stroke by the unprecedented terrorist attack that was responded by Bush waging his global 'war on terror'.

Although the Islamic Republic of Iran was among the first ones to condemn the terrorist attack on the US and to pass its condolences to the American nation, Tehran did not avoid accusations from Washington. George W. Bush delivered the State of the Union Address at the United States Capitol building on 29 January 2002. An *"axis of evil"* was a term first used by President Bush in this address. The so-called *"axis of evil"* was said to be made up of three countries: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. These countries were cited as countries pursuing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and having terrorist training camps.

The situation with Iran further worsened in 2002 when Mujahideen-e Khalq group that is in opposition to the leadership in Tehran declared that Iran is secretly engaged in uranium enrichment and, more importantly, is working towards development of a nuclear weapon.

It was clear that sanctions against Iran were going to get tougher although the then-president Mohammad Khatami was rather constructive during nuclear talks with Western countries. He even signed the Additional Protocol[26] along with the Safeguards agreement on 18 December 2003. This supposedly made Iranian nuclear program totally open for IAEA.

However, this was not enough to dispel US concerns about Iran. The United States were also alarmed with the presence of modernized missiles in Iran. '*The United States has intelligence that Iran is working to adapt missiles to deliver a nuclear weapon, further evidence that the Islamic republic is determined to acquire a nuclear bomb*', Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said in one of his speeches in 2004.[27] He meant *Shahab-3* missiles that could reach the borders of Israel.

2005 State of the Union Address of President Bush had the following wording regarding Iran: *Today, Iran remains the world's primary state sponsor of terror - pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve. We are working with European allies to make clear to the Iranian regime that it must give up its uranium enrichment program and any plutonium reprocessing, and end its support*

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[24] *Major Treasury Department Regulations Implementing or Modifying the Trade Ban'* in *U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws and Regulations.* Washington: Atlantic Council, 2011), 94-102.

[25] M. Anadi, "Democratic Party of the U.S. and Islamic Republic of Iran", 132.

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[26] According to the Additional Protocol the representatives of IAEA could enter the country and implement monitoring without prior notification.

[27] Robin Wright and Keith B. Richburg, "Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb", *Washington Post Foreign Service*, November 18, 2004,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57465-2004Nov17.html. (accessed on February 12, 2019)

for terror. And to the Iranian people, I say tonight: As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.[28]

It was an actual call for rebellion to Iranians in the wake of presidential elections in Iran.

Interestingly, in the result of 2005 presidential elections in Iran and in the light of utmost anti-Iranian rhetoric by the US, ultra conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected. The harsh speeches of Ahmadinejad reinforced the hard-line policy of America against Iran.

Tension towards Iran got more intense especially after the prominent speech of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad pledging to wipe Israel off the map etc. Certainly, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's remark was subsequently the subject of dispute blaming media to manipulate the words, but the image of a hard-line politician was already depicted.

IAEA adopted a strict position towards Iran on 24 September 2005, demanding from Tehran to stop the restart of experiments on uranium enrichment and otherwise threatening to pass the case to the UN Security Council. The resolution was adopted by majority of votes, with Russia and China abstaining.

In this context, the following circumstance is interesting. On 31 May 2006, IAEA director Muhammed el-Baradei gave interview to Italian RAI TV, noting that *'Iran does not constitute a certain and immediate threat for the international community.'*[29]

Given the hard-line policy of George W. Bush towards Iran and no less hawkish rhetoric and non-flexible policy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, UN SC adopted a number of resolutions concerning Iran: No. 1696, No. 1737 in 2006, No. 1747 in 2007, No. 1803 in 2008, No. 1929 in 2010. All of those were imposed during the rule of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and seriously hit the Iranian economy and deepened its isolation. But it is also worth of mentioning that while being isolated, Iran expanded its uranium

enrichment programs and developed considerable amount of own enriched uranium that brought qualitative change both in knowledge and experience of uranium enrichment and strengthened its hand during 5+1[30] subsequent talks. We can claim that amount of enriched uranium contributed in 2014 talks to ensure Iran's right to enrich its own uranium for peaceful purposes.

But one of the main problems was the rough and disrespectful attitude of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad towards international bodies and their decisions. Thus, regarding the UN SC resolution in 2007, Ahmadinejad said that the West had lost its chance to improve relations with Iran: *They seek to mobilise a group of their agents on the pretext of this piece of paper in order to sow seeds of discord among the Iranian nation. No matter [whether] they accept it or not, Iran is now an established nuclear state and it is in their interest to live alongside the Iranian nation.*[31]

And this type of approach was not conducive to problem-solving, and it was already clear that Iran was not going to implement the demands of UNSC and the sanctions were to get stricter. He commented on the UNSC resolution of 2010 as well. *"From right and from left, they adopt sanctions, but for us they are annoying flies, like a used tissue,"* he said.[32]

One could understand from his words that Iran was not going to implement anything regarding the resolution within next 90 days, i.e. the timeframe given by the UNSC resolution. America ran out of patience and Washington decided to proceed without UN mediation. The United States started to persuade the oil-buying states to stop their trade with Iran and look for alternative sources of hydrocarbons.

The atmosphere of hate deepened from both sides. On 10-13 December, the Gallup poll updated a question from earlier the same year that asked Americans to name, in their own words, the single country they considered to be the greatest threat to stability in the world. Iran continued

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[28] George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, *Social Security Administration,* 2 Feb. 2005, https://www.ssa.gov/history/gwbushstmts5.html#02022005.(accessed on February 14, 2019)
[29] "Iran not an "immediate threat", says IAEA chief", *The Daily Star,* 22 Sep. 2007, http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-4904(accessed on February 14, 2019)

[30] UNSC permanent members plus Germany were negotiating with Iran in regard to the nuclear programs.
[31]"Ahmadinejad rejects UN sanctions",*BBC,* December 24, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6207319.stm.(accessed on February 10, 2019)
[32] "Iran dismisses new UN sanctions as "a used hanky", *The Telegraph,* June 10, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/7816395/Irandismisses-new-UN-sanctions-as-a-used-hanky.html.(accessed on February 11, 2019)

to top the list, with 31% of Americans then saying it was the greatest threat to world stability.[33]

The public also believed that Iran's nuclear program posed a serious threat to America. According to the poll, 61% of Americans said the Iranian nuclear program posed a threat to the United States, with 33% saying it posed a "very serious" threat. Thirty-seven percent said Iran's nuclear program did not pose a threat to the United States. To another question on public's perception of Iran's nuclear program posing a serious threat to the United States, 33% of responders answered 'Yes, very serious threat', 28 % of them 'Yes, somewhat serious threat', 37% of them 'No, does not pose a threat', and just 1% had no opinion.[34]

The Approach of Barack Obama's Administration towards Iran: Negotiations with no Preconditions

Since the commencement of the first four-year term of Barack Hussein Obama, bringing a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue has been perhaps the highest one on the foreign policy agenda of the President. During his first term, Barack Obama clearly stated that the Iranian nuclear problem should be solved through negotiations, at the same time not excluding the possibility of applying the military power in case of need. The Democrats, in contrast to the Republicans, have always been prone to solution options that include negotiations. The Obama administration knew well what type of issues would bring military strike against Iran. This made Washington DC to put all possible efforts to evade military conflict. However, normalization of relations with Iran is not an easy task, either.

Still, at that period heading for the toughest negotiations was more favourable for the United States than engaging in military actions. At the same time, we should state that Obama's administration was not a yielding one and the strictest sanctions against Iran were imposed during Obama.

These sanctions had much influence on the Iranian economy. Meanwhile, both the content and the strictness of the sanctions before Obama were remarkably much weaker.

Decision makers in the US came to the understanding that Iran has influence on a number of the most important US foreign policy issues, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestinian issue, war on terror, energy security. They could manage these issues only in case they have a dialogue with Iran. Grasping this fact, the President Obama did more than any other US President after 1979 Islamic Revolution to introduce changes in Iran-American relations.

During his first inauguration speech Obama, while openly hinting Iran, offered *'we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.'*[35] Even before his election, in contrast to his predecessors as well as his rivals, as a candidate for the US presidency Barack Obama publicly campaigned on the exigency of a more effective approach to Iran; during the Democratic primary race, he embraced the need for direct negotiations without preconditions.[36]

On 19 March 2009, via a special video-message Obama extended his congratulations to the Iranian people and the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the occasion of the New Year– Nowruz. In the message, Obama said that his administration is aiming establishment of constructive ties between the US and Iran: *'This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.'*[37]

In spite of the opinions on the possibility of breaking the ice between the two states, the Supreme leader of Iran declared that Obama's speech regarding the change is a mere tactical trick. He also reminded the long list of historical injustices made by the US towards Iran and called the

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[33] Joseph Carroll, "Public: Iran's Nuclear Program Poses Threat to US"', *GALLUP News,* December 20, 2007, http://news.gallup.com/poll/103402/Public-Irans-Nuclear-Program-Poses-Threat-US.aspx.(accessed on February 15, 2019)
[34] Ibid

[35] Barack Obama's Inaugural Address. *The New York Times*, January 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html.(accessed on 14.02. 2019)
[36] Takeyh and Maloney, "The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions", 1304.
[37] Remarks by the President in celebration of Nowruz. *The White House*, March 20, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/VIDEOTAPED–REMARKS–BY–THE–PRESIDENT–IN–CELEBRATION–OF–NOWRUZ(accessed on February 5, 2019)

administration of Obama to take several unilateral steps ahead in order to prove their sincere devotion to the change.[38]

Nevertheless, Obama's initiative did have its indirect influence on Iran. Whereas George W. Bush's administration was making hawkish statements and thus unintentionally helping the different and opposing political wings in Iran to join efforts against the shared threat, the peaceful calls of Obama gave opportunity to those powers to focus on domestic issues of Iran. This became more evident after the presidential elections in 2009 when Mahmud Ahmadinejad got re-elected and Iran experienced the largest wave of political protests after the 1979 Revolution. During his first term, Obama clearly showed that the US is not the trouble-maker party in the Iranian issue by continuing to propose direct negotiations even after the authorities suppressed the Green movement. At the same time, Obama succeeded at gaining Russia's and China's agreement to implement the toughest ever sanctions against Iran.[39]

In 2010 the Iranian issue again found itself in the UNSC agenda since no advancement had been registered in relation to the previously adopted resolutions.[40] Any vessel, plane or any other vehicle could be checked in case of doubt. Moreover, according to the 29th para of this resolution, a group of eight professionals was established in order to research to issue and present their report to IAEA. This resolution also included all points of the previous resolutions that were not implemented by Iran.[41]

Barack Obama wanted to include another point in this resolution according to which Iran would be sanctioned also in oil industry. This would lead to limitation of purchase of oil and gas from Iran whereas the

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[38] Sadjadpour and Perkovich, *The Iranian Nuclear Threat*, 46.

[39] Andrew Sullivan, "Obama's handed them the rope. Will Iran or Israel hang itself first?", *The Sunday Times*, January 20, 2013, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/comment/columns/andrewsullivan/article1197473.ece(accessed on February 7, 2019)

[40] UNSC adopted the following resolutions: 1696 on 31 July 2006, 1737 on 23 Dec. 2006, 1747 on 24 March 2007, 1803 on 3 March 2008. Iran ignored all those resolutions.

[41] "Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention", *UN, Security Council SC/9948*, Security Council 6335th Meeting* (AM), June 9, 2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm.(accessed on February 10, 2019)

budget of Iran is replenished mostly from hydrocarbon revenues. This would be a very big strike on Iranian economy. The United States imposed tougher sanctions on Iran. In addition to UNSC resolution regarding Iranian nuclear issue, heavier unilateral sanctions were imposed by the US and EU. In December 2011, the US Senate unanimously voted for sanctioning the central bank of Iran[42], thus making many countries and the organizations working in the area of energy, basically, to choose cooperating either with Iran or with the United States.

On 23 January 2012, the European Union made its final decision to stop purchasing oil from Iran. A while later, Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) declared that it freezes its relations with Iranian financial institutions.

'The international pressure, coupled with Iran's endemic mismanagement, has caused economic conditions in the country to severely deteriorate. During Obama's presidency, Iran's oil production has dropped from 4.2 million barrels per day (mbpd) to 2.7 mbpd. Its oil exports have dropped equally precipitously, falling from 2.5 mbpd to .9 mbpd. The country's official inflation rate has risen to 29 percent, though some unofficial estimates are double that number. Unemployment and underemployment remain rampant. And Iran's currency, the *rial*, has lost nearly 80 percent of its value vis-a-vis the US dollar.'[43]

The continuous character of the nuclear program constantly kept the US alert since at any moment Iran could break the agreements and increase the percentage of the enrichment. The leadership of both countries do not trust each other. For example, Khamanei is sure that the main target of Washington DC is the regime change. According to several Iranian analysts, the US strategy is not in military attack but in ripening a soft revolution or coup d'état through cultural and political steps. To them, US criticism of Iran's human rights record, its sponsorship of Persian language media broadcasts such as Voice of America, and the power of Hollywood

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[42] "Senator Menendez Praises Conference Committee for Staying Tough on Iran", *Official website of Senator Menendez*. December 13, 2011, https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/senator-menendez-praises-conference-committee-for-staying-tough-on-iran.(accessed on February 5, 2019)

[43] Sadjadpour and Perkovich, *The Iranian Nuclear Threat*, 48.

are all symbols of America's cultural-cum-political subversiveness. It's noteworthy that both countries scare their people by seeding fear and hatred against each other through different information.

In 2012, a Gallup poll in the United States revealed that most of the US citizens think that Iran is the top one enemy of the United States. The following question was asked: 'What one country anywhere in the world do you consider to be the United States' greatest enemy?'. Here are the answers: 32% of responders answered 'Iran', 23% of them China, 10%- North Korea, 7%- Afghanistan, 5%- Iraq, 2%- Russia, 2%- Pakistan, 1%- the US, 1- Japan, 1%- Saudi Arabia.[44]

By the way, in 2011 only 25% of the respondents viewed Iran as the greatest enemy, meaning a seven-point increase in one year. At the same time, since 2014 these dynamics have stopped and Iran did not lead the list for the following years.

Islamic Republic of Iran also tries to infuse the deepest hatred and fear against the US and Israel. Large billboards with words 'Death to the US' and terrifying pictures symbolizing the US can be seen all over Tehran and other towns.

Certainly, this reciprocal hatred does not support to the normalizing of bilateral relations. Moreover, Israel's anti-Iranian politics and influential Jewish lobby in the US impede that process. In its anti-Iranian propaganda, Israel brings seal argument on the table.

• Iranian nuclear program, including Tehran's active efforts in missile-building.

• Anti-Israel, anti-Zionistic rhetoric of Ahmadinejad,

• Rejection of the existence of Israeli state and support to the Palestine,

• Raise of the role of Iran in the region.

Israel has always been sensitive towards Iranian nuclear programme and persistently called for the United States' attention on its potential

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[44] F Newport, "Americans Still Rate Iran Top US Enemy", *GALLUP News*, February 20, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/152786/ Americans-Rate-Iran-Top-Enemy.aspx.(accessed on 5.02.19)

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threats. Thus, every year Israel declared that if Iranian nuclear program is not prevented, then after Tehran crosses the red line it would be meaningless doing anything against Iran. However, Obama's administration decided to negotiate until they reach to a result. The United States publicly decries Iran as a threat to Israel and to other countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, but expresses reservations about military action out of fears that Iran would respond to a strike by destabilizing the region and because it does not believe the Iranian nuclear program is as advanced as the Israelis say it is.[45]

Anyway, given the continuous animosity and absence of trust for nearly three decades, it is impossible to reach to solution of the issues between the United States and Iran promptly, but Washington DC should continue its efforts to keep the dialogue with Iran going on.

Barack Obama got re-elected on 6 November 2012. We highly appreciate his message to the regional countries in his inauguration speech saying, '*We will defend our people and uphold our values through strength of arms and rule of law. We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully — not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.*'[46]

Although Iran was not named, but we think that this was a real call to Iran to start direct negotiations and solve issues in a try to discharge the tension that has chased the leaders of the two countries for already 30 years. The first media briefing of the re-elected President was also noteworthy. Here he also reflected on Iran. '*With respect to Iran, I very much want to see a diplomatic resolution to the problem. [...] we're not going to let Iran get a nuclear weapon. But I think there is still a window of time for us to resolve this diplomatically. We've imposed the toughest sanctions in history. It is having an impact on Iran's economy. There*

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[45] George Friedman, "War and Bluff: Iran, Israel and the United States", *Stratfor*, September 11, 2012, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/war-and-bluff-iran-israel-and-united-states.(accessed on February 10, 2019)

[46] "Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama", *The White House, Office of the Press Secretary*, January 21, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama.(accessed on February 5, 2019)

should be a way in which they can enjoy peaceful nuclear power while still meeting their international obligations and providing clear assurances to the international community that they're not pursuing a nuclear weapon. If Iran is serious about wanting to resolve this, they'll be in a position to resolve it.[47]

Thus, it was clear that the United States will wait for the results of the upcoming Iranian presidential elections and only then will take on real steps through direct negotiations. If the negotiations were fruitless or Iran continued its protraction policy, then possibly the US would apply to its plan B of implementing more tough policy against Iran, including probability of military strikes. But one thing was for sure. Through all this process, Iran was to be under the heaviest sanctions that would slowly deteriorate its economy, would bring in largescale outcry of discontent among the population and would make the Iranian leadership to go for drawbacks in order to reach agreement.

Presidential elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran took place on 14 June 2013 and resulted in election of Hasan Rouhani, a representative of the moderate wing. After his election, the tension in the US-Iran relations seemed to get weaker. As another sign of it, two presidents had a conversation over the phone, an unprecedented one between the heads of government of the two nations since 1979.[48] The desire to go for cooperation was clearly observed in the actions of both presidents. This was further strengthened by the statement of Rouhani twitted by him on 6 August: *'If US shows goodwill & intentions based on mutual respect & equal footing without hidden agenda way for interaction will be open.'*[49]

The negotiation process related to the Iranian nuclear issue got more constructive outlines. Finally, after prolonged discussions of the foreign ministers of 5+1 and Iran bringing in clarifications to a range of issues, on 14 July 2015, the sides came to a final agreement. The signed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was justly called as a historic one and the agreement of the century.[50]

Iranian foreign minister also described the agreement between Iran and the six superpowers in Vienna as 'historical'. President Rouhani in his address on television told that this opens a new page in the Iran's relations with the world and added that the prayers of Iranian people 'got realized' at last. Correspondingly, in Twitter Rouhani wrote, *'Today is a new chapter to work towards growth and development of our dear Iran; a day for our youth to dream again for a brighter future.'*[51]

After ten years of negotiations, and eight days of Iran and the six powers talking in one room the sides at last succeeded coming to the agreement regarding the future of Iranian nuclear program.

• The West reached the agreement that the IAEA will have a team of 130-150 designated inspectors for Iran. According to the agreement, Tehran *'will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran'*[52]—and since Iran has no diplomatic relation with the United States it meant that no inspector with US citizenship would enter the country.

• Iran got the permission to enrich uranium. That was the greatest achievement for Iran although it could not exceed the threshold of three and half percent.

• According to the agreement, Iran would have no right to import military equipment for five years, however in case of any force major and acute need for military equipment this can be overruled by UNSC decision.

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[47] "Remarks by the President in a News Conference", *The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,* November 14, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/14/remarks-president-news-conference.(accessed on February 14, 2019)

[48] Jeff Mason and Louis Charbonneau, "Obama, Iran's Rouhani hold historic phone call", *Reuters,* September 28, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-iran-idUSBRE98Q16S20130928.(accessed on February 14, 2019)

[49] Constance Duncombe, "Twitter and transformative diplomacy: social media and Iran–US relations", *International Affairs* 93:3 (2017): 545-562, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix048 (accessed on February 10, 2019)

[50] "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", *US Department of State,* https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/.

[51] The Final Deal: Rouhani Statement",*The Iran Primer,* July 14, 2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/jul/14/final-deal-rouhani-statement; Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) July 14, 2015, *Twitter,* https://twitter.com/hassanrouhani/status/620926429740576768. (accessed on February 14, 2019)

[52] JCPOA, Annex I, Section N

It is noteworthy that again there were hopes for changes in US-Iran relations after the signature of this agreement. In fact, at least the rhetoric of the two countries changed. At the same time, Barack Obama did not rush taking the signed agreement to the Congress for vote and that 'heritage' was left for the discretion of the next president. We think that Obama foresaw what fate could have its discussion in the Congress and did not want to undergo that process during his presidency.

Meanwhile, Iran stayed loyal to his commitments and it was the United States' turn to weaken the sanctions. However, the following developments showed that nevertheless the US is not ready to continue the process of normalization of the relations.

In the result of 8 November 2016 Presidential election, 70-years old businessman billionaire Donald Trump was elected the President of the United States. Even during the election campaign, he was noted with his anti-Iranian statements. He started discussing the exit of the US from the deal. This discussion brought in additional tension between two countries. At the same time in February 2017, the US Congress launched discussions on the necessity of introducing additional sanctions on Iran.Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that Trump is still within the confines of US foreign policy priorities while opting for more hard-line approaches and rhetoric.

Conclusion

- Iran is developing its foreign and domestic policies for upcoming 20 years and changes of presidents do not really affect those policies, thus the foreign policy vectors of Tehran are more predictable because the decision-maker is the Supreme Leader who is in fact ruling for life. But the same cannot be attributed to the United States because the foreign policy is highly influenced by partisan interests and objectives.

- The ruling elites of both states have not forgiven each other for a number of past problems that surely have had negative influence upon bilateral relations. Iran did not forget the continuous interference of the United States into their internal affairs, the military support to both sides during the Iran-Iraq war, the disregard of Iraq's use of chemical weapons

against Iran, shooting down of Iranian civil airplane in 1988 etc. America does not forgive Iran for parting from its influence, taking over the US embassy in Iran, taking the diplomats as hostages and torturing them, as well as numerous captures of American soldiers.

- There is an apparent issue of mutual ignorance, and both Israeli lobbying and the emigrants from Iran further exacerbate that by presenting every step by Iran from a negative aspect.

- Normalization of relations can be realized only if both sides have clear political will to eliminate the problems. At the same time, we think that it is nearly impossible to pursue that goal as long as the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and generally the senior generation of the current cleric elite of Iran are alive. They have had direct involvement in the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the republic and do not believe in any initiative by the US. In case of a next Supreme Leader-*rahbar*, especially if a more liberal one is elected, there might be an opportunity to revert to this question.

- Iran has been a key regional player for millennia, and nowadays it cannot come to terms with the activities of a non-Middle Eastern country in the region. In its turn, the United States, as a superpower, cannot stand that any country in the region can hinder its projects and prevent the promotion of its interests.

- Nonetheless, we are sure that in case political will both side can surmount the issues. To achieve that both parties should immediately stop propaganda war and start respecting the interests of each other.

ՄԻԱՑՅԱԼ ՆԱՀԱՆԳՆԵՐ-ԻՆՉ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԴԻՆԱՄԻԿԱՆ 1993-2016ԹԹ.

Գոհար Իսկանդարյան
(Ամփոփում)

Հոդվածում քննարկվում է Իրան-ԱՄՆ քաղաքական հարաբերությունների դինամիկան 1993-2016թթ., որտեղ հատուկ ուշադրություն է դարձվում միջուկային ոլորտում տեղի ունեցող քննարկումների համատեքստում Իրանի նկատմամբ ԱՄՆ-ի վերաբերմունքի փոփոխություններին, ինչպես նաև կիրառվող պատժամիջոցների մեխանիզմներին: Իրան-ԱՄՆ հարաբերությունները հիմնականում դիտարկվում են ԱՄՆ-ի երկու խոշոր կուսակցությունների՝ հանրապետականների և դեմոկրատների շահերի, նպատակների և որդեգրած մոտեցումների համատեքստում: Մյուս կողմից, վեր են հանվում այն անհաղթահարելի խնդիրները, որ առկա են եղել Իրանի Իսլամական Հանրապետությունում ԱՄՆ-ի հետ անգամ նորմալ հարաբերություններ հաստատելու համար: Ներկայացվում և վերլուծվում են Հ.Ռաֆսանջանիի, Մ.Խաթամիի և Հ.Ռոհանիի ներդրած ջանքերը Արևմուտքի հետ հարաբերությունների կարգավորման գործընթացում: Միևնույն ժամանակ վեր է հանվում Մ.Ահմադինեժադի վարած կոշտ քաղաքականությունը, որը հանգեցրեց Իրանի մեկուսացման խորացմանը:

Tereza Amryan[1]

THE IDEA OF SECRET MYSTICAL KNOWLEDGE IN YEZIDI RELIGIOUS HYMNS

The Yezidi community was formed between the 11th and 14th centuries in the canyon called Lalish in present-day Northern Iraq. The religion of the Yezidis has preserved a significant number of Sufi elements since it was formed on the ideology of the Adawia Sufi brotherhood founded by Sheikh Adi bin-Musafir. Those Sufi elements represent not only certain rites and ceremonies, but also some religious terms. Many terms are related to certain phenomena associated with the idea of secret, mystical knowledge. Those terms are mainly found in Yezidi religious hymns. Yezidi hymns are lyrical verses which are considered sacred and are recited by Yezidi priests during religious ceremonies. The terms designating the idea of mystical knowledge have a special place in Yezidism and have interesting interpretations in the framework of the Yezidi religious world-view. The Sufi meaning of the terms related to mystical knowledge is present in contemporary Yezidism. While those terms are used in their original Sufi meaning, in the texts of Yezidi religious hymns, they are not interpreted in this way in the world-outlook of contemporary Yezidis.

The Yezidi community was formed in Lalish (situated in present-day Northern Iraq) in the XI-XIV centuries, on the basis of the Adawia Sufi brotherhood. The founder and leader of that Sufi order was Sheikh Adi bin Musafir.[2] The religious doctrine of this Sufi brotherhood became the basis of Yezidi religion. The main temple of Lalish, where Sheikh Adi was buried after his death, became a religious center and pilgrimage site for

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[2] Kreyenbroek, Ph. *Yezidism: Its Background, Observances and Textual Tradition*. New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995: 3-6; Arakelova, V. "Ethno-Religious Communities: To the Problem of Identity Markers." *Iran and the Caucasus*, no. 14 (2010): 6-7, 16.

Yezidis. The Yezidi religion was also influenced by Islam, Christianity, local beliefs, as well as some gnostic sects. It thus became a syncretic religion.

There are many Sufi elements preserved in Yezidism. The idea of mystical secret knowledge inherited from Sufism is best expressed in Yezidi religious hymns.[3] The terms designating the secret mystical knowledge are interpreted in a very unique way within the framework of the contemporary Yezidi religious world outlook.

In Sufism *sir* (Arab. "secret") symbolizes mystical knowledge, divine secret,[4] which is revealed to the hermit after passing through certain hardships, difficulties and overcoming some degrees on the path of self-perfection.[5]

In Yezidi religious hymns it is mentioned:

Ya Xwedк, пкуа te rastɑye,
ьІkarк te bi heqɑye,
Sura te here mixfɑye. (Qewlê Padşayî)[6]
O God, your way is straight
And your work is true,
Your *secret* is hidden.

Melik Fexredɑn ji padşê xo diket pisyare:
"Belê ezîzê min navê te ê şîrin extîyare,
Te зar kitкb nazil kirine xware,

Te qet *soreke* heqɑук me ra nekir dehare?" (Qewlк Axretк)[7]
Malak Fakhradin[8] said to his Lord:
"Your sweet name is holy,
You have brought down four [holy] books [from above],
Have not you revealed any *secret* to us?"

Нын bidene xatirк зerxan ыfeleka,
Horɑyan ыmeleka,
Sura TawьбоMelek ызardeh tebeqe,
Ya Şêşims, tu pirsiyareke xкrк li mala xo ыme jobike. (Duaya Hкvarɑ)[9]
For the sake of destiny/fortune,
[For the sake of] angels,
[For the sake of] the *secret* of Tausi Malak[10] and fourteen layers[11],
Sheykh Shams,[12] tell us and your family a nice thing.

Нын bidina xatira behiştê û darê,
Kafк ыmexaрк,
Sura Kзоывeyt el-Farк,
Ya Şêşims tu pirsyareke xкrк li mala xo ыme jobike vк care. (Duaya Hкvarɑ)[13]
For the sake of paradise and the tree,
[For the sake of the] the cave[14]

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[3] Yezidi religious hymns are lyrical verses which are considered to be sacred. The hymns are devoted to Yezidi saints, prophets, cosmogony, eschatology, etc. Religious hymns are recited by Yezidi priests (sheykhs and pirs) during religious ceremonies (Amryan, Т. *Yezdineri kronakan ashxarhayacq'*. Yerevan: Yerevani petakan hamalsarani hratarakčut'yun, 2016: 21, 169-176).

[4] Amryan, Т. "Sufiakan siro yev arbecumi gaghap'ar' yezdiakan kronakan himnerum." Arevelagitut'yan harcer, № 12, Yerevan, 2016: 282; Sajādī, S. Ĵ. *Farhangē ēstēlāhāt ō ta'bīrātē ērfānī*. Tēhrān: Êntēšārātē Tahūrī, 1393: 460.

[5] Schimmel, A. *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975: 174, 192, 312.

[6] Hecq Bedelк Feqɑ. *Bawerî û Mitologiya Êzdîyan, Çendeha Têkist û vekolîn*. Dihok: Hawar, 2002: 206.

[7] Ibid: 121-122.

[8] In Yezidism, Malak Farkhadin (sometimes called Fakhradin) is considered to be the author of religious hymns, as well as the lord of the disc of the Moon (Amryan, 2016: 100, 170-171).

[9] Kreyenbroek, Ph. *Yezidism: Its Background, Observances and Textual Tradition*. New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995: 220.

[10] Tausi Malak (Arab. "peacock angel") is one of the main saints in Yezidism. The Yezidis depict Tausi Malak as peacock and consider him the embodiment of divine essence (Amryan, 2016: 33-35).

[11] According to the Yezidi world-view, the world consists of fourteen layers or fourteen stages (seven layers of heaven and seven layers of land) (Amryan, 2016: 34, 92).

[12] Sheykh Shams (Arab. šams, "Sun") is one of the main saints in the Yezidi religion and is associated with the Sun (Amryan, 2016: 94, 100).

[13] Kreyenbroek, 1995: 220.

[For the sake] of the secret of Yezid[15] and Bayt al-Far,[16]

O Sheykh Shams, ask us and your family a nice thing.

The concept of secret mystical knowledge called *sir* has its unique place in Yezidi cosmogonic myths and legends. It is mentioned in a religious hymn:

Şembû dane esase,

Цоук kir xilase,

Bedoheft sed sal, heft *sur* hatine dura kase. (Qewlк ZebьnoMeksьr)[17]

[The Creator] began the creation of the world on Saturday (lit: the creator put the fundament of the creation of the world on Saturday),

[He] finished it on [Friday],

Seven hundred years later seven **secrets** came towards the pearl[18] of the cup.[19]

According to one Yezidi cosmogonic legend, after creation, the body of Adam was not alive for seven hundred years. He came to life only after drinking a cup of mystical secret knowledge.

Bedobi heft sed sal heft *sur* hatine hendave,

Qalib mabьу bк gave,

Gote: "Ruhê tu bo çi naçiye nave?". (Qewlê Zebûnî Meksûr)[20]

Seven hundred years later, seven secrets came to [Adam's body]

The body was stunned,

It was heard: "Soul, why do you not enter [into the body]?"

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[14] There is a cave under the temple of the central sanctuary of the Yezidis in Lalish. According to Yezidi religious tradition, Sheykh Adi used to fast, pray, and contemplate in that cave (Amryan, 2016: 108):

[15] Yezid or Sultan Yezid is one of the main saints in Yezidism. He is also considered to be the forefather of the Yezidi people (Amryan, 2016: 34-35).

[16] Bayt Far (or Beyt Far) is a village not far from present-day Baalbek, Lebanon. Bayt Far is the birthplace of Sheykh Adi (Guest, J. *The Yezidis: A Study in Survival.* New York: KPI Limited, 1987: 15).

[17] Kreyenbroek, 1995: 176.

[18] In some Yezidi religious legends, the Pearl is the symbol of cosmogony. According to one of the Yezidi cosmogonic legends, the world was created as a result of the explosion of the Pearl (Amryan, 2016: 62-63).

[19] It refers to the cup of mystical knowledge (Amryan, 2016: 286-291).

[20] Kreyenbroek, 1995: 176.

Adem ркхember ji wк *kasê* vedixwar ьi vedijya,

Mest вьi hejya,

Goşt lê hurya, хьп tк gerya. (Qewlк ZebьnoMeksьr)[21]

Prophet[22] Adam drank that cup and came to life,

[He] got drunk and moved,

[The body] was covered with flesh, the blood flowed [through his body].

Adem ркхember ji wк kasк vedixware,

Keremeta wк *kasê* hate diyare,

Lew Adem pêxember pêngijî, pê bû şiyare. (Qewlк ZebьnoMeksьr)[23]

Adam the Prophet drank from that cup,

The miracle of the cup revealed itself (The miracle of the cup was revealed),

Adam the Prophet sneezed and his senses awoke.

The concept of *u'lm* (Arab. 'īlm, "knowledge") has a special place in Sufism. Many Sufi philosophers distinguish *ēlmē bātēn* (lit: "secret knowledge") from *ēlmē zāhēr* (lit: "apparent knowledge").[24] The expression, "*īlm ladunnī*", mentioned in the Qur'an, symbolizes the knowledge transferred directly from God.[25] In Yezidism, *u'lm* is interpreted as the knowledge of the Yezidi religion.[26] It is worth noting that Yezidis also call religious texts, *u'lm*.[27]

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[21] Ibid: 176.

[22] The Yezidis call not only Biblical, that is Judaic and Christian prophets (*Mūsā pēxambar* - Prophet Moses), *pēxambar* (Pers. payyāmbar, messenger), but also Muhammad (*Mahmad pēxambar* - Prophet Muhammad). In Yezidism, Jesus is also called prophet *Īsā pēxambar*. Some Biblical characters, who are not considered to be prophets in the Christian, Muslim and Jewish religions, are also called *p'ēxambar* by Yezidis. For example, *Ādam p'ēxambar* - prophet Adam, *Ayūb pēxambar* - prophet Job, *Aqūb pēxambar* - prophet Jacob.

[23] Kreyenbroek, 1995: 176

[24] Sajādī, S. Ĵ. *Farhangē ēstēlāhāt ō ta'bīrātē ērfānī*. Tēhrān: Ēntēšārātē Tahūrī, 1393: 589.

[25] Schimmel, 1975: 18.

[26] Arakelova, V. "Sufi Saints in the Yezidi Tradition." *Iran and the Caucasus*, no. 5 (2001: 90.

[27] The integrity of Yezidi religious hymns is called *qawlūbayt* (qawl, Arab "word", bayt, Arab. "verses"). Some religious hymns are called *qawl*, some, *bayt*, and the remaining ones, *u'lm* (Amryan, 2016: 169-170).

Padşayê min li nav textê xo yî bi *sure*,
Padşayê min xudanê *ilmê* pire. (Qewlκ Texta)[28]
My King is near the table full of secrets,
My Lord is the master of big knowledge.

Ew kasa te mira ano
Wekomin zanq wekomin vedixarq
Te dame ser *ulmekî* Qatano (Qewlκ Ghanκ)[29]
You fetched that cup for me,
So I know and drink that.
You put me on the path of the knowledge of the Qatano[30] [sheykhs].

A hymn, dedicated to Sufi martyr, Huseyn Hallaj, mentions:

Destκ Husκynda heye *ulmê* dowanκ. (Qewlκ HusκynoHelac)[31]
Huseyn has the knowledge of *dîwan*[32] in his hand.

In Sufism, **ma'rîfat** (lit: "wisdom," "knowledge") is one of the stops on the Sufi path to self-perfection. At this stop, the hermit, who is deprived of physical desires, is able to contemplate God and can become a teacher for beginners._ In Sufism, **ma'rîfat** is also the ability of the hermit to comprehend his integration with divine nature.[33] Sufi *ma'rîfat* is comparable to the Hellenistic concept of "gnosis," i.e. the divine knowledge and wisdom based on revelation.[34] Some authors have differentiated divine knowledge (*ma'rîfat*) from knowledge gained through intellectual activity

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[28] Hecq 2002: 337.
[29] Kreyenbroek, 1995: 194.
[30] The caste of sheykhs is divided into three clans: Qatani, Shamsani, and Adani (Amryan, 2016: 72): The expression, *ulmê Qatanî* (lit: "the knowledge of Qatani") used in religious hymns symbolizes the knowledge of the Yezidi religion and hymns (Kreyenbroek, 1995: 199, fn. 7).
[31] Celd O., and Celd C. *Zargotina Kurda*. Vol. II, Moscow: Nauka, 1978: 38
[32] In Yezidi religious vocabulary, *dîwān* (Arab. "office", "bureau") indicates the hierarchy of forty saints (çil mêrê dîwana Şîxadî, lit: "The 40 saints of the *diwan* of Sheykh Adi") (Amryan, 2016: 38).
[33] Khalidov, A. "Arabskij yazik." V *Ocherki istorii arabskoy kul'turi (V-XV vv.)*. redaktor Bol'shakov O. G., Moskva: Nauka, 1982: 30.
[34] Nicholson, Reynold A. *The Mystics of Islam*. London: Forgotten Books, 1914: 71.

('ilm), since *ma'rîfat* is associated with divine love (Arab. mahabbat, "love").[35]

Some Yezidi religious hymns mention:

Şêxşims xudanê *merîfet* ыerkan ыnasoe. (Qewlκ Sibeykκ)[36]
Sheykh Shams is the master of knowledge, commandments, and wisdom.

Ji stыnk heta bi stыnk,
3end mifte heye li hindiru xizonκ,
Ya Şêşims, te dane desto me *merîfet* û nasînê. (Qewlê Şêşimsê Tewrκjơ[37]
From commandment to commandment (lit: from pillar to pillar) [38]
There are so many keys in the treasury,
O Sheykh Shams, you gave wisdom and knowledge to us.

Birme dowanκ ыhedretκ,
Ew coyκ edebκ ыmerîfetê,
Siltān Ēzī bi xō wē li wē suhbatē. (Silav silavκt cebκre)[39]
I was taken to *dîwan*,
It is a place of knowledge and wisdom,
Sultan Yezid is speaking [there].

Ji Şamê birme Şerqê,
Nefsa bκ *merîfetê*,
Ne li rê şevêt giran dewκ dikey li xedrκ. (Qewlκ Axretκ)[40]
I was taken from the West to the East (lit: I was taken from Sham[41] to the East),

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[35] Nicholson, Reynold A. *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923: 9.
[36] Kreyenbroek, 1995: 216.
[37] Ibid: 258.
[38] In Yezidism, the religious commandments and duties are called *pillars* (Amryan, 2016: 161-162):
[39] Hecq 2002: 61.
[40] Ibid: 116.

The senseless lust,

Which is not on the path, reveals traitorous demands.

Sedqa me xoş sikane,

Rêya me xoş erkane,

Merîfeta me xoş nîşane. (Qewlê Aşê Muhbetê)[42]

Our purity is a good station,[43]

Our way is a commandment,

Our wisdom is a good sign.

Although the term ***ma'rīfat*** is used in its Sufi meaning in Yezidi religious hymns, in contemporary society it has lost its original meaning and is interpreted as "wisdom," "goodness," or "politeness." Sometimes it is interpreted as "zeal" and is devoid of Sufi religious mystical nuances.

The term ***ma'rīfat*** is a part of the name of the holy place in Lalish. *Sūkā Marīfatē* or *Suq al-Ma'rīfa* (lit: "the market of wisdom") is the name of a square which is not far from the main Yezidi sanctuary. The square is edged with a construction resembling arches. This area does not have a definite function today. During pilgrimages and holidays, it is used for ceremonies related to fire and is full of pilgrims.[44] One historical source points out that there used to be a market that occupied the western part of the square.[45]

The religious hymns mention:

Hьn bidine xatirк *Sûka merîfetê,*

Mкrк li ber beddк diket xilmetк,

Dewrêşê[46] şev û roj diket ibadetк,

Her pкnс ferzкd heqαjetк,

Şêx û pîr, hosta û merebî, yar û birayêd axretê,

Ya Şêşims, to meferiyakê mala xo û me jî bikey vк carк. (Duayк Hкvarɗ)[47]

For the sake of *Suka Marifat,*

[For the sake of] the saint who is serving,

[For the sake of] the saint who is exalting day and night,

[For the sake of] of the five priests,

[For the sake of] *sheykh, pir, hosta, marhabi* and the brother of the hereafter,

Oh Sheykh Shams, this time become a shelter for us and your family.

Xoza зoboma *Sûka merîfatê,*

Ya tijoji xкrк ji nazк ji nemetк,

Ewe joyк sitolк dikin dawetк. (Qewlк Miskαn Tajdαn)[48]

I wish I went to *Suka Marifat,*

Which is full of miracles and blessings,

The *stis*[49] are enjoying the wedding there.

Studying Yezidi religious terms related to secret mystical knowledge allows us to reconstruct the development and transformation of some Sufi realities in Yezidi beliefs. The religious terms of Sufi origin, which express the idea of mystical knowledge, have lost their original meaning in Yezidism.

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[41] The word Sham in Arabic was used to denote Syria. Since it is west of the historical homeland of Yezidis - Lalish, it is sometimes used to mean West in the Yezidi language (Amryan, T'. "Sufiakan inqnakatarelagorc'man č'anaparhi gaghap'arn artahaytogh vorosh yezrer yezdiakan kronakan himnerum.", *Banber Matenadarani*, № 24, Yerevan, 2017: 38):

[42] Hecq 2002: 265.

[43] The stops on the Sufi path to self-perfection (Amryan, 2017: 35-46):

[44] Açıkyıldız, B. *The Yezidis. The History of a Community, Culture and Religion*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2010: 136; Kreyenbroek, 1995: 80-81.

[45] Empson, R.H.W. *The Cult of the Peacock Angel*. London: Harry Forbes Witherby, 1928: 124.

[46] In the medieval Islamic world, the term *dewrêş* was used to describe the hermits and members of Sufi brotherhoods. The term *dewrêş* in Yezidi religious hymns is used not only to characterize the hermits, but also for describing the saints (Amryan, 2016: 47):

[47] Kreyenbroek, 1995: 222

[48] Hecq 2002: 316

[49] The Yezidis use the word *stī* (Arab. sayyida, "mistress") to refer to female members respectfully, as well as representatives of sheykh or pir families. In religious hymns, *stī* is also used for female saints (Amryan, 2016: 50).

ԳԱՂՏՆԻ, ԽՈՐՀՐԴԱՊԱՇՏԱԿԱՆ ԳԻՏԵԼԻՔԻ ԳԱՂԱՓԱՐԸ ԵԶԴԻԱԿԱՆ ԿՐՈՆԱԿԱՆ ՀԻՄՆԵՐՈՒՄ

Թերեզա Ամրյան
(Ամփոփում)

Եզդիական համայնքը ձևավորվել է 11-14-րդ դարերում ներկայիս Իրաքի հյուսիսում գտնվող Լալիշ կոչվող կիրճում: Եզդիների կրոնում շատ սուֆիական տարրեր են պահպանվել, քանի որ այն ձևավորվել է Շեյխ Ադի բին Մուսաֆիրի հիմնած աղավիա եղբայրակցության դավանաբանության հիմքի վրա: Այդ սուֆիական տարրերը խորհրդանշում են ոչ միայն որոշակի ծեսեր, այլև կրոնական եզրեր: Գաղտնի խորհրդապաշտական գիտելիքի գաղափարի հետ կապված մի շարք եզրեր հիշատակվում են եզդիական կրոնական հիմներում: Եզդիական կրոնական հիմները չափածո տեքստեր են, որոնք արտասանվում են հոգեւորականների կողմից որոշակի կրոնական արարողությունների ժամանակ: Խորհրդապաշտական գիտելիքի գաղափարի հետ կապված եզրերը հատուկ տեղ ունեն եզդիականության մեջ և հետաքրքիր մեկնաբանություն են ստանում եզդիների կրոնական աշխարհընկալման շրջանակներում: Խորհրդապաշտական գիտելիքի հետ կապված եզրերի սուֆիական իմաստը եզդիականության մեջ այլևս կենդանի չէ: Չնայած եզդիական կրոնական հիմների տեքստերում այդ եզրերը կիրառված են սուֆիական նշանակությամբ, բայց դրանք սուֆիական մեկնաբանություն չունեն ժամանակակից եզդիների կրոնական աշխարհընկալման մեջ:

Nshan Thomas Kesecker[1]

THE HISTORICAL GILGAMESH AND KINGSHIP IN THIRD-MILLENNIUM MESOPOTAMIA

The Epic of Gilgamesh remains one of the most important contributions of Mesopotamian civilization. Its wide-ranging influence can be observed in a large number of epic tales and stories, including the Bible. Many scholars have also speculated about the origins of the epic and its main protagonist, Gilgamesh. From the epic, we know that he was a king of Uruk who was responsible for the construction of its imposing walls. But who was the real Gilgamesh and why was he such a memorable character? This study examinesthe available historical evidence regarding the enigmatic historical figure of King Gilgamesh.Some of the details of the Gilgamesh epic and stories paint the portrait of a powerful, if not exceptional, king of Uruk who was an important actor in the inter-city conflicts that plagued Early Dynastic Mesopotamia, prior to the arguably imperialistic unification efforts of later kings such as Lugalzagesi and Sargon.

The Epic of Gilgamesh is the most famous text from ancient Mesopotamia. It was first discovered and translated in the mid-nineteenth century and became famous due to its section regarding the Flood. It is clear that the Epic of Gilgamesh was highly influentialand this can be observed in the Bible and much later epic tales. However, thehistorical origins of the epic remainshrouded in mystery. The historical Gilgamesh was a king of Uruk in the early third millennium BC, probably around 2800 or 2700.[2] This article focuses on what we can parse from the epic regarding

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the historical Gilgamesh, the political landscape of the time in which he reigned, and the political developments of Early Dynastic Mesopotamia (2900-2350).

First, let us briefly go over the development of the Gilgamesh epic. The earliest stories related to Gilgamesh are from six known poems in Sumerian that have come down to us from copies made in the Ur III and Old Babylonian periods from around 2100-1700 BC.[3] It is important to note that Sumerian was quite likely a dead or dying language at that time. These stories are "Gilgamesh and Akka," "Gilgamesh and Huwawa" (in two versions), "Gilgamesh, Enkidu, and the Netherworld," "Gilgamesh and the Bull of Heaven," andthe "Death of Gilgamesh."[4] Scholars consider these to be separate compositions about Gilgamesh rather than one complete epic. The first known Akkadian version of Gilgamesh comes from the Old Babylonian period, and this is the first version of the Gilgamesh story that is a true epic.[5]Unfortunately, the Old Babylonian version is not well-preserved and there are numerous gaps in the narrative. However, the Old Babylonian version remains a very important source that even fills in some of the lacunae of the later, standard version of the epic. It was also Sometime in the Middle Babylonian period, perhaps around 1200BC, a scribe named Sin-leqe-unninicompiled what became known as the standard version of the epic, in Standard Babylonian Akkadian.[6] The major modern translations of Gilgamesh follow this version, which is the most complete of all the narratives. Of course, with each version of the epic came several additions and alterations to the original story.

As noted above, Gilgamesh probably reigned in the early part of the third millennium BC. However, the earliest written fragments regarding Gilgamesh we have, the Sumerian poems, are from around 2000BC, with the vast majority of the early texts being from the Old Babylonian period

(1800-1650). This does not necessarily have to mean that these texts were composed in the Old Babylonian period and it is quite probable that they were copies of late Third Millennium texts, perhaps from the Ur III period (2100-2000).[7] This is a very important point to note. During the Ur III period, the Sumerian King Shulgiboasted of his academic prowess.[8] Sumerian literature also underwent a so-called "renaissance" in this period, led by him. In some of his texts, he claims to be a relative of Gilgamesh.[9]Unfortunately, the scale and scope of these revisions are unknown, making it difficult to say whether the Sumerian Gilgamesh poems were significantly altered in this period from possible earlier forms. It is in fact quite possible that the known Sumerian Gilgamesh poems were composed during his reign.

In the Early Dynastic (ED) period, Mesopotamia was a collection of competingcity-states.[10] Though society was literate and there are many documents from this period, they are all economic texts in nature and deal mostly with transactions. However, in the middle of the ED period, we start to see the first few texts that do deal with historical themes: royal inscriptions. Most of the first royal inscriptions deal with construction or temple offerings, but, especially in the late ED period, many kings begin to elaborate on their military achievements. In doing so, they reveal important details regarding politics in Mesopotamia in this period. One of the most important early texts is the Kish prisoner plaque, which was discovered just a few years ago.[11] In the text, the king of Kish describes capturing a large number of prisoners after a battle with another city-state. This is very much an echo of a theme in Gilgamesh – his city's rivalry with Kish. In the Sumerian King List, a text that recounts the succession of kingship in Mesopotamia from antediluvian times, Kish and Uruk often trade places as

[3] Foster, "Introduction," xii.

[4] Douglas Frayne, "The Sumerian Gilgamesh Poems," in *The Epic of* Gilgamesh, ed. Benjamin Foster (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 99.

[5] William L. Moran, "The Gilgamesh Epic: A Masterpiece from Ancient Mesopotamia," in *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, ed. Benjamin Foster (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 172.

[6] Moran, "Masterpiece," 175.

[7] Frayne, "Sumerian Gilgamesh," 99.

[8] Jacob Klein, "Shulgi of Ur: King of a Neo-Sumerian Empire," *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East. Volume 2*, ed. Jack M.Sasson,(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1995),848.

[9] Klein, "Shulgi," 847.

[10]For a summary of the history of ED period, see Nshan T.Kesecker, "Lugalzagesi: the first emperor of Mesopotamia?," *Aramazd: Armenian Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 12, no. 1(2018), 76-95.

[11] For a detailed discussion of this plaque, see PiotrSteinkeller. "An archaic 'prisoner plaque' from kiš," *Revue d'Assyriologie et d'Archéologie Orientale* 107 (2013): 131–157.

the main sites of Mesopotamian kingship.[12] We see this theme in the Sumerian Gilgamesh stories. In Gilgamesh and Huwawa, Gilgamesh makes a joke about letting the monstrous Huwawa marry his "sister," Enmebaragesi.[13] Enmebaragesi was, of course, the king of Kish and Gilgamesh's rival. Gilgamesh and Akkais entirely about Akka's siege of Uruk. Akka is the son of Enmebaragesi.[14] These themes are more prevalent in the early Gilgamesh stories and perhaps faded over time as Kish's early third-millennium political dominance was slowly forgotten.

The most important textual evidence of Gilgamesh's existence aretwo very short royal inscriptions from Kish in the early ED period, which mention Mebarasi, a "king of Kish."[15] This Mebarasi is almost certainly the same Enmebaragesi from the Gilgamesh stories. These texts, from Enmebaragesi himself, show that he was in factan historicalking. Gilgamesh was also probably deified by the late ED period. Besides these texts, we also have the aforementioned Sumerian King List, which refers to Gilgamesh as a king of Uruk in this period.[16] A much later text from a king of Uruk in approximately the year 1900BC states that Gilgamesh constructed the famous walls of Uruk.[17] The walls have been dated to approximately 2700BC, around the time in the ED period when Gilgamesh would have reigned.[18] The Enmebaragesi texts are also from around this time. All of these indirect references show that Gilgamesh was in fact a king of Uruk around 2700BC, though of course there is no evidence from the famous king himself, or his immediate predecessors and successors. This lack of direct evidence makes it difficult to make any concrete statements about the historical Gilgamesh. However, it is not unheard of for

there to be few historical references to Gilgamesh despite his heroic deeds – the kings of the Sargonic dynasty, who conquered vast expanses of territory and cemented their own places in Mesopotamian legends for millennia, never even mentioned their predecessors, and this causes confusion over which of Sargon's sons succeeded him first (they never mention their father, Sargon, either).[19]

The most important historical rival of Uruk in the ED period was Kish, which as noted above was also referenced in the Sumerian Gilgamesh stories. Sometime after the collapse of Uruk's unchallenged dominance in the late fourth millennium BC, kings of Kish began to wield significant power in Mesopotamia. The exact nature of the hegemony of Kish is unclear.[20] There are no extant texts of the kings of Uruk that reigned in this period and texts from Kish are few.One viewpoint is that Kish's power was largely symbolic and was not necessarily related to the city of Kish.[21] One text that supports this viewpoint is the famous Vulture Stele, which details a border dispute between two other cities, Umma and Lagash, from the Lagashite point of view.[22] In this text, Eannatum, king of Lagash, mentions that at an earlier time, the king of Kish, Mesilim, drew the boundary between Umma and Lagash and it was the violation of this boundary drawn by a King of Kish that sparked the conflict between Umma and Lagash.We also have some texts from Mesilim himself.[23] In the late ED period, kings from other cities would take the title king of Kish. It would later come to signify, "king of everything," a play on words with the meaning of the word "kishatum" in Akkadian.[24] It is difficult to say when this play on

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[12] SeeJean-JacquesGlassner, *Mesopotamian Chronicles*, Writings from the Ancient World 19,(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004), 117-126.

[13] Frayne, "Sumerian Gilgamesh," 110.

[14] *Frayne, "Sumerian Gilgamesh,"*100.

[15] Douglas R. Frayne, *Presargonic Period (2700-2350 BC)*, The Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia 1,(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 55-57.

[16] Glassner, *Mesopotamian Chronicles*, 121.

[17] Foster, "Introduction," xi.

[18] Foster, "Introduction," xi.

[19] For a recent discussion regarding this confusion, seePiotrSteinkeller, "An Ur III Manuscript of the Sumerian King List," in *Literatur, Politik und Recht in Mesopotamien: Festschrift fur Claus Wilcke*, ed. Walther Sallaberger, Konrad Volk, and Annette Zgoll, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003), 278.

[20] For a recent discussion of Kish's hegemony in light of recent evidence, see Steinkeller, "Archaic Prisoner Plaque."

[21] For an example of this viewpoint, see Marc Van De Mieroop, *A History of the Ancient Near East ca. 3000-323 BC*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 50.

[22] For the inscription and a discussion, see Frayne, *Presargonic Period*, 126-140.

[23] For these texts, see Frayne, *Presargonic Period*, 69-71.

[24] For a dated, but comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Tohru Maeda, "King of Kish' in Pre-Sargonic Sumer," *Orient: Report of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan* 17 (1981).

words began. It may have already existed in the ED period, since Akkadian was already widely known, spoken, and a form of it was written as well.Maeda traces the usage of different titles of rulers, tracing them from "city-state"ideology to "regional authority," to perhaps outright "imperial" thought.[25] Though I agree that the shift in rhetoric is important, it is not quite so ideologically significant, and that imperial ideology is developed in the late ED period. The king Eannatum of Lagash is the prime example of an ED monarch who launched campaigns far outside the boundaries of his own city-state, even attacking cities outside of Sumer, and briefly took the title "King of Kish."[26] Though his control of these areas did not last very long at all, it shows that Mesopotamian kings were, in fact, keen on expanding their power to other areas and controlling them as well. Bringing this history back to Gilgamesh – all of these kings reigned after the time Gilgamesh was probably the king of Uruk, and these themes of expanding royal control over neighboring opponents arecompletely absent in the Gilgamesh epic entirely. In fact, in Gilgamesh and Akka, Gilgamesh, in the end, forgives Akka completely and allows him to return to Kish unharmed. It is thus possible that Gilgamesh himself predates the imperialist titularies and rhetoric developed by later kings, such as Lugalkiĝinedudu, Lugalzagesi, and arguably perfected by Sargon's grandson, Naram-Sin.

One theme in Gilgamesh that is echoed is many historical texts is the expedition to the cedar mountains. The Cedar Mountains most probably refer to Lebanon and the area around it. The wood from the cedars was utilized in many important construction projects, especially temples, with Gilgamesh himself mentioning that the scent provided by cedars is pleasing to the gods the construction project is dedicated to.This was an important task that was completed not only by monarchs with imperialist tendencies, but also by leaders of city-states.[27]

[25] Tohru Maeda, "Royal Inscriptions of Lugalzagesi and Sargon," *Orient: Report of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan* 40 (2005), 4.

[26] Frayne, *Presargonic Period*, 125.

[27] A prime example of this is Meskigala, lord of Adab. See Frayne, *Presargonic Period*, 33-34.

It is difficult to say anything definitive about who King Gilgamesh might have been. We know that the circumstantial evidence and references in the epic and in the Sumerian stories place him in about 2700 BC. We know that in that period, the Sumerian city-states were in several intercity conflicts, with one of the main rivalries being that between Uruk and its northern rival, Kish. Enmebaragesi, a king of Kish mentioned in the Gilgamesh epic and stories, has texts from about the same period that prove his existence. The walls of Uruk were also constructed in that timeframe. The historical Gilgamesh was probably a king of Uruk who was able to resist the campaigns of the kings of Kish, constructed the walls of Uruk, and undertook a journey to the Cedar Mountains near or in Lebanon, which is an activity also attested in royal inscriptions from the Early Dynastic and Sargonic periods (though of course, Gilgamesh's combat with Humbaba, the forest guardian, is not found in the royal inscriptions). Unfortunately, the several edits, revisions, and compilations of the Gilgamesh stories over the course of several thousands of years prevents us from knowing what details are original and which ones are later additions or alterations to better suit the time period in which it was edited. However, some of the details of the Gilgamesh epic and stories paint the portrait of a powerful, if not exceptional, king of Uruk who was an important actor in the inter-city conflicts that plagued Early Dynastic Mesopotamia, prior to the arguably imperialistic unification efforts of later kings such as Lugalzagesi and Sargon.

ՊԱՏՄԱԿԱՆ ԳԻԼԳԱՄԵՇԸ ԵՎ ԱՐՔԱՅԱԿԱՆ ԻՇԽԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ Ք. Ա. ԵՐՐՈՐԴ ՀԱԶԱՐԱՄՅԱԿԻ ՄԻՋԱԳԵՏՔՈՒՄ

Նշան Քեսեքեր
(Ամփոփում)

Գիլգամեշի էպոսը իրավամբ համարվում է միջագետքյան քաղաքակրթության ամենակարևոր կոթողներից մեկը: Էպոսի հետքերը կարելի է գտնել տարածաշրջանի ժողովուրդների բազմաթիվ էպիկական պատումներում, ավանդազրույցներում, ինչպես նաև Աստվածաշնչում, ինչը վկայում է նրա՝ աշխարհագրական լայն ընդգրկում ունեցող ազդեցության մասին: Գիտական գրականության մեջ կան բազմաթիվ ենթադրություններ էպոսի ծագման և նրա գլխավոր հերոսի մասին: Էպոսից մեզ հայտնի է, որ Գիլգամեշը Ուրուկի թագավորն էր, և ինքն է կառուցել քաղաքի մեծ պարիսպները: Բայց ո՞վ էր իրականում պատմական Գիլգամեշը և ինչու՞ էր նրա կերպարն այդքան հիշարժան: Այս հոդվածը քննում է Գիլգամեշ թագավորի՝ որպես պատմական կերպարի մասին առկա փաստերը: Գիլգամեշի էպոսում և առանձին պատումներում առկա որոշ տվյալներից, ինչպես նաև պատմական անուղղակի փաստերից կարելի է եզրակացնել, որ նա ուժեղ և յուրահատուկ թագավոր էր և կառւնոր դեր խաղաց վաղդինաստիական կռիվների ընթացքում, որոնք տեղի ունեցան Շումերական քաղաք պետությունների միջև:

Gevorg Sahakyan[1]

"VICTORY HAS A THOUSAND FATHERS, BUT DEFEAT IS AN ORPHAN": WHO IS TO BE BLAMED FOR TURKS' DISINTEGRATION IN GERMANY?

Introduction

This narrative policy analysis (NPA) examines the complexity, polarization and uncertainty around educational system in Germany, in regard with minority integration. The sphere of education integration is an area of high importance as educational achievements lead to employment, which is considered integral component of integration (Council of the European Union 2004). The NPA elaborates on the case of Germany as the country demonstrates one of the worst records referring inequality in educational attainment between the natives and the minorities (Program for International Student Assessment 2000). The specific targets are Turks, as they are the biggest and most resilient minority group to integrate in Germany (Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Deutsche Welle 2009).

In order to demonstrate the educational integration challenges Turks face in Germany, it is significant to delve into the discussion of a broader context, such as the general level of disintegration. A considerable amount of literature has tried to shed light on this case, and the analysis offers contradictory findings about the responsible of the disintegration. On one hand, the Republic of Germany is claimed to be the party responsible for the lack of Turkish integration. On the other hand, the minority group itself is blamed.

In support for this first notion, some scholars argue that the integration of Turks in Germany is shaped by the country, rather than by the Turks themselves (Zolberg and Woon 1999). This argument is backed by the

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Gevorg Sahakyan

contradiction between successfully integrated Turks in the United States and their disintegrated compatriots in Germany. This is mainly attributed to the constructionist approach in the USA towards minorities, which perceives ethnicity as an adaptable phenomenon (Rudolph 2006) in contrast to Germany where "Germanness" is a matter of blood (White 2005; Anil 2007; Kılıç and Menjivar 2013). In other words, the disintegration of Turks in Germany is determined by the primordial approach where the importance of ethnic revival is emphasized (Roedger 1991).

Oppositely, the historical background of Turkish migration coupled with some academic literature support the second notion that minorities determine disintegration. Historically, the first major stream of Turks arrived to Germany as part of "*Gastarbeiter*" program. These people were low-skilled labor migrants recruited from the lowest socio-economic strata. The influx continued even after the abolition of the guest-worker initiative in 1974 due to the oil crisis (Schnapper 1994), and they did not return to their home country as it was envisaged by the agreement. After the refusal to repatriate, the social exclusion of Turks began and this situation did not even change after the emergence of the next generations. The literature provides explanation to it by arguing that the children are aspired to reach their parents' class level (Boudon 1974; Heath Rothon and Kilpi 2008). Thus, the fact that Turks are the least integrated in Germany may be linked to the specific characteristics of the very minority group.

Similar polarized views, along with other contradictory interpretations, can be observed in the subsequent narratives in regard with education attainment of Turks. In particular, the analysis refers to educational system in Germany, which starts at primary schools, followed by the transition to secondary schools. The secondary education in its turn is three-tiered, *Gymnasium* (higher-track), *Realschule* (medium- track) and *Haupstchule* (lower-track). The track that the children are to be enrolled depends on their grades and recommendations of teachers. Here is the place when the institutional discrimination towards minorities can be expressed (Surig and Wilmes 2014). According to the statistics provided by PISA (2000) second-generation migrants, particularly Turks, greatly underperform the natives.

Hence, driven from the complexity, uncertainty and the nature of polarized views around the integration through education, this NPA analyzes German state document by Federal Ministry of the Interior (2014), afterwards, the paper juxtaposes the contradicting narratives on the same issue provided by Open Society Foundations (2013). In the section that follows, the mentioned narratives are compared, and the meta-narrative is presented which is derived from the juxtaposition. Finally, the potential for change in the sphere of education is introduced with referring to the meta-narrative.

Narrative I: Germany

The German state narrative (2014) provides a brief historical background about the migration to Germany by stating that the phenomenon has a very long history and immigrants' desire to settle in Germany has a large range of a spectrum. Given the multi-diverse nature of the German population, the authorities offer equal integration measures for all migrants, including long-term residents with migration background. So, several educational policies in this regard are implemented such as support programs for young children with migration background offered by the Ministry of Education. In particular, government tries to ameliorate the educational situation of migrants. Additionally, the ministry funds research targeting language diagnostics and promotion on equal bases. The authorities promote extracurricular educational activities for children with disadvantaged backgrounds. Moreover, for the implementation of some program the government has funded several hundred million of euro.

As regards the difference of educational attainment, the government accepts that minority students are far less successful than the natives are. Particularly, about three times more migrant children are enrolled in Hauptschule (the lowest-track) than natives. Oppositely immigrants are less successful in entering Gymnasium (the highest-track), which enables to continue education in universities. In addition, school dropouts are twice as many among immigrants. However, the document suggests that after

PISA (2000) report, the migrant pupils have significantly improved their positions. Thus, a positive trend is provided. For example, if in PISA 2000 reports the difference of 75 points between the natives and immigrants, in report 2012 the difference decreased to 53 points. Finally, the document presents a major difference between nationalities in terms of educational attainment by elaborating on the cases of Russian and Polish performing much better than other groups.

Thus, the character of "hero" can be applied to German authorities, who accept the problematic situation around educational attainment of minorities and initiate several programs to improve it. The fettle around identifying the "victims" is more complicated. At first, immigrant groups might seem the "victims" negatively affected by the inequality. However, the further analysis of the text implicitly entails that if some minorities (i.e. Russian and Polish) significantly outperform other groups, than the underperformers are to be blamed for the inequality (i.e. Turks as the most underperforming group). In this case, the latter can be also considered as "villains", as they are not "innocent" victims and are the cause of the policy problem (Stone 2002). It can be summarized, that the moral of this narrative analysis, is that German authority do not avoid accepting the problem, moreover they initiate several programs to improve the situation. Hence, a positive trend in terms of decreasing the inequality in educational attainment between Germans and migrants is ascribed to the continuous efforts by the authorities.

Narrative II: OSF

An alternative narrative is provided by Open Society Foundation (2013). The report starts with an epigraph showing that children of different racial and ethnic backgrounds in Germany have quite varied educational experiences and opportunities, which is a violation of federal and international law. In particular it is argued that immigrant children are identified as "foreigners" and as a result of the discrimination at schools they face limited life and career possibilities.

The story starts with the introduction of PISA (2000) report that nearly a decade ago shocked the country famous for having outstanding educational system, by great inequality rates in education between the natives and migrant children. The alarmist publication illustrates that the latter show one of the worst results of educational attainment in the world. Minorities are overrepresented in the lowest-track (Hauptschule), and have significantly less opportunity to continue their education in Gymnasium (higher-track).

The report by OSF claims that letting alone some promising steps implemented by German authorities (such as combining Realschule and Haupschule into Sekundaschule in Berlin), notwithstanding there is an overall denial of serious and continuing discrimination in the specific field. Notably, the report specifies that children with foreign origin (mostly Turks) face salient inequality in the schools, high levels of discrimination, racism, unfair grading, elements of stigmatization and segregated classrooms mostly composed of migrants.

Moreover, instead of recognizing and fighting the root causes of inequality, German people try to find a scapegoat to blame all the failures on. The underachievement is explained by causes of low socio-economic conditions, indifference and low education achievements of migrant parents, which is why their children are not aspired to succeed. Finally, the document calls to adhere the Article 2 of European Convention of Human Rights, which disallows discrimination in education. Thus, they demand to stop the practice of students' segregations by separating classrooms based on ethnic characteristics.

Hence, the "heroes" in this narrative are PISA report (2000) by OSCE that broke the stereotype of excellent educational system in Germany, and OSF, which also underlines the current problems and urges for necessary changes. The "villains" are the German authorities and representatives of educational bodies who continuously deny but are to blame for the above-mentioned problems. The "victims" are foreign origin pupils, mostly Turks, who are the main negatively affected party. Finally, the moral of this narrative is that if the much-needed educational policies are not

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implemented, the continuing discrimination will entail limited life and career opportunities for children of migrant background. Thus, first the German side has to accept the presence of discrimination and then initiate immediate actions.

Meta-narrative and comparison

Given the fact that the above-mentioned narratives have two antithetical settings, it is not surprising that they have opposing plots, characters and morals. Nevertheless, meta-narrative is also present in the stories. Both parties unanimously assert that inequality in educational system is an area of immense concern and both seek to improve the situation. Particularly, the documents are referring to the PISA 2000 report that pioneered in unpacking the truth behind "excellent" educational system in Germany. The parties agree on the disproportionate allocation of immigrants at schools. And from this part on, the polarizations of the narratives occur.

The state document claims that after the problem was diagnosed, the government initiated several steps to decrease the gap between the natives and the minorities. The mentioned initiatives have quite large range of a spectrum, from project implementations to allocation of some hundred million euros for ameliorating the lack of equality in education. As a result, the authorities guaranteed a positive trend in decreasing inequality, which was manifested in the PISA 2012 report. Whereas, the alternative narrative states that since 2000 PISA report nothing has changed significantly and consequently children of immigrants continue witnessing institutional racism in face of stigmatization, discrimination, unfair grading and so on. Here, it is worth mentioning that German side completely ignores the presence of discrimination. In contrast, OSF evaluates the phenomenon as one of the root causes of the inequality.

In the same way, the first narrative argues that the inequality in educational attainment depends on specific nationalities, as some of them, for instance Russians and Polish have fairly good records. Oppositely, OSF report claims that level of inequality is determined by the society in

which the immigrants have settled. This discourse can be linked to the literature mentioned in the first section of the NPA. Similarly, the identified characters also vary among the documents. In the state document, the authorities are presented as "heroes" that accepted the problem and have mobilized their efforts to change the situation for the better. The situation over identifying the "victims" is rather difficult. To be considered as such, the affected group should be "innocent" (Stone 2002), however, given the context that underperforming minorities, such as Turks, are the ones to be blamed for their harsh conditions. They may also be identified as "villains". In contrast to this, OSF report has different characters. Notably, they are the "heroes" for highlighting the root causes of the issue. The "villain" is the German society for discriminating the minorities. And the latter are the "victims" who as a result of institutional racism have unequal life and career opportunities.

Finally, the two narratives have contrasting morals. In the report by the ministry of Inferior the moral is in facing the problem and overcoming it. Which entailed positive developments in terms of betterment of minority conditions. Contrary, in the OSF report the moral is in recognizing the current levels of discrimination and consequently solving them, which will finally lead to the objective present in meta- narrative in face of decreasing the levels of inequality.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, both parties agree that there is a vivid inequality in German educational establishments. Yet another meta-narrative present in the texts is the willingness to decrease the gap of educational attainment between the natives and the immigrants. Accordingly, the German authorities and OSF seek to see children of migrant background shifting from "bright" to "blurred" boundaries (see Alba 2005). Here, it is pertinent to note that the policies mentioned by the parties, which will enable to reach the presented outcome are contradictory. German authorities highlight the positive trend in terms of reaching "blurred" boundaries as a result of previously mentioned projects, which decreases the inequality

between the natives and minorities. However, German government refrains from mentioning specifically Turks in regard with minority education issues. In contrary, the latter are abundantly represented in OSF report, which claims that the situation will not change for better as long as the presence of racism and discrimination is denied. In addition, they call for the rejection of segregated classrooms based on ethnic characteristics, as an example of possible policy change.

Hence, by summarizing the possibility of change in the policy area, it can be claimed that boundaries between the minorities and the natives in educational establishments are "bright" and there is a high possibility that they will not become "blurred". This suggestion is conditioned by the primordial approach towards ethnicities in German society. Another argument is attributed to the fact that the German side denies the presence of racism and forms of discriminations, which is the major cause of having unequal educational attainment between the natives and the children of foreign origin, as OSF reports it.

And, if the status quo in the educational system maintains, or if the boundaries are still labeled as "bright", Turks living in Germany will not have the same life and career opportunities as the natives have. Eventually the inequality in education will entail an underclass formation. Thus, the lack of possible educational policies meant to curb inequality and discrimination will persist the applicability of downward assimilation concept (see Portes and Zhou 1993). That is to say, the offspring of first-generation labor migrants, not like their predecessors who were recruited as guest workers, will encounter some major problems in terms of labor-market integration. Consequently, Turks and other ethnic minorities will continue being disintegrated.

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«ՀԱՂԹԱՆԱԿՆ ՈՒՆԻ ՀԱԶԱՐ ՀԱՅՐ, ԲԱՅՑ ՊԱՐՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ՈՐԲ Է». Ո՞Վ Է ՄԵՂԱՎՈՐ ԳԵՐՄԱՆԻԱՅՈՒՄ ԹՈՒՐՔԵՐԻ ԱՊԱԻՆՏԵԳՐՄԱՆ ՀԱՐՑՈՒՄ

Գևորգ Սահակյան
(Ամփոփում)

Սույն հոդվածը միտված է լույս սփռել Գերմանիայում բնակվող թուրք միգրանտների ինտեգրման խնդրին: Մասնավորապես, ուսումնասիրությունը թիրախավորում է կրթական ոլորտը, ինչը կարևորագույն նշանակություն ունի, քանի որ ուսումնական առաջադիմությունն է մեծապես ենթադրում աշխատաշուկա մուտք

գործելու կարողությունը, որն էլ ինտեգրման հիմնական բաղադրիչներից է: Մի կողմից Գերմանիան արձանագրում է ամենավատթար ցուցանիշներից մեկը տեղացիների և փոխրամասնությունների միջև եղած կրթական ձեռքբերումների անհավասարության հարցում, մյուս կողմից էլ` թուրքական զաղթօջախները համարվում են ամենից վատ ինտեգրված փոխրամասնությունը, որոնք նաև ամենամեծ ներկայացվածություն ունեն Գերմանիայում: Վերջիններիս ունեցած խնդրի բացատրությունը ակադեմիական գրականության մեջ իրարամերժ կերպով է ներկայացվում: Հետազոտողների մի մասը պնդում է, որ ստեղծված իրավիճակի պատասխանատուն ընդունող երկրի կրթական քաղաքականությունն է, քանի որ նույն ժողովուրդը բավականին լավ է ինտեգրված ԱՄՆ-ի հասարակության մեջ, իսկ մյուս թևն էլ մեղադրում է հենց թուրքերին` մատնանշելով ներգաղթյալների առաջին հոսքի ցածր կրթական մակարդակը, ինչն էլ շարունակում է արտացոլվել հաջորդ սերունդների շրջանում, քանի որ ժառանգները հակված են զբաղեցնել նույն սոցիալական դիրքը, որն ունեն նրանց ծնողները: Այսպիսով, դեկավարվելով խնդրի կարևորությամբ և պատճառների հակասականությամբ, տվյալ հոդվածը ուսումնասիրում է իրարամերժ ապյուրների բովանդակությունը` օգտագործելով նարատիվի քաղաքականության վերլուծության գործիքը (Narrative policy analysis), որի միջոցով վեր կիառվեն հակասող ապյուրների միջև եղած խոսույթի տարբերությունները:

REVIEW

Safrastyan R., Melkonyan R., Ter-Matevosyan V., Dumanyan A., Chakryan H., Geghamyan V., Hovhannisyan A., History of the Republic of Turkey, Yerevan, 2018, 364 p.

One of the most important issues that Armenian higher education system has faced since the independence of the Republic of Armenia, is the creation of university textbooks in the tune with the new times. In a rapidly changing world a majority of the fundamental Soviet textbooks become out of date. Moreover, those related to the field of humanities have very little connection with modern visions of Armenia. This gap was considerably distinct in the field of Oriental Studies and especially, Turkic Studies.

The history of Turkey, taught in the textbooks written by the famous Soviet specialists of Ottoman and Turkish studies, was under the inevitable influence of the tides in the Turkish-Soviet relations. Furthermore, some assumptions and assessments in these books misrepresented the historical truth. Besides, many episodes of contemprorary Turkish history, which are of extremal importance for Armenians, were not even included.

The endeavour to create new textbooks has been done in the faculty of Oriental studies of YSU in recent years. The textbooks of Turkish, Azerbaijani, Farsi, Arabic, Hebrew, Kurdish languages, that were published, took into consideration the pecularities of teaching oriental languages to the Armenian-speaking students. There are books devoted to the problems of Ottoman and Turkish history among the workbooks and methodological guides, prepared in the faculty[1].

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[1] See Safrastyan R., Ottoman Empire: Two Programs of Genocide (1876-1915), Yerevan, 2007 [Ṙ. A. Safrastyan, Ösmanyan kaysrowt'yown. C'ełaspanowt'yan erkow cragir (1876-1915 t't'.), Erevan, 2007], Safaryan A., The "Economic Turkification", the Policy of Etatism and "Turkification" of Economy, Yerevan, 2012 [A. V. Safaryan, «Tntesakan t'yowrk'akanowt'yowna», ētatizmi k'ałak'akanowt'yowna T'owrk'iayowm ev tntesowt'yan «t'owrk'ac'owma», Erevan, 2012], Melkonyan R., History of Turkish literature (1920s-the

As a result of cooperation between the specialists from the Faculty of Oriental Studies of YSU and the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA, textbook on the history of Turkey was published in 2014.

Renowned researchers, such as the Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, professor Ruben Melkonyan, Dr. V. Ter-Matevosyan, Dr. Arthur Dumanyan, Dr. Hakob Chakryan, Dr. Varuzhan Geghamyan and Anush Hovhannisyan, are the members of the authors' group, headed by the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA, full member of NAS RA, professor Ruben Safrastyan.

The textbook under review is the second edition of the above-mentioned book, printed in 2014. Making minor changes in the structure of the book, the authors have expanded the frame of the historical problems, discussed in the first edition. For instance, new sub-chapter on the Lozanne conference and negotiatons on the ethnic-religious minorities of Turkey and, especially, Armenians is added (pp. 44-51). In the new edition, the authors have also reformulated some subchapters and, being the most important, included the analysis of the developments in the both internal and foreign policy of Turkey in 2014-2018 (pp. 293-316).

In truth, the historical evolution of Turkey starting from Mudros Armistice up to our days, is chronologically represented in the eight chapters of the textbook.

Thus, students are granted a chance to obtain general information on the domestic and foreign political life of Tukey in the frames of one book. It is also noticeable that at the end of each chapter there is an additonal list of literature for readers willing to get more information on the particular topic.

We should mention that the authors have paid special attention to shed light on the state policy towards ethnic-religious minorities in Turkey after 1918. The trials against Young Turks (p.15-17), Kemalist war against the first Republic of Armenia (pp. 36-40), as well as, signing of Sevr, Kars and Moscow agreements, crucial for Armenians, are among the topics, represented in the book. The manifestations of nationalistic policy from the

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early XXI century), Yerevan, 2017 [Ṙ. H. Melk'onyan, T'owrk'akan grakanowt'yan patmowt'yown (XX dari 20-akan t't'. XXI dari skizb), Erevan, 2017].

1920s to the 1930s, state-developed programs against minorities, namely 'Twenty classes' draft (1941-1942) and 'Tax of wealth' (1942-1944) (pp. 105-113), implemented during World War II, as well as, 6- 7 September pogroms in 1955 (pp. 143-146), representing the continuity of anti-Armenian policy in Turkey, are also a focus in the book.

The problems concerning modern stage of Armenian-Turkish relations (pp. 256-258) and, especially, the process called 'football diplomacy' (pp. 281-285) are also among the topics of the textbook.

It is noticeable that the texbook refers to the important facts of the both positive and at times unfortunate negative activity carried out by the Armenian members of the Turkish parliament in different periods. (pp. 76-77, pp. 148-151, pp. 294-295, p. 300).

In the first edition of the book short informaton on the most important political parties, functioning in Turkey in the 20th Century, and short biographies of the most influential politicians of different periods were included in the appendixes of the textbook. In the new version alongside with this information, the authors added a table representing a demographical picture of Turkey for the period of 1935-2017 (pp. 348-354).

Special attention should be paid to the colored maps also included in the second edition that provide opportunity to get a better view of the represented topics.

Thereby, the authors succeeded to outline the general discourse of the history of Turkey using primary sources and researches conducted by Western, Russian and Armenian schools of Turkish Studies. At the same time they have managed to stay far from the highly politicized assessments and critically consider the intentions of the Turkish historiography on Armenia.

Alexander Safaryan[2]
Naira Poghosyan[3]

Նկատված վրիպակներ

«Թուրքիայի Հանրապետության Պատմություն» (երկրորդ լրամշակված հրատարակություն) դասագրքի 292-րդ էջում լրացուցիչ ընթերցանության համար գրականության ցանկում նշված «Թուրքիայի արտաքին քաղաքականության առանձնահատկությունները «Արդարություն և զարգացում» կուսակցության կառավարման տասնամյակում (2002-2012թթ.)» մենագրության հեղինակն է **Անդրանիկ Իսրայելյանը**, որի փոխարեն սխալմամբ նշվել է Անդրանիկ Իսպիրյան:

Errata

In the monograph "History of the Turkish Republic" (Second edition), 292th page, in the list of additional reading, the author's surname of the monograph "Peculiarities of Turkish Foreign Policy under the governance of the Justice and Development Party(2002-2012)" shall be read as **Andranik Israyelyan,** not Ispiryan.

ԵՐԵՎԱՆԻ ՊԵՏԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՄԱԼՍԱՐԱՆ
ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՖԱԿՈՒԼՏԵՏ

ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՀԱՐՑԵՐ

№ 15