

THE HISTORY OF MODERN IRAN
AN INTERPRETATION

JOSEPH M. UPTON

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II

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
BY

JOSEPH M. UPTON

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PREFACE

My purpose is to present an interpretation of the recent history of Iran based upon characteristics of Iranian society which have determined the success of the internal and external policies of successive governments. The course of modern Iranian history is marked by the persistence of popular attitudes and practices which exert continuous pressures, though of varying intensity. All but essential details have been omitted. My attention is focused upon Iran; and I am assuming on the part of the reader familiarity with the general history of modern Iran.

The risks of this approach are many. At least one qualified Iranian scholar has complained that there is no accurate history of modern Iran in any foreign language. Even though he might have added "or in Persian," it would be presumptuous to claim that this volume is an exception. An educated Persian with intimate personal knowledge of his country, countrymen, and culture would have distinct advantages in describing and explaining Persian history and the attitudes and practices of the people, even though his explanation might be difficult for a Westerner to understand. Unfortunately, such an explanation has not been published. There is, therefore, no alternative to attempts by foreigners if a contemporary Western desire to understand Iran is to be satisfied.

Any account of the history of Iran in modern times, especially since 1918, is highly controversial. Information about the period is incomplete; and even when available often has been distorted to serve some particular interest. This constitutes a major handicap where, as in Iran, personalities play a crucial role. One must also be constantly alert to note the contrasts between the text of a law, plan, or program which is usually available, and a description of the execution which is usually not available.

I have relied heavily upon surmise and estimates of probability based upon reading, discussion, and observation over a period of thirty years from 1928 to 1958 including about fourteen years of intermittent residence in Iran. My latest visit was for two and

a half months in the summer of 1958. Those familiar with the published literature about Iran will recognize my debt to the writers. I am also grateful to Iranians and non-Iranians who have wittingly or unwittingly contributed to my understanding of life in Iran and to my admiration of many aspects of Iranian culture. I would like to acknowledge my appreciation publicly, but loyalty to them under current circumstances prevents it.

I have tried to avoid judgments because one is never in possession of all the facts; but it is inevitable that this interpretation should be colored by my own understanding, prejudices, and fancies. My hope is that its publication may stimulate those in a position to correct or confirm these interpretations to do so in the interests of objectivity.

Without involving them in any responsibility for the substance of this study, I would like to express my appreciation to Professor H. A. R. Gibb, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies in Harvard University for his support; to Mr. Derwood W. Lockard, Associate Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, for his generous assistance and encouragement; and to Mrs. Melville Smith and Mrs. Kenneth Pease for their patient editing and typing of the final draft.

JOSEPH M. UPTON

Cambridge, Massachusetts
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THE HISTORY OF MODERN IRAN
AN INTERPRETATION

I

INTRODUCTION: FROM FATH ALI SHAH TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

It is obvious that the recent history of Iran is the product of the interaction of a great variety of influences from many sources. It is also obvious that some knowledge of these influences is helpful in understanding modern Iran. But for the purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to start with the 19th century and to consider historical developments at that time only in the most skeleton fashion. That was the period when the rulers discovered that their military strength was totally inadequate to defend the national territory from foreign invasion; and when the enticements of European travel induced the rulers to seek foreign loans and increased internal revenues to pay the cost of these nationally unproductive excursions. These, in turn, led to the emergence of a national policy of balancing off irresistible foreign pressures in an effort to preserve some measure of national security; and, on the individual plane, to a strengthening of the practice of balancing off irresistible pressures within the community in an endeavor to achieve a sense of personal security. This lively and persistent feeling of both national and individual insecurity is perhaps the dominant characteristic of modern Persian history.

If we consider Persia's foreign relations during the 19th century with these facts in mind, we find that they can be conveniently divided into four periods:

1. From about 1800 to 1814, dominated by the repercussions of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and his dreams of an overland invasion of India.

2. From 1814 to 1828, during which Persia suffered severe territorial losses to Russia and lost her complete sovereign independence.

3. From 1828 to about 1870, when Russian expansion on both sides of the Caspian Sea engulfed almost all the territory there which had been periodically under Persian rule; and when Persian

conflicts with Great Britain resulted in the final surrender of any Persian claims to territory in Afghanistan.

4. From about 1870 to 1906, when Russia and Great Britain intensified their rivalry for economic concessions and political influence in Persia, while the pressures were mounting which culminated in the revolution of 1906.

These developments will be mentioned chronologically and very briefly, starting with the reign of the somewhat Hajji Baba figure of the second ruler of the Qajar dynasty, whom Edward Browne describes as "the uxorious and philo-progenitive Fath Ali Shah." Fath Ali Shah came to the throne in 1797 and is famous among Persians for three things: his exceptionally long beard, his wasp-like waist, and his progeny. It is said that his children and grandchildren, during the forty-seven years of his mature life, numbered 2,000 and would have amounted to 10,000, twenty-one years later. Fifty-seven sons and forty-six daughters survived the Shah, as well as 296 grandsons and 292 granddaughters and 158 wives who had borne children to him. Since every male descendant of the Shah was entitled to the prefix Prince, the justification is apparent for the Persian saying, "Camels, lice, and Princes, are to be found everywhere."

Although not as bloodthirsty as his predecessors, Fath Ali Shah about 1800 did become suspicious of his Vizier and had him thrown into a cauldron of boiling oil, while killing his entire family, except one sickly boy. The Shah died at the age of sixty-eight on October 23, 1834. Avarice was his ruling passion, causing him to prefer to hoard jewels and gold rather than expend money on national defense or in developing the national economy.

FROM ABOUT 1800 TO 1814

In the year following Fath Ali Shah's accession, that is, in 1798, Napoleon invaded Egypt and enlisted the interest of the Russian Czar in a joint attempt to invade India overland. To forestall such an attempt, the British sent a mission to Fath Ali Shah in 1800. In return for a promise of munitions and the gift of a very large diamond, the Shah agreed to expel any French subject in Persia and to foster British trade. However, since the Shah had been unsuccessful in getting British aid against the Russians, who had resumed attacks on Erivan (Yerevan) and Enzeli (Pahlavi)

in 1804, he welcomed Napoleon's envoy on May 6, 1806. By the terms of the subsequent Treaty of Finkenstein in 1807, the Shah agreed to join France in an attack on Russia and to aid in an invasion of India, but refused to cede any Persian port to Napoleon. The same year, the French General Gardanne arrived with seventy officers to train a Persian army.¹

By the following year the situation had changed. Although Napoleon's threat to India appeared to have passed, along with the Shah's hopes of regaining Georgia, the treaty obligations between France and Persia were in effect. Another British envoy was therefore sent to Persia in the autumn of 1808 to try to oust the French. His proposals were welcomed by the Shah, and General Gardanne was given his passports. In 1810 a large staff of British officers arrived. On November 25, 1814, an Anglo-Persian treaty was signed. Among its provisions were that mutual assistance was promised in the case of aggression against either party; the Persian frontier with Russia was to be determined by negotiation between Persia, Russia, and Great Britain; and Great Britain promised to pay Persia a subsidy of 150,000 pounds sterling a year, which would not be stopped unless Persia engaged in an aggressive war.

In the meantime, despite Napoleon's invasion in 1812, Russia had resumed efforts to drive the Persians from the area west of the Caspian Sea. By the Treaty of Gulistan, signed on October 12, 1813, Persia surrendered most of her territory in the Caucasus north of the present frontier and agreed to maintain no navy on the Caspian Sea.

FROM 1814 TO 1828

However, the treaty was so vaguely worded that fighting again broke out in 1825. Despite Russia's simultaneous participation in the Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman government, by the end of 1827 Russian troops had occupied Tabriz and peace negotiations were under way. Great Britain, in alliance with Russia, was also engaged in the Greek War of Independence and for this and other reasons took no steps to aid Persia.

In 1828 the Treaty of Turkmanchai was signed. Persia surrendered all of the territory west of the Caspian Sea, north of the present boundary with Russia; agreed to an indemnity of

about 3 million pounds sterling; and signed a separate trade and security agreement which limited the duty on Russian imports to 5 per cent, granted free entry for goods for official use, allowed Russia the right to protect her Persian employees, and granted extraterritorial privileges for Russian subjects in Persia. The last item surrendered part of Persia's sovereign rights, with far-reaching consequences, because these concessions were subsequently demanded by most foreign countries for their nationals in Persia.

The Persians were badly defeated for a number of reasons, among which were the Shah's refusal to provide enough money for the army; the erratic leadership of the Princes in command; and the lack of discipline of the troops, who tended to be distracted from their main purpose by the lure of booty.

FROM 1828 TO ABOUT 1870

In 1834 Fath Ali Shah died. Fierce rivalries for the throne were unleashed, since the heir and favorite son had died the previous year. Fortunately for the rightful heir, Muhammad Shah, he was able to enter Tehran, accompanied by the Ministers of Great Britain and Russia and at the head of a considerable force, commanded by Sir Henry Lindsay Bethune, an Englishman who had been hired to build up a Persian army. The open intervention of these two powerful neighbors is of distinct significance as a forecast of subsequent Anglo-Russian intervention in Persia. The Shah was crowned on January 31, 1835. Six months later he had his Vizier strangled. On September 5, 1848, at the age of forty, the Shah died from complications stemming from the gout he had had since boyhood.

During the reign of Muhammad Shah, Persia attempted to compensate for the loss of territory in the west to Russia by turning to Turkoman areas and Afghanistan. In 1834 another large military mission had been provided by Great Britain, but it was withdrawn in 1836 due to hostility and lack of the Shah's support. Persian attacks on Afghanistan led to a rupture of diplomatic relations with Great Britain; and British troops occupied a Persian island in the Persian Gulf. Relations were restored in 1839, accompanied by the signature of a commercial agreement.

In the meantime, the Russians, responding to a Persian request of 1836 for aid against the Turkoman raiders, established in 1843

a naval station on the Persian island of Ashurada in the Caspian Sea.

On October 20, 1848, Nasir ed-Din Shah was crowned in Tehran. For three years he benefited from the loyal services of an able Vizier, to whom he had given his sister in marriage. But in due course, the customary activities of jealous rivals or opponents bore fruit. In 1851 the Minister was exiled to Kashan where he was treacherously murdered. On May 1, 1896, four days before the celebration of his entry into the fiftieth year of his reign, the Shah was assassinated by a revolutionary. He had made three trips to Europe, in 1873, 1878, and 1889; and in understanding of the West and of Persia's relations with it, was regarded by Sir Percy Sykes as probably far ahead of his countrymen. By some observers he was considered the best ruler produced by the dynasty; and by his subjects as the ablest man in his dominions.²

In 1856 Persian troops again attacked Afghanistan and Great Britain declared war on Persia. In 1857, following her defeat, Persia relinquished all claims to Afghan territory, granted capitulatory rights and commercial privileges to Great Britain, and promised to resort to Britain in case of dispute. By 1864 Russia had completed her conquests of territory west of the Caspian Sea and nine years later, in 1873, had completed similar conquests of practically independent areas east of the Caspian, establishing a common frontier between Russia and Persia and Afghanistan.

Up to this time, the principal British objectives in Persia were two, both interrelated: first, to establish and expand British trade; and second, to defend British possessions in India. At the same time, the principal Russian objective was to extend her territorial possessions as far into Persia as was feasible, while laying the foundations for a contest with Great Britain for commercial and political domination of Persia.

FROM ABOUT 1870 TO 1906

From about 1870 to the revolution in 1906, Anglo-Russian overt military pressure was replaced by a rapid intensification of economic and commercial rivalry which contributed to the revolution. The need for quicker communications between London and India, emphasized by the Mutiny, was met in 1864 by the inauguration of British efforts in Persia, which resulted in a

well-developed and efficient telegraph system across Persia from which the Persian government also benefited. Related also to the security of the British position in India and the Persian Gulf, were extensive, persistent, and successful British efforts over the years to delineate the boundaries between Persia and Turkey, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan.

Serious economic rivalry with Russia was initiated by the grant in 1872 to a British subject, Baron de Reuter, of a comprehensive, country-wide monopoly, which included railway construction, mining, and banking. While this concession was not developed and was, in fact, cancelled soon afterwards as impractical, its grant led promptly to private Russian demands for a railroad concession from the frontier to Tabriz, a Caspian Sea fisheries monopoly, and a concession for the construction of a toll road from the Russian frontier to Tabriz, which were granted and developed. Each of these called for some down payment to the Shah and promised a share of the prospective annual profits.

In 1878 Nasir ed-Din Shah requested and received Russian aid in organizing, equipping, and training a Persian Cossack regiment, a development of great subsequent significance.

In 1889 the Shah awarded de Reuter, in part compensation for the 40,000 pound sterling deposit he had made on the cancelled 1872 concession, the right to organize the Imperial Bank of Persia, a commercial bank with limited privilege of note issue. This was followed the next year by the award to another British subject of a monopoly of the production, sale, and export of tobacco. Russia promptly responded by demanding the right to introduce the Banque d'Escompte, an agency of the Russian Ministry of Finance, which did not operate on commercial banking principles, but rather as a political instrument.

The award of the tobacco monopoly proved to be a disaster for the Shah. Many adult Persians of both sexes habitually used tobacco and some undoubtedly resented paying money for it to a foreigner to provide for the extravagances of the Shah and Court. Furthermore, resentment was heightened by the dismay of the many Persian handlers and processors of tobacco, displaced in the course of the execution of the monopoly. Russian agents may also have contributed to the agitation. In any case, the climax came when the leading *Mujtahid* issued a religious order forbidding the use of tobacco which had passed through religiously unclean hands. This was universally obeyed, even in the Court.

The Shah was forced to cancel the concession in 1892 and to pay an indemnity of 500,000 pounds sterling, which he borrowed from the Imperial Bank.³ This loan constituted the beginning of Persia's national foreign debt. At the same time, the Russian Bank loaned the Shah about one million pounds sterling in return for a concession for a highway from Julfa to Tehran via Tabriz; certain oil and coal mining rights; and a revision of the Russo-Persian treaty to raise customs tariffs.

This was the state of Persia's relations with Russia and Great Britain in 1896 at the time of Nasir ed-Din's assassination at the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim, about five miles from Tehran. There is evidence that his granting of *any* foreign concessions was opposed, principally by some of the clerics, on the grounds that they represented an intrusion of foreign influence, dangerous to Persian society. But the conclusion is almost inescapable that the Shah's motive in granting concessions was not based primarily on their intrinsic benefit or damage to Persian society, but on the amount of revenue he could derive personally from them. There is also some evidence that he felt unable to refuse concessions and thought he might as well derive the greatest possible benefit from them by encouraging Anglo-Russian competition.

In any case, there were three other developments during the reign of Nasir ed-Din Shah which contributed revolutionary pressure; first, the public reminder of the power of the *Mujtahids*; second, the Babi movement; and third, the increasing role of the press.

The Mujtahids. The Persians of the Safavid and Qajar periods, as of today, belong to the minority Muslim sect of the Shia, expounded by *Mujtahids* and mullahs. According to Professor Browne, "the great practical difference between the ulema of the Sunnis and the Shia lies in their conception of the doctrine of *ijtihad*, or the discovery and authoritative enunciation of fresh religious truths, based on a comprehensive knowledge of the Scriptures and Traditions and arrived at by supreme effort and endeavor. . . ." ⁴ One who has attained this is called a *Mujtahid*. No such dignitary exists among the Sunnis.

In Shii doctrine, supreme temporal power belongs to the Twelfth and last Imam, who disappeared from view in the year 873-74, but is still living and will return in the last days to establish the Shii faith and fill the earth with justice. The Shah's exercise of temporal power was, therefore, regarded as illegal and

on sufferance. Religious power was vested in the *Mujtahids*, who were often the most powerful figures in the state, since they could, and often did, openly oppose the Shah successfully. The fact that the leading *Mujtahids* often lived at the Shii shrines at Karbala and Najaf in Turkish territory tended to strengthen their power with respect to the Shah. The principal immediate source of the power of the *Mujtahids* and mullahs lay in their concern with every department of human activity and their monopoly of knowledge of religious law (the only law in force) from the administration of which they derived their major income. The success with which the *Mujtahids* opposed Nasir ed-Din's award of the tobacco monopoly almost certainly encouraged their opposition to his successor's excesses which contributed to the revolution.

The Babi Movement. The founder of Babism was Sayyid Ali Muhammad, born in 1819 in Shiraz, the son of a grocer. Since he showed a religious disposition, he was sent to Karbala for study. At the age of twenty-four he proclaimed himself to be the *Bab*, or "Gate," implying that he was the gate through which man might achieve knowledge of the Twelfth Imam, or Mahdi, who had disappeared from view precisely a thousand years before, according to the lunar calendar. On returning to Shiraz from a pilgrimage to Mecca, he was examined by theologians to whom he declared that the mission of Muhammad was ended and that he had come to inaugurate a new era. He was pronounced insane and was beaten and imprisoned.

In the meantime, his followers increased and persecutions were instituted, primarily because of the obvious threat which his teaching posed to the clergy. He was removed to a prison on the Turkish frontier, but finally was ordered to be shot at Tabriz in 1850. When the smoke from the volley fired at him had rolled away, he was gone. The popular inclination to regard this as a miracle was shattered when it was discovered that the shots had cut the ropes which bound him and he had fled, only to be caught in a nearby room and shot. He was succeeded by a young man of nineteen, Mirza Yahya, known as *Subh-i-Ezel* or "Morning of Eternity," whom the *Bab* had apparently named. For some time his position was undisputed, although in 1852, owing to the persecution of Babis in Persia, he had fled to Baghdad. In 1863, he and his followers were transferred to Adrianople at the request of the Shah. From Babism emerged Bahaism.

Meanwhile, armed bands of Babis in Khurasan, Mazandaran, and elsewhere roamed the country proclaiming the advent of the expected Mahdi. In 1850, there were scattered risings of followers of the *Bab*, who preached, among other things, the removal of class distinctions. A conspiracy to murder the Grand Vizier was uncovered; and in 1852 three Babis, attempting to assassinate the Shah, wounded him in the thigh. The result was a reign of terror during which perhaps forty thousand Babis were killed, some after torture. The bravery of the Babis won the sympathy not only of some of their countrymen, but of Europeans resident in Tehran; and it is believed that their heroism gained them many converts. The official excesses which marked the suppression of their movement intensified the resentment against the tyranny of the government and contributed to the revolutionary pressures.

The Press. Although the first Persian newspaper appeared about 1851, those which exerted the strongest revolutionary influence were written and published by Persians in Cairo, London, and Calcutta. Of these the most violent was *Qanun* (The Law), first published in London in 1890. Although its circulation in Persia was often forbidden, its contents were nevertheless known. In it the Shah and the Grand Vizier were attacked and a fixed code of law and the assembly of a Parliament were demanded.

Thanks to the ingenuity of Nasir ed-Din's immediate entourage, the body of the murdered Shah was propped up for the return trip to Tehran and public announcement of his death was postponed until the heir apparent in Tabriz had been notified. Muzaffar ed-Din left Tabriz, accompanied by the British and Russian representatives, and was crowned in peace, the Cossacks having maintained order in Tehran. However, the new Shah, after years of indolence and excess in Tabriz, was in bad health and wished almost at once to go to Europe for a cure. He was, furthermore, surrounded by a hoard of greedy and expectant followers. But there was insufficient money. So, in 1900, British banks having declined a loan, the Shah obtained a little over 3 million pounds sterling from the Russian Banque d'Escompte with the following provisions: the Imperial Bank loan was to be paid off and no foreign loans were to be contracted for ten years without Russian consent; Persian customs receipts, except from the Gulf ports, were pledged as security for the loan; and customs rates were not to be lowered without Russian consent.

In the meantime, mineral rights in northern Persia had been granted to a Russian mining company and, to restore the political balance and get more revenue, the Shah in 1901 granted a British subject, William Knox D'Arcy, an oil concession covering the entire country, with the exception of the five northern provinces adjacent to Russia. From this concession was to evolve the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

The next success for the Russians occurred in 1903 when the Shah again needed money. In 1898 a Belgian, Monsieur Naus, had been hired to take charge of the customs offices in Kerman-shah and Tabriz. He had been so successful in increasing revenues that the entire customs administration, except for Mohammareh (Khorramshahr) near the Persian Gulf, had been placed in his charge and was administered by Belgian colleagues. As mentioned above on page 9, one of the clauses of the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1892 provided for a revision of the tariffs. A new tariff was secretly negotiated by Monsieur Naus and the Russians while the Shah was on a European trip. It was ratified in December, 1902, and announced in February, 1903. The new rates were highly advantageous to Russian traders and equally disadvantageous to those of Great Britain. For example, the rates on imports of oil and sugar — two major Russian items — were reduced from 5 per cent to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent, respectively; whereas the rate on tea — a major British import — was raised from 5 per cent to 100 per cent.⁵ The net result was to make British imports pay for the Shah's Russian loan; but despite this, British trade grew, along with a lively trade in smuggled tea.

To counter this development, Britain took two actions: first, an agreement was negotiated recognizing the new tariffs in the hope of preventing more unfavorable changes; and second, the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, visited the Persian Gulf with a naval squadron on a good-will tour.

But it was, of course, ultimately the Persian people who paid for these loans, which by now equalled the government's total revenue for one year. The mood of some was not sweetened by the tremendous fortune which Monsieur Naus was reported to have been amassing.

In the meantime, forces pressing for reform were becoming focused. The aspiration for a constitution was not something which developed suddenly or spontaneously. It was the result of many factors, among which were the evolution of liberal political

concepts among certain religious leaders; the penetration of European ideas into Persia, sparked by Persian publications in London and Cairo; the examples set by Western technicians and missionaries in Persia; the fermentation of new ideas among groups of Persians living in exile; the upsurge of emotion resulting from Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905; and the impact of the abortive Russian revolution of the same year. Despite the fact that these all contributed to pressures for change in Persia, it is not surprising that both the range of aspirations and the concepts of goals differed widely in nature and precision.

The first action which culminated in the revolution was a protest against the Grand Vizier, who was usually the Shah's chief aid, controlling all the departments of the government. Ordinarily, the Grand Vizier was a man of no family, since the Shah regarded it as too dangerous to appoint a prince of the blood or a great noble. The Grand Vizier, for example, during the last years of Nasir ed-Din's reign and the first of Muzaffar ed-Din was the Amin es-Sultan, "The Trusted of the Monarch." He is described by Sykes this way: "Son of a royal cup-bearer and grandson of a Georgian cook of Gurtan, near Isfahan, Amin es-Sultan was typically Persian in his opportunism, his political acuteness, his charming manners, and his lack of business qualities." ⁶

At the time of the second dismissal of Amin es-Sultan in 1903, Sykes goes on to describe the situation as follows: "He had made an alliance with the Shah's chief adviser for a division of the spoil. Governments were put up for sale, grain was hoarded and sold for the benefit of the two conspirators, rich men were summoned to Tehran and forced to disgorge large sums of money, and even the lives of all Persian subjects were at their mercy." In 1904, Ayn ed-Dowleh, "The Eye of the State," became Grand Vizier. He was an exception in that he was a prince of the blood and son-in-law of the Shah, whom he had served in Tabriz as Master of the Horse.

The provincial system of government at about this time was as follows. Aside from the post of Governor-General of Azerbaijan, reserved for the Crown Prince, governorships were assigned in return for gifts to the Shah and the Grand Vizier. The incumbent assumed responsibility for the revenues as laid down, but was generally free to collect as much more as possible. The usual method of accomplishing this was to sell every provincial

post at auction. The system, of course, resulted in terrible acts of tyranny. Persian grandees who constituted the governing class were merciless in their exactions and showed little interest in the welfare of their country.

Sir Percy Sykes gives an example of the revenues collected by the Governor-General of Khurasan in 1905. There were five types of taxes, but the Governor, through his Vizier, collected about 30,000 pounds sterling from this source above the amount required for the established revenue. Of this, 14,000 pounds was paid to the Shah and about 6,000 to the Grand Vizier. But this was supplemented by sums from five other sources: namely, by levying a percentage on all cash pensions and mixing at least 20 per cent of earth in the grants of grain; by deriving profits from the administration of "justice," from the sale of minor governorships and other posts, from the sending of special officials to inquire into real or invented complaints, and from other windfalls, such as the death of a rich man from whose heirs the Governor-General extorted large sums.⁷ These practices naturally contributed to a demand for reform.

The first instance of actual revolt was caused when the Governor of Tehran in 1905 gave some *sayyids*⁸ and merchants the *bastinado*⁹ on charges of making a corner in sugar. On this occasion in Tehran a number of merchants, in protest, took refuge, or *bast*,¹⁰ in the *masjid-i-shah* (Shah's mosque) where they were joined by some of the chief mullahs. They were driven out at the request of the Grand Vizier, but proceeded to take refuge at the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim, where their numbers increased.

The purpose of those who participated in the *bast* of December, 1905, was to bring about the dismissal of the Grand Vizier.¹¹ They were aided by the Crown Prince and the ex-Grand Vizier, who sought the removal of Ayn ed-Dowleh for their own personal reasons. The Shah finally yielded, promising the dismissal of the Vizier and the convocation of an *adalat khaneh* (House of Justice). At this time there was no demand for a Constitution.

However, by the spring of 1906, the Shah had taken no action other than to issue a proclamation promising Courts of Justice, a new Code, and a Council to consider the question of reforms. In August, a leading *Mujtahid* was arrested for denouncing the Grand Vizier. A mob collected, shots were fired by the soldiers, and a student, who was also a *sayyid*, was killed. At the funeral,

fifteen more persons were killed during the disturbances and *bast* was taken in the *masjid-i-jami* (Mosque of Assembly). The *Mujtahids* alone were given permission to depart for Qum, but on the way they threatened to leave Persia in a body if the Shah did not fulfill his promises. This they subsequently did, stopping all legal transactions in the country.

At the same time, Ayn ed-Dowleh ordered that the bazaars, which had been closed in protest, be reopened, threatening to loot them if they remained closed. Thereupon, a delegation of leading merchants and bankers sought and received assurances that they would not be expelled by force if they took *bast* in the grounds of the British Legation. Their numbers soon increased to about 12,000. Their demands were for the dismissal of Ayn ed-Dowleh, the promulgation of a Code of Laws, and the recall of the exiled *Mujtahids*. The Shah yielded again and replaced the Grand Vizier. But in the meantime, under the instigation of a few Europeanized Persians, the demands had been expanded to include a representative National Assembly with guarantees of the Shah's good faith.

As a result of negotiations, carried on through a British representative, the Shah issued an order on August 5, 1906, granting a National Assembly and promising reforms, a Court of Justice, and amnesty. All demands had been won on paper without civil war. But Ayn ed-Dowleh reappeared and persuaded the Shah not to sign the regulations for the Assembly. However, on the advice of British and Russian representatives, the Shah ordered the ex-Grand Vizier to go to his estate in Khurasan and then signed the published document.

The Shah's rescript provided for an Assembly of delegates to be elected by seven groups or classes within the population. These were the Princes, the *Mujtahids*, members of the Qajar family, the nobles and notables, the landowners, the merchants, and the guilds. The Assembly was to draft its own regulations and provisions and submit proposals to the Shah for ratification. It is significant that only a small percentage of the population was to participate in the selection of the members of the Assembly, but, even so, this concession terminated the Shah's despotic power.

Although the number of Assembly members was to be 136, the Assembly was formally opened by Muzaffar ed-Din Shah in October, 1906, when the sixty-four members from Tehran had been elected. The Shah was very ill at the time, but was still

able on December 30, 1906, to sign the Constitution, which had been drafted in the meantime. He died on January 4, 1907, and was succeeded by the heir apparent, Muhammad Ali, who swore allegiance to the Constitution, but was soon engaged in efforts to destroy it.

The Constitution was drafted by a committee and is, in general, based on that of Belgium. The principal concern of the drafters was to establish a firm check on the Shah's previous right of granting foreign concessions, contracting foreign loans, selling the public domain, or transferring public revenue. This is achieved in paragraphs 22 through 26, which require Assembly, or Majlis, approval or authorization for all such transactions.

The oath which every member of the Majlis is required to take includes loyalty to the Shah and a promise not to betray the institution of the monarchy. Provision was also made for a Senate of sixty members, half to be appointed by the Shah. The Shah was given the right under certain conditions to dissolve the Assembly with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate and of the Cabinet. These provisions with respect to the Senate aroused strong opposition from many constitutionalists, but the need for speed, in view of the Shah's worsening health, overcame their objections. Despite this provision, forty-three years were to pass before a Senate was convened.¹²

SOURCES OF DISUNIFYING PRESSURES IN MODERN IRAN

The history of Persia since 1900 has two persistent features: first, the effort to establish a constitutional government; and second, the effort to raise the nation onto the plane of a modern industrialized state. But a prevalent characteristic of government in Persia since 1900 is that it has been by individuals or groups of individuals rather than by law.¹ Perhaps the reasons for this become more intelligible if one bears in mind the six following facts:


1. Until December 30, 1906, the government of Persia was a despotism under the Shah.

2. On that date constitutional government was granted to a population totally inexperienced in that type of government and almost totally lacking in an understanding of the elementary principles of constitutional government, despite the fact that there had been in the past some measure of local self-government in the villages and among the tribes.

3. A counterrevolution to destroy the Constitution, accompanied by Russian armed occupation of northern areas, kept the country in a turmoil until the First World War.

4. Despite Persia's neutrality, it became an arena of fighting in the First World War, following a Turkish invasion in 1914. Russian troops and local forces under Russian command were in occupation in the north; and British troops and local forces under British command were in occupation in the south. After the Russian Revolution, troops under British command were also moved into northern Persia and constituted the only significant force for the maintenance of order in the country. In the spring of 1921 the last British forces were withdrawn, but some Soviet troops remained in Persia on one pretext or another until the ultimate evacuation of Enzeli (Pahlavi) in September, 1921.

5. From 1921 to August, 1941, the Persian government was under the progressively autocratic domination of Reza Khan



1325
(1325)



IRAN

(PERSIA)

KEY

Main Road —

Secondary Road —

Railroad ---

Scale 1:4,000,000

Mohammareh (Kharramshahr)

Meshed (Mashhad)

Enzeli (Pahlavi)

ERIVAN (YEREVAN)



who became Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925, founding a new dynasty.

6. From August 25, 1941, to March 2, 1946, Persia was again occupied by Allied forces: the Russians in the north, the British and Americans in the south. The last Soviet troops were not withdrawn until May 9, 1946.

It seems clear from this brief reference to the highlights since 1900 that the atmosphere in Persia was distinctly unfavorable to the orderly evolution of constitutional government, even if the short period of fifty years had been sufficient, which would clearly not have been the case. The result is that many of the factors characteristic of Persia before the constitutional era have continued to exert strong, though in some cases weakening, influence.²

The principal factors are three:

1. National disunity, stemming principally from geographical features, the composition of the population, social organization, and social customs.

2. Foreign intervention or influence exercised through a variety of means.

3. Opportunism, most pronounced in the efforts of individual Persians to seek personal security from alliances with the changing dominant groups within the country or from services to foreign powers in advancing objectives which might or might not be in the national interest.³

GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES, COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, AND SOCIAL CUSTOMS

To take first the factors contributing to national disunity — geography, composition of the population, social organization, and social customs. Persia is a country about the size of the United States east of the Mississippi, with the New England states lopped off. The border areas, except on the east, consist of a series of high mountain ranges running roughly parallel to the frontiers. The only areas outside of the ranges are the fertile rice, tea, and timber provinces along the southern shore of the Caspian Sea and the flat plains on the southwest where the large oil refinery at Abadan is located, merging into the plains of Iraq. The center of the country consists of a vast, more or less sandy, desert which leaves a comparatively narrow strip of cultivable land between it and the mountains on the north, west, and south, and the frontier of Afghanistan on the east.

The tracks or roads which connect the various sections of the country must wind over mountain passes, follow the valleys between the ranges, or skirt the desert. There are no roads which cross the desert from north to south and only two roads, passable with difficulty, which cross it from west to east. The distances by road from Tehran, the capital, to the provincial capitals are long. Although one can now go by air twice a week, it still takes two days of hard driving, partly because of the condition of the roads, to go from Tehran east to Meshed (Mashhad), the capital of Khurasan province; or from Tehran south via Isfahan to Shiraz, the capital of the province of Fars.

Until the mid-twenties movement and transportation overland were almost exclusively on foot, on donkey, camel, or horseback, or in some type of horse-drawn conveyance — a carriage for persons, a heavy, springless wagon for merchandise.⁴ Railroad service was inaugurated in 1938 over the Trans-Iranian Railway from Bandar Shapur on the Persian Gulf to Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea, with a branch service from Tehran to Mianeh, finally opened to Tabriz in 1958; and service was inaugurated in 1957 from Tehran to Meshed (Mashhad). There has also been a substantial expansion of the road system since 1925. But the railroad and roads still fail to tie the country together in an effective network and many of the estimated 45,000 villages which dot the cultivable areas are still inaccessible to motor transport.

It is inevitable under these circumstances that local necessities, prejudices, and anxieties should maintain a vitality which has constituted a major obstacle to the evolution of national unity throughout history.

To turn to the disunifying pressures which stem from the composition of the population of Persia, the most striking feature is provided by the minority groups. Of these the most significant politically is the Turki-speaking minority, concentrated across northern Persia, particularly in the province of Azerbaijan; a group which owes its language and its characteristics to the waves of Turkish invaders who crossed Persia in the 11th and 14th centuries on their way to Asia Minor. This minority group had the closest ties with the population of the Russian Caucasus areas; provided the bulk of the personnel in the Persian Cossack Brigade, which played a significant role in Persia from the late 19th century until 1922; provided at Tabriz one of the major

sources of support for the constitutionalist movement; and had the widest direct and continuous experience of Czarist and Soviet military and economic penetration.

For a hundred years before Reza Shah, successive Qajar Crown Princes had been named Governor-General of Azerbaijan with the capital at Tabriz. Whenever one was in residence the provincial inhabitants suffered from the rapacity of his large entourage.⁵ The traditional condescension of the Persian-speaking majority toward this part of the population contributed to national disunity.

The other major source of disunity within the population consists of the tribal groups, nomadic, transhumant, or sedentary, concentrated in the peripheral areas of Persia, but often widely scattered.⁶ The major groups starting at the Caspian Sea and moving counterclockwise are the Shahsevans, the Kurds, the Lurs, the Bakhtiaris, the Arabs, the Qashqais, the Khamseh, the Baluchis, the Hazaras, and the Turkomans. The tribes constitute about one-fifth to one-quarter of the population. During the period before the Constitution the tribal levies under their chiefs had constituted the major source of the Shah's military force. The Bakhtiari tribesmen made a significant contribution to the forces fighting to prevent the destruction of the constitutional government from 1909 to 1911. Up to the mid-twenties tribal leaders had exercised a large measure of independence in their respective areas. They covered the entrance and egress routes to rich areas, extorted payment from anyone using the paths across their territory, and indulged in varying degrees of pillage and feuding. Most of these tribes were not of Persian extraction and each had its own language or dialect and customs. These factors contributed to the inability of the tribes to unite to any significant extent for any prolonged period, so that their potential power has never been fully exerted. Many tribal leaders before Reza Shah were rich and powerful, but their loyalty to the Shah was always doubtful.

In addition to the Turki-speaking and tribal minorities, there are also those of ethnic and religious groups, such as the Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, all of whom are subject to some discrimination from the Persian majority which has regarded each with some degree of distrust, though in numbers they represented perhaps only one-tenth of the population.

To turn to the disunifying pressures which stem from the

social organization in Iran, the most striking feature is the disparity between the small number of comparatively rich Iranians and the large mass of extremely poor, with a comparatively small, though increasing, number in between.⁷ At the time of the constitutional movement fifty years ago in 1906 the population could be divided simply into three parts: 1) the Shah and Court; 2) the aristocracy (including tribal leaders), the clergy, and the merchants; and 3) the bulk of the population, the peasants, including the tribesmen devoted to animal husbandry. Despotic power was in the hands of the Shah whose decisions were influenced by a small group of advisers and courtiers, headed by the Grand Vizier. The impact of the Shah's power was felt by the intermediate group who served at times and to some extent as a buffer between the Court and the peasants.

The power of the aristocracy, including tribal leaders, lay in its ownership of land or livestock and in the family ties which an individual was able to establish or strengthen by marriage.⁸ The practice of polygyny obviously resulted in the establishment of large family groups bound by blood relationship and able usually to rely to some extent on the support and assistance of individuals within the group. It was from the aristocracy that the leadership of the Shah's forces and the government bureaucracy was largely staffed; and it was predominantly this group which benefited from the perquisites and profits of government office. The individuals of each group were therefore engaged in a ceaseless effort to maintain their representatives in positions of power and to bring about the disgrace and dismissal from power of non-family members.⁹

The aristocratic tradition still plays a highly significant role in Iranian society. It therefore seems appropriate at this point to outline briefly its major characteristics. The aristocrat derived his income from his villages, usually under the direct administration of a representative of his choice;¹⁰ from pensions bestowed upon him or his forebears by the Shah; from personal *waqfs* (religious endowments) which either he or his forebears had established for his benefit; and from the sums which he, as a government official, was able to retain over and above the sums which custom or prudence induced him to pay to the Shah and his superiors in office.

The derivation of the largest possible personal profit from government office was not only expected but was regarded as his

official right.¹¹ Not only did the official pay his superiors in some form or other for his post, but he, in turn, received similar payment from his subordinates for their posts. The practice was no secret nor did any stigma attach to it. It was only later that the Western attitude toward peculation by public officials came under discussion and ostensibly won public approval.

The aristocrat received his education from private tutors, supplemented sometimes by study or travel abroad. The training tended to be in languages, literature, philosophy, and the arts, practical application to current circumstances being virtually ignored. The customs and practices of polite society and his attitude toward other segments of the population he acquired by practice and observation under the supervision of tutors. The most striking omission from his education was the lack of experience in manual labor. For that reason, inability to work with one's hands came to be a prominent attribute of an aristocrat; and the pronounced stigma attached to such work has had far-reaching effects on attempts to industrialize the economy of Iran. It is still widely regarded in Iran as beneath the dignity of anyone with aristocratic pretensions to perform manual labor. The view has tended to produce wide acceptance of a belief that a thorough theoretical knowledge of a mechanical operation makes practical experience unnecessary and suffices to qualify the possessor for a managerial position to which greater popular prestige is attached.

The occupations regarded as appropriate for the aristocrat included hunting, gambling, conversation, participation in the endless intrigues of government, and, of course, procreation of a large progeny. An aristocrat usually spent his life surrounded by a large body of dependents, reported in the case of one grandee to have numbered 3,000,¹² who looked to him for support and protection and who had, therefore, a direct personal interest in his fortunes. The dependents, aside from blood relatives of the aristocrat, included household and personal servants and their families — both the servants he had engaged and those he had inherited — gardeners, stable-boys, grooms, gun-bearers, guards and secretaries, as well as the tradesmen and artisans who catered to the needs of the establishment. The prestige of the aristocrat in the public view was often measured by the size and splendor of his entourage. This attitude helps perhaps to explain the lack of privacy which is so striking a feature of social life in Iran

today. It also helps to explain an aristocrat's sources of power. The aristocrats in Persian society have been traditionally tribal leaders as well. They normally prided themselves on their skill in horsemanship and marksmanship which constituted the predominant elements in the tribal leader's education. The aristocrat tended to depend heavily on the support of his tribal kinsmen and when in trouble usually returned to his tribe. The tribal instincts of those who entered service at the Court or in the government tended to be glossed over by the polite and sophisticated attitudes characteristic of those circles, but they were seldom far below the surface.

The next most significant element in the society was the clergy. The power of the clergy stemmed from their monopoly of knowledge and interpretation of the law; from the influence which they enjoyed over the population in general through the exercise of their professional functions;¹³ from their participation in the government bureaucracy; from relationships through marriage; and from their administrative control of *waqf*, such as villages or sources of irrigation water.

Before the constitutional period the influence of clerical leaders upon the Shah tended to be very strong. The Constitution declares that the official religion is Islam and that the true sect is the Jaafariya (commonly known as the Shia) which the Shah is required to profess and propagate. The same document grants to a body of five theologians the right to set aside any law which may contravene the holy principles of Islam, although this provision appears in practice to have been virtually ignored. The clerical group also included the numerous *sayyids* who claimed certain prerogatives from the rest of the population and enjoyed normally the very valuable right of exemption from capital punishment.

Members of the clergy were free to marry and, like all other Muslims, were permitted to have four legal wives at one time. They were also under no restrictions on the acquisition of property. Since they were faced with the same economic pressures as other members of the community, it is not surprising that, whenever possible, some employed the same methods of intrigue, extortion, and conciliation to acquire and retain security or wealth as were used by the aristocrats. In this pursuit they were of course aided greatly by an almost exclusive control of courts and legal procedures.

The third section of the population which stood between the Shah and the peasants was composed of the merchants, as distinct from the small shopkeepers. Their numbers were comparatively small, but the elements of their trade which were of mutual concern appear to have given them greater cohesion than other segments of the population. The tangible nature of their activities tended to place their relationships with foreign merchants and their experience in foreign markets on a distinctly different basis than those of other Persians. At the same time they appear to have been among the staunchest adherents and most faithful practitioners of their faiths. They enjoyed an exceptionally high reputation for dependability in their business transactions.¹⁴ It was perhaps due to the business needs of this group that commercial centers in Iran have become famous for the variety of news which reaches them and the speed with which it is circulated.

The power of the merchants stemmed primarily from the fact that their services in buying, collecting, exporting, importing, or distributing major national products, such as rugs or opium, and imports, such as sugar and tea, directly affected the incomes of the Shah, the aristocracy, and the bureaucracy. The merchants were also the major potential source of loans. Among their principal concerns were the safe and prompt transportation of their merchandise; the maintenance of an atmosphere in foreign relations favorable to profitable trade; and the prevention of excessive financial loss through taxation and bureaucratic interference and extortion.

They therefore had a direct interest in the maintenance of internal security, the staffing of high government posts, and the preservation of national financial credit. It was primarily the extortionate demands and the threat to the national credit, entailed in the Russian loans to the Shahs to finance their trips to Europe, which aligned the merchants in 1906 on the side of the constitutionalists. And it was the opposition of the merchants, plus that of the clerics and politicians, based upon fear of foreign interference (usually tied in with the terms of foreign loans), which accounts largely for the strong popular opposition to such loans that has been a characteristic Persian attitude since 1906.

Why then did this group — the aristocracy, the clergy, and the merchants — exert strong disruptive pressures on national unity? The reason was that, despite the ostensible unity deriving

from their allegiance to the Shah, their common adherence to the Shia, and their devotion to Persian culture, the individuals had basically one over-riding goal, namely to enhance their personal security and profits at any cost.¹⁵ The incentive of personal profit presents no novelty to Westerners whose attitudes are based upon private enterprise, but the difference lies in the checks. In the West, controls are exercised by law, community pressures, and individual conscience. In Iran, different attitudes employed different checks.

The profit was composed of personal security, wealth, or prestige and the appetite was often insatiable. The ruthlessness was checked fundamentally only by the threat of physical force. The ultimate check, of course, was execution under order of the Shah, either openly or surreptitiously, by some such means as poison or strangulation, accompanied by confiscation of the victim's property. Even in this case, some provision of custom or law seems to have left the heirs a minimum of shelter. However, short of the ultimate check, there were virtually endless devices in a highly personalized society by which the individual could limit his losses until more favorable circumstances permitted him to recover them. Dramatic fluctuations in personal fortunes constitute one of the most striking aspects of all Iranian history.

The peasants constituted the vast majority of the population, but were concerned exclusively with their immediate, pressing, personal problems; had only a vague conception of the Shah as the embodiment of a beneficent power far away and far above them; and had no interest in or understanding of the national government. This group included the nomadic tribesmen and was usually also regarded as including urban manual workers and petty landlords living in the villages, whose attitudes and style of living closely resembled those of the peasants, at least through most of the Reza Shah period.

The annual income of the peasant consisted of cash and produce and was derived basically from the manual labor provided by himself and all the members of his household—old and young, male and female. This basic income varied in amount from area to area, depending upon the type of crop, the fertility of the soil, the supply of water for irrigation, and the local system of division with the landowner. It was augmented if the peasant was also able to supply the labor of an ox or donkey or to own a few sheep or goats; and it was sometimes supplemented by in-

come from rug-weaving or other handicraft. The actual administration of agricultural operations — assignment of lands, determination of crops, directions for planting, cultivation, and harvesting, and the distribution and disposal of the produce — was in the hands of a local superintendent appointed by the owner of the village. The peasant was at the same time required to perform certain free services for the owner of the village.¹⁶ From this meagre income the peasant had not only to feed and clothe his family, but also to contribute to the support of the local baker, mullah, or bath-keeper, if there were one.

The major assaults upon his income and possessions were made by social superiors¹⁷ and government officials.¹⁸ In the social organization the peasant was in a position similar to that of a soldier in the military organization. There was no one within either group from whom the peasant or soldier could recoup the sums extracted by superiors. To the pillaging of robbers and the depredations of military forces, from which the peasant had always suffered in times of unrest and insecurity, was added, after the introduction of the Constitution, a burgeoning of the bureaucracy. The basis of the power of these officials over the peasants was force — visible in arms carried by the gendarmes and the military and implicit in the threats of arrest and detention employed by the civil authorities. The tribute laid on the peasants by these officials was, generally speaking, very heavy, partly because their pay was inadequate, but even more because of the dominant predatory attitude already referred to. It was not unusual in the pre-Reza Shah days for a provincial official to acquire property in the area of his assignment.

It might be argued that the crudity and brutality of official methods were required by the stubborn resistance of the peasants to the payment of their legal dues; but this argument deserves little consideration in view of the fact that the peasant was, in practice, unable to avail himself of the theoretical means of obtaining redress. His chances were probably better under the patriarchal system prevailing before the undermining of the responsibility of the large landlords and its replacement by that of a cumbersome bureaucracy.

The result of these circumstances was to arouse among the peasants strong distrust and distaste for government officials and a lack of confidence in official pronouncements and promises. The disunifying pressure from this source was enhanced by the isola-

tion of many villages which resulted in a tenacious devotion to local interests.¹⁹

The fourth of the factors contributing to national disunity is social customs, including those of the tribal and other ethnic and religious minorities, each with its peculiar customs and traditions. It seems clear that the creation of an effective national unity would require either the destruction of these divisive characteristics or their subordination to a predominant institution or ideal. The latter was the only feasible course and it required the leadership or at least the cooperation of the ethnic Persian majority.²⁰ It is therefore appropriate to examine the capabilities of this group.

The distinctive unifying forces among the ethnic Persians were their common language and their cultural heritage, rich in content and experience, expressed particularly in poetry. These tended to give the Persians a sense of pride and superiority, not only toward the minorities, but toward foreigners as well. In some cases this sense was intensified by the consideration of the Shia as the only true religious faith. Related to this attitude was the fact that there had been over the centuries a subtle intermingling with Koranic teaching of beliefs and practices prevalent among the Persians in the pre-Islamic period.

By 1900 the ethnic Persians had evolved a society which was remarkable, if not unique, for its sophistication and ability to maintain its position almost without the use of physical force. An elaborate system of forms of address and custom reduced outward signs of disagreement or friction in human relations to a minimum, while carefully maintaining a clear distinction between the social positions of the individuals involved. This practice helped to preserve the public prestige of the individual, upon which great importance was placed.

A prevalent manifestation of this system at work in government was the committee. The use of a committee has the immediate advantage of delaying a decision and so allowing time for outside negotiations to run their course, in this way avoiding the appearance of open conflict. Another advantage of the committee was that it dispersed and confused responsibility, thereby making it difficult for individuals who might suffer damage as a result of committee action to focus their resentment on any single individual. The system was also manifested in the usual organization and operations of a committee. In practice, the oldest or most dis-

tinguished member was usually selected as chairman and his views tended to be accepted ostensibly by the junior members without significant dispute. But even so, the mechanics of the committee made it difficult to pin the entire responsibility on the chairman.

However, despite the appearance of harmony and acquiescence, disagreements and conflicts existed and were often bitter. There might be an endless series of plausible excuses for the non-fulfillment of what had been regarded as an agreement, although if at all possible the person who was alleged to have made the commitment would avoid giving a flat refusal. In other cases one or more third parties would undertake to settle the conflict, usually with the actual or implied receipt of a reward for their efforts. The result was often a prolonged and very complicated series of intrigues in which families and dependents of the contestants became involved if the threat were of a very serious nature. The points to be stressed here are that such negotiations were carried on between individuals on a person to person basis and employed as instruments every form of pressure or persuasion short of physical force; and that they were carried on outside of the formal framework of the courts and civil law.²¹

This procedure was successful in a society in which time was of little consequence and where mental agility and imagination in attack and defense were highly prized. But the procedure had two serious consequences for the Persians: among non-Persians generally it won them a reputation for dishonesty and bad faith;²² and among the tribesmen and the more pugnacious foreigners, their reluctance to resort to physical force won them a reputation for cowardice²³ and effeminacy. Fortunately for the reputation of the Persians, there have been instances in which both accusations have proven to be false.

It is true that the practice of polygyny, plus a variety of incentives, has led over the years to a considerable intermingling of Persian and minority strains in Iran, but the outline of the basic attitudes of the various segments of the population is still valid. It therefore seems clear that the ethnic Persian majority itself also contributed to the forces militating against effective national unity.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION, INTERFERENCE, OR INFLUENCE

Foreign intervention, interference, and influence were encouraged by the disunifying factors which have just been dis-

cussed as characteristic of the Persian population. Armed intervention such as the movement of Czarist troops to Tabriz in 1911 or the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August, 1941, is easily recognized and explained. But to draw a line between foreign interference and foreign influence is often difficult.

"Interference" implies meddling in an unwelcome sense, whereas "influence," while it may in fact be the same meddling, may be regarded in a welcome sense. It is not surprising to find that foreign activities in Iran are described simultaneously by some Iranians as "interference" and by others as "influence." Most Iranians would deplore and denounce foreign interference as an affront to the national dignity; and, indeed, all nations tend to proclaim that whatever they may do in another country is not "interference." On the other hand, many Iranians would welcome and accept foreign influence, even though they might view it from the point of view of personal, rather than national, interest.

When the American banker, Morgan Shuster, was Treasurer-General of Persia in 1911 he organized a body of Treasury Gendarmes to enforce the orders of the Treasury.²⁴ Under orders of the Cabinet, through the Treasurer-General, gendarmes were sent to confiscate the Tehran property of a certain Prince who had been exceptionally remiss in paying his taxes. They were prevented from carrying out their orders by the physical intervention of Czarist officials who claimed that the Prince was under Russian protection. The opponents of constitutional government would describe the action of the Treasurer-General as American interference. On the other hand, the defenders of the Constitution would describe the action of the consular officials as Russian interference. From the national point of view the attempt of an American employee of the Persian government to carry out a legitimate order of the government could, at most, be described as an example of American influence.

For convenience in attempting to explain the Persian attitude toward foreign activities in Iran, foreigners might be divided into three categories: accredited representatives of foreign powers, employees of the Persian government, and private individuals, including Christian missionaries, scientists, and businessmen. This division was complicated after the signature of the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921 because private trading by Russians was abolished or at least severely restricted, with increased Soviet supervision of Russian merchants in Persia. It might also be noted that foreign

activities, except in wartime, were brought somewhat out of focus by their concentration in the cities, especially in Tehran and in the area of oil operations. Their impact was, therefore, primarily on the urban population. It is also of some pertinence that the great majority of foreigners conducted their affairs in European languages or through interpreters with all of the inherent risks of misunderstanding and misrepresentation.

One would have a clear conception of the situation in Persia at various times since 1900, if one could imagine say Massachusetts of a hundred years ago as an independent nation with the following features: Belgians administer the customs service on the eastern seaboard and along the northern frontier; Swedish officers command the state police as well as the municipal police of Boston; Russian officers staff and command the National Guard, supplied with Russian equipment at public expense; Hungarians with broad executive powers administer the Treasury and collect taxes with a Hungarian chief in each county seat; the Dutch own and operate the only telegraph line in the country with Indian employees; French professors lecture in French at Harvard; the Dutch own and manage the only bank (the New England Trust Co.), staffed largely with Puerto Ricans, with a branch in each county seat; a Dutch company owns and manages with its own personnel the only large industrial operation (textiles), employing a large number of Indians; and the Dutch and Russian governments maintain large legations in Boston with consulates in the larger cities, such as Worcester, Springfield, etc., all guarded by substantial detachments of uniformed Dutch or Russian troops who escort legation or consular officials whenever they leave their compounds. These are only some of the types of foreign activity present at some time in Iran, by no means all of them. While some citizens of Massachusetts as, for example, those with enough initiative to learn Dutch, Hungarian, etc., and so to obtain employment, or those who profited because of influence or knowledge useful to the foreigners, might not find the situation unpalatable, by and large the people of Massachusetts would certainly resent the state of affairs and try to change it, despite the likelihood that some of the activities might actually be highly beneficial to them.

This was also the feeling of the Persians. One might then inquire briefly how such a situation arose. The explanation is

perhaps to be found in the disunifying pressures already outlined and in the prevalent practice of virtually unrestricted pursuit of personal profit, reflected in government by individuals rather than by law. The result of all this was that within the population there was no force sufficiently united to oppose antinational foreign pressures or enticements successfully.

The practice of employing foreign advisers falls into a somewhat special category. It was only under very exceptional circumstances that an adviser was granted executive powers. The ostensible reason for engaging a foreign adviser was to increase the national revenue or reduce national expense by improving the effectiveness of a given ministry or service, usually by administrative devices such as streamlining the organization and operations and defining responsibilities with more precision. But there were also usually other reasons, particularly the following.

Foreign advisers were often hired in the hope that the employment of an adviser of any given nationality would induce his government and private investors to interest themselves in the problems of the Persian government and economy. The benefits anticipated might include grants, loans or other financial and economic assistance, and diplomatic support.

Another reason for resort to foreign advisers was of a purely internal nature. Every Cabinet Minister is the object of continuous, insistent, and often contradictory pressure for personal attentions or favors of one kind or another. He has at times been regarded as a servant not only of the Majlis, but of the Court as well. He has normally been obliged to engage in a running fight for his life, sometimes literally, as well as figuratively. A foreign adviser was for him an invaluable scapegoat, since upon the shoulders of the adviser could be placed responsibility for unpopular measures which circumstances might require as well as for the inability or unwillingness of the Minister to grant the requests of his petitioners.²⁵

With perhaps the exception of the foreign advisers employed for the National Bank where circumstances were unique, it is fair to say that no foreign adviser in Iran so far has been able to carry out his assignment to his satisfaction. Regardless of his competence or his personality, he has been defeated ultimately by the conflicts of personal ambition and the disunifying pressures mentioned above. Although he sometimes served as a shield to protect the

beginning growth of a sense of national responsibility and some traces of his influence usually have survived which may be expected, over the long run, to make a lasting impact, one may safely say that the end results have never approached very closely to the potentialities of the effort expended.

OPPORTUNISM

On the subject of opportunism, one might add the following to what has been said or implied already. The prevalence of opportunism, described earlier as being one of the three factors characteristic of Persian history since 1900, was due principally to five circumstances.

First was the absence of any dominant national ideal or personality to which the individual would voluntarily grant his allegiance. This lack is reflected in the remarkable longing in Iran for such an unselfish, courageous, and benevolent leader as Gandhi, for instance; a longing which may perhaps not be unrelated to the Shii belief in the ultimate reappearance of the last, or Twelfth Imam. Another factor was the economic pressure which disposed an individual to seek assistance from any source. A third factor was the enthusiastic indulgence in gambling,²⁶ characteristic of the aristocracy but not unrelated to the practices of traders, which induced an individual to seek and accept risks. The fourth was frustration, especially among members of minority groups, who saw in a foreign relationship the only hope of protection and, perhaps, improvement. The fifth was fatalism, most characteristic perhaps of the peasants who were inclined to accept whatever came to them as beyond their power, or indeed their right, to resist.²⁷

Since 1900 there have been three significant attempts to establish national unity. The first was after the inauguration of constitutional government in 1906, the second was during the period of Reza Shah from 1921 to 1941, and the third is since the military coup d'état in 1953. The first attempt failed for many reasons, but one was the helplessness of the Parliament, or Majlis, upon which popular hopes had been pinned. The second attempt failed largely because the steps taken to strengthen the authority of the central government produced a decrease, rather than an increase, of national unity. It is too soon to estimate the chances of success on the third try but various factors, such as greater understand-

ing of the problem and the pressures from Westernization, make the prospects perhaps more favorable.

The reason for devoting so much time to a description of the disunifying pressures in Iran is that a recognition of them is essential for an understanding of developments in Iran since 1900. In writings about Iran one sometimes reads of steps to establish "national unity" when what is actually meant is not "national unity" but the authority of the central government. These are not necessarily the same thing and, with respect to Iran especially, one should not lose sight of the fact that no national government can be regarded as stable in the absence of a reasonable degree of national unity.

III

THE EMERGENCE OF REZA KHAN IN 1921

The most conspicuous feature of Persian history from 1900 to 1921 is a very complicated interplay between the Persian forces attempting to establish constitutional government and the intervention of the Russian and British governments. The developments during the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century which culminated in the signing of a Constitution on December 30, 1906, have already been discussed. It is important to bear in mind that this was by no means a unified national movement in the sense that most of the inhabitants were its supporters. It was essentially an urban movement, led and supported by certain groups in the provincial capitals, but especially in Tehran, though without universal backing even in the cities themselves. Although the new Shah, Muhammad Ali, swore repeatedly to uphold the Constitution, he was extremely irked by Majlis control of funds and soon showed that his real aim was to destroy the constitutional government.

The Shah was aided in pursuing his course by Czarist alarm over developments in Persia and Turkey and by the publication of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, signed on August 31, 1907.¹ The ostensible purpose of the agreement was to strengthen the military positions of the two powers in the face of a growing threat from Germany by minimizing the danger of Anglo-Russian conflict in Persia through the establishment of a Russian zone in the north, a British zone in the southeast, and a neutral zone in between. The Russian zone included all of the large cities in Persia, except Kerman, which was in the British zone, and Shiraz and Bushire in the neutral zone.

Under the terms of the agreement each power undertook not to seek any political or commercial concessions in the other's zone nor to support such a request from any subject of its own or a third power. In addition each power agreed not to oppose, without previous arrangement with the other power, the granting of any concession whatever to a British or Russian subject in the

neutral zone. Other provisions also covered Anglo-Russian control over the Persian customs revenues, guaranteeing amortization and interest on British or Russian loans. The preamble included the usual engagement to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, although the agreement was concluded without any consultation with Persian officials.

The constitutionalists were profoundly dismayed by the agreement, because they had believed, on the basis of substantial encouragement rendered to them by British officials in Persia, that they could count upon the support of the British government. On the other hand, the Shah and his supporters were immeasurably encouraged in the pursuit of their goal of destroying constitutional government. Had the spirit of the agreement, at least as defined by defenders of British policy, been observed, the efforts to establish a reasonable semblance of constitutional government would certainly have been more productive. As it was, the Russian government set about vigorously not only to establish its economic and military position in northern Persia,² but to support the efforts of the Shah to destroy constitutional government, thereby simplifying the means whereby Russian pressure could be applied.

Although the constitutionalists did succeed in procuring the Shah's acceptance of a supplementary Constitution on October 8, 1907, on June 23, 1908, the Shah launched a coup d'état, ended constitutional government, imprisoned, strangled, hanged, or exiled his opponents, established martial law in Tehran under the Russian commander of the Cossack Brigade (described on pp. 48-49), and inaugurated a reign of terror in all cities against the liberals and constitutionalists. Civil war broke out in various places, notably in Tabriz where Russian armed intervention wiped out opposition to the Shah. A year later, on July 16, 1909, the combined opposition of the constitutionalists and nationalists, reacting to the Shah's excesses and to Russian intervention, succeeded in deposing the Shah. An indication of the Anglo-Russian position in Persia at the time is given by the fact that the stipulations governing the ex-Shah's pension and exile were set forth in a formal Anglo-Russian protocol.

But that was not the end of Muhammad Ali, although his thirteen-year-old son had been named in his place under a Regent. On July 11, 1911, the ex-Shah, with Russian connivance, reentered Persia from Russian territory and attempted to regain his throne by force. Civil war was resumed, marked once more by

Russian armed intervention. The ex-Shah was finally ejected in June, 1912, through a combination of military defeats, administered by the Persians, and diplomatic exchanges between the British and Russian governments.

The most disastrous effects of these events were two: first, the appearance of deep rifts within formerly more or less united families and social groups; and second, the spread of opportunism, as convictions weakened under mounting pressures and temptations from all sides, and self-interest tended to become the sole criterion for decision. Although most of the population was probably indifferent to political developments, they were affected by the decreasing ability of the central and provincial governments to maintain order and security. Local control by tribal leaders or brigands became widespread. The Bakhtiari leaders, for example, held the premiership as well as the governorships of five districts as the result of their armed support of the constitutional government. But there appears to have been no inclination on their part to abandon their traditional predatory practices in favor of government by law.³

On the other hand, one valuable purpose which the Majlis served was to prevent the Shah from increasing the national debt and decreasing national independence by additional loans from Russia for his personal extravagances and those of the Court. But the major burden of attempting to establish constitutional government rested upon the Cabinet. The ministers tended to reflect the actual centers of power within the population. For example, in the cabinets of the second half of 1911, the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of War were held by members of the Bakhtiari tribe whose forces played a crucial part in the defense of constitutional government. But the ministers had their own individual concepts of constitutional government and of practical politics and it is doubtful if they were much disturbed by the somewhat petulant rebuke administered to the Cabinet by the Regent in May, 1912. He asserted that government programs up to that time had reflected lack of realism and confusion of responsibilities; and charged the Cabinet with internal dissensions and rivalries. He repeatedly stressed that constitutional government meant government by law.⁴

But it would be unjust to overlook the fact that there were both nationalist and constitutionalist leaders who persisted, despite every discouragement, in their efforts to free Persia from both

the tyranny of the Shah and Court and the intervention and interference of the British and Russian governments. An outstanding example of such courage was the strong support which the Majlis, though not the Cabinet, gave to Morgan Shuster in 1911. He was hired as Treasurer-General to head an American financial mission charged with bringing order into the public finances in an attempt to avoid annual deficits. His efforts proved abortive because of the opposition of certain influential Persian elements and of the Russian government, both believing that their interests were threatened.⁵

The aftermath of the Shuster incident was that the British and Russian governments demanded on February 12, 1912, that the Persian government formally accept the provisions of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and agree to submit to various types of Anglo-Russian supervision. To this the Regent assented on March 20, 1912, but his assent was never confirmed by the Majlis, probably primarily because of the outbreak of World War I. The Majlis had been dissolved on December 24, 1911, and was not reconvened until November 1, 1914, a week before the Turkish incursion in Azerbaijan.

When Ahmad Shah inaugurated the Third Majlis on November 1, 1914, he announced the official policy of neutrality.⁶ But he had no significant forces with which to back up his policy so for this and other reasons northern sections of the country were soon over-run by Turkish and Russian troops, which were subsequently followed by British troops in the south and east. Furthermore, the Germans carried on successful efforts to harass the Russians and British until the end of the war, although they did not succeed in getting the Persian government to abandon its policy of neutrality in favor of open alliance with Germany. The fighting, movements, and maintenance of the Turkish and Russian troops enormously increased the chaos prevalent in large areas of the country and their devastation and interference with the crops in Azerbaijan contributed to the famine of 1918, when it is estimated that one-quarter of the agricultural population in the province of Tehran died of starvation.⁷ In July, 1917, Kerensky ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia at the earliest moment.⁸

The Persian government was virtually powerless during the war, its effective authority being limited to the Tehran area. Aside from the Russian troops in the north and the British

troops in the south, each had established a large body of local recruits under Russian or British officers — the expanded Cossack Brigade (the Cossack Division) and the South Persian Rifles.⁹ Until the withdrawal of Turkish troops and their German allies on February 26, 1917, the military relationships in Persia had been further complicated by the activities of the gendarmerie, a rural police force under the command of Swedish reserve officers, many of whom sympathized with Germany. Some had joined the forces under Turkish and German command in the Kermanshah area; some had been incorporated into the South Persian Rifles where they staged a serious mutiny against the British officers.¹⁰

Many influential Persians feared that if the Allies won the war, Persian independence would be lost and its territory perhaps be divided between Russia and Great Britain.¹¹ They therefore regarded Germany, regardless of the actual objectives of German policy in Persia, as perhaps the most effective source of help to save Persian independence and territorial integrity. Not only did the Germans meet with a favorable reception in high government circles, but they succeeded in organizing a separate "national" government in Kermanshah, and benefited in Berlin from the active cooperation of one of the most highly respected constitutionalist leaders.¹² In early November, 1915, there were reasons for believing that a widespread revolt by "pro-German" Persians was ready to be launched. Rapid Russian counteraction and subsequent Anglo-Russian steps, plus German military reverses elsewhere, served to at least drive underground "pro-German" support. At about the same time the Majlis was dissolved.¹³

From the point of view of Persian unity, the most serious results of the war were three: a Germanophile group was added to those of the Russophiles and Anglophiles; latent antagonisms between minority groups, such as the Kurds, Armenians, and Assyrians, had been aroused; and there was an intensification of the efforts of some Persians to extract personal profit from the general atmosphere of disorder and helplessness. It is important to bear in mind that a so-called Germanophile, Russophile, or Anglophile was not necessarily an unpatriotic Persian. Some, of course, assumed their attitudes for purposes of personal gain, but others did so from the honorable conviction that the national good would be served by cooperation with a particular foreign

power.¹⁴ Parenthetically, it should be said that the practice in some American circles of referring to Iranians as pro-German, pro-French, or pro-some other nationality is the cause of many misconceptions and consequent frustrations. The terms have, in fact, very limited substantive significance.

The signature of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, by no means meant that Persia was to be freed immediately of foreign troops.¹⁵ The primary British objective in Persia of assuring that no threat developed to the security of India or the British position in the Persian Gulf now included concern for the oil installations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, whose crucial importance to British naval power had been demonstrated during the war. A potential threat had already been posed in the terms of a Soviet note to the Persian government on January 14, 1918, renouncing Czarist privileges in Persia, repudiating the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, and promising aid to repel Turkish and British troops.¹⁶ At the end of the war Persia was not only under British protection, but the regular expenses of the government were being met to a significant extent by monthly advances amounting to 225,000 pounds, including a sum for the upkeep of the Cossack Division.¹⁷ In addition, large sums in the form of subsidies and bribes were being paid by the British to local officials, such as the Governor of Shiraz, to procure assistance in the preservation of order.¹⁸

The problem facing the British government was how to meet the pressures at home for demobilization and a drastic reduction of expenditures and, at the same time, defend its objectives in Persia. The answer seemed to be in the Anglo-Persian Agreement signed in Tehran on August 9, 1919.¹⁹ The British government had been approached in January, 1919, by three high Persian officials: the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, and the Minister of Finance. It may be significant of the interests they served to note that the last two were nephews of Muzaffar ed-Din Shah and that all three were subsequently characterized in the Tehran press as "robber princes."²⁰ The negotiations were conducted in secret and the text made no specific reference to Majlis ratification.²¹ The agreement provided for a loan, the revision of the customs tariff, the provision of British advisers in the principal ministries, and of British officers to organize the gendarmerie and to rebuild and equip the army, and the construction of a railroad.

On the face of it the agreement's most significant contribution would have been the stability and efficiency in government provided by a homogeneous group of capable officials under whose guidance and protection an efficient government bureaucracy could develop.²² This was probably the major reason for its ultimate rejection, although the question of its ratification kept the Persian government in a turmoil for a year and a half. The announcement of the agreement brought a strong protest from the American government, ostensibly over the method of its negotiation. Persian opposition was due to suspicion of secret clauses, because of the one-sided appearance of the terms; resentment at the secrecy of the negotiations; dissatisfaction with the implied curtailment of opportunities for speculation, with the fact that the exclusive employment of British advisers would preclude the use of other foreign advisers as an incentive to attract foreign credits, and with the right of the Financial Adviser to control the expenditures of the proposed loan.²³ Furthermore, the agreement was repugnant to those Persians who believed that national safety lay in a balancing of unavoidable foreign pressures.²⁴

In the meantime, the Russians were not idle. If they were not in a position to launch sizeable military movements beyond their frontiers they could at least promote propaganda, which they did. The note of January, 1918, was followed by a more specific proposal on June 26, 1919.²⁵ On November 28, 1920, they named as their first Ambassador to Persia Theodore A. Rothstein, who had been for many years a prominent member of the editorial staff of the *Manchester Guardian*.²⁶ Despite delays occasioned by clerical opposition, the negotiations resulted in the signature of the Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in Moscow on February 26, 1921.²⁷ Although the text is interlarded with propaganda, the substantive benefits to Persia included the cancellation of all outstanding debts, transfer of all physical commercial installations in Persia, and the surrender of all concessions, of extraterritorial rights, and of all special privileges. The reservations in favor of the Soviet government, which were subsequently to prove disadvantageous to Persia, included the right to introduce troops into Persia under certain conditions, the denial to Persia of the right to grant the surrendered concessions in the five northern provinces to any other foreigner, and the agreement to renegotiate the Caspian Sea fisheries monopoly.

While this treaty was under negotiation, a significant series of events occurred in the middle of 1920. On May 18, Russian troops re-entered Enzeli (Pahlavi) and subsequently aided a Persian rebellion in Gilan which had initially been both anti-Russian and anti-British.²⁸ On June 2 the Shah, who had visited London in November, 1919, returned to Tehran from Europe.²⁹ On July 24th, the Prime Minister who had negotiated the Anglo-Persian Agreement resigned and left immediately for Europe. The tide was turning against Great Britain. It is clear from the text of the Irano-Soviet Treaty that the Russian government was worried over the possibility of an attack from Persian soil by White Russians, alone or aided by the British. The signature of the treaty would not only place upon Persia the obligation of preventing such a development, but would give Russia the legal right to send its forces into Persia, should Persia be unable to avert the threat. In response to Persian protests over the Enzeli (Pahlavi) landings, Moscow officials denied authority over the troops on the grounds that they belonged to the independent Caucasian republics. In any case, these troop movements had two effects favorable to the Russian government: one was to alarm the Persian officials and so speed up the treaty negotiations; the other was to alarm the British officials and so hasten the withdrawal of British troops.

The Russian protestations of 1918 and 1919 of an intention to renounce Russian interference in Persia had given rise to significant popular sentiment in favor of the removal of British interference. The hope on the part of some was undoubtedly that Persia might be left alone to arrange her own affairs, although one should not overlook the fact that there were great differences in the conception of what an ideal arrangement might be.³⁰ But, despite the popular feeling, there was a conviction among responsible ministers that the British government would, at their request, postpone the withdrawal of its troops and continue its subsidies. The Cabinets therefore took no steps to meet the needs which would arise should these convictions be without foundation, as they were. In the autumn of 1920 British troops were withdrawn from Khurasan and at about the same time the payment of the British subsidies and advances ceased; and preparations were made to withdraw the troops from the north in the spring of 1921.

By January 1, 1921, it was clear that the Persian government

would do nothing to replace the retiring British forces without British help, which was not forthcoming. The prospect of disorders was so strong that British civilians in Tehran were advised on January 6 to leave at the earliest possible moment. The Cabinet was indeed faced with a major crisis. The province of Gilan was in open rebellion, apparently with Soviet support; order was being maintained in the south only by the South Persian Rifles; some provinces, such as Kermanshah and Khurasan, were in the firm hands of the governors, but little or no money was reaching the Treasury from the provinces. Government debts and salaries were in arrears. This made little difference to those officials who could and did supplement their pay by various devices, but it was of crucial importance to pay the one organized body of government troops, the Cossack Division, upon which the government would soon be wholly dependent.

The Cossack Division will be discussed in greater detail later but at this point it is sufficient to note that in 1921 it probably numbered between 14,000 and 15,000 men and had its headquarters in Tehran with the bulk of its forces based on Qazvin, Hamadan, and Kermanshah. The Russian officers were finally dismissed under British insistence only on October 30, 1920.³¹ They were replaced by Persian officers from the Cossacks or the Swedish-trained gendarmerie, some of whom had been trained in Europe.³² There is evidence of a plot on the part of some senior Cossack officers in Qazvin to take control of the government, but they appear to have felt the need of political cooperation. There appear to have been other conspiracies;³³ but the best organized and led was that of Sayyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai in Tehran who, however, recognized the need of military support. These two groups were brought together and a fortuitous circumstance provided an occasion for a Cossack detachment of 2500 men under Colonel Reza Khan to proceed to Tehran without arousing suspicion on the part of the Cabinet until it was too late to stop them.³⁴

The condition of the government leadership just before the coup d'état is shown by the record of the then Prime Minister, the Sepahdar.³⁵ He resigned on January 19, 1921, but resumed office four days later, when other leaders refused to do so. On February 3rd he formed a Cabinet that resigned on the 6th. He again formed a Cabinet on the 16th which fell at the time of the coup d'état on the 21st.

On the night of February 20, 1921, the Cossacks and Sayyid Zia entered Tehran. Sporadic, but accidental, fighting lasted for ten minutes and on the 21st quiet reigned under martial law. On the 22nd and 23rd a large number of arrests took place, mostly of former high government officials charged with peculation, the purpose being to replenish the national treasury. Within a week Sayyid Zia had formed a Cabinet composed of entirely new faces and Reza Khan had been named Commander-in-Chief with the title of Sardar Sepah.

Sayyid Zia remained in office three months. As his name implies, he claimed descent from the Prophet and received the respect and perquisites derived therefrom. At the time he was in his early thirties. Balfour describes him as "a slender man of medium height with a pale and rather narrow face, good features, and a black, pointed beard. His expression had about it much of the mystic and dreamer, but he had in addition a very practical side to his character."³⁶ It was chiefly through his activities as a writer and newspaper owner that he had established a large following. His right-hand man was an Armenian. His major weaknesses appear to have been his obstinacy, overconfidence, and inability or unwillingness to compromise with the forces in opposition.

The opposition arose from various sources: the Shah, who apparently feared that his throne was endangered; Reza Khan, who resented Zia's inclination to seek British officers to train the army; and members of the previous governing group whose leaders Zia had arrested. New municipal taxes also lost the reforming government many supporters. Hopes of social and agrarian reform which had been aroused, but could not be satisfied, and the disunity and dissension within the Cabinet deprived Sayyid Zia of the power to remain in office. He resigned on May 25, 1921, and immediately left for Baghdad.³⁷

Among those who had been arrested was Qavam es-Saltaneh, Governor of Khurasan. He was now released from confinement to become Prime Minister. He appointed his brother to the post of Minister of Finance. Political power was thus restored to the traditional governing group and talk of reform died down.³⁸ Military power was, however, concentrated in the hands of Reza Khan, although he was still technically under the orders of the Prime Minister and was still obliged to maintain a voluntary, cooperative relationship with his former colleagues in the Cossack

Division.³⁹ Furthermore, at this stage, he required the uncertain support of the Shah. Reza Khan gradually increased the strength of the national military power and its control remained in his hands until his abdication in 1941. On November 22, 1921, the long-awaited Fourth Majlis opened with a scanty attendance, but a strikingly large proportion of clerics.

The most urgent task of the government was to restore its authority throughout the country and thereby collect provincial revenues.⁴⁰ The fact that they had large personal and family holdings of land and villages in uncontrolled areas also gave this objective a high priority in the minds of many political leaders, including Qavam. The Cabinet and Majlis therefore supported Reza Khan's efforts to build up the armed forces. By August, 1921, he had more than tripled the sums devoted to the army, amounting to four times the civil appropriations in the budget.⁴¹

IV

THE REIGN OF REZA SHAH, 1925-1941

After the coup d'état of 1921, the most pressing problem confronting the government was to assert its control over provincial areas. The principal agency was the army under the effective command of Reza Khan. It is probable that the ministers and Majlis deputies were willing to grant the sums required by the army to restore control of the provinces of Mazandaran, Gilan, and Azerbaijan where the large estates of important officials were located. But they were probably less enthusiastic about the extension of control over the area of the southern Arabs, popularly believed to be under British protection, or the Kurdish areas in Azerbaijan where they feared that the Turks or the Russians might intervene. Furthermore, there is evidence of uneasiness on the part of the Shah, as well as of the traditional political leaders, over the increasing personal prestige of Reza Khan. There were rumors of an attempted assassination of Reza Khan in February, 1923.¹ But there was no effective opposition to him when he decided to suggest that the Shah name him as Prime Minister on October 28, 1923. The Shah agreed and left soon for Europe, never to return.

Despite any official misgivings, government troops were sent successively against rebellious groups in Khurasan, Gilan, and Azerbaijan and against the Lurs, Qashqais, and the southern Arabs. Since most of the rebel bases were in the mountains, most of the fighting was of the traditional mountain warfare type with relatively small numbers of troops involved. All of the movements took place under the immediate command of officers who appear to have been close personal colleagues of Reza Khan. The only occasions where he appeared personally were to spur on and hearten the troops moving against the rebels in Gilan and to head the national mobilization of troops against the southern Arabs, who surrendered without fighting. In the suppression of the rebellions, ruthless employment of arms was supplemented by negotiation, the creation of dissension, payments of money,

and treachery. By 1925 the country was reasonably quiet, although subsequent scattered revolts took place from the tribes, chafing, among other things, at the predatory practices of the military governors.

By 1924 Reza Khan's public prestige was high and the Shah's correspondingly low. It appears to have been popularly expected that his assumption of the post of Prime Minister on October 28, 1923, would be followed the next year by the establishment of a republican form of government, following the example of Turkey. This might have taken place had not strong clerical opposition arisen as a result of the Turkish abolition of the Caliphate on March 3, 1924, which had dealt a severe blow to the power and influence of the Muslim clergy in Turkey. This opposition was probably bolstered by Reza Khan's own doubts, discussed on pages 51-52. In an ostensible attempt to still the agitation, Reza Khan recommended on April 1, after consultation with religious leaders at Qum, that discussion of a republican form of government cease.² The following year on October 31, 1925, the Majlis formally deposed Ahmad Shah, naming Reza Khan to exercise power until a Constituent Assembly had decided on the question of succession.³ On December 12, 1925, Reza Khan was named Shah and on April 25, 1926, in accordance with custom, he placed the crown on his head and founded a new dynasty. He was forty-eight years old.

How was it possible for Reza Khan to rise from obscurity to the throne in a period of only five years? The primary reason was because the policies of both the British and Soviet governments with respect to Persia created a power vacuum.⁴ The reason that Reza Khan, rather than someone else, moved into the vacuum is explained by his personal characteristics. He is said to have been born in 1878 in a small village, lying in the mountains between Firuzkuh and the Caspian Sea. His parentage was clearly modest, though the stock appears to have been sound.⁵ It is not clear where his youth was spent, but most accounts state that he entered the Cossack Brigade in Tehran about 1900, when he was in his early twenties, although one account gives fifteen as his age at the time of enlistment. From then on his life was spent in the Cossacks and in 1921 he was a Colonel, though not in command of the Division.

As for the Cossacks, when Nasir ed-Din Shah passed through the Caucasus on his second trip to Europe in 1878, he was so

impressed by the Cossack guard which was provided for him, that he asked the Czar to loan him some officers to organize a similar body of men in Persia. This was done and, until October, 1920, the Persian Cossacks were trained and commanded by Russian officers. In due course many of the junior positions were filled by Persians, but even so, it appears that they were not treated as equals, even by their Russian subordinates. The major duty of the Cossack Brigade was to serve as a bodyguard for the Shah, but Cossacks were also assigned to other services, such as guard duty at legations.

Information about the Cossacks is scanty and scattered, but they seem to have had a large measure of independence and were probably influenced more by the suggestions from the Russian Legation than from the Shah.⁶ A monthly lump sum for their support was paid to the Russian Colonel in command for which he submitted no significant accounts. The Cossacks were mounted, each soldier being responsible for the care of his mount. They had their own barracks, apparently with housing for married Russian personnel and a school with Russian instructors for children and recruits, although the Russians and Persians appear to have been segregated. Most of the recruits were Turki-speaking individuals from the northern provinces. When on an expedition the Cossacks either took their wives with them or married peasant girls, apparently for the duration of their assignment. The Brigade had no organized transport or commissary of its own, so lived off the country when outside of stations. It seems probable that the whip was freely used both within the organization and in its relations with the Persian public.

The exact roles which Reza Khan played in the Cossacks are not clear, but he appears to have served in Tehran, Hamadan, Kermanshah, and the west, and to have been engaged in actual fighting there and near Ardabil in 1911. Although it was the Cossacks who bombarded the Majlis in 1908 in defense of the Shah, they appear to have fought in defense of his son when the ex-Shah, Muhammad Ali, attempted in 1911 to regain his throne. In 1916 the Russians expanded and re-equipped the Cossack Brigade into a Division to aid in the war. At the end of the war it numbered about 8,000 men, organized into mixed formations, differing in size, composed of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Reza Khan was made commander of the formation in Hamadan which enjoyed a reputation for quality.

Reza Khan appears to have been noted for exceptional courage and determination and was undoubtedly the type of officer whom soldiers would willingly follow and obey in the rough and tumble warfare characteristic of tribal conflicts in Iran.⁷

He was unusually tall for a Persian, straight, powerful, and energetic. He had a quick temper and was prompt, direct, and brutal in responding to it.⁸ His mode of living was simple, almost austere, and his tireless concentration on military duties and training appears to have been virtually single minded.⁹ Of his intelligence as a Major early in 1919, we have the testimony of a British officer who remarked on Reza Khan's avid interest and quick grasp of difficult points connected with the problem of mechanical transport lines.¹⁰ There was seldom any trace in his facial expression of the human qualities of humor, pity, sympathy, or devotion.¹¹ On the whole, his attitude toward life was serious. He was sparing of speech and appears to have had no use for small talk. But perhaps his most striking characteristic was his ability to keep his own counsel and so take action which was both sudden and unexpected, as when, for example, later on as Shah he struck down his old friends or colleagues, the Minister of the Court, Timurtash, and the Minister of War, Sardar Assad. There is, furthermore, some evidence that Reza Khan was well versed in the methods of intrigue current around him¹² and there appears to be no doubt that he thoroughly understood his common countrymen. Reza Khan had one handicap which was to color his career. He really knew no foreign languages. Persian appears to have been his native tongue and he picked up a smattering of Russian and Turki in the course of his service, but in no instance was it the polished literary form.

Given these characteristics and his singleness of purpose, it is not surprising that Reza Khan soon established himself in a position from which he could not be ousted by the usual forms of pressure. Up to the time in October, 1923, when he became Prime Minister, it seems probable that his objective was to build a strong army, toughened by combat experience, and capable of at least deterring foreign intervention. His simultaneous objective was to re-establish the authority of the central government throughout the country and thereby provide the necessary funds for the army.

It was probably with this objective in mind that, following

the resignation of Sayyid Zia, Reza Khan supported the return to power of the traditional ministers who were at least capable of administering the government in the traditional style without the introduction of controversial reforms. By October, 1923, when Reza Khan took over the premiership himself, all sections of the country had been brought again under control except the area of the southern Arabs, who were believed to have British protection. Reza Khan may have decided to become Prime Minister partly out of fear that any traditional type of Prime Minister might weaken in the face of potential British pressure. As it was, the order for general mobilization was not given until October 4, 1924, presumably because the full strength of the army could not be concentrated until then.¹³ The importance which this move had in the mind of Reza Khan is shown by the fact that he himself took the field in over-all command. The submission of the Arab leaders completed the establishment of government authority throughout the country and Reza Khan's triumphant return to Tehran opened the way for future developments.

Agitation for a republic had not died down following Reza Khan's statement of April 1, 1924. On the contrary, it appears to have been intensified following his return from the south, with the participation of some deputies. In ostensible protest. Reza Khan resigned dramatically early in the year and withdrew to a village near Tehran. This resulted in popular demonstrations throughout the country, led by generals and politicians, who insisted upon Reza Khan's resumption of office. Following the visit of a delegation of sixty humbled deputies, he returned to Tehran in February, 1925, and was granted dictatorial powers by a Majlis vote of 93 to 7.¹⁴ This action established his domination of the central political authority and he already had, in effect, control of provincial areas through the dominant position of the army there, despite the probability that his relationships with the top army commanders were still based upon voluntary collaboration.¹⁵ The Shah was in Europe, though efforts were under way on the part of the Crown Prince and Court supporters to induce him to return in a last attempt to check the power of Reza Khan. Despite the fact that Ahmad Shah telegraphed his intention of leaving Marseilles on October 2, 1925, to return, circumstances prevented him from doing so.

It is probable that Reza Khan's decisions with respect to the establishment of a republic, the deposition of Ahmad Shah, and

his own nomination as founder of a new dynasty, were neither sudden nor easy. Given his energy, ambition, and determination, the dominant question in his mind was probably how he could achieve his personal goals most effectively. His thinking must have been colored by admiration of Atatürk's achievements in Turkey and by the developments in Russia, following the overthrow of the Czar. As president of a republic he would have had broad powers and, given the circumstances prevalent in Persia in 1924, undoubtedly would have become a dictator. Under those circumstances, the course of events from 1924 to 1941 might not have differed significantly from that which, in fact, took place.

But the establishment of a republic would involve the destruction of the institution of monarchy, deeply established in Persia for thousands of years. Reza Khan had sworn personal allegiance to the Shah and his active military life had been based upon obedience to authority. But so long as any other person held the top position in Persia, a potential check to Reza Khan's ambitions would be present. He appears to have solved the problem by separating Ahmad Shah, the Crown Prince, and the Court clique from the institution of the monarchy. He could then justify the breaking of his oath on the grounds that the Shah was, in fact, a traitor to the institution of the monarchy. And he could include in this charge the Crown Prince and the Qajars, generally. That appears to be what Reza Khan did, and it helps to explain his subsequent disregard of constitutional provisions as Shah.

It may seem that this account of Persian history so far has placed too much emphasis on political developments to the neglect of social and economic factors. If this appears to be so, it is because political factors set the tone for social and economic developments; increased in significance as government pressures during the reign of Reza Shah became more pervasive and touched a far larger proportion of the individuals in the population; and have been strikingly apparent during and since World War II, notably in respect to the oil nationalization controversy of 1951 to 1953 which was, from the Persian point of view, primarily a political, rather than an economic, problem. This fact is also a reflection of the extent to which government in Iran has been based upon personal relationships rather than law. But as we move forward with Persian history, social and economic developments do play an increasingly significant role.

If then we attempt to look at this twenty-year period, 1921-1941, as a whole, what are the things which stand out? We at once run into difficulties because most accounts of the period are distorted in one way or another. Sometimes, in a conscious effort to use the figure of the Shah as a focus, the achievements of his collaborators are either minimized or ignored. The result is to give Reza Shah a stature which, by universal standards, is hardly justified.¹⁶ Another difficulty arises from statistics. Interest in statistics has never been a marked trait of Persian civilization and the attitude of most Iranians towards the completeness or accuracy of statistics is one of almost total indifference.¹⁷ Along with the efforts to modernize Iranian economy since 1923, statistics were produced, but they tended to be regarded, especially during the period of Reza Shah, as a propaganda medium to illustrate alleged tangible progress.

We can probably accept as Reza Shah's dominant goal the creation of an army strong enough to maintain internal control and to constitute a significant deterrent to foreign armed aggression; and most of his reforms can be viewed in this light.¹⁸ The first requirement was more money. The obvious source was taxation. But, to be effective, this required improvement of the quality and efficiency of the bureaucracy. Here foreign assistance appeared to be useful, so the American Financial Mission under Dr. Millspaugh, which had been engaged in 1922 for a five-year period, was continued.¹⁹ The oil royalties provided foreign exchange for military equipment, which had to be purchased abroad; but the next need for an effective army was an improvement in communications by road, railroad, and telegraph. Expansion of the army required the incorporation of vigorous rural and tribal recruits, secured by universal compulsory conscription; but the effective administration of conscription required the adoption of family names to provide precise identification of individuals, registration of births, and the reorganization of national administrative districts.

To meet the mounting need for money, especially foreign exchange, for the costly modernization of the army, new sources of revenue were essential. One apparent source was the sizeable amount of foreign exchange spent annually for imports, including tea, sugar, and textiles. The result was an industrialization program in an attempt to produce imports locally. But this, in the short run, increased the demands for foreign exchange to

pay for the importation of machinery. Another device was to attempt to increase internal production, especially of agricultural produce, and so provide additional taxable income and perhaps exports.

The need for large numbers of better educated and trained personnel to meet the requirements of a modernized army, industrial expansion, and the introduction of new, related services, such as banking, called for the expansion and improvement of educational facilities and the training of more Iranians abroad. Furthermore, in this national effort there was need for the co-operation and participation of women, which would only become possible if they were freed of some of their traditional disabilities, such as veiling.

The improvement and expansion of medical and hospital services constituted another essential element in Reza Shah's goal of building up the army. So, too, did a conscious effort to win or exact popular respect for the army, aimed at achieving consideration of service in the army as the most desirable career for any ambitious young man. The army, therefore, held the dominant position in all Iranian communities throughout the reign of Reza Shah, civil authorities being, in practice, subservient to the pressure of local military officials. Another activity designed to build up the prestige of the army, especially in foreign eyes, and of Reza Shah as Shah, but perhaps even more as Commander-in-Chief of the army, was the construction of wide, straight avenues, circling around occasional parks, in every sizeable city and town in Iran. Along them were constructed new government offices, schools, hospitals, or hotels and in the center of the circles stood statues of the Shah.

Although the goal of these and many other activities may be described as the transformation of Iran, under the leadership of the army, into a state with a significant industrialized economy and a markedly higher general standard of living, characterized by an integration of Western and Iranian ideals, it would be a mistake to imagine that there was any detailed, coordinated plan of procedure. Despite the fact that there were plans for specific projects, such as the construction of grain storage facilities, drawn up by Western engineers who usually received the contract for their construction, these were not conceived in the light of the national economic needs as a whole.

The difficulties were enormous, even if restricted to the field

of the national economy. Aside from that of the foreign owned and managed Anglo-Persian Oil Company, there was no centralized, organized body of information about the national economy, its potentiality, or its needs. Having decided to construct the Trans-Iranian Railroad and to finance it by a special tax on sugar and tea, the responsibility for planning and construction was turned over to Western engineers. Once Iran appeared to have been opened to foreign companies as a potentially profitable field of activity, the Iranian government was deluged with offers of equipment or services.²⁰ But these were for specific projects, such as a tobacco factory, a sugar refinery, a textile mill, or a cement plant, viewed by the proposers and apparently accepted by the government with little or no consideration of their proper place and priority in the development of the national economy as a whole. The result was that at the time of Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, there was a substantial number of factories concentrated in the north, particularly at Tehran, and operating almost without exception at a loss, despite the high protective tariffs. Development was spotty and each new enterprise tended to expose the deficiencies of other aspects of the national economy.

But the economic difficulties were subordinate to political difficulties, both internal and external. To look first at the internal difficulties. As has already been mentioned, the landowning aristocracy was almost certainly opposed to the growing strength of the army, particularly as their group was losing political control. A somewhat extreme example of this group is the Sardar Akram, whose second wife was the daughter of an ex-Prime Minister. In 1916 Sardar Akram inherited from his father an estate of 500 square miles, containing ninety-six villages in the vicinity of Hamadan. From this, in the early twenties, he received an income of about \$150,000 a year. Like most members of his group, his taxes were in arrears, although his position was better than that of one nobleman who owed over 5 million dollars at the time when Sayyid Zia was trying to collect back taxes.²¹

Not only had this group felt the heavy hand of the tax collector, following the expansion of the authority of the central government, but their income had come under increasing pressure from government policies. These arose partly from regulations modifying the traditional relationships between the land-

owner and his peasants, which resulted in loosening the former's grip; partly from increased taxes and exactions of various types; and partly from the increased cost of imported luxuries to which they were accustomed. Insofar as these families were able to introduce members into the dominant military hierarchy or establish alliances with it through marriage, they were somewhat mollified by participation in the profits accruing from the possession of power during the reign of Reza Shah.

But opposition to Reza Shah and his regime also arose, perhaps primarily, from less tangible motives. It was the landlord group, generally speaking, which had maintained and encouraged through its wealth and leisure the intellectual and artistic traditions of Persian culture. It was they who had set the example and practiced the formalities of social intercourse, which had tended traditionally to reduce social tensions and conflicts. Furthermore, there were individuals within this group who accepted the responsibilities imposed upon them by the paternalistic relationships between the landlord and peasant; and there were liberally-inclined individuals who welcomed efforts to restore Persian independence and self-respect and build up the national economy. It seems probable that their opposition was based less upon disapproval of Reza Shah's policies, than of the methods used to execute them and the disastrous results of those methods in terms of national morale.

It must naturally have been galling to members of this group to find themselves subject to a Shah who tended to treat them publicly with disrespect, had little understanding or appreciation of the national traditions and values they supported, abolished their titles, and seemed bent upon their destruction. Nor could the more conscientious landlords have been unaware of the fact that the practices of the regime were grinding the peasants deeper and deeper into poverty. Though apparently resigned and acquiescent and, in fact, deprived progressively of effective power, the opposition of this group remained alive, alert, and strong, waiting for such a situation as arose following the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941.

The other main group which presented difficulties in the execution of Reza Shah's policies was the clergy. As explained above on page 9, in strict application of Shii theory, Reza Shah, like his Qajar predecessors, was a usurper. At the time of Reza Shah's accession, the recognized leaders of the sect resided at the Shii

holy places at Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, outside of the jurisdiction of the Iranian government, although the individuals themselves were Persian subjects.

The power of the clergy as one of the disunifying forces in Persian society has already been discussed. In the context of their opposition to Reza Shah's policies, it should be noted that the Shii clergy did not constitute a formal organization with lines of authority. It was, therefore, possible and, indeed, usual for individual mullahs to express their personal views on matters which are generally regarded in the West as political and to arouse their local followers to public agitation. The *Mujtahids* themselves have usually taken care to preserve their traditional role as mediators between the governors and the governed in Iran by remaining aloof from political controversy.

Although the opposition of individual clerics was undoubtedly colored by the severe reduction of their incomes caused by a variety of government measures, it seems probable that it was based in many instances on religious grounds. The replacement of religious law by Western codes and the gradual restriction of religious authority on matters of personal status, such as marriage and divorce, certainly represented a serious threat to the maintenance of Shii doctrine as the dominant social force. This threat was compounded by the refusal of the government to exempt theological students from military service and by the removal of general education from ecclesiastical control. The prohibition of the wearing of traditional headgear which identified the occupation and status of the wearer, and the introduction of Western forms of entertainment, such as the cinema, all appeared likely to undermine public morality as understood in Shii Islam. The antagonism of the clerics was further aroused naturally by the progressively open contempt shown them by the Shah and aped by his subordinates.

This is not the place to attempt to discuss whether the clerics could have forestalled or resolved these problems within the framework of Shii doctrine, problems, incidentally, which confront and are equally baffling to their Sunni co-religionists. In any case, the clergy, because of their preoccupation with spiritual matters were in a stronger position than the large land-owners to bide their time until the temporal power of Reza Shah should end, as it did with his abdication in 1941.

But probably the greatest internal non-economic difficulty

which confronted Reza Shah was the problem of personnel. Reza Shah's adult experience had been exclusively in the Cossacks where he had learned to take and give orders, which continuous pressure assured would be promptly and precisely carried out. When he entered the political world at the age of forty-three, he was in a realm whose characteristics are discussion, negotiation, persuasion, and compromise. In practice, these characteristics tended to prevail throughout the bureaucracy with no definite assurance that any order would be executed, especially promptly and unchanged. There are evidences that Reza Shah realized this and, during the earlier years of his domination, adapted his actions to these circumstances. But it seems inevitable that he must have found the experience frustrating and extremely irritating. This self-control did not, however, last. By the end of 1928 he had destroyed the independence of the Majlis and by the end of 1933 had removed any likely source of disagreement from the Cabinet, except for the Minister of War, whom he is accused of having had murdered in 1934, and he was well on the way to the establishment of an all-pervasive system of secret police.

The practical knowledge of what to do and how to do it, required to establish the prestige of the new regime both within and abroad, was apparently provided largely by three men, Firuz Mirza (Nosrat ed-Dowleh), Ali Akbar Davar, and Abdul Hoseyn Timurtash.²² They were ambitious men of exceptional energy, intelligence, knowledge, and experience, who appear to have been able to work in close cooperation. The first and last were arrested, accused of bribery and murdered, if not by Reza Shah personally, undoubtedly with his approval. The second committed suicide, apparently from fear of a similar fate.

All had been Majlis deputies, active and effective supporters of Reza Khan when he was Prime Minister. Firuz Mirza was Minister of Justice in Reza Khan's last Cabinet and was subsequently Minister of Finance from February 13, 1927, to his arrest on June 16, 1929, serving in all as Minister about three years. Ali Akbar Davar, after serving as Minister of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works in one Cabinet, was Minister of Justice from February 13, 1927, to September 14, 1933. He was then named as Minister of Finance, in which capacity he served until February 10, 1936, when he committed suicide, in all a

service of nine and a half years. Timurtash became Minister of Court in January, 1926, and served in that capacity until his arrest in January, 1933, a period of about eight years.

To Davar should go the major credit for the reorganization of the Ministry of Justice and the compilation, introduction, and administration of the great variety of new codes, laws, and regulations which the gradual transformation of the economic and social life of Iran required. It was also Davar who argued effectively the Iranian case in the presentation to the League of Nations Council at Geneva of the dispute with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1932. And it was upon his shoulders that was placed in September, 1933, the killing task of trying to find still more revenues to meet the mounting demands of industrial investment, economic expansion, and the Shah's personal accounts. To Firuz Mirza and, especially, to Timurtash should go the major credit for the preliminary steps which made it possible for Iran to re-establish its independence by the abolition of capitulations in 1928. And it was largely due to Timurtash that bottlenecks were cleared away and momentum maintained in the complicated and confused efforts to transform and build up the economic life of Iran.²³

The fate of Timurtash, though only one example of several hundred murders laid to Reza Shah's account, serves to illustrate an already mentioned characteristic of political life in Iran, the ceaseless struggle to discredit and overthrow persons in positions of power. In this instance, it appears to have been primarily a struggle between civil officials and those of the army and secret police for positions closest to the Shah. The Shah's willingness to listen to attacks was probably, in the case of Timurtash, increased by fear for his dynasty in the event of his sudden death, regardless of whether such a fear had any realistic basis, and by his mounting avarice.

This series of political murders and persecutions throws light upon another characteristic Persian attitude.²⁴ Varying degrees of lack of consideration or brutality in personal relationships appear to be expected from persons in positions of authority in Persian society. The justification usually given is that without this protection a person in authority would be swamped by importunities. But the result has been to create attitudes of apparent servility which, in the presence of the Shah, tend to verge on

obsequiousness. That these attitudes are not sincere, is demonstrated by the rapidity with which they swing to the opposite extreme once an individual has fallen from a position of power. This explains the apparent popular acceptance of the fates of many of Reza Shah's collaborators or opponents, and the virtual absence of any acknowledgement of the significant contributions they made to the modernization of Iran.

The fall and fate of Timurtash had a number of serious consequences.²⁵ One was that the modernization and expansion of Iranian economy was slowed down. The efficiency of a capable administrator was replaced by the ponderous working of the bureaucracy, apparently marked by an increasing hesitancy to accept responsibility. Social contacts with Westerners, which Timurtash had encouraged, dropped off sharply. Under the orders of the Shah, non-official contacts of government employees with foreigners were controlled ultimately by specific permission. The Shah became progressively more sensitive and suspicious in his relationships with Westerners, especially over critical materials appearing in the foreign press.²⁶ He seems to have had no understanding of the concept of a free press and, in any case, would have disapproved of it. Nevertheless, despite all these handicaps and setbacks, the momentum which had been established and the foundations which had been laid through 1934 began to bear fruit.

An attempt to meet the shortage of qualified personnel was made in 1929 by the appropriation of a specific sum for a period of six years to train Iranian students abroad. By 1938 about 400 government students had returned and it was reported that about 1500 were then studying abroad on government and private funds. This source was supplemented by the presence in Iran of hundreds (and during the construction of the railroad, thousands) of foreign technicians, employed either by the government or provided by foreign contractors or firms importing machinery.

The effective incorporation of returned students was impaired by the usual inadequacy of their practical experience and the disinclination of the entrenched bureaucracy to make places for them and to regard them as a strengthening of the service.²⁷ Furthermore, the morale of returning students was not sustained by the circumstances they found. Confusion was the inevitable accompaniment of such rapid and extensive development as was

taking place in Iran, made possible only by very heavy taxation and very low wages, both maintained by force.

Difficulties from foreign sources which confronted Iranian efforts to modernize and expand the economy included reluctance on the part of foreign manufacturers to sell on credit when collections tended to be slow, if not impossible; and a tendency on their part to respond to Iranian bargaining practices, based on price, by selling machinery and materials which proved to be unsuitable for the purposes for which they were purchased. Furthermore, there was undoubtedly unwillingness on the part of some reputable manufacturers to mark up their prices by 10 per cent or more to provide the usual honorariums for the representatives of the purchaser.²⁸

Major difficulties also stemmed from Soviet commercial policies. Partly because of the cost in time and money of transportation in Iran and partly because of the complementary nature of their exports, the economy of northern Iran has been dependent traditionally on trade with Russia. Indeed, there is evidence that at certain times, the economy of northern Iran has been regarded in Russian thinking as an integral part of the Russian economy. In any case, Persian merchants suffered particularly from two types of Soviet commercial activity: an embargo on Persian exports (which often included perishable fruit) such as occurred in 1926;²⁹ and the Soviet practice of dumping merchandise on the Persian market or withholding it from sale, which tended not only to bankrupt the merchant, but to undermine the Persian government's efforts to foster local industry. The Foreign Trade Monopoly Act of 1931 constituted an attempt to lessen the disabilities under which individual Iranian merchants labored in dealing with the Soviet state agencies. But throughout Reza Shah's reign, protection of the economy from damaging Soviet policies or practices was a major preoccupation.

Despite all the obstacles, social and economic changes continued, stimulated perhaps by Reza Shah's visit to Ataturk in Ankara in 1934. In 1932 the Majlis had already authorized the National Bank to issue paper money, thus for the first time introducing a money economy into Iran and gradually confronting the government with the baffling complications of a managed money system. In 1933 the oil dispute had been settled and annual royalties from that source amounted to about 3½ million

pounds sterling until the war. Part of the stimulus for economic growth undoubtedly stemmed from the efforts of foreign manufacturers to find a market for their products.

The period from Reza Shah's return from Ankara to his abdication was marked by the following developments.

From December 31, 1934, foreign governments were requested to use "Iran" rather than "Persia" in official correspondence.

In 1935 the Shah laid the foundation stone for the University. School uniforms were introduced. Teachers and schoolgirls were not allowed to appear veiled and army officers were forbidden to be seen in the company of a veiled woman. The use of honorary titles was abolished and, on the 6th of June, the Shah removed his cap on entering the Majlis, a gesture dutifully copied by all those present.

In 1936 the veil was officially abolished for all women, and men were ordered to wear European hats or caps. Labor laws were introduced; and the construction of seven grain elevators was planned. Dr. Schacht negotiated a German trade agreement.

In 1937 the first train passed from Bandar Shah to Tehran and the Iran Tobacco Factory, monopolizing the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes, was opened in Tehran. The Saadabad Pact of Friendship between Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan was signed in Tehran. The Crown Prince returned from his schooling in Switzerland.

In 1938 the country was reorganized into ten provinces with appropriate subdivisions. The first train left Tehran for Ahvaz and the line from the Gulf to the Caspian Sea was completed, having taken eleven years to build at a cost of 30 million pounds sterling. The Soviet Union protested against alleged German economic penetration in Iran.

In 1939 the Crown Prince married Fawzia, sister of King Faruk of Egypt. All army officers and government officials were required to limit their purchases to Iranian products. Trade with Germany increased. Iran concluded a treaty of friendship with Japan and on September 4th declared its neutrality in the European war. An office for the education and guidance of public opinion was established. Seventy miles of railroad from Tehran to Semnan were added.

In 1940 a five-year plan was launched to increase agricultural production. One hundred and sixty miles of railroad from Tehran to Zenjan were completed. At the first annual meeting of

the National Aero Club a membership of nearly 25,000 was announced, indicating the response which the Shah's sponsorship of an institution elicited. Trade with Germany took top place in foreign trade. The census of Tehran recorded 531,246 inhabitants.

In 1941 there were about 15,000 miles of roads and 25,000 motor vehicles of all types. On June 26th Iran declared its neutrality in the Russo-German conflict; and on the same day received its first note from the Soviet Union, asking that the Iranian government reduce the number of Germans in Iran, whose numbers, occupations, and types the Soviet government regarded as a potential threat. On July 19th and August 16th there followed two strongly-worded joint Anglo-Soviet notes along the same lines. On August 25th British and Soviet troops invaded Iran. The Iranian government surrendered on August 26th, a new government took office on the 27th, and on September 9th an agreement was signed which placed the communications systems under Anglo-Soviet control.

On September 16, 1941, Reza Shah abdicated and on the next day his son, Mohammed Reza, took the oath as Shah. On September 21st two letters were transmitted to the Prime Minister. In the first, Reza Shah, "in the name of Almighty God," gave his son all of his property in return for ten grams of sugar. In the second, his son gave the same property to the government and the people for "agricultural progress, improvement of the life of the peasants, urban progress, national industry, improvement of the life of the workers, progress of national education, and the improvement of public health."

V

THE IMPACT OF REZA SHAH'S REGIME ON PEASANTS, TOWNSMEN, AND TRIBESMEN

The lives of the common people — that is, the peasants, townsmen, and tribesmen — underwent a variety of changes during this twenty-year period of the Reza Shah regime.

THE PEASANT

Although the style of the peasant's home differed sharply in various parts of the country according to climate and available building materials, one type could be found in a "village" consisting of a large rectangle, enclosed by a fifteen- to twenty-foot mud wall without outside openings, other than a gate.¹ The enclosure was entered through a wide gate, closed at night by a pair of stout, rough wooden doors. A room was sometimes built over the doorway with French doors at the front and back, closed with wooden shutters.

In the center of the village enclosure was a rectangular pool, ten to twenty feet across and two to three feet deep, sometimes surrounded by a low stone coping. This constituted the water supply for man and beast and was normally refilled once or twice a week. Water for drinking and cooking was usually carried in large unglazed earthenware jugs from a spring or some comparatively clean source in the vicinity of the village. The community latrine was usually in one corner of the enclosure and consisted of a pit with a more or less suitable arrangement of stones for the feet.

Against the inner surface of the enclosure walls were built cell-like rooms which housed the occupants. They might be ten feet wide and twelve to fifteen feet deep. Entrance was across a threshold, raised to keep out rain or snow, and through a narrow opening, closed by a rough wooden door which never fitted the door frame. Shoes were invariably removed before

entering the room. There were no windows, though there was sometimes a small opening in the roof to serve as a chimney. The walls had one or more niches which provided a shelf. The floor was of packed earth, the walls sometimes coated with a whitish clay. Sometimes the back of the room was separated by a partition to provide storage space. The roof was flat, topped with a layer of mud mixed with cut straw, which had to be packed anew with a stone roller after every rain.

The furnishings of a room included a thick felt or carpet for the floor, swept daily with a brush made of soft, semi-dried grasses; the bedding, composed of a thin mattress, a quilt, and a bolster pillow, which were rolled up during the day in a piece of blue denim and placed against the wall as a back rest; a piece of block-printed cotton to hang across the opening when the door was open; a coarse towel or two; a brass samovar; a brass or tinned copper tray on which could be placed a square or round sort of box for burning charcoal; a small kerosene lamp; several small glasses for tea, with a few punched-out brass spoons; a china teapot (often repaired); a few metal plates; and some covered cooking pans of copper, lined with tin, which had to be periodically renewed. Pieces of bread, made in slabs a foot wide, a foot and a half long, and three-eighths of an inch thick, were used, and still are, by the common people throughout Persia as plates.

Within this village might live from forty to eighty men, women, and children, together with their livestock — donkeys, oxen, cows, sheep, goats, and hens. Such a village would not contain a mosque, bath, or school. Much of the living took place openly in the large enclosure where virtually every conversation was held in the presence of other persons; and privacy was found only within each household.

The administration of the village and of the fields which surrounded it was in the hands of one member of the community appointed formerly by the owner of the village, but in Reza Shah's day, named by the chief official of the district and regarded as a government employee. He was known as the *kad-khuda* and was responsible for the maintenance of order in the village and the discharge of the duties of the villagers to the owner and the government.²

The external aspects of life in a village were simple. First the clothing. The women wore black trousers, narrow at the

ankles, a shirt, and the *chadur* or long, loose, sort of cape, ingeniously tied around the waist and draping the figure from the top of the head to the soles of the feet. When the woman needed to use both hands in public, she skillfully held the veil between her teeth and so kept her face modestly covered, although, in general, the peasant women were less fussy than the women in towns. In the rice plantations along the Caspian the women made little pretense of trying to keep their faces covered as they waded through the mud transplanting rice. The men wore coarse, loose trousers of blue or black cotton, drawn together on a cord at the waist and ending halfway down the calf of the leg. Over these was a waist-length pullover white shirt, slit at the neck and buttoned on one shoulder. On their heads they wore tight-fitting caps, concealed by turbans, with which they could swathe their faces in windy sand- or hail-storms, and against the hot sun or the cold. Both men and women wore coarse woven white cloth shoes with soles of rawhide and pounded cloth, dyed blue, or went barefoot. In cold weather the women added an extra *chadur* and the men knee length, loose coats of blue denim, sometimes quilted. In the coldest weather, both wore thick home-knitted socks, and the men put on coats of felt or sheepskin, using them as capes, rather than coats. The long sheepskin coat is actually essential, even today, if one is travelling off the beaten track in Persia in cold weather. But, in fact, against the cold, wet, heat, and blazing sun, the peasant often lacked effective protection, so he simply either became inured to them or perished. He was, therefore, tough, though weatherbeaten.

Food was also simple, consisting almost exclusively of whole wheat bread, sometimes mixed with barley, goat's cheese, onions, garlic, a great variety of green herbs rolled up in a piece of bread, fruit in season, an occasional egg, clabbered milk from cow's or goat's milk, or the same diluted with water as a beverage, and tea, sweetened with lumps of sugar, if times were good, or with dried currants, if times were bad. On rare occasions, such as a wedding, the peasant might taste lamb with rice, flavored with lamb fat, or chicken.

The workday was from daylight to dusk and, at some time of the year, every able-bodied member of the community engaged in some form of labor. Hand labor is still predominant in agricultural production, although, of course, animals are used in plowing,

tramping out the grain, and in transportation. To the smallest children often went the task of taking the cows, goats, and sheep out every day and staying with them while they foraged for food. Small children, also, sometimes helped to gather the dried *botté* used for fuel and helped at odd jobs, such as forming manure into round, flat cakes to be dried for fuel. At harvest time, the women and children joined the men in the fields. The principal crop was usually grain, cut, stacked, and winnowed by hand. Other usual crops were cotton, tobacco, and opium, involving much hand work.

The farmer's tools included a long-handled spade, a mattock, wooden rake, pruning knife, baskets of woven reeds or willow withes, a wooden sled with metal or flint knives for chopping up straw, and a wooden shovel, resembling a snow shovel, used by two men to make low enclosing walls around an area of irrigation. One man inserted the blade and the other, standing opposite him, pulled on a thick rope of goats' hair to move the dirt. For the harvesting of opium, other specialized tools were required.

The provision of water for his crops is one of the major and continuous worries of the peasant. In many sections of the country irrigation water comes from two sources — a stream or a *qanat*. The *qanat* has been in use in Persia since the fourth century, at least.³ It consists of a series of vertical shafts about fifty feet apart, joined horizontally at the bottom. Small boys are let down into the shafts to laboriously dig out the tunnels, the earth being hauled up by the bucketful on a winch. Depth and distance vary, the purpose being to conduct water from a spring to the area of cultivation, augmenting the flow by seepage along the course of the channel and protecting the precious water from evaporation. The well tops are often uncovered. The *qanat* is expensive to build and requires constant maintenance, since it is often seriously clogged or reduced to uselessness by heavy rains. Water from these sources is apportioned under a complex and very detailed traditional system of regulations, supervised by specific individuals. But in a matter of such vital importance to both the peasant and landlord, it is not surprising to find that theft and physical force enter in. More than one peasant has been beaten, stabbed, or killed in an effort to protect the flow of water he regarded as his due.⁴

However, agricultural work in Iran was not an unsociable occupation. When a group of farmers was weeding a field, for

instance, they worked rapidly and steadily, but were seldom silent and, not being subject to the drive of machinery, were never loathe to stop for gossip with passers-by. Furthermore, for the man, at least, there was novelty involved in the transportation of produce to the market where, if the market were in a sizeable town, there were tea-shops, a bazaar, a bath, and a mosque.

Up to 1932 the economy of a village was essentially one of barter. Payment for services rendered tended to be in produce and the simple essential materials the peasant required tended to become a charge against his share of the crop when the harvest was in. In a bad year, a good landlord would adjust the division to meet the minimum needs of the peasant and he often tried to help the peasant in case of sickness. Sickness for a peasant was a serious matter. Probably his greatest defense against it was his type of activity in the air and sun and the garlic and herbs in his diet. If he did become sick, all but home remedies were beyond his means, even if available in the town to which, in any case, he would have to be transported in the event of severe illness or accident. Chief among the home remedies which he could secure by barter was opium which was almost the sole agency available to the peasants to ease physical pain from illness, accident, hunger or cold. It is partly for that reason that the use of opium in Iran was so widespread and its eradication so difficult.

To sum up briefly, the Persian peasant was, generally speaking, a very industrious worker, inured to the assaults of the heat, wind, and cold which buffeted him. His greatest foes were sickness, which in view of the unsanitary conditions and habits prevalent in Persia presented a constant threat to him and his dependents, and adverse weather conditions, which might destroy his crops, since he normally had no margin of safety from day to day. His horizons tended to be bounded by the urgency of meeting his most essential physical needs and by the village in which he was born, by its traditions, prejudices, and attitudes. In the many villages removed from main arteries, his news and interpretation of outside events were derived from visitors and the gossip of the local tea-house, the social center of the village. His religious attitudes and understanding of Persian history were molded by the local mullah and by recitations of the itinerant storytellers or of those who had learned the Persian classics

and legends. He tended to be shrewd, earthy, and quick-witted, but his environment and experience engendered a strong defensive mechanism which made him cautious, secretive, and suspicious. On the other hand he shared with his countrymen instinctive courtesy to strangers and a capacity for generous hospitality and responsibility for his guests.⁵

The first impact of Reza Shah's regime on the peasant was from military conscription, introduced in 1925 and carried out by force. In practice, initially at least, the recruiting officers had considerable leeway in selecting the required number of recruits from a given district and in timing their selection. Furthermore, initially, recruitment could be postponed for a period upon the payment of certain sums of money. The abuses to which these regulations could lead and the virtual defenselessness of the peasants are obvious.⁶ Although, in theory, a portion of the recruit's miniscule pay was to be remitted to his dependents, in practice, the village was not only deprived of the labor of the recruit, but found his family dependent upon its charity.

The second impact, in the same year 1925, stemmed from the decision to finance the construction of the railroad by a tax on sugar and tea. This of course increased the costs to the peasants of two of the principal staples in their simple diet — including one major source of energy.

The next burden on the peasant was imposed by the law of December 28, 1928, requiring the replacement of usual types of headgear by the *kolah* Pahlavi, a cap similar to the French military *kepi*. In due course, the European coat, vest, and trousers were prescribed. On July 8, 1935, the law was changed to require the replacement of the *kolah* Pahlavi by the European form of headgear. And on January 8, 1935, the veil was abolished.

It might be supposed that these would have had no effect on a peasant, since these clothes were so obviously inappropriate to his type of life and activity. But he was obliged to scrape together the means of conforming, because to fail to do so would get him a severe beating, if not a stay in jail, should he be seen in a town, or even on the highway or at work, by an ardent policeman, gendarme, or army officer. In some villages, one fedora was kept for the exclusive use of whoever was obliged to go into town. In practice, peasants were aided and local officials hampered by the prevalent uncertainty as to what actually constituted European dress.

In addition to the charges upon agricultural produce which resulted from a great variety of laws and regulations designed to tighten government control and increase revenue, all of which, in practice, reduced the peasant's income, he was caught in another squeeze. Up to 1932 the gold and silver coinage in circulation was, in effect, a commodity which could be bartered like any other commodity. It appeared to have a certain permanence and, as jewelry or a hoard, provided a sense of security. With the appearance of bank notes in 1932, the gradual withdrawal of gold and silver and its replacement by token coinage, the rapid increase of bank notes in circulation, and the manipulation of foreign exchange rates, the peasant found that what he received for his produce became progressively less adequate to meet his usual, simple, basic needs; these included such imported goods as the glass chimney for his lamp, the iron tools of his trade, and the printed or woven cotton for his wife and children. The net result was that of the peasant's few possessions, one after another was relinquished — the wife's few bits of gold or silver, the rug, in some cases, the samovar — and clothing was less frequently replaced.

One might suppose that these results would have disposed the peasants to listen to and accept communist propaganda, which was undoubtedly preached in Iran, despite Reza Shah's attempts to stamp it out. But this was not the case. On the contrary, Reza Shah appears to have been generally admired by the peasants up to the end. A variety of factors seems to account for this. In the first place, with the advent of Reza Shah the peasants were freed for the first time in many years from the pillaging, raping, and destruction of brigands and tribesmen. This may have created in their minds, partly filled with the stories of legendary Persian heroes, an image of a strong and benevolent Shah. In the second place, the pressures and exactions visited upon them were gradual and were exercised not by the Shah himself, but by his minions, whom past experience had always taught them to distrust and fear. In the third place, a remarkable characteristic of the Persians is that while, from our point of view, they are very wasteful of what they have, they do not appear to be disconsolate when it is gone.

In the cumulative memory of the village there had been periods of plenty and of scarcity, of tyranny and benevolence, of justice and injustice.⁷ That the period of Reza Shah was one of

oppression did not seem to them unusual. Furthermore, it appears probable that they were impressed by evidences of a new spirit in Iran reflected in the roads, the railroad, motor transportation, electric lights, the radio, and all sorts of strange imported novelties which they either saw in the towns or heard about; and which, although they certainly did not understand their implications, probably filled them with a certain pride in this Shah of whom they were constantly hearing, but knew only from his photographs which blanketed the country.

There are two other related factors that probably contributed to disinterest in communist teaching. One is religion and the other is an intangible bond, tying the peasants to their villages and their soil. Reza Shah attempted to destroy the institutional power of the clergy and weaken their influence. Despite this, it seems almost certain that the influence among the peasants of the mullahs and *sayyids* who either lived and worked among them as farmers, or with whom they were in periodic contact, remained strong. Nor is it likely that the government, by law or regulation alone, could weaken the convictions of the peasants, based upon their understanding of Shii beliefs, mixed up as they were, and still are, in rural areas, with pre-Islamic folklore. These convictions, vague and perhaps indefinable as they may be, are tied up with the world the peasant knows best, namely his village and his soil, and contribute to the suspicion of foreigners which is a marked characteristic of peasants in Iran. "Foreigner" is used here in the broad sense of anyone not a member of the village community. Communism, like Christianity or Buddhism, is a foreign idea, frequently proposed to the peasant by a "foreigner." It therefore aroused his immediate and instinctive opposition.

That the peasant spends his life in hard physical labor with outmoded tools and often under very harsh circumstances is undeniable. Nevertheless, he does not appear, generally speaking, to be less happy than town and city Persians. He has the great advantage over them of being inaccessible to officialdom during most of his activities and his poverty and supposed ignorance spare him to a large extent from their attention. In fact, he usually possesses a great deal of shrewdness, is far from being a fool, and enjoys a quick and spontaneous, if perhaps somewhat crude, sense of humor. Except in circumstances beyond his control, he exercises a very considerable degree of independence, despite his loud complaints; and he shares with his countrymen the frustrat-

ing and entertaining propensity of trying to order other people about.

THE TOWNSMAN

To turn now to the impact of the Reza Shah regime on a townsman. A carpenter is a typical example of a townsman. His type of house depended, of course, upon the location, size, and prosperity of the town; but a hypothetical description is given here. The house would not be visible from the narrow, winding, dirt street, bare of trees and bordered on each side by an eight-foot mud wall, built upon a foundation of field stone. In the wall was a low double door of unpainted wood, through which one stepped down into the garden. There might be, directly in front of one, a narrow wall, cutting off the view into the garden; but, passing to the right or left, one would be in a courtyard, the sides formed by high mud walls and the back by the house. A small triangular room with a door in one front corner marked the latrine. The courtyard might be paved with yellow bricks with spaces left free for a few trees, rose bushes, or flowers, but in the center was the usual pool, round or square, with a coping of stone or yellow brick.

The house, of white plastered mud brick with yellow brick trim and a flat mud roof, would have two floors, the lower floor projecting about four feet above the ground level. At each end of the house would be two windows with glazed shutters, one above the other. The house was entered by a broad flight of stone or brick steps in the center, giving onto a porch, supported at the front by two white wooden or plaster columns and enclosed at the sides and back by rooms, a double wooden door giving access to each room. Beneath the stairs another flight led to the rooms below, which might include the kitchen. The doors sometimes had glass in the upper panels and were fastened inside or outside by a chain and a slotted piece of iron, slipped over a ring, in which a padlock could be placed. It was not unusual in a house of this type to find several closely related families living together, or at least, the carpenter, his wife and children and one or more grandparents.

The furnishings did not differ greatly from those of the peasant, except for their greater quantity and better quality. But as a townsman, the carpenter might have on the plastered walls

a chromo of the Shah or a religious subject, or an enlarged, faded photograph of himself. As a carpenter he might also have one or two small square tables and two or three straight-backed chairs with wooden seats, all rather roughly made.

Since none of the doors or windows ever closed tightly and fuel was expensive, it was customary in cold weather for the family to use what is called a *kursi*. One type consists of a receptacle of glowing charcoal on a metal tray over which is placed a stout wooden frame about a foot and a half high.⁸ Over this is spread a large quilt. By placing this in a corner of the room or at the end of a narrow room, putting mattresses on the floor and pillows against the wall, a number of people could keep reasonably warm while in the house; and, indeed, they usually slept under the *kursi*, guarding only against the danger of the poisonous fumes given off by any charcoal not thoroughly combusted by keeping their heads from under the covers. In a family such as the carpenter's charcoal was the fuel used for the samovar and for cooking. The stove consisted of bricks set on edge, on which the cooking pots rested.

While the clothing tended to resemble that of the peasants, it was of better quality and the carpenter added a pair of long white cotton pants, fastened at the ankles and worn under his trousers. When dressed up, he wore a shirt without a collar, the neckband being held together by a collar button of gold or silver, sometimes set with a small turquoise.

In a town the diet for a family of the type of the carpenter's was more varied than that of a peasant. While relying principally on bread, cheese, onions, herbs, and tea, stews of lamb or chicken and dishes with rice were likely to be less rare. Furthermore, nuts, candies, a wider variety of the fresh fruits and vegetables, and the sherbets, or sweetened fruit syrups, so popular among the Persians, would also appear.

The carpenter's shop was a stall either in or near the bazaar. The open front on the street was closed at night by four vertical, solid planks held in place by iron bands and secured with a padlock. His basic tools included an adze, rip saw, hammer, screwdriver, one or two chisels, a measure, a large two-handled saw for cutting logs into boards, a plane, and a drill, worked with a string bow. The wood with which he worked was almost invariably green. Given his tools and materials, the astonishing thing is that his products were as good as they were.

In a town, the carpenter's principle work was the preparation and repair of agricultural implements, such as the sleds for threshing, and the construction of doors and windows. For most of his work he used poplar, but for exceptionally heavy work he would probably use sycamore (*chenar*), beech or maple, already cut into thick planks at the sawmills near the Caspian from which most of the hard woods come. If he were hired to make the doors and windows for a new house, the builder usually paid for the materials and the carpenter and his assistants were paid at the end of each day's work.

The carpenter usually worked at the building site. He first bargained with the nearest wholesale wood merchant for planks which come in various, irregular lengths and run in thickness from about two to three and one-half inches with the bark still on the edges. He then bargained with some man who owned a horse-drawn cart to move the planks to the site. There the planks, marked into board thickness with red chalk and braced against an improvised sawhorse, were slowly and laboriously sawed into boards by two men or boys. The boards naturally varied in thickness and were irregular and rough on the surface. After a casual planing by hand, they were regarded as ready for use. Wood was expensive, patching and piecing-out were customary and, since the wood was usually green, doors and windows swelled up in the winter and left wide gaps in the summer. But they served their purpose in a minimum fashion and, from the Persian point of view, were satisfactory.

The first essential need of the carpenter was, of course, to maintain his status in the community. As already mentioned, the indispensable basis for any successful enterprise in Iran is smooth personal relationships with the sources of power. Money can, of course, help, but is frequently not the most important factor. The establishment and maintenance of such relationships is still the most crucial and time-consuming activity of every Iranian, whether in a village or in the capital itself.

What does this mean then in terms of the life of the carpenter? His shop would be in or near the bazaar, the nerve center of the community. A bazaar, or market, consists usually of one or a group of unpaved streets which are roofed over and could formerly be closed off at night by heavy gates, being patrolled inside by watchmen employed by the bazaar merchants. All kinds of shops, raised a foot or two above the level of the street, line

both sides. In some shops goods only are for sale — rugs, cloth, spices, clothing, jewelry, tea, sugar, nuts, fruit, glass- or china-ware; in others, goods are being manufactured — shoes, quilts, printed cottons, tin-, copper-, or silverware. From the bazaar, wide gateways lead into the large courtyards where wholesale merchandise is stored and sold — cotton, grain, rugs, etc. The bazaars normally contain small restaurants and tea-shops and are usually adjacent to a mosque and public bath. The streets of a bazaar are normally crowded with men and women bargaining and buying or just looking, jostled by donkeys, camels, and porters. The din is terrific, but it is man-made din and, therefore, differs from that of a factory.

Every stranger and virtually every local male and many housewives go to the bazaar at least once a day, except Fridays, when the shops are closed. It is the place where news and gossip are exchanged or manufactured and where the pulse of the community has been taken, traditionally. As in any such community, the carpenter gradually got to know all of the other regular businessmen and workers with whom he would converse and drink tea. He would, furthermore, get to recognize and have at least a bowing acquaintance with the members of the clergy and the civil authorities, including especially the police and army officers.

One indication of the prestige of an individual in Iran has been traditionally the number and social importance of the individuals who accompany him whenever he appears in public or who call upon him at his home. At the same time, the prestige of a given individual was bestowed to some extent on his entourage. In accordance with this custom, the carpenter occupied himself in his spare time in the evenings and on Fridays in cultivating the acquaintance of individuals through whose good offices he might be able to enlist the decisive aid of key officials in time of need. The carpenter's sense of security was also enhanced by his membership in his guild and in the traditional gymnastic groups prevalent in towns and cities in Iran, each known as a *zur khaneh* (House of Strength); and by his participation in group exercises and recitations of a religious character, such as the *rozeh khani* (a systematic commemoration of the martyrs of Karbala). He would also share the intense loyalty to his town which is a strong Persian characteristic.

The traditional formalities of social intercourse tended to be more developed in a town community than in a village, and there

was somewhat more privacy. But, as in the village, life tended to be lived in public and each individual seemed inclined to make the affairs of every other individual his own, readily offering comment and advice. Like the peasant, the carpenter learned early in life to rely primarily on his wits to protect himself from injustice and oppression.

The carpenter had virtually no idle boyhood. From the time he could pick up nails or small bits of wood, he was put to work. Generally speaking, the workday in a town was, for the carpenter as for most other manual laborers, from sunrise to sunset, though they might actually get to work somewhat later. He probably got up about sunrise, washed in the courtyard pool, drank a cup of tea, ate some bread, and walked to his shop. A boy normally spent his days with his father, or perhaps an uncle, also a carpenter, and acquired his knowledge of events and human behavior by observation, experience, and buffeting. This process of early and uninhibited indoctrination into the ways of men probably accounts for many of the characteristics displayed by adult Persians. Generally speaking, the best workers are boys from eight to fifteen before they begin to practice the less productive habits they have learned from adults.

The carpenter was confronted with the same problems as the peasant by the introduction of military conscription, clothing reform, compulsory primary education, the gradual imposition of stamp taxes of a great variety for licenses, contracts, etc., and the rising cost of living. But he was, in fact, more vulnerable to exactions from petty officials who would certainly regard him as a potentially more profitable target than a peasant. Not only were an increasing number of civil, military, and police representatives of the central government settled in the towns during the Reza Shah regime; but they appear to have been more ostentatiously checked and harried by supervisors or inspectors from Tehran, one agency competing and tending to spy on another. Furthermore, these officials might be described as the spearhead in the province of new principles and practices enunciated in Tehran. For them to try to carry out this role with totally inadequate salaries and equipment and in the midst of confusion and probable misunderstanding of purposes and methods, must have caused continuous frustration and irritation.

Such a situation among the officials could contribute to the advantage and disadvantage of the carpenter. Illegal exactions

from one source could perhaps be tempered by introducing competition from another source. Furthermore, the practical need of officials to arrive at some working arrangement with the richer and more influential individuals in a town, who alone could provide substantial aid to the official in meeting his economic needs, tended to provide the townsman, including the carpenter, with a degree of protection against excessive pressure from zealous officials.

Other new expenses forced upon the carpenter by Reza Shah's regulations were, of course, the cost of the new types of clothing which were heavier for a townsman than for a peasant. Pressure upon the fathers to send their children to school, obligatory for the primary grades, involved expense for prescribed uniforms as well as for supplies and, at the same time, deprived the carpenter of the help of his sons in the shop. The carpenter was also expected to contribute to the expense of public decorations and entertainment on such occasions as the birthday of the Shah, New Year's, or religious holidays. These payments were, of course, heavier than those of the peasant, reflecting the greater prestige of the town. The carpenter was probably aware of the mounting activity of the secret police on a hunt for actions or words critical of the Shah and Court; and he must have noticed a growing tension in the bazaar and remarked an increasing avoidance of political discussion.

But in the case of the carpenter, as of the peasant and other more humble segments of the population, it seems probable that such things as the novelties and superficial public improvements around him gave him a sense of satisfaction and pride which at least counterbalanced his resentments. So it seems to be true that, in general, the more humble members of the town community, such as the carpenter, retained an admiration for Reza Shah up to the end.

THE TRIBESMAN

The impact of the regime on the tribesman, of course, varied from tribe to tribe, depending upon its strength in terms of arms, the comparative inaccessibility of its homelands, and the extent to which the tribal economy was nomadic.⁹

Although there was great variety, a typical nomadic tribesman lived with his family of one or more wives, a raft of children, one

or more grandparents, and some dogs, in a black felt tent near a smaller or larger group of his close kinsmen. The numbers depended upon the adequacy of the pasturage at any spot, usually in some mountain valley. Life was lived on the ground, so that furniture, other than perhaps a chest for clothing, was absent. Rugs or felts were spread inside or in front of the tent; and sheepskin coats or cotton quilts served as covers at night. Cooking pots and pans, a samovar, and simple utensils, including a flint, completed the household equipment. For the tribal economy there were the basic materials for rug-weaving, and for making ropes and cheese.

There is considerable variety in the traditional dress of nomads, the distinctive feature for men being the type of turban or rimless felt hat. The man usually wore baggy trousers and, over his shirt, a fitted jacket, often worn unfastened. Around his waist he often wore a long, wide sash. The women usually wore several voluminous skirts, one on top of the other, with a fitted shirt or jacket. Their clothes were designed to give them the freedom their activities required and protection against the weather. They tended, furthermore, to be colorful; and the women wore no veils, but instead, necklaces, bracelets, and earrings, usually of heavy silver or gold.

The diet of the tribesman included wild fruit, game, goat's cheese, clabbered milk, bread, occasional eggs, occasional rice and lamb, wild honey, tea, and sugar.

The traditional life of the tribesman was focused on the breeding of sheep and goats, accompanied by hunting and fighting. Therefore, his most prized possessions were his horse and his arms — a rifle and a variety of daggers and knives. The men were responsible for the protection and guidance of the tribe, especially on the migrations between the summer pastures in the high valleys and the winter pastures on the plains. Aside from the normal work of caring for the children and cooking, the women milked the goats, made cheese, spun yarn, and wove rugs. They also gathered brush for the fire and foraged for wild fruit and berries. When the tribes migrated, the women struck the tents, packed the goods, kept track of the children, hens, and pets; and, often carrying a baby or small child, walked alongside the loaded animals.

The tribal group of interrelated families was under the control of a leader, usually elected. Several such groups might be under a

sub-chief, the entire sub-groups being under the control of a paramount chief, also often elected, who was advised by a council of elders. The paramount chief was responsible, among other things, for deciding when the seasonal migration should start and how it should be conducted; as well as for relations between the tribe and the authorities. His decisions could mean the salvation or destruction of the flocks on which the tribal existence depended.

Tribal life was based on customs and traditions of long standing, although the origins of the tribes are lost. Each tribe had its own dialect and traditions, transmitted orally by the older members of the tribe. Conversation and storytelling occupied the leisure of the tribesmen, with emphasis on the bravery, skill, or exceptional feats of their forebears. The tribes are still nominally Muslim, but it is probable that their religion is strongly colored by pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. The type of life required exceptional hardihood and self-reliance from the women, but gave them far greater freedom than that enjoyed by women in the villages.

The lives and interests of the tribesmen were focused on the precarious problems of guarding their flocks and finding water and forage, but their lives were enlivened occasionally by feasting, dancing, and music which would normally accompany weddings, the beginning of spring, or the successful completion of an arduous and dangerous migration. In these pursuits, they inevitably came into contact or conflict with other tribes and with settled communities. The result was to tighten the bonds within the tribal groups as they faced outsiders, although a characteristic of the larger tribes was the prevalence of jealousy and feuding within the tribe.

The aim of Reza Shah was to stop the tribesmen from their customary practices of pillaging settled communities and goods in transit; and to bring them under the authority of the central government by three methods: conscription, disarmament, and settlement.

Under the circumstances which existed, the only means by which the government could introduce conscription were persuasion through education or force. The latter method was used and the nomadic tribes were defeated one at a time with considerable losses on both sides.¹⁰ The more serious and permanent effects, however, stemmed from government policies and army practices

after such defeats. Martial law was established in the areas and the tribesmen were subjected to more or less systematic pillaging and oppression. It was these practices which caused the periodic rebellion of tribal groups goaded to desperation; rebellions were put down with extreme brutality. In addition to these practices, tribal unity was weakened by government intrigue and bribery, and the imprisonment, exile, or murder of tribal leaders.

As the government asserted its authority, it became feasible to station troops at bottlenecks through which the tribes were obliged to pass during migrations and so assure the collection of taxes. But it would be unrealistic to conclude that the sums collected under these circumstances were limited to those legally due. Evidence of the gradual impoverishment of the tribes was shown during the Reza Shah period by the quantities of tribal jewelry and rugs which found their way to the Tehran markets.

In theory, the policy of stopping nomadism in order to bring the tribes more firmly under government control need not have damaged seriously their pastoral economy. A limited number of individuals were to be permitted to take the herds and flocks to pasturage, which would presumably be adequate and easily accessible. But in practice the location of the resettlements tended to be unhealthy spots where the tribesmen, accustomed to rugged exercise and clear mountain air, were weakened and decimated by sickness; and the economy, which was based on a close and continuous association of the tribesmen with their flocks and herds, was seriously dislocated, with a consequent loss to the national economy.

All in all, the treatment of the nomadic tribes constitutes the most sordid chapter in the period of Reza Shah and inevitably casts a deep shadow on the reputations of the generals and colonels involved, who must share a large measure of the responsibility. It is, therefore, not surprising that the abdication of Reza Shah was widely regarded by tribesmen with satisfaction and renewed hope.

VI

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1941

The initial shock for the Persians in the fall of 1941 was the collapse of their army which for twenty years had constituted the focal point of national effort and sacrifice under the domination of Reza Shah. It might be said that Reza Shah was well aware of the inability of his forces to face successfully those of two major powers, but that the German successes in the Caucasus made it politically expedient to offer token resistance. In any case, the fact was that the pretensions of the army and police, upon which the government was based, had been shattered. The only forces to maintain order in large sections of the country were once more British and Russian.

Although Reza Shah had never had personal experience of modern warfare, it seems probable that he was deeply angered and disillusioned by the performance of his army. It has been authoritatively stated that the Allies did not call upon the Shah to abdicate. What led him to do so appears to have been the danger for his person or dynasty potentially implied by the Soviet movement of troops from Qazvin to the environs of Tehran.¹ In any case, he left Tehran on September 16, 1941, and, after spending about a month in Isfahan, was given passage aboard a British ship for Mauritius; then subsequently moved at his request to Johannesburg, where he died on July 26, 1944.

The transference of the throne from Reza Shah to his son took place without incident, probably because the comparative rapidity of the action had not allowed potential opposition to solidify; and because of the presence of foreign troops, who were in no mood to tolerate any threat to their operations from local disturbances. Mohammed Reza Shah was born on October 27, 1919, spent about five and a half years in study at Le Rosey in Switzerland and returned to Tehran in May, 1937. In 1939 he married Fawzia, the sister of King Faruk of Egypt and in 1940 had by her his only child, a daughter, Shahnaz. Following his return to Tehran in 1937, he spent several years in the local Officers' School from

which he was graduated, engaged actively in sports, and was under the constant tutelage of his father. On his accession at the age of twenty-two he was, however, without practical experience in government and, more important, lacked the intimate, first-hand knowledge of his subjects which his father possessed. To reduce potential dissatisfaction with his accession, he freed political prisoners, gave his father's property to the nation, as noted above, and restored the Constitution to vigor by his formal proclamation of a constitutional monarchy. But the burden of government had, of necessity, to be carried by the experienced politicians.²

From the foreign point of view, the dominant theme in the history of Iran since 1941 has been foreign interference or influence to accomplish one of two objectives: first, the political objective, namely the establishment of a foreign foothold on Iranian soil or foreign subversion of the Iranian government, or the prevention of such a development; and second, an economic objective, namely the assurance that Iranian oil would be available to foreign economy on profitable terms.

From the Iranian point of view, the dominant theme has been the expression of nationalism, which includes the strengthening of Shii Islam as an integral part of Persian nationalism; and the secondary theme, the expansion of Iranian economy.

During this period the peasants and ordinary tribesmen, constituting perhaps 85 per cent of the population, have played little significant political role, though they have continued to constitute the backbone of the national economy. Their emergence as a significant political force is certainly only a question of time.

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE OR INFLUENCE

For purposes of this discussion, foreign interference or influence came from three sources: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The legal basis for the cooperation between the Persian government and those of the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia was set forth in the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942. The presence of United States forces was never covered by a treaty between the United States and Iran, but was justified on the grounds that American forces were under over-all British command. The conflicts which developed culminated in three crises: that of Azerbaijan in 1946; that over the

nationalization of the British oil industry in 1951; and that of the military coup d'état of 1953.

The Azerbaijan crisis broke in November, 1945, when a local government, under Soviet sponsorship, set up an autonomous regime, imitated promptly by a Kurdish group in western Azerbaijan, both areas being within the Red Army's zone of occupation. With American and British support, Iran appealed to the Security Council for help in January, 1946.³ The dispute was settled in April through negotiations carried on in Moscow by the Iranian Prime Minister and Stalin.⁴ These involved the granting of an oil concession to a joint Irano-Soviet company under Soviet control, subject to Majlis ratification.

Soviet troops were evacuated from Iran on May 9th, five weeks after the date set by the 1942 Tripartite Treaty. In November, 1946, despite vehement Soviet protests, central government troops restored control in Azerbaijan. In October of the following year, 1947, the Majlis rejected the oil agreement on the grounds that it had been negotiated illegally; and, at the same time, ordered the government to seek a revision of the concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

The Azerbaijan crisis was perhaps hastened, and was certainly embittered, by an incident which had occurred in 1944. In the fall of 1943, in the midst of the war, representatives of the Dutch Shell Oil Company arrived in Tehran to seek an oil concession. They were joined in the spring of 1944 by representatives of two competing American companies on a similar errand. It is not surprising to find that they were, in turn, soon joined by a large Soviet delegation, also seeking an oil concession. The Persian government postponed the problem by refusing to grant any concession while foreign troops were on Iranian soil. This decision was soon strengthened by a law prohibiting any discussion of foreign concessions by government officials. This action was roundly denounced by Soviet officials, but was described by American officials as within the proper rights of the Iranian government.

The second crisis stemmed from the law of October, 1947, under which official conversations were initiated with the AIOC, looking to a revision of the 1933 concession to procure, among other things, an increase in the royalties. They culminated in a Supplemental Agreement, signed on July 17, 1949, but requiring Majlis ratification. However, Persian dissatisfaction with the

company's policies had been mounting. Although it soon became apparent that no Majlis would approve the agreement, no modifications were made in its provisions, and consequently, tempers and emotions rose both in Iran and Great Britain. In December, 1950, the agreement was withdrawn from a Majlis committee and demands for cancellation of the concession and nationalization were heard. Although the AIOC was a private company, a majority of the stock was owned by the British government, which naturally intervened. Largely for this reason, anti-British sentiment was stimulated in Iran.

It may be helpful at this point to say something briefly about the place of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the Persian community. Although the concession was granted in 1901, a gusher resulted only on May 26, 1908. The following year the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, was organized; but when, in 1913, additional capital was required, it was supplied by the British government, which then became the majority shareholder. During World War I the Iranian fields were the principal suppliers of fuel for the eastern fleets. By 1946 the annual royalty revenue paid to the Persian government was about \$20 million, while the annual company expenditures in Iran for goods and services amounted to another \$50 million. At the same time, the Persian employees constituted about one-third of the total number of Persians employed in manufacturing industries.

The company's main office was in Tehran; there was a small refinery in Kermanshah, and a nation-wide distribution service by tanker cars, tanker trucks, and lorries. In a few cities gasoline was sold from filling stations, but by far the more prevalent way of selling gasoline, kerosene, and fuel oil, was in square tins which contained five Imperial gallons. These empty tins were extensively used by artisans for roofing and the manufacture of a great variety of articles, including containers, pipes, and even stoves. The company's local banking was done with the Imperial Bank, a British firm with its main Persian office in Tehran and branches throughout the country.

The main concentration of activity and employment was, of course, on the island of Abadan, where the world's largest refinery was located and where ocean tankers were loaded with raw and refined products, and in the oil fields lying in the mountains to the north and east of Abadan. The company had its own town, separated from the Persian town of the same name on the main-

land, supplied its own housing and public utilities, had established hospital, public health, and athletic facilities, and housing for some of its Persian employees. The company built and maintained its own roads, telephone system, and airports. Until the construction under Reza Shah of the road to Mohammareh (Khorramshahr) and the railroad, access to the oil fields from the plateau had been arduous and the authority of the central government largely formal. The company had been accustomed to assuring the cooperation of the local tribes, notably the Bakhtiari, in providing labor and protecting property, by regular subsidies to tribal leaders.⁵ Law and order in Abadan and the oil fields, if not actually maintained by company officials, were under their strong influence.

The unskilled labor at Abadan and in the fields tended to be procured locally, the semi-skilled or skilled labor coming from the cities or being trained in the company's own training system. The clerical staff and the household domestic servants consisted almost entirely of Indians or Pakistanis; and, with virtually no exceptions, the top managerial and technical positions were filled by British subjects or other foreigners.

Until the nationalization of the oil industry and the Caspian Sea fisheries (a Soviet concession), the value of the exports of both organizations was usually omitted from Persian official trade statistics, since the value accrued directly to the concessionaires. The only part of this value which indirectly re-entered the national economy consisted of the royalties, which were paid directly into the national treasury. This system of bookkeeping has always constituted a major problem for anyone dealing with Iranian economic statistics.

The Persian attitude toward the AIOC as something foreign within the national economy, implied in this procedure of accounting, was probably accentuated by the ubiquity of the transportation and distribution system, which extended its tentacles into every town and many villages. The monogram BP, for British Petroleum, in both Persian and Latin alphabets, seemed to be everywhere, even on the tin boxes, pitchers, or pails in the house and shop. It is not surprising that these indications were regarded widely as evidence of British power in Iran. Nor would it be surprising if this power were suspected of exercising every kind of pressure and interference.

The principal initial incentives which induced the Persian gov-

ernment to seek a revision of the AIOC concession were two: first, by a gesture of impartiality, to make the rejection of the proposed joint Irano-Soviet Oil Company more palatable to the Soviet Union; and second, to increase the Persian revenue from the oil exports. As the controversy over the revision of the oil agreement grew more heated and became progressively anti-British, as well as anti-AIOC, it is not surprising that the government could easily stir up broad national support.

Nationalization, therefore, took on gradually the appearance of a national objective, led to the assassination of the Prime Minister on March 7, 1951, for opposing it, and swept the Majlis, which passed the law on March 15, 1951. On March 20, the Senate approved the law and on May 2, it was signed by the Shah. On October 22, 1952, Iran broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

Almost two and one-half years after the nationalization of the oil properties, on August 19, 1953, the government was overthrown by a military coup d'état. On the following December 5th diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom were resumed. On August 5th, 1954, a new oil agreement was signed, which replaced the exclusive control of the AIOC by the effective control of an international consortium of eight large oil companies, five American, one Dutch, one French, and the AIOC, re-christened the British Petroleum Company. The Majlis ratified the new agreement on September 21, 1954, and the Senate followed suit a week later.

Both the British and American governments at the highest levels were deeply involved in a series of proposals, counter-proposals, and negotiations which marked the course of the dispute. As the British position in Iran was progressively weakened, the major burden of attempting to maintain a Western position there fell upon the United States, whose principal concerns were two: first, to prevent the loss of Iranian independence to the Soviet Union, partly as a result of the absence of oil revenues considered essential to the economic development of Iran; and second, to prevent any solution of the oil problem which might threaten the continued availability of oil — essential to the economy of western Europe — from other sources in the Persian Gulf area or cause a disastrous increase in its cost or the disruption of the intricately intertwined operations of the giant oil companies engaged in international trade.

It may be said briefly that Persian aspirations of independent control of the production, distribution, and sale abroad of its oil were doomed from the start. This was principally because from the foreign point of view the Persian aspirations ran counter to political objectives of the United Kingdom, such as the maintenance of prestige in the Persian Gulf area, and therefore, to the broader objectives of the United States, which gradually made it clear to the Iranian government that there was significant solidarity of United Kingdom-United States views. Furthermore, Iranian aspirations conflicted with the objectives of the giant oil companies, whose operations were of such importance to their governments and national economies that they could enlist effective official support. From the internal point of view, Persia had no feasible alternative means of transporting and distributing significant quantities of oil abroad other than the tankers actually or potentially under the control of the international oil companies; she lacked a sufficient number of adequately trained and experienced Iranians to operate the industry and could not obtain the required foreign technicians because of the lack of confidence inspired by the political control of the industry which had been set up; and finally, enough influential Iranians would compromise to obtain the oil revenues for economic expansion, despite claims that Iran could do without them and would, indeed, never be free of foreign interference until it did so.

No attempt will be made here to discuss the highly complex and technical facets of this dispute which lasted for three and a half years, although reference is made to some of the internal effects, which are perhaps of greater long-range significance.⁶

The third foreign crisis since 1941 is related to the United States. The promptness with which the United States provided financial aid, denied to Mosaddeq, to his successor in 1953, was regarded by many Iranians as one indication, among several, that the United States government acknowledged the moral obligation implied in its active interference in the oil dispute. Consequently, subsequent relations between Iran and the United States may be viewed in the light of mutual attempts to define the character and scope of this obligation. In the seven years from 1951 to 1957, U.S. economic aid, as distinct from military aid, has amounted to about \$264 million in grants and \$130 million in loans.

THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Before turning to the expressions of nationalism since 1941, one might consider very briefly the national economy. The collection and compilation of dependable economic statistics is only now developing in Iran and many estimates are still unavailable.⁷

The basic industry is agriculture, including animal husbandry, which provides a livelihood for perhaps 80 per cent of the population, including roughly 12,000,000 peasants, scattered in 45,000 villages, and an estimated 2,000,000 nomadic and transhumant tribesmen. In a normal year their production of foodstuffs and raw materials is sufficient to meet current standards and supply limited exports of such materials as rice, dried fruits, nuts, wool, skins, hides, and sausage casings. The most important annual needs which are not met internally, but must be imported, are about two-thirds of the requirement for sugar, slightly over half of that for tea, and about half of the requirements for cotton and woolen cloth.

Of the remaining members of the working population, some 100,000 are believed to be engaged in the making of rugs on home looms or in small workshops. Many small children are included in this number, because their delicate, deft fingers are peculiarly adapted to tying of hand knots. Another 200,000 are estimated to be in government employ and about the same number in industrial factories. This includes some 65,000 workers directly or indirectly employed by the oil industry; and 5,000 each in the sugar refineries and the mining industry. But the figure excludes the several hundred thousand independent artisans and their apprentices.

The total number of factories in Iran in 1950 was 239, of which thirty-six were state-owned and produced textiles, refined sugar, tobacco products, chemicals, cement, and processed logs, canned fish, and packaged tea. Privately-owned factories supplemented these, the largest number of workers being employed in cotton and woolen textile manufacturing, cotton ginning, rice polishing, flour milling, and the manufacture of matches, hosiery, and alcoholic drinks.

By far the largest private employer and the most lucrative economic activity in Iran is the operation of the Oil Consortium at Abadan. In addition, the National Iranian Oil Company

(NIOC), an exclusive government organization, operates the former AIOC refinery at Kermanshah, the internal distribution and sale of petroleum products, amounting to some 2,000,000 tons a year, and certain peripheral activities at Abadan. The NIOC is also in charge of new prospecting outside of the Consortium concession and is installing the pipelines for the internal distribution of products from Abadan.

In addition to the large sums expended by the Consortium for its local labor and other expenses, the Consortium paid to the Iranian government for the first three months of 1957 58.8 million pounds sterling, a sum equal to the total amount for 1956. It is estimated that such payments will amount in the near future to 100 million pounds a year, of which 60 per cent or about \$170 million would be assigned to the Seven-Year Plan Organization described below on pages 106-07.

EXPRESSIONS OF NATIONALISM

Following the Anglo-Soviet invasion in late August, 1941, and the abdication of Reza Shah in mid-September, the situation in Tehran was one of confusion and tension. Martial law had been declared and a curfew was imposed which varied from early or late evening until sunrise. Roadblocks had been set up on roads leading from Tehran and trucks as well as some cars had been requisitioned. Since Tehran receives much of its fresh food from the Caspian provinces, anxiety mounted. Throughout it all was the turmoil and confusion accompanying the roundup of hundreds of Germans and Italians. The roads were dotted with ex-soldiers or released political prisoners, particularly tribesmen, making their way home.

The Cabinet had, of course, resigned and been replaced; the term of the Twelfth Majlis ended on October 31, 1941, and the members of the next Majlis had been elected and were ready to take office. Communication systems outside of Tehran were largely monopolized by the Anglo-Soviet forces and provincial governments were virtually on their own. From this time until May, 1946 — a period of four and a half years — the authority of the central government was distinctly limited.

It was soon apparent to the British authorities that some efforts had to be made to control the national economy. The emission of

bank notes to meet the needs of the foreign forces (which, beginning in 1943, included the American Persian Gulf Service Command), plus the reduced imports and internal dislocations, started an increase in the cost of living index which rose from 154.1 in August, 1941, to 1,108 in March, 1945. One attempted solution was to bring in an American Financial Mission, authorized by a Majlis vote of November 12, 1942. Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, who had served Reza Shah in a similar capacity from 1922 to 1927, headed the mission.

To meet the situation as it existed in January, 1943, measures such as price-fixing and rationing, revision and increase of income taxes, reduction of the government budget and an internal Treasury loan were required—all anathema to the dominant political groups in Iran. Internal opposition, Soviet non-cooperation, and the physical obstacles to enforcement under prevailing circumstances contributed to the difficulties which finally led Millspaugh to resign in February, 1945.⁸ These efforts were supplemented by those of various other American advisers—for the army quartermaster and supply departments, the Gendarmerie or rural police, the Tehran National Police administration, the Food, Agriculture, and Health Ministries. But the effectiveness of these officials was limited.

All of the Allied forces in Iran employed thousands of Iranian workers, many of whom were trained in methods of operation and maintenance, especially of trucks and railway equipment.⁹ Those employed by the British and Americans, at least, were well and regularly paid and unquestionably absorbed a great variety of ideas from observation of operations efficiently conducted by individuals whose style and habits of living, even in wartime, contrasted sharply with their own, if not perhaps always, to their minds, more favorably.

Of equal significance in the wartime picture were the propaganda activities conducted by each of the Allies in Iran. Throughout the late thirties, Iranian cities had been blanketed by Nazi and Fascist propaganda of great variety. After the outbreak of war, radio broadcasts from all sources, but especially German, were avidly followed and were widely known. At the same time, official communiqués from all sides, funnelled through the government's news agency, were printed side by side in the daily Tehran papers. After the invasion, of course, Axis publications disappeared from view and the newspapers were purged, but little could be

done to discourage listeners from tuning in on German broadcasts.

After the occupation, the British and the Russians set about introducing and organizing their own institutions for news and propaganda. In time, these were supplemented by those of the United States, the Free French, and the Poles, but it was not until after the war that the U.S. Information program blossomed into a large-scale operation. In some respects, the Russian activities in this field contrasted sharply with those of the Western powers: one was the inclusiveness of their targets; another was emphasis on Nazi atrocities, rather than on Allied solidarity.

Another source of significant internal influence during the war stemmed from those Iranians, including students, who had been living abroad, but whom the war or the end of the Reza Shah regime had induced to return home. They were, of course, filled with all sorts of notions about how much better this, that, or the other was done elsewhere and what changes should be made in Iran.

The cumulative effect of these developments was to increase confusion and dissatisfaction. The initial reaction to the abdication of Reza Shah was one of intense relief in urban centers, due to the lifting of the restrictions which had limited freedom of movement and of speech.¹⁰ Power was clearly in the hands of foreigners, who seemed to be preoccupied with their own affairs, and it seemed an opportune time for every Iranian to re-assert himself in whatever ways occurred to him.

To look first briefly at the government. Both British and Soviet authorities had declared that the presence of their troops did not constitute an occupation.¹¹ The Persian government therefore continued to function, although its power was limited and progressively reduced in the Soviet zone, until it ceased entirely in Azerbaijan after the rebellion of 1945. At the head of the government was a young inexperienced Shah, who could be and was, for the moment, largely ignored. The bureaucracy remained unchanged, although the Cabinet was filled with new, but familiar faces. The Prime Minister was a highly-respected old gentleman who had served Reza Shah for about eight years as a Minister, during the earlier part of his reign. But, under the Constitution, the ministers are responsible individually and collectively to the Majlis. It is, therefore, necessary to look at the Majlis.

The Majlis consisted of 136 members, but seldom, if ever, had

a full attendance. Deputies were elected, and still are, to represent the nation at large, a specified number being elected from established districts — Tehran, for instance, elects twelve, Isfahan four. There are no printed ballots, each voter arriving at the polls and casting his handwritten list of choices. If he wishes, he may place his own name at the top of the list. Not only does the tabulation of such votes present opportunities for misrepresentation and take a long time, but elections are delayed because they do not take place simultaneously throughout the country. In this way, a candidate defeated in one place, may run in one or more later contests.

The vast majority of the deputies represented sources of power — usually the Court, the army, clergy, or propertied classes — whose interests they were expected to advance along with their own personal interests. The deputies who took office soon after Reza Shah's abdication had been elected during his reign. They, therefore, might reasonably expect that they might be serving their last term.

The deputies were informally grouped into what are called factions, representing the common views of some group on a specific issue. But these fly apart and re-group on other issues, so that the Majlis organization is normally in a state of continuous flux. But it is upon the support of a majority of the members of this fickle mass that ministers and a Cabinet must rely for political life.¹² The general impression of cabinets from 1941 to 1953 has been, therefore, of a group of about seventy individuals taking turns in office. Individuals who profited by this continuous uncertainty were, of course, opposed to any change, and there is little doubt that this system is in complete harmony with the traditional attitude toward political position as an instrument for enhancing personal and family interests, exercised through and based upon personal relationships and negotiations, rather than law. Aside from the dissatisfaction of those who were temporary non-participants in the profits of government, there has been a wider growing resentment over the realization that too many citizens are excluded from active participation.

Dissatisfaction with the deputies broke out immediately following Reza Shah's abdication and has been a feature of political life in Iran ever since. Some were accused of buying their seats, of giving and taking bribes, of using their positions for personal profit; some never attended sessions, others were often absent;

some were accused of lying, of being too ignorant to understand the laws on which they voted, of sacrificing broader interests to those of a province, city, or group of cronies, of irresponsibility, pomposity, and neglect of their duties. The charges were endless and probably all contained some element of truth. However, the alternatives proposed were often couched in vague platitudes and sometimes clearly indicated that the goal of criticism was the replacement of a specific deputy by his critic.

The fact appears to be that centralization of government in the somewhat artificial atmosphere of Tehran has not been conducive to the evolution of a body of experienced, responsible politicians with knowledge of the national needs. The absence since 1900 of reasonably independent governments on the provincial, city, or town levels has provided no training ground for such individuals.

Furthermore, there have been no nation-wide political parties of duration, which might have provided such a training ground. There have been periodic spawnings of so-called political parties, usually in preparation for elections, but with the exception of the communist-dominated Tudeh Party they were without much substance and proved to be ephemeral. Despite the avid interest in politics among urban populations, especially in Tehran, the emergence of effective political parties to date has been abortive, probably for three reasons: lack of incentive, lack of understanding, and lack of cooperation. First, given the system of elections, there was probably little confidence that even a comparatively large and well-organized party could obtain an effective voice in the Majlis; second, even if the purposes and methods of political party organization were understood, there has probably been a scarcity of volunteers to perform the humdrum chores of a party over a sustained period which alone could produce results; and third, the individualism of the Persians, which is their most prevalent and hotly-defended characteristic, would make effective organization difficult, if not impossible. It may be that it was awareness of this dominant national characteristic of individualism which contributed to the fact that there were no political parties sponsored by Reza Shah.

The major agencies of attack on the ministers and the deputies were, of course, the newspapers. Once Reza Shah was gone, the floodgates were open and hundreds of newspapers and news sheets gradually filled Tehran.¹³ The circulation of some was

small, and perhaps only one or two issues might appear before the publisher ran out of money. Some papers clearly existed only for libel and blackmail. Up until 1954, various publications were in periodic conflict with official efforts to control the press and were intermittently suppressed. Since 1954 the press has been once more under close government supervision.

Aside from these complaints against the national government, there were other sources of dissatisfaction, three of which are: the mounting cost of living, the bread shortages, and employment difficulties for college graduates.

The impact of the cost of living, which had increased seven to eight times by the end of the war, was, of course, nationwide, but was especially severe for government workers and people with small fixed incomes, most of whom were concentrated in Tehran. An immediate saving for families in the cost of women's clothing was achieved by the prompt return to the *chadur*, encouraged by the clergy for other reasons. Diets were restricted to necessities, beggars increased, and in 1942 soup kitchens and various types of public and private assistance were organized or expanded on a continuing basis with large foreign participation. Periodic strikes took place in various parts of the country until 1954, and the pressures to meet the barest needs led to a vast increase of giving and taking bribes throughout the bureaucracy, virtually from top to bottom.

But more dramatic than the slow grind of inflation were the periodic bread shortages. Wheat bread is for almost all Persians literally the staff of life. Reza Shah had followed a policy of assuring cheap bread in the cities by setting a low price for grain right at the fields and requiring specified deliveries from the landlords, the government storing a reserve. The shortage in 1942, especially in Tehran, was caused principally by four things: the diversion of rail and motor transport to Allied uses; the reluctance of growers to sell in the face of increasing prices; the inability of the government to enforce collections; and hoarding. It should be remembered that a substantial number of deputies were or represented large wheat growers, whose goal was maximum profit.

The government supplied Tehran bakers with a daily quota of wheat flour which they, in turn, baked and sold. As the supply dwindled, wheat was officially mixed with barley flour which gives the bread a gritty quality. But this was unofficially adulter-

ated with all sorts of materials, including straw, sawdust, and bits of stick and stone. The resultant riots on December 9, 1942, which included the burning of the Prime Minister's house and widespread looting of shops, were in this case apparently spontaneous. But this example of the power of a mob set a pattern for subsequent mob demonstrations and riots, of which the latest accompanied the military coup d'état in 1953.

The third source of significant discontent was the problem of employment for college graduates. For reasons outlined on page 60 above, employment and promotion prospects in the army or the government bureaucracy were not regarded as attractive by most college graduates, in view of their training and their estimates of their own abilities. At the same time, the government had encouraged students to study abroad and had exerted pressure on Tehran University to turn out an ever-increasing number of graduates. As government monopolies were dissolved, following Reza Shah's departure, private enterprise was resumed, but the trade restrictions, stemming from the war, limited the feasibility of expansion and therefore limited job opportunities. Many graduates entered government agencies, but were often obliged to seek any available type of outside work to help meet expenses. Some entered the employment of foreign wartime agencies, but to most of them this was regarded as a temporary solution. Some looked to the AIOC which had, of course, its own training programs; but a conviction grew, regardless of its validity, that the company could, if only it were willing to do so, replace its thousands of foreign employees with Iranians.

Each successive year added its quota of hundreds of new graduates. Their feeling of being ready, willing, and able to provide their services, but of finding virtually no congenial, stimulating opportunities, gradually produced a widespread atmosphere of frustration and rebellion, and a conviction that there must be a change. All that seemed to be needed was leadership; and since that was not forthcoming from the groups in political power, it came from outside — notably from the Soviet-sponsored Tudeh Party and from the Iran Party.

The Tudeh (or, Masses) Party. There is ample evidence that as the Red Army settled down in Iran after the invasion in 1941 it was planning for a long stay. For the first time in twenty years the Soviet Union had an opportunity to pursue unhampered political activities in Iran. The first need was for an organization,

and the means for it were at hand. The nucleus was composed of members of a group of fifty-three Iranian students who had listened to communist teaching in France and Germany in the 1920's or 30's and had been arrested and jailed by Reza Shah on their return to Iran. For ten years they had devoted their time in prison to the study of communist theory and practice. They formed the hard-core native leadership of the Tudeh Party, which emerged in 1942 with a public program of a liberal, progressive type, supported by many Iranians who were discontented for a great variety of reasons. The ostensible leadership of the party was in the hands of a central committee, whose members were known. The actual subservience of the party to Soviet imperialist goals was concealed, as were efforts to create a secret hard-core organization.¹⁴

With the active participation of experienced Iranian communists trained in the Soviet Union, organizations were established throughout Iranian society with particular emphasis on labor groups, students, minor government workers, and intellectuals. The party set up its own newspapers and, partly by supplying scarce newsprint with Soviet help, gradually established control of a significant number of Tehran and provincial papers. In general, the theme of the party was nationalistic. It claimed that social and political conditions in Iran should be, and could be, changed by legal methods under the guidance and leadership of the party, which sought only loyal support from its members and a willingness to follow its directions. Perhaps because loyalty to an organization and willingness to follow directions are not among the strongest traits of the ethnic Persians, the most active adherents of the party appear to have come from minority groups. Nevertheless, the party did succeed in attracting a large following.

The party first showed its bias in favor of Soviet goals, despite its claims of being nationalistic, at the time of the rejection of the Soviet request for an oil concession in 1944. In 1945 nine Tudeh members were elected to the Majlis and, for the first time in the history of the Majlis, a group of deputies acted and voted consistently as a unit. Tudeh support was openly expressed for the Azerbaijan rebels and a significant growth of political power appeared to have been indicated by the inclusion in 1946 of three Tudeh members in the Cabinet. In addition, the labor union branch of the party took credit for the first serious strikes by oil company workers. In October of the same year, the party

suffered a setback when these ministers were replaced, but a serious popular discrediting of the party occurred only after the fall of the Azerbaijan government in November, 1946. Party leaders then retired from political activity to concentrate on improving the training and discipline of the hard core.¹⁵

The party received its next serious setback in 1949. It was officially implicated in the attempted assassination of the Shah on February 4th and was declared an illegal organization on February 5th. By that time, however, another popular cause had arisen through which the party could, in fact, continue disguised activities. This was the mounting dissatisfaction over the Supplemental Oil Agreement, signed on July 17, 1949. Despite the fact that in January, 1950, it was reported that about a dozen people a day were being arrested in connection with the underground publication of Tudeh pamphlets attacking the Shah, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Tudeh activities were unchecked and were now expanded to attempt subversion within the armed forces.

That the Tudeh Party could continue to carry on its activities was probably due to the general disunity of views which prevailed on four subjects: the proper role of the Shah in the government; the acceptance or rejection of the oil agreement; the acceptance or refusal of U.S. military aid; and approval or disapproval of a series of Soviet protests over the acceptance of U.S. military aid, as an alleged violation of Iranian treaty obligations, and over other alleged American activities in Iran.

The nationalization of the oil industry on May 2, 1951, provided the Tudeh Party with its next opportunity. It was able to act without persistent government interference under the cover of front organizations set up with broad popular support to agitate and demonstrate against both the oil company and the British government. Thus, in the name of nationalism, the party could promote the minimum Soviet goal in Iran of destroying British and American influence. As the dispute became prolonged and embittered, Tudeh activity became more openly identifiable, though not without bitter opposition from other groups.

The doom of the Tudeh Party followed the military coup d'état of August 19, 1953, when members were accused of leading demonstrations against the Shah and of destroying and defacing royalist monuments. It was immediately followed by ener-

getic and persistent efforts under military direction to root out, execute, or imprison Tudeh adherents. These efforts are still continuing and have disclosed the extent to which the party had succeeded in establishing itself throughout the bureaucracy, the armed forces, the police, the teachers, and urban labor.

The Iran Party. The other principal source of leadership for dissatisfied Iranians, especially college graduates, was the Iran Party. The party was organized during the war and consisted of a small number of young men in established careers, many of whom had received their Ph.D.'s in Europe or the United States. They were not frustrated by a dispute over the leadership for they accepted that of Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq, at that time in his late 60's. He was an aristocrat, a wealthy landowner, and a professor at the University, with an exceptional reputation for honesty and courage, and a long record of disinterested public service. He was one of the five Majlis deputies who had opposed the termination of the Qajar dynasty in 1925, had been in political retirement during most of Reza Shah's reign, and was among the political prisoners released by the present Shah on his accession. His simultaneous qualities of stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise with the realities of power were only to become apparent later.

The general objectives of the members of the Iran Party were to encourage gradual political and social improvement, not by seeking office themselves, but by exerting whatever influence they could in support of capable and liberal deputies and constructive legislation and bureaucratic action. They hoped to, and in fact did, obtain the sympathetic support of large numbers of Iranians, particularly college graduates, who had confidence in Mosaddeq and had not turned to the Tudeh Party. Mosaddeq himself was an exception, since he did accept service as a Deputy and won successive elections in Tehran by a very large vote.¹⁶ The party operated through its meetings, publications, and private, personal missionary work; and constituted a source of progressive, constructive influence.

As conditions in Iran deteriorated, following the end of the war, and as the Tudeh threat mounted, a working coalition of deputies, known as the National Front, came into being under the acknowledged leadership of Mosaddeq. Although these deputies owed their political support to a variety of sources, the support of the Iran Party was probably important. From the time

Mosaddeq became Prime Minister on May 2, 1951, charged with the responsibility of trying to achieve a settlement of the oil dispute, until his ouster by the military coup of August, 1953, he appears to have received the full and unwavering support of most members of the Iran Party. As a result, they suffered the consequences of his fall. Although the military court which tried him asked for the death sentence, he was sentenced to three years of solitary confinement under the orders of the Shah. However, in the case of the Iran Party, as in that of the Tudeh Party, although the organization has been discredited, the sources of dissatisfaction against which the members were struggling and to which was due their principle support, still remain.

For the great mass of the Persians it was a tragedy that the oil controversy should have coincided with the emergence to political power of the first government which appears to have had the will to try, at least, to correct many of the sources of popular frustration and discouragement. It may, of course, be argued that without the pressures generated by the controversy the Mosaddeq government never would have come to power. And it may also be argued that, on the basis of the government's record, the pursuit of impractical goals would have culminated ultimately in Tudeh control of the government.

But in any speculation as to what the government might have accomplished, it seems essential to separate the two problems of oil revenues and the Tudeh Party. With oil revenues and such foreign aid as would have been forthcoming, the government could have made progress along the lines of the Seven-Year Development Program, while at the same time reducing somewhat, at least, the grievances of urban workers, the bureaucracy, students, the peasants, and perhaps ultimately the tribesmen. Under such circumstances it seems likely that the appeal to these groups of the Tudeh communist solution would have been progressively weakened. Furthermore, with more to defend, opposition to Tudeh resort to violence might be expected to have been more spontaneous and persistent in those areas where Tudeh strength appears to have been greatest.

Without oil revenues and without Tudeh agitation or foreign interference, Persian economy probably could have met for some time the limited essential industrial requirements and the customary essential needs of the population, even without foreign aid from any source, though this would have required a consid-

erable degree of national determination to do without oil revenues, rather than give up Iranian control of the industry. Such a solution might have satisfied Tudeh aims, at least temporarily, since it would have reduced severely Western influence in Iran. However, such a development was clearly unacceptable to the West and to influential Iranians who regarded it as folly, for a variety of reasons, to give up the revenues and economic benefits stemming from the oil industry, or to oppose the wishes and recommendations of Western leaders.¹⁷ Efforts to restore the activity of the industry under Western control were met, of course, by Tudeh efforts to prevent such an outcome.

THE CHANGING STATUS

The Shah and Army. The Shah and army may be viewed as a unit. As mentioned above on page 54, Reza Shah's government was based upon his personal domination of the army and was, to a large extent, carried on through military personnel. At the time of Mohammed Reza's accession, the senior commanders far overshadowed the Shah in age and experience, although, under the Constitution, he was Commander-in-Chief.

The Shah's first need was to rebuild the army and restore its morale and public prestige. In this he obviously had the full cooperation of the officers' corps. The burden of defense against bitter charges and attacks in the Majlis was borne by high career officers. Fear that the ultimate goal of the Shah and army was the restoration of a military dictatorship has been a strong and recurrent factor of political life in Iran since 1941. In 1943 the army received U.S. military aid in the form of a military advisory mission for the quartermaster services and when U.S. military aid in the form of equipment was supplied, this group was joined by a small training mission which has continued up to the present.

The army suffered new loss of prestige during the war in clashes with the Qashqai tribes south of Isfahan and from Russian restrictions on its activities in Azerbaijan. Army morale and public prestige were first restored by the reoccupation of Azerbaijan in November, 1946, for which the army claimed entire credit. Despite its prompt loss of prestige among the inhabitants of Azerbaijan where troops were stationed, because of its resort to traditional methods of extortion, the army grew in strength and influence, largely through additional contributions of U.S.

supplies and equipment; and was aided by a conviction which gradually spread in propertied circles that only through its restoration could some control be imposed over the excesses which had followed the restoration of complete freedom with the abdication of Reza Shah.

In 1949 the Shah apparently felt strong enough to call a Constituent Assembly to modify the Constitution to provide him with certain veto powers. At the same time, he increased his political power by the establishment of the upper legislative house, the Senate, of which the Constitution permits him to appoint half of the members.

In June of 1950 the Chief of Staff resigned to become Prime Minister, but his assassination in March, 1951, quieted fears of a military dictatorship and the army appeared to join the rest of the population in support of Mosaddeq in the oil controversy.

It should be borne in mind that, although the members of the officers' corps were united by their allegiance to the Shah, as individuals they introduced disunity in the corps by the same conflicts of ambition, aspiration, comprehension or family interest which fragmented the rest of the population. Their support of nationalism was strong, but their individual conceptions of it differed widely.

By the summer of 1952, Mosaddeq was placing strong pressure on the Shah, of whose support he was apparently doubtful. On July 22, Mosaddeq had succeeded in assuming the post of Minister of War in addition to that of Prime Minister. In the next two months he dismissed twenty-five Generals and, by decree, restricted the powers of the military courts. By progressive steps Mosaddeq reduced the Shah's powers, until at the end of February, 1953, the Shah announced his intention of leaving Iran. He was dissuaded by appeals from supporters and mass demonstrations. This was followed by clashes, riots, and demonstrations between supporters of the Shah and of Mosaddeq.¹⁸

In April, 1953, the Minister of the Court, the Shah's principal adviser, was replaced and in May the Shah transferred his private estates to the government. Early in August he and the queen went to his palace on the Caspian Sea at Ramsar. He had divorced Fawzia in the meantime and on February 12, 1951, had married Soraya, the daughter of a Bakhtiari leader and his German wife. On August 13 the Shah signed a decree removing Mosaddeq and naming General Fazlullah Zahedi as Prime Min-

ister. Following the arrest of the Shah's messenger and the disappearance of Zahedi, the Shah and Queen Soraya flew on August 16 from the Caspian Sea to Baghdad and thence to Rome. He returned to Tehran on August 22, after the military coup d'état of the 19th had established Zahedi as Prime Minister.

The core of the internal struggle which culminated in the military coup d'état of 1953 was not the nationalization of the oil industry, nor was it a personal conflict between Mosaddeq and the Shah. It was rather a struggle for control of the government by the politically significant elements within the population whom Mosaddeq and the Shah represented. In this context it seems only fair to consider as characteristic of his backing the groups which supported Mosaddeq during the early months of his term as Prime Minister. Although it is perhaps an oversimplification, the two groups represented by Mosaddeq and the Shah can probably be described as the young, educated, liberal Iranians who wanted a "New Deal" and their entrenched, ultra-conservative compatriots who preferred the continuation of the status quo.¹⁹ Both groups would claim to be nationalist and patriotic, but the money and power of the latter won — though for how long is uncertain.

Since 1953 the Shah and army leaders appear to have worked closely together; military control was established and has, in effect, continued. The former Minister of Court resumed his office and remained in it until he was named Prime Minister in April, 1955. Two years later he was replaced and resumed his post as Minister of the Court. Since his return from a two month vacation in the United States in March, 1955, the Shah has, it is generally believed, taken a much more direct part in the government.

From his accession, the Shah has had two major official pre-occupations in which he has maintained comparatively sustained interest; namely, the army and Iranian foreign relations. With respect to the former, his principal effort has been directed toward getting as much military equipment and related assistance from the United States as possible. His most apparent activity with respect to the latter has been an attempt to build up Iranian prestige by a series of official good-will trips to many foreign capitals including Moscow, London, Paris, Washington, Ankara, Karachi, Madrid, and Tokyo. It is perhaps of some significance that he has never been accompanied by his highest officials and

has permitted his Prime Ministers to go abroad on state business only on occasions where exceptional circumstances made it unavoidable. Related to both objectives was the decision, for which he was obviously responsible, for Iran in October, 1955, to join the Baghdad Pact, a regional defense group composed of Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. This decision represents an ostensible abandonment of the historic Iranian policy of attempting to defend its independence by maintaining a balance among foreign pressures, notably those of Britain and Russia.

It is easy to criticize the Shah, but it is also easy to minimize the difficulties which confronted him. He has been blamed for not acting with the singleness of purpose and ruthlessness of his father. But among the reasons for his not attempting to do so may be the following. He lacks the exceptional physical stature of Reza Shah and has never been obliged to buffet and push his way through such turbulence and physical misery and hardship as toughened Reza Shah's character and provided him with his intimate knowledge and understanding of his countrymen. These differences have probably contributed, despite his personal courage, to an apparent inability on the part of the Shah to act with the ready brutality of his father, even if such a course had been feasible under changed circumstances. His knowledge and experience of the life, amenities, and attitudes of Europe also undoubtedly have given him a perspective on Iranian conflicts and aspirations such as his father never had; and probably have raised honest doubts and questions which would never have occurred to his father.

Past instances of indecision appear to indicate that one of the major problems which has disturbed the Shah has been the clarification in his own mind of the role he should play. Up to 1953 his inclination had apparently been to permit the dominant political groups to initiate and recommend policies, as is the case in European monarchies where responsibility is borne by the ministers, where, in fact, it is placed by the Persian Constitution. However, the success of democratic monarchical government in Europe rests upon the existence of a wide electorate, reasonably well-informed and active; and a willingness to accept and respect the will of the majority. Neither of these essentials exists in Iran. It appears to have been the Shah's inclination to ignore these facts which almost lost him his throne in 1953.

The emergence of the Shah as the dominant figure is undoubtedly the most important change in the political life of Iran since 1953. His power stems from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the army and depends upon the support of the army, or more precisely, of military commanders. As in the case of the reconquest of Azerbaijan, so in that of the coup d'état of August, 1953, the army seems to have claimed the entire credit. The disruption of civil government in 1953 and the absence of the Shah from the country left a power vacuum into which the army moved. The commanders were loyal to the Shah and so he resumed his place as head of the government. Until the settlement of the oil controversy, military personnel openly constituted the dominant force in the government. Subsequent to the settlement, they appear to have been willing to accept the Shah as their spokesman. If the Shah is to remain on the throne, it is essential that there be a reasonable degree of mutuality of interest between himself and the army commanders. But this alone is not enough.

The army commanders are themselves dependent upon the loyalty of their immediate subordinates who are in turn dependent upon the loyalty of their men. Since all of these individuals are at the same time members of the armed services and of Iranian society, stresses and strains in the society influence their effectiveness as members of the services. This applies equally to members of the National Police, including the Secret Police, the Frontier Guard, the Gendarmerie, and the recently established National Security Organization.

Fear and suspicion from the top seem to have permeated all of these organizations, if one may judge from their public activities and appearances. This is understandable in view of the extent of Tudeh subversion from 1942 to 1953, of extremism in 1953, and of the example of revolution in neighboring Iraq in 1958. But this fear and suspicion have been directed since 1953 primarily toward fellow Iranians. At the same time the almost complete indifference of the people of Tehran toward efforts to whip up enthusiasm for the Shah and army could not have been more clearly revealed than it was on August 19, 1958, by the meagre and shoddy results of police and military efforts to organize parades and celebrations to commemorate the anniversary of the coup d'état of 1953.²⁰ This situation is undoubtedly one cause of the prevalent atmosphere of insecurity in Iran.

The emergence of the Shah as the dominant political figure

has been accompanied by a progressive weakening of the institutions of civil government, such as the Cabinet, Senate, and Majlis. No real expression of preference has been permitted in the elections since 1953, the candidates being "elected" by procedures similar to those which prevailed in Reza Shah's day. To the traditional frustrations which confront the members of these institutions are now added those which stem from the Shah's habitual indecision and failure to follow through when he has reached a decision. Incumbents derive little public prestige by virtue of the offices they hold and exert virtually no independent influence on the shaping or execution of national policies. The ultimate control of the national armed forces at the present time does not rest with the institutions of civil government, but with the army command in alliance with the Court.

The difference between the power structure under Reza Shah and at the present time appears to be as follows. During Reza Shah's reign there was no doubt whatever that ultimate control of the national power was in the Shah's own hands. At the present time, for propaganda and tactical purposes, it is invariably represented publicly as being in the current Shah's hands; but control is actually divided between members of the Court, including the Shah, and top figures within the national security forces. The influence of those who, including the Shah, share ultimate control is constantly shifting and each individual is surrounded by his or her group of opportunistic adherents. It is probably consciousness of this turmoil and rivalry at the top of the government that is primarily responsible for the sense of insecurity which pervades the well-to-do circles in Iran, especially in Tehran.

It remains to be seen how the Shah will attempt to meet this continuing problem in the future. The experience of Reza Shah seems to have demonstrated that no individual alone can succeed in transforming the character of Iran and that voluntary co-operation, the exercise of initiative, and some freedom of exchange of views are essential. The extent to which the Iranian people are able and willing to support the Shah's aspirations may, of course, in the long run depend upon the character and productivity of Iranian economy. One might, therefore, now turn to a discussion of the segment of the population which controls the economy, namely the large property owners.

The Large Property Owners. Generally speaking, it is the

group of large landowners which has dominated the Majlis since its establishment. Even individuals who have made fortunes in other activities have tended to invest in villages, since ownership of villages has been traditionally a major source of public prestige. Those whose properties lay within the Soviet zone of occupation suffered varying degrees of reduction of income during the war. Their political attitudes were naturally colored by a desire to retain and ultimately to regain the full benefits from their property. Those whose property lay outside the Soviet zone gained from the increased demand for their village produce as well as from the land speculation in Tehran; and owners of factories, such as those manufacturing textiles, enjoyed the profits to be derived from an uncompetitive market for products in great demand.

The deputies representing this group were united by a common desire to protect, and, if possible, increase their properties and privileges. They had been willing to support the employment of American financial and economic advisers during the war, so long as such a course appeared expedient. However, when the measures introduced by the advisers appeared about to reduce opportunities for profit or tax evasion, their opposition emerged into the open and ultimately removed the advisers. In 1946, under the implied pressure of the Azerbaijan revolt, these deputies were willing to support labor and other liberalizing legislation. In 1948 and 1949 they were willing to support government efforts to draw up and put into operation a comprehensive plan for national economic and social development.

This plan was based upon the studies made by two American groups, modified by an Iranian commission, and approved by the Majlis on February 14, 1949, as the Seven-Year Plan for Economic Development. A separate and independent agency, known as the Plan Organization, was authorized on July 4th, and on September 19th, the American firm, Overseas Consultants Incorporated, was hired to provide general consultant services. The program was to cost some \$650 million, to be provided from oil revenues, all of which were assigned by law to the Organization, from loans and from private capital investment. Its activities were to cover virtually every type of enterprise — transportation, communications, irrigation, electric power development, industrial organization, exploitation of mineral resources, agriculture, public health, education, etc. All were to be developed more or less simultaneously in a coordinated program.

There was naturally widespread approval of this grandiose plan, since it would obviously increase property values; offer many opportunities for new or expanded enterprises; and for profitable participation. To the farsighted, it seemed likely to improve national health and increase political stability by creating employment opportunities for all, including college graduates. It was also of significance that the oil resources might not be inexhaustible; and that at least some of the income from oil should be used to create alternative resources. But when supporters came to consider practical details, opposition and criticism rapidly emerged.

In January, 1951, the contract with Overseas Consultants was cancelled and on May 2 the nationalization of the oil industry cut off the essential source of funds for the plan. The development program was virtually dead, although the Plan Organization did manage to keep barely alive with Point IV assistance. It had, however, temporarily lost its attraction for politicians.

On March 4, 1955, the Shah ordered a resumption of the Seven-Year Plan and at the end of April a revised plan was announced, based upon the availability of 60 per cent of the oil revenues. In August, 1955, the United States Export-Import Bank loaned \$5 million for highway construction and in January, 1957, the World Bank loaned \$75 million for a variety of projects. Further comments on the Seven-Year Plan are given on pages 123-24.

In the political field since 1941 the large landowners and their representatives have occupied the majority of the ministerial posts. They rapidly asserted their control of the Majlis following Reza Shah's abdication and on several significant occasions lent their weight to the defense of Persian independence and nationalism. In the initial stages of the oil controversy most of them ostensibly supported Mosaddeq. But as the dispute dragged on, their traditional inclination to compromise or to lie low until the storm had passed over fragmented their ranks. This fragmentation was undoubtedly intensified by two other factors: the hostile propaganda of the Tudeh Party and the conflict between Mosaddeq and the Shah. It appears certain that many large property owners owed the accumulation and retention of their wealth to the fact that government had been, in practice, by influence rather than by law. Individuals within this group are most sensitive to Western attitudes which during the oil controversy became progressively more critical of Mosaddeq. Fur-

thermore, most of these large property owners had traditionally owed their prosperity to the Court. It would, therefore, not be surprising if many members concluded that their property interests would be safer under a government controlled by the army than under a more broadly-based government, especially if it were dominated by a popular figure such as Mosaddeq, who would insist upon more than lip service to reform and respect for law. It is this group which has profited most from the tremendous growth of cities of which Tehran is the most striking example.²¹ Tehran also illustrates the most extreme effects of the migration from rural areas, although they are to be found in almost every city.

The monopolizing and centralizing policies of Reza Shah's government gradually induced large property owners and merchants to establish themselves or some member of their families in Tehran to protect their interests by proximity to the sources of official power. Although their major holdings and family establishments were in the provinces, they tended to build comparatively modest houses in Tehran as alternative residences.

Following the Allied occupation in 1941, many large property owners in the parts of Iran under Soviet control fled to Tehran or even farther south to Isfahan or Kerman. Many of their relatives or dependents gradually joined them. Reports of employment opportunities in Tehran and curiosity to see what was going on there combined to attract skilled and unskilled workers from other places. These sometimes lived with relatives or friends, usually in the already overcrowded slum sections of Tehran. Students squeezed in wherever they could.

Although most of the Allied troops stationed in Tehran during the war years (roughly 1942 through 1945) occupied specially constructed quarters, hundreds or thousands of foreign officers and civilians engaged in wartime activities in Tehran, with or without their families, rented existing housing. The opportunities thus presented to Iranian landlords induced many to rent their homes, move to summer houses in the suburbs or in with relatives, and build additional housing in the city.

With this impetus, despite a shortage of certain imported materials, a virtually unrestricted building boom developed after 1946 and is still continuing. Initially this was financed by the large sums which individual Iranians had been able to accumulate during the war years and had succeeded in retaining because of the

unwillingness or inability of successive governments to reduce the sums by taxation.

One result of the housing boom was a skyrocketing of land values, accompanied by speculation. In 1941 much of the vacant land around Tehran belonged either to the state or to private owners. Probably because the land appeared to be almost worthless, the owners had been disinterested or negligent about having their titles officially registered. Ownership also was perhaps in some cases doubtful because of the loss of deeds, their ambiguous terms, or the existence of conflicting claims. But equally significant is an Iranian law or custom which permits a squatter to claim ownership of land after a certain period of residence.²² He need only lay the bottom course of an enclosure wall and may live in the roughest type of shelter. As the building area expanded, much of this "vacant" land was either purchased from the squatters or seized by interested individuals. By the time the land had been sold several times at increasing prices, the original claimant might succeed in having his case brought to court. But the courts normally confirmed the title of the last purchaser, apparently on the grounds that even an initial injustice would not be corrected by the second injustice of depriving the last purchaser of land he was presumed to have bought in good faith. Such transactions are undoubtedly the source of some of the large fortunes in Tehran.

It is difficult to find out where the money has come from for this vast amount of private building which has cost many millions of dollars. Probably only a small percentage has come from mortgages or personal loans. There may be some instances in which funds have been used for a house which would formerly have been used to buy a village, rugs, or jewelry, the traditional forms of investment, although houses are not usually built for rent because the profits to be derived from other uses of capital are so much greater. It is possible that much of this money has come from the expenditures of the Plan Organization or government funds or those available from some foreign source. One must not, of course, overlook the probability that much of this investment is on credit, since debt has been traditionally regarded as an attribute of an aristocrat and is a fact of life for the peasant. In this instance the creditors would probably consist not only of the bank or institution which had loaned the money, but the suppliers of materials, services, and work as well.

But the housing boom has another significance which is difficult to evaluate. With the exception of the grandees, the traditional tendency in Persia has been to conceal wealth lest it attract unwelcome official attention. The fact that this attitude appears to be breaking down probably indicates an increased sense of security of property rights, despite insecurity of social and personal rights.

The Clergy. The clergy also since 1941 have been disunited in their policies and activities. The leading Shii divines made peace with the Pahlavi dynasty following Reza Shah's abdication; and the present Shah appears to have received their support at crucial periods of his career. He, on the other hand, has been outwardly punctilious in the public performance of his religious duties.

The Muslim leaders in Persia were faced with a variety of problems. In addition to those which stemmed from the Reza Shah period, such as the termination of clerical administration of law and control of education, were those stemming from trends which were accelerated during the war period. Among these was greater freedom for women which contributed to a weakening of the dominant position of men which has characterized Shii society. Another stemmed from the non-religious or irreligious emphasis of much foreign propaganda which could, and undoubtedly did, give many Persians a conviction that those attitudes, incompatible with Islam, constituted a significant aspect of modern life abroad, if they were not, in fact, an indispensable element in the modernization which Persians were being urged to seek.

As the custodians of the public conscience, it was with clerical satisfaction that circumstances brought about the rapid resumption of the wearing of the *chadur*, which enjoys the reputation, perhaps not with entire justification, of encouraging modesty. It was also not long after the abdication of Reza Shah that certain prohibited public religious exercises, such as those described on page 111, which had traditionally played an important role in maintaining religious fervor, were resumed. The clergy also acquired wider control over endowments and won a firmer hand in the field of education.²³

It would be a mistake to imagine that the clergy are unanimously opposed to modernization. As active members of Persian society who share popular aspirations and conflicts, virtually all members of the clergy would welcome some aspects of moderni-

zation. They may also be regarded as among the most ardent nationalists, since the establishment of the Shii faith as the state religion has always set Persians somewhat apart from their co-religionists. But their major concern is that no development take place which conflicts seriously with the Shia, which, like other Islamic sects, teaches an all-inclusive way of life.

During the oil controversy and the developments which led to it, the Shii clergy, in general, supported nationalization and was anti-foreign, but it was brought into some disrepute by an extremist Muslim group which employed assassination as a political instrument; and by the activities of a few ardent, fanatical, and ambitious clerical politicians.²⁴ At the same time, certain clerics were notably active in combatting communist atheism. Since the coup d'état of 1953, the clerics appear to be concentrating on the religious problems which are their peculiar province.

Some Persians say quite positively that Islam is dead in Iran, so dead that any revival or readjustment to current community needs is unthinkable.²⁵ Others insist that Islam is an active and powerful force, often underestimated by foreigners.

It appears to be indisputable that most Iranians regard the great leader and aged head of the Shii community, Ayatullah Burujirdi, who lives and teaches at Qum, as the most highly respected and influential individual in the country. He is said to receive enormous voluntary contributions which he uses for charitable works, but his own style of living is simple and unpretentious. In contrast to those of the children of some other prominent figures, his children also apparently lead simple and orderly lives. The complete confidence that most Iranians place in Burujirdi appears to rest upon absolute faith in his justice and incorruptibility.

An impressive example of the power of Islam at work was observed during the month of Muharram which began in 1958 on July 19.²⁶ To the Shii adherent the Imam Husain was a martyr to the cause of justice because, although deserted, he chose to die rather than to give up what he regarded as his duty and his right to the office of Caliph.

The story of the Imam Husain is commemorated during the period at evening assemblies, known as the *rozeh khani*, and is re-enacted publicly on the tenth day in the *Tazieh*.²⁷ The frenzy which marked these public ceremonies and the excesses of peni-

tents who cut their heads with swords and tore their flesh with chains, led Reza Shah to forbid them. But they have now been resumed in a more restrained fashion. Reza Shah did not, and probably could not, even if he had wished to do so, forbid the evening assemblies, which are held in mosques, public buildings, or private houses under the leadership of mullahs who normally contribute some words of advice and guidance of their own.

During the month under observation music and entertainment were suppressed and their places on the radio programs were taken by sermons, prayers, and religious readings. At the present time, the three days culminating in *Ashura* are holidays and virtually all activity comes to a halt. A black or green triangular pennant over a doorway indicates that a *rozeh khani* is scheduled, at which any Shii adherent is welcome; and for *Ashura*, enclosures are often hung with rugs and with black cloth, and tables with glass candelabra are set up in front of mirrors which reflect the candlelight.

There is a common belief among foreigners that the commemorative ceremonies of *Ashura* are for many participants primarily an occasion for sociability, at most comparable to the presentation of a tragedy on the Western stage; and that only poor and uneducated individuals participate in the *rozeh khani*. Although such an impression might be gained from superficial appearances, its major source is probably the comment of Iranians who are antagonistic to Islam or who have become, or wish to appear, so Westernized that they are ostensibly critical from shame. The reality appears to be quite different.

It is true that there is an element of sociability, particularly among the small boys who proudly wear their black shirts, fashioned in such a way that flaps at the front and back can be unbuttoned to hang down, and carry in their hands light chains of soldered wire for the flagellation. It is also true that sociability may be involved in the practice of performing pilgrimages during the month and attempting to be in some larger center for the *Ashura* ceremonies where the accompaniments would be more lavish.

However, during the month under observation one saw and heard in cities, towns, and villages indications of the peculiar significance of this period of mourning. A large proportion of the male adherents, particularly in villages, apparently attend all

or some of the *rozeh khani*. Among them are well-educated individuals of high standing in their communities, whose attendance is probably due to conviction. Many participants are said to mentally transfer the sufferings and injustices which accompanied Husain's martyrdom to their current personal and national sufferings and injustices. Thus, while they are mourning over the social and political evils which killed Husain, they are at the same time mourning over current social and political evils and are perhaps also publicly expressing sorrow for their personal contributions to them. The focus is the figure of the Imam Husain, but the implications are far broader and deeper.

It seems obvious that the annual month-long preoccupation of a large majority of the population with these themes must produce a strong feeling of solidarity within communities, as well as a sharp consciousness of separation from other elements of the population and from adherents of other creeds. Furthermore, it seems inevitable that the attention of many participants, perhaps stimulated by the words of the mullahs, is directed to consideration of the current contrasts between things as they are and as they should be. The religious focus of the exercises makes it virtually impossible for civil authorities to suppress the *rozeh khani*, even if they wished to do so. But it is probable that this annual period of review and stock-taking in the atmosphere of the strongest nationalistic force in the country must exert powerful social pressures which may not be apparent to the foreigner.

Writers, the Middle Class, and Urban Workers. Writers, the middle class, and the urban workers have followed an extremely checkered course since 1941. They, of course, shared in the general relief at the end of the Reza Shah repressions, and looked forward to a period of freedom of expression and action. Being concentrated in cities, especially Tehran, they, of course, entered into the popular exercise of political discussion and argument.

Writers. The dominant mode of written expression since 1941 has been in prose and many writers found an outlet in newspapers, magazines, and illustrated weeklies, where their writing was often colored by the political views of the publisher. At the same time, there was a spate of pamphlets and short volumes, allegedly presenting the truth about the Reza Shah period; there were biographies and some more objective histories of earlier periods; and articles treating a variety of subjects in a serious

manner began to appear in scholarly publications. Some writers experimented with the novel, usually modelled on the more sensational French types.

Since 1946 there has been a growing number of prose writers, often treating historical, sociological, or psychological themes in the form of novels.²⁸ The quality which they appear to share in common is an unusual keenness of observation. Aside from the interest or entertainment of the stories, they are particularly useful to foreign students for the intimate glimpses they give of Persian living conditions, conduct, and attitudes.

It is not surprising that the group of writers, concerned as many were with sociological problems, should have become thoroughly entangled in political developments since 1941. They were among the most responsive to both communist and non-communist propaganda, which purported in both cases to demonstrate how social justice, progress, and peace could best be assured. During the oil crisis most writers were ardent supporters of nationalism. Since the coup d'état and the suppression of communists and supporters of Mosaddeq, it seems probable that the writers remaining in Iran are temporarily concerning themselves publicly with non-controversial subjects. Much of their effort appears to be devoted to the translation of foreign works.

A significant feature of the present scene is the restriction of free speech, which is another indication of fear among top officials. This attitude inhibits the possibility of constructive public discussion of political, social, and economic problems, as well as meaningful instruction in the political and social sciences in the universities. It is, of course, true that the bulk of the comment in these fields was destructive or negative during the war years and the period of the oil controversy when public expression of opinion was almost unrestricted. And it is also possible that opportunities for free discussion of even a constructive type might not be widely utilized so long as the proponent received no public recognition but, on the contrary, might be subjected to social or economic penalties.

Despite this official attitude, one of the most striking innovations in Tehran is the astonishing range of translations of Western and Russian classics, technical works, and novels available at reasonable prices. Many of these works are also available in the original texts in cheap editions; and there is a marked increase in the variety of reprints or new works in Persian. For these publi-

cations there appears to be an active demand, especially among older students and teachers. It seems inevitable that these works are arousing a ferment of speculation within a significant segment of the population and that this is also affecting the attitudes of members of the security forces.

The Middle Class. The middle class, for purposes of this discussion, includes teachers, especially university professors, the middle echelons of the government bureaucracy, and members of the business community, including the professions.

Teachers constituted a major target for propagandists from all sides. Many were anxious to learn and took all possible advantage of the exceptionally rich opportunities for non-political learning, widely available during the war. One would expect to find among teachers as a group perhaps a more extensive knowledge of Persian history and literature and a higher appreciation of Persian culture. Sensitivity to uninformed criticism might also be expected to be high and a spirit of nationalism strong.

But it was, of course, inevitable that many teachers should become involved in political activities and should come to regard the solutions proposed by either the Tudeh or the National Front as perhaps the only, or at least most promising, road to a rewarding livelihood. Consequently, teachers were numbered among the most active members of both Tudeh and National Front groups. Like many Persians, they had great confidence in Mosaddeq. They were, of course, subject to the repressions which followed the coup d'état and have turned their eyes exclusively to their work, though their hopes probably continue to smolder.

A large segment of the middle class is composed of government officials of all but the top echelons. While they shared the general relief at the restoration of freedom which followed Reza Shah's abdication, they were probably the first to note the effects of the removal of his strong hand and were among the greatest sufferers from the rising cost of living. It would perhaps be unreasonable to expect many bureaucrats to decline to follow the examples set by their superiors, and so before the end of the war bribery had become prevalent, as apparently the only way of making ends barely meet. With this development there was, of course, a serious decline of morale.

The organization of political groups and infiltration of the bureaucracy was an early Tudeh objective with particular atten-

tion to the Ministries of Education, Justice, and the Interior, which controlled the National Police. In utilizing the discontents of government employees and focusing them against the Western powers, the Tudeh Party was aided by two factors. First, were the restrictions on foreign trade which affected particularly the Customs Service, Treasury, and Commerce Departments. These were set and supervised locally during the war by an Anglo-American organization called the Middle East Supply Center, which attempted to maintain a flow of essential imports, such as medicines and spare parts, while trying to stimulate the maximum local production of essentials such as cotton textiles. The Russians did not choose to participate or cooperate in these efforts, so the brunt of criticism was directed against the British and Americans. The second factor was provided by the efforts of the American Millspaugh Mission to check inflation, ration scarce commodities, collect and distribute wheat, and keep civilian transport in operation. The Mission officials perforce operated through the bureaucracy, but not without some unavoidable misunderstanding, friction and resentment, which resulted in much ill will toward Americans.

These activities, of course, stimulated a strong feeling of nationalism and were described by Tudeh propaganda as evidence of a British and/or American intention of reducing Iran to a state of economic or political dependence. The sale of American war surplus material to Iran and the subsequent provision of military and economic aid were all interpreted by Tudeh propaganda in the same sense.

The burden of the Tudeh argument, which varied in emphasis and lucidity, was that the governing groups, specifically the large landowners and the Shah, were willing to sell their services to the British and American governments; and that, under those circumstances, true patriots, among whom they numbered all but the top officials, could hope for no improvement in their lot unless and until British and American influence in Iran had been destroyed and disloyal Iranians had been driven from power and punished. Then, under the guidance and leadership of the democratic and freedom-loving Tudeh Party, all Iranians, including government officials, could build a new Iran, characterized by social justice, equal opportunity, freedom, and peace, under the benevolent eyes of the Soviet Union, which had repeatedly promised non-interference and good-neighborly relations. Through

persistent and imaginative efforts, the Tudeh Party succeeded in establishing groups within the bureaucracy and attracting a substantial following of sympathizers.

At the same time, the National Front attracted a significant following among government officials, suspicious of Tudeh intentions. During the oil controversy, both groups demonstrated in support of Mosaddeq and both experienced a return to the realities of power, following the 1953 military coup d'état.

Another important component of the middle class in Iran is the business community, excluding the large property owners and employees. The burst of economic activity since 1953 has swollen the numbers of small manufacturers, agents, and suppliers of services. They constitute what might be described as the operational management of the economy and are the channel through which innovations in the shape of foreign machinery, methods, and materials enter into the economy. Their center of concentration has been traditionally the bazaar and, although the growth of cities has led to some dispersal, their attitudes and loyalties probably continue to be those of the bazaar.

The individuals who constitute this group represent all sections of the country and all segments of the population, including minority ethnic and religious groups. Despite competition among them, their common professional interests give them a certain cohesion and they tend to be highly articulate. In the past this cohesion enabled the group to exert political pressure by closing the bazaar, but their gradual dispersal has reduced, if not ended, the effectiveness of this particular form of pressure.

In the past many members of this group have been particularly aware of and responsive to their respective religious beliefs and this is probably still true. This class as a whole is sensitive to both political pressure and economic pressure from the large property owners. And it is from this class that the upper echelons of the government and the top social groups receive new blood. In this process of infusion the characteristics of ethnic minorities tend to be suppressed so that in most respects the attitudes and actions of the newcomers do not differ from those of the dominant ethnic Persians.

During the years 1951-1953 this expanding middle class was also fragmented by conflicting interests and attitudes. It is, nevertheless, probably the most constructive and responsible section of the population, though at the same time the most frustrated.

The attitudes and actions of its members are perhaps somewhat less motivated by pure self-interest than those of the members of the current dominant political groups, and they are probably somewhat more nationally minded. As the power of the present dictatorship weakens, as appears inevitable from the character of its composition, or if it is overthrown by force, it seems probable that the dominant political force in the succeeding government will be that of the middle class.

Urban Workers. Urban labor also was an early target for Tudeh activity, in this case directed by a Persian with long experience and training in labor organization and agitation in both Iran and Russia. The justified grievances of industrial workers were so varied and prevalent in 1942 that Tudeh organizers had little difficulty in organizing unions in virtually every type of industry. The only place where Tudeh met strong resistance was from the AIOC which had never permitted union organizations, although it subsequently set up a company union to combat Tudeh pressure.

Through strikes and agitation, the Tudeh unions contributed to wage increases and improved working conditions, claiming entire credit, with a natural increase of members and sympathizers. It was these labor groups, of varying degrees of reliability, which contributed the bulk of the participants in mass demonstrations, utilized by the Tudeh Party as a political instrument. Following the coup d'état of 1953 and the resumption of oil revenues, the restiveness of factory workers appears to have been brought under control, though many of the basic grievances remain.

The mob potential of the urban working population which became apparent during the oil controversy apparently stimulated the government to increased effort to correct the festering slum conditions in the southern part of Tehran, where the workers' homes were concentrated. Although the Shah during the war had laid the cornerstone of a mosque in what was to become a workers' community in the south, work had lagged. Finally, new streets were laid out, old ones asphalted, wells dug, piped water brought in, and much cheap housing constructed, so that today this section of Tehran bears little resemblance to its condition in 1941.

The urban working population has been progressively increased by a migration of workers from the villages to the cities.

The primary incentive was to take advantage of the work opportunities provided by the building boom and intensified by the general economic expansion since 1954. A secondary incentive appears to have been the attraction of a comparatively higher standard of living in the cities.

Competent Iranian observers have stated that of city dwellers in Iran today only 20 per cent or less live reasonably well. It is significant that the estimate is made by Iranians and not by foreigners, who would probably name a lower percentage. Taking the figure of 20 per cent for Tehran would imply that 400,000 persons live reasonably well and 1,600,000 do not. Although it is not quite certain what an Iranian means when he says that a person lives "reasonably well," he probably means, at a minimum, that an individual has adequate food and shelter, some surplus for baths, medicine, and simple entertainment, and suffers no serious deprivation. In speculating about what this minimum might consist of, it is important to bear in mind that Persians are far less exigent in such matters as food, furniture, fixtures, and "conveniences" than most Americans. Furthermore, they are much less self-conscious in meeting and mixing with strangers than most Westerners.

The "comparatively higher standard of living" which the immigrant finds in the city probably consists basically of greater variety — in foods, in people, in conversation, in things to look at and experience. His ability to participate in this "higher standard of living" is limited only by the amount of time and energy he must devote to earning the money for his minimum needs and those of his dependents. These are, of course, greater in the winter when the cold requires greater protection. But despite the increased economic activity in the cities, this wave of immigrant workers is said to have caused a high percentage of unemployment and underemployment, which is producing serious tension.

The Tribesmen and Peasants. The tribesmen and peasants, who number perhaps 80 per cent of the population of Iran, constitute an indispensable element in the functioning of the basically agricultural national economy. The nomadic elements of the tribes have been subjected to increasing control from the central government in an effort to accomplish two things: first, to prevent the establishment of any fighting force which might challenge the control of central authority; and second, to assure the collec-

tion of taxes. Both the sedentary and transhumant elements of the tribes have benefited to some extent from the efforts which have been expended since 1944 to improve the health of the tribesmen and of the animals upon which their economy is based; although it is probable that to date the impact among the tribes as a whole is marginal.

The personal prosperity of the vast majority of tribesmen has probably in most cases been unaffected by the political fortunes of their leaders. On the other hand, those fortunes have directly affected the prosperity of the managerial hierarchy of the tribes, whatever form that may have taken. As already noted on pages 79-80, the tribes, but specifically their leaders, had suffered extremely during the period of Reza Shah. They naturally profited by his abdication to attempt to restore their economy and their political influence. In the case of the Qashqai leaders, in particular, their capabilities met with success. Their influence was invaluable to Qavam in reversing the trend of Tudeh influence in the government. But they subsequently supported Mosaddeq in his struggle with the Shah and shared the consequences of his overthrow. The animosity of the subsequent government has led to the exile from Iran of all but one of the four brothers who constituted the top leadership of the tribe. Other tribal leaders who had kept out of direct political activity appear to have been spared any extraordinary pressure from political sources.

The fact that a significant proportion of the tribal population is principally engaged in agriculture makes their problems and those of the peasants similar. The most striking development within this group since 1941 has been the continuous and increasing migration of peasants and tribesmen from the rural areas to the cities and towns. In addition to the attraction of work opportunities and of the comparatively higher standards of living in the larger localities, an incentive was provided by increased population pressures.

By 1958 a somewhat greater awareness among the peasants of hygienic practices and a somewhat wider availability of medicines seem to have reduced the former high rate of mortality among babies and small children. The prohibition of the cultivation of the opium poppy has virtually wiped out the use of opium among the peasants who cannot afford to pay the price of the smuggled product; and the campaigns of DDT spraying throughout the country appear to have improved the health of

the rural population. How long the effectiveness of the DDT will last is apparently debatable; but, in any case, there appears to be at the present time an increase in villages and hamlets of mouths to feed and bodies to clothe.

The problem of supplementing the peasants' incomes continues to be met by the weaving of rugs for sale and by the periodic departure of some of the men during the year to earn money in the cities or, for example, by the seasonal collection of gum tragacanth in the foothills where it grows wild. It is probable that some of the men obtain permanent employment in the cities and are joined by their families whenever the man is able to pay off his debts — the usual accompaniment of life in a village. The possibility of augmenting the peasant's income by increased production is complicated in many villages and hamlets by the fact that the area of cultivable land is invariable and the maximum production under current methods is therefore known.

In other villages and hamlets the area of cultivable land is not only invariable, but its size and conformation make the use of mechanized machinery impractical. Even in areas where the use of tractors is feasible, their utility is limited so long as harvesting, threshing, and winnowing are done in the traditional fashion by hand and animal labor. The opposition of the peasants to the introduction of the combine in many areas where its use might be feasible appears to be due not only, or perhaps primarily, to the fact that the combine would reduce the number of workers needed, but rather that its use would deprive the peasants of badly needed, even if ostensibly meagre, benefits they derive for themselves and their animals through the traditional processes and through the sale of the cut straw which by custom belongs to them.²⁹ In addition the peasants point out that in harvesting by hand it is possible to avoid the inclusion of thistles and other weeds.

Until some feasible alternative is found for the use of cut straw as fodder and as a binder in the acres of mud and straw which coat walls and roofs throughout the country, it seems certain that the opposition of peasants to the use of the combine will continue in many parts of the country.

In fact, the successful use of the combine at the present time appears to be limited to areas of Khurasan near Quchan, and in Khuzistan near Ahvaz and Shushtar. Although there are other areas where its use would be practicable, local circumstances

make it unfeasible. It is probably doubtful whether the combine is practicable for many of the large areas where grains are grown by dry farming methods, because the stand is usually sparse and the growth uneven. Whether or not combines were used, if the stubble were ploughed under, that procedure would at least help to meet the dire need in many agricultural areas of humus in the soil. The need is apparent from the fact that in most places dried bricks are made customarily simply by mixing the soil with water. But a change would require an alternative to the current practice of relying on the stubble as feed for goats and sheep. The use of green manure for humus, of course, would raise other problems for the peasant.

Much has been said and written about the redistribution of land as a solution of the problem of raising the peasant's standard of living by increasing his income. With much publicity at home and abroad, the Shah has distributed the land of a substantial number of his villages to the peasants at low prices with deferred payments. What has not been publicized is that only one other large landowner, even among the close associates of the Shah, has followed his example; and that his action has presented the beneficiaries with a host of new problems which are still unsolved. Until they are solved, an evaluation of the benefits of this program must remain in abeyance.

The bald fact appears to be that in Iran only large holdings can provide the capital required, among other things, for the construction and maintenance of *qanats*, and to assure maximum profits. The largeness may be achieved through a cooperative, an association of a few large landowners, or a single owner. There are reported to be only two notably successful farm co-operatives in operation, each run by an informed, efficient manager who apparently has the full confidence of his employers. On the other hand, there are successful companies owned by a few large landowners and considerably more than two examples of large owners who have set about intelligently and energetically to increase the productivity of their lands and to raise the morale and living standards of their peasants by providing new, improved housing and, in some cases, granting a substantial increase in the share of the produce the peasants receive. Part of this effort probably represents an attempt to dissuade good farmers from migrating to the city or moving to some village where conditions are better.

In view of these factors, efforts to raise the standards of living of the large and scattered rural population through education and hygienic training are likely to prove ineffective, unless some concrete action is taken at the same time to provide the peasant with the means of benefiting from his education and training. It may be that the resources of some villages and hamlets can never suffice to provide what is currently regarded as a reasonable standard of living for the peasants. Under those circumstances the population of a village might be expected to shrink to those who preferred to live harshly in a place they knew and were accustomed to than to live an uprooted existence elsewhere. These might by many Persians be regarded as the wise ones.

In any case, it seems evident that the solution lies neither in the distribution of the land to the peasants, nor in the importation of agricultural machinery, though each could with discretion supplement more fundamental solutions.

The migration of peasants and tribesmen to the cities and their conscription into the army might be interpreted as steps in a melting-pot process which would reduce disunifying pressures. But because of the contrary influences to which they are exposed during these experiences, the net result may also be an increase of social tensions working against national unity.

THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

If one looks at the changing status of the national economy since 1941, the new element is the introduction of an all-inclusive plan for development under government initiative and control. As already noted, the idea was conceived in 1946, took concrete form in 1949, was in virtual abeyance from 1951 to 1955, and was resumed in 1956 with authorization to spend about \$350 million. Under the current law assigning 60 per cent of the oil revenues to the Plan Organization, the prospects suggest that from \$150 million to \$170 million a year may soon become available. One may assume that the plan is conceived as a continuing enterprise of indefinite duration.

To make this program politically palatable and to win popular support, it was essential to spend some of the available sums on public works not only in Tehran, but throughout the country. The pattern usually followed is a 50-50 Plan Organization and local contribution for those services which are normally a local

responsibility. This has resulted in the construction of many new schools and some hospitals, in limited aid to local industries, and in the appearance of electric current in almost every sizeable town. One of the most apparent and most publicized activities in provincial towns and cities has been a program of asphaltting the main streets and building roundabouts for the traffic. In many instances this work is just getting under way. Much of the Plan work appears to be under contract to foreign firms, working presumably in cooperation with Iranian sub-contractors, although in some cases the contract is given directly to an Iranian firm.

The emergence of this new and potentially profitable market has naturally aroused considerable interest from foreign and Iranian businessmen. American, British, French, Italian, Japanese, and West German manufacturers and construction firms are among those which have set up offices in Tehran. Official Italian, Japanese, and West German economic missions, as well as representatives from communist bloc governments, have been in consultation with the Plan Organization. Iranians have set up agencies to represent foreign firms or have organized their own companies to procure materials or supply services, with (it might be noted) the inclusion of an essential "contact" man. The new pattern of foreign participation in Iran suggests that it may be that of a partnership with the foreign company providing perhaps technical management instead of large amounts of capital.

Aside from the requirements for professional contracting and technical services are those for all sorts of materials, of which the following list gives examples: iron and steel for the building industry, diesel engines for irrigation schemes and industrial projects, pumping equipment, agricultural machinery, textile machinery (for which the demand in the next three years is estimated at \$14 million), sugar processing machinery, heavy electrical equipment and radio receivers, domestic electrical appliances, refrigerating plants for storage, railway wagons and other vehicles, automobiles, buses, trucks, bicycles, tires and tubes, industrial chemicals, paints, varnishes, and enamels.

Despite the pressures from a great variety of foreign private and official sources to induce the Plan Organization to adopt certain procedures, techniques, or types of construction, machinery, or equipment, one should not overlook the fact that this is basically an Iranian development, whose course will be determined by Iranian attitudes and objectives. One concrete example of the

significance of this in practice is shown by the current status of communications which constitute an important part of the development program. In this case it appears to be political and social rather than economic factors which are dominant.

One significant change is that of airplane transportation. The major international lines provide Tehran with frequent rapid communications with other countries. Within the country, the local airline ties the capital with every major center on at least a weekly basis, but usually oftener. The fares are within the means of only a small proportion of the population, but the planes do a substantial business in transporting suitable merchandise.

Public transportation by buses run by competing companies is available between the major cities. Not only is the equipment better than ever before, but it is better maintained and the services are organized with more consideration for the passengers and on more dependable schedules. Both the equipment and the services tend to worsen as one gets further from Tehran, but this is in keeping with the traditional tendency of assigning the best to the capital.

Railroad service is available from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea and from Tehran to Tabriz and Meshed (Mashhad). The cost of transportation is more than by bus, though less than by plane, and the sleeping accommodations appear to be insufficient to meet the demand.

One change especially noticeable in rural areas is the wider use of jeeps and bicycles. An increasing number of outlying villages, though still small in comparison with the total, are joined to the main roads by more or less rough tracks, passable for jeeps and trucks. The asphaltting of at least the main street in most cities and towns, plus the expansion of the built-up areas, appears to have encouraged the sale of a large number of bicycles and their use has spread widely to villages in many parts of the country. These developments have undoubtedly resulted in an increase and strengthening of the ties and relationships between the cities and large villages and the settlements spread around them.

But roads continue to constitute a crucial element in the national communications system. Dependence is also primarily placed upon roads for the transportation of passengers, merchandise, or produce overland from all but one of the traditional entrance points into Iran (Khorramshahr-Bandar Shapur); and

roads constitute the major links between Tehran and the important cities of Hamadan, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and Kerman. With insignificant exceptions these are dirt and gravel roads in the same or worse condition than in 1946, with resultant high operating and maintenance costs for motor transportation.

This situation appears to be due to a variety of factors reflecting the persistence of tradition in Iran. Despite the fact that very large sums have been spent for machinery for road building and maintenance, it appears to be in use primarily in the vicinity of Tehran. A small group was observed in operation in one other place and, at the entrance to Meshed (Mashhad), another group was smartly set up just off the road, but was idle and showed few signs of wear, allegedly because of a lack of funds for operation. At another place a stretch of road under construction was observed where two small groups of workers were laboriously cutting stone blocks and building culverts and bridges at a rate which will take years to complete. At still another place a four-lane asphalted road was under construction where a two-lane road at half the cost would apparently have sufficed for all foreseeable traffic. But the most striking aspect of road construction and maintenance is its spotty character. One may ride for hours over an abominable road and then come to a section of ten or twenty miles of good road before returning to another section of bad. The impression is of an attempt to do too many things simultaneously with the result that no one thing is completed.

As a result, one is led to conclude that, despite any pronouncements to the contrary, the actual official attitude toward the development of communications is governed by two factors: international prestige and the interests of the dominant political and social groups in Tehran.

From the first point of view, a foreigner arrives at the excellent airport in Tehran by plane. He is driven over asphalted streets to a comfortable hotel. During his stay in Tehran he can travel easily and quickly throughout the city and suburbs on asphalt. If he is a tourist with time to visit only Isfahan and Persepolis, he can fly to either Isfahan or Shiraz where he again travels on asphalt to a comfortable hotel. If he drives to Persepolis from Shiraz, he must ride for only about an hour over a rough and dusty road, but he arrives at an excellent hotel almost directly at the foot of the great staircase to the palace platform. If he has

more time to visit other cities, he can fly and again get onto asphalt, though, with the exception of the hotel in Hamadan, he is likely to be unimpressed by the hotel and restaurant accommodations. Under these circumstances it is probable that the foreigner will leave Iran with the impression that its cities, especially Tehran, are bustling, modern agglomerations with most of the comforts and amenities of similar communities in the industrialized West.

From the second point of view, the official attitude appears to be that anyone of consequence — foreign or Iranian — will fly. If he has more time, he might be expected to seek the greater sociability of travel by train. Only if he is debarred from air travel by health, or if the railroad is unavailable, would he be expected to travel by road. The comfort and safety of those who use the roads become then a matter of secondary importance in the official view. The decisive factor is that road communication, except in the vicinity of Tehran, appears to have less direct bearing upon the interests and prestige of officials than do those of railroad and air communication.

The problem of communication is also affected by the centralization of political and economic power in Tehran. The concept of Tehran as a center from which communications radiate was highly developed during the reign of Reza Shah and appears to have been revived since 1953. The concentration of expenditure and effort is therefore in Tehran and its immediate vicinity which are of the closest interest to the current dominant political and social groups.

But more important than any tangible results achieved to date in the field of communications is certainly the impetus which the creation of the Plan Organization has given to economic activity and the encouragement and incentive which the potential opportunities are providing for Iranians. One danger, reflecting national tendencies, is illustrated by the housing boom of which perhaps the most significant aspect is that the large sums expended have not created any proportionate addition to the national productive capital. This applies equally to the heavy expenditures for government offices and other official buildings. One might argue that this activity stimulates the local production of necessary building materials and provides work. This is true of the brick, tile, ironwork, and lime-making industries, but the girders, glass, paint, most of the cement and of the mechanical equipment,

including electrical supplies, must be imported; and the uncertain assurance of continuous work opportunities is obvious. While this tremendous recent investment in housing and land in urban centers has been accompanied by some investment in the means of supplying goods and services, this may be an undependable source of continuous employment, in view of the traditional Iranian indifference toward maintenance.

Despite these risks, the funds put into circulation by the activities of the Plan Organization or as a result of its stimulus have resulted in a current burst of economic activity. Since the program was resumed, it appears until recently to have been able to proceed without political interference, except perhaps from the current dictatorship. The propertied groups are undoubtedly deriving profit in whatever ways are feasible, such as representation of foreign suppliers and through their own organizations, but their participation is probably considerably less than they had hoped. Viewed in perspective, it appears that the major problems now are not related to financing, but to continuity, coordination, planning, supervision, and the training of personnel for efficient operation and management. As during the period of Reza Shah, the principle initiative and the provision of detailed planning, execution, and operation appear to be by competing foreigners. Nevertheless, there is greater participation by Iranians and the prospects are that this will gradually increase.

VII

IRAN IN 1958

Primarily because of national disunity, the Iranians have been unable in modern times to prevent foreign invasion or intervention or the emergence of successive internal dictatorships. It may be argued that during both World Wars the military forces under government command would have been unable to prevent foreign invasion. But, if the fighting forces of the large, but dis-united, tribes had been united and used effectively, they would have constituted at least a significant deterrent. However, in each case, more important than the numbers of troops or their equipment was the absence of a national will to resist, such as, for instance, enabled Ataturk to establish modern Turkey.

In the case of the oil controversy, it was again national disunity which deprived the government of a strong bargaining position. From the purely economic point of view, there is considerable evidence to show that the economy of Iran, which is basically agricultural, could have been maintained for an indefinite period without oil revenues; and that the foreign exchange earned by non-oil exports would have sufficed to keep the limited national industries in operation and permit some expansion. But this would have required the cessation of non-essential imports, a careful husbanding of national resources, and a willingness on the part of the propertied classes to place their resources at the disposal of the government. In this case, too, it was basically the absence of a genuine national will which deprived the government of the power to resist foreign pressures effectively.

It was also primarily national disunity that permitted or required the emergence of dictatorship after each major foreign intervention — of Reza Shah, Mosaddeq, and the Iranian army hierarchy.

But probably more important than the political effects of these developments has been their pronounced unsettling effect upon internal social pressures. Here too, paradoxically enough, the major modifying force has unquestionably been foreign influ-

ence, particularly from the West, but also from the communist bloc and the non-communist countries of the East. The most tangible evidences of this influence are in the fields of education, communications, and industry.

Aside from education provided in the great expansion of formal educational institutions in Iran—though they are by no means yet within reach of large numbers of the population—there is also education by example. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians have been exposed to some experience of formal education within the country during the past thirty years. In addition, thousands have studied, traveled, or lived abroad during the same period and have returned to Iran, some with foreign wives. One must also bear in mind the thousands who availed themselves of educational opportunities offered by the various foreign agencies which were active in Iran during and since World War II.

Among the types of sources of education by example are the activities of the Allies during World War II and of such agencies as the Near East Foundation and Point Four, which have been demonstrating methods of improving public sanitation, health, and the preparation and conservation of foodstuffs.

It appears certain that the net result has been to produce a large and significant number of Iranians who are aware of and more or less disturbed by the apparent social weaknesses and deficiencies of the nation, even though it may be very difficult for them to contribute effectively to an amelioration under current political and economic conditions.¹ This awareness, nevertheless, plus a heightened sense of national responsibility which has probably resulted from residence abroad, is certainly active.

In the examples given below of the modification of the sources of some social pressures, the potential effects are both unifying and disunifying. It is very difficult, on the basis of available information, to determine with assurance which effect is dominant or whether its dominance is permanent or short-range. The characterizations given in the following paragraphs are therefore estimates of probability.

Not the least significant source of unifying pressure stemming from education and the expansion of industry is the strikingly increased role of women. They now participate publicly in virtually every realm of national activity except the higher echelons of the government and the army, which remain exclusively male preserves. Although this development is still in its initial stages

and although Iranian women are still deprived of the ballot, this trend probably enhances their self-respect as members of the community, introduces a healthier tone in Iranian society, and weakens the national disunifying pressures which stemmed from the traditional attitudes toward women.

Another aspect of education which is exerting a predominantly unifying pressure is the increase of interest and participation in sports, such as swimming, tennis, and soccer. The Shah's sponsorship of sports has undoubtedly contributed to this expansion, but it seems likely now that the momentum generated will carry the practice along. This activity and interest are contributing to some reduction of disunifying pressures inasmuch as there are no religious, racial, or social bars to participation; even though the competitions involved arouse jealousies of varying intensities which would tend to discourage unity.

The development of communications has also exerted a unifying pressure. Although the present system of communications is limited in its scope and still excludes many thousands of villages and hamlets, it has, nevertheless, resulted in a noticeable reduction of the sense of isolation dominant thirty years ago. This has resulted in some merging of the interests of towns and villages, at least with those of their surrounding settlements, and has undoubtedly resulted in some reduction of the former emphasis on local differences and peculiarities. This reduction has also been furthered by the greater comparative ease with which individuals can move about the country, even though here again the costs of travel by air or train limit the indulgence. The significance of this limitation is, however, to some extent reduced by the fact that many of those individuals who do travel by air or train participate in political power. In their case, too, this experience is probably weakening the traditional force of provincialism and creating a greater sense of national unity.

Another result of the expansion of communications and of the growth of cities has probably been to arouse a wider awareness of the economic interrelationships and interdependence of the rural (peasant and tribal) populations and the urban populations. This would also tend to stimulate a unifying pressure, even though it appears probable that it is at the moment very weak.

The expansion of industry in Iran is exerting additional unifying pressure in society. The success of any given industrial process is easily measured by the quantity and quality of its product,

which can scarcely be concealed, and by its annual profit, assuming that its records are both accurate and complete. The competence of both management and labor in an industry can, therefore, be measured in tangible terms; and the normal pressures of competition, where they are permitted to operate, tend to favor increasing competence. This is a personal and rather complex quality which tends to be independent of race, color, religion, social position, or family connections. As industry in Iran has expanded, there has undoubtedly been an increase of voluntary and involuntary soul-searching on the part of those charged with responsibility for successful operation. As competence tends to compete with friendship or relationship as a basis for the selection of an employee, a unifying, rather than disunifying, force is introduced into Persian society. It would probably be misleading to credit this force with much accomplishment so far, but its existence and growth are significant.

Other unifying pressures which stem from the extension of industry are discipline and cooperation. To the Westerner brought up in the atmosphere of industrialization these requirements are self-evident, but to the Iranian they appear, in fact, to be innovations. Inasmuch as these qualities are essential for industrial efficiency, acceptance of them and adaptation to them by all participants in Iranian industrialization are of importance. Still another new element with which industrialization confronts the Iranian worker is the impersonal quality which the power-driven machine introduces between the worker and the product of his labor. All of these qualities conflict with the traditional habits and attitudes of the Iranians and adjustment to them is certain to be slow and painful, but to the extent to which it is achieved, national unity on a far broader front will emerge.

But industrialization has also brought with it disunifying pressures. It has to date resulted in the establishment of comparatively large groups of workers in the cities where industry has tended to concentrate, particularly in Tehran. It has been customary (and probably still is) for urban industrial managers in Iran to hire villagers as employees in preference to urban residents. This practice is probably based upon a belief that the villagers are more amenable to control, because the sources of their basic sense of security are the ties to their villages, rather than to the urban community which is unfamiliar and disquieting, if not hostile. This belief is strengthened by the ability of managers to re-

place workers of village origin with other villagers whenever the processes of urbanization have made the workers more demanding. This practice contributes to the high turnover of industrial labor in Iran and to its comparatively low productivity.

Despite official efforts to protect industrial workers from exploitation by legislation passed in 1946 and 1949 to regulate working conditions and unionization, these groups continue to constitute a restless, aggressive, and often unassimilated element in urban society. As industrialization expands, the attitudes of these groups will become of increasing social and political significance and their transformation from a national disunifying to a unifying force will become more urgent.

Another disunifying pressure stems from those Iranians who distrust the implications of industrialization. Their opposition is probably based upon a conviction that the material gains from industrialization would not justify the potential cost in terms of the human sacrifice required. In other words, that spiritual wealth outweighs material wealth in importance. Industrial prosperity in the West depends for success on a large measure of uniformity in public tastes, induced either by advertising or limiting the range of choice. This tends to produce uniformity in popular attitudes and thought.

In Iran, on the other hand, although there is, at least in the cities and towns, noticeable outward conformity induced by economic pressures, there appears to be great diversity in attitudes and thought. The dominant impression can perhaps be described as nomadism — of being on the move mentally and physically — reflected in the remarkable adaptability of Iranians to circumstances and their characteristic sociability. They stand out as individuals, rather than types.

One illustration of this characteristic of nomadism appears to be provided by the comparatively large numbers of Iranians who crowd all forms of public transportation and occupy any available space on loaded trucks. This practice is not new, but has only been made more noticeable by the expansion of the means of communication. In the absence of any poll, one can only speculate on where they are going and why. Although part of the travelers are probably on business, part on pilgrimages, and part seeking work, it seems likely that the majority are simply going visiting — not for sight-seeing or education, but just to see relatives. For most Iranians the visit itself would be sufficient

reason for travel, though they would readily supply some other justification should a questioner appear to feel that it were required. Their natural gregariousness and unselfconsciousness in human relations would enrich the travel itself. The traditional practice of intermarriage tends to provide every Iranian with innumerable, widely-scattered relatives; the rather high percentage of seasonal employment makes free time available; and the type of living prevalent in Iran makes the accommodation of even unexpected guests no housekeeping problem.

To be sure, the adoption of the trappings of Western civilization is pronounced among high officials and in wealthy circles in Tehran, but their adoption is partly due to their utility as evidences of position, power, and prestige. The trappings include automobiles, radios, electric refrigerators, air-conditioners, Paris gowns, etc., but it would not be surprising to find that in most cases these are a veneer and that in private the attitudes and habits are in closer conformity with the traditional national characteristic of nomadism.

The dominant political groups in Iran at the present time are committed to rapid and extensive industrialization and Westernization. Insofar as these developments improve the health and living conditions of Iranians, they will probably be popularly acceptable. But it would be folly to ignore the constant modifying pressures of those who distrust these developments, even though it is impossible now to estimate the strength of this force.²

But one must view these predominantly unifying pressures in perspective. At the moment most of them are only identifiable, though likely to continue, however slowly. The power which has enabled Persia to preserve a unique and productive culture for twenty-five hundred years has been a spiritual force. Though perhaps weakened, this force is still active. One may fairly anticipate that, as in the past, it will modify and adapt foreign contributions to its own advantage and perhaps to universal advantage as well. Only time can tell.



NOTES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: FROM FATH ALI SHAH TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

1. Much detailed information about this interesting and colorful period can be found in the following publications, from which most of the historical data in this chapter is taken: Edward Granville Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (4 vols.; Cambridge University Press, 1928), vol. 4, and *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909* (Cambridge University Press, 1910); Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Persia* (3rd ed.; 2 vols.; London, 1930), vol. 2.

2. "His [Nasir ed-Din's] best intentions, inspired by the purest love of the public welfare, were too often paralyzed by the people interested in the maintenance of the status quo, who found, to boot, a solid support in the phenomenal inertia of a Muslim fatalism." Dr. Feuvrier, *Trois ans à la Cour de Perse* (Paris, n. d.), p. 350. Dr. Feuvrier served as the Shah's doctor from August 1, 1889, to November 1, 1892, and has left in his record of these years a fascinating description of the organization and activities of the members of the Court.

3. Details of the disorders throughout Persia which followed the granting of the tobacco concession are given by Dr. Feuvrier. The concession was signed on March 21, 1890. By the spring of 1891 masses of British, Levantine, and other concession employees had arrived. On January 4, 1892, a mob stormed the palace and on January 5, 1892, the concession was cancelled. On January 26, 1892, the religious interdict, forbidding the use of tobacco, which had been issued on December 3, 1891, was lifted (Feuvrier, scattered references through pp. 267-334).

4. Browne, *Literary History*, vol. 4, p. 353.

5. The average rate on goods of interest to Russia was 4.75% and to Great Britain 26.77%, effective February 8, 1903. W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (New York, 1912), p. 313. The tariffs put into effect on March 22, 1920, under the terms of the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement averaged 13.07% on goods of interest to Russia and 14.88% on those of interest to Britain. A. C. Millsbaugh, *The American Task in Persia* (New York, 1925), p. 61.

6. An indication of family interrelationships among the top aristocracy of Qajar times is given by Sykes' statement (*History of Persia*, vol. 2, p. 378) that the Grand Vizier, Amin es-Sultan, was at one point driven from office through the efforts of a party headed by the Farman Farma, the cousin, son-in-law, and brother-in-law of the Shah.

7. Sykes, vol. 2, pp. 386-87. Balfour also describes additional methods of

supplementing salaries in 1920-21. J. M. Balfour, *Recent Happenings in Persia* (Edinburgh and London, 1922), p. 70.

8. A *sayyid* is any male who claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad through the Caliph Ali and the Prophet's daughter, Fatima.

9. The victim of the *bastinado* lies on his back with his feet held in the air by a thong and rod arrangement. He receives a specified number of strokes with a stick on the bare soles of his feet. It was, until recently, a widely-used method of punishment in Persia, especially for inattentive schoolboys. No particular shame was attached to its infliction, though the effects might be crippling. In the case of *grandees*, a silk carpet was usually spread under the body.

10. This practice of taking refuge, or *bast*, as it is called in Persia, was a common one. Anyone who took *bast* was free from official molestation and had the theoretical right, at least, of direct appeal to the Shah to hear his case. It stemmed from the practice of throwing oneself on the Shah's mercy by seizing the stirrup or bridle of his horse. From that it was extended to include the royal stables. When telegraph lines were built, the popular belief that the wires ended at the foot of the throne, led to the inclusion of telegraph offices as places of *bast*. By extension, additional places, such as mosques, shrines, and palaces, have been popularly included. Those who took *bast* were, of course, supplied with food and essentials by their friends or supporters outside.

11. A description of the worsening state of public morale following the accession of Muzaffar ed-Din Shah is given by Balfour. Part of the opposition to Ayn ed-Dowleh was because he had carried "interference in judicial matters to such an extent as seriously to interfere with the emoluments of those usually accustomed to concern themselves therewith" (Balfour, pp. 77-78).

12. The references used throughout this study are by no means exhaustive, nor are they necessarily the best possible sources. An effort has been made, however, to use the works of individuals who had personal experience of the events they record and whose testimony may therefore be regarded as reliable in those aspects pertinent to this study.

CHAPTER II

SOURCES OF DISUNIFYING PRESSURES IN MODERN IRAN

1. I am referring, of course, to written laws and regulations in the Western sense, not to the unwritten or traditional laws and regulations which govern Persian society in practice.

2. A brief and concise exposition of the gradual transformation of the major features of society in Persia is given by A. K. S. Lambton in *Islamic Society in Persia* (London, 1954). In the concluding paragraph Miss Lamb-

ton observes: "The primary and fundamental problem facing the Persians, both as a nation and individually, is this: how to express a sense of social purpose now that the modern governmental system has virtually caused traditional mediums to atrophy."

3. An exceptionally perceptive discussion of Persian psychology which is of distinct help in understanding Persian behavior is to be found in the chapter "Persian Psychology" in William S. Haas, *Iran* (New York, 1946), pp. 116-36.

4. For a vivid description of travel from Hamadan to Tehran in the winter of 1921, see F. A. C. Forbes-Leith, *Checkmate: Fighting Tradition in Central Asia* (London, 1927), pp. 215-16.

5. When Muzaffar ed-Din as Governor-General of Azerbaijan met his father at the border on Nasir ed-Din Shah's return from Europe on September 13, 1889, his establishment numbered more than 1,000 tents, housing about 10,000 persons (Dr. Feuvrier, p. 45).

6. Information on the tribes in Iran is scattered and far from complete, but references to standard sources may be found in L. P. Elwell-Sutton's *A Guide to Iranian Area Study* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1952).

7. A very perceptive and sympathetic picture of life in Persia at the time may be found in Edward Granville Browne's *A Year Amongst the Persians* (London, 1893).

8. An example is Sardar Akram's expulsion of his wife to marry the daughter of Vossough ed-Dowleh (Forbes-Leith, p. 103).

9. "There was no unity among the ruling classes. This led to constant political quarrels among them. The orientation of the landed aristocracy was towards the imperialist protectors. Part of the trading class was seduced by the markets of the rich metropolis, while the rest considered that independence was the only way out," said the nationalist rebel, Kheiyabani, on June 15, 1920. Nasrullah Saifpour Fatemi, *Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923* (New York, 1952), p. 251.

10. Forbes-Leith (pp. 37-74) gives an excellent description of a typical large landholding and the characteristic attitudes of the aristocratic owner. The prestige value of large landholdings and the traditional attitudes and characteristics of large landowners are admirably discussed by Miss Lambton who notes that the country is still largely administered on a personal basis and concludes that "the large landed proprietor still holds an immensely important position in society and is able to exert great influence in the political field" and that "a strong element of conservatism running through society enables the large landholder to maintain his privileged position *vis-à-vis* the peasant." A. K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London, 1953), chap. XIII, especially p. 274.

11. "Indeed, so far is speculation from being regarded as disgraceful, that a man who does not make use of his opportunities is considered not only a fool, but with suspicion, as one who is a potential spy, and at any rate an inconvenience to be got rid of at the first favorable opportunity"

(Balfour, p. 66). Forbes-Leith (p. 197) says that Sardar Akram urged him to accept small bribes as it was the custom of the country and would make everyone happy.

12. Balfour (p. 39) mentions the establishment of the Sepah Salar in Tehran.

13. Forbes-Leith (pp. 86-87) refers to the role of the mullah in a village and describes a peasant's avoidance of trouble with the mullah by marrying a woman before beating her. He also (p. 91) mentions the cooperation of the local mullah in obtaining the consent of the villagers to the more frequent changing of the water in the public bath.

14. "Of them [the merchants] it may generally be stated that their word is as good as their bond, and that a verbal understanding in most cases will be scrupulously implemented" (Balfour, p. 34).

15. The important role in political life in Persia of self-interest and the exchange of favors is noted by G. Demorgny, *La Question Persane et la Guerre* (Paris, 1916), pp. 32-33.

16. Forbes-Leith (pp. 48-53) describes certain levies on the peasants and the rights of landowners in the administration of justice. Miss Lambton in *Landlord and Peasant*, chap. XVIII, discusses at length the subject of the peasant's personal servitudes and dues.

17. Forbes-Leith (pp. 67-74) describes the friction prevalent between the village headmen and the peasants, arising mostly from the power of the former over the latter and also (p. 44) mentions the ways in which the headmen preyed on the absentee landlord.

18. "Between the oppressions of the officials and the exactions of the landlord, his [the peasant's] hope of redress is small, and the wise man submits to the oppression to which he is exposed lest worse befall" (Balfour, p. 35).

19. Balfour (pp. 70-74) gives a useful description of the system of local government in the post-constitutional period. "Formerly the village entity was much more in evidence, but since the constitution it has been to a great extent ignored."

20. The term "ethnic Persian" is used to describe that group which constitutes the majority of the population and is identified by an apparent sharing of a common pattern of beliefs, attitudes, and behavior.

21. Of the common attitude toward law in Persia, Miss Lambton writes "The jurists of the early centuries of Islam, in their zeal to preserve what they conceived to have been the practice of the early Islamic community, became as time went on more and more divorced from reality. The legislative power of the present day is perhaps little less divorced from reality in that it tends to consider the putting on paper of words to be an end in itself, while utterly disregarding the instruments by which the law is to be put into practice and the conditions under which it is to be implemented" (Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, p. 193).

22. An example is Sardar Akram's proposal to lure a certain bandit to

his house under a promise of protection and then seize him (Forbes-Leith, p. 124).

23. Forbes-Leith (p. 134) pays a tribute, on the basis of his personal experience, to the courage of the peasants, if well led.

24. W. Morgan Shuster has written a very spirited account of his experiences in Persia in his *The Strangling of Persia*. Although the book is primarily a defense of his mission, it throws a great deal of light on the characteristics and attitudes of his Persian associates. The book has been translated and is popular reading among the Persians, perhaps because he places the major blame for the failure of his mission on Russian and British policies.

25. "One Minister frankly stated that he would welcome the presence of a European adviser in his department, if only to occupy the position of whipping-boy" (Balfour, p. 69).

26. Forbes-Leith (pp. 23-24) has considerable to say about the gambling debts of Sardar Akram and of the endless devices to which the grandee resorted to get money to pay them.

27. Forbes-Leith notes (pp. 88-102) the evidences of fatalism among the peasants, disclosed in his clinic; as well as (p. 108) their fatalistic attitude toward insect pests.

CHAPTER III

THE EMERGENCE OF REZA KHAN IN 1921

1. Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907. Arrangement concerning Persia. The text is given in Appendix B of Fatemi's *Diplomatic History of Persia*.

2. Russia "proceeded to act like a dictator over the northern parts of Persia included within her sphere." Fatemi, quoting Bahar, *Political Parties in Persia* (in Persian; Tehran, 1942), p. 120.

3. Balfour (p. 94) gives additional details of Bakhtiari profits from government.

4. A very enlightening description of the conditions in Persia at the time, of the conflicts between the Regent and the Cabinet members, and of the dissensions within the Cabinet is given by G. Demorgny, a French professor who arrived in Tehran on August 13, 1911, under a three-year contract to teach administration and to act as adviser to the ministers. Among his pupils was the Shah. In his book *La Question Persane et la Guerre* (pp. 173-76) he gives a translation of the text of a letter of April 3, 1912, from the ex-Prime Minister Sepahdar to the Regent in which he blames the weakness of the Regent for all the disasters which occurred during his nineteen months as Regent. In his reply of April 5, 1912, (pp. 176-87), the Regent, after inquiring what prevented the Sepahdar from correcting the abuses of which he complains when he was Prime Minister,

goes on at length to explain the duties of the Regent, Cabinet, and Majlis under the Constitution and places prime responsibility upon the Cabinet. Just before he left for Europe on June 15, 1912, allegedly again for health reasons, the Regent addressed another long letter to the Cabinet (pp. 187-96) in which he again explains the basic principles of constitutional government, criticizes the government's programs, and presents it with a list of nine topics for its consideration. In characteristic administrative fashion, he urges the prompt establishment of an administrative and financial Superior Council to carry out reforms. And he closes by saying "the abuses which we have to deplore at the present time are the result of your faults and you are fully responsible for them."

5. "... there are some, whose opinions are worthy of consideration, who consider that the true reason lay in the fact that Mr. Schuster (*sic*) realized that in the face of the latest Persian opposition which existed success was impossible, and that he deliberately forced the quarrel with Russia to an issue, preferring to be defeated by the action of Britain and Russia rather than by Persian opposition. . . . From this time until the outbreak of war, Persia was compelled to give way to all Russian demands, while British policy did not consist of more than at times acting as a restraining influence upon our ally" (Balfour, p. 102).

6. Text of the Proclamation of Neutrality by Ahmad Shah, November 1, 1914 (Fatemi, Appendix D).

7. Balfour (pp. 20-21) describes the results of the drought and crop failure, reports (p. 23) that an estimated two million persons died, and says (p. 145), "There is not the slightest doubt that the distress of the 1918 famine was gravely accentuated by manipulation on the part of those in high authority."

8. Fatemi (p. 7) reports Kerensky's order to Baratoff.

9. "This force [The South Persian Rifles], amounting to about six thousand men, under British officers and British and Indian N. C. O's, consisted of two brigades based upon Shiraz and Kerman, although its activities extended as far north as Isfahan. Under British instruction this force proved itself capable of dealing with the forces of disorder in an absolutely efficient manner, and showed what could be made of the Persian as a soldier if properly trained and led" (Balfour, p. 171).

10. The mutiny is referred to by Balfour, p. 107.

11. Suspicion of British policy was undoubtedly increased by the Bolshevik publication in November, 1917, of the secret Constantinople Agreement of March 18, 1915, between Russia and Great Britain, modifying the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 to include the "neutral zone" in the British zone (Fatemi, p. 14). See also Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925, a Study in Post-war Diplomacy* (London, 1934), pp. 127-28.

12. A detailed account of his personal participation in German military and political efforts in Persia during World War I, including a description

of the "national" government set up in Kermanshah in 1916 under German and Turkish auspices, is given by W. von Blücher in his book *Zeitenwende in Iran: Erlebnisse und Beobachtungen* (Biberach an der Riss, 1949), pp. 15-124.

13. In December, 1917, Tehran papers called for the convocation of the Majlis (dissolved in autumn of 1915 under Anglo-Russian pressure), for a fairer system of elections, and for the pardoning of Nationalist deputies, imprisoned or banished (Fatemi, p. 7).

14. The following is an example of one type of foreign aid provided Persians by foreign governments, in this case, Great Britain. When Firuz Mirza, who as Minister of Finance had played an active part in the negotiation of the Anglo-Persian 1919 Agreement, was arrested in February, 1921, the British Minister protested to the Persian government, and the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs said in Parliament, "This ex-Minister had in the past received assurances of the good offices and support, in case of need, of His Majesty's Government, whose duty, therefore, it is to see that his trial is conducted impartially" (*Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, p. 140, April 19, 1921, as quoted in Fatemi, p. 19).

15. "The British were occupying this country with a division of troops. As it was a neutral country they were there as the guests of the Persian Government, and were acting as a counter to the Bolshevik menace from the Caucasus. They were guarding British interests in the country, and the natives welcomed their advent as a means of safeguard for themselves at such a critical time. . . . The peasants in particular welcomed this occupation. . . ." (Forbes-Leith, p. 117). Also, "They [the British] were guests of the Persian Government and as such it would have been a great diplomatic error to take any action which interfered in any way with the interior economy of the affairs of the country" (*re* the pursuit and punishment of brigands who had killed a British lorry driver in September, 1920, Forbes-Leith, p. 119). In contrast to this interpretation of British troops as guests of Persia, Fatemi (p. 5) says the Majlis voted a series of protests against the Russian occupation of northern Persia and against British landings at southern points to repress local agitations against the Entente; and on p. 12 writes that in British Command Paper, no. 33, reference is made to British troops "which his Majesty's Government were obliged to send to Persia owing to Persia's want of power to defend her neutrality. . . ."

16. For the text of Trotsky's note to Persia of January 14, 1918, see C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries* (Delhi, 1933), p. 94. This note was apparently regarded by Persian officials as a sign of Russian weakness. They therefore included in the claims which they hoped to present to the Peace Conference in Paris a demand for the return of territories lost to Russia in the past. See George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Cornell University Press, 1949), pp. 48-49.

17. Balfour, p. 109.

18. Balfour, p. 107.

19. For excerpts see Fatemi (p. 11) and for other copies of the 1919 Agreement see *British Command Paper*, no. 300, and Balfour, pp. 123-25.

20. Balfour (p. 123) refers to the payment of 131,000 pounds sterling to three ministers before the 1919 Agreement was signed. [Later described as a bribe, a charge neither the British nor the Persians could disprove.]

21. Wrangling over the agreement continued from August 9, 1919, until February, 1921, when the Persian government denounced the agreement "as a major stumbling block to what the people of Persia regard as a mutually advantageous economic collaboration." The British, French, and Russian attitudes and motivations are discussed by Fatemi, pp. 10-94. Persian attitudes reflected these. A good summary of the initiation and demise of the agreement is given by Fatemi, chap. I, pp. 1-26. Balfour (p. 134) writes that there are some grounds for thinking the British wished to be free of the agreement while throwing the onus on the Persians. "Although repudiating the Agreement, and renouncing any desire to profit by the loan thereunder, he [Sayyid Zia] expressed himself anxious to avail himself of the services of Military and Financial Advisers, so that, the Customs having been revised and railway construction never having been opposed, the policy of the Agreement would have been given effect to practically in its entirety."

22. Balfour (p. 132) gives a brief summary of British actions taken under the terms of the 1919 Agreement.

23. Forbes-Leith (p. 23) says most Persian landowners and nobility favored the 1919 Agreement. The mullahs opposed in the belief that their power would be undermined. Also see Balfour (pp. 126-27) who lists reasons for the rejection of the agreement.

24. For a description of the anti-foreign Kheyabani revolt of 1920, see Fatemi, pp. 244-54.

25. For the text of Tchicherin's note of June 26, 1919, see Aitchison, p. 94.

26. For a description of Rothstein's activities from his arrival in Tehran on April 24, 1921, to his recall as a result of a Persian note of complaint of January 28, 1922, see Fatemi, pp. 288-93.

27. For the text of the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921, see Fatemi, Appendix E.

28. For a description of the Gilan rebellion of Kuchik Khan and Bolshevik participation, see Fatemi, pp. 217-43. Russian troops were finally withdrawn after repeated Persian protests only on September 8, 1921.

29. For comments on the Shah's stay in London and dissension among his advisers, see Fatemi, pp. 83-93.

30. After the war there was a general reconciliation among the politicians who had remained in Tehran or had fled, according to von Blücher. Among them he mentions Nizam es-Saltaneh, ex-Governor of Luristan,

who had headed the "national" Cabinet in Kermanshah (von Blücher, p. 147).

31. Colonel Storroselski was a White Russian named by the Prime Minister as Commander-in-Chief of the Persian forces. He resigned on October 30, 1920, at the personal request of the Shah, acting under a British refusal to help the Cossacks while under Russian command. The Prime Minister resigned in protest (Fatemi, pp. 107-18). For comments on the Cossack Division see Balfour, pp. 167-70.

32. "Foremost amongst these [officers of the Cossack Division in Qazvin] were two young gendarmerie officers, Masud Khan, afterwards Minister of War, and Kasim Khan, who became Military Governor of Tehran. . . . They had both been trained in Europe, and at the time were serving upon the staff of the division. The latter in particular struck me as being possessed of much greater hardihood and resolution than the average Persian officer" (Balfour, p. 220).

33. See Fatemi, p. 119, for an alleged attempt by Persians in Tehran to persuade Col. Storroselski to launch a coup d'état. See also Balfour, pp. 225-30, ". . . there is the very strongest reason to believe that, when passing through Kermanshah, he [Firuz Mirza] had plotted a coup of his own with his former colleague, Sarem ed-Dowleh, who was then Governor of that town."

34. "At this time part of the Cossack brigade was stationed at Kasvin, and amongst the officers of this force was the newly promoted Col. Reza Khan. . . . If they [the British] could not garrison Persia in strength, and with her goodwill, it was to their advantage to have a strong Persia between Russia and India. . . . The British cooperated with Reza Khan and Zia-ed-Din, rendering every assistance to the former, and enabling him to collect some sort of army from the ragtag and bobtail forces in Kasvin. Everything that they lacked in the way of arms and ammunition was found for them by the British" (Forbes-Leith, p. 78). This perhaps explains partially the common Persian assertion that the British brought Reza Shah to power. Balfour (p. 221) describes the "fortuitous" circumstances that brought Reza Khan to Tehran. The growing lack of discipline among the 700 Cossacks stationed in Tehran had led to a decision to replace them from Cossacks in Qazvin. The order was given, cancelled, and then restored by a telegram from an unknown source. It was the officers in Qazvin who decided to increase the membership of the replacement to 2500 and put Reza Khan in command.

35. See Balfour (p. 206) for comments on the characteristics of the Sepahdar, a large landlord in Gilan who took refuge in the British Legation when his government was overthrown by the 1921 coup d'état.

36. Balfour, p. 216.

37. With the fall of Sayyid Zia, Sardar Akram and his family left in a hurry (Forbes-Leith, p. 233). "Thus terminated an honest and self-sacrificing attempt to save Persia from bankruptcy, and to preserve her from

foreign invasion. We must do those who participated the justice of admitting that they risked their lives in the attempt, and that they did so, as I know from personal intercourse with them, with their eyes open" (Balfour, p. 250). ". . . when the time comes that the history of the attempt can be written with full information, I believe that it will be universally admitted that upon the civil side those responsible were actuated by motives of patriotism and self-sacrifice. By civil side it must be understood that I intend the party headed by Seyd Zia, whether civilians or soldiers, like Masud Khan and Kasim Khan" (Balfour, p. 252).

38. Of the government in 1920 Balfour writes (p. 90), "It may be safely affirmed that the chief consequence of the introduction of constitutional government up to the present has been to saddle the country with an additional swarm of political parasites. . . . In practice the country is run, one can't say ruled, by small rings of politicians cooperating with a powerful and corrupt bureaucracy, whose aim is to enrich themselves so far as possible before a turn of the political wheel brings their terms of office to an end. . . . Persia is ruled by Tehran, and Tehran is ruled by perhaps three hundred men, including the ins and outs." Speaking of Sayyid Zia's government, Balfour writes (p. 248), "While this unpopularity continued until after a change of government had taken place, there was a very general revulsion of feeling, except amongst the upper classes, when, under the succeeding government [Qavam] the forces of corruption were again uncontrolled."

39. Reza Khan's relationships with senior Cossack officers and contemporaries in the Cossacks appear to have been tenuous, requiring a sudden flying trip to Qazvin in June, 1921 (Balfour, p. 266).

40. Balfour (p. 274, 282-84) gives a good summary of the security problems facing the Persian government in the midsummer of 1921.

41. Balfour, p. 265.

CHAPTER IV

THE REIGN OF REZA SHAH, 1925-1941

1. Forbes-Leith (p.238) mentions two attempts on Reza Shah's life, but gives no details.

2. A translation of Reza Khan's notice, published on April 1, 1924, is given by Herbert Melzig *Der Aufstieg Irans und die Grossmächte* (Leipzig, probably 1935-36), p. 69. He is quoted as saying "I, and the officers and men of the army have always considered our first duty to be to protect Islam and its glory and to maintain its respected position in the world" and he implies that the institution of a republic would weaken the foundations of faith and the independence of the country.

3. Melzig (pp. 90-121) quotes the 1926 account given by General Amir Abdullah Tahmasp of the events leading up to the deposition of Ahmad

Shah on October 31, 1925. General Tahmasp was Minister of War at the time of Reza Shah's coronation. According to him, secret societies dedicated to ending the Qajar dynasty were revived. He names the various groups and guilds who joined the movement and claims that on October 30, 1925, the merchants' guild in Tehran called for the election of Reza Khan to the throne.

4. Lenczowski (pp. 86-90) gives an interesting summary of the controversy among Soviet theoreticians from 1924 to 1927 over the nature of Reza Shah's emergence to power and the attitude the Soviet regime should take toward him. The conclusion was that the regime represented a national liberation movement of anti-imperialist and semi-bourgeois character and, as such, called for Soviet support. But by 1927 the OGPU had sent its organizer to Iran (pp. 108-17). It is perhaps an indication of the prevalent opportunism in Iran that he was able to engage the services of the cipher expert of the Council of Ministers (p. 114).

5. "Reza Shah had a very humble origin, and as a boy followed the plough of his father, who was a peasant farmer" (Forbes-Leith, p. 235). Melzig (p. 36) gives the more usual version, which follows: Morad Ali Khan, Reza Shah's grandfather, as Captain of the regiment of Savad Kuh, fell in the siege of Herat against the British in 1856. In Alasht in the region of Savad Kuh, Reza Khan was born on March 16, 1878. The same year his father, Abbas Ali Khan, died. He was Major of the same historic regiment of Savad Kuh which was regarded as "the Column of the Throne and Protector of the Capital." Reza Khan was brought up by his uncle, Nasrullah Khan, who commanded the forces of Mazandaran. He entered the Cossack Brigade at the turn of the century.

6. For further comments on the Cossacks, see Balfour, pp. 167-70. A most informative account of the formation and early years of the Cossack Brigade, based on Russian sources, is given by Firuz Kazemzadeh in "The Persian Cossack Brigade," *American Slavic and East European Review*, vol. 15, (Menasha, Wis., Oct. 1956), pp. 351-63.

7. Forbes-Leith (pp. 124-34) gives an excellent example of the usual type of mountain fighting as he describes the capture of a group of bandits. Von Blücher (pp. 28-37) describes the ineffective fighting methods of the mounted members of the Sanjabi and Kalhur Kurdish tribes engaged against the Russian troops in the vicinity of Kermanshah during the First World War.

8. Von Blücher tells, possibly for the first time in print, of the incident when the Shah knocked out a Turkoman rider at the Tehran races, in the presence of the entire diplomatic corps. "The Shah walked a few steps from the circle and, as soon as he was within reach, struck the Turkoman a blow with his heavy riding crop with a strength and technical skill which only professional boxers could deliver with their fists as a result of years of training." On the next day the Shah atoned by paying the rider 100 Tomans. He had found out in the meantime that the rider was not guilty of the foul he had suspected. But the incident, although hushed up at the

time, aroused speculation as to what occurred, not in public, but in the palace (von Blücher, p. 211).

9. "Reza was a north Persian of herculean build, who came from the simplest surroundings and as a soldier entered the Cossack brigade before the first World War. In his capacity as a non-commissioned officer he was in temporary command of the guard before the German Legation and attracted the attention of all visitors by his stately appearance. . . . Then he was rapidly promoted to Colonel, but kept himself so reserved during the war that no one knew on which side his sympathies lay. After the end of the war, he stepped more into the foreground and won the reputation of being the most energetic and also brutal Persian officer. . . . He did everything for the army and was ruthless in pursuit of those lining their pockets at the expense of the soldier" (von Blücher, p. 147).

10. Forbes-Leith, p. 22.

11. "He was a big man, physically powerful, large-featured, with cold brown eyes set in a greyish face. There was little humor in that face, no trace of human kindness. It was an immobile face that very rarely smiled but could express the savage temper he often loosed." Melvin Hall, *Journey to the End of an Era* (New York, 1947), p. 198, writing of his interview with Reza Shah.

12. Of Reza Khan in 1921 Balfour writes, "In spite of great educational limitations, he was a man of very considerable military ability, as he subsequently proved, while in appearance and manner he possessed all the qualities calculated to win the confidence of the men under his command. He also possessed a considerable aptitude for intrigue, which had been proved some years before, when, after the revolution in Russia, the officers of the Division had removed the then commander (Col. Clerge). The initiative and organization of the plot had rested with the Russian officers under Col. Storroselski, but to Reza Khan had been entrusted the task of winning over the Persian officers, and he it was who at the crisis had marched the troops from their billets to the Cossack Headquarters. Since that time he had exercised a very great influence in the Division, although by no means the senior officer, and when the conspirators looked round for a man to lead the striking force, his record clearly indicated him for the task" (Balfour, p. 222).

13. A description of this campaign to obtain the submission of Khazal, the Sheikh of Mohammareh (Khorramshahr), is given by Melzig (pp. 78-87). The fact that the Sheikh had for many years been virtually independent of the central power in Persia and had during that period developed very close ties with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the British government led both the Sheikh and Reza Shah to expect potential British intervention.

14. These incidents are described by Melzig (pp. 70-71). When he retired, Reza Khan delivered a message to the generals charging them with the maintenance of relations between the army and the Majlis.

15. The steps which Reza Khan took to protect the army from political interference and to stamp out dissension in the army by the establishment of a top army council are described by Melzig (p. 73).

16. Forbes-Leith (pp. 235-42). His comments on Reza Shah and his accomplishments constitute an excellent example of the rather unobjective and emotional attitudes common to many observers at the time. Major Forbes-Leith left Persia in 1921. His views of subsequent developments through 1927 when the text was copyrighted are presumably based upon second-hand information.

Other accounts which tend to reflect these same attitudes are to be found in Vincent Sheean's *The New Persia* (New York, 1927) and in Herbert Melzig who writes (p. 140), "Reza Shah means for Iran what Adolf Hitler does for Germany, Kemal Ataturk for Turkey, and Benito Mussolini for Italy. He belongs to that heroic type of the 20th century which has developed into mature statemen from the experience of great need and a hard fight."

17. For the prevalent attitude toward statistics in 1920 Balfour (p. 137) describes the operation of a branch of the Ministry of Finance, characterized by inaccurate figures, incomplete figures, or none.

18. A rather detailed account of the changes introduced by Reza Shah through 1935 is to be found in Henry Filmer's *The Pageant of Persia*, (Indianapolis, 1936). Miss Lambton gives an authoritative exposition of legislation of the Reza Shah period dealing with land tenure and peasants in *Landlord and Peasant*, chap. VIII; and less detailed accounts for the period as a whole may be found in L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *Modern Iran* (London, 1941, chaps. V-VIII; Haas, *Iran*, and Elgin Groseclose, *Introduction to Iran* (New York, 1947), pt. III.

19. Dr. Millspaugh has described the work of his mission in *The American Task in Persia*. It is pertinent to bear in mind that the text was written when only about half of the period of the contract had elapsed and before the rupture of relations between Reza Shah and Millspaugh. This appears to have arisen primarily over Millspaugh's insistence that the military budget should be submitted to the same procedures as governed other items in the national budget.

20. In Lenczowski's view it "may be said that Germany was the virtual founder of the young Iranian industry" (p. 154) and he presents an impressive summary of detailed German activities in his chapter on "The Growth of German Influence in Iran," pp. 145-66.

21. Forbes-Leith (pp. 37 and 146) describes the incorruptible type of tax collector that Sayyid Zia employed and some of the methods usually used to evade the payment of taxes.

22. During Reza Shah's first years there was near him, according to von Blücher, a secret triumvirate of the Minister of the Court, Timurtash, the Minister of Finance, Firuz Mirza, and the Minister of Justice, Davar. All had exceptional knowledge of Europe, spoke several foreign languages,

and were unusually intelligent and free from prejudice. They formed a sort of brain trust to influence and inspire the Shah. Against them was a military party under Generals Kerim Agha and Sheibani (von Blücher, p. 147).

23. Graf von der Schulenburg was the German Minister in Iran from 1922 to 1931. Von Blücher, who succeeded him, quotes him as describing Timurtash as "an unusual person. Unoriental through and through, without prejudice, precise, and of quick decision. He was with the Shah daily and was much better informed of his intentions than the ministers. He could, therefore, often himself make decisions which the ministers would not risk doing" (von Blücher, p. 153).

24. Von Blücher gives a rather detailed account of the persecution and ultimate poisoning of Timurtash (pp. 256-60) and of the murders of the Minister of War, Sardar Assad (p. 289), and the Qashqai leader, Solat ed-Dowleh (p. 290). Many details of these and other murders were revealed and published in the Tehran press during the trials of some of Reza Shah's police collaborators following his departure from Iran.

25. An interesting commentary on the effects of events which occurred between November, 1931, and February, 1935, on the appearance of Reza Shah is provided by von Blücher, even if one bears in mind that the two men were apparently mutually antipathetic. When he presented his credentials as German Minister to the Shah on November 1, 1931, he writes (p. 171), "[I] saw opposite me a tall man in a military uniform. Heavily-built and with broad shoulders, he stood erect, both hands in his broad leather belt. He wore a plain uniform, consisting of a yellowish-brown blouse which almost reached his knees and blue riding britches. Heavy high boots, a curved sword and a kepi, which he kept on, completed his outfit. Across his chest ran the ribbon of an order and aside from that there were two or three simple decorations. I could discover no insignia of rank. . . . But the Shah who stood before me was nevertheless impressive. On the herculean body was a head which was highly interesting and bore a certain resemblance to that of a bird of prey. The face was sharply, but coarsely modelled. The powerful, broad eagle's beak sprang boldly forth and achieved something singularly irregular from the scar between the eyes. The eyes were large, dark and unfathomable. The ears were strongly developed and the mouth noticeably tight. No expression moved the face. A strong current of strength, energy, and brutality flowed from the whole personality which was reduced in an extraordinary way by the lack of transparency which lay over the whole being." When he had his final audience with the Shah on February 27, 1935, von Blücher writes (p. 328), "He wore a clay colored, blouselike uniform, buttoned up to the chin, and no cap, so I saw him for the first time without head covering. He had medium short hair going from dark to white. His face appeared smaller than formerly and sunken; the eyes still larger, deeper and more unfathomable. The body did not exude the brutal strength as formerly,

but lack of exercise and the use of opium had left recognizable traces. On the other hand, the cunning and malice which always lay in his manner, had come more to the foreground. . . . Reza Shah did not look me in the eyes, but played with his beads, a small string of yellow beads of which he allowed always two by two to slip through his fingers. I noticed that an ice-cold temperature reigned and wondered how this audience would turn out."

26. "What picture of the world Reza Shah formed for himself is hard to imagine. Completely illiterate, in spite of his great abilities, he was compelled to receive all information through others. Wrapped in suspicion he cut himself off from foreigners and saw only his ministers and chief officials, who had good reason to know that he did not welcome unpleasing news. The representatives of the British and Soviet Governments, if they ever reached him, had little or no effect." Sir Reader Bullard, *Britain and the Middle East* (London, 1951), p. 132. The illiteracy, of course, refers to foreign languages.

27. That these problems of employment and adjustment for foreign-educated Iranians still persist is indicated by Reza Arasteh, Associate Professor of Education at the University of Tehran, in "Some Problems of Education in Underdeveloped Countries," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 12, no. 3 (1958), pp. 270-76.

28. Useful reviews of the economic conditions in Persia during the Reza Shah period are to be found in the following publications of the Department of Overseas Trade, published by H. M. Stationery Office, London: E. R. Lingeman, *Report on the Finance and Commerce of Persia, 1925-1927* (1928) and *Economic Conditions in Persia, 1930* (1930); and S. Simmonds, *Economic Conditions in Iran (Persia), July, 1935* (1935).

Much economic information is also available in the monthly bulletins of the National Bank of Iran (*Bank-i-Melli-ye-Iran*) and in the annual customs statistics, *Statistique annuelle du commerce extérieur de l'Iran*, Ministère des Finances, Administration générale des douanes (Tehran); and references to studies of special aspects of the economy may be found in Elwell-Sutton's *Guide* and subsequent publications.

29. Timurtash was sent as Envoy Extraordinary to Moscow. His negotiations resulted in a provisional trade agreement valid for two years (Fatemi, p. 298).

CHAPTER V

THE IMPACT OF REZA SHAH'S REGIME ON PEASANTS, TOWNSMEN, AND TRIBESMEN

1. An excellent description of the type of village found in the southern part of Khurasan province is given by Carleton S. Coon, *Caravan, the Story of the Middle East* (New York, 1951), pp. 179-82. A similar descrip-

tion of a landlord-owned village near Tehran is given by L. J. Hayden in "Living Standards in Rural Iran," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1949), pp. 140-50. A description of still another type of contemporary village and of village life is given by Najmeh Najafi and Helen Hinckley in *Reveille for a Persian Village* (New York, 1958). But the most exhaustive study of the lives and problems of the peasants is given by Miss Lambton in *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*.

2. The characteristics and capabilities of the individual *kadkhuda*, of course, varied widely. Forbes-Leith gives a critical description in *Check-mate*, pp. 68 and 81.

3. A very engaging description of an expedition to the region of Kerman for the purpose of investigating the *qanat* is to be found in Anthony Smith's *Blind White Fish in Persia* (London, 1953).

4. Forbes-Leith notes stabbings and fighting over the distribution of irrigation water in the villages of which he was the manager (p. 47).

5. For a description of the life and habits of some of the peasants and of the women, see Forbes-Leith, pp. 152-70 and 180-93.

6. Melvin Hall (pp. 335-38) cites an example of military oppression of villagers.

7. Examples and comments on the administration of justice among the peasants in the early 1920's are given by Forbes-Leith, pp. 48-53 and 80-81.

8. The charcoal brazier is now in some places replaced by a small kerosene lamp (a corner of the quilt being lifted to provide a draught) or by an electric light bulb.

9. Miss Lambton says of the tribal policy of Reza Shah that it was "ill conceived and badly executed, resulted in heavy losses in livestock, the impoverishment of the tribes, and a diminution of their numbers" (p. 286) and she discusses the tribal problem which "still awaits a settlement" (*Landlord and Peasant*, chap. XV).

10. Melvin Hall (pp. 279-304) describes an enlightening example of army-tribal relationships in 1925 which helps to explain the tribal lack of confidence in official promises.

CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1941

1. "It has been said that the sole reason for the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran was a desire to open a safer route for aid to Russia than the sea route to Murmansk, but it is probable that if ever a defensive-offensive was justified, it was justified in this case by the obvious inability of the Shah to counter any serious German coup. . . . What decided him [Reza Shah] to abdicate however was a movement of Russian troops from Qazvin, some ninety miles from Tehran, towards the capital" (Bullard,

pp. 133-34). Sir Reader was the British Minister in Tehran at the time of the invasion.

2. Although the history of Iran since 1941 is very controversial, this discussion offers a plausible explanation. This requires some oversimplification and it should be stressed that only time, perspective, and the availability of information now locked up in official and private files can determine its accuracy. Any student of modern Iran should refer to the review of "Recent Books on Iran" by T. Cuyler Young in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1950), pp. 106-10. Summaries of events which occurred since 1941, with varying interpretations, are available in many publications, including the following: Groseclose, *Introduction to Iran*, and Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, referred to above; L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics* (London, 1955), especially chap. XV, "The Nation Aroused," which describes the various Iranian personalities involved in the oil controversy and the coup d'état of 1953; Donald N. Wilber, *Iran: Past and Present* (4th ed.; Princeton University Press, 1958) containing information for the most recent years; and Richard N. Frye, *Iran* (New York, 1953).

3. The most convenient collection of documents relating to the Iranian appeal to the Security Council is probably to be found in A. H. Hamzavi, *Persia and the Powers* (London, 1946).

4. Steppat attributed the non-fulfillment of pessimistic forecasts in 1946 in Great Britain and the United States that Iran had or would soon enter the Soviet sphere to three things: the existence of the United Nations; the decisive firmness of the United States; and, not least, "the statecraft of Qavam who, despite all the great weaknesses and errors which cling to him, established clear proof that even small, powerless states—even occupied by foreign troops—need not accommodate themselves to a colonial fate, but, on the contrary, can participate authoritatively in the determination of their fate." Fritz Steppat, *Iran zwischen den Weltmächten, 1941-1948* (Berlin, 1948), p. 51.

5. A first-hand account of the tremendous local efforts and difficulties which accompanied the early growth of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company is given in Sir Arnold Wilson's *S. W. Persia: A Political Officer's Diary, 1907-1914* (London, 1921).

6. From the popular Persian point of view the oil controversy was primarily a political, rather than an economic question. The best exposition of that point of view is in Elwell-Sutton's *Persian Oil*. From the non-Persian standpoint the best presentations are in S. H. Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East, its Discovery and Development* (Oxford University Press, 1954) and Benjamin Shwadrán, *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers* (New York, 1955). That the interpretations in each of these books have been severely criticized by reviewers only indicates the controversial nature of the subject. Perhaps the book which best places the whole subject of oil operations in the Middle East in perspective is David H. Finnie's

Desert Enterprise, the Middle East Oil Industry in its Local Environment (Harvard University Press, 1958).

7. The most convenient summaries are to be found in the following publications of the Department of Overseas Trade, published by H. M. Stationery Office, London: *Persia: Review of Commercial Conditions, April, 1945* (1945); N. S. Roberts, *Iran, Economic and Commercial Conditions* (1948); and *Economic and Commercial Conditions in Iran* (1958). Convenient references to contracts, concessions, and current economic developments since January, 1957, may be found in the *Middle East Economic Digest*, a weekly publication of Economic Features, Ltd. (London).

There is considerable doubt and variation in the estimates of total population, breakdown of the population into categories, and the total number of villages and hamlets. There are no estimates of the types of land attached to the villages and hamlets. According to the latest census (*Announcement of Public Statistics*, Office of Public Statistics, Ministry of the Interior, Tehran, 1957) [unavailable to the writer] it is reported that the total population is about 19,000,000 of whom about 14,000,000 are described as rural inhabitants. This number appears to include tribesmen, estimated at about 2,000,000. Including urban dwellers connected with agriculture, it has been estimated that 80% of the total population is dependent upon the agricultural economy. The estimated number of villages and hamlets ranges from 42,000 to 51,300, depending perhaps on the definition of a village or hamlet.

8. In his book *Americans in Persia* (Washington, D. C., 1946), which bears the subtitle "A Clinic for the New Internationalism," Dr. Millspaugh offers a highly emotional defense of his mission. Although he places the major responsibility for its failure on American officials, particularly those of the Department of State, the unconscious revelation in the text of his personal characteristics makes it clear that he must bear a large share of the blame. Nevertheless, the book does furnish much enlightening information about the atmosphere in Iran at the time and the attitudes and activities of Persian officials.

9. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC) trained 8,000 Iranians as chauffeurs and mechanics and brought in hides and tanning materials for the manufacture in Iran of boots for the Red Army, according to Steppat (p. 11).

10. "The first result of the disappearance of the strong hand of the late Reza Shah Pahlavi was one of bewilderment. . . . When he first came to power he carried the people with him, but as time went on he retained it more by fears which he created than by the trust and good-will of the people, so that the immediate effect of his removal was a feeling of relief and the removal of a heavy burden." The Rt. Rev. W. J. Thompson, "Iran, 1947: Conditions of Daily Life," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, vols. 35-36, iii-iv, (1948-49), p. 203.

11. The official accounts of British and American military activities in Iran during the war are given in: *Paiforce: The Official Story of the Persian and Iraq Command, 1941-1946* (London, 1948) and T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* (Washington, 1952).

12. The outstanding example of the force of personal interest in political life in Iran is provided by the Majlis ousting of Qavam on December 10, 1947, under a flood of personal abuse, despite the fact that he had, through his brilliant diplomatic skill, extricated Iran from the threat of the first serious Soviet step toward ultimate subversion.

13. When Reza Shah came to power there were 100 to 150 newspapers in Tehran. By 1940 the number was reduced to fifty. By the end of 1942, there were 120. In June, 1947, martial law in Tehran was lifted for the first time since 1941 and the press was free for a short time. L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "The Press in Iran Today," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, vols. 35-36, iii-iv (1948-49), p. 209.

14. A useful summary of the emergence and growth of the Tudeh Party is given by Lenczowski in his chapter on the Tudeh Party (pp. 223-34). A characteristic Tudeh instrument was the organized mass demonstration which frequently resulted in premeditated or accidental violence.

15. In the view of Bishop Thompson (p. 205), "It is only the strong individualistic streak in his [the Persian's] nature, strengthened by his fatalistic attitude to life, which has prevented Communism making much more progress than it has."

16. Elwell-Sutton (*Persian Oil*, pp. 191-94) gives a detailed account of Mosaddeq's background and career from his birth in 1879. He entered government service at eighteen and ten years later studied economics in Paris for two years, transferring later to Neuchatel in Switzerland where he took his doctorate in law in 1914. From 1915 to 1928 he served as Majlis Deputy or Minister, with the exception of the period from mid-1918 to mid-1920, when he revisited Europe. From 1928 to 1940 he lived in political retirement, having fallen foul of Reza Shah. In June, 1940, he was arrested and imprisoned, but was released in December and allowed to live under house arrest until the abdication of Reza Shah. In March, 1944, he rather reluctantly re-entered political life as a Deputy. He gradually assumed the vigorous leadership of the National Front. The basis of his popular admiration was "his refusal to compromise with Reza Shah's dictatorship, his longstanding campaign against inherited privilege, and his resolute determination to rid Persia of corrupting foreign influence."

17. The problems with which Iranian society has been faced in its contacts with the West are admirably discussed by T. Cuyler Young in two chapters in *Near Eastern Culture and Society* (Princeton University Press, 1951): chap. VIII, "The Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Iran," and chap. XI, "The National and International Relations of Iran."

18. Elwell-Sutton attributes Mosaddeq's overthrow in 1953 to his conflict with the Shah over the principle of whether the Shah was to reign

or rule. Any possible difference of opinion over the nationalization of the oil industry as a national objective was secondary (*Persian Oil*, pp. 309-12).

Article 50 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907 states that the King is the Commander-in-Chief of all land and sea forces; and Article 47 grants him the power to confer military ranks, etc., in conformity with the law. In view of the clear intention expressed in other articles of the law, it appears almost certain that the drafters intended these articles to confer the same power on the Shah as the United States Constitution confers on the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

In any case, these articles had not deterred the government in February, 1921, from naming Reza Khan Commander-in-Chief; and this function he exercised until it was brought into conformity with the Constitution by his nomination as Shah on December 12, 1925. Both Qavam es-Saltaneh and Mosaddeq as Prime Ministers attempted to persuade the Shah and army hierarchy to accept the predominance of the civil government and both failed. Related to this problem are the provisions of Article 46 of the Supplementary Law which states that ministers are nominated and dismissed by decree of the King. This again was interpreted after the abdication of Reza Shah as meaning that the Shah confirmed the choice of the Prime Minister, informally selected by the Majlis, and approved the selection of a Cabinet by the Prime Minister, before it was accepted or rejected by the Majlis. In other words, the initial responsibility rested with the Majlis. It is generally recognized at the present time that this responsibility has been taken over by the Shah.

19. These developments are discussed by T. Cuyler Young in "The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1948), pp. 47-59. For a discussion of this problem from the Persian point of view, one might refer to Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil*, chap. XV, "The Nation Aroused."

20. It is doubtful whether much popular good will accrued to the United States from the fact that the police patrols lined up at the main square in Tehran, and the jeeps in the motorized demonstrations bore the Point Four insignia of clasped hands against American and Iranian shields prominently painted on their sides. In the popular mind these are regarded as among the traditional instruments of official oppression.

21. The population of Tehran has quadrupled from about 500,000 in 1941 to about two million in 1958 and the populations of other cities have increased, but to a lesser extent. The newcomers are of five categories: large property owners, employees of foreign governments or representatives of foreign firms, skilled or semi-skilled workers from smaller communities, unskilled workers from the villages, and students.

22. Ownership of lands which have fallen into disuse and on which are neither habitations nor cultivation, defined as "dead lands," may be acquired by anyone taking certain actions, such as digging a well, unless the owner thereof acts to counter his ultimate intention of claiming owner-

ship. These provisions are described by Miss Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, pp. 204-05. Related to this are certain transferable customary rights which would deprive the landowner of the right to evict the holders. These Miss Lambton describes on p. 296.

23. A revival of clerical power in 1942-43 is noted by Lenczowski (p. 240). A Society for the Propagation of Islam was founded in 1942 and a Theological Faculty was inaugurated with the status of a Department of Tehran University.

24. The *Fedaiyan-i-Islam* (Devotees of Islam), a small but extremist Muslim group, played a strong role in the movement to nationalize the oil industry. In November, 1949, a member of this fanatical group assassinated the Minister of the Court and ex-Prime Minister, Hajir, who was regarded as a leader in the Westernizing movement in Iran. On March 7, 1950, Prime Minister Razmara was also assassinated by a member of the Devotees for opposing oil nationalization. On May 13, 1951, Mosaddeq himself took sanctuary in the Majlis, declaring that his life had been threatened by the Devotees for not moving ahead faster with the implementation of the oil nationalization law. In each of these instances the motivation was anti-foreign, specifically anti-British, but this should not obscure the fact that the group was equally anti-Russian.

The power behind the Devotees was a Persian mullah, Abol Qasem Kashani, of whose career Elwell-Sutton gives a summary in *Persian Oil*, pp. 195-96. He was born in Tehran of a clerical family and went at the age of fifteen to Karbala with his father. Both were involved in a religious war against the British in 1915, the father being killed during the siege of Kut al-Imara. In 1919 Kashani fled to Persia and was sentenced to death *in absentia* by the British mandatory authorities. Until the abdication of Reza Shah he devoted himself to religious propaganda. On June 17, 1942, he was arrested by British agents on a charge of collaborating with the Germans and was interned. He was subsequently arrested by Iranian officials in June, 1946, and in February, 1949. "Through him speaks the democracy of Islam, the elimination of bars of class and colour, the fellowship with millions of Asians and Africans from Nigeria to the Malay States. Like others of his class, he is completely fearless, completely unscrupulous, completely free from self-interest. With these qualities he combines humility and ready accessibility, kindness and humour, wide learning and popular eloquence."

25. A brief description of the various Muslim groups active in Iran at the present time is given by Richard N. Frye in "Islam in Iran," *The Muslim World*, vol. 46, no. 1 (Jan. 1956), pp. 5-12.

26. Muharram is the first month of the Islamic lunar year. The mourning period of the first ten days reaches a climax on the tenth day, known as *Ashura*, the anniversary of the death of the Imam Husain, the younger son of the fourth Caliph, Ali, and Muhammad's daughter, Fatima. According to the Shii tradition, he was treacherously abandoned by his supporters

and was barbarously killed by the soldiers of the Caliph Yazid in the course of a three-day battle at Karbala in 680 A.D.

27. Sir Percy Sykes gives a description of the traditional Passion Play, the *Tazieh*, which constituted the high point of the ceremonies on *Ashura*, in *The Glory of the Shia World* (London, 1910,) chap. XII. Almost every book of travel or residence in Persia up to the period of Reza Shah gives some description of the Muharram ceremonies.

28. Miloš Borecký has made available much useful information about Persian prose writers in his critical review "Persian Prose since 1946," in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1953), pp. 235-44. Sidney Glazer also comments in his review of the "Chatiseria Orientalia" in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1958), pp. 96-97 on the work of three modern Persian writers, Mohammed Baqer Khosrovi, Sadeq Hedayet, and Dr. Fakhr ed-Din Shadman.

29. Among the benefits which accrue to the peasants from the traditional method of piling the grain in large heaps and threshing by wooden sledges, drawn usually by horses or oxen, are the following: the livestock get free feed during the period of weeks of the threshing period; at the end of each day's work the peasant can take home a pocketful of grain; the straw is finely cut up during the threshing so that it is ready for use as fodder or for mixing with mud for roofing and coating walls; the women are permitted to glean at the end of the threshing and can usually collect several bushels of grain. The use of a combine would end all of these benefits.

CHAPTER VII

IRAN IN 1958

1. Examples of some of the types of obstacles to amelioration of the peasant's lot are given in *Reveille for a Persian Village* by Najafi and Hinckley.

2. Under the title "Nationalism and Neutralism in Iran" in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1958), pp. 20-32, L. P. Elwell-Sutton comments on his impressions in Iran during August and September, 1956. He notes a persistence of nationalism reflected in continuing resentment toward the West and a critical attitude toward the policies of Western governments, and states that "more and more intellectuals are beginning to understand the value of traditional ways of life, and to regret their wholesale sacrifice to the insistent demands of Western materialism." He is convinced that the sentiment of national pride is shared by all the disparate constituents of Iranian society and that it is very real and very deeply felt.



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