



The MANAGEMENT *of*
PROTRACTED
SOCIAL
CONFLICT

T h e o r y a n d C a s e s

EDWARD E. AZAR

THE MANAGEMENT OF PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT

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**THE MANAGEMENT OF
PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT**
Theory and Cases

By

Edward E. Azar

Professor and Director

**Center for International Development
and Conflict Management**

University of Maryland at College Park

8724

Dartmouth

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Preface and Acknowledgements

This book is a distillation of much of the theoretical and applied work which has been undertaken at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland, College Park, over a period of nearly eight years. It describes a type of conflict ('protracted social conflict') that has become more easily identifiable throughout the world. Protracted social conflict originates when communal groups (defined by shared ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other cultural characteristics) are denied their distinct identity or collective developmental needs. We have seen that these conflicts have a propensity for involving neighboring communities and states, and even the superpowers.

Management of protracted social conflict poses intellectual and political challenges. Neither military nor legal strategies will be successful in bringing about a definitive end to the crises and outbreaks of collective violence or war generated by these conflicts. We continue to search for methods that permit us to play a role in advancing ideas and processes that increase the levels of trust and provide hope to parties involved in protracted conflict. The staff of our Center is engaged in the discovery of alternative methods of conflict management and resolution, and in this volume we present a variant of 'Track Two' diplomacy that we believe shows some promise of success.

At Maryland, we place special emphasis on bringing representatives of parties to a dispute together in an unofficial, face to face environment to explore their grievances. We do insist, however, that this applied work can only follow serious theoretical and empirical research on protracted conflict behavior and outcomes. The case studies included in this volume describe our attempts to

address the Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Falklands/Malvinas conflicts by means of problem-solving forums.

We advocate the use of certain Track Two techniques, but emphasize the necessity for mobilizing broader participation in devising solutions to the problems of economic and political underdevelopment in the Third World. Intercommunal conflict is driven not only by hostility and distrust, but also by political and economic impoverishment or gross exploitation of communities on the basis of their collective identities and historical misfortunes. In this book we discuss these matters in greater detail and present some ideas regarding the resolution of protracted conflict, both in general terms and in three specific cases.

Our efforts in this area are ongoing, and we are certain to continue to revise our approach. We invite the reader to share in this evaluation of our work and ideas, and to make a contribution to their refinement. Our overall goal is to contribute to the literature on integrative politics and peaceful social change. This book is a product of two decades of thinking and working in the field of conflict management. The field is a broad one since many academic disciplines share a concern with understanding the nature of conflict and discovering ways to reduce the incidence of violence at all levels of social interaction. Thus, in many ways, this has been a collaborative effort among a large number of individuals. To properly acknowledge and thank them all is impossible. I would, however, like to make special mention of the efforts of some individuals whose suggestions and ideas have set me on the track described in this book. I alone am responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation that remain.

I am particularly indebted to Chung-In Moon, whose friendship and intellectual collaboration have been critical to my preparation for the writing of this book. Hayward Alker, John Burton, Stephen P. Cohen, Marius Deeb, Nancie Gonzalez, Herbert Kelman, Christopher Mitchell, Joseph Montville, Robert C. North, and Robert Pranger, among a number of colleagues and friends, have provided scholarly criticism and constructive suggestions. Stavros Cologer's assistance and insights have been crucial to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2. For research assistance with the chapter on Sri Lanka I wish to thank Dale Tuttle, and for critical commentary Mohan and Sria Munasinghe, Kumar Singam and Sam Samarasinghe. Chapter 6 on the Falklands/Malvinas was co-written with Anthony Pickering of CIDCM, who also performed the research and compiled the background material. John Davies, research coordinator at CIDCM, reviewed the whole manuscript and made perceptive and substantive revisions and refinements throughout, giving the book a coherence it otherwise would have lacked. For technical assistance I am grateful to Nabil Azar. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my friends and colleagues at the University of Maryland who have consistently and generously lent their support and moral encouragement to this and other efforts.

*Edward E. Azar
College Park, Maryland*

Introduction

There are two competing images of politics. For many, 'real' politics is about engaging in conflict over scarce goods and values. In other words, it is about gaining comparative advantage or power, however transient, in an incessant struggle over what Harold Lasswell once described as 'who gets what, when and how.' Within this framework, conflict is thought to be inevitable at all levels of human interaction from the interpersonal to the international. However, there is an alternative view that posits that politics is about collective security, community building and prosperity. The goals of politics, in other words, are about the promotion of cooperation, advancement of conflict management, the pursuit of socio-economic development, and the facilitation of peaceful interactions at all levels.

Since World War II, the newly emergent states have experienced internal, regional and international conflict while engaged in a process of nation-state building which emphasizes centralization and maximizing state power vis-a-vis sub-state actors. Our analysis of these conflict events and the consequent search for peace and cooperation has increased our sensitivity to the latter perspective; that is, that politics must be about consensus and community building as opposed to power acquisition. Otherwise, mankind will continue to live in a perpetual state of war. The idea that there are mechanisms to induce nations to make a durable peace necessarily requires a vision of politics as a positive rather than negative force. The practice of politics as balance of power will rarely promote the termination of protracted war in the Third World, for example. Our thesis in this volume is that effective conflict management involves consensus-building augmented by socio-economic development, a perspective which is

compatible with the view that politics is about community building and is thus an inclusive enterprise.

I. Protracted Social Conflict

The outbreak of identity-related conflicts and wars since World War II has made world politics unpredictable and unstable. Many of these conflicts invite the intervention of the superpowers, thus complicating even further the relationships of the superpowers themselves. In the world today there are more than seventy conflicts--such as those in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia, Israel, Sudan, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Iran, South Africa and Zimbabwe--which may remain dormant for a period of time and then suddenly break into open warfare, destroying life and property. These protracted conflicts incubate and grow best in underdeveloped settings. We believe that the potential for sustaining peaceful political and commercial international relations will depend on how well we learn to contain, manage and resolve these conflicts.

These situations, which we have called 'protracted social conflicts' (see Azar: 1986, 1984, 1979), possess several unique properties. The focus of these conflicts is religious, cultural or ethnic communal identity, which in turn is dependent upon the satisfaction of basic needs such as those for security, communal recognition and distributive justice. While domestic, regional and international conflicts in the world today are framed as conflicts over material interests, such as commercial advantages or resource acquisition, empirical evidence suggests that they are not just that. More fundamentally, most contemporary conflicts are about developmental needs expressed in terms of cultural values, human rights and security. As such, they are not easily suppressed, and continue to be pursued in the long term by all means available, including the possible acquisition and use of destructive weapons (Azar and Cohen: 1981).

Terrorism and other forms of low-intensity warfare are thus common practices in places experiencing protracted social conflicts. This behavior increases as internal repression, external intervention and manipulation of local grievances increases. In the long term, unmet psycho-political and socio-economic needs lead to dysfunctional cognitive and behavioral patterns that are not easily remedied by ordinary methods of diplomacy or the use of force. Furthermore, because there are too few sufficiently trusted national or international institutions with skills in problem-solving and conflict management, these conflicts appear to be intractable.

It is naive to assume that protracted social conflicts can be managed by military or balance of power means. It is possible to contain violence for a short while through the application of these techniques, but political and economic development which will reduce the insecurity of individuals and communities is crucial to the process of conflict management. It may even be necessary to

consider forms of political organization within a reconceptualized nation-state structure so as to foster a sense of genuine and secure community for those who have been marginalized and made insecure within existing national arrangements.

II. Why Conflict Management?

In the Third World, war and extreme poverty combine to demoralize entire populations, and reduce their capacity to search actively for solutions to their problems. Thus, in conflict situations in the underdeveloped world, peace-building and development with justice must be regarded as two sides of the same coin. In recognition of this interrelationship, several programs in conflict management and resolution have evolved in recent years. At the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland, College Park, we are engaged in basic and applied research into confidence-building measures, trust-inducing modes of communication, and the facilitation of analytical breakthroughs between antagonists, in combination with the design of appropriate and effective developmental strategies. There are indications that this approach holds some potential for creating long-term peace and stability, thus providing hope to those affected by protracted conflict and war.

The analysis of protracted social conflict has importance for how one defines national security, as well. The debate over the American concept of 'low intensity conflict' is enriched by our analysis of protracted social conflict. The perspective on conflict provided by our formulations posits that regional low intensity conflicts are not simply a product or extension of the Cold War. In fact, such conflicts would exist without the superpower rivalry (although they would perhaps not reach the same level of intensity and violence). By emphasizing the underlying social causes, protracted social conflict theory contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of this type of conflict, which in turn creates greater challenges for conflict management.

The applied conflict management approach works well if one holds to certain premises, namely, that politics and diplomacy are about building consensus between contending parties and that this process involves a long and complicated series of tasks. In almost all cases of protracted social conflict, the use of Track Two diplomacy is a crucial first step (see Montville, 1987). Track Two is designed to establish a pre-negotiation stage in which analytical 'breakthroughs' by the disputants themselves are encouraged. We have found that the successful application of this process (as the three case studies in this book demonstrate) will create conditions enabling the introduction of other components of conflict management and resolution, such as strategies for economic development and political institution building. Although only a first, and small, step in the complex process of protracted conflict resolution, it is one that has been underestimated by both the academic and practitioner alike. Fortunately, Track Two and other forms of alternative diplomacy have become

increasingly visible and popular during the last twenty years and have made contributions to the concepts and vocabulary of conflict analysis and management. The cases presented in this volume show some of the strengths of 'problem-solving forums' (our version of Track Two diplomacy), as well as some of the weaknesses. Much work remains to be done, and it will be useful to continuously evaluate our procedures.

III. Organization of the Book

In this book we provide a brief discussion of the phenomenon of protracted social conflict--a type of conflict that we believe poses a very serious challenge to the world community--and suggest practical strategies that might be applied in the search for conflict resolution breakthroughs. By focusing on the characteristics of this prevalent type of social conflict, on how these characteristics suggest methods that may contribute to conflict management, and on the results of specific experiments in the application of these methods, we hope to make a dual contribution. That is, first, to advance our knowledge about conflict behavior and conflict management, and second, to present insights about the utility of problem-solving forums as a tool in applied peace research.

The first chapter in this book introduces the reader to the concept of *protracted social conflict*. In Chapter Two we present a brief review of various conflict management techniques which have been developed and employed over the years. Chapter Three describes the particular conflict management strategy that we have employed (*i.e.*, problem-solving forums) and discusses its promise in contributing to the resolution of protracted social conflicts. In the three succeeding chapters, we consider its application to specific conflicts (Lebanon, Sri Lanka and the Falklands/Malvinas). Each case is presented with particular attention given to the origin and history of the dispute and an analysis of the events that seem to perpetuate each conflict. The final two chapters provide an evaluation and critique of applied conflict management in terms of the three cases, and introduce the related concepts of tracking, structural development and development diplomacy.

This book was written for the benefit of students, colleagues, diplomats and Third World national security specialists. We hope that this effort is particularly helpful to scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution who argue that genuine national security is about conflict management, economic and political welfare, political legitimacy, communal integrity and development, and national consensus.

1. Protracted Social Conflict: An Analytical Framework

I. Introduction

Conflict is an inseparable part of social interactions. Conflict cannot take place without involvement of two or more parties. Mutually incompatible goals among parties amidst a lack of coordinating or mediating mechanisms give birth to conflict. In this broad sense, conflict is a generic social phenomenon involving individuals, societies, states, and their collectivities. In the 1950s, several scholars attempted to group various forms of conflicts (family, community, political, class) under one ontological entity: social conflict. Even interstate wars and other external conflictual behaviors were interpreted as subsets of social conflicts. Thus, the study of conflicts was framed by multidisciplinary and holistic approaches (see Boulding: 1956; Coser: 1956; Janowitz: 1964; Simmel: 1956).

Over the last three decades, however, the study of wars, crises and conflicts has gradually become compartmentalized and differentiated. *First*, a tendency has emerged to understand conflicts through a rather rigid dichotomy of internal and external dimensions. While sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists and others have been preoccupied with internal or domestic conflicts (civil wars, insurgencies, revolts, coups, protests, riots, revolutions *etc.*), external conflictual behavior (interstate wars, crises, invasions, border conflicts, blockades, *etc.*) has become an exclusive domain of investigation by international relations scholars. Some have attempted to link these internal and external dimensions of conflict. A number of scholars have traced domestic

sources of external conflictual behavior by focusing on domestic political structures (Kissinger: 1969; Rosenau: 1966; Rummel: 1963), domestic conflicts or disorders (Rummel: 1973; Wilkenfeld: 1973), and population pressures and resource bases (Choucri and North: 1975; Pirages: 1978). On the other hand, several sociologists have identified external-systemic factors as independent variables responsible for domestic conflicts. Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973), Paige (1968), and Skocpol (1979) have drawn a conclusion that domestic conflict, revolutionary crises, or regime breakdown can be accounted for by looking into the pattern and structure of intrusion by international political, economic and military systems into the domestic realm.

The second important development is the field theoretic approach to conflict analysis following Quincy Wright (1942). Kenneth Waltz has emphasized the importance of multiple-level causation of conflict and the utility of analyzing interstate conflict in terms of the contrasting images of man, state and society (Waltz: 1959). The study of domestic conflict has also been dominated by theories addressing different levels of causation, organized around concepts such as cognitive frustration-aggression, structural-functional deformity, inter-group competition, or the intrusion of systemic factors. By coupling this multilevel understanding of causation with functional issue areas, conflicts are further sub-categorized into psychological, social, political, economic, and military conflicts.

Finally, apart from this internal-external polarization and functional differentiation of conflict types, students of conflict appear to share consensual knowledge of the behavioral dynamics of conflicts. However, regardless of source and type, conflicts are generally conceived as such only when they are *overt and violent*. *Covert, latent or non-violent* conflicts are seldom regarded as appropriate objects of study. Moreover, conflicts are understood from an organic cycle perspective. Every conflict is thought to go through a cycle of genesis, maturity, reduction, and termination. The termination of violent acts is often equated with the state of peace (Yaniv and Katz: 1980).

The field is full of good ideas, but more knowledge is needed. Indeed, we need to study more systematically the type of conflict that does not fit exactly into the above classifications, a type which we have called 'protracted social conflict' (Azar *et al.*: 1978; Azar and Cohen: 1981; Azar: 1986). For example, many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterized by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets. Finally, these conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points.

II. Protracted Social Conflict: Genesis, Dynamics and Outcomes

A. Genesis

The genesis component of our model identifies a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones. In addition, it traces the pattern of causal relations among these conditions which give rise to a specific protracted social conflict. On the following page is an illustration (diagram 1.1) of the relationship between four clusters of variables (communal content, needs, governance and the role of the state, and international linkages) which are preconditions for protracted social conflict.

1. Communal Content


Perhaps the most significant factor related to a protracted social conflict is the communal content of a society. If a society is characterized by multicommunal composition, protracted social conflicts are most likely to arise. (We use the term *community* as a generic reference to politicized groups whose members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural 'identity' characteristics.)

There are two factors which are responsible for the rise of politically active multicommunal societies. The first is colonial legacy. Application of the principle of 'divide and rule' by colonialists produced a unique political landscape in many parts of the world where a state artificially incorporated a multitude of communal groups (such as occurred in Lebanon, Israel, Malaysia) or a nation became divided into two or more states (*e.g.*, Korea). The second factor is a historical pattern of rivalry and contest among communal actors. Multicommunal societies, whether formed through the colonizing process or through intercommunal struggle, are characterized by disarticulation between the state and society as a whole, with the state usually dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society. Imposed integration or incorporation of distinctive and often conflictual communities into one political entity retards the nation-building process, strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict (see Alcock: 1972; Azar: 1986, 1979; Kriesberg: 1982; Osgood: 1979; Pruitt and Rubin: 1986).

2. Human Needs

We assume that individuals strive to fulfill their developmental human needs through the formation of identity groups. A community is an identity group. The most obvious ontological need is individual and communal physical survival and well-being. Individual or communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of material needs. In the world of physical scarcity, these basic needs

Diagram 1.1
Genesis and Dynamics of
Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)



are seldom *evenly* or *justly* met. While one group of individuals may enjoy satisfaction of those needs in abundance, others do not. Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict.

In reality, however, the deprivation of basic material needs *per se* does not directly give birth to conflicts. The allocation or exchange of the means to satisfy such needs is a function of *access* to the superstructure of society; *i.e.*, social institutions such as political authority or the market. Therefore, access to social institutions (that is, effective participation in society) is a crucial determinant for satisfying physical needs. Effective participation may thus also be considered a developmental need, rather than merely an *interest* which can be negotiated or denied. As is the case with scarce material values, however, a fair and just allocation of access or participation is rare in a stratified human society. Unequal distribution tends to be more pronounced in a multicommunal society where social goods involving access needs (*e.g.*, positional values) are in limited supply, in comparison to the heterogeneous and diverse demand for them.

The lack of means to satisfy basic physical needs in Third World countries is often attributed to the nature of the economic development strategy adopted (see Burton: 1984a; Maslow: 1954; Sites: 1973). Typically, an unbalanced, rapid-growth development strategy has distorted the traditional allocation of resources, leading to sectoral and regional imbalances. Certain groups of individuals, especially minority communal groups, tend to be marginalized by such rapid development strategies (see Brown: 1985; De Janvry: 1981).

In such situations, the marginalized groups create a menu of responses designed to redress their grievances. Correcting and restructuring-responses are usually a function of the level of access to economic decision-making. Participation in economic decision-making is in turn determined by the overall distribution of political power. It is in this nexus that the deprivation of physical needs soon leads to discord over the just and fair distribution of political and economic power.

Access to political and economic power is by and large influenced by the level of acceptance of each community. If the ruling political elites were to recognize and politically accommodate alienated communities, then discords over the distribution of political and economic power could be managed satisfactorily. In many cases, however, deprivation of physical needs and denial of access are rooted in the refusal to recognize or accept the communal *identity* of other groups. Formation and acceptance of identity thus also may be understood as a basic developmental need, with collective identity manifest in terms of cultural values, images, customs, language, religion, and racial heritage.

Consider the example of South Africa. Blacks are denied access to social institutions precisely on the basis of their racial identity. A claim of superior identity (*i.e.*, white supremacy), rather than objective conditions (*e.g.*, economic or political motives), largely determines the nature and scope of the denial of security and identity needs of blacks. Such denial fosters greater cohesion within

victimized communal groups, and may work to promote collective violence and protract the conflict if no other means of satisfaction is available.

As another example, the perpetuation of violence in Lebanon can be ascribed more to conflict over acceptance and security of communal identity than to the acquisition of needed physical resources or power. The satisfaction of needs for communal security, fair governance by the ruling elites, and acceptance and recognition of cultural diversity, are all basic to nation-state building in that country. The deprivation of security cannot be understood without reference to equitable access to the institutions of government, cultural tolerance and acceptance of diversity. The deprivation of one form of developmental need usually leads to problems in other areas. Therefore, to elucidate the complex relationship among these needs is an important step toward understanding the causes of any protracted social conflict.

3. Governance and the State's Role

Deprivation or satisfaction of human needs for physical security, access to political and social institutions, and acceptance of communal identity (*i.e.*, political pluralism) is largely a result of social, political and economic interactions. In the modern world, the regulation of such interactions, and thus the satisfaction of these basic needs, is undertaken by the political authority called *the state*. The state is endowed with authority to govern and to use force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens, and to provide collective goods. Therefore, the level of satisfaction or deprivation of basic needs is generally influenced by the intervening or mediating role of the state. Indeed, an ideal state characterized by a fair and just mode of governance should be able to satisfy human needs regardless of communal or identity cleavages, and promote communal harmony and social stability. In actuality however, this is rare. Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs.

Most states in protracted social conflict-laden countries are hardly neutral. In democratic societies, the state is an aggregate of individuals entrusted to govern effectively and to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts. Empirically, however, the world behaves differently. Political authority tends to be monopolized by a dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups. These groups tend to use the state as an instrument for maximizing their interests at the expense of others. In the protracted social conflict context, these groups have manifested in communal terms. The monopoly of political authority by one or more groups denies the state a capacity for fair and successful governance. As a result, the means to satisfy basic needs are unevenly shared and the potential for protracted social conflict increases. In this regard, the communal content of the state becomes basic to our study of protracted social conflict.

Further, the domination of the state apparatus by one or few communal groups is achieved through the distortion of modes of governance. To sustain

their monopoly of power, these dominant groups limit access to social institutions by other identity groups and thus often precipitate crises of *legitimacy*. Such crises exacerbate already existing competitive or conflictive situations, diminish the state's ability to meet basic needs, and lead to further developmental crises. Thus, regime type and the level of legitimacy are important linkage variables between needs and protracted social conflict.

Protracted social conflicts seem to be concentrated in the developing countries, although they are not limited to the developing world. These countries are typically characterized by rapid population growth and a limited resource base. Poor resource environments amid population expansion will constrain policy options. Accordingly, the availability of resources becomes an important indicator of a state's ability to satisfy needs and prevent conflict.

Equally important is the nature of the *policy capacity* of the state, in which framework basic needs are evaluated and policies are formulated and implemented. Policy capacity is about governance and the effectiveness of the state. It is largely determined by the nature of the authority structure and the resulting pattern of decision-making. In most protracted social conflict-laden countries, policy capacity is limited by a rigid or fragile authority structure which prevents the state from responding to, and meeting, the needs of various constituents. This happens because the state is often unable to insulate the decision-making machinery from the political pressures of the dominant identity groups. Thus, the relative strength and autonomy of the state is directly linked to the level of satisfying basic needs.

4. International Linkages

The role of the state in engendering or preventing protracted social conflicts by depriving or satisfying basic needs is not determined solely by endogenous factors, such as the political power configuration underlying the authority structure and regime type. Formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced by the patterns of linkage with the international system. Two models of international linkage can be conceived.

The first of these models focuses on economic *dependency* within the international economic system. Such a dependent relationship not only limits the autonomy of the state, but also distorts the pattern of economic development, impeding the satisfaction of security needs. Moreover, dependency often exacerbates denial of the access needs of communal groups, distorting domestic political and economic systems through the realignment of subtle coalitions of international capital, domestic capital, and the state.

The second of these international linkage models focuses on political and military *client* relationships with strong states. In a client relationship, the patron provides protection for the client state in return for the latter's loyalty. Client loyalty and obedience involves some sacrifice of autonomy and independence, which induces the client state to pursue both domestic and foreign policies disjoined from, or contradictory to, the needs of its own public. The

behavior of Lebanese governments over the last four decades is an open data base for illustrating this point. The support for the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (encouraging US anti-communist actions in the region following Nasser's rise to power) and the government's acceptance of the 1969 Cairo Accords (giving the PLO the right to use southern Lebanon as a base for its war against Israel) are but two examples of how loss of autonomy and increased dependency can lead governments to trap themselves in situations which constrain satisfaction of the national need for intercommunal trust and harmony.

In brief, protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of their communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multicomunal nature of the society) play important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict.


B. Process Dynamics

The previous discussion identifies preconditions for the rise of a protracted social conflict. In reality, however, the existence or even recognition of these conditions by communal groups may not lead to an overt or manifest conflict. Our model of the process dynamics of protracted social conflicts attempts to elucidate factors which are responsible for the *activation* of overt conflicts. We identify as key determinants the interactive effects of three clusters of variables: communal actions and strategies, state actions and strategies, and built-in properties of conflict. (Please see diagram 1.2 on the following page.)

1. Communal Actions and Strategies

Like other forms of conflict, a protracted social conflict remains latent until some effective triggers begin to operate. When organizational and communication systems break down within an environment of mutual distrust between groups, protracted social conflict can begin to escalate. Initially a trigger may, but need not be, a trivial event (*e.g.*, an insult to an individual with strong communal ties). But the trivial event tends to become a turning point at which the individual victimization is *collectively* recognized. Collective recognition of individual grievances (or incompatible goals) naturally leads to collective protest. Collective protest is usually met by some degree of repression or suppression. As tension increases, the victimized communal groups begin to draw the attention of their constituents not only to the event itself, but also to a broad range of issues involving communal security, access, and acceptance needs (*e.g.*, selective poverty and political inequality). The spill-over of the event into multiple issues increases the momentum for organizing and mobilizing resources. As the level of communal organization and mobilization becomes greater, communal groups attempt to formulate more diverse strategies and

Diagram 1.2
Process-level Dynamics and Outcomes of
Protracted Social Conflict



tactics, which may involve civil disobedience, guerrilla warfare or secessionist movements.

Demands for greater autonomy and independence may invite coercive responses, rather than accommodation and concessions, from the ruling elites or their constituents. Since the balance of power is generally in favor of the state, the communal groups tend to seek external military and economic assistance. Because national boundaries of protracted social conflict-laden countries were often defined without adequately taking into account the distribution of communal groups, appeals for assistance tend to gain neighboring actors' support. Often this external support is associated with hegemonic designs, which lead to attempts at co-option and destabilization. By manipulating communal tensions, a neighboring nation can enlist the support of disenfranchised groups to subvert their nation's ruling regime. Assistance is given as a means of furthering the regional power-play that many (especially Third World) nations are engaged in. At this stage, the internal and external demarcations of conflicts become blurred as domestic communal conflicts become regional.

In sum, the type of initial conditions, the organization and mobilization of communal groups, the emergence of effective leadership, the strategies and tactics of this leadership, and the scope and nature of external ties, become important determinants of the dynamics of protracted social conflicts. But these variables themselves are influenced by the responses of political authorities. In this context, state strategies and tactics are another crucial determinant of the behavioral properties of protracted social conflicts.

2. State Actions and Strategies

A protracted social conflict can be resolved or at least kept latent if the state *accommodates* communal grievances and improves the satisfaction of communal needs in the initial stage. But accommodation strategies are seldom employed. It is not only because of the political and economic costs involved, but also because of the norm of 'winner-take-all' which still prevails in multicommunal societies. Any authentic accommodation or concession may be perceived as a sign of defeat. Therefore, the state usually avoids such a strategy and employs *coercive repression* or *instrumental co-option*.

In many cases, a militant, harsh response constitutes the core of state strategy in coping with communal dissent. Such a hard-line strategy invites equally militant responses from the repressed groups. Co-option could serve to mitigate communal grievances, but it is usually perceived as being a tactical maneuver to fragment the opposition and divert its attention. Failure of the co-option strategy further justifies coercive, repressive options, leading to an upward spiral of violent clashes. Under these circumstances, states try to *contain* a conflict situation within a national boundary by attempting to sever links between domestic communal actors and external support groups. When such containment strategies do not work, the state (or dominant communal actor that monopolizes state authority) seeks its own *external assistance*. The existing dependency and client ties facilitate direct or indirect intervention of external

powers, which not only amplifies the scope of the conflict, but also makes it more protracted.

3. Built-in Mechanisms of Conflict

Apart from the strategies and organizational capabilities of state and communal actors, the history of experience in the conflict and the nature of communication among hostile contestants are also responsible for the shaping of the behavioral properties of protracted conflict.

Conflicts associated with communal identity and fear of marginalization or loss of communal integrity, tend to involve an enduring antagonistic set of perceptions and interactions between and among communal groups and the state. The perceptions and motivations behind the behavior of the state and communal actors are conditioned by the experiences, fears and belief system of each communal group. In a situation of limited or proscribed interactions, the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side. There is little possibility of falsification, and the consequence is reciprocal negative images which perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social conflict.

Parties subject to the continual stresses of protracted conflict tend to become closed-minded. In these cases, proposals for political solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived by all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control. At this stage, hostility begets hostility and the process becomes institutionalized (Gurr: 1970). This mechanism of a conflict spiral, set in motion by communal fear and hostility, gains velocity with the deepening of the deprivation of basic needs. Therefore, it becomes important to analyze the perceptions and cognitive processes generated through experience of conflictual interactions, such as premature closure, misattribution of motives, stereotyping, tunnel vision, bolstering and polarization (Mitchell: 1981).

C. Outcome Analysis

Most conflicts, as classically understood, involve zero-sum outcomes in which winners and losers can be differentiated. But protracted social conflicts result in negative-sum outcomes because of their innate behavioral properties: *protractedness*, *fluctuation*, and *actor and issue spill-over*. There are no winners: rather, all the parties to these conflicts tend to be victimized in the process. Protracted conflicts, unlike other forms of conflict, do not have clear termination points. Outcomes (military victories, negotiated agreements, etc.), insofar as they do not satisfy basic needs, contain latent conflicts which cause further cycles of manifest conflict, often involving a shift or spill-over in issues and actors. The perpetuation of social conflict in the Third World has thus proved to be devastating in terms of physical, psychological, political and economic costs.

In protracted conflict situations, development programs cease to function effectively, and economic retrenchment takes place. An acute trade-off in state expenditure between the maintenance of internal security and provision of welfare

occurs and greatly undermines the satisfaction of basic needs. Even worse is the psychological damage and disorientation of individuals entrapped in a protracted conflict situation. They become vulnerable to absorption in a violent war culture, further separating them from normal civil life.

The process of protracted conflict deforms and retards the effective operation of political institutions. It reinforces and strengthens pessimism throughout the society, demoralizes leaders and immobilizes the search for peaceful solutions. We have observed that societies undergoing protracted social conflict find it difficult to initiate the search for answers to their problems and grievances. As the protracted conflict becomes part of the culture of the ravaged nation, it builds a sense of paralysis which afflicts the collective consciousness of the population. An environment of hopelessness permeates all strata of society, and a siege mentality develops which inhibits constructive negotiation for any resolution of the conflict.

The one element that polarizes the parties most is fear. Protracted social conflicts are rooted in fear of marginalization. Affected communities' paranoia regarding each other often leads to alliances of convenience with external actors. This state of affairs encourages dependency on external parties rather than reliance on one's own abilities and resources. Inviting outside actors to become involved simply promotes the entrenchment of a cycle of dependency, violent conflict and despair.

In short, protracted social conflicts generate (and are further reinforced by) the following conditions:

1. Deterioration of physical security

This is the most obvious consequence, exacerbating initial conditions of insecurity through further loss of life and means of support. Apart from physical destruction, protracted social conflict institutionalizes underdevelopment through the destruction of physical and social infrastructures. Efforts to pursue systematic development planning are halted and discarded as excessive military expenditure absorbs scarce resources. A vicious cycle of underdevelopment and conflict deprives not only the victimized communities, but also the dominant groups, of the economic resources for satisfying basic needs.

2. Institutional Deformity

Degeneration of socio-economic and political institutions, which makes the satisfaction of communities' access needs virtually impossible, occurs in two distinctive ways. One is *de facto* paralysis of political institutions. Central governments become weak and consequently cease to effectively perform their functions of regulation, extraction, allocation and arbitration. The other form of degeneration is further fragmentation of the broader social fabric. At the onset of conflict, social and economic institutions mediating communal interrelationships may still be functional, and communal boundaries permeable. As conflict protracts, however, communal cleavages become petrified, and the prospects for cooperative interaction and nation-building become poor.

3. Psychological Ossification

Protracted social conflict entails a vicious cycle of fear and hostile interactions among the communal contestants. With the continued stress of such conflict, attitudes, cognitive processes and perceptions become set and ossified. War culture and cynicism dominate. Meaningful communication between or among conflicting parties dries up, and the ability to satisfy communal acceptance needs is severely diminished.

4. Increased Dependency and Cliency

As conflict protracts, communal actors rely more and more on support and aid from others and thus external actors are systematically drawn into the conflict. Decision-making power is increasingly exercised by external actors, so that communities suffer further loss of access and control over their lives.

These entrenched conflicts provide the most severe challenge to those concerned with peace-building. Their apparent intractability suggests that conventional approaches have been too narrowly conceived, failing to address the underlying dynamics which drive protracted conflicts. It is to this challenge that we now turn.

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2. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: The Potential of Track Two Diplomacy

Given what we know about protracted social conflicts, how can we make a contribution towards their management and ultimate resolution? This chapter and the rest of the book are intended to supply one answer.

As the informed reader knows, the literature on conflict termination and resolution is rich. One can find arguments in favor of political solutions and judicial settlements--arbitration, mediation, legal awards and direct bargaining. On the other hand, one finds serious advocates of the view that gaining control over conflict events can only succeed by co-opting parties to a conflict *via* a combination of material rewards and threat of punishment through conventional means of force or repression. The approach we present below advocates the use of political and developmental tools as opposed to armed force and coercion.

There are pitfalls to any proposal to manage or resolve a protracted social conflict. Given the nature of cultural, religious and ethnic conflicts amidst conditions of poverty and economic underdevelopment, a conflict settled or controlled at one point in time might flare up later with greater intensity and devastating damage. Settlements between conflicting sides are nullified when isolated or victimized communal groups become 'spoilers.' Attempts at settlement or control of a crisis that do not tackle the deeper dynamics underlying the crisis will be temporarily successful at best. Moreover, the intractable and entangled nature of issues in protracted social conflicts involving the struggle over communal needs and demands reduces the efficacy of third-party assistance. Indeed, there are no 'quick fix' solutions to these problems.

I. Track Two Diplomacy

Conflict management from our perspective emphasizes promotion of balanced socio-economic and political development, and facilitation of psycho-political problem solving. The approach that we advocate argues that as a supplement to official diplomacy, conflict management calls for non-official, sub-national and analytical 'problem-solving' orientations within the broad category of what has been called Track Two diplomacy (Montville: 1987).

Although there are many different interpretations and examples of Track Two diplomacy, the term generally refers to the search for and promotion of peaceful relations between warring parties without reliance upon official efforts. Track One diplomacy, which emphasizes official contacts between representatives of sovereign entities, governments and other parties to a dispute within a bargaining framework, lacks the necessary orientation to generate conflict resolution breakthroughs. A 'bargaining' framework implies that the conflict is about clearly defined goods which are in short supply, so that a 'zero-sum' outcome (either win-lose or compromise) is assumed. Track Two is a response to the perceived failure of this approach. Before describing our own model, we will briefly discuss some of the other processes which fall under the broad category of Track Two.

A large and increasing number of experiments in alternative forms of diplomacy has been undertaken in recent years. Terms used to describe non-traditional diplomatic processes include 'citizenship diplomacy,' 'supplemental diplomacy,' 'pre-negotiations,' 'walks in the woods,' 'face to face diplomacy,' 'problem-solving workshops' and 'back-channel diplomacy.' In order to avoid confusion when talking about initiatives and processes which in practice may be quite dissimilar, it is important that clear distinctions between the different practices be established on the basis of goals, structure and procedure.

The confusion that currently exists regarding terminology is understandable given both the proliferation of new experiments in alternative diplomacy as well as a healthy increase in citizen participation in international and intercultural relations. This confusion is the predictable product of the generation of many new ideas and the involvement of a large number of individuals, and should not discourage people interested in conflict management from exploring alternative processes. Several experiments have had notable success and the field is becoming increasingly rigorous in terms of both theory and practice.

All of the terms mentioned above refer to processes which are distinct from, or supplemental to, official diplomacy (referred to here as 'Track One'), although they may involve limited formal diplomatic participation. 'Track Two' refers conceptually to processes which parallel and, ideally, eventually 'hook up' with Track One diplomacy. Ultimately, all non-official processes are aimed (at least in part) at influencing official opinion, even though the link may at first seem very remote. For example, highly-visible symbolic events such as a cross-nation linking of hands to show solidarity or support for an issue are staged in the hope

that political leaders will be swayed by the demonstration of broad popular support.

Some approaches are designed to establish contact between official or non-official representatives outside the customary negotiating framework so that ideas, concepts and issues can be explored without binding the participants (and thus the parties they represent) to an agreement. For example, a 'walk in the woods' between individual negotiators will enable them to more easily pursue and reject options free from the cumbersome machinery of official negotiations which usually entail the presence of large teams of negotiators on each side. Of course, agreements reached through this process may not be ultimately acceptable to the highest decision makers unless they themselves were involved. 'Face to face' diplomacy similarly attempts to facilitate the official process by bringing together individuals with decision-making power who do not have to constantly consult with higher authorities whenever a new proposal or counter-proposal is offered. Although non-traditional, both of these processes involve official diplomats and a bargaining, 'zero-sum' environment is likely to be maintained.

Other approaches which attempt to facilitate official negotiations employ the use of third party mediation. Most of the recent efforts in alternative diplomacy have been made by third parties. Obviously, third party mediation is not a new phenomenon; it has had a long, and unfortunately, inconsistent history. The basic idea behind the traditional use of third parties is to induce warring factions or states to meet together, usually through the offer of *mediation services*.

This type of approach is most useful in cases where parties to a dispute have ceased, or refused to begin, any type of communication with each other. This may occur when one or both parties are reluctant to meet because of the negative political consequences associated with meeting with the 'enemy.' Furthermore, in highly conflictive situations between parties of dissimilar military strength the stronger party will be reluctant to grant 'legitimacy' to the weaker by agreeing to negotiate with them. It is not uncommon that a government will derive positive political capital by publicly refusing to negotiate with an adversary, even though the policy may be detrimental in the long run. It is possible in this case to 'save face' (*i.e.*, avoid the appearance of capitulation or 'legitimizing' the opponent) while at the same time opening a useful channel of communication by agreeing to deal with a respected third party. Thus, legitimacy is granted not to the opponent but to the mediator and little or no political capital is risked in what, given the volatility of such situations, may in the end turn out to be a failed venture.

One of the problems with the traditional third party role is that the bargaining/negotiating framework is preserved. Another potentially serious problem with third-party mediation, one which pertains to Track Two as well, is that third parties bring along their own biases and agendas, thus transforming or influencing the outcome in several different ways. In these situations, although contact between parties to a dispute may be facilitated, a profound analysis of the

sources of conflict is not achieved since bargaining over interests within a power-politics environment remains the norm.

Finally, a third class of non-traditional diplomacy involves the use of 'independent' or private third parties (such as academics, clerics, retired diplomats, *etc.*) who bypass official channels in an attempt to open clogged channels of communication or to propose/discuss/explore alternative solutions to a dispute. This type of effort, examples of which have been called 'citizenship diplomacy,' can be useful for initiating contact between parties or for bringing to light possible solutions which were unseen due to lack of communication. Its effectiveness is limited, however, as long as it does not induce the parties to educate themselves and one another through the exploration and mutual recognition of underlying needs (as opposed to immediate interests) which are motivating the conflict.

Private third parties may also attempt to bring representatives of opposing groups together for discussions within a non-official setting such as an academic conference or forum. The main objective of such processes is to create an environment in which a free exchange of ideas can occur. Ideally, a linkage will exist between this process and official decision makers, but historically the positive effects have been difficult to clearly identify.

From our perspective, the most promising form of alternative diplomacy is what is generally known as the 'problem-solving' approach, which combines aspects of private, non-official or semi-official approaches with third party approaches to conflict resolution. After a brief history of the development of this process, we will describe how problem-solving forums are suited to addressing protracted social conflict and in what ways the approach avoids the problems associated with the other types of alternative diplomacy described above.

II. The 'Problem-Solving' Approach to Conflict Management

A. Background

The problem-solving approach is predicated on the belief that violent and prejudicial, or peaceful and cooperative, thinking and behavior are *learned* phenomena, and that what is learned therefore can also be modified. Problems of communication in conflict situations obscure the common interests and potentials for mutual benefit which the protagonists share. Thus, the conditions for adaptive learning and conflict resolution will be enhanced if the parties are able to talk.

One format to accomplish this involves bringing together representatives of parties to a dispute to engage in frank, face to face, analytical discussions about their grievances, interests and perceptions of problems and possible solutions. The term 'problem-solving' is intended to convey a view that conflict is not something which is to be 'won' but rather something which must be 'solved.'

The most familiar problem-solving exercises are meetings which involve representatives of parties to a conflict and a facilitating third party. Although similar to the various forms of third party mediation, to the extent that the third party must be objective, knowledgeable and skilled, this form of third party consultation is distinct in certain important respects. One key feature of problem-solving forums is the insistence that the third party consultant refrain from developing or imposing compromise solutions. Rather, the consultant should focus on facilitating a mutual understanding between the parties and identifying the grievances, perceptions and values of all sides. Third party consultants need to be trusted by the parties to the conflict; although they need not be full-fledged authorities on the specific conflict. It is more important, and in fact essential, that the consultant be knowledgeable about the sources of conflict and of the processes which exist for building trust and increasing understanding between parties to a dispute.¹

Pioneering work in this area in the post-World War II era (although not 'problem-solving' exercises *per se*) was done by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker organization, as it attempted to intervene in several crisis situations at the international level. Efforts were made to mediate between the two Germanies (1961-1973), between India and Pakistan (1965), and during the civil war in Nigeria (1967-1970). The Quakers' concept of conflict resolution emphasizes attentive listening to help release pent-up grievances, facilitating communication between parties with different languages and imagery, and maintaining a confidential environment which excludes the destabilizing influence of publicity. They found that their approach, because of its private nature and because AFSC had no 'power' or official identity, contributes to a process of 'conciliation' between the actors (Yarrow, 1978: p.xxiii).

Subsequent efforts in this area, crucial to the development of the problem-solving approach, were the projects developed by John W. Burton ('controlled communication') at the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at University College, London; by Leonard W. Doob (the 'Fermida workshop') at Yale University; and by Herbert C. Kelman (the Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution seminars) at Harvard University. Each of these approaches involves 'workshops' that combine discussions designed to alter perceptions with facilitated problem-solving exercises.

As is the case with AFSC conciliation, these workshops are unofficial, face to face encounters which take place in a neutral setting. Key to these efforts is the involvement of a group of social scientists who are knowledgeable about both group processes and conflict theory. The important advance made by these approaches is to move beyond simple 'sensitivity training' for achieving greater trust at the inter-personal level (since this can rarely be transferred to the institutional level), and attempt to utilize improved levels of communication to practically address specific aspects of a conflict. Depending on the nature of the conflict and the type of participant involved, the 'product' of the workshops will differ from case to case. It must be mentioned that these approaches are continuously being re-evaluated and refined, and that in neither case do the

practitioners believe that they have developed the definitive conflict resolution process.

It will be useful to briefly highlight the basic features of two of these approaches; those of Burton and Doob. (For an excellent early study comparing and contrasting their work, see Kelman: 1972.)

B. John Burton's Controlled Communication Approach

Burton's first applied experiments in controlled communication were workshops held in the late 1960s concerning the conflict in Southeast Asia between Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, and the conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Discussions ranged over periods of ten and seven days, respectively. In these exercises, the participants were chosen by officials of their communities, and the panel of facilitators which 'controlled' the discussions was comprised of academics from the social sciences.

One of the propositions which Burton and his colleagues wanted to test was whether or not it is possible to induce representatives of parties to meet with each other unofficially during periods of a lack of official contact (Burton: 1986). These and other exercises indicate that it is possible when the participants are assured that the exercise will be academic in nature and that they will be participating only as private citizens and not as official representatives.

The meetings were relatively unstructured, with no preliminary agenda, so as to enable the participants themselves to explore the source of the conflict, the reasons for its perpetuation (including underlying perceptions and attitudes toward the opposing side), and then possible solutions. In this latter stage, the panel of third party facilitators was responsible for preventing the establishment of a bargaining situation in the belief that such a zero-sum approach to the conflict would make no contribution to resolution, but rather would serve to perpetuate it.

Crucial to the approach is allowing the participants to present their own views of the conflict without interruption by the facilitators, except in order to request clarification. Following presentations by the participants, the facilitators described various models of conflict in an attempt to establish an appropriate academic and practical context in which mutual analysis by the participants of their own dispute could take place. In this stage, the role of the facilitators was more active in that they would attempt to suggest parallels with other conflicts which could be useful in arriving at agreed interpretations. During the final meetings, the participants began to consider alternatives for the resolution of their conflict, benefiting from the insights generated during the previous discussions. The role of the panel of facilitators in this stage was not to propose solutions or attempt to influence the direction of the talks in any way, but rather to bring in relevant experiences from other conflict situations and, most importantly, to insure that the differences between the parties that continued to

exist were not obscured or minimized in the climate of increased understanding and trust which had been generated.

From the outset of the process, the participants knew that any progress in resolution of the conflict would be the responsibility of government or community officials themselves, and that the only contribution the participants could make would be to communicate any new ideas or insights to these officials in the hope that they would be incorporated into the official diplomatic and decision-making process. It is for this reason that Burton and his colleagues were careful to invite individuals who were in close contact with decision makers and who could thus have an impact on policy (Burton: 1969).

Because of the very nature of the process, it is difficult to assess the impact of these contributions to resolution of the two disputes. The discussions were informal and private, and the contacts between the participants and decision makers is not a matter of public record. In both cases, however, movement on the official diplomatic fronts was made soon after the discussions took place: fighting stopped in Southeast Asia, and formal contacts between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots re-commenced. Nevertheless, the direct or indirect contribution to these events made by the workshops is at this stage impossible to measure.

C. The Fermeda Workshop

Although differing somewhat in focus from Burton's controlled communication, the Fermeda workshop (named after a hotel in South Tyrol, Italy) of Leonard W. Doob and his associates was another early and influential attempt to explore non-traditional conflict resolution strategies using a problem-solving format (Doob, Foltz and Stevens: 1969). The workshop was convened to address the border conflict in the Horn of Africa between Somalia and its neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia.

Whereas the goal of the Burton process was the generation of specific ideas which would be communicated to decision makers, that of the Fermeda workshop was the incorporation of the increased understanding and sensitivity achieved by the participants during the encounter into the decision making process back home. Both processes recognized that resolution of conflict ultimately will be the product of formal negotiations. However, they differ somewhat in terms of how they attempt to influence official decision makers.

Participants in the Fermeda workshop were academics (in the case of Kenya and Ethiopia) and civil servants or professionals in non-foreign policy related fields (in the case of Somalia). Although the two-week process was given the approval of the three governments, the participants were chosen by the sponsors of the workshop and served in the capacity of private citizens. However, the organizers were careful to choose individuals who were influential politically in their home environments. The panel of facilitators was comprised of three academics from Yale University and four Americans who specialized in 'sensitivity training.' The invitation to the participants stressed that the effort

was experimental, and that it would involve exercises in sensitivity training. They were also told that the organizers hoped that possible solutions to the border conflict would be generated.

The workshop was similar to the Burton exercise in that the first several days were spent not on the substantive issues of the conflict, but rather on discussion designed to improve communication between the participants and raise the level of trust. In the Burton exercise this was accomplished through analysis of perceptions of the conflict and goals and grievances of the two sides. In the Fermeda workshop this was accomplished primarily through sensitivity and group process training. Another similarity was in the role of the facilitators, their participation being collaborative and not interventionist.

After the first few days, the participants were broken up into national groups which would attempt to conceptually reverse roles and understand the grievances and perceptions of their counterparts. Although this aspect of the process appeared to be successful, when the entire group met together they were unable to transfer their heightened awareness and sensitivity to the larger group. Although the workshop failed to produce an overall agreement, on the individual level there was progress in increased cultural and personal sensitivity. In addition, the participants gained a greater appreciation of their counterparts' perceptions of the sources of the conflict (Doob: 1970).

In all of these cases, as well as in subsequent exercises, officials have expressed a great deal of distrust and skepticism about the approach. It is clear that politicians and diplomats will have a natural bias because they are generally excluded by design. However, just as it is impossible (at this stage) to say with certainty that the process has had a positive influence, it is equally impossible to prove that it has not. Because of its private and unofficial nature, we cannot be sure. Nevertheless, as this author's experience with over fifteen problem-solving exercises confirms, there is no doubt that the process induces the participants to speak about their conflicts in a new way, using different vocabulary based on cooperation as opposed to competition. This change in communication is an indication not simply that participants' interpersonal relations have improved (although desirable, this does not directly contribute to conflict resolution), but more importantly, that their understanding of the causes and dynamics of the conflict has been transformed, and that this transformation can be shared.

D. Other Workshops

In addition to the above mentioned exercises, there have been a number of other experiments structured along problem-solving lines (for a good listing and brief description of such projects, including efforts at the local and business/industrial levels, see Fisher: 1983). One very significant series of meetings, known as 'the Dartmouth Conference,' was designed to contribute to improved US-Soviet relations during the Cold War and after the failure of *detente*. (For a summary of the approach, see Stewart: 1987). Although the Dartmouth Conference does not

strictly share the problem-solving approach, it does incorporate the idea of involving unofficial, non-governmental participants (who are in contact with decision makers) in the exploration and interpretation of the relationship between the two countries, while focusing on substantive issue areas.

Other workshops at the international level include a weekend pilot workshop hosted by Stephen P. Cohen and associates (1977) on the Middle East conflict, with Palestinian and Israeli participants. Kelman and Cohen (1979) describe another pilot workshop on the Pakistan-India-Bangladesh conflict using a problem-solving approach. Fisher (1980) also reports on a similar effort concerning the conflict between India and Pakistan. Azar and Cohen (1981) served as third-party facilitators in discussions between Egyptians and Israelis concerning the peace process between their two countries.

It is appropriate to direct the reader's attention as well to the important theoretical work on problem-solving workshops by several theorists and practitioners, including Fisher (1983), Foltz (1977), Hill (1982) and Kelman (1972). These authors have clearly described theoretical concerns which remain to be addressed, as well as the necessity for developing adequate means for testing propositions from conflict resolution theories and assessing the impact of the workshops.²

None of the practitioners mentioned above regard the problem-solving workshop as a panacea in the resolution of conflict. Most agree that the approach should be regarded as one tool among various which can contribute to the peaceful solution of disputes. The workshop approach to international conflict (as one of the many forms of Track Two diplomacy) does not substitute for the ultimate need for formal diplomacy. What it may do is prepare the ground for productive official negotiations to occur in a non-zero-sum environment and free from rancor and hostility born of misperceptions and prejudice.

Even so, this approach will not be useful for all conflicts. First, not all conflict is demonstrably the result of misunderstanding. Second, the approach is predicated on the belief that there exist shared interests which transcend the current conflict, which the disputants would perceive if only they could clear away the webs of distrust and prejudice. However, not all disputes can be shown to originate in a failure of communication, nor do there always exist compelling shared interests between parties to a conflict. Furthermore, as Kelman (1972) points out, even in the case of a successful workshop or other process which manages to change the perceptions of the individuals who participate, this does not guarantee that these changes will affect the 'institutional' misperceptions which might exist, or influence a decision-making process which serves to perpetuate conflict. Thus, the approach is useful only in certain situations.

Practitioners and theorists agree that we must decide what these situations are and what conflict resolution techniques are useful. The 'good intentions' of third parties, however praiseworthy, are not sufficient to make an impact in conflict resolution. As Yarrow (1978) indicates, we must learn to objectively assess the effectiveness of our efforts, and this will require the establishment both of appropriate hypotheses, and reliable measures and tests.³

The contribution which we hope to make with this body of social research is to provide a theory of conflict which will indicate proper conflict management strategies. We believe that a major shortcoming of many of the efforts in the field is the failure to link management strategies with an understanding of the origin, escalation and perpetuation of conflict in the context of the modern world. Once this is understood, appropriate management techniques can be devised and tested.

Notes

(For full bibliographic information on citations, please see bibliography at end of book.)

1. For many scholars in international relations, this approach has a great deal of appeal because it is conceptually related to 'international integration' theory which became important after the end of the last world war. Supra-national institutions, built upon the foundation of shared interests between members of the world community, would prevent the re-occurrence of the calamities of the war and the breakdown of the international system. Political scientists in particular began to focus on the problems associated with the 'nation-state' (E. Haas: 1964a) and the feasibility of another form of international organization based on unity. International or regional communities were seen as a way to create a more peaceful and stable system (Etzioni: 1965).

This interest has continued and has not been limited to political scientists. Sociologists, economists and even students of public administration have also been involved in study of regional systems such as the European Economic Community and the Andean Pact, examples which indicate well both the potential and the difficulties of efforts at integration. 'Integration' involves many fields of study. Sharing the concerns of the theorists mentioned above, we are primarily concerned with those areas which we believe are directly related to the initiation and perpetuation of conflict, namely, economic and political development and the concept of 'national security' (Azar and Moon: 1988).

The challenge faced by proponents of integration has been how to initiate the process; that is, how to break the cycle of traditional international behavior which encourages conflict and initiate a new type of organization. This question naturally requires a definition of who the important actors in conflict management are, the level or levels at which they act and how they can be influenced. Frustration with creating a breakthrough in integration led researchers to reassess these questions and search for alternative approaches. The developers of the problem-solving approach believe that the breakthroughs will be created outside the formal structure of international relations.

2. Foltz (1977) clearly makes the distinction between workshops which are 'problem-solving' and those which are 'process-promoting,' a distinction which is useful when comparing the various approaches mentioned above. Basically,

the distinction lies in how directly each approach may lead to conflict resolution. Problem-solving workshops share some aspects of negotiations in that the participants attempt to construct an agreement which addresses the main points of contention and which ideally could be incorporated into the official negotiating process. The ability of the representatives to explore new and potentially radical solutions will depend much upon inter-personal dynamics and feelings of trust, but 'good feelings' are not in themselves the goal of the process. In a successful problem-solving workshop, 'formal' agreements ('formal' given the non-official nature of the contact) will be reached.

In contrast, the process-promoting workshop attempts to influence the conflict in a less direct and concrete way. The goal of the encounter is to 'train' the participants in interpersonal and group techniques to be used in one's own home environment. No formal agreements are reached, but knowledge is shared and generated and personal contacts created. Ideally, in this case, the 'breakthrough' in analysis of the conflict will occur in the home environments rather than in the workshop, as is the case with the problem-solving approach. The problem-solving workshop attempts to influence leaders and representatives of the parties to a conflict directly, whereas the process-promoting approach influences leadership through the 'base' of their communities. (Most of the processes reviewed here are of the problem-solving variety, and others, such as the Fermeda workshop, share characteristics of both types.)

3. Fisher (1983) decries the lack of high quality research and analysis in the area of third party consultation (such as the workshop approach and other Track Two techniques) at a level which could lead to the devising of a scientific method of conflict resolution. He believes that theorists and practitioners have been overly concerned with case studies. We agree, but at the same time do not discount the difficulty of such an effort. The large number of variables involved, most of which are affected by the vagaries of 'human nature,' provides a serious challenge to the establishment of the controls necessary for rigorous testing of hypotheses. Hill (1982) describes the ongoing debate over what are the proper components of the workshop approach (type of participant, composition of the panel of facilitators, length of the process, etc.), and this reflects the current theoretical confusion which exists. It is therefore clear that in order to make progress in the field of conflict resolution we must devise and employ an appropriate scientific method.

3. Problem-Solving Forums at the University of Maryland

I. Introduction

Our approach begins with the use of a panel of trained individuals to help create a non-bargaining, analytical environment in which representatives of parties to a dispute can explore alternatives in the movement from war to peace. The approach is comprehensive, in that it encompasses pre- and post-forum phases. The period preceding the convening of a forum requires systematic and thorough identification, tracking and analysis of the protracted conflict situation including its genesis, dynamics, and consequences as well as possible resolution strategies. The post-forum phase involves follow-up and further analysis, leading ultimately to negotiations or other appropriate official actions. These phases are of course concerned with the development and initiation of processes which address the fundamental grievances of the parties to a conflict, which characteristically are concerned with physical security, identity and access needs in the context of political and economic underdevelopment.

In sum, conflict resolution from our perspective entails both the management of current disputes and planning for the future so that further outbreaks of violence and destruction are prevented. Four elements constitute the core of effective management of protracted social conflicts:

- i) *conflict identification and tracking;*
- ii) *facilitation of breakthroughs in a conflict situation through problem-solving forums;*

- iii) promoting self-sustaining *structural development*; and,
- iv) adopting *development diplomacy* to alleviate external barriers to the termination and prevention of protracted social conflicts.

In this book, we will concentrate on one element, *facilitation*. The other elements, *conflict identification and tracking*, *structural development*, and *development diplomacy*, are briefly discussed in the concluding chapter.

II. The Forum Environment

Our research into the causes of protracted social conflict has focused our attention on the significance of an environment within which identity-related needs may be discussed, clarified, and analyzed by representatives of the parties to a conflict. In our view, it is possible to create an environment where such representatives, through serious and effective communication, can together discover breakthroughs in their hitherto 'intractable' adversarial relations, which may lead to consensus concerning the mutual compatibility of the parties' competing goals. This means, of course, providing the conditions necessary for the recognition by each party of the legitimate needs and aspirations of its opponent. As we found from our experience with several protracted conflict situations, there is a tendency for the afflicted groups to center all their attention and concern on themselves. Thus, it is extremely difficult for the group which considers itself wronged to recognize that a competing group may also have been fundamentally wronged.

We have found it useful in the effective management of conflict situations to act as impartial facilitators, or 'honest brokers,' and to enable each side to appreciate and address the basic grievances and needs of the other. These tend to be expressions of the basic needs for physical and economic security, for recognition of identity in a context of cultural diversity, and fair and effective political participation. Obviously, this is a very difficult process, even more so when one takes into account that mutual distrust and fear of future victimization will induce parties to a conflict to regard their adversary in the most negative way.

In conflict situations it is indeed rare that parties take the risks which are necessary to establish necessary and efficient contact. The risks to which we refer here are of two types. The *first* is the typical risk involved in the entry into informal discussions or bargaining situations with an adversary; that is, because of the high level of distrust which exists in protracted social conflict situations, it is difficult to guarantee good faith in the participation of all parties, or that any agreement reached will be upheld. The *second* type of risk affects the delegate who may be involved in negotiations or dialogue. Any individual who reaches an agreement, or even makes contact with the adversary is in danger of being alienated from his constituents unless he is able to achieve the difficult task of

convincing the group that he has not betrayed its interests (known as the *re-entry* problem) (Kelman: 1972).

Effective mediation by a third party can help minimize the risks involved in establishing communication between the opposing parties. Third parties can also do a lot to destroy the peace-building process, since they bring their own 'baggage' and biases which may (intentionally or not) distort the concerns of the parties themselves.

Typically, in traditional international negotiations, both sides to a dispute tend to think that their opponent is pursuing to some extent strategic (win-lose) outcome, whereas they may very well be acting primarily to secure psychological (recognition) needs. In this case, the problem-solving forum needs to provide a framework in which the parties can analyze and explore their perceptions of the origin and nature of their conflict and thus discover that they are pursuing similar or even compatible goals through adversary tactics. In conflict management and resolution terms, the 'win-lose' (or zero-sum) environment of traditional diplomacy/bargaining needs to be transformed into one of 'win-win,' in which the possibilities for cooperation and mutual progress are maximized (see Burton: 1986).

Formal 'third-party' mediation (*e.g.*, by the United Nations) is rarely effective because it inhibits frankness by placing a premium on concluding agreements rather than searching for options and non-binding outcomes. The UN, a perfectly logical body to provide third party mediation, finds it difficult to act outside the 'limelight,' and also suffers from constraints stemming from its permissible role in internal and regional politics. The UN tends to appoint mediators who relay proposals and counter-proposals between opposing sides, thus maintaining the bargaining framework. In contrast, an informal, non-governmental and non-structured approach allows the parties to meet in such a way that their relative power and bargaining positions are not affected and they do not become susceptible to charges of 'appeasement.'

Burton has argued that if the problems of recognition and relative status are to be avoided, the environment must be free from the influences of power relations (Azar and Burton: 1986, Chapter 7). This means, first of all, that the process must be independent of traditional diplomacy and the efforts of international organizations such as the United Nations. Second, the parties must not feel obliged to come up with agreements; that is, bargaining should not be the purpose of the meetings. The parties will be induced to participate only if it is a 'no-lose' situation. Third, it must be established that the representatives of the opposing sides are independent decision makers; otherwise a type of 'shuttle diplomacy' is established which will be destined to fail. The final, and most difficult condition, is that the outcome of the interaction be satisfactory to the representatives as well as to their constituents.

III. The Problem-Solving Forum Model

The forum model employed at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland attempts to meet these basic conditions and thus create the analytical, as opposed to the bargaining, framework which is essential to effective conflict management. As mentioned earlier, however, the optimal structure of the problem-solving exercises themselves is still a question for debate. We intend the following description to serve as a guideline only, and not as a definitive statement.

A. Preparation

Prior to the actual forums, our model requires the identification and tracking of conflicts. *Tracking* is designed to obtain information about changes in the nature and extent of hostilities involved in each conflict situation, so that facilitators can determine trends and be better prepared to speak about the conflict at hand. Tracking the conflict dynamics is essential, not only because it can provide guidelines to indicate *when* a conflict is ripe for facilitative intervention, but also because it offers information about grievances, goals, concerns and interests of the parties to the conflict. These data are useful for experts who help organize the facilitation environment.

Preparation for each forum is a major event. In addition to the important issues of physical planning and logistics, interactive dynamics and psychological elements need to be anticipated and understood. Our model takes the unique dynamics of each forum seriously—we rarely assume that we know enough about how things will turn out. We have some general ideas and we set out some general conditions, but then we permit ourselves to be flexible and innovative.

One basic condition is that the forum process must last at least four days, with our experience showing five days to be a better length of time. It usually takes one or two days for the participants to accustom themselves to the process and to respond to encouragement to move from bargaining to analysis. In addition, our experience indicates that except on rare occasions the participants warm up to each other only after the second day.

In terms of setting, the most important factor is that the participants and facilitators feel comfortable and at ease. A neutral setting, such as a university, contributes greatly to the willingness of representatives to participate and also to engage fully in the process. Also important is finding an area which is quiet and in which the participants can remain physically comfortable during the demanding sessions. It is also important to provide areas where each group of participants, as well as the facilitators, can confer in private. Tables should be set up in such a way that encourages discussion and interaction yet maintains the unity of the groups. Decisions concerning other practical and logistical details should be made by the facilitators in response to the particular situation; we do not believe that there should be a fixed prescription.

B. Discussion vs. Bargaining

The forum is not a formal bargaining environment. It is an opportunity to explore differing perceptions and co-discover ways of inducing breakthroughs in the move from conflict to mutual accommodation and peace. It is an occasion to be open and candid about the needs and grievances of one's group.

It is not the place for people to compromise so as to stop being useful in their environments. The model calls for participants to be analytical, and for the facilitators to be able to search both for areas of agreement and for differences among the participants, and to bring these findings to their attention. The forum participants are responsible for dealing with the meaning and implications of their own statements and postures.

Negotiation between parties in conflict will not achieve the results desired. There must be a deep analysis of the nature and causes of the conflict by the participants, to achieve an understanding of each other's view of the conflict, and to agree on structural and institutional innovations needed to build confidence and minimize threat and acts of violence. We have found that the comparative method is very important to the model. As the panel of facilitators compares cases and speaks about other conflicts and how those who tried to manage have failed or succeeded and why, then new and creative ideas emerge, and the participants become excited by new insights into their own dilemma and its dynamics.

The role of the facilitators is not to propose solutions, but rather to create an environment in which the participants themselves can discover, through facilitated interaction, mutually agreeable approaches to resolving their conflict. There is no guarantee that these approaches will work: the problem of convincing constituents and key decision makers, and the difficulties posed by the rapid change of events in conflict situations, will still remain to be overcome. It is guaranteed, however, that no lasting solution will be welcomed unless it is mutually agreed upon and self-sustaining, the latter condition requiring that all parties regard the agreements as compatible with their needs.

The interactive process is crucial to our approach. However, interaction by itself will not lead to a solution. Indeed, interaction within a bargaining framework often serves to exacerbate protracted social conflict situations. For the process to be successful, it must induce the participants to make the journey from bargaining over interests to frank discussion of needs, and finally to an understanding of the sources of the conflict. It is only at this point that the necessary steps for long-term structural development, aided by development diplomacy, can be initiated.

C. Participants

Who is targeted to participate in the forums? Should high-level decision makers be targeted, or should private individuals such as academics represent the parties to a dispute? The goal of the forums is to facilitate communication between the

parties in such a way that mutually agreed solutions can be discovered. Obviously, if individuals participate who have no access to key decision-makers or influential leaders, there is little chance that agreed solutions will be implemented, and thus the forum may increase frustration and cynicism. Conversely, we continue to see the inability of official negotiators to detect the underlying needs of communities (which would pave the way for solutions) during the traditional negotiating process.

Ideally, what is needed, then, is the participation of individuals who are close to the key decision-makers of a community or state and who can influence these individuals in a private and personal way, and yet are able to explore alternatives without fear of political repercussions. (It is useful to emphasize again that we are concerned with protracted conflicts, and thus the problem-solving forum which we employ may differ from other forum-oriented approaches.)

The most important factor to be considered is the link between participants and decision makers. On a practical level, it is easier to get non-decision-makers to participate: their schedule may be more accommodating to the time demands of a forum; they are able to avoid the publicity which the participation of high-level officials would create; and their participation can be publicly disavowed by officials in the event of failure (even if the participant has been designated by an official), since the process is non-official.

Fortunately, the participation of individuals who are not decision makers themselves but who are in contact with decision makers has functional as well as practical advantages; in fact, the forum process is most effective with this type of participation. It is nearly impossible to induce official representatives during discussions to move away from the traditional bargaining framework characterized by preconceived negotiating positions and explore alternative perceptions and attitudes regarding a conflict. However, these same officials may be more amenable to such alternatives if they are presented by trusted advisors and other contacts. In addition, the 'political capital' which a politician risks when engaging in discussions with an enemy is no longer an issue when he or she is not personally involved yet maintains contact with the process.

In protracted social conflict situations, it may not even be possible to locate individuals with strong decision making authority, since the conflict often is between communal or ethnic groups which have little or no institutional or bureaucratic structure. The key task in these cases is to find individuals who are influential within their communities.

In sum, the practical as well as functional benefits of targeting non-decision makers outweigh those of targeting decision makers, although it is hoped that official designates of parties to a dispute will ultimately become involved in the forum process as a means of overcoming the limitations of the traditional diplomatic process.

We would like to emphasize that it is not essential for a successful forum that the ideal type of participant described above be secured. As long as there is a link between the forum and decision makers, the process will have a chance of

being productive. Other useful participants would include respected members of a community who do not have personal contact with decision makers, such as respected scholars, journalists and intellectuals who have an influence on the decision-making process through writing or commentary. These individuals may or may not serve as advisors to government or other community officials: their influence may lie in an ability to influence public opinion. Another group of useful participants would be one comprised of young people, such as students or political party activists, who can be expected to be influential in decision making in the future. Forums which target these individuals should be primarily educational and exploratory in nature, attempting to broaden perceptions rather than uncover political solutions.

D. Facilitators

An integral component of the version of Track Two diplomacy employed at CIDCM is the use of a 'third party,' which is a panel of facilitators schooled in conflict analysis, management techniques, or human behavior. As mentioned above, the involvement of organized bodies as third parties may not be efficient. In fact, the poor record of formally established third parties in intervening effectively in disputes may have contributed to the rise of the unofficial Track Two approach. Established third parties often fail because they preserve the power-based bargaining framework when mediating between conflicting groups and because they tend to impose their own biases and preconceived notions.

When conflict is about need deprivation then the formal bargaining framework is inadequate. The individuals on the forum panels are chosen because they possess skills which are often quite distinct from those which are deemed necessary for 'traditional' conflict management. Most important is knowledge about protracted conflicts (especially the social-psychological factors involved) and cross-cultural experience and sensitivity. In addition, the prestige or status of the individuals is determined by individual knowledge and expertise and not by institutional affiliation, as is often the case with established third party mechanisms such as the United Nations. The facilitators are effective in the Track Two approach because they are seen by the participants as unbiased, independent and helpful.

In the forum environment it is a decided advantage that the third party's (*i.e.*, the facilitators') prestige will not be negatively affected by a failure to bring the parties to an agreement (or positively if agreement is reached). The facilitators are merely individuals who want to be parties to peace-building and the termination of conflict. This is quite distinct from the case of third parties headed by individuals with a high public profile. We believe that it is crucial that the participants regard the facilitators as 'honest brokers' who do not have their own agenda.

The panel of facilitators in our model is a small group of interdisciplinary colleagues who have been involved in tracking and studying conflict situations. It is helpful to have the same facilitators throughout a forum. It is also

important that the number of facilitators be less than or equal to half the participants in a forum. We have discovered this to be helpful, as have other colleagues with experience in facilitation. (We are indebted to John Mroz of the Institute for East-West Security Studies for insights into this issue.)

In our model, the facilitators interact with one another very extensively, despite the demands placed on them during each forum. Sharing ideas, exchanging views, and continuously reassessing the dynamics of the forum are necessary elements of a good facilitation model. Of course, confidentiality and objectivity must be hallmarks of the facilitators.

The success of a forum is dependent upon the level of trust and respect that the participants have for the panel of facilitators. Much care must be exercised in putting panels together and in cultivating relationships among the members of a panel. Our model emphasizes continuity and co-learning about each conflict situation and the performance of the whole project.

An important characteristic of the facilitators is that they must be able to remain fair and neutral during the process and resist getting drawn into the dispute itself. Facilitators must afford recognition to both parties and act so as to increase the level of trust between them and the participants. When the parties to a conflict see that the facilitators, whom they have come to trust, afford recognition to their opponent, they become less reluctant to directly address each other. This in itself is always a major step forward.

An ongoing debate among practitioners of Track Two diplomacy concerns the composition of the panel of facilitators. Many practitioners advocate that facilitators not be intimately knowledgeable of the particular dispute being mediated. The proponents of this approach argue that independence and objectivity can be best assured by choosing individuals who do not have extensive substantive knowledge about the participants, the history of the dispute, *etc.* (Burton: 1969; Walton: 1969; Fisher: 1972). Otherwise, they are more likely to form opinions and behave, albeit unconsciously, in a biased manner, thus negating their usefulness. Others are not convinced by this argument (Kelman and Cohen: 1979).

Our experience indicates that an ability to recognize and appreciate communal needs is enhanced by, and may in fact be dependent upon, close and even intimate experience with the conflict. All practitioners of facilitated, problem-solving forums agree that one of the roles of the facilitator is to point out to the participants possible similarities between the conflict being analyzed and other conflicts, in the belief that this will encourage objective analysis. In our view, this logically implies that the facilitator be knowledgeable about the details of the conflict. Otherwise, how are similarities to be determined? Clearly, a facilitator cannot be a party to the dispute nor be associated by the participants with one or another perspective. Each facilitator should therefore be an outsider, but one who has a clear understanding of the conflict and who can appreciate the *emotional* aspects of the situation. Passion has a role in effective mediation; the process should not be sterilized.

Thus, the possibility of resolving protracted social conflicts is enhanced by improved knowledge of the history of the dispute, of the needs and interests at stake, and an appreciation of the participants' emotional investment in the outcome.

E. Follow-Up and Communication

One of the most important requirements of our model is follow-up, 'networking' and communicating with participants and other individuals in each community. In our forums, the participants have set goals for themselves which require us to remain heavily involved with their future activities. They have decided that we need to have other meetings and that new participants should be brought into the sessions.

Follow-up has a psychological value. When participants and facilitators keep in contact and exchange studies, letters, ideas, and information relative to the management of their conflict (as well as conflict resolution in general), then trust increases and confidence between those involved improves. Maintaining continuity and stability in the facilitators is a type of assurance that these people are serious and honest about their facilitating goals and roles. Follow-up is also a way of learning to improve the model and for tracking of the conflict itself.

4. The Problem-Solving Forums: Lebanon

I. Introduction

At this writing, the war in Lebanon continues to linger. Violence in that country goes through phases, sometimes surging for internal political reasons, sometimes as a reaction to regional or international developments, and almost always as a result of some combination of both. For fourteen years, academic analysts, the international press and even the Lebanese themselves have wavered in analyzing the conflict. At times they have called it a civil war, at other times an international conflict pitting Syria, the PLO, Israel, *etc.* against Lebanon. At the height of frustration, some have referred to it as a superpower conspiracy aimed at undermining the stability of a peaceful but weak regime for the sake of political expediency. Even the supposed nature of this expediency has changed to fit the mood of the times. Thus, securing oil, the Camp David process, the wider issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and numerous other reasons have been invoked at various times by such conspiracy-theorists to explain Lebanon's torments when no other explanation was readily available. But if there is a common element across all these diverse views of Lebanon's conflict, it is its apparent intransigence, its inability to resolve itself--or indeed, the inability of mighty powers, near and far, to resolve it.

In May and October of 1984, forums on conflict resolution in Lebanon were held at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. In this chapter we will present a brief summary and analysis of the origin of the conflict in terms of protracted social conflict theory;

detail the attempts at third-party intervention and mediation; present the record of the forums and analyze their success and shortcomings; and finally, discuss the prospects for the future of Lebanese conflict resolution.

II. The Origins of the Recent Lebanese Armed Conflict¹

The Lebanese conflict, which continues to erupt into armed violence, is rooted in the linkages between the regional and international setting in which Lebanon finds itself, and in the evolution of the country's domestic socio-political structures. The self-serving interventions of its neighbors and the weak civic culture within Lebanon have repeatedly precipitated destruction, dislocation and death. External interventions have not been motivated by external forces alone--some have been encouraged by several Lebanese communities who found it necessary to recruit regional and international allies in accomplishing their communal objectives. On the other hand, regional and international conflicts, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, make their way into Lebanon and lead to destruction and destabilization, thus enhancing the opportunities for further external intervention. Lebanese national integration and stability cannot be established as long as blatant external intervention in Lebanon's socio-political affairs continues.

Why Lebanon? Why do Lebanon's neighbors feel free to intervene in Lebanese affairs, carry out their proxy wars, conduct their own military campaigns, or destabilize Lebanon without much concern for sanctions, cost, *etc.*? Why do some Lebanese groups express greater loyalties to non-Lebanese entities and precepts than they do to Lebanon? What have the Lebanese done about these social deformities in their country?

To try to answer these questions, the following elements need to be examined:

- a. Anxiety, fear and the lack of national integration in Lebanon.
- b. The National Pact of 1943 and the system of governance derived from it.
- c. Regional and international events and their impact on Lebanon.
- d. Lebanese communal images of self and others.

A. Communal Anxieties and the Dilemma of National Integration

Lebanon is composed of diverse cultural and religious communities, with only minimal social integration at the national level. Social relations between religious communities are rare and when they do occur, they tend to be ritualistic. Thus, national loyalty among some Lebanese communities is low, and national institutions have rarely succeeded in forging stable intercommunal bonds.

In Lebanon, religious identity is valued as a source of personal security and a vehicle for political ideas and action. The present war is in part an attempt to defend the country's 'confessional system' (linking representation in the national government to religious affiliation), even at the cost of national integration (Malik: 1983). Many Lebanese nationalists feel that to barter away the system of confessionalism for something less predictable would be a tragic mistake. Thus, resisting major alterations of the *status quo* has become a popular value.

The main traditional communities in Lebanon include the Maronite Christians (indigenous to the Mount Lebanon area and linked to the Roman Catholic Church); the Sunni Moslems (the largest of the Arab Moslem sects, and now also the largest of the Lebanese communities); the Shi'a Moslems (concentrated more in the farming communities of the south and the Beqa'a valley, and a minority in the region except for Iran); the Melchite Christians (a smaller community further divided into Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics); the Druze (an independent sect, also based primarily in the Mount Lebanon area following earlier persecution by Moslems); as well as several smaller groups.

The roots of distrust and fear among some Lebanese communities go back at least to the nineteenth century--fears of massacre, subjugation, or marginalization and loss of control. Obviously, the events of the recent past have not reduced the level or scope of fear and anxiety among minorities throughout the Middle East. Nor do present-day trends in attitudes towards religious or cultural minorities in several countries in the Middle East inspire much confidence in the future of intercommunal relations. Distrust and fear persist and alienate. Whether there is a realistic basis for intercommunal distrust and fear is not the issue. Memories do not simply go away and those who have been victims of discrimination do not forget as fast as the external analyst or mere observer does. What matters is that these anxieties provide inertia and engender resistance to change or capitulation. Much of the present-day hostile rhetoric throughout the Middle East can be interpreted as worry and concern for the minorities of the region.

Like many other countries undertaking the process of nation-state building, Lebanon has been unable to establish a mechanism (*i.e.*, a strong state) to provide physical and economic security for the population. The Lebanese state has failed to act as an 'honest broker' for all its communities and individual citizens, and this has created tensions between the state and the various communities. Further complicating the domestic cleavages is the use of Lebanese territory (and population) as an arena for the conduct of wars between Syria, Israel and the PLO.

Of course, there have been some peaceful attempts to reduce the level of fear and distrust among the Lebanese communities (*e.g.*, the 1943 National Pact), but they have had very limited success. Why? While the National Pact of 1943 represented a major breakthrough designed to encourage political compromise and protect religious and political identities, it also entailed some unreasonable costs and consequences. At the time it was concluded, the Pact promised an opportunity for greater national integration and independence, but as the events

of the Middle East began to unfold after World War II, these positive expectations began to fade away. As the Arab-Israeli war became protracted, Lebanese nation-building began to stagnate. As new demographic and socio-political trends developed, the Lebanese state machinery failed to deliver fair and efficient government. As the Arab-Israeli war continued to rage during the past forty years, Lebanon has had to choose either political emasculation and sterility or destabilization and violence. This ugly choice has never been more explicit than during the past fifteen years of violence, and has been dramatized by recent Syrian and other Arab states' reactions to Lebanon's agreement with Israel on May 17, 1983. The lessons of Lebanon are useful for all multicommunal and divided states surrounded by strong neighbors.

B. The Lebanese National Pact

Prior to 1922, 'Lebanon' referred only to Mount Lebanon proper, an Ottoman province covering an area about one third the size of Lebanon today. The area came under Ottoman rule in 1516. For more than three centuries, Mount Lebanon was a relatively calm area populated predominantly by Druze and Christians. The area was governed by local *emirs* who ruled according to a complex and carefully elaborated code of protocol along feudal lines.

France received the mandate over Syria and Lebanon in April 1920 after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. In August 1920, France expanded the borders of Lebanon to include former Ottoman zones such as Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, and the Beqa'a valley. This action increased the number of Sunni and Shi'a Moslems so as to necessitate a revision of the old political system. The Maronite Christians no longer held an absolute majority in the country, although the various Christian groups combined slightly outnumbered all the Moslem groups. The French action had enormous significance for Lebanon, because the country became a patchwork of minorities, no one of them strong enough to oppose the French mandatory government or dominate the rest of the Lebanese state. There was some internal and external opposition to this French action, but this was kept in check. In 1943, the French transferred sovereignty to the Lebanese who established the 1943 National Pact.²

The Pact formally addressed two thorny problems that the new state faced: *internal* distribution of power, and national character with respect to *external* relations. The National Pact institutionalized power-sharing along 'confessional' lines (*i.e.*, according to religious affiliation), based on each group's proportional size in the census of 1932, which found Christians to be a majority. In practice, power-sharing at the executive and legislative levels was operationalized as follows: The President would always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi'a Moslem. Cabinet appointments would follow confessional lines and thus accommodate the interests and concerns of the Druze, Catholics, *etc.* Representation in the

Parliament was similarly allocated along confessional lines--six Christians to every five Moslems.³

The system was designed, in large part, to alleviate Christian fears that their regional minority status would somehow impinge on their historical *national* majority status in Lebanon. In return for some advantages in internal affairs, the Christians agreed to membership in the Arab League with special reservations.⁴

The major flaw of the 1943 National Pact was that it did not consider, whether intentionally or otherwise, what should be done in the event of a change in the proportional balance in the population, or in the event that a regime or group of leaders would conspire or work outside the spirit and substance of the pact. Of the two premises upon which the Pact was based, which should take precedence? Would demographic change determine the distribution of power? Or would Christian fears about minority status in a Moslem region be decisive if demography was mooted? These questions have been so sensitive that no official census has been taken since 1932 and no doctrine has been developed to address this Christian fear.

Related to these issues is the problem of representation. Does the president represent his nation or his religious community? Does the prime minister represent the Sunni interests, or those of the whole country, including the Maronites and Druze?

And what about the members of Parliament--how do they vote when an issue hurts their community but serves the national interest? The conflict between serving as a representative of one's religious group and serving as a representative of one's national district, combined with the high priority placed on the preservation of a government by consensus, has had paralyzing effects.⁵

While these problems are not unusual in democratic societies, in Lebanon the tendency toward paralysis is compounded by *mahsubiya*--a tradition of loyalty to leading figures and families rather than to the nation.

Theoretically, power-sharing as conceived by the framers of the 1943 Pact institutionalizes channels of cooperation, places high national value on accommodation and unity, and promotes moderation rather than extremism. Because Lebanese confessionalism recognizes the religious identity of communities and guarantees multiple channels of access to the national leadership, it can be a stabilizing and integrative force. But, in practice, the political, ideological, and strategic polarization in the Middle East produced a turbulence which found its way, in one form or another, into Lebanon. Consequent events made a mockery not only of confessionalism, but also of the second half of the National Pact dealing with Lebanon's external relations.

C. The National Pact and Regional and International Events

1. 1943-1958

The provisions in the National Pact that pertained to Lebanon's foreign relations were as pivotal, if not more so, as those which specified internal arrangements. In exchange for constitutional recognition of their majority status

in the country, the Christians agreed to the preservation of a neutral stance in regional affairs. The Pan-Arabists--notably the Sunni population, which had expressed some preference for merger with Syria over the post-1920 *status quo*--acquiesced to the idea that Lebanon would have an 'Arab face' but maintain its sovereignty and independence.⁶

Lebanon's internal stability and domestic politics were greatly affected by, and closely linked to, the course of events outside its borders. That this obtained even in the early years, when Arab disarray precluded realization of dreams of unity and conservatism prevailed, did not augur well for the future when Pan-Arabism and radicalism would sweep the Arab world. Perhaps the fear of such an eventuality propelled the Lebanese delegation at the first Arab Unity Conference in 1944 to insist upon 'respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers.' This clause was subsequently incorporated into the Arab League pact under Article 8 where all signatories agreed to respect one another's 'system of government' and 'abstain from any action calculated to change these systems.' Article 9 specifically reserved the choice of initiating 'closer cooperation and stronger bonds' with the respective states themselves. Lebanon acquired a neutral identity, and the Arab world pledged to respect that neutrality.

The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought approximately 140,000 Palestinian refugees to Lebanon. As ninety-five percent of these were Moslems, their entry posed a considerable dilemma for the fledgling government.

The explosive entry of Egypt's Nasser onto the world scene in the mid-1950s renewed the energies of the Pan-Arab movement in Lebanon. Since independence, the Pan-Arab nationalists had strongly advocated the merger of all or part of Lebanon with Syria. Although they had accepted the 1943 National Pact, many still believed that total merger with Syria would eventually come to pass. Nasser's ideas and rhetoric re-ignited that spark among them. Many Lebanese began to look to Cairo for guidance and inspiration. Nasser himself encouraged this by appealing directly to the Lebanese populace.

Nasser's impact on internal Lebanese politics quickly became evident. The tendency of the Pan-Arab nationalists to gravitate towards Cairo caused grave concern among the country's Christian population. They feared that the Pan-Arabist passions of the time might lead to the dissolution of Lebanon, or its merger with Syria or with several Arab states together. They therefore turned to their traditional protectors--the West--as a counterweight to the fervor that swept through the region. Both the Pan-Arab nationalists and President Chamoun's government accused each other of deviating from the National Pact. Both groups felt that the other's excessive dependence on an external supporter required a response in kind.

The formation of the anti-communist Baghdad Pact in 1955 rigidly polarized the Arab world. To complicate matters, Nasser made his first arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1955 and set in motion a series of destabilizing actions and reactions in the region. To the conservative American administration, this represented another example of Soviet penetration that had to be confronted and

halted. Thus, the United States, for its own reasons, devised a means of strengthening its Lebanese connection, which widened the distance between the pro-United States and pro-Soviet Union camps in the region.

The increasing polarization of regional and international relations had such a strong impact on the Lebanese government that in 1956 representatives of both groups appeared to be conducting foreign policy independently of one another. The Suez War of 1956 brought the tension to a breaking point. Lebanon had split along lines which mirrored the global dichotomy.

By March 1957, when the Eisenhower Doctrine (providing for a large-scale US response to any perceived communist threat in the region) was announced, the situation had indeed become grave. Waves of unrest swept throughout the Middle East. Given the state of affairs inside Lebanon, it was not surprising that the government endorsed the Doctrine within a month of its inauguration and gave it the strongest support of any Middle East country.

In this situation, so pregnant with tension, the announcement in February 1958 that Egypt and Syria intended to merge and to establish the United Arab Republic (UAR) burst like a bombshell. It suddenly seemed that many regimes would soon topple under the weight of Pan-Arabism.

This prediction was perceived as perilously accurate when violence and civil war erupted in Lebanon in May 1958, and when the Iraqi regime was overthrown in July 1958, by what appeared to be a pro-Nasserite government. The UAR, though short-lived, actively fostered the internal Lebanese conflict and encouraged the destabilization of Chamoun's government.⁷

The fundamental principles of the National Pact had, in one way or another, been violated, as the Middle Eastern turmoil spread into Lebanon. Nasser's actions on behalf of one group prompted the other half of the population to seek external support to reassert the internal balance. But externalization of the balance (directing the support base outward) did not prove feasible, as the parties whose assistance was sought were not themselves in balance.

2. Post-1958

For about a decade, Lebanon made a feeble attempt to mitigate the consequences of the 1958 crisis. After implementing a few administrative changes which were intended to fine-tune the old system, and convinced that they had the system on course, the Lebanese turned their attention to what they knew best—finances, trade, and services, primarily in the Persian Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.

The Lebanese elites immersed themselves in economic pursuits and the needs of the Persian Gulf states to the detriment of their own social and communal affairs. Whether this situation was necessary as a psychological escape from the previous anxieties of war and instability or whether it represented a rekindling of a Lebanese self-image, namely that Lebanon is best at being the economic and commercial highway between the West and the Middle East, is not an issue to be addressed here. For a decade after 1958, though, the Lebanese set aside the contradictions inherent in their National Pact and

dismissed the significance of conflict in the Middle East. Eventually, of course, it was just this issue of regional war and peace which led to the demise of the Lebanese national authority and to large-scale destruction of lives and resources.

In the post-1958 period, business interests began to devour the Lebanese and to dominate all aspects of their individual and collective lives. Accumulation of wealth became a personal objective of the elite without much concern for its political and social consequences. The profundity of the impact of this greed for a society that had been founded on very delicate social and political imperatives is difficult to appreciate.

During and after the 1960s, national income increased substantially, while the need for national and social integration was forgotten. Lebanon's business and political elites underestimated the dynamics of socio-political change and overestimated their ability to deal with adversity. It is during this period that the Lebanese ruling class lost the long-term war to protect a collectively vibrant and politically exciting Lebanon in favor of winning the short-term battle of economic selfishness and personal greed. While the Lebanese public and private leadership expanded and accumulated its wealth, certain communities and regions remained neglected.

As this was occurring in the late 1960s, the country was again being taken over by outsiders and the 1943 National Pact heavily undermined. As the violence increased and the psychological quality of life diminished, the Lebanese who were obsessed with financial success discovered that they would not enjoy the fruits of their efforts. From 1967 to the present, the Lebanese have been on the run.

The condition of present-day Lebanon cannot be understood without a serious analysis of the decadence that beset the ruling class in the post-1958 period. The intervention of regional and international groups and powers easily destabilized Lebanon because the state was left weak by an unconcerned and materially-preoccupied society.

The June 1967 Arab-Israeli war shattered the political and strategic calculations made by all the states in the Middle East, including Lebanon. In 1968-69, Lebanon found itself extremely vulnerable. Its territory had become a staging ground for the new phases of Palestinian-Israeli and inter-Arab conflicts. In 1969, a weak and insecure Lebanon had perhaps no choice but to accept the Cairo Accords, which gave the PLO the right to use southern Lebanon for its military operations against Israel. While other Arab League states have been reluctant to grant the PLO the right to use their territory to stage war against Israel, the entire Arab League, with the utmost disregard for Lebanon's freedom and integrity, encouraged President Helou's government to sign these accords and turn southern Lebanon into 'Fatahland.'

The defeat of the PLO in Jordan in 1970 added to Lebanon's problems, and paved the way for more violence. Tens of thousands of Palestinian fighters and their families were driven into Lebanon where they began to wage war against Israel. Israeli retaliation against the guerrillas hurt the people of Lebanon as well, making many of them refugees in their own country. Some turned to

makeshift shelters in and around Beirut and the Beqa'a. Soon after 1971, physical and economic insecurity increased and this affected all other sectors of Lebanese life. Thus, between 1968 and 1973, the victimization and destabilization of Lebanon began to assume ominous proportions and repositioned Lebanon on the course of protracted violence.⁸

In the early 1970s the Lebanese Maronites, the Christian community at large, and several Shi'ite leaders began to publicly question the conditions that had befallen their country. Some political leaders saw that Lebanon had unwittingly become the arena for armed struggle and for international terror. The country had become a source of insecurity for its neighbors. By 1975, the cleavages and contradictions of the region as a whole became centered in Lebanon.

The PLO-Lebanese wars and Syrian-Lebanese crises from 1976 to the present have been costly in human and material terms for all concerned. These wars and their component crises divided the Lebanese population a dozen different ways and precipitated further internal strife among the Lebanese religious and political communities. Lebanese instability encouraged Israeli retaliation and occupation in 1982, and led to a very active and controversial involvement of the United States and some European states in Lebanon in 1982.⁹ Emasculated by the National Pact of 1943, Lebanon invited external disrespect for its sovereignty and, ultimately, direct intervention in its internal affairs. Having accepted the role assigned to it by the Arab League community, Lebanon paid little attention to its security needs and finally witnessed its own destruction as a national entity.

D. The Lebanon Communities' Images of Self and Others¹⁰

Since independence, the Lebanon communities' images of themselves and of their country's significance in regional and world affairs has helped distort their sense of reality. Assumptions about the nature of Lebanon's 'geographic and cultural' utility to both East and West; its economic, communications and commercial indispensability for the region; and its sense of 'cosmopolitanism,' have been sources for self-deception and protracted trouble. These assumptions have not only been proven false in the light of recent events but they have generated situations which make a future Lebanon more difficult to reconstitute on reliable ground. To illustrate this point, we shall dwell on Christian and Moslem myths about their 'national extensions' in the world.

1. Lebanese Christian Assumptions

Historically, the Christians of Lebanon (and to some extent their counterparts elsewhere in the Middle East) have made some large assumptions regarding the centrality of their role in the region. They have seen themselves as the custodians of Western values and world view, and thought of themselves as the natural highway for Western ideas and interests to the East. They have

convinced themselves that in time of need the West would come to their aid since they were its extension. They have assumed that they share a strong bond with the West based on religious affinity. The West, however, has not responded accordingly during times of Lebanese strife.

This view assumes that the Christians of America and Europe are motivated by Christianity and its symbolism. It assumes that international alliances and politics are a function of broadly shared values and tendencies which motivate Western man to act. Whereas this romantic view may have had adherents in days past, one would be hard pressed to find much support for it in modern times.

The West is increasingly becoming secular, parochial and nationalistic. It is more preoccupied with its immediate needs and concerns than with the Christians of Lebanon or of the East (Malik: 1983). Truly catastrophic events (e.g., earthquakes, starvation, large-scale massacres) may elicit voluntary individual and perhaps governmental support for the victims, but this is irrespective of color, race or religious affiliation. The West does not see the Christians of Lebanon or the East as victims (although some do perceive them as minorities faced with social and political difficulties). In terms of Western strategic interests, the Christians are not a good tool. To the contrary, they are seen as somewhat of a burden. The old style alliances (*a la* the concert of Europe in the 19th century) which dominated the colonial and pre-colonial days are gone. The West and its Christians will act to protect their regional and geopolitical interests (often materialistic) regardless of the religious, cultural or ideological nature of the other parties involved.

Furthermore, this generalization applies equally well to American Catholics and the Protestant Right. Because Christians of all sects in the US are Americans first and have been socialized to look at world problems and linkages in much the same way as other segments of the population, the Lebanese cannot expect from them a radically different political performance.

More importantly, with respect to the Lebanese Catholics and Maronites, members of the US Catholic clergy who are involved in international issues tend to be politically left of center among the Catholic laity and Church hierarchy. They define and explain the world in terms of 'topdog-underdog' and view the Christians of Lebanon as topdogs, and thus not deserving of support. Whether or not this is a correct reflection of the balance of communal strength today matters very little. The 'internationalists' among the Catholic clergy see the Lebanese Christians as wanting to control and maintain hegemony rather than as a community trying to survive and protect its cultural identity. Thus, the sympathy of some individual clerics for the Lebanese Christian dilemma should not be understood as an indicator of likely active support from the larger Catholic community, or even the Church hierarchy.

Whether the Christian community in Lebanon and the Middle East is justified in considering itself a vital link for the West to the Moslem East is not the question at this point. Nor is the issue whether the sources of these assumptions lie in the history of colonialism, the fear of being absorbed by a predominantly Moslem Arab world, the past performance of European

Christianity, or something else. These questions deserve more careful research. What matters, however, is that these views and assumptions are not sustained in mainstream Western thinking, and thus may serve only to feed the conflict in Lebanon. No steady Western support on the basis of the Christian bond is likely.

2. *Lebanese Moslem Assumptions*

Lebanese Moslems have assumed that the natural environment of Lebanon is the Arab Moslem world. They argued it is their responsibility to be true to their larger 'nation' and faith, in both peace and war. Lebanese Moslems have thought that they have a special responsibility to be the representatives of Arabdom and Islam. They should be modern and able to deal with the West without giving an inch on their national origin, religious piety and dignity. Moslem Lebanese could be the point of transmission, linking the West and the rest of the Moslem world. On the whole they have felt somewhat paternalistic towards other Arabs, whom they considered less educated and sophisticated than themselves. They have seen themselves as the agents of modernization of the larger Arab 'nation.' They have argued that the Arab world needs them and that they have to live up to its expectations.

Moslem Lebanese have thought it their duty to be a dynamic and true part of the Arab nation and share in its fateful decisions. It is their responsibility to be vigilant and aware of the ills befalling the Arab world. They further feel it necessary to live up to the expectations of other Moslem Arabs regarding their Arab national authenticity. Thus bargaining and negotiating with their Lebanese Christian counterparts has to be done within the framework of protecting the Arab nation's will and interests. Lebanese Moslems assume that by their being aware and protective of the needs and interests of the Arab nation, that nation would automatically be responsive to their needs. Again, their assumptions have gotten them into trouble.

The Arab world of post-World War II has been preoccupied with two problems--conflict and underdevelopment. Arab ideologists have emphasized that unity of all Arab states and a centralized economic development strategy (often called 'socialist') will help them achieve peace, stability and prosperity. In this domain Egypt was the dominant leader. Under Nasser, Arab unity in Lebanon was focused on fighting Israel and under Sadat it was on making peace with Israel. The Lebanese masses, especially the Moslem population, endorsed Egypt's Nasser (publicly and enthusiastically) as well as Egypt's Sadat (albeit timidly and privately). In both cases, the dream of Arab unity failed to materialize and the opportunity to develop the Arab nation and achieve prosperity weakened.

Today, the Arab world is in the midst of protracted conflict not only with all the non-Arab states of the Middle East but also with one another. Because of this, the Lebanese Moslems find themselves on weak ground. When war broke out in Lebanon in 1982, the Arab states appeared to have not heard the news. When Iran occupied part of Iraq, very few Arabs bothered to respond. When the

United States bombed Libya, verbal protest was heard but nothing else. Arab unity has disappeared and under these circumstances, Lebanese Moslems can expect little real support from other Arab states for their assumed role as the bulwark of the Arab nation.

With regard to the possibility of the Lebanese Moslems being a means of transmission to the rest of the Arab world of modern education, communication, commerce and the like, the situation has changed. The Arab world, especially the Gulf states, now has its own institutions, banks, communication systems and networks for linking with the West without the help of the Lebanese. It is building its own cadre of engineers, doctors and professionals. In recent years, its needs for Lebanese and other Arab experts have declined substantially.

The Lebanese Moslems cannot perform the function they once assumed for themselves. Thus, the sooner they and their Christian countrymen discover one another, the better for both of them. Both sides wait to be rescued by external heroes. However, neither the Christian West nor the Moslem East is making much headway in solving the Lebanese dilemma.

It was within this perspective that the Maryland Forums on Lebanon were conceived. In the following section we discuss the record of the meetings, paying particular attention to the progress that was made in discovering and strengthening similarities in perceptions and goals between the various participants.

III. The Maryland Forums¹¹

Two forums on conflict resolution in Lebanon were held in May and October, 1984, under the auspices of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland at College Park. These forums were attended by scholars, political advisors and consultants who were invited (as nominees of the community leaders) to represent the views of the leadership of the Lebanese religious and political communities. Each meeting lasted four days and featured intensive discussions of the values, needs, issues, and expectations of the various communities and the whole nation.

The forums were analytical encounters between individuals who had been deeply involved, in their different ways, in the internal and regional struggles of Lebanon. During the first meeting, we focused on whether a united Lebanon was desired as the homeland for the conflicting Lebanese communities. The second meeting focused on what kind of Lebanon was desired. In each case, the participants tried to articulate the positions of the communities to which they belonged and those of the leadership that had nominated them to come to the forums. At times during these discussions, the participants did not personally hold the views they presented, but in most instances, the personal views of the participants matched those of the leadership of their communities.

These meetings were intensive efforts to determine the otherwise hidden data of motives, values and intentions. They were carried out without fanfare. The four days of each forum were fully utilized--from nine in the morning until five

or six in the evening, participants and facilitators were engaged in serious, difficult, and frank discussions about a variety of issues as shown below.

In the two forums, the Lebanese participants numbered seven and eight. The participants were all male professionals, from the Maronite, Druze and Moslem communities. The panels of experts that facilitated each session numbered four and five, and were made up of scholars and practitioners who were specialists in conflict analysis at different levels of social organization. Most were also experienced in facilitated conflict resolution.

These meetings were based on some guidelines regarding theory and process that John Burton (1984) has spelled out as follows:

1. Discussions must be informal to avoid committing the authorities in any way, and for this reason should be between persons nominated by leaders, but not representing them.
2. Discussions should be analytical; that is, structured so as to reveal the hidden motives and intentions of the parties and whether assumed motivations and intentions are real.
3. The goal of the exercise is to provide an opportunity to explore possible outcomes in the light of the goals and values revealed, again without any commitments.
4. In order to help participants discover options that are particularly suited to their situation, a panel of individuals drawn from several disciplines should serve as a third party in the discussions.
5. It is essential that no party be required to compromise or submit to influence or power in any way that would prejudice its basic needs. To this end, bargaining and negotiation must be avoided.

Burton has found that this process is welcomed by parties to disputes and, furthermore, leads to exciting and unanticipated discoveries about the motivations and intentions of the parties. The process has revealed that conflicts that the parties believe to be unique have many features in common with others; that is, that basic needs for security, identity and control emerge as fundamental in all conflicts. This proved to be the case in the Lebanon forums.

What, then, was revealed at these two intensive forums on conflict resolution in Lebanon?

A. The Forum Dynamics

In the first meeting it emerged that the participants had not been able to communicate with each other across the Green Line in Beirut (separating the Christian and Moslem communities). While most of them were professors who write a great deal about their community and nation, they had not had direct, face-to-face meetings to discuss their ideas, differences and points of view. They had not exchanged their writings, articles and books with one another. During the first meeting, as we, the panel, passed out handouts regarding the forum, we

observed individual participants on both sides of the table exchanging notes and papers with one another. Words of thanks for this gesture were also exchanged as persons on both sides had finally obtained each others' writings to examine and read.

In the second meeting, where there was 20 percent participant overlap, and where there had been some communication prior to coming to the US, the two sides were less surprised by the presence, ideas, writings, *etc.* of one another. During this meeting, however, they exchanged books, pamphlets and articles revealing that they had not been communicating their ideas and points of view in any systematic manner.

At both meetings, the first day, and especially the first session, was spent by each participant setting out the conditions under which he came to these meetings. Moslem participants spent more time spelling out their reasons and conditions for participating in these forums. Christian and Moslem participants wanted to make it clear that, while they came from certain communities and had been nominated by leaders of these communities, they had their own views and wanted that clearly understood at all times. Needless to say, the participants were very sensitive on the point of their personal views *vs.* that of the leaders who dispatched them to these forums. They also wanted affirmed where they agreed with their communal leaders and the general public in their communities.

The second and third days of each forum were more difficult. High levels of tension filled the air, emotions were clearly revealed, and deadlocks were encountered at different times. In these latter instances, facilitation and constructive intervention were deemed appropriate and necessary.

Participants were neither asked nor expected to engage in a simulation. None was asked to give up his view or alter it so as to satisfy the other side or members of the panel. Participants were simply encouraged to see the values of the other side as authentic and real.

The last day of each of the forums was characterized by nervousness and worry. The participants appeared to want to go back home with concrete ideas and accomplishments. They wanted their differences asserted and their performance commended. Many of them, especially during the last session of the forum, tended to express some cynicism about the *real* intentions of one another. Almost all of them expressed concern about how to agree and on what points, how to disagree and on what points, and what to take back home and defend effectively.

The re-entry problem is not an easy one. There were many concerns about it and we shared them. However, the level of confidence and trust that was nourished by the panel of facilitators and participants was important in enabling the participants to cope with the problem.

Almost all the participants, however, expressed the desire to maintain linkages and to create an informal network back home. Many of them made positive statements regarding one another, in private and public settings. Most became hopeful that there exist others on each side who would be good partners in a full national reconciliation effort. Every one of the participants appeared to

be eager to become a party to any reconciliation effort in Lebanon. Several of them expressed many regrets about not having had meetings of this kind before the war started or during its early days.

B. The Role of the Panel of Facilitators

The panel's role was well defined and significant. It remained neutral and facilitative throughout. The main task of the facilitators was that of questioning and making observations that had a general application. In conflict resolution forums of this type, it is the parties that are the experts on their situation and it is they that determine relevance. Thus facilitation in these circumstances is no more than a device whereby the parties involved can discover for themselves hidden motivations and intentions on both sides. They need the assistance, however, of facilitators who know the kinds of questions to ask to ensure that the parties reveal the true nature of their relationships.

Early encounters in these Track Two conflict resolution forums must not become bargaining and negotiating situations. In the Lebanese case thus far, the panel thought it necessary to focus the discussion on the 'needs conflicts' and to sort out the hidden data and not allow the group to get diverted into bargaining. Eventually, however, the participants (or their community leaders) will have to dwell on 'interest conflicts' where a good deal of bargaining and negotiation will be appropriate.

When problems arose, the panel of facilitators introduced empirical data about other cases in which the similarities or differences were instructive for the participants. These interventions in terms of experience and findings were very important. At times, a deadlock was ended by the portrayal of the experience of other societies with identity-driven protracted conflicts such as Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Spain, India, Sri Lanka, *etc.* When solutions were proposed and found problematic, the panel introduced data from other cases where similar solutions were proposed or adopted. In these situations fresh ideas began to emerge and in some cases creative approaches to the problem began to appear on each side. The panel's low-profile role and the use of comparative data and theory were most significant in this process.

Both of these forums were held in private, under an academic umbrella. No publicity or showmanship was permitted, for confidentiality was deemed essential. When participants became convinced that public knowledge was not only acceptable but necessary, the panel concurred. At the end of the second forum it was agreed that the substantive and theoretical ideas presented in these sessions should be publicized.

C. The Results of the First Forum

Our first forum in May, 1984 focused on the fears and goals of the different communities and the means by which there could be cooperation in the

reconstruction of a new Lebanon without the sacrifice of the values and the security of any community. Valuable conclusions were reached. The most significant agreement was that, without qualification, all valued and identified with the State of Lebanon: its independence and development was given the highest priority, subject only to the preservation of the security and values of all.

The following are the shared needs and values and the conflicting interests between the parties.

1. Shared Needs and Values: (Not specifically agreed but inherent in the statements made.)

a) Security

Personal and physical security;
Preservation of communities as identities;
Security of each community from fear of external (or internal) threat;
Durability of any agreed outcome.

b) Identity

Personal identity based on confessional community;
Identity based on Lebanon's special role as a crossroads between East and West;
Identity with Arabs as a people.

c) Equality

Equality of political participation;
Economic equality of opportunity and distributive justice;
Equality in economic development between regions.

d) Participation and Control

Values and needs of people should determine structures;
Leadership should lead in response to demands on them;
No community should be marginalized and none should have total control;
Well-being is not possible unless provided for all.

e) Freedoms

Freedom of speech, religious belief, and physical movement.

2. Conflicting Interests

Political power allocation and built-in security provisions;
Economic privilege;
Leadership roles;
Property rights;
Displaced persons (internal refugee) rights;
War-time interests and roles.

Having established the common values, it was easily agreed that Lebanon should be independent, removed from regional conflicts, while maintaining and developing its commercial, cultural and other links with the outside world.

While it was agreed that religious affiliations are an important feature of Lebanese society and that such affiliations determine political behavior in that country, it was also recognized that there is a national culture with its own special features. Lebanon, by reason of its multi-religious structure and the historical interactions between different communities, has developed a culture and a set of values that enable it to identify with both Christian and Islamic civilizations, while not being identical to either. For this reason, Lebanon can be a member of the Arab League and influence its policies, and at the same time be in a position to interpret Arab politics and concerns to the West.

Frequently, the discussions revealed a concern about relations with Syria, Israel and the United States. It appeared that Christians were unhappy about their past relations with Israel, and Moslems were disappointed with the Lebanese Government's apparent need to rely so much on Syria. The actions of both sides were described as incompatible with the agreed and shared desire for an independent and culturally unique Lebanon.

The discovery of a common value attached to Lebanese nationalism, and a common willingness to preserve the values of the different communities, led to the observation that past political compromises and institutions were not appropriate for the satisfaction of emerging communal needs and grievances. Different opinions were expressed as to what structural changes should be introduced in Lebanon. It was, however, agreed that whatever decentralization or public administration changes were introduced, these should address the grievances of the various communities and reflect the goals and values of the whole Lebanese society. It was thought possible and useful that the local administration in Lebanon be expanded and given greater say in the local affairs of people.

It was agreed that this process of discussion facilitated by a panel of scholars was an appropriate one in the circumstances, for it enabled the participants to interact under controls that ensured that the discussions were exploratory, that they focused on the fundamental needs and values of the people of Lebanon, that experience drawn from other situations was available and that important issues would not be hidden or avoided. It was agreed that further meetings of this kind should take place with the least possible delay.

D. The Results of the Second Forum

Our second forum in October, 1984, focused on what kind of Lebanon the Lebanese want. This question was not fully addressed although some major steps were taken in this direction. The forum concluded with a declaration by the participants outlining some interim steps and some long term concerns.

1. In the hierarchy of political values, the highest is the preservation and development of the State of Lebanon.
2. By a Lebanon State is meant a united, Arab, independent State which is a meeting ground for Christianity and Islam.
3. The State of Lebanon should develop into a non-communal political system.
4. No community can accept political structures as solutions when they are based on force.
5. In the preservation and development of the State of Lebanon as defined, unless the basic needs of security, freedom of movement, identity and distributive justice in all aspects of life are satisfied, there will be continued strife.
6. In the transition from war to stability, it is necessary not merely to control violence, but to take positive steps to reestablish citizen relationships within and among identity groups.
7. It is only the unity of the Lebanese and Lebanon, embodied in a national consensus, that finally is a defence against external pressures and interventions.
8. It is acknowledged that the need for security may lead to tactics that tend to destroy the independence of Lebanon. The above definition of the united and independent Lebanon implies an obligation on all who support it to refrain from seeking external alliances in their quest for security through power.
9. It is the role of the Government of Lebanon and its armed forces to provide physical security to all persons and all religious communities within Lebanon.
10. The armed forces of the Government of Lebanon should be under the command of government authorities, and should be reformed, retrained, and re-equipped for their policing role; and should cooperate with local forces and police until such a time as local forces become redundant.
11. The integrity, unity and preservation of Lebanon finally rest on social justice and equality of citizens before the law, regardless of religion, race, color, sex or social status.
12. Justice requires (a) that all kidnapped persons be unconditionally freed; and (b) that all Lebanese displaced citizens have the opportunity to return to their previous abodes as soon as security permits.
13. Pending an effective transition from war to peace, a third party, agreeable to all, may be required to mediate power rivalries and to reduce the incidence of violence.
14. Extremist elements, that is, elements that do not share the above definition of a united Lebanon and which work for foreign movements and governments, must be contained.
15. Transition steps are not complete in the absence of a clear vision of future political, social and economic reforms which are to be ratified by a freely elected representative body.

16. Immediate decisions are required as to the duties and powers of the national legislative, executive, judicial and local authorities, for whom appropriate institutional structures should be developed.
17. The transition from war to stability and peace requires the recognition of the authority of the existing political coalition of leaders and their mutual cooperation.
18. Alterations in the distribution of authority within the political system are required to give a real and a perceived equality of influence to the two main groups.
19. Decisions by the legitimate government should be implemented faithfully and immediately.
20. Stability and peace in Lebanon will contribute to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
21. Social stability and peace require a major program for social, economic, psychological and moral rehabilitation of groups and individuals that have been affected by war, and their reintegration into Lebanese society.
22. Lebanon's economic base is facing decline. The political and social goals stated herein have no possibility of success without a speedy solution to the impending economic crisis in the country. The following measures are thus critical: (a) the restoration of the authority of the State in the economy; and (b) the urgent and vigorous implementation of plans for reconstruction, investment and development.

E. Comparing Some Aspects of the Two Forums

One of the most significant features of both meetings was the preoccupation of both sides with history and its interpretation, and the different perspectives within which each side thinks about the meaning of events and processes, and about individual and group roles and decisions in intercommunal, national Lebanese, and regional history.

Another, related, preoccupation was with local vs. regional nationalism. These nationalisms are not new to any Lebanese, and have been especially strong in the past decade; nor should they be surprising to students of protracted social conflict. The history of nationalism reflects the intra-societal and cultural struggles we refer to as identity driven conflicts.

All participants at both meetings asserted time and again their loyalty to Lebanon as a final homeland and affirmed Lebanese nationalism as desirable without being prejudicial to other allegiances. This preoccupation was a reflection of underlying distrusts. Whereas the issue of national allegiance looked simple on the surface, it was clear that there were many other hidden problems. Every time the participants could not agree, whether on a trivial or significant issue, they would resort to doubting each other's nationalism. The Moslems would argue that reference to Lebanese nationalism camouflaged Christian hegemony, and the Christians would argue that Moslem acceptance of Lebanese nationalism hid the Moslems' true intentions and their strategy of buying time

in order to take over the state and its institutions, and to reduce Christians to second-class status. Discussions about history and nationalism easily turned into discussions about the fears and distrust of each side.

The lack of concern with the past or future roles of Syria, Israel and the US was an interesting feature of the second forum. In the first forum in May, 1984, Syria, Israel and the US were brought into the discussion at all times. Very often, these three states were blamed for almost everything that went wrong in Lebanon.

During the second forum, domestic determinants of the conflict were discussed at length and the regional and international variables were virtually ignored, thus reflecting a transformation in the balance of forces in Lebanon and the region. This emphasis in October 1984 was unexpected. After so many years of Lebanese dependence on external forces, we thought it would be difficult for most Lebanese to face the reality of their own actions and dependent behavior. They did talk about the need for external support to assist the Lebanese authorities to establish the modalities for communal security, personal safety and the rule of law. Some participants were more specific in naming the UN and Syria as capable of providing security support for the immediate future.

The reference to external parties to the Lebanese conflict was full of contradictions, remorse and anger. Each side tended to accuse the external supporters of the other as being motivated by malice. The participants were critical of themselves for having sought external support in their internal struggles. They appeared to be cognizant of the helplessness which had beset them as a result of the decade of war and the decades of dependence on external forces and alliances aimed at tipping the domestic scales. While they all wanted external parties to lend a helping hand to stabilize the country, most of them saw external parties more as sources of strife and violence than as agents of reconciliation and co-existence.

Participants appeared to have come to grips with the notion that 'winning' in the Lebanese context is a more complicated process than in other conflict situations. Thus, at times the tone of the group seemed to be one of self discovery. They talked of their responsibilities for promoting peace and prosperity in Lebanon without waiting for external parties to participate or take charge. Their discussions revealed a deepening understanding of the dilemmas of hegemony, control, utilization of power, zero-sum games, and the like.

It is important to note that the participants tried hard to push their points of view with great deftness, frankness and politeness. At times they avoided sensitive issues which some members of the panel thought they should tackle. They appeared to prefer to succeed in accomplishing as much as possible and to avoid failure. The concern about succeeding and doing well as representatives of their communities and leaders, and not presenting difficulties, was interesting. That is not to say that all sensitive issues were avoided. On the contrary, some of the most agonizing and difficult issues concerning loyalty to the community, trustworthiness, and authenticity of identity were brought up with great

frankness. Issues avoided were the present links to external parties and the role of each community in the movement to peace.

F. Synthesis and Analysis

The definition of Lebanon's identity and the discussion of what type of society the country should develop were highlights in these meetings. The participants struggled with these issues for some time. When an acceptable solution was suggested, each side appeared surprised at the reaction of the other. The Moslems could not see why the Christians were so concerned about the issues the Moslems had raised during the discussion, and felt that the Christian position was exaggerated, since they had always been in a leading role in Lebanon. On the other hand, the Christians felt that the Moslems were still being obstinate and unwilling to accept Lebanon's legally recognized borders as permanent, and that Lebanon must not be annexed by any other state. The Moslems had been so used to playing second fiddle that they could not believe the Christians were feeling insecure about the economic, demographic and political shifts in Lebanon and the region. On the positive side, the Moslems were pleasantly surprised that the Christians had accepted the definition of Lebanon as an independent, unified Arab country and a meeting place between Christianity and Islam.

One topic that clearly brought them all together was that of the rise of fundamentalism. On this, their fears and that of the state were well articulated. Both sides argued that the problem of extremism needed to be attacked, but how to deal with it became a controversial issue. Immediately, the problem of checking fundamentalism was linked to the nature of the state. Both sides spoke about the threat of fundamentalism to each community. Both sides seemed to argue that fundamentalism--and the terrorism that is sometimes associated with it--are a function of denial of needs and rights, and of fears of the future. Both sides argued that the lack of national integration and the weakness of the army permit terrorism.

However, the Christians were more adamant about the inability of the Moslem leaders in Lebanon and other external states to check terrorism in the short run. They agreed, however, that in the long run the solutions have to derive from an integrated and united Lebanon with a strong army and police force.

The Moslems argued that fundamentalism threatens them just as much as the Christians. They argued that they are the direct victims of terrorism. They stated they could not terminate terrorism because of all the external links and powers and because of the present skewed and inadequate political system in Lebanon. Reforms now and the removal of injustices in the long run would deal a blow to terrorism and finally to fundamentalism.

While all agreed that the fears of both sides concerning terrorism and fundamentalism were genuine, there were doubts about who benefits from these trends in the short and medium term and therefore who is really behind them. Both sides thought that the issue in the long run will be serious for all. Of

course, the fact that the participants represented the ruling elites in Lebanon may be part of the reason for these attitudes.

The question of fundamentalism, however, was discussed in a way which revealed a contradiction in Lebanon's ability to deal with its political reform issues. Fundamentalism can probably best be tamed by, and through, increased communal security. However, the participants' preoccupation was with nationalism and national solutions to many Lebanese issues, and these will most probably not be effective in coping with fundamentalism. The nationalism that the Lebanese participants promoted to solve the historical quarrels will most probably end up promoting terror and counter-terror as well. This situation is paradoxical. If fear of extremism drives Lebanese together, then the conflict of the army vs. extremists might get worse, because if you are a Lebanese extremist the last thing you want is an *integrated Lebanon*. Yet the moderates are seeking nationalism, integration and political reform in the name of checking extremism. Thus some of the instruments being promoted to combat terrorism may backfire.

We believe that the following are primary issues that must be fully addressed and ultimately resolved in the Lebanese quest for peace:

1. Definition of national identity and its reflection in the constitutional structure;
2. Security and the means for harmonizing communal militias and the national army;
3. Power structure and the demarcation between central and local authorities;
4. Healing the scars of war and promoting positive participation by the young population; and,
5. Promoting economic reconstruction and development.

We also believe that immediate steps toward conflict resolution in Lebanon can be enhanced in the following ways:

1. Through mapping the future so that there are clear goals;
2. Through comparative knowledge of other conflicts, as a source of ideas on how to overcome obstacles and potential deadlocks;
3. Through focusing on domestic issues for the immediate future (although these ultimately cannot be separated from the regional sources of conflict); and,
4. Through conceptualizing two periods in the transition from war to peace: *transitional* and *long-term*. The long-term period focuses on general principles about structures and institutions. All communities must be engaged in this long-term process. The transition period is a short-term one which must focus on designing and defining intercommunal confidence-building measures. Fundamental reforms take a long time to be formulated and implemented. They require a semblance of law and order before they can become a reality. In the meantime, Lebanon needs a period of transition towards stability and reform. This transitional period can be most effective if it is used to develop intercommunal confidence through meetings, networking, planning, arguing,

and agreeing upon solutions to the problems of physical safety and stability of the economy.

IV. Prospects for the Future

The events of the Maryland Forums have convinced us that there is not, and will never be, an ideal time for the resolution of the Lebanon conflict. Rather, what is necessary is that a process of peace-building and reconstruction be devised and set in motion, regardless of timing. There will be no ideal time to start this process because 'ideal time' is subjectively defined according to goals; so at least broad agreement on goals must be achieved first. Protracted social conflict presents complex obstacles which can only be eliminated by actively establishing the conditions for frank and effective discussion among the various parties concerning the sources and dynamics driving the conflict. We believe that the Maryland Forums have contributed to this process.

It is not patently ironic or absurd to speak of conflict resolution and consensus-building in Lebanon, despite the ample pessimism prevalent there and the continuing horror stories of intercommunal violence. The people of Lebanon, like people in dozens of other countries, are experiencing protracted social conflict, which is the process of attempting to correct perceived injustices and remove fear of social marginalization. There is inevitably a defensive reaction by those who have been in relatively secure positions. Violence in Lebanon has continued at a high level and so it is understandable that Lebanese have felt depressed and defeated. However, when one compares the current situation in Lebanon with other cases around the world, one discovers that the Lebanese situation is not as hopeless as it seems. Indeed, because it is a struggle to 'correct,' it is positively motivated and therefore more likely to succeed. The problem is how to foster and direct non-violent means of change.

The forums were useful in a number of ways. The most important results were the advancement of certain ideas concerning management of protracted conflict, including the role of third parties, and the establishment of opportunities for personal interaction among Lebanese representing the various groups. At the two intensive sessions in 1984, the Lebanese representatives of the major confessional communities emphasized *unanimously* a primary commitment to an independent Lebanon, with the political structure as secondary. All the participants emphasized the need to co-exist as communities, and to work together in some framework yet to be designed to reconstruct and develop the country.

This unique process of exploration begun in 1984 initiated an important step in the vastly difficult task of rebuilding Lebanon's future. The search for appropriate strategies for consensus-building and the rehabilitation and development of the country, even while fighting continues, must proceed in anticipation of normal political life in the near future.

The competing communities are faced with a very difficult agenda. On the domestic level there are three main areas to address: institutional development,

physical reconstruction, and normalization of intercommunal relations. Operationally, these give rise to many specific issues. Thus, it is essential to first agree on the general analytical principles for reforming and rebuilding Lebanon. Agreement at this level will be less difficult than the practical one at which specific interests are involved. However, the framework we have evolved can establish the environment in which the necessary creativity and good will can be expressed.

The post-civil war period will require the mobilization of vast resources within and outside the country. It is not too early for a team of forward-looking scholars to begin a thorough job of assessing the important socio-economic problems and analyzing ways of dealing with them. Such problems include the management of intercommunal trade and the treatment of children (and adults) traumatized by years of violence.

We will continue to bring together analysts and professionals delegated by leaders of the confessional groups to discuss these problems and begin the detail-oriented work. It is essential to pursue these forums within an academic framework, and with courage and analytical clarity. By preserving the momentum initiated in 1984, we hope to anticipate and perhaps deflect potential disagreements among the communities which would create further sources of distrust and conflict.

In both the initiation and the management of their conflict, the Lebanese have tended to rely very heavily on the outside world. After years of war, the Lebanese have begun to show signs of exhaustion and a sense of loss. In response, they have internalized the notion that they cannot solve their own problems by themselves and that they need others to help them. Outside intervention, however, has created more problems than it has solved. The outside world comes to Lebanon with its own values, priorities and interests and this only makes the conflict more difficult to manage.

Thus, the Lebanese will have to rely upon themselves. They can only resolve their problems through mutual accommodation and not through force. Of course, this is easier said than done. Lebanon will not be able to work out a lasting solution to its problems either under occupation or while it is manipulated by its neighbors and other external powers and groups. However, this external influence will diminish in proportion to the increased dedication of the various Lebanese groups to finding a consensus about ending the violence.

The citizens of Lebanon need to devise a structure which protects the physical security and the political and economic needs of the different communities. This, in our opinion, can be achieved best through a process of facilitated conflict management. As we discussed earlier in this volume, 'solutions' arrived at through violence or other coercive action only perpetuate protracted social conflict.

After decades of violence, Lebanon has become politically and economically deformed. To rebuild the country will require that much of the existing norms and patterns of behavior that have been established during the periods of violence be replaced with others which would contribute to nation-building. It is no

longer simply a question of reform of institutions, but reform of *attitudes* and *behavior* as well. The first steps in effective conflict management must therefore involve redressing the negative psychological effects of protracted social conflict in order to provide a basis for long-term peace-building.

Notes

(For full bibliographic information on citations, please see bibliography at end of book.)

1. This section is a summary of a larger historical analysis found in Chapter 2, 'Lebanon and Its Political Culture: Conflict and Integration in Lebanon,' by Edward E. Azar in Azar, *et al.*, 1984.
2. The transfer of sovereignty was neither voluntary nor very peaceful. The German occupation of France during World War II and continued British pressure ultimately left the French little choice but to transfer sovereignty of the country to its own people in 1943. For two years however, France continued to retain mandatory advantages and preferential status despite opposition from the Lebanese nationalists and Western powers. The French were forced to relinquish their mandatory administration in May, 1945 after conflict broke out and Britain and the United States demanded French departure from Lebanon.

J.C. Hurewitz (1963: p.498) says: 'Without British firmness in handling the Free French, the Lebanese Government and Chamber in November 1943 would not have succeeded so soon in unilaterally expunging from the constitution those articles that reserved to the mandator transcendent powers. Free French clumsiness in attempting first to use the offer of elections and then to hold on to residual mandatory controls as bargaining levers for wringing preferential treaties out of the Lebanese served to unite the Confessions behind the program for keeping greater Lebanon intact and weakened the resolve of Sunnis to fuse Lebanon with Syria immediately and unconditionally.'

3. Walid Khalidi (1979: footnote number 16, p. 161) cites the figures as 612,590 Christians vs. 423,364 Muslims, counting a certain percentage of emigrants on both sides.
4. See Ralph Crow (1962: pp. 489-520) and, Richard H. Dekmejian (1978: pp. 251-65).
5. The 1943 formula had positive and negative repercussions. On the domestic side, the parliamentary and presidential elections tended to produce very able politicians who had cross-communal appeal. While the President has ample constitutional powers available to him, his success had to be measured by his ability to work with the Sunni prime minister (the head of the cabinet) and the highly independent parliament and its Shi'a speaker. Certain laws require a two-thirds majority approval, and their passage requires legislative compromise. The country's electoral districts encompassed multicommunal

electorates, so each candidate had to campaign among Lebanese from all groups in order to win a parliamentary seat, and needed to be responsive to the demands of his district's residents and not only to the members of his own sect or community. This in turn created a natural mechanism that promoted the election of able leaders (often well-tested) possessing special competence in the art of compromise and consensus-building.

6. For a good discussion on related issues see Ralph E. Crow, 'Parliaments in the Lebanese Political System', in E. Kornberg and L. D. Musolf, (eds.), *Legislatures in Developmental Perspective*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 273-302.
7. For a good discussion of the background of some of the issues we bring up here see P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, (eds.) (1979).
8. See Robert Pranger, 'Perspectives on Lebanon's Political Future,' in Azar, *et al.*, (1983: pp. 51-60).
9. R. D. McLaurin, 'Lebanon and the United States,' in Azar, *et al.*, (1983: pp. 87-112) and, Paul Jureidini, in *ibid.*, (pp. 113-24).
10. A related discussion can be found in E.E. Azar (1986a).
11. This section is based on Chapter 9, 'The Lebanon Case,' by E.E. Azar, in Azar and Burton (eds.) (1986).

5. The Problem-Solving Forums: Sri Lanka

I. Introduction and Background

Violence in Sri Lanka has raged overtly since 1983. However, the underlying causes of this particularly unfortunate instance of protracted social conflict have roots which go back over thousands of years. However, for the purposes of this introductory review, we will focus on just the few decades before and after independence, which was achieved in 1948.

Sri Lanka includes several distinct ethno-cultural groups, of which two are prominent. The Sinhalese, who are mostly Buddhist, comprise approximately 74 percent of the population. The Tamils, who represent about 18 percent of the total population, have language, cultural and religious traditions distinct from the Sinhalese, being predominantly Hindu and of Dravidian origin. Both communities include a minority of Christians, with Sinhalese and Tamil Christians comprising 5 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of the overall population of Sri Lanka. Also in Sri Lanka is a strong Moslem community that comprises about 7 percent of the population. Complicating this mosaic is an Indian Tamil community (6 percent of the total population) originally imported by the British as a plantation labor force--the 'Estate Tamils.' However, the Moslem and Estate Tamil communities have not been actively engaged in the present conflict, despite the fact that the latter group has been severely affected, losing citizenship in 1958. The majority of the Tamils (the remaining 12 percent, known as 'Sri Lankan Tamils') have developed a culture somewhat distinct from that of the Estate Tamils or the Tamils of southern India, and it is

this community which is directly and openly directly confronting the majority Sinhalese.

Tamils live, for the most part, in the northern and eastern provinces, and the Sinhalese throughout the rest of the island. There is also some inter-mixing--for example, many Tamils were at one time found in localities in and around Colombo--but this has been significantly reduced during the past decade by sectarian violence, which since 1983 has claimed over 7,000 lives and created well over a half million refugees, mostly now in India.

The continuing civil war is primarily between the Sinhalese-dominated government and Tamil guerrilla forces fighting for a separate Tamil nation-state, 'Tamil Eelam.' However, Indian forces, originally dispatched for 'peace-keeping' duties under a 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord, have also undertaken operations to contain the guerrillas; and intra-Sinhalese and intra-Tamil hostilities further fragment the population.

To some analysts, there does not appear to be any definitive incident or issue that thrust Sri Lanka into the chaos of the present decade. Rather, as in other areas that are plagued by protracted social conflict, a complex set of grievances left unresolved eventually festered and erupted into systematic repression and wide-spread violence.

The factors that make modern Sri Lanka unstable and violent are by now familiar. As in the case of Lebanon, the colonial legacy of an unintegrated or superficially integrated social base, and the corresponding communal needs for recognition of cultural identity, communal security, and effective economic and political participation are primary, with external intervention again a significant complicating factor. For the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, these needs translate into practical policy issues concerning, for example, permitted use of language; access to political, economic and educational opportunities; and defining intercommunal territorial boundaries. Attempts to legislate solutions to these issues have been perceived as partisan, and thus only add to the complexity of the issues.

In order to better understand the events that have consumed Sri Lankan society in the past decade, we will present an outline of the history of the conflict (for these purposes omitting developments before the British colonial period), and review some of the main grievances of both sides. We shall then review the results of the problem-solving forums on Sri Lanka conducted by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland.

II. The British Colonial Period

Sri Lanka, or parts of it, has been ruled in turn by the Portuguese, Dutch, and British for nearly five hundred years. By 1795, the British had all but evicted the Dutch from the island, which under the British became known as Ceylon. The subsequent unification of the island by the British, and the central governmental

and administrative institutions they ultimately left behind, have created a troublesome and lasting legacy (see de Silva: 1981).

Until 1815, Sri Lanka had never been physically unified. The rugged hill country of the Kandyan region ensured that the 'up-country' Sinhalese who inhabited this area never came into meaningful economic or social contact with Tamils, Moslems, and even other ('low-country') Sinhalese. Only after a costly and particularly bloody guerrilla-style war did the British manage to wrest control over this region. As with their other possessions, the British extended colonial authority into the region, which meant that roads, schools, and other items essential to the colonial infrastructure were built. This enabled the different groups on the island to come into contact with one another.

The severely limited economic and agricultural resources of the northern peninsula, and the relative ease of access by westerners to their coastal homelands, led to a greater interest among Tamils in the educational opportunities provided by the missionary schools. In contrast, the missionaries found it difficult to tolerate the pride and cultural insularity of the up-country Buddhist Sinhalese. Missionary schools were thus much more common in the regions dominated by the Tamils, and their education was put to good use because of the large number of administrative personnel that the British colonial apparatus required.

It was the competition between groups for British civil service positions that renewed an age-old conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese. Centuries before, the Sinhalese had endured numerous invasions by the Tamils both of the northern peninsula, and of southern India. Even though there were long periods of cooperative relations as well, the legacy of these invasions was not forgotten. As the two groups were forced to deal with one another, their respective ethnic and cultural differences came to the fore.

The British set up a characteristically elaborate system of colonial administration. By the latter half of the 19th century, Sri Lankans were permitted to serve in the Legislative Council, which along with the British Executive Council, ruled the colony.¹ While the political and constitutional travails of British Ceylon deserve a fuller analysis in themselves, certain British actions can be identified which particularly contributed to the present protracted conflict.

In their attempts to manage and develop the colony, they were met with the reality of different peoples attempting to preserve different languages, cultures and religions which were fundamental to their unique identities. While the British at times used these divisions to their advantage, on the whole they appear to have been interested in establishing an integrated Ceylonese national identity.² Nation-building and social integration in multi-cultural, multi-religious and underdeveloped societies is not an easy task. Communal passions and cultural pride are powerful forces in shaping nations. Administrative and economic measures are useful but cannot work to alter the imprints of centuries. The British colonialists in Ceylon, however, tended to equate nation-building with state-building, because an efficient state apparatus served their colonial purposes on the island. Through neglecting the deeper issues of nation-building, British

actions and policies had the impact of increasing intercommunal competition and distrust, and therefore increased conflict and the potential for war.

For instance, the Sinhalese were very concerned that the Tamils were being given preference when applying for civil service jobs, and that they were also given first choice of coveted positions in the education system. These perceived injustices are at the heart of the conflict today, although they are not confined to the Sinhalese. What is critical to understand is that the colonial administration was aware of the communal grievances, but its remedies were inadequate. In short, a lack of institutional mechanisms that could resolve the differences prevented the emergence of the national character the British wished to forge in Ceylon. The British colonial actions thus led the Tamils and Sinhalese communities, and to a degree the Moslems of the island, to fear that their unique cultural identities were being threatened.

The Sinhalese fears, particularly in more recent times, were not merely from the Tamils within Sri Lanka. In the South of India, in the state of Tamil Nadu, there are 50 million Tamils who share a common language and religion with their distant relatives in Sri Lanka. As the Sinhalese are quick to point out, India is about twenty miles off the northern coast of Sri Lanka. Therefore, the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka consider themselves to be a minority in the region.

The Tamils, on the other hand, believe that because they are a distinct minority in Sri Lanka, they have been deliberately and systematically discriminated against by the Sinhalese. They also assert that while they are related to the Tamils within India, they have an ancient culture and unique identity of their own that must be preserved. Many Tamil separatist groups have emerged, and Sri Lanka now finds itself engaged in a communally-driven war characterized by terror, massacres, and race riots, as each community attempts to emerge from the conflict with its identity intact.

III. The Post-Independence Period

During the colonial period, and especially during the first half of the twentieth century, Tamils and Sinhalese had cooperated in the struggle for independence from the British colonialists. However, with the coming of independence in 1948, the problems between Tamils and Sinhalese became more acute. The first Sri Lankan government was headed by the United National Party (UNP), which was led at the time by D. S. Senanayake. The UNP has always been a Sinhalese-dominated party, yet in the true style of Sri Lanka's parliamentarianism, the majority party had enjoyed the support of the Tamils and Sinhalese alike. The other Sinhalese parties at the time were the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP).³ The Tamils also were represented in Parliament, in the form of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (TC) and the Tamil Federal Party (FP), with the Ceylon Workers' Congress representing the Estate Tamils.

Towards the end of the 1950s, Sinhalese and Tamil communal chauvinism began to grow. The most graphic example of the former was the 'Sinhala Only'

legislation passed during 1956 that made Sinhala the official state language. Naturally, this enraged the Tamils, and a large degree of political polarization took place. Finally, when it appeared that the legislation would not be rescinded, the first communal rioting took place--an event which was to become common by the early 1980s.

The rioting of May 1958 was critical in shaping the future of communal relations in Sri Lanka. The Sinhala Only act was vehemently opposed by Tamils in and out of Parliament. As the Act was implemented, these frustrations began to spill over from the halls of Parliament into the streets. In protest, the Tamil Federal Party called for opposition in the form of *satyagraha*, or passive disobedience. Ultimately, as the Tamil language was replaced as the administrative language in certain areas of the north and east by Sinhala, rioting occurred. As events transpired, many Tamils and Sinhalese were killed, and order was not restored until June, 1958. By the end of the summer, provisions were made for the special use of the Tamil language in the traditional Tamil homelands of the north and east. However, a complete rescinding of the Sinhala Only Act was not effected.

Other divisive issues concerning education, employment, and participation in parliament started to fester and provide well defined popular causes. Each side claimed to be at a disadvantage when compared to the other group. Specifically, the Sinhalese majority placed quotas on such things as the numbers of Tamils admitted to universities and civil service as an 'affirmative action' method of correcting for what they perceived as British skewing of Sinhalese opportunities in favor of the Tamils.

IV. Divisive Issues in Tamil-Sinhalese Relations

Some of the issues that have remained intractable through to the 1980's are the following:

A. Education/Employment

It has been claimed by the Sinhalese that Tamils have been over-represented in the universities and civil service due to preferential treatment by the British. The Tamils assert that their success in these areas indeed may be attributed to superior education under colonial administration, but that they have been the only career options available to them. In the north there is very little agriculture due to the climate, and industrial development has lagged behind that designated for Sinhalese areas. Additionally, Tamils believe that if they are systematically refused positions in educational institutions through imposed language barriers and quota systems, they will become true second-class citizens since their chances to secure governmental and related occupations will be eroded. Thus, the issue of education is closely related to that of employment.

Compartmentalization of education into Sinhala and Tamil-speaking institutions, and the rewriting of history books also relate to fundamental issues of communal identity, as well as to the ability of Tamils to effectively participate in national political, administrative and economic institutions.

B. Political Participation

This issue is very explosive in Sri Lanka, and is perhaps the best example of the deep cleavages within society. For example, the Estate Tamils were disenfranchised in 1958, leaving the Sinhalese with more than 75 percent representation in parliament. Since then, about half the Estate Tamil population has left the country as refugees, and there has been a decline in the faith of Sri Lankan Tamils in the electoral system.

The Tamils live primarily in the north and east, making up more than 95 percent of the northern province, and about 35 percent of the eastern province. Since the time of independence, the Sri Lankan Tamils have pressed for more autonomy from the Sinhalese majority government in the administration of these areas as a means of redressing their lack of effective political participation at the national level. This has been resisted by the government as they believe that it would be the first step in partitioning the country. Both communities have tried, on a number of occasions, to find ways to resolve their differences, but have failed due to their divergent positions regarding the amount of autonomy and whether the northern and eastern provinces should be unified administratively. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987 devoted most of its attention to the issue of autonomy, which will be given further attention below.

C. Land Colonization

Closely related to autonomy in the northern and eastern provinces is the government policy of establishing 'colonies' of Sinhalese in the eastern province. The government claims that these colonies are merely attempts to populate uninhabited areas and relieve overpopulation in other areas. The Tamils, however, assert that this policy is designed to expand Sinhala domination into Tamil homelands and that the government's use of population density data as a motivation for this policy is absurd.

These political and socio-economic grievances have been at the base of intercommunal conflict in Sri Lanka to this day. There are other explosive issues which interact with these, such as those arising from abrogation of pacts dealing with religious differences, which cannot be adequately discussed here. Other more peripheral issues continue to emerge, and old ones have been lost in the shuffle. The end result has been the inability of both groups to come to terms with the above issues, leaving them to eventually explode into the chaos of today.

V. The 1980s: Civil War

As the 1980s began, no solution was in sight for what had become totally incompatible positions on the part of both Sinhalese and Tamils. Extremism had become commonplace since the 1970s. During 1971, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a radical Marxist Sinhalese group, incited riots in an attempt to overthrow the Sinhalese government. The JVP and other Sinhalese groups have in general been opposed to any concessions to the Tamils. Also during the 1970s, Tamil calls for a separate nation-state grew in intensity and determination. By the turn of the decade, these calls had led to the formation of guerrilla units. The breaking point had arrived as neither side was willing to accommodate the other's demands. To do so carried the risk of political or even physical suicide.

In July 1983, a Tamil separatist group became engaged in a shoot-out with Sri Lankan troops. After the shooting stopped, 13 Sinhalese troops were dead. Widespread rioting erupted throughout the Colombo area, as well as in the south. Hundreds of Tamil men, women, and children were killed. Other critical incidents occurred during this period; initiating an expanding cycle of violence. Each side engaged in acts of terror, and the Tamil insurgency grew. The Tamil political movement, organized as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) refused to take their seats in parliament.

The Sinhalese majority has struggled with ways of addressing the demands of the Tamils without hurting its own interests. The immediate past president of Sri Lanka and leader of the United National Party (UNP), J.R. Jayewardene, a long-time Sinhalese nationalist, has admitted that in Sri Lanka there has been 'some discrimination' against Tamils. He has also asserted that much has been done to ensure that the state is no longer systematically repressive. The Tamils do not seem to be convinced.

The dilemma of how to address grievances in a multicommunal society trying to remedy the unfairness of colonial rule is not an easy task. The Sinhalese, who had clearly been discriminated against by the missionaries who developed and ran the schools during the occupation of Sri Lanka, were determined to correct the situation upon winning independence. The Tamils perceived the resultant Sinhalese actions as evidence of a deliberate policy to weaken them.

VI. The Indian Role

As mentioned earlier, there are fifty million Tamils in South India who have been sympathetic to the worsening plight of their relatives in Sri Lanka over recent years. In recent years, this sympathy has been expressed in the form of sanctuary, weapons, and political support. Indeed, Madras, the capital of Tamil Nadu, until January of 1987 served as headquarters to most of the Tamil insurgents. At this time, however, relations between India and the guerrillas

became very strained. In 1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi declared that he was opposed to the creation of 'Eelam,' the Tamil nation-state. This was the beginning of intensive pressure on the part of the Indian government to force the most powerful insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to come to a political settlement with the Sri Lankan government. The Indians for their part pledged to be the guardian of Tamil rights in any agreement reached. However, both in 1985 and 1987, the LTTE refused to sign agreements that the Indian and Sri Lankan governments supported.

A. Draft Accords of 1985/1986

During 1985, the Indian government determined to broker an agreement between the Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese. As a result, the governments of India and Sri Lanka entered into intense negotiations. The talks revolved around providing political autonomy for the Tamils through the creation of Provisional Councils. This federal scheme for distributing power was designed to ensure Tamil control over their own areas without politically separating the northern and eastern provinces into a truly independent Tamil nation-state (Eelam). Various plans were discussed on how best to organize such a distribution of power; however, serious roadblocks were encountered.⁴ Ultimately, after often violent debate within the Sinhalese community, the Government of Sri Lanka and India came to an agreement. However, the LTTE decided that the agreement did not go far enough in guaranteeing Tamil autonomy and the calls for a separate Tamil nation-state grew more intense. It was at this time that the Government of India became impatient with the LTTE, and maneuvered to conclude an agreement with the Sri Lankan government independently of the Tigers.

Despite Prime Minister Gandhi's growing impatience with the LTTE, he was forced by domestic political constraints to express continued concern for their cause. Hence, relations between the Indian and the Sri Lankan governments were not very smooth. At this time, the situation within Sri Lanka became very grim. The Government of President Jayewardene, bowing to increasing pressure from right-wing groups, launched a military offensive against the LTTE in the North. As the situation in Jaffna, the northern-most Tamil city and the main stronghold for the Tigers, grew worse, so did Indo-Sri Lankan relations. On June 4, 1987, Indian cargo planes, escorted by Mirage fighters, dropped food and medicine into Jaffna. This ominous event was followed by new negotiations between the two governments, resulting in a final agreement in July, just short of two months after the Indian incursion into Sri Lankan airspace.

B. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accords of 1987

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accords provided for a great deal of political autonomy for the Tamils in exchange for a stop to the insurgency. This agreement was substantially based upon the negotiations of 1985 and 1986. Its most interesting

feature was a temporary merger of the northern and eastern provinces, with the stipulation that a referendum be held in the east to settle the question of whether it should be permanently united with the more predominantly Tamil north. However, immediately upon the signing of the accords on July 28, mass rioting broke out with Sinhalese in Colombo, Kandy and Galle, as well as the surrounding areas, protesting the treaty. Although most of the Tamil insurgent groups accepted the agreement, the most powerful group, the LTTE, did not. A primary Tamil objection to the accords is the provision for a referendum: as the east is only about 35 percent Tamil, and Moslem support is not assured, they fear the vote (now scheduled for July 1989 by the Sinhalese-led government) may be lost.

The agreement also provided for the introduction of Indian peace-keeping forces into Sri Lanka to ensure that violence between the two groups would not erupt. However, the LTTE would not surrender their weapons to the Indians, and in October, fighting broke out in Jaffna. After three weeks of intense fighting, the Indians entered Jaffna and forced the LTTE into the jungle where they have vowed to fight on. Terrorist incidents against Indian and Sri Lankan forces have continued, with sporadic violence against Tamils taking place as well.

The fact that the Indian government began to take such an active role in the affairs of Sri Lanka is significant. In protracted social conflicts, it is common (and perhaps inevitable) that outside actors become involved. As the conflict endures, the competing groups attempt to find allies in the outside world, leading to 'actor spill-over.' In this case, India has cultural ties to the Tamils, and is the most powerful nation-state in the region. Because of this, India has long been involved in this conflict. However, her role has changed quite dramatically, moving from supporting the Tamil insurgents through training and sanctuary, to negotiating a peaceful settlement, to military confrontation with the same Tamil insurgents.

Against the background of Indian involvement, new sources of conflict ('issue spill-over') have become evident. Once India intervened so blatantly, the situation became more confused, providing new opportunities as well as unleashing new social forces in Sri Lanka and the region. Few observers envisioned Indian troops battling the LTTE. But both the Sri Lankan and Indian governments share a concern over the extent of demands from ethnic minorities for regional independence, and this may motivate Indian actions as much or more than their cultural kinship with the Sri Lankan Tamils. Thus, the possibilities for conflict management in Sri Lanka, and the future that will unfold on the island, are even more unclear today than in the past. The failure of the Sinhalese, Tamils, and the Indians to find a solution to this conflict is not unique. Other nations experiencing protracted conflict have not fared any better. Attempts at resolving the differences between the two competing groups have been geared towards traditional forms of diplomacy. For instance, both the accords of December 19, 1985, and the Indo-Sri Lankan Accords of 1987 attempted to solve the conflict through political means. While a political settlement may be considered crucial, it is by no means the only component to a realistic solution.

Communities engaged in protracted social conflict tend to insist on guarantees that secure recognition of their collective rights and cultural identities, as well as socio-economic and political access to state institutions. Strategies for approaching resolution that do not provide such guarantees are doomed to fail.

As the conflict continues in Sri Lanka, it provides clear evidence that forced political solutions to protracted conflicts cannot succeed. The Indians may be able for a time to suppress the ability of the LTTE and others to mount large-scale operations. However, while there is no solution to the underlying grievances that motivate these groups, even the existence of more than 40,000 Indian troops and a signed agreement between two nation-states will not be able to solve the centuries-old conflict. Not only is the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement short on real solutions for the needs of Sri Lanka's warring factions, but the exact nature of Indian intentions within Sri Lanka are not yet clear. Perhaps the only clear element to this very complex situation is that intercommunal peace-building must stem from a conflict management approach rather than a strategic one. The Maryland Forums were meant to provide exactly that. We now turn to a discussion of these forums, including their accomplishments and shortcomings.

VII. The Maryland Forums and Seminars on Sri Lanka

The Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, in collaboration with the International Center for Ethnic Studies based in Sri Lanka, has sponsored one large forum, as well as two smaller, more intensive seminars that addressed the salient issues at stake within Sri Lanka. Efforts to build on the achievements of these events have involved maintaining and extending contacts with both academic and government figures in Sri Lanka and the United States, participation in some important conferences in Sri Lanka, and meetings with President J.R. Jayewardene and other leading Sri Lankan government officials, as well as with representatives of the Tamil political opposition.⁵

This section presents the main points raised at the 1985 Forum and at the 1986 and 1987 seminars. A discussion of the recurrent concerns of the participants will be featured also. While each of our activities tried to focus on new and different concerns, we discovered that the Tamil and Sinhalese participants would go back to the same list of grievances and arguments every time a new and unpleasant interaction situation emerged.

A. The Maryland Forum, December 5-7, 1985

The forum was designed to provide a balanced perspective on the conflict, as well as to bring together certain Sri Lankan individuals who were influential within their respective groups. The participants, particularly the Tamils, included representatives from the highest levels of community leadership, and several

more highly influential in government or opposition circles. Specifically, the forum was divided into four distinct sections, each dealing with an integral aspect of the conflict, as follows: a) Sri Lankan society--religious roots, ethnicity and demographics of the conflict; b) economic dimensions of the conflict; c) political issues--decentralization; and d) mechanisms for resolution.

1. Brief Summary of Points Made by Sinhalese and Tamil Participants.

(In order to preserve the confidentiality of the forum process as well as some of the texture of the dialogue, individuals' names have been substituted with the phrases 'Participant A,' 'Facilitator B,' etc.)

a) Social Factors.

Participant A began by asserting that there is no inherent conflict between Buddhism and Hinduism as religious traditions. The conflict in Sri Lanka is not a clash of religious ideologies. While it is by no means claimed that intrinsic differences between the two religions do not exist, there is no record of a historic clash of Buddhist and Hindu doctrine. Instead, the conflict is based upon 20th century interpretations of Buddhism.

According to Participant A, since the time of independence this reformation of Buddhist thought has become intimately associated with Sinhalese nationalism. The resulting chauvinism has alienated both the Tamil and Moslem minorities in Sri Lanka, creating to a large degree the socio-political fractionalization evident today. However, there has also been a neo-reformation, led by the Sarvodaya Shramadana movement, that advocates a return to social harmony and non-violence. Thus, while a Buddhist reformation originally polarized society, there may now be a further movement attempting to heal the wounds that have been inflicted since independence.

Participant B, a member of the Tamil United Liberation Front, began the next discussion. He indicated that, with the rise of Sinhalese nationalism, Tamils perceived a significant threat of loss of their communal identity, and of their physical and economic security. The conflict is thus not one specifically of religion, but one driven by communal needs to address social, economic and political injustices. Additionally, he argued that the Tamil people have the right to demand autonomy in the north of Sri Lanka since it is their historic homeland, being inhabited long before the Sinhalese people came to Sri Lanka.

Participant C pointed out that the Buddhist reformation of the 20th century was essentially a reaction to Christianity, and not specifically directed at Tamils. During the Dutch and British occupations, Christians had occupied a large share of the privileged positions in the colonial administration. The most aggressive reformer, Anagarika Dharmapala, was basically responding to a perceived identity crisis that had permeated Sinhala society. His struggle against Tamils *per se* was probably due to disputes over control of Buddhist shrines in India. Buddhist reform was not designed to be a threat to Tamil or other minority rights. Rather, in the larger context, reform was directed at redressing injustices from colonial domination that threatened Sinhala perceptions of identity.

Later in the proceedings, Participant D claimed that Tamil demands for a homeland that incorporated the eastern province were based upon false assertions of ethnic majority. Instead, the eastern province has traditionally been jointly inhabited by Sinhalese, Tamils, and Moslems. A clear cut Tamil majority does not, and has never existed in the form claimed by Tamil political groups, such as the Tamil United Liberation Front. The boundaries that exist today in the east are a result of colonial administrative needs, and are not illustrative of any definitive ethnic composition.

Facilitator A commented on the importance of understanding perceptions in conflicts of this type. The perceived reality and causes of conflict are often skewed, and they differ between identity groups. What is important is what each group perceives to be reality, and the attempt to address those perceptions should be the top priority.

b) Economic Factors.

Participants E and F addressed Tamil perceptions of the economic impact of communal strife. Essentially, there has been widespread discrimination against Tamil areas with respect to resource allocation, as well as a backlash against Tamils who practice white-collar professions. It was argued that because there is little fertile land or industry in the north, Tamils out of necessity have traditionally been attracted to occupations such as engineering and administration.

Participant G challenged these claims by asserting that the reduction of Tamils in professional occupations was in reality a leveling off of over-representation of Tamils in these positions. Statistical data does not support the hypothesis that Sinhalese have deliberately eroded Tamil economic security. Analysis of Tamil and Sinhalese perceptions of economic inequality, he argued, indicate that the perceptions of both groups deviate substantially from reality, and that this must be taken into consideration if solutions are to be found.

c) Political Issues.

Participant C began this discussion, which centered around the devolution of power and ethnic politics in Sri Lanka. He indicated that decentralization was actually a British idea that was implemented in order to make politics in Sri Lanka more democratic by increasing representation and participation by all groups. The Donoughmore Commission of 1928 drew up plans for a federal system, but it was not acted upon until after independence, which was too late for it to be effective. After independence, federal schemes for power distribution became increasingly associated with Tamil separatist activity, which ensured Sinhalese opposition.

Participant H gave an overview of Tamil grievances, which included the issues of language, education, land, and job opportunities. Tamils were generally receptive to the idea of a federal system, as it was thought that it would address perceived grievances. However, as events ran their course, peaceful Tamil protest

was met with violence, which all but destroyed hopes for a federal scheme of government.

Facilitator B commented that conflicts of this type are not unique to Sri Lanka, and should be recognized as being endemic to multi-ethnic societies. It seems that the original grievances on both sides were forgotten once the conflict became overt and spilled into the streets in 1983, and were supplanted by new demands reflecting desires for retribution.

d) Mechanisms for Resolution.

This portion of the proceedings specifically concerned itself with the need for Track Two diplomacy in conflict situations of this type. Representatives from the US Department of State's Foreign Service Institute offered insight into this area, outlining the mechanics of Track Two and the constructive role it can play. Analysis at this point centered on how Track Two deals with divergent or skewed perceptions associated with political violence, and how it attempts to move individuals and groups from conflict to cooperation.

2. Comments

It became clear that the Tamil and Sinhalese participants came to the December 1985 forum with certain viewpoints that were highly contested by their counterparts. This was evident even where the participants were academic and political professionals as opposed to official representatives of the opposing groups. The forum participants challenged each other's perceptions of the conflict as not necessarily true. The debate was often passionate and lengthy, as each speaker attempted to win adherents to his viewpoint. Regardless of the topic, there emerged differing perceptions of reality, reflecting divergent conceptions of what was at the root of the conflict in Sri Lanka, and what sustained it.

However, by the end of the proceedings, there appeared to be a difference in the participants--some significant development in how they perceived each other's views. None thought the others were 'right,' but they began to see a kind of pluralism. It became clear to participants that there was no monolithic viewpoint either in the other community, or in their own.

All had come with an agenda, hoping to influence others, but went away with a richer agenda. We detected a wider, more generous set of comments in the later discussions, moving beyond the narrow alternatives of combativeness and politeness. There seemed to be a recognition that simply 'making a case' by using statistics and history was an ineffective strategy for swaying an opponent's opinion. At the conclusion of the forum, each side emerged with a better understanding of the other's perceptions, as well as of the futility of 'winning points.'

There was also a genuine desire in participants on both sides for follow-up and continuation of the process. There was discussion of the value of inviting Indian participants, and moving on to consider possible options for resolving issues in dispute. Thus it was obvious that the forum process was felt to be

useful, despite the fact that no big breakthroughs had been made, and not all goals had been accomplished.

On the basis of this excitement and desire for further events, it was felt that the Center should arrange some form of follow-up to the forum. It was decided that the best option, given the resources of the Center, was to arrange a series of seminars allowing direct observation of the discussions so that non-participants could learn more concerning the conflict. This would also promote the development of a network of scholars and others interested in pursuing options for conflict management and resolution, providing a resource base for research, teaching, and monitoring or tracking the conflict.

In addition to the two seminars in 1986 and 1987, follow-up to the forum included a series of exchanges among participants and others in Sri Lanka as well as visiting scholars to and from the Center, allowing dissemination of the insights from the forum back to each community. These processes are all part of the mechanism for operationalizing Track Two diplomacy. The forum itself is only one aspect: all cultural, scholarly, and other unofficial interactions are also included in the broader spectrum of the Track Two process.

B. Follow-up Seminars: October 18, 1986 and December 5, 1987

The two substantive seminars held at the Center in College Park, Maryland, were designed to promote follow-up contacts with scholars and political analysts interested in conflict resolution in Sri Lanka and to further address specific issues in the Sri Lanka conflict, particularly in light of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accords and the proposed creation of Provisional Councils. Some of the participants and facilitators in both seminars had also participated in the 1985 forum. The seminar format allowed the proceedings to be open for observation by students and others interested in the conflict and the Track Two process. The following segment will present the main points raised at the seminars and then discuss the implications of these ideas for conflict resolution in Sri Lanka.

1. Brief Summary of Points Made at the Seminars

The October seminar opened with Facilitator A requesting the participants to discuss the issues at hand in an honest, respectful, yet forthright manner. He emphasized the need for a better understanding of the issues, since only through such understanding would viable conflict resolution techniques emerge. If a free exchange of opinion could not be generated, salient issues of identity, security, participation and development could not be addressed, and thus any hopes of formulating resolution options would be lost. In short, the road from war to peace in Sri Lanka is necessarily dependent upon a full understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the conflict.

In the seminar setting as in the Forum, the Sinhalese and Tamil participants tended to repeat the same arguments and emphasize the same divisive issues concerning language, employment, education and territory. These presentations

sparked debate among participants and observers alike as to which group (Tamil or Sinhalese) was at fault for the current crisis. However, discussions also focused on how the issues and factors which perpetuate conflict seem to change and proliferate over time. New developments discussed include the following.

a) Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka.

The participants observed that external intervention into the affairs of smaller states experiencing conflict is by no means a rare occurrence. Some recent examples are Syrian and Israeli interventions in Lebanon, Greek and Turkish actions in Cyprus, and South African incursions into Angola. While the immediate causes triggering third party intervention into protracted social conflicts vary from case to case, there are deeper underlying causes common to all. These are domestic processes within each nation-state experiencing protracted social conflict.

As the people of a nation become socialized to protracted conflict, the elites of those communities involved become less and less able to effectively deal with the situation. As frustration grows and resources are found to be insufficient to achieve perceived objectives vis-a-vis the conflict, external alliances are sought in order to enhance the capacity to achieve these goals, or at least to frustrate the goals of others that are perceived as a threat.

This is precisely why we find Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. The Tamils in Sri Lanka have turned for help to the South Indian Tamils. However, the Sinhalese have courted the Indian central government in order to assist in finding solutions amenable to their position. The government of Sri Lanka has also sought assistance from Pakistan, Israel, and the United States. Its efforts at negotiating with the Indians reflect calculations of a purely political nature. India is without doubt the most powerful actor in the region. For Sri Lanka to ignore this fact could prove disastrous. This holds true for every small nation-state that is in physical proximity to large powers. Thus, not only are there internal motivations for courting external alliances, there are geo-political reasons as well.

Once any external intervention has taken place, the original set of issues that formed the core of the conflict becomes confused with new issues. In the Sri Lankan case, once the accord was signed, great dissention was created within the Sinhalese community concerning the desirability of such an agreement. For many months there has been heated debate over whether the Indians intend to exert hegemony over the Sri Lankan internal and external political agenda. Equally pressing issues to emerge concern the role of Indian peacekeeping forces, and the proposed referendum over the linking of the northern and eastern provinces. As Facilitator A noted, the issues created since the intervention have superceded, for the time being, the grievances that have divided Tamils and Sinhalese for decades.

b) Indian Motivations for Intervention.

The seminar participants agreed that Indian action in Sri Lanka and particularly the 1987 Accords were designed with domestic constraints concerning Indian ethnic conflict in mind. For instance, Indian support for Tamil Eelam would give legitimacy to those groups within India who also are demanding their own state.

Another important aspect of Indian policies toward Sri Lanka is rooted in India's desire to exert her influence in the region. Indian military and political power is without doubt respected by all nations in the area. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and even China must be aware of it when formulating external and internal policies. It appears that the Indians are aware of their status in the region, and are very interested in exerting this growing power in order to codify and build upon it. In other words, India does display hegemonic tendencies.

Further, Indian protracted conflict and hegemonic activity has become coupled with the protracted conflict within Sri Lanka. The Indians understand that both the Tamils and Sinhalese court their active support. The conflict in Sri Lanka has created an environment that the Indians believe they are able to exploit, in that intervention enables India to deal with her own protracted conflict, as well as enhance her regional position.

c) The Provisional Councils and Land Colonization.

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accords of 1987, a participant observed, had shaped some fresh questions regarding the possibilities for conflict resolution in Sri Lanka. These accords, which specified that regional Provisional Councils be established, and that a referendum be held to determine whether the northern and eastern provinces were to be combined into one Tamil-speaking, semi-autonomous area, provided new conflict dynamics. Much of the discussion was concerned with the impact upon the eastern province, as its heterogeneous ethnic composition has the potential of derailing the provisional councils. It was argued that because there is no clear-cut majority group in the east, giving too much economic and political power to one group could cause more injustice and polarize society to an even larger degree.

Tamil and Sinhalese claims upon the disputed land in the east, which, with support from the government of Sri Lanka, has been colonized by groups of Sinhalese in recent years, seem to be mirror images of one another. This process has been very controversial, as the Tamils claim it is a strategy whereby the Sinhalese are in effect annexing ancient Tamil homelands. The government, on the other hand, asserts that the policy is designed simply to develop heretofore uninhabited land. Participant A argued that many of the Tamil claims concerning the disputed land were erroneous; there was little evidence pointing to ancient Tamil settlements. However, she did also indicate that the government may be interested in exerting its authority over Tamil lands through this colonization process.

Most importantly, according to this analysis, it is not essential that the validity of Tamil and Sinhalese claims be proved or disproved. The real issue is

that the Tamils perceive this policy to be an encroachment on their lands, and even careful and detailed studies will not sway Tamil objections. The conflict has endured for such a long time that the truth on both sides often becomes distorted, and the need to address rather than attack each group's version of reality is the most important priority for resolution of this dispute.

2. Comments on the Seminars

The follow-up seminars, although lasting only one and a half days each, were productive and instructive. Despite their brevity, they did not lack passion and sincerity of purpose. During these encounters, the participants inevitably attempt to win adherents to their point of view, producing a tense atmosphere. However, with third party facilitators present, the discussions were channeled towards substantive discussions. Despite the tension that often prevails in these meetings, they ended with a positive tone and produced some fresh insights and ideas. In both seminars, a number of random issues were presented by different participants who wished to make points which were not part of the agenda. While some flexibility is often helpful, the seminar organizers needed to worry about the consequences of these tendencies. In these seminars, we permitted a source of 'steam-letting' and then intervened to table some of the good points that were raised apart from the substantive topics at hand.

In the 1987 seminar, convened to discuss the Indo-Sri Lankan accords and their implications, we found it very helpful to recall the experiences of other conflict management attempts in other regions in the world. Our comparative conflict management research at CIDCM has enriched our vocabulary and empirical base and given us a tool needed in pre-negotiation situations dominated by high stress and anxiety. Track Two diplomacy is also an opportunity for gaining new insights and finding breakthroughs for resolving conflicts. This seminar facilitated a better appreciation of the imperatives operating on India and the motivations of both India and the Sri Lanka governments in signing the accords.

The seminars did not bring representatives of the leaders of each community together for discussions. However, these seminars did utilize techniques of Track Two diplomacy, and in this they were successful. The Sri Lankan participants, who were mostly scholars, are important actors in their respective disciplines and communities. In the conference environment, members of the communities in conflict were able to agree on the salient issues in the conflict, and better understand the perceptions of the other communities concerning these issues, as events continued to unfold. A well-developed understanding of such community perceptions, together with an understanding of the dynamics of conflict, is required if meaningful options are to be discovered that will satisfy collective developmental needs for identity, security and effective control or participation, thus providing a firm base for political and socio-economic development and allowing societies to make the move from war to peace.

At the Center for International Development and Conflict Management we will continue to adapt the techniques of Track Two diplomacy for application in

a wide range of situations. We would not want Track Two to be used solely as a tool for co-learning by the elites of antagonistic communities, to be applied when they return to their respective groups. It was apparent from the seminars that the Track Two process is also useful for instructing scholars in the mechanics of protracted social conflict. We feel that these activities made a contribution to the scholarly community both in and outside of Sri Lanka regarding novel approaches to conflict management and resolution.

Notes

1. A good description of the constitutional arrangement in Ceylon under the British is contained in Sir Charles Jeffries' *Ceylon: the Path to Independence*, (New York: Praeger, 1963).
2. The principle of divide and rule was utilized by the British when they imported Indian Tamil laborers to work the tea plantations of the Kandyan region. This kept the people divided, and less able to rebel.
3. All three parties exist today, with the UNP in control, and the SLFP serving as the main opposition. These two parties have been the majority parties in Parliament. The LSSP is a Trotskyist group that has had a strong influence on the evolving conflict.
4. For complete details on the discussions, see *Draft Proposals of 8/30/85 and 12/19/86*, issued by the Government of Sri Lanka.
5. Other institutions, such as the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, have contributed greatly to these efforts.

6. The Problem-Solving Forums: The Falklands/Malvinas Islands

Edward E. Azar and Anthony F. Pickering

I. Introduction

The following chapter looks at the history of the dispute between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, paying particular attention to the failure of negotiations between the two nations prior to the 1982 war and the attempts made by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland to bring the sides together to search for a solution beginning in 1983.

As is clear to students of the dispute, the Falklands/Malvinas conflict differs in significant respects from the Lebanese and Sri Lankan disputes which were the result of *intra-national* problems caused by competition between ethnic or religious groups within the countries, as opposed to *international* problems. Indeed, in many ways the dispute between Argentina and Great Britain is more akin to traditional 'great power' rivalry, despite Argentina's position as a developing country, and may seem to be more appropriately analyzed from other than the protracted social conflict perspective. However, as the following discussion reveals, this conflict does share certain important characteristics with the two conflicts analyzed previously; characteristics which make it fertile ground for the application of Track Two diplomacy.

Prior to the war in 1982, the dispute did not share many of the qualities of protracted social conflict. A case could be made that the British did not invest much energy, or were unwilling to compromise during the seventeen years of pre-war negotiations with Argentina, because they did not consider their relations

with that country to be of great importance (thus denying recognition of Argentina's 'identity'). Or it could be argued that Argentina adopted too rigid a stance during the period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities because of ultra-nationalistic attitudes. But these attitudes did not define Argentina-UK relations prior to 1982. As became apparent during the Maryland Forums, it was the war which exacerbated these attitudes and established them as the starting point from which UK-Argentina relations would henceforth proceed.

Regardless of the cause, current relations between the two countries are characterized by a mutual distrust of intentions, by lingering feelings of resentment, by jingoism, and by hostility. More importantly, the dispute seems intractable to both sides as long as neither will renounce their negotiating positions. The main stumbling block is no longer the issues themselves (sovereignty, the rights of the islanders, *etc.*) but rather the inability of the two countries to create a mechanism by which they can be addressed. It is this mechanism that the Maryland Forums have attempted to establish--the success of which will be evaluated in the following pages.

Part II of this chapter will briefly describe the origins of the territorial dispute, UK-Argentine relations before the war, the domestic political contexts within which the countries decided to fight, the dynamics of the conflict, and the costs to both countries of the continuing conflict. Part III will summarize the pre-war negotiating record of the UK and Argentina under UN auspices, the mediation efforts of the US and others during the hostilities, and the initial post-war discussions which took place between representatives of the two countries. Part IV will review the record of the Maryland Forums which took place in 1983, 1984, and 1985. In the concluding section we will look at the current state of the conflict and the prospects for a peaceful settlement.

II. Anatomy of a Conflict

In 1982, after seventeen years of unfruitful negotiations, Great Britain and Argentina fought a brief but intense war over the Falkland Islands (*Islas Malvinas*), a rocky archipelago located 300 miles off the Argentine coast over which both countries claim sovereignty. After ten weeks of primarily naval and air battles in which nearly 1000 soldiers died, the Argentines surrendered to the better-trained and equipped British forces on June 14, 1982. At this writing, over seven years later, Argentina has not yet formally declared an end to hostilities, and both countries have continued a military buildup in the area. Why were the UK and Argentina, two countries with historically close economic, political, and cultural ties, unable to avoid going to war over several inhospitable islands inhabited by 1,800 people and 600,000 sheep?

A. Origins of the Territorial Dispute

The dispute over possession of the Falklands/Malvinas dates back to at least the 18th century. Claims of discovery were advanced by both the Spanish and British in the 16th century but it was not until another two hundred years had passed that any efforts at colonization were made. The first known colony, established by France, appeared in 1764. Two years later, in 1766, the British established their own settlement apparently unaware of the French presence. In a complex set of maneuvers the French sold their settlement and rights to Spain, with the administration of the islands being handed over to the Spanish authorities in Buenos Aires.

In 1770, the Spanish forcibly removed the British, but later, under the threat of war with Britain, agreed to restore the colony. Both powers agreed that this action did not indicate a Spanish recognition of British sovereignty. In addition, there is some evidence that the British made a secret pledge to remove their colony at a later date. In the agreement, Spain stated that its restoration of the colony did not in any way affect the prior right of sovereignty claimed by Spain. The British did not duplicate precisely this wording in their draft of the agreement, but neither did they formally assert sovereignty over the islands. The British did eventually remove their settlement in 1774, after threat of war with Spain, leaving behind a plaque claiming sovereignty over the islands.

The Spanish settlement which replaced that of Great Britain survived until 1806 when it was abandoned by Spain at the outbreak of the wars of independence in Latin America, with colonists remaining there until 1811. By 1816, the colonists of Buenos Aires had essentially established their independence from Spain and began to be interested in the Falklands/Malvinas. Until 1823, when Buenos Aires formally appointed a government for Falklands/Malvinas, the islands were used primarily by US whaling and sealing vessels which ignored periodic claims to sovereignty made by the Buenos Aires authorities. In 1829, a Buenos Aires colonial presence was resumed as Louis Vernet was formally established as governor on the islands and given land tenure.

The events leading up to the eventual recuperation of the islands by the British in 1833 are somewhat complex. In essence, Governor Vernet, whose authority was not recognized by the American whalers and sealers, seized the American vessels in response to what he believed to be violations of sovereignty. One vessel escaped and returned to the US at which point President Andrew Jackson dispatched the warship *Lexington* to the Falklands/Malvinas. In Buenos Aires, the US consul, supported by his British counterpart, accused Vernet of piracy. At this time, the *Lexington* sailed into the Argentine port in the islands under a French flag and forcibly removed Vernet's lieutenant. Buenos Aires was incapable of restoring control over the islands in the face of US opposition (negotiations proved futile), and the British, taking advantage of the situation, sailed into the islands. Finding the replacement governor to have been murdered, the British ordered the Argentine flag replaced by the British flag. The governor's deputy refused, and the British landed a small military force to do it

themselves. The Buenos Aires colonists left on the islands were over the years peacefully replaced by British and, despite vehement and repeated protests from the Argentines, the British flag continued to fly over the islands until April 2, 1982, when the Argentines invaded.

B. Argentine-British Relations Pre-1982

Despite historic Argentine rancor over the British presence in the Falklands/Malvinas, relations between the two countries, particularly economic relations, have been at times very close through the 19th and 20th centuries. In fact, the enormous Argentine economic successes during the 1880-1914 period were due in large part to its exports of food to Europe and especially to England. Closely related to this trade was a high level of British investment in Argentina in railroads, docks, meat-packing houses, public utilities, and government bonds, all of which helped contribute to strong economic growth in the country. This Argentine-British economic interdependence began to wane in the 1940s with the political rise of Juan Perón, a fervent nationalist whose criticism of the British 'imperialist' presence in the country was popularly received. Although exports to Britain continued, Perón moved quickly to nationalize much of British industry in Argentina.

Rather than being characterized as anti-British, popular sentiment at that time is better described as anti-imperialist, or pro-Argentine. Genuine anti-British feelings were not manifest until 1982 and the war. Cultural as well as economic ties had been strong due to a large number of British living in the country. In fact, at present there are approximately 17,000 British citizens in Argentina as well as hundreds of thousands of British descendants. This is one reason why the conflict and its protraction have been both surprising and painful for many Argentines and British.

C. Domestic Political Situations in the UK and Argentina in 1982

When the Argentines overran the small British garrison on the islands on April 2, 1982, both countries, and particularly Argentina, were experiencing profound political tensions at home, and this fact had a decisive influence in precipitating the war. In Argentina, the military dictatorship was the target of intense political criticism. Inflation was skyrocketing, the country was in a severe recession, and the government's critics were becoming bolder in their condemnation of human rights abuses and in their calls for a return to democracy. In fact, only days before the invasion, the largest anti-government protest since the military took power in 1976 occurred. The generals needed a way to divert the country's attention from its problems.

At this time, the Argentine generals also made several crucial erroneous assumptions about possible British responses to an invasion. They believed that the UK had changed its mind and would not defend the territory which, after all, was 8,000 miles from Great Britain and had only 1,800 inhabitants. Furthermore, in view of the Reagan administration's active courting of the *junta* to help with US policy in Central America, the generals decided that the US would support Argentina in any dispute with the UK. Both assumptions proved false.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was embroiled in her own domestic difficulties when Argentina attacked. Her Conservative government had been resolutely pursuing a hard-line monetarist economic policy, and with recession and high unemployment gripping the country, public support of the government was very low. Given the public outcry against the Argentine invasion, a war to protect the British islanders against the 'brutal South American dictators' and simultaneously restore Britain's long-declining position as a world power would likely help boost Thatcher's popularity. Hence, both Argentina's decision to invade and Britain's decision to defend the islands were consistent with each country's domestic political logic. This does not completely explain the reasons for the conflict, however.

Since 1965, Britain and Argentina had been engaged in negotiations under UN auspices for the return of the islands to Argentina. On many occasions agreement seemed imminent but was never reached. The Argentines were certainly frustrated over what they regarded as British intransigence in the face of sincere and laborious Argentine efforts to peacefully resolve the dispute.

The Falklands/Malvinas issue is much more salient and of greater national importance in Argentina than it is in Britain, and to understand the Argentine decision to invade this must be appreciated. When the war erupted, no Argentine needed to be told what or where the islands were. The same cannot be said about the British. The depth of Argentine feeling on the subject is indicated by the fact that the public was willing to support a roundly-despised government on the issue. Illustratively, the current president of Argentina (at time of writing), Raúl Alfonsín, has described the invasion as an 'illegal act by an illegitimate government in a just cause.'

In short, and taking the domestic political contexts into account as well, the Argentine invasion was an attempted vindication of wounded national pride and a frustrated response to the lack of progress in negotiations. And when Thatcher responded, it was to show that 'aggression does not pay,' that the rule of international law must be upheld, and that the islanders' right to 'self-determination' was to be protected, even at the risk of war.

D. Outbreak of Hostilities

The events which triggered the war and the war itself are not the focus of this chapter. A brief description will suffice. Ostensibly, the war broke out in March 1982 over a dispute taking place on the remote island of South Georgia (800

miles east of the main Falklands/Malvinas islands group). Whether the incident was a pretext for the Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas, or whether it was simply a miscalculation which later escalated into a larger conflict, is still undecided. At any rate, when a party of Argentine workers arrived and established a base to remove scrap metal which it had purchased from a British businessman, the British government protested strongly to the Argentine government, claiming a violation of their sovereignty. The Argentines promised to remove the settlement of workers (which had raised the Argentine flag), but the British nevertheless sent the *HMS Endurance* with twenty-one marines, half of the Port Stanley garrison, to the area. The British believed that the South Georgia dispute was intended by Argentina to force the British to negotiate the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty issue and declared that they would refuse to do so until the current dispute was settled. Argentina replied that they would not talk about South Georgia until the British would agree to discuss sovereignty.

These machinations and discussions became meaningless on April 2 when 11,000 Argentine troops landed on the Falklands/Malvinas. The British garrison, heavily outnumbered, surrendered and was taken prisoner. At this point, as the British prepared their fleet for the voyage to retake the islands, a series of diplomatic maneuvers designed to bring an end to the hostilities began, lasting until May 18. All failed, and after ten weeks of primarily naval and air battles, the Argentines surrendered on June 14, 1982. During the war 712 Argentines and 255 British died.

E. Costs of the War

The human costs of the conflict were great. The political costs have been profound and are still being manifested. Subsequent events have established the validity of our interpretation of the domestic political contexts within which the war was fought. Thatcher's popularity soared and Great Britain was able to show that, indeed, 'aggression does not pay.' In Argentina, the ultimately disastrous military campaign, after first generating intense popular support for the government's actions, led to the disgrace of the generals and directly contributed to the return of civilian government in January 1984.

The remainder of the legacy left by the war is deeply troubling and will make the achievement of an eventual solution to the dispute more difficult. Argentina has not yet formally declared an end to hostilities, claiming that it will not do so until the UK agrees to resume talks on the sovereignty issue and reduce their military presence in the area, in essence reversing the 'Fortress Falklands' policy adopted by the Thatcher government.¹ Britain has responded that sovereignty is non-negotiable, and that the military presence is necessary in the face of Argentina's refusal to officially terminate hostilities and of what the British perceive as an unjustified Argentine rearmament effort.²

Since the war, the negotiating stances adopted by the two governments have become more rigid, especially in Britain's case. Britain, which (as we shall see below) had before the war discussed the sovereignty issue and on certain

occasions been apparently close to agreement with Argentina, now refuses to discuss the issue without the approval of the islanders themselves. Since the Argentine invasion, public opinion in the Falklands/Malvinas themselves has been resolutely anti-Argentine and in favor of continued association with the UK. On the surface, this seems an insurmountable obstacle. Diplomatic relations between the two countries, which were broken in 1982, have not yet been resumed, thus severely limiting opportunities for discussion of the issue.

The militarization of the zone has created problems both for future reduction of tensions and for domestic politics. The British claim that Argentina has developed an important capability to fight a protracted, low-intensity war in the area, having made substantial purchases of air-to-surface missiles, mid-air refueling craft, and submarines, among other equipment.³ The Argentines point to the military airport at Port Stanley, the 9,000-foot strategic airstrip constructed on Mount Pleasant, the naval escort and submarine force in the area, and the quantity of modern aircraft operating from the islands to support their claim that the British presence surpasses the UK's legitimate defense needs in the area.⁴

Further contributing to tensions in the zone have been the British declaration of a 150-mile military exclusion zone and their October 1986 expansion of the fishing zone to 200 miles. Domestically, in Great Britain the high cost of maintaining British military capability in the South Atlantic has led many to question the wisdom of the policy and to look more favorably to negotiations.⁵ Argentina, with its difficult economic problems, is also concerned about rising defense costs. However, the government feels it must respond to what is publicly considered provocative behavior by the British.

Both the dispute itself and the continued lack of progress in resolving it have other difficult domestic political implications, especially for Argentina. It is not only politically important to the Argentine president that he not be seen as giving in to the British, or as renouncing the belief held universally within Argentina that the Falklands/Malvinas are Argentine, but it is also important for Argentine democracy. The democratic process in Argentina remains somewhat tenuous (although it has likely been strengthened by both Alfonsín's handling of several military mutinies and the 1989 presidential elections) and the Falklands/Malvinas issue is potentially destabilizing. It is partly for this reason that the post-*junta* government of Alfonsín adopted a 'wait and see' attitude, not wanting to risk the prestige of the government on this emotional issue, and hence jeopardize either Alfonsín's political standing or the nation's political stability.

In Great Britain, the Falklands/Malvinas issue is no longer a highly visible one, nor does it carry the emotional weight that it does in Argentina. Nevertheless, the issue remains important to the government and the views of concerned officials will have important implications for the future of negotiations. The Prime Minister feels very strongly about the islands for obvious reasons. To a large extent, her political popularity is due to how she handled the war, and so it will be difficult for her to change positions on the

issue. However, there are indications that the cabinet and even the Conservative Party itself are divided over the issue. The Foreign Office would like to begin discussions, and the Ministry of Defence is concerned about the large expense required to defend the islands.⁶ These indications, plus the fact that when polled the public also indicates a strong preference for negotiations, perhaps point to a future confrontation with Thatcher over the need to negotiate. Informal talks by Argentine and British parliamentarians and academics, such as those held at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management between 1983-1985, showed promise in helping to generate the climate needed for meaningful negotiations to take place.

Finally, the war has also been costly to the United States. By actively supporting the British during the conflict, the US created a large amount of ill-will in Argentina, as well as in the rest of Latin America. The US may have thus essentially precluded itself from an active mediation role in any future discussions between the UK and Argentina, a role which its traditionally close ties to both countries would have encouraged it to assume.

III. The Failure of Negotiations

A. Pre-War Bilateral Negotiations Under UN Auspices

The UN resolution which served as the basis for bilateral negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina was General Assembly Resolution 2065 of December 16, 1965, which called for bilateral negotiations to peacefully resolve the dispute over the islands, and which also referred to the UN Charter and the 1960 General Assembly Resolution 1514 on decolonization. In 1964, Argentina had brought up the issue of the Falklands/Malvinas before the Subcommittee on Small Territories of the UN Special Committee on Decolonization. At this time, Britain agreed to talk about island contacts with Argentina and an Argentine role in improving the welfare of the islanders, but sovereignty was not to be an issue. The record of the succeeding seventeen years of negotiations is a complicated series of events, including some near-agreements. What follows is a short chronological description of the negotiating process, highlighting the main points of contention between the two parties.

The first high-level talks began in January 1966 when Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart visited Buenos Aires to discuss the Falklands/Malvinas issue. Six months later, another round of bilateral talks was held in London. It appears that the British goal in these discussions was to maintain good relations with Argentina and to minimize tension over the sovereignty issue. Argentina, however, made it clear that it was most concerned with the question of sovereignty and therefore it found the discussions fruitless. Interestingly, the British then declared through unofficial channels (but publicly denied) that the UK had no serious economic, political, or strategic interests in the islands, and

that once the question of timing and method was resolved, the islands would eventually become Argentine.⁷

In November 1966, Argentina rejected a proposal made by Britain that the two sides implement a thirty year freeze on the question of sovereignty during which time all bilateral negotiations between the UK and Argentina would have no influence on either side's claims in the dispute. According to the proposal, at the end of the period the islanders would choose between British and Argentine sovereignty over the islands. This proposal was followed in March 1967 by a British statement that the concept of transferring sovereignty was acceptable to the British under certain conditions, the most important being that the wishes of the islanders be taken into account. The inclusion of the islanders in the process has remained the primary consideration in pursuing negotiations. The islanders at this point organized a vociferous lobby called the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee which was effective in generating sufficient pressure to terminate discussions with Argentina over the issue. The British government then made a public declaration that sovereignty would not be transferred without the consent of the islanders.

Progress seemed to be made in August 1968 when Great Britain agreed in principle to future Argentine sovereignty if it could be assured that the 'interests' of the islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees offered by the Argentine government.⁸ Apart from this agreement in principle, but published simultaneously, the British government issued a statement that any agreement would have to be acceptable to the islanders. The Argentines responded that they accepted neither this role for the islanders in UK-Argentina bilateral negotiations nor the linking of the latter statement with the agreement in principle. At any rate, opposition from the islanders, the UK Parliament, and the British public destroyed any chance for a formal agreement on the transfer of sovereignty.

Britain's insistence on protecting the wishes of the islanders, the concept of 'self-determination,' dates from the time of this failure in negotiations. All subsequent negotiating positions adopted by the British have included the self-determination provision.

Despite the UK's apparently unwavering position, Argentina called for new talks in June 1970 on improving communications and transportation links between the islands and the Argentine mainland with the issue of sovereignty to be absent from the discussions. Several agreements, eventually incorporated into the Treaty of Communications, provided freedom of movement for the islanders in Argentina, scholarships to Argentine universities, domestic-rate postal service, and the construction by Argentina of an airstrip on the islands. In the agreement, Argentina was to supply fuel and air transport service to the Falklands/Malvinas, among other services. Argentina considered this agreement to be a major concession on their part and an indication not only of their good faith in negotiating but also of their ability to contribute to the well-being of the islanders, thus proving that the interests of the islanders would be enhanced by the islands' incorporation with Argentina.⁹

There is evidence that at this point Great Britain for some reason believed that the major issues with Argentina had been resolved and that no further serious negotiations were necessary. Argentina believed, however, that the communications agreement should have been the first step to further negotiations which included the question of sovereignty.¹⁰ In April 1973, the ongoing discussions broke up because of Britain's insistence on the self-determination of the islanders. In August of that year, Argentina informed the UN that negotiations were paralyzed and requested that the UN urge that the pace of discussions be accelerated, which the UN did.

The following October, Argentina warned in the UN that it could not continue to talk indefinitely and thus preserve the *status quo* on the islands, at which point the British indicated a willingness to resume negotiations. Argentina then attempted to resolve the 'self-determination' issue by endeavoring to make a distinction between the 'interests' of the islanders (using the language of General Assembly Resolution 2065) and their 'wishes' (the language upon which Great Britain insisted; *i.e.*, 'self-determination'), a distinction which it would continue to make during negotiations.

In early 1974, the British began to consider a 'condominium' arrangement as a possible alternative to the outright transfer of sovereignty; that is, an agreement to share sovereignty with Argentina. However, the islanders once again stymied progress on the issue, this time by refusing to participate in negotiations. (Great Britain continued to insist upon the islanders' participation in any negotiations.) Britain and Argentina broke off the unfruitful talks in August 1974.

In July 1975 the UK suggested discussions regarding joint development of the southwest Atlantic. The Argentines' response proposed including talks on the transfer of sovereignty under a lease-back arrangement. An obstacle to these efforts was created, however, when Britain sent a survey team, the Shackleton Mission, to assess the long-term economic development prospects of the Falklands/Malvinas. Argentina, pointing out that the mission would arrive on the anniversary of the 1833 British occupation, protested the move by keeping its ambassador to the UK in Buenos Aires and requesting that Great Britain recall its own.

The situation further deteriorated in February 1976 when an Argentine naval vessel fired upon and attempted to board a British ship in an effort to enforce Argentina's claim to a 200-mile territorial sea around the Falklands/Malvinas. Despite discussions in July and August of 1976, relations remained strained, and the situation worsened further in December when the British discovered an Argentine military scientific station on the remote and otherwise uninhabited South Sandwich Island of Southern Thule (one thousand miles east of the main Falklands/Malvinas islands group). The UK protested formally but did not take military action against the station in the hopes of keeping the dispute low-keyed. The Argentines, however, reinforced the station and maintained it until it was forcibly removed in 1982.

In February 1977 the British initiated talks in Buenos Aires in order to establish the agenda for future negotiations to be held in Rome in July. Britain agreed to discuss a broad range of issues, including sovereignty, but the talks in Rome were fruitless. Argentina accused the British of once again refusing to discuss sovereignty. Tensions between the two countries remained high as military activity in the region increased during 1977, and did not lessen until the New York talks in December 1977, which went smoothly. In New York, the two issues of sovereignty and economic cooperation were addressed separately by different teams of negotiators, although in neither case was agreement reached.

Between the winter of 1979 and March 1982 the two parties apparently came very close to an agreement, this time using the lease-back concept as a possible solution. In September 1979 diplomatic relations were resumed at the ambassadorial level and this gave new impetus to negotiations. Despite intense opposition from the islanders' lobby and their supporters in Parliament, the Foreign Office actively pursued the lease-back arrangement. However, the islanders' opposition proved critical in the end, and the best the British could do during the talks of February 1981 was propose a freeze on negotiations, perhaps in order to give the Foreign Office some time to change the islanders' attitude.¹¹ The Argentines rejected this proposal.

The discussions in February of the following year made some headway with the establishment of a negotiating commission which would attempt a political settlement by the end of 1982. However, the Argentine *junta* hardened its position and announced its dissatisfaction with the February agreement. The *junta* also warned that Argentina might feel obligated to pursue its interests in non-peaceful ways. Argentina made good its threat on April 2, 1982 and thus brought an end to seventeen years of negotiations between the two countries.

B. Mediation Efforts

After the eruption of hostilities, major mediation efforts to resolve the dispute were made by US Secretary of State Haig, Peruvian President Belaunde Terry, and UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuellar. Although there was a strong similarity in the content of each of the respective proposals, the methods of diplomacy employed by each mediator were quite different. Haig shuttled back and forth between London and Buenos Aires, Belaunde relied on telephone discussions, and Pérez de Cuellar tried alternating sessions with representatives of the two governments in New York.

Basically, each proposal that was generated sought the withdrawal of military forces from the area, an interim administration for the islands with the involvement of third parties, and an agreement to pursue negotiations over the sovereignty issue. The odds against the success of these plans were great, although each mediating party did much to overcome them. In the end, the acute lack of time available for mediation, the climate of hostility that existed between the UK and Argentina, and the nationalistic fervor which had been generated in both countries proved to be insurmountable obstacles to an agreement.

Haig began his efforts by attempting to reconcile the extreme British and Argentine preconditions for negotiations. Great Britain insisted that Argentina withdraw its forces from the area and accept reinstitution of British administration of the islands. Argentina declared that it would agree to negotiate if a time-frame for the eventual recognition of Argentine sovereignty were established. Also, Argentina would only accept an interim administration of the islands (prior to eventual Argentine sovereignty) in which it played the dominant role.

The Secretary of State shuttled back and forth between Britain and Argentina in his attempt to bring the two sides closer. Prime Minister Thatcher reiterated Britain's demand for Argentina's prior withdrawal of its troops, and further stated that in any future negotiations the British would negotiate on the basis of the wishes of the islanders. Argentina announced that it would not withdraw its forces until the British fleet was stopped, and then declared a new minimum condition for negotiations: that Argentina be able during negotiations to retain some symbol of sovereignty over the islands, such as the flying of the Argentine flag. Haig informed the *junta* that the US, in the event of war, would feel obligated to support Great Britain but that it hoped that further hostilities could be avoided. He then proposed a plan calling for the withdrawal of all forces, a temporary joint Argentine-US-UK administration of the islands, and negotiations over the final status of the islands to begin in December 1982. Argentina rejected the proposal on the grounds that it did not guarantee eventual Argentine sovereignty.

Haig's efforts continued but eventually failed due to the continued British insistence on Argentine withdrawal of its forces prior to negotiations and on respecting the wishes of the islanders in any future negotiations, and to the Argentines' insistence on a guarantee of its ultimate sovereignty over the islands. The mediation efforts were further complicated by Argentina's resentment of the close US-UK relationship and their belief that Haig's approach, particularly the insistence on Argentina's military withdrawal and the lack of the sovereignty guarantee, favored Great Britain. The Argentines resented as well the Americans' warning that they would support the British should the mediation efforts prove unsuccessful.

The next mediation attempt was made by President Belaunde of Peru. On May 2, he proposed a peace plan similar in content to the Security Council resolution of April (which Argentina had rejected) calling for immediate cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of Argentine troops, and the resumption of diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute. Belaunde's plan proposed a cease-fire and reciprocal withdrawal of troops; an interim administration by a contact group comprised of Peru, the US, Brazil, and West Germany; consultation with the islanders on a settlement; recognition by both parties that there were conflicting claims to the islands; recognition of the aspirations and interests of the islanders; and an effort by Britain and Argentina to come to an agreement by April 30, 1983. Argentina objected to the inclusion of the US in the contact group (but later accepted this provision) and also proposed the substitution of the phrase

'aspirations and interests' with 'views of the islanders concerning their interests.' The UK agreed to consider the revised plan. However, later on the same day, the Argentine cruiser *Belgrano* was sunk by a British torpedo and the *junta* informed Belaunde that it could not accept the plan.

Further efforts were made to revive the Peruvian proposal, first by Haig, and later (May 5) by Belaunde himself. The British position was that since the Peruvian plan was very similar to Haig's it was unlikely to succeed, although it was willing to accept Belaunde's mediation with the precondition that reinstatement of British sovereignty be part of the cease-fire agreement. Argentina responded that it had already appealed to Secretary General Pérez de Cuellar to mediate the dispute. The Peruvian initiative had thus failed.

Pérez de Cuellar's mediation officially began on May 5, but he had been in contact with both sides since the beginning of the conflict. During a series of over thirty separate meetings with representatives of each government, Pérez de Cuellar was able to achieve an enormous compromise: Britain was willing to end its insistence on the islanders' self-determination if Argentina would not insist on a guarantee of sovereignty. On May 11, Argentina agreed. The basic plan provided for UN supervision of the withdrawal of forces, UN administration of the islands, and negotiations to be concluded by the end of the year. After the British ambassador to the UN presented this tentative plan to his superiors in London, however, the British decided to propose some amendments. Pérez de Cuellar's efforts ended in failure on May 18, 1982 when Argentina rejected the new British proposal.

C. Post-War Bilateral Contacts

Current relations between Argentina and Great Britain are at a very low point. Diplomatic relations remain broken and Argentina has not yet declared a formal end to hostilities. However, certain discussions between the two governments, briefly outlined below, have taken place, and there have been signs on occasion of a warming of relations, such as the note of congratulations sent by Prime Minister Thatcher to President Alfonsín after his election in 1983, and the subsequent series of notes exchanged between the two. Furthermore, there are currently several major inducements to both sides to resolve the dispute. In addition to the obvious economic benefits of demilitarizing the Falklands/Malvinas zone, a solution acceptable to Argentina would have enormous salutary effects on the health of the Argentine democratic system. It is certainly in Great Britain's interest to do all it can to help consolidate the democratic gains made by Argentina in the last several years, and as long as the sovereignty issue is unresolved, it remains a potentially destabilizing one in Argentine politics. Opponents of the government will not hesitate to exploit the issue if no progress is made. The increased trade which would likely accompany improved relations should be another strong inducement for both countries.

Nevertheless, both sides are at present as far apart in their negotiating stances as ever. The continued military build-up by both sides, the 150-mile

British exclusion zone, and recent events such as the British declaration of a 200-mile fishing zone around the islands in October 1986, have further perpetuated and intensified a climate unfavorable to negotiation and compromise.

The first official talks between Britain and Argentina after the war occurred in July 1984 in Bern, Switzerland, and were presided over by Switzerland and Brazil, the two countries which represent the UK and Argentina, respectively, in Buenos Aires and London. These talks had been set up earlier in the year through the exchange of personal messages between Thatcher and Alfonsín, and it appears that there was a preliminary agreement between the two leaders that the discussion would follow an open agenda. The talks opened on July 19 but broke down the next day because of Argentina's demand, and Britain's refusal, that sovereignty be discussed. This has been the extent of official public contacts between the two sides since the war. In order to resume normal relations Britain demands from Argentina a formal declaration of an end to hostilities and the lifting of the economic sanctions which Argentina imposed upon Britain during the war (the second condition has apparently been largely met). Argentina responds that it will do so when Britain lifts the exclusion zone and stops reinforcing the islands.

There have been some public informal contacts between the two sides since the Bern talks. These include the meeting of President Alfonsín with Labor Party leader Kinnock in Paris in September 1985 and with Liberal Party leader Steel in Madrid the following month. Both meetings resulted in an appeal for negotiations between the two governments over the sovereignty issue. Other unofficial interactions, stemming from contacts made at the Maryland Forums, include the visit of British parliamentarians to Buenos Aires in June 1984 and a reciprocal visit by several Argentine parliamentarians to London in February 1986. On both these occasions, the parliamentarians met with local politicians and civic groups for informal discussions.

IV. A New Approach: The Maryland Forums

It was in a climate of hostility and distrust, created by the war and the seventeen years of failed negotiations, and perpetuated by the lack of formal contact between the two governments, that the Maryland Forums commenced. It had become obvious that the pre-war official contacts and negotiations between Britain and Argentina had failed to resolve the dispute because of the inability to discuss the key issues of sovereignty and the rights of the islanders. Since the war, the issues of militarization of the Falklands/Malvinas zone and the demand for cessation of hostilities have further complicated the process. During bilateral contacts, both sides consistently maintain prior stated positions: the UK will not discuss sovereignty or negotiate until hostilities are formally ended; Argentina will not declare an end to hostilities or negotiate until sovereignty is on the agenda and Britain halts its fortification of the islands. The dispute has therefore remained intractable. It was hoped that the forum setting would provide an

environment in which these issues could be analyzed and a way found to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable demands made by the two sides.

A. Maryland I

The first session was held from September 12 to 15, 1983. The basic goals of this session were:

- 1) to establish an informal communications link between policy makers in Argentina and Great Britain to be used to discuss possible ways to solve the diplomatic impasse and to reduce the level of tension in the South Atlantic;
- 2) to update each side on current views held in the two countries in order to identify potential changes in position and new possibilities for agreement;
- 3) to begin searching for possible solutions to the dispute, and analyze the means necessary to arrive at official agreements;
- 4) to facilitate the dissemination of information to the appropriate policy makers in each country regarding any insights, concurrence in opinions, or possible solutions made apparent at the forum, and;
- 5) to prepare possible future activities that might reinforce and carry forward any progress made at the forum.

Due to the structure of the forum and the dedication of the participants, discussions were frank, energetic, and wide-ranging. It was lamented that no representative from the islands was present, since both sides recognized the critical role that the islanders will play in any future agreement. The islanders had declined to participate on the grounds that it was inappropriate, since a formal end to hostilities had not yet been declared by Argentina. Nevertheless, considerable success was achieved in meeting the above goals.

After both sides had presented and discussed their views of the situation, the participants moved on to discussions regarding possible solutions to the difficult issues of sovereignty, and the tension-reducing steps which could be taken by both sides. Both sides agreed that an eventual solution might be found in the acceptance of an Argentine 'titular sovereignty' which would allow Argentina to display its flag, maintain an official presence, and resume providing health and education services to the islands. The islanders would maintain self-government and have representation in the Argentine congress.

At the conclusion of the forum, both sides agreed that the *status quo* was unacceptable because of the great political and economic costs involved in its maintenance; that unofficial efforts should be made by both sides which might 'trigger' movement beyond the stalemate situation; and that little formal progress could be achieved until the new Argentine government took office in 1984 and established its position regarding the dispute. Finally, the participants agreed that the unofficial process begun at Maryland should be continued and that contacts between the three sets of participants should be maintained.

B. Maryland II

The second Maryland Forum was held from April 27 to 30, 1984. The main organizations involved in the forum were the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI) and the British South Atlantic Council (SAC), the latter organization having been formed in the wake of the September forum. Three of the original British team returned for the April discussions and they were joined by a Labor Party Member of Parliament. The Argentine delegation consisted of the three original participants with the addition of two members of the Argentine Congress, one from the ruling Radical Party and the other from the Justicialist (Peronist) party. The panel of facilitators was unchanged save for the absence of one original participant and the substitution of another with a new facilitator. Once again, to the concern of all participants, there was no island representative. Efforts had been made to bring a British military officer with experience on the islands, but at the last minute he was denied permission to attend by the Ministry of Defence.

The main objectives of this session were:

- 1) to report on the response generated in each country to the events of the first forum, and to bring the participants up to date on any change in government position since the last meetings;
- 2) to report on changes in the domestic political environments including both elite and public opinion concerning the Falklands/Malvinas issue;
- 3) to continue to investigate potential long-term solutions to the dispute in light of the changing political environment;
- 4) to investigate methods of tension-reduction which each side could pursue in the short-term either unilaterally, in coordination with the other side, or following a predetermined sequence;
- 5) to incorporate a broader range of individuals into the forum process and to increase the dissemination of information regarding forum achievements; and,
- 6) to consider coordinated efforts to influence national decision making processes and to continue the informal contacts begun in September 1983.

The April talks, building upon the mutual confidence generated at the September sessions and benefitting from the addition of the British and Argentine parliamentarians, generated a high level of substantive discussion and what the participants regarded as significant progress in analyzing the so-called 'non-negotiable' issues: sovereignty and the islanders' self-determination. After a somewhat frustrating series of open-ended talks, the participants decided to structure the discussions around three topics, to be taken in turn: 1) domestic political constraints and public opinion; 2) tension-reduction possibilities, and; 3) sovereignty and other intractable issues. It was within this format that progress was achieved.

The presentations on domestic political constraints and public opinion brought the participants up to date on developments in Argentina and Great Britain. Of particular note was the concurrence between the two sides in their perception of strong public support at home for negotiations, although the British delegation noted a difference between public and elite opinions in the UK. The discussions also indicated the difficulty that the 'Fortress Falklands' policy might cause for future negotiations: Argentina remains firm in its opposition to the policy, yet since it is well under way and because it has broader strategic implications, Great Britain may not be able to abandon it easily.

The discussions then turned to the idea of linked tension-reducing measures which the two sides might undertake. Suggestions included informal measures such as the liberalization of consular activities; permitting a visit by Argentines to the islands to commemorate their war dead; public statements regretting the loss of life during the war; removal of the Argentine 'intervenor' from British firms operating in Argentina; and the expansion of diplomatic representation in the two capitals. These informal moves could be followed by official policy decisions that altered the British military protection zone to permit the entry of Argentine fishing vessels, the ending of formal hostilities, and the eventual abolition of the protection zone. It was stressed that these measures, progressing from informal to formal, must be sequential for them to be effective.

During the discussions of sovereignty it became apparent that there was a discrepancy between British and Argentine conceptions of what the term meant. The Argentines indicated that they make distinctions between sovereignty over people and sovereignty over territory, the latter being most important to Argentina. It was pointed out that this might indicate the way to accommodate the two previously irreconcilable demands: Argentine sovereignty and self-determination of the islanders. Along with other options, the concept of 'titular sovereignty' was once again discussed as a possible future solution. The participants agreed that the issue of sovereignty must be 'relativised'; that is, eliminate the 'either-or' or 'zero-sum' situation in which both Argentine sovereignty and islander self-determination are incompatible.

The forum concluded with agreements to maintain contacts between CARI and SAC, and to arrange a visit of British parliamentarians to Buenos Aires the following June. The participants also agreed to prepare a third forum to be convened early in 1985 and to exchange papers concerning the first two Maryland sessions.

C. Maryland III

The third Maryland Forum was held from February 18 to 20, 1985. During this forum a representative of the islanders was finally able to participate in the discussions. Also, the presence of a British Conservative Party Member of Parliament and high-ranking Argentine politicians helped to both broaden the range of views given during the discussions and strengthen the links between policy makers in both countries and with the Maryland process.

The format of this forum was identical to that of the first two. The stated purposes were broadened to include substantive discussion of alternative conceptions of sovereignty, and routes by which formal negotiations between the two governments could be undertaken. Whereas the first two forums were mainly exploratory in focus, it was hoped by the participants that in the third meeting concrete proposals could be generated which might contribute to breaking the impasse in negotiations and indicate a possible basis for future agreements. After a rough start, the participants emerged at the end of the sessions with an agreed set of twelve principles which are reproduced in their entirety below.

Agreed Propositions between the Argentine and British Delegations

1) It is the consensus of the participants that the present situation is unacceptable, principally because it constitutes a source of potential conflict, but also because of its cost, its progressive destruction of the longer-term relations between Britain and Argentina, and the anxieties and uncertainties for the people of the islands.

2) It is noted that there can be no progress on transition to peaceful relations until there is agreement in principle to discuss all aspects of the future of the islands. Furthermore, it is recognized that there can be no beginning of either a transition to peaceful relations, or the final stage of negotiations, in the absence of an overall agreement between Great Britain and Argentina to terminate any condition of hostility, to remove restrictions on movement outside territorial waters, and to re-establish diplomatic relations. This, in turn, would depend on the perception of favorable prospects for such a transition and final stage.

3) There is convergence in the view that this interdependence of stages, which seems to have defeated previous official attempts to break the deadlock, is best dealt with by a prior informal understanding that ending hostilities, removing restrictions on movement in any security zone, and reestablishing diplomatic relations implies:

- a) good faith in discussing at an official level all matters relating to the return to peaceful relations; and,
- b) good faith in commencing discussions simultaneously, but separately, on all aspects of the future of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

4) In the discussions which led to Proposition 3, it was clear to all that the transition period could not be measured exclusively in chronological time, but must be measured also in social time; and that it would result from the gradual reestablishment and development of confidence and relationships between Great Britain, Argentina, and the islanders.

5) The forum considered a large number of possible sovereignty options and decided that only some warranted further discussion and consideration. These included shared sovereignty, the transfer of sovereignty with treaty guarantees, and forms of lease-back. There was agreement on the importance

of the preservation of the way of life and respect for the wishes of the islanders.

6) Further exploration of options is necessary. There is a growing realization that agreement on all aspects of the future of the islands will come as a consequence of a successful return to peaceful relations and the establishment of closer Argentina-UK ties.

7) In so far as this might be the case, it is agreed that there should be regular reviews of overall progress of the many detailed peace processes, and regular reviews of the development of relationships, especially between Argentina and the islands, at a high official level.

8) With respect to these ultimate goals it is understood that the process would be step-by-step, 'natural,' conscious, and voluntary, with the islanders influencing the pace in response to developing relationships with Argentina.

9) It is generally agreed that guarantees, if necessary by other nations and international organizations, of any future of the islands could be helpful, but that they would not negate the necessity of gradually building up confidence among the concerned parties.

10) The participants expressed the view that in a complex matter of this kind, official discussions should not be attempted unless and until there is established a set of agreed principles and propositions that create a relevant context for negotiation, and that this might best be achieved by informal discussion between persons with access to, but not part of, government.

11) The participants also noted that there is a role for a third party in all such discussions, not to mediate in the ordinary sense, but to facilitate, to assist with analysis, and to formulate propositions, and that this could be the case in official as well as in unofficial exchanges.

12) The participants believe that there is sufficient good-will and sincerity of purpose on both sides to justify immediate action by the British and Argentine governments along the lines set out in this report, and accordingly, copies have been delivered to the embassies and Foreign Offices of the two governments.

Several points in the declaration stand out. Primary among them are the recognition that the wishes of the islanders must be respected in any future agreement, and that no lasting agreement can be reached unless all aspects of the future of the islands are discussed. These two propositions go far in addressing the primary concerns of both governments. It also became apparent during the forum that there is room to maneuver on the sovereignty issue. A broad range of options was presented and debated by the participants. The Argentine delegation emphasized that a distinction could be made between sovereignty over people and sovereignty over the land ('titular' sovereignty), thus indicating a possible way to preserve the islanders' way of life while at the same time satisfying the requirements of Argentine national honor.

Another crucial aspect of the declaration dealt with the current impasse in negotiations. It was agreed that the essential British and Argentine positions--

that, respectively, negotiations could not begin without a formal end to hostilities, and that hostilities could not be terminated until assurances are made that the future of the islands would be discussed--might be reconciled in negotiations that were divided into two, parallel, sets. One set would discuss normalization of relations, and the other would discuss sovereignty. Finally, the participants declared that an agreed set of principles should precede official discussions, and that this might be best achieved through informal talks involving a third party in a facilitating role, and that sufficient goodwill exists on both sides to begin the confidence-building and tension-reducing steps outlined in the report.

V. Critique of the Falklands/Malvinas Forums

How do we measure the success of the forums? Ultimately, it can only be measured in terms of how the forums have contributed to progress in resolving the conflict. But as the lessons of effective Track Two diplomacy show, progress must be looked for in areas other than traditional diplomacy or official negotiations. We can point to the increased level of contact between Argentina and British parliamentarians as a visible product of the Maryland talks, and we believe that contact of this type between individuals who influence the policy makers in their countries is a positive achievement. Forum participants on both sides generated forceful and novel ideas, several of which were later used during meetings of parliamentarians from both countries as well as during contacts made between President Alfonsín and the British party leaders Kinnock and Steel in 1985.

In general, we believe that the main achievements of the forums were: 1) an increased desire on the part of certain policy makers on both sides to work for a solution; 2) a higher level of confidence in, and understanding of, each side's intentions; and 3) the creation of a much-needed channel of communication between the two parties. (More specific achievements and limitations of the Falklands/Malvinas Forums will be addressed in Chapter 7.)

We attribute these achievements to the process of Track Two Diplomacy. However, while the opportunity to explore new conceptual territory is provided by the forum environment, the success of the process in each instance relies solely on the courage of the individual participants. Hence, we would like to make it clear that all credit for progress in the Falkland/Malvinas forums should go to the forum participants themselves.

The primary advantage of Track Two is that it provides an opportunity to analyze and discuss issues which have not been addressed, for various reasons, during traditional, or Track One diplomacy. In the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, these issues have been sovereignty and the rights of the islanders to self-determination. As we saw earlier, official negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina before the war inevitably broke down because the two sides were (and still are) unable to openly discuss these two issues and search for alternative paths to agreement. Why has this been so? To answer this question, it will be

useful to briefly review the concept of protracted social conflict as it applies to the Falklands/Malvinas case.

A. The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute as Protracted Social Conflict

Conflicts between two nations which exhibit aspects of stereotyping (such as racism), ethnocentrism, or an overriding concern with national identity tend to be *protracted* conflicts. To resolve such a conflict, deep-seated values and motivations have to be addressed and managed. As long as racial/ethnic/nationalistic hostility is allowed to become manifest in the relations between nations, the ability to address *negotiable* issues is minimized. In the event that this hostility is at the root of a dispute, the conflict will tend to be protracted until both elite and mass opinions are changed, a process which is long and difficult.

It is apparent to students of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict that questions of national identity and image have been extremely important, although never explicitly recognized by decision makers on both sides. Thatcher never stated that Britain was fighting in order to shore up its declining position as a world power, nor has the Argentine government publicly declared that it was resisting 'British imperialism,' although these are certainly important motivating factors in the conflict. It is obvious that a way must be found to address these concerns, legitimate or not, before any acceptable solution is found. Of course, in contrast with the Lebanon and Sri Lanka cases, it cannot be said here that nationalism or ethnic hostility is at the root of the conflict. Clearly, the dispute originated over questions of territorial sovereignty. However, it is equally clear that sovereignty issues often have much to do with national identity, and this is certainly true in the Falklands/Malvinas case. If the problem were only juridical, resolution of the conflict would most likely have been achieved long ago.

A protracted social conflict makes relations between the two concerned nations very volatile; that is, it has the capacity to generate other, and often more serious, crises. For example, a low-level dispute over national borders may easily lead to larger disputes and eventually to violence. Also, unresolved issues may tend to multiply, further increasing tensions. This description obviously applies to the Great Britain-Argentina dispute. A war was fought over what was at the time a relatively insignificant piece of land because of an inability to address the issues at the core of the dispute. Also, the current conflicts over fishing rights and mineral exploration in the area may possibly escalate into violence because of the underlying tension between the two countries.

Protracted social conflict tends to become the dynamic which primarily drives relations between two states. The incidence of, and propensity for, cooperative interactions diminish over time as they are increasingly subsumed to the demands of the protracted conflict. For example, the Argentine-British territorial dispute has negatively affected cooperative relations in more significant areas, such as trade. Relatively insignificant disputes, if protracted due to

identity-related issues, may become the basis upon which the desirability of other interactions is determined and thus reduce the larger arena of bilateral contacts to one in which the protracted conflict is paramount.

These conflicts do not respond to traditional diplomatic processes (Track One diplomacy) which tend to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, differences based upon distrust or enmity. As we saw earlier, Track One diplomacy in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict was ineffective because it was carried out on the basis of prior-stated positions (Argentina demanding sovereignty, Great Britain demanding the right of self-determination of the islanders). These positions were apparently irreconcilable to both sides, and negotiations were thus doomed to failure. With each successive failure, tensions and distrust increased, making a resolution of the conflict more problematic.

A final characteristic of protracted social conflict is that it may generate conflict *within* a state regarding questions of government legitimacy. Because of the high domestic concern with a protracted conflict, political elites are in danger of being criticized if they are regarded as not protecting the national identity which is at issue. This is the dilemma for political leaders: to search for creative solutions to a protracted conflict requires an understanding and appreciation of the deep-seated identity issues important to both sides; yet the political elite or government which is seen by its own public as ceding the primacy of the other party's national values, goals, *etc.*, in negotiations is in danger of losing its political legitimacy at home and being driven from power. Whether or not the Falklands/Malvinas conflict poses such danger to the stability of British or Argentine governments is open to question. However, it is conceivable, particularly in the Argentine case, that a highly unpopular decision made by the government concerning the islands, coupled with simultaneous widespread dissatisfaction with the economic situation, could lead to generalized protests and the creation of an unstable political environment.

VI. Conclusion: Inducements and Constraints to a Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict

What are the prospects for a negotiated solution to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute? The original issues of sovereignty and the wishes of the islanders have yet to be addressed by Great Britain and Argentina, and this in itself will be a difficult process. However, other issues and factors have also become important, many of them separate from the basic sovereignty/wishes question. The 1982 war created the necessity of bringing about a cessation of hostilities and a normalization of relations before negotiations can be undertaken, and since then several other issues have emerged which will have an influence on the dispute.

A. Current Negotiating Positions

With regard to the main obstacles (sovereignty, wishes of the islanders, cessation of hostilities, normalization of relations, demilitarization of the zone), there has been mixed progress. In 1984, Argentine President Alfonsín declared that Argentina would recover the islands only through peaceful means, but at the same time stated that normalization of relations between the two countries would occur only when Great Britain agreed to discuss sovereignty.¹² British Foreign Secretary Howe replied that Britain remained committed to the right of self-determination of the islanders. It is encouraging that Argentina has publicly stated its commitment to negotiations to resolve the dispute, but beyond that there has been no apparent softening of positions on either side in regard to the major points of contention.

A recent development is that demilitarization of the Falklands/Malvinas zone has emerged as the most important issue from the Argentine perspective. In statements made at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 1985, an Argentine representative indicated that demilitarization, and not sovereignty, is now given the highest priority.¹³ This, taken with the British government's statement that it would not alter the Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ) even if a formal end to hostilities were declared, indicates how the post-war military buildup and continuing presence in the region has increased tensions.

B. Conflict Over Economic Resources

Since the war, a major new area of contention has emerged which has added significantly to the complexity of the situation: the economic resources of the Falklands/Malvinas zone and their exploitation. Until recently, the area, an immense and valuable fishing ground, was one of the last large unregulated fishing areas left in the world. Since 1982, the islanders have been clamoring for regulation of the area in order to increase revenue flowing into the islands and as a way of managing the marine resources. To this end, the British government began negotiations with other countries over fishing rights, and in April 1986, imposed a \$2,250 tax on every fishing vessel operating within the FIPZ. In October 1986, Britain expanded the regulated fishing zone from 3 to 200 miles in response to 'aggressive Argentine patrolling' in the waters around the islands.¹⁴

Naturally, this has created some serious difficulties for Argentina. First of all, Argentina does not recognize British sovereignty over the islands and hence has felt free to negotiate with other countries over fishing rights in the area. Such agreements have already been made with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, despite the fact that this might lead to a dispute with the British in the contested zone. Secondly, the British-declared 200-mile fishing zone (patrolled by the British navy) overlaps with the claimed 200-mile Argentine territorial waters.

Argentina's cancellation of the discharge of army conscripts is an indication of the tension created by this situation. Both countries have been unable to come to an agreement over fishing rights, despite the involvement of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

To further complicate matters, Britain has commenced drilling for oil in the islands with the aid of a US-based company. It is ironic that economic issues should become important at this point, because for hundreds of years the islands were regarded as having little economic value.

C. Democracy in Argentina

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the consolidation of Argentine democracy should serve as an inducement to resolving the conflict. An early agreement acceptable to Argentina would have increased Alfonsín's popularity and justified his commitment to a peaceful resolution of the dispute, thus contributing to the democratic government's stability.

However, the continuing instability of Argentine democracy, made evident by the military mutinies in 1987 and 1988 over the prosecution of officers for human rights violations, is a constraint as well as an inducement to a negotiated solution. Statements made by the British and the islanders over recent years have indicated concern over the implications that a return to military rule in Argentina would have for negotiations and the future of the islands. They wonder if a military government would feel obligated to comply with agreements made by a previous civilian government or continue a policy which renounces the use of force. This concern was made evident in 1985, when the islanders showed interest in a deal involving lease-back of the islands with third party guarantees, which also included a clause stating that the agreement would be nullified in the event of a military coup in Argentina.¹⁵ The Argentines appreciate and share this concern. A proposal put forward in 1985 by Argentina regarding temporary joint administration of the islands included a similar provision.¹⁶

D. Strategic Issues in the South Atlantic and the Role of the US

Another issue which must be addressed is the strategic importance of the islands, and the related question of what role the US will play in the resolution of the conflict. The close relations which the US maintains with both Great Britain and Argentina would perhaps normally indicate a strong future role in any brokered or third-party-guaranteed agreement, but US strategic interests and certain recent events have made this participation problematic. Effective mediation and other involvement by a third party generally requires objective, unbiased participation, and it will be hard for the US to establish its credibility should it attempt to assume this role. Argentina still resents the fact that the US supported Britain in the war and the participation of a US-based company in the oil project in the islands will also likely bother the Argentines.

It should also be no surprise that the US is concerned with the strategic importance of the region and will be active in pursuing its own interests. The Americans naturally want to minimize Soviet influence in the region and will therefore pay strict attention to the Argentina-Soviet Union fishing agreements and the presence of Soviet fishing trawlers in the South Atlantic. Great Britain, Argentina, and the US all want to avoid a further militarization of the region, and the US is anxious lest a Soviet fishing fleet and a large British naval presence induce Soviet naval forces to enter the zone. The British as well would be concerned about an American role in mediating the dispute, in case the US should begin to support the Argentine position more strongly and press Great Britain for concessions.

E. National Security Concerns of Great Britain and Argentina

For both the British and the Argentines the South Atlantic is vital in terms of protecting their conflicting claims in the Antarctic. The Antarctic may prove to be vastly more valuable economically than the Falklands/Malvinas themselves, in which case both countries will even more actively defend their interests. This, added to the overlapping fishing and territorial waters, and the strategic issues mentioned above, means that the large British military presence on the islands is also seen as a potential threat to Argentine national security.

F. International and Domestic Opinion

Finally, international and domestic opinion has not remained static during the last seven years, and may influence the course of events, possibly leading to a resolution of the dispute. Britain spends approximately \$700 million per year on the defense of the islands and this has created strain within the government and increased public disfavor with official Falklands/Malvinas policy. A poll taken in November 1984 showed that 74 percent of those queried favored the restoration of diplomatic relations with Argentina, and only 37 percent wanted the islands to remain permanently British.¹⁷

Public opinion in the islands themselves may also be changing. At the 1985 SAIS conference, an island representative said that the islanders would like the Falklands/Malvinas to become a nuclear-free and even an arms-free zone. Even if this does not indicate a greater willingness to come to an agreement with Argentina, it certainly represents dissatisfaction with the *status quo*.

Finally, international opinion has recently been clearly shown to favor negotiations between Argentina and Britain. The Argentine-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution of November 25, 1986 calling for negotiations on sovereignty resulted in a vote of 116-4 in favor, with 34 abstentions. For the first time, the US, France, and Italy voted against Great Britain. The loss of support from its major ally and from its fellow EEC members may induce Britain to regard negotiations more favorably.

G. Possible Tension-Reducing Steps

The situation has clearly become more complicated and perhaps more volatile. It is possible, however, that the more recent obstacles and issues may not become embedded into the conflict (contributing to its intractability); but rather may provide opportunities for conflict resolution.

Track Two diplomacy reflects the necessity for initiating confidence-building and tension-reducing steps prior to the initiation of negotiations on the major issues to a dispute. At the Maryland Forums, the facilitators undertook to discover how the proper type and sequence of such measures might contribute to Falklands/Malvinas conflict resolution. We believe that elimination of the most recent obstacles, particularly the fisheries dispute, might provide confidence-building and tension-reducing benefits and bring the two sides closer to agreement. In February 1986, both Great Britain and Argentina indicated to the FAO that they were willing to 'freeze' the sovereignty issue in order to address the fishing problem.¹⁸ British M.P. Foulkes has said that one way of inducing the islanders to accept negotiations with Argentina is by 'convincing them of the danger of over-fishing.'¹⁹ Although no agreement has been produced, the possibility of a bilateral accord on managing fishing rights still exists and should be pursued. It is not inconceivable that such an agreement might lead to a normalization of relations, which in turn might reduce military tensions and create an environment conducive to negotiations on the sovereignty issue.

Other potential confidence-building and tension-reducing steps could be taken by Britain and Argentina with regard to expanding unofficial representation in each other's capital, or organizing visits by the Argentines to the islands to honor the war dead. However, if easing current tension points is to be used as a means of getting closer to resolution of the major issues, action must be taken before these points themselves become intractable and perhaps lead to another war.

The mechanics of initiating contacts and discussions between the two countries is a complex issue, but we believe that much can be done on either side, both officially and unofficially, to help initiate the negotiating process. Assuming that the two countries can be brought together to work out an agreement on the Falklands/Malvinas, however, one further question remains to be considered. What international institutions and which members comprising them would be able to arbitrate and ensure compliance with an agreement? Is the UN or Organization of American States capable of doing this? Should the US or only strictly neutral countries be involved? A full exploration of these issues would make a needed contribution not only to the resolution of this conflict, but also to the study of conflict management in general.

Notes

(For full bibliographic information on citations, please see bibliography at the end of the book.)

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7. The Maryland Forums and Track Two Diplomacy: A Balance Sheet

I. Achievements and Limitations of the Forums

A. Lebanon

1. Achievements

We were impressed during both forums by the intense dedication, interest and energy of the group of Lebanese participants. Much of this is attributable to the nature of the conflict which is characterized by high levels of mobilization, emotion and anxiety on the part of all Lebanese. It was to be expected that the participants would bring this environment with them when they came to Maryland. We are also convinced, however, that the participants' ability to express themselves was facilitated by the structure of the meetings which encouraged expression of perceptions, grievances and needs. We have found that the expression of emotion plays an important role in the resolution of conflict, and we were gratified by the events of the forums in this regard.

Although the participants were dedicated, during the outset of the first series of meetings they also exhibited clear ideological agendas which posed some problems. It was important to separate and maintain the positive qualities (*i.e.*, energy, dedication and interest) as distinct from the ideological constraints. Fortunately, in our estimation, the process was able to achieve this to a remarkable extent. Frank and effective communication between the various groups was achieved, and the participants developed both a new and significant level of respect for each other as individuals, and a greater understanding and

appreciation of each other's political positions, as evidenced by the informal network of communication among the parties which has arisen since the Lebanon Forums.

The second forum built upon the success of the first, in that the participants were more relaxed and confident, both in themselves and in the process itself. For these meetings we were able to incorporate some new individuals who were nominated by the leaders of the various communities. In this way, we had in attendance individuals who had previously participated (and thus were comfortable with the process) in addition to the new individuals who, being nominated by the different leaderships, brought with them a certain measure of authority and legitimacy. This proved to be an excellent combination of qualities. The points of agreement outlined in Chapter 4 illustrate the progress made at the second forum. These points showed that there exists a commonality of perspectives across the Lebanese communities, including concern over religious fundamentalism and external interference in Lebanese affairs.

Perhaps the most positive result of the forums has been their contribution to the establishment of an informal network of concerned Lebanese in the different communities, who continue to communicate and discuss issues related to the conflict. We believe that the formation of these kinds of networks among individuals who are engaged in protracted social conflict is essential. By maintaining contact, the different groups are able to more intelligently interpret the various 'signals' that are sent during a conflict which, given the volatility of the situation, are otherwise often misconstrued. Thus, these networks may provide tangible benefits in reducing tension and misperceptions between the parties. We are gratified that this network of Lebanese includes a much larger number of individuals than the original forum participants. New people have been brought in and are now indirectly benefiting from the progress made at Maryland. Despite the difficulties of communicating in a conflict environment, we at the Center have also managed to maintain regular contact with more than half of the participants. With these individuals we are discussing possible future activities including the design of a program to be used in Lebanese schools and universities which would describe the forum process and analyze other conflict resolution strategies.

One tangible product that has already emerged from this informal network is a paper called the 'National Covenant Document,' written by representatives of various groups in the spring of 1988, which proposes ideas for beginning the reunification of all Lebanese and initiating a much needed healing process. We are currently organizing a gathering of some of these individuals in Washington D.C. to announce the signing of the document and to publicize its content among Lebanese in the United States. We view the Document as a means both of continuing dialogue among the broad array of Lebanese, and of bringing to the attention of important decision makers in the US the particular needs of Lebanese society.

The success of the forums can also be measured in less concrete, but no less important ways. The very fact that the forums took place is a positive

achievement, given the pessimism and cynicism which characterizes the current attitudes of most Lebanese. The forums provided the opportunity for participants to discover and explore areas of agreement, and this, in turn, introduced a certain amount of hope and optimism into the conflict environment. Our experience with protracted social conflict has taught us that attitudes themselves are extremely important, and that any progress which is made in changing them is a positive step in the movement from war to peace.

2. Limitations

The first obstacle to the process, alluded to above, was that the participants came to Maryland 'armed' with position papers, reports, and other lobbying materials despite the fact that we had requested them not to do so. It was not until approximately mid-way through the second day that the panel of facilitators was able to induce the Lebanese to depart from their prepared agendas and begin anew. We are presenting this as a 'limitation' to the Lebanon forums, but we are not sure that we could realistically have expected to avoid it. Participants will almost always come to a forum expecting the worst and so must be prepared to defend their positions in the event that they are attacked. As shown by the second forum, once the process is initiated then participants will more readily open themselves up to frank and analytical discussions.

Another obstacle that the facilitators faced was that the participants were very concerned with presenting their case to Americans, hoping to attract some supporters to their cause. It was clear to the facilitators that one of the reasons that the Lebanese agreed to participate in the forum was the fact that it was to be held in the United States. We are not sure that they would have participated had the event been hosted by individuals in another, less powerful country. Thus, the participants had an agenda for the forum distinct from that of the facilitators.

The panel of facilitators had limited success in convincing the participants that the panel of facilitators did not represent, nor have some association with the US government, and that no good would come from lobbying activities. We regard this attitude of the Lebanese during the forums as reflecting a basic contradiction which has plagued the country historically. That is, that the Lebanese agree that outside interference has had much negative influence on Lebanon, yet the various communities continue to look for outside support. The United States, it appears, is currently regarded by many Lebanese as more 'benevolent' than other powers, and so becomes the target of more requests for support.

One limitation to our approach in the Lebanon case involves the composition of the participating groups. Ideally, it would have been better had fewer Christians, especially Maronites, and more Moslems, especially individuals representing the more extreme positions, been involved. The Maronite Christians were over-represented simply because they were easier to recruit. Although normally a drawback, this might be acceptable in the Lebanon case since it reflects actual divisions within the Lebanese Christian community, with the Maronites having more influence. All of the Moslem participants were

politically moderate. This was helpful in terms of initiating discussions, and keeping them going, but it limited our ability to address the extreme positions which, especially in the Lebanese case, are no less valid or important. We tried to get a better balance but in this case we can say that reality got in the way. Events at the time were rapidly changing and creating new situations which we were not always able to cope with. Nevertheless, we consider the mix of participants overall to be successful, although not ideal.

The composition of the panel of facilitators also posed a problem, one more serious than what occurred with the participants. Although the panel was uniformly intelligent, creative and dedicated, not all facilitators had specific knowledge of, or experience with, Middle East politics, particularly Lebanese politics. This was a limitation because the panel was unable to challenge the participants to re-analyze prior assumptions and interests. The participants, realizing that several facilitators did not have such specific knowledge, were for the most part comfortable in maintaining their original positions. In short, the panel did not make the participants work hard enough. Ultimately, the participants' sense of having reached a 'dead end' (discussed below) was partially created by this situation. In retrospect, we believe that a panel consisting of experts in Lebanese politics as well as experts in facilitation techniques would have been more effective. We will discuss this issue at greater length later in this chapter.

A final limitation of the forum was created by the agenda. During both sets of meetings we concentrated on domestic political issues to the exclusion of regional political and economic development issues. This was fine as far as it went, but we exhausted the usefulness of analysis of these issues prior to the end of the second forum. Our concern was with avoiding discussion about issues which the participants, and the groups they represented, could themselves do nothing or little about. We considered it pointless, and even counter-productive, to dwell for example, on the roles of Syria and Israel in Lebanon. Rather, progress would come from analysis of communal grievances, perceptions and needs. Our basic approach was not incorrect, but rather, the amount of time we spent on these issues was excessive. Questions regarding outside actors and economic development are crucial in the Lebanese situation, and in fact they influence communities' grievances, perceptions and needs. There was agreement that outside actors created problems, but no analysis was made of what the proper role of these countries was in Lebanon. The participants became impatient with the pace of progress in this regard, and although they left feeling good about each other as individuals, they still did not feel good about the prospects for resolving conflict. This might not have been the case had we incorporated discussion and analysis of substantive and perhaps even technical issues into the two forums. Future efforts will address these areas in more detail.

B. Sri Lanka

1. Achievements

The achievements of the Sri Lanka Forum were not as dramatic as those of the Lebanon or Falklands/Malvinas Forums. No agreements were signed, nor were any permanent networks for communication between the two sides established. There were several factors involved which discouraged such progress, including the composition of the participant group, a shortage of meeting time, and perhaps even the nature of the conflict at the time. These factors will be discussed below. However, before turning to these points, we would like to describe certain positive aspects of the forum which were noted by the participants and facilitators.

First of all, we were able to attract influential and knowledgeable individuals representing both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities to participate in the process. The discussions which occurred were marked by a very high level of sophistication since the representatives were for the most part scholars as well as decision-makers or individuals in close touch with decision-makers. All the participants were able to speak knowledgeably about current issues and so there was little time wasted in beginning discussion of the most important aspects of the conflict. Discussion was animated as each side made and defended its case with its counterparts as well as with the panel of facilitators.

Although they adopted a strong advocacy stance, the Sri Lankans did not remain as firmly rooted to their ideological perspectives as did, for example, the Lebanese. Some of the participants arrived with a prepared agenda, yet they were willing to reject it and develop arguments as the forum progressed. In sum, the participants were able to quickly arrive at the perceptions and values which lie at the heart of the dispute.

The December 1985 forum ended with both sides pledging to maintain contact with the aid of the forum sponsors in order to pursue confidence-building and tension-reducing steps. Meetings hosted by the sponsors since then have focused on substantive issues in an attempt to maintain dialogue and personal contact between Sinhalese and Tamils.

The first meeting was also useful as a 'laboratory' for the study of relations between groups engaged in protracted social conflict. Each side devoted a great deal of time to trying to convince their counterparts that their own perceptions were correct. Even questions and points which normally would be expected to be part of the historical record were argued over at length and with great passion. From the perspective of conflict resolution specialists, then, the forum was a 'textbook' case in the dynamics of protracted social conflict and thus was instructional. (Later seminars, such as those held in December 1986 and October 1987, were convened to focus on specific substantive issues, and did not follow the typical forum format.)

2. Limitations

Unlike the Lebanon and the Falklands/Malvinas forums, in the Sri Lanka case we have been able to host only one forum, covering three days, with follow-up seminars covering even shorter periods. As pointed out in the guidelines in Chapter 3, we believe that forums should ideally last four to five days, and if possible, be repeated at later dates in order to build on earlier progress and include discussion of substantive issues. The three-day forum, although useful, would have been more effective had it lasted two or three days longer. Given the type of participant who attended, we believe that more time was needed to encourage the Sri Lankans to abandon their prior positions and ideological/ intellectual commitments, and engage in the type of 'needs analysis' which occurred during the Lebanon and Falklands/Malvinas Forums. Nevertheless, the Sri Lanka example is worth analyzing both in terms of how it did (or did not) contribute to conflict resolution, and as an example of inter-group dynamics in the forum setting. We believe that the greatest obstacle to significant progress during the forum was the fact that both sides came to Maryland looking for some type of written agreement. That is, they were slow to take advantage of the opportunity to explore the differing grievances, perceptions and needs of each community. (The panel of facilitators must share responsibility for this shortcoming.) Our experience with the Lebanon and Falklands/Malvinas Forums show that only when the participants are not trying to come to an agreement do the conditions arise under which commonality of needs can be detected (a 'win-win' situation), thus paving the way for useful agreements to be made. We believe that with more time these conditions could have been created. Unfortunately, changing events and a lack of resources did not permit a series of events similar in length and scope to the Lebanon and Falklands/Malvinas Forums.

Several of the participants were highly influential in government and opposition circles and this may have had a negative influence on the process. It was the facilitators' perception that several of the participants were looking for ways in which their political allies could benefit from the meetings, through the discovery of new ideas to be passed on and used in the Sri Lanka political arena, or through political posturing. Political struggles in Sri Lanka were evident at Maryland as several participants jockeyed to 'win' points and influence other participants. We do not mean to imply that the forum was dominated solely by political competition. As we have mentioned, important issues were brought up and discussed. However, it did appear to the panel that these discussions were consistently influenced by political considerations, and so the participants were unable to move beyond perceptions and discover underlying needs.

In retrospect, then, it appears that the participants may have been too close to decision-makers in their communities, especially in the case of the Tamil participants. Little concrete progress was made in the forum because of what we considered excessive emotional sensitivity due to the high public profile of several individuals. Such hyper-sensitivity will always exist in these conflict situations, but it is possible to move beyond it as long as the participants are

behaving and interacting as individuals and not as representatives responsible to their constituents. The Tamil participants were themselves high-level representatives and decision-makers. It is difficult for such individuals to experiment and perhaps alter their perceptions without feeling that they are betraying their community.

Also, the fact that the Sinhalese were not as influential in their community as were the Tamils in theirs may have created an imbalance in terms of prestige and respect. Participants will not take the emotional and intellectual risks asked of them by the forum process if they perceive that their counterparts are not undertaking a similar level of risk. Since the Sinhalese leadership was not present it was unrealistic to expect the Tamils to behave in a way that could not be reciprocated by the Sinhalese. Rather than achieving the goal of frank and analytic probing of grievances, perceptions and needs, the forum thus served in part to confirm for the participants their previous attitudes. Participants in both groups were unable to fully allay their cynicism regarding the other's intentions in participating. Once again, we believe that this failure was at least in part due to a lack of time in conducting the forums, as well as the proximity of the participants to their leadership.

A final limitation may have been posed by the 'low' level of development of the conflict itself. Intervention in protracted social conflict will be most successful when the parties to a dispute perceive that they have exhausted all other means of settlement, such as military action, official diplomacy, or even public lobbying activities designed to convince the other side that their interpretation is historically and objectively incorrect. The meetings turned out to serve as a forum for the latter type of activity, we believe. That is, the participants remained imbedded in historical interpretation and 'objective' analysis, hoping to change the opinions of the other side. The forum process was not successful in revealing to them that such objective analysis is fruitless because of the very nature of the conflict. The Sri Lanka conflict is not the result of juridical disputes nor differing interpretations of history, but rather it is the result of the unaddressed grievances and unmet needs of the two communities.

To a greater extent than is the case with the Lebanese or with the Argentines and British, the Sri Lankans are still arguing over who is 'right' and 'wrong.' In addition, the conflict has not acquired the sense of 'hopelessness' that the other two conflicts have. The Sri Lankans still expect that a solution will be found either through military means or through the intervention of an outside power. Until they think otherwise, it is probable that a great deal more violence will have to occur and time pass without finding a solution before the parties will be ready to begin the search for a mutual understanding which will necessarily precede the resolution of the conflict.

C. Falklands/Malvinas

1. Achievements

Of the three series of forums, we were most pleased with the results of the Falklands/Malvinas forums in terms of both participant attitudes and substantive progress. Certainly, the fact that three separate series of meetings were held on this conflict (as opposed to two for Lebanon and one for Sri Lanka) contributed to the overall success. Nevertheless, the participants on both sides displayed from the beginning an extraordinary acceptance of the process and willingness to work within the established guidelines. These attitudes were responsible for the success that the forums had in increasing mutual confidence and understanding of positions, perceptions and values. The individuals came to the meetings in order to learn, and not to lobby, and thus the conditions were created which allowed the eventual substantive agreements and other progress which took place.

Perhaps the clearest sign of the positive achievements of these forums was the desire on the part of the participants to continue working with each other after the meetings had concluded. Mechanisms for continued communication were established in the wake of the meetings and these links have been maintained. This desire for continued contact is a product of the confidence and trust which were generated during the meetings.

Because the participants were able to move away from the prior-stated and official positions of their respective parties, a profound and effective analysis of the motivating factors of the conflict was achieved. The document expressing the twelve agreed principles is proof of the extent to which the participants penetrated the barriers formed by the established official positions of the UK and Argentine governments. The progress made in discovering potential tension-reducing steps is indicative of the conceptual and attitudinal changes which the participants underwent in terms of learning to concentrate on the movement from war to peace. Our experience with other conflicts has shown that it is very difficult to cease to fixate on the present conflict and attempt to envision a viable future solution.

The ability of the participants to make this progress has much to do with the type of individual who attended. The fact that the participants were not official governmental representatives enabled them to consider alternatives without committing their governments to any official action. Yet the proximity of several of the participants to the decision makers in their respective countries ensured that any suggestions or proposals derived from the forums would be passed on to governmental officials back home. Current Argentine-British relations are characterized by a high level of tension and distrust and before official negotiations will have a chance of success, confidence-building and tension-reducing steps such as those outlined at Maryland II must be undertaken. Track Two diplomacy processes such as the Maryland Forums permit the exploration of ways to insert these essential steps into the negotiating process; and the forums may in themselves be regarded as such a step to the extent that they lead to increased understanding and trust between the two sides to a dispute.

The substantive achievements of the forums were the product of the conceptual progress which was made. What the Maryland Forums provided in the Falklands/Malvinas case was the opportunity to determine if demands and interests are truly irreconcilable. As we saw earlier, the Argentine conception of sovereignty, previously unknown to the British, may in fact be compatible with the British insistence on respecting the wishes of the islanders. It is conceivable that an agreement be reached which simultaneously gives Argentina titular sovereignty over the islands and preserves the islanders' way of life. This type of discovery is rarely achieved during Track One diplomacy because of the impediments created by concern about national image and by prior-stated positions.

The forums also made progress in untangling the knot of conflicting and simultaneous demands which characterize the current state of the dispute. (Argentina wants to begin negotiations on sovereignty; Great Britain will not begin talks until Argentina formally ends hostilities; Argentina will not end hostilities until Britain reduces its military presence in the area; Britain will not do so because of the Argentine military threat; *etc.*) It was agreed that this impasse could be broken by a combination of two events: first, the official recognition by both sides that the issues of sovereignty and wishes of the islanders are paramount, and second, the initiation of tension-reducing measures such as those outlined in Maryland II. In this way, neither side would have to compromise on 'needs' questions in order to lessen the diplomatic and military tensions which currently exist. Once these tensions were reduced, the conditions would be more favorable for the exploration of ways to accommodate the demands of both sides concerning the two principle issues.

2. Limitations

Although we are pleased with the overall results of the forums, we are also aware of several obstacles to further progress which we were not able to remove. Some of these are related to the problems inherent in protracted social conflict as mentioned above. The discussions between the participants were handicapped, in the facilitators' estimation, by differences with regard to perceptions of time and identity, and by a mutual distrust of intentions. We will now turn to a brief discussion of each of these three elements.

The first, and most obvious, observation that the panel of facilitators made was one regarding both sides' perception of time. It has become obvious that neither party, and particularly the Argentines, is in any real hurry to make efforts to resolve the dispute, albeit for different reasons. (We refer here to official government perceptions and not to those of the individual participants.) The British government does not feel obligated to actively push for a resolution of the dispute for several reasons. First of all, the *status quo* favors the British. Secondly, they won the war and do not feel that they should be the ones to make concessions. Finally, Britain feels itself on the moral high ground since Argentina was the one that initiated hostilities in 1982. For its part, Argentina feels that time is on its side. The official Argentine perception is that as time

goes on, the British government will tire of the effort and expense needed to defend the islands, the British public's support for its government's policies will diminish, international pressure on Britain to change its position will increase, and finally, the Conservatives will be replaced by a more liberal government. These attitudes were made apparent by the comments of the participants. However, our view is that this lack of urgency is dangerous in that it ignores the necessity of resolving the issues still at the core of the dispute. And while both sides wait, current tension points may sharpen and proliferate, thus triggering a new conflagration.

Another of the facilitators' concerns was the lingering of 'hidden' cultural and identity-based differences that have played a role in the decision-making process of both sides during the dispute. During the war, unofficial statements from the British disparaging South American dictators, and from the Argentines regarding the duty to resist yet one more act of British imperialism, were frequently heard. Since the war, and as tempers cool, the cultural aspect of the dispute has receded, but not disappeared. We believe that such cultural tensions play a role in conflict and therefore must be addressed, just as historical, legal, or political aspects of the dispute must be addressed. Unfortunately, this did not occur during the Maryland Forums. Rather, the participants' attention was focused exclusively upon national interests and goals. We believe that if both sides were to openly recognize this tension at the cultural level, and its role in inhibiting mutual understanding and trust, then a successful resolution of the conflict would become more possible.

During the forums, the panel of facilitators also observed a mutual distrust between the parties concerning the other's real intentions when discussing the non-central issues. As with the differing perceptions relating to identity, a distrust of intentions is a problem typical of protracted social conflict. During the exchanges on the sovereignty and self-determination questions, the atmosphere was marked by a high degree of openness and honesty by both sides. However, when peripheral questions were brought up and discussed, the frankness and trust evaporated. Essentially, the central issues were of such importance to everyone that neither side could believe that the other really had an interest in the secondary issues, and so that when they were discussed, each side detected hidden motives in the other's positions. The British, for example, found it difficult to believe that Argentina's willingness to discuss steps towards demilitarization of the Falklands/Malvinas area was unrelated to their insistence on sovereignty. Similarly, Argentina was distrustful of Britain's position that an Argentine visit to the islands to honor the war dead did not necessarily imply an acceptance of the *status quo*. So, although the participants did make progress in the discovery of tension-reducing and confidence-building steps to be taken by the two governments, complete understanding and mutual trust between the participants were never established.

Two general limitations to the Track Two process were observed during the forums, limitations which apply to the Lebanese and Sri Lanka cases as well. One has to do with the perception by participants that Track Two is less relevant

or worthwhile than Track One diplomacy. Of course, this perception diminished over the course of the forums and afterwards when the achievements of the process became apparent, but it was a liability at the beginning of the meetings. The participants must be convinced that Track One-type negotiations are not inherently more substantive or productive, and that in fact they are usually less so in the case of protracted conflicts.

A second limitation obtains when the 'net' of participants cannot be widened to include a broader range of opinions and perspectives. This may occur if potential participants are concerned with the political risk of becoming involved; for example, if they do not want to jeopardize their standing with the government or ruling party by meeting with the 'enemy.' Or it may happen as a result of animosity or rivalry between groups within a country; for example, one group may not want to share the forum with a group to which it is ideologically opposed or with which it is competing. In a protracted social conflict, given its emotional and politically volatile nature, it is always difficult to bring together representatives of the parties to the dispute. Overall, we were successful in eliciting a wide range of viewpoints, especially during Maryland III with the addition of an islander and several parliamentarians from both sides. However, the first two forums suffered from the absence of an islander.

In sum, although there were limitations to the Falklands/Malvinas forums, there did not arise any problems serious enough to prevent the achievement of progress. In fact, several of the limitations, such as those posed by differing perceptions of time and identity and by distrust of intentions, will most likely always exist in any Track Two process. It may be enough for the facilitators to be aware of them and not be overly discouraged when they appear. When these limitations can be managed then the forum or other facilitated conflict resolution process will likely enjoy success.

II. Critique of Track Two Diplomacy

Our experiences with the problem-solving forums have illuminated the advantages and benefits of pursuing Track Two diplomacy. However, these same experiences have also shown us some potential and existing problems with the approach, and it is to them that we now turn. Some of these problems have to do with what may be regarded as the ethics and utility of third party intervention; issues which we believe must be given serious attention. Other problems were 'technical' in nature, having to do with the composition of panels of facilitators and representatives; and still others have to do with their perceptions and the goals of the process.

A. Composition of the Panel of Facilitators

The private, third party nature of the forum process gives it a great strength, but is in one sense problematic. That is, because Track Two diplomacy is generally carried out by private individuals or organizations, it is difficult to control or supervise their actions in order to ensure competence. At this point we can only rely on each practitioner's own integrity and preparation, and so far we have been fortunate.

In order to avoid this potential problem, some conflict resolution specialists have advocated the creation of permanent private, third parties who would pursue Track Two diplomacy, or the training of individuals in already existing organizations such as the International Red Cross. Whether this would be a good idea has to do with attitudes regarding what type of Track Two diplomat is desired. Some scholars are convinced that the facilitator should be ignorant of the details of a specific conflict and therefore a permanent third party would be necessary and effective. On the other hand, those who argue that facilitators should have close knowledge and experience with the conflict discount the effectiveness of such an organization.

It is possible that a balance could be achieved which would benefit from both the professionalism that a permanent body might help guarantee, and the particular insights into a conflict that knowledgeable facilitators provide. Perhaps panels could be comprised of both 'conflict-specific' experts and individuals who are experts in conflict resolution *via* the forum model. It would be useful to pursue this idea further. At any rate, at this stage we maintain that the best way to guarantee serious, professional and dedicated facilitation is through the rigorous analysis, by the community of practitioners and students, of the proper goals and methods of Track Two diplomacy and the dissemination of their findings. Given the nature of the enterprise, and the human element involved, it would be impossible (and undesirable) to standardize methods; but basic guidelines can be, and are being, established. The dissemination of these guidelines, which should be the product of consensus among practitioners, will help avoid problems in the future.

As we continue to develop and refine our approach, we must also continue to be aware of another problem posed by the composition of the third party. As has been mentioned, the third party should ideally be neutral in its role as facilitator. In reality, however, we believe this to be impossible. Of course, it is possible to avoid using a third party which takes sides in a dispute, but this does not guarantee 'neutrality.' Each facilitator will come to a forum with her or his own intellectual, professional, ideological and other personal 'baggage' which will have an effect on the process. Individuals' perceptions, even those of trained facilitators, are influenced by their experiences. This is unavoidable, but not necessarily problematic. It becomes problematic when this baggage 'overloads the system' and incapacitates or lessens the ability of the participants themselves to independently arrive at solutions or make analytical progress. When this baggage is effectively managed it is no longer a problem, and may even be

beneficial if it enables facilitators to successfully synthesize for the consumption of one party the other's perspectives, interests and values. This synthesizing role, essential to the process of moving from stated negotiating positions to analysis of basic assumptions, is only possible if the facilitator is able to control his or her own natural inclinations and preferences regarding 'solutions.' We must at all times remember that solutions are the product of clear self- and mutual-analysis by the participants themselves.

B. Relations Between Third Party Facilitators

Another potential problem associated with the composition of panels, also related to facilitators' personal baggage, is the nature of the dynamics that exist within the facilitator group. Certainly as much care as that which goes into the process of selecting participants must go into selecting facilitators. Facilitators must share the same motivations for becoming involved with conflict management, as well as have the same understanding and appreciation of the process. This does not mean, however, that the backgrounds of the facilitators should be identical. Rather, what must be identical is the type of training received and the level of dedication to the process. This will avoid one problem which we have on occasion seen in forums.

Another concern, not unique to Track Two diplomacy, is with the 'personal chemistry' of the facilitators. Obviously, given the intense environment of the forums, facilitators must be capable of working well with one another and this requires above all the ability to communicate effectively in a group. This is a question of both training and personality, and much effort must go into finding the correct 'mix.' We believe practitioners will do well to continue their serious analytical and empirical efforts devoted to this issue.

C. Representation of the Parties

Earlier we mentioned our desire to include the broadest array of viewpoints possible when inviting participants, since one of our goals is fostering general intercommunal consensus over issues affecting needs and recognition. Such an approach works best when there exists prior consensus *within* each party to a dispute; thus, each side speaks with a coherent and unified voice which is capable of clearly articulating a group's needs. Unfortunately, such a consensus does not always exist. In fact, our analysis of protracted conflicts indicates that a community will not always have a unified leadership which can effectively speak for its constituents. The inability to institutionalize, or otherwise devise the means for the consistent expression of demands and interests, is one of the effects of protracted social conflict, and is most common in the case of victimized communities, which in a conflictive society are kept fragmented by the hegemonic group. Thus, it is often difficult to pinpoint those individuals to be included in the forum process who can represent the various viewpoints

within each community. This situation becomes problematic for the forum process to the degree that there is unresolved or unmanaged tension, disagreement or hostility between the representatives of a single community. The forum process is not designed to resolve differences *within each party*, and when these differences are too great to be managed, the forum process cannot function effectively.

For example, in the Falklands/Malvinas case, representatives of both the Peronist and Radical parties represented the Argentine position. As students of Argentine politics know, there exists a high level of disagreement between the two political parties concerning a wide range of fundamental issues. This tension was not apparent during the forums, but it is possible that it was kept hidden so as not to indicate to the British that perhaps there existed disagreement within Argentina regarding the Falklands/Malvinas issue.

This point shows an apparent advantage of the official diplomatic process where parties to a dispute are represented by negotiators who speak with one voice and have official backing. However, in the context of protracted conflict, official negotiations which have not been preceded by communal needs analysis will not resolve the conflict. Practitioners must therefore investigate the timing and mechanisms for integrating Track Two with Track One diplomacy so that the gains of processes such as the problem-solving forums may be effectively utilized during official negotiations.

D. Confidentiality and Trust

Practitioners of Track Two diplomacy, particularly of problem-solving forums, need to be keenly aware of the ethical responsibilities associated with the process. Intervention in conflict situations by third parties is a very serious matter. The psychological process of learning to trust a third party and an opponent is long and difficult and participants who attempt it make an enormous emotional and intellectual investment. It is the responsibility of the panel of facilitators not to betray this trust by failing to maintain confidentiality; by taking or appearing to take sides in a dispute; by being intellectually or physically unprepared in any way for the forums (*i.e.*, failing to become knowledgeable of the process and the dispute or to make an appropriate time commitment); or by using the process for personal gain.

By engaging in problem-solving forums, or other forms of Track Two diplomacy, practitioners have a duty to the participants who invest trust in them, as well as to the process itself, whose effectiveness depends on the care, honesty and integrity of the individuals and organizations involved. If the participant's trust is betrayed, for example, by a failure to maintain the private, confidential nature of a forum, the participant will naturally be much less inclined to become involved in future in other alternative diplomatic attempts. In some instances, not only the political stature of participants, but also their lives might be threatened as a result of mistakes of this nature. Obviously, Track Two diplomacy is not easy, and the potential hazards can be numerous. It would be a

terrible waste if this form of diplomacy would incur a negative image due to the incompetence or carelessness of a small number of practitioners.

E. Expertise of Facilitators

A problem which we became aware of through experience with the Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Falklands/ Malvinas Forums is that which arises when the facilitators are perceived by the participants to be ignorant of the details of the dispute, including not only the historical record but the nuances of relations *within* each party to a dispute, as well. We are convinced that the ability to inspire trust is closely related to the respect which participants have for the facilitators' level of knowledge. We have observed through experience that participants do not respect facilitators who display ignorance about important issues and facts. Nor, of course, do they respect a facilitator whose intense involvement with or knowledge of the dispute leads her or him to support any specific position. A party's feelings of isolation and sense that no one genuinely understands its position, common in protracted social conflicts, will be increased by facilitators' ignorance. The question of the participants' respect for the facilitators is very important because of the need to establish a relationship based on trust.

The 'legitimacy' of a facilitator, measured by his or her acceptability to the participants, is a function of 'social standing' as well as knowledge. We have observed that academics are highly respected by the participants in our activities and so we continued to involve them as facilitators. Academics have the advantage of being both respected for their social position and perceived as objective. Other respected individuals could be found, such as government functionaries or diplomats, but it is important to avoid the problems created when the facilitator is perceived to have links with decision makers or to have his or her own subjective agenda.

Once again, there is no 'ideal' facilitator, and practitioners will have to make their selections according to the demands of a specific situation. Facilitators must, however, strive to include individuals who inspire trust. We have found that forums function best when facilitators and participants have similar levels of stature and knowledge.

F. Expectations and 'False Hopes'

Another danger associated with the process, involving both ethical and practical considerations, is that of *creating false hopes* in the participants concerning the end result or influence that the forums might have. It is both unethical and counter-productive for a practitioner of Track Two diplomacy to give the impression that the process may be more effective than it is actually designed to be. Participants must be made fully aware of the limitations as well as the advantages of the forums so as not to develop unfounded hopes which ultimately will be disappointed. One way in which false hopes can be created is if

participants are led to believe that the facilitators have personal influence with important decision makers in the government of a country who might be able to intervene directly or otherwise affect the conflict. This misconception may be created unintentionally. For example, it has been our experience that when facilitators are Americans, this in itself may create false hopes on the part of the participants who assume (or wish to believe) that the forums are connected somehow with the US government. In fact, in the Lebanon Forums, the facilitators were at pains to dispel the notion that they had no official ties with, or support from, the United States government and that in reality the process was completely divorced from official US policy. It is particularly important that the participants be informed *at the time of invitation* that the process will be private and unofficial.

Facilitators must also be sensitive to the fact that, once the forum has begun, participants will often clutch at any suggestion of hope or progress. The facilitators must be very circumspect in this regard, even when it appears that there may indeed be cause for hope. It is thus essential that participants be convinced that any progress which is achieved will be the result of their own efforts and not those of the facilitators.

G. Exploitation of the Process

Another danger which facilitators must guard against is the danger that the process will be manipulated and exploited by participants for political purposes. By following the guidelines regarding confidentiality, selection of participants, and setting a forum agenda, opportunities for exploitation will be minimized. However, there will still exist the possibility that participants will attend for purposes of intelligence-gathering and/or 'grandstanding,' or that participants will betray the private, confidential nature of the process by publicizing the event. There is little that facilitators can do to prevent this beyond adhering to the guidelines.

Facilitators can, however, prevent their being induced by the participants to abandon a neutral stance and support, consciously or unconsciously, one side's position. In protracted social conflicts, parties become adept at psychological warfare and make great efforts to enlist the support of outside powers. Facilitators who are sensitive to this danger and who work well as a self-monitoring team can avoid this problem. We believe that practitioners should not be reluctant to immediately abandon the process if the necessary conditions for success are not being met, even if this means the loss of a great investment of time, money and effort. If susceptible to being 'taken hostage,' private diplomacy will degenerate into just another form or tool of power politics.

H. Realism, Caution and the Costs of Overconfidence

Another warning that we have for practitioners using problem-solving forums is against permitting the forums to be 'too successful.' That is, we must not permit the human closeness which is a product of a successful forum to obscure the very real and complicated differences which will continue to exist between the parties, at least during the initial stages of the process. It is natural that participants will develop personal friendships during the intensive forum sessions. For these individuals, the conflict loses some of its impersonal aspects and the participants learn to see their opponents as fellow sufferers.

This rapport can be dangerous, however, since it complicates the 're-entry' problem mentioned earlier in this volume. Participants, when they return to their communities, will have intense difficulty sharing their experiences with their peers, and it is possible that they will be ostracized or considered traitors for their new attitudes. Therefore, a certain level of skepticism is healthy for the process; participants will be able to maintain their credibility in the eyes of their community and thus have a better chance of imparting some of the positive experiences which they had. The facilitator is instrumental in keeping the differences between the parties at the forefront during the process while also being careful to pursue opportunities for progress when they arise.

Finally, we would like to raise two other 'warning flags' concerning Track Two diplomacy in general as it is currently practiced. Specifically, we would like to caution practitioners about what we view as 'overconfidence' and 'over-aggressiveness.' It is clear that those conflicts which most require, and are best suited to, third party intervention are those which occur in poor and mal-developed societies. Conflict in the Third World, often originating in the legacy of colonialism, is exacerbated by material shortages. It follows, then, that an integral component of any conflict resolution strategy must be one which addresses the problems of underdevelopment. However, we regard current conflict resolution strategies (including Track Two as well as Track One processes) as inadequate in this respect, and hence, practitioners have been unjustifiably confident in the positive influence which they will have.

We also feel that current practitioners are often not well enough versed in the specific aspects of a particular conflict when they decide to intervene. Successful intervention requires careful preparation, and in our estimation practitioners who intervene without this preparation are being over-aggressive. Track Two diplomacy has in general focused on process and not on substantive issues such as economic development and conflict monitoring. Practitioners have to decide what they are experts in: hosting people, or the intricacies of conflict. Certainly, aspects of both are important, but we believe too much emphasis has been placed on the dynamics of hosting people to the exclusion of continuous monitoring of conflict and the devising of development strategies.

We ourselves would be guilty of naivete if we were to imply that all that is required now of conflict resolution specialists is to focus on issues of economic development. Unfortunately, there is no handbook which will provide us the

guidelines for achieving 'economic development' in conflictive societies. Not only do we not know *how*, but we are not even sure of *what kind* of economic development to pursue. There is no one correct approach. However, this does not mean that we should ignore the subject altogether when devising and implementing conflict resolution strategies. It is important that the parties to a conflict become aware of the alternative development strategies which exist (if they are not already), but more importantly, that they have the opportunity to discuss these strategies and economic development issues *among themselves*. Economic development is a key component of conflict resolution and, like the other components, it must be explored jointly by all the parties. An economic development strategy cannot be imposed from the outside; it must be in harmony with the broader process of societal development, and come as the product of intercommunal effort and consensus.

Facilitators can help the parties explore alternatives but they must be careful not to advocate any particular strategy. At this stage in the development of alternative diplomacy processes, almost all practitioners come from Western political and economic traditions. We must strive to be constantly aware of our own perspectives and keep our inclinations in check. This can be accomplished in part by making an effort to train individuals from non-Western societies and include them in the facilitating process.

Lest we give the impression that Track Two processes such as the problem-solving forum have too many potential problems associated with them, we would like to stress that this critique should be regarded as an effort to 'fine tune' an approach which has already proven to be considerably useful and productive. Almost all of the pitfalls mentioned above are avoidable and should not be regarded as inherent. Our discussion is intended merely as a contribution to current efforts to refine the approach.

Above all, we should be mindful that the problem-solving forums (or any other form of Track Two diplomacy) are not strict methodologies of conflict resolution, but rather tools to be used in creating environments in which co-learning can occur. Different situations will require different tools and it is for this reason that the approach outlined here is one which strives to be responsive to changing demands and innovative in its methods. Our approach is only one of many which might prove to be effective. We do believe, however, that all effective approaches will share a certain characteristic, namely, a profound understanding and appreciation of the sources of conflict. For the particular type of conflict with which we are concerned, we believe that the theory of protracted social conflict facilitates such an understanding.

8. Conclusion

The problem-solving forums at Maryland have been useful and we will continue them in the years to come. Conflict management as a field is in the beginning stages of development, and we cannot wait for increased applied and theoretical sophistication before we attempt to contribute to the stock of ideas on peace-building in general and in specific situations. We must refine our approach at the same time that we apply it.

In this volume we have employed the terms *conflict management* and *conflict resolution* at different times. From our perspective, the concepts are not synonymous. The difference in meaning pertains to differences in goals: *managing* as opposed to *resolving* a conflict. For example, through problem-solving forums one might enable parties to a conflict to co-explore new ideas and opportunities to reduce violence and hostility. Or, through third-party mediation, one might be able to establish a cease-fire between conflicting parties (without addressing the underlying causes of the conflict). These are examples of conflict management.

Conflict management may be regarded as a necessary preliminary step in the process of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution itself requires a more comprehensive process of identifying the underlying developmental needs which drive the collective thinking and behavior of each community, and ways in which they may be reconciled through the pursuit of compatible goals. This again may be undertaken through problem-solving forums in order to bring the parties to the point where official negotiations can be effective.

The complexity of protracted social conflicts necessitates undertaking two important tasks as part of the overall effort of conflict management and resolution, namely: a) the careful tracking of conflict dynamics and changing circumstances; and b) addressing the social, economic and political conditions that nurture conflict and violence. Problem-solving forums which generate ideas for conflict management and potential negotiations must also focus on strategies for development that provide hope and increase the level of confidence of the parties to a conflict. The balance of this chapter is a brief discussion of these two themes--conflict tracking, and development strategies and diplomacy.

I. Conflict Identification and Tracking

Earlier in this volume, we briefly described the role that 'identification and tracking' plays in the problem-solving forum process. The identification step unfortunately is not always straightforward. Ideally, we would like to be able to anticipate overt conflictive behavior, so as to be better able to prevent it. Regrettably, we usually become aware of protracted social conflict only after overt violence has broken out. Therefore, individuals and institutions dedicated to conflict resolution must devise strategies and procedures through which incipient communal violence can be detected.

This process will require more than simply locating those nations which have multicomunal compositions. In-depth analysis of the specific intercommunal relations within a society must be made as well, and this entails extensive research. In order to devise an effective identification process we must determine what kinds of data are useful. How does one accurately and uniformly measure intercommunal relations? Are issue categories devised for one example applicable to other examples? As the three case studies point out, the last question in particular poses problems. For example, the issue of education is a critical one in Sri Lanka, but not in Lebanon. Certainly, education can be classified as an area relevant to satisfaction of identity or access needs, but we must be careful not to be left with overly-broad descriptive and analytical categories. These are the types of questions we are attempting to answer in our current efforts to expand the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), which is housed at CIDCM (Azar: 1982), to include interactions between non-state as well as national communities in areas subject to protracted social conflict.

Our approach to conflict management also requires continuous 'tracking' of protracted social conflicts as a means of determining both the specific grievances and issues relevant to the conflict and when intervention may be appropriate. Several of the difficulties with identification also pertain to the tracking step. At both stages there is the challenge of determining if variables can be devised which are not case-specific but are applicable to protracted social conflict in general. However, even having devised such variables does not eliminate or lessen the need for intimate knowledge of specific cases. Indeed, the protracted social conflict approach is based on the idea that the origin of many conflicts is to be found at the communal level, and although communities across societies

will share identical needs, the dynamics of how these needs are or are not met will vary widely from one society to another.

Effective tracking of protracted conflict will better enable organizations such as ours to determine an appropriate time for intervention through Track Two diplomacy. For example, it has been our experience that problem-solving forums will be ineffective in the case where one party to a dispute holds a perceived military advantage over its opponent after overt hostility has erupted. It is only after either a military stalemate has been reached, or there emerges a 'victor,' that the time is most propitious for intervention. Naturally, in the latter case the appearance of a victor is fictitious since military victory will not eliminate the deeper conflict; however, it is the perceptions of the actors themselves that determine the appropriate opportunity for intervention. Thus, during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict it was impossible to induce the Argentines or British to negotiate a peaceful solution as long as either side enjoyed a military advantage, the former at the beginning of the war, and the latter towards the end.

Continuous tracking will also enable a third party to stay abreast of changing conditions which affect groups' abilities to meet their needs. In problem-solving forums, facilitators must be aware of the perspectives of the different parties, which are shaped by continuously changing conditions. In a protracted social conflict, the underlying needs of the parties will remain unchanged, but their focus of expression may change or become disguised, or they may be made to appear less critical, by events such as the outbreak of overt hostilities, the intervention in the dispute by outside actors, or altered economic conditions. In addition, new possibilities for tension-reducing steps can only be effectively exploited if facilitators stay aware of new issues and opportunities in the context of the parties' own perceptions of the dispute. Finally, continuous tracking can provide the basis for assessment of the impact of various attempts at intervention.

II. Structural Development and Conflict Management

Development traditionally has been equated with economic growth measured in such terms as gross national product, industrialization, and exports of manufactured goods. However, this concept of development has been subject to harsh critiques. In most cases, rapid-growth-oriented economic development strategies in underdeveloped countries result in the deepening of the dual economy in which the *modern* sector becomes prosperous with the assistance of foreign capital and through state protection and promotion, while the *traditional* sector stagnates or even deteriorates as wealth is intentionally transferred to the modern sector. The urban and rural poor are further marginalized during the process of uneven economic development, thus sowing the seed for, or accelerating, the process of protracted social conflict in many parts of the Third World.

Marginalization occurs not only along rural-urban lines but along communal and regional lines, as well. The growing gap between rural and urban

income, mal-distribution of wealth, deprivation of opportunities for the poor to satisfy basic needs do not necessarily lead to *protracted* social conflict. They do usually result in social conflict, including political protests, riots, and occasionally, insurgencies or full-scale revolution. In other words, deteriorating economic conditions amid uneven economic development do result in domestic conflict: but no matter how great mass grievances are, they can conceivably be addressed within the existing policy framework. Once the marginalization takes place along communal-regional lines, however, the conflict is likely to protract. The protracted social conflicts involving the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Shi'ites in Southern Lebanon, Palestinians in Israel, Kurds in Iraq and Iran, and Moslems in Yugoslavia and the Philippines, among others, are due to this type of marginalization.

There is ample empirical evidence that demonstrates a causal link between distorted patterns of development plus communal discrimination on the one hand, and protracted social conflict on the other.¹ To effectively address protracted conflict, one must attend to the links between development strategies and ethnic/communal cleavages. For example, the 'trickle-down' strategy, emphasizing growth first and broader distribution of benefits later, may not be helpful in protracted social conflicts, even in the long run. Rather, more attention should be given to a balanced development strategy comprised of several dimensions.

First, *sectoral balance* should be preserved. In most cases, the disadvantaged ethnic communities are concentrated within distinct economic sectors, chiefly the agricultural sector. Discrimination against the agricultural sector, for example, in favor of the modern industrial sector can easily precipitate or inflame existing protracted social conflicts because economic discrimination is perceived in collective terms. Therefore, attention needs to be oriented towards the disfavored sector, to ensure that the allocation of scarce resources is re-aligned so that sectoral balance can be achieved.

Second, a balanced development strategy should include as a goal *regional balance*. Communal groups are distinguished not only in terms of sectoral orientation, but also geographically. As noted before, the colonial legacy of artificially-integrated communities within a nation has contributed to the rise, or increased severity, of protracted social conflict. Communal groups are inclined to regional, as opposed to national, loyalty and so resist physical integration with other communities. As skewed economic development proceeds, regional imbalances trigger and deepen protracted social conflict. In other words, the coincidence of communal and regional economic discrimination (motivated by intercommunal rivalry and economic policy 'imperatives,' respectively) leads to the rise and proliferation of protracted social conflict.

The management of the problem is clear to see, albeit difficult to achieve. Governments should be more attentive to the issue of regional imbalances in the course of economic development. Priority of resource allocation should be given to disadvantaged regions with strong communal diversity. In a similar vein, development strategies should be adjusted to ensure regional balance.

The achievement of sectoral and regional balance requires a fundamental alteration of traditional development strategies. Balanced distribution, growth, justice and efficiency are all goals which need to be emphasized, with the relative attention given to each goal to be determined by the specific conditions of each society or conflict. Enclave economies that have caused regional and sectoral imbalances should be developed into more diversified economies. Furthermore, the satisfaction of the basic human needs of the victimized, whether along communal lines or as part of a national strategy, should always be given the highest priority in governments' development policies. This is essential for the move towards managing and resolving protracted social conflict.

A shift to development strategies which promote regional, sectoral and communal balance should be accompanied by increased attention to population dynamics and their ecological consequences. An important aspect of protracted conflict is that it is generally influenced by population dynamics. The conflict in Lebanon is a good example. In Lebanon, the distribution of political power corresponds to the relative population of the different communal groups. As long as the population ratio between the confessional groups remains stable, socio-political stability can be maintained. When population dynamics lead to an alteration of the ratio, however, the conflict is exacerbated.

As several studies have found, an uneven pattern of economic development is usually responsible for the breakdown of population equilibrium among communal groups. Communal groups whose security or basic needs are denied and whose social mobility is structurally blocked in terms of education and employment are more inclined to have high rates of fertility. Such regenerative propensity is a function not only of a desire for insurance against high mortality rates, but also of illiteracy and poverty. Conversely, communal groups with high income and education show an opposite trend. As a consequence, demographic balance among communal groups is lost, leading to immediate demands for redistribution of political and economic power. Thus it is imperative that communal population dynamics should be taken into account when plans for structural development are being formulated.

Equally important is to allow for the impact of ecological variables. As can be seen in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and the Sub-Saharan states, the proliferation of protracted social conflict is strongly associated with ecological disasters. Droughts, severe shortages of water resources and the resultant famines have bred and intensified communal conflicts. As several reports have indicated, these ecological disasters are largely man-made rather than natural. In this regard, the preservation of ecological integrity should be an important goal of plans for economic and structural development.

Altering development strategies to ensure communal, regional and sectoral balances as well as to preserve ecological integrity is not easy. As a rule, development strategies are not the product of rational calculation of national objectives. Rather, they reflect to a large extent the vested economic and political interests in society. In this sense, a development strategy is a function of the distribution of political and economic power in society. Therefore, a prerequisite

of successful development is progressive reform in the socio-political structure to allow a balanced distribution of power; this in turn will lead to the establishment of institutions which can foster broad-based economic development. Even if reforms are enacted, this will not in itself guarantee sustained structural development sufficient to prevent or resolve protracted social conflict. Such reforms are difficult to achieve without triggering traumatic social upheaval or violent revolution. Consensus-building within and between contending communal groups must also be an integral part of the shaping of such structural reforms if they are to be accepted. Thus, a strategy for balanced economic development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the alleviation of protracted social conflict.

Consensus-building is a difficult process and must follow certain guidelines. First, the goals and objectives of national development need to be re-defined from the perspective of the security and other basic needs of contending communities, especially those which have been previously victimized. Second, policy and institutional designs should emerge from the 'bottom up' and not only from the 'top down.' In other words, the state should not be the sole actor determining the nature and direction of development. Inputs from the grass-roots level involving various communal actors should be systematically incorporated into the overall decision-making process. Finally, consensus-building involves the decentralization of political power and decision-making authority. Local autonomy needs to be ensured. Individuals at the local level must be allowed to define their needs and participate in fulfilling them. This reorientation may in the short run undermine the overall economic 'productivity' of the society by both inducing an inefficient allocation of resources and by removing the existing management structures. However, protracted social conflicts resulting from over-centralization and an uneven pattern of growth can be much costlier than the economic inefficiencies generated by decentralization.

III. Development Diplomacy and Conflict Management

Challenges associated with structural development are largely endogenous in origin. However, this does not negate the importance or utility of benign external intervention, particularly by superpowers or regional middle-powers. The reform of current interventionist practices in light of the realities of violence in the developing countries can help reduce the levels of structural imbalance and therefore of protracted conflict. This is why we advocate development diplomacy, as a pattern of assistance designed to reduce the structural victimization prevalent in developing countries, thereby yielding long-term benefits to the parties, both intervening and intervened. Development diplomacy demands a careful analysis of a given society in terms of its specific social relations and victimization syndromes in order to properly locate the linkages between current economic growth policies and their negative products (*i.e.*, communal fragmentation and more idiosyncratic features of a particular protracted social conflict).

The nature and direction of interventionist diplomacy must be shaped in such a manner as to reduce the severity of deep-rooted causes of social conflicts endemic to developing countries. The shift from conventional assistance to development diplomacy should take place in both the endogenous and exogenous domains. In the endogenous domain, assistance for development in marginalized communities can be given by emphasizing change in the domestic structures of a conflict-laden country in order to reduce structural inequality.

As noted earlier, structural inequalities and correspondingly deformed political institutions are crucial barriers to sustaining development in many developing countries. Thus, development diplomacy's major focus needs to be the elimination of these barriers. In this context, there are two main considerations--reducing the impact of those external systemic sources which foster domestic structural deformities, and building responsive domestic institutions.

Domestic institution-building within conflict-laden countries is a step in the right direction. However, the traditional pattern of diplomacy has been based largely on patron-client relationships. Such bilateral ties have been responsible for an erratic and biased pattern of intervention which is not sensitive to the needs and perceptions of all communal groups, and thus eventually fragments domestic political institutions and aggravates conflict situations. This pattern is very common within multicommunal societies and is very difficult to correct. Development diplomacy attempts to alter the nature of the existing patron-client relationships in a direction which will better promote communal balance and institution-building.

Dependency on external powers may be best corrected through multilateral, rather than bilateral, efforts. In this regard, development diplomacy needs to be included as an integral part of global political and economic reform movements, as manifest, for example, in the New International Economic Order and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Equally important is innovation in development assistance. We propose that external assistance be redirected from a fragmentary deployment of military/economic assistance to a comprehensive policy-package to enhance authentic and self-sustaining economic development. We argue that development diplomacy must aim at inducing economic participation in the same way political reform emphasizes political participation. Individuals and communities need to believe that their participation is assured and makes a difference. It is the sense of involvement as opposed to marginalization and discrimination that facilitates conflict management and stability.

In development diplomacy terms, balanced and redistributive development strategies are more conducive to conflict resolution than those which are imbalanced and merely rapid-growth-oriented. Fulfillment of basic needs for all people becomes a concrete goal. While at the same time advocating gradual, long-term and comprehensive development efforts through policy reform, development diplomacy also focuses on the immediate needs of societies engaged in protracted conflict situations through the supply of emergency relief, food aid,

medical supplies, educational support and the like. This responsiveness to short-term needs enhances receptiveness for long-term conflict management and resolution efforts.

It is important to emphasize that development diplomacy concerns itself with long-term outcomes as much as it concerns itself with short-term results. It favors coordinated multilateral efforts on a regional and global level and attempts to avoid extending bilateral assistance, whether direct or indirect, to the benefit of one social group as opposed to all. It emphasizes the satisfaction of the basic needs of people experiencing structural deprivation, while helping to induce a gradual, structural reform through sound development strategies. Such an approach, we believe, can be conducive to the resolution of conflicts by severing the causal chain between underdevelopment and structural inequalities, and between communal imbalance and institutional paralysis.

In sum, the management of protracted social conflict cannot be undertaken without addressing the issues of economic development and communal pluralism. Fully taking into account the causal links, it is necessary to pursue both short-term breakthroughs in a protracted social conflict situation and long-term and comprehensive developmental goals. It conceives peace as an end-process in itself and not as a means of gaining influence or strategic benefits. The approaches of facilitation, structural development and development diplomacy value collective efforts, rather than unilateral or bilateral means, to alleviate protracted social conflict on both the regional and global levels. They also represent a gradual, comprehensive and structural approach to the resolution of a protracted social conflict, as opposed to temporary strategic containment or partial legal settlement which does not address the human needs underlying the dynamics of development.

We recognize that there is a limit to what this diplomatic process can achieve. For example, we can only promote the initiation of development diplomacy on the part of the developed world, not create the necessary conditions for its success. However, we are still far from reaching the limits of usefulness of the broad Track Two process. By involving the parties to a dispute in interaction designed to explore needs underlying current interests, as well as broad, substantive solutions to problems of economic and political underdevelopment, we will greatly advance the process of conflict management.

Notes

1. See Edward E. Azar (1979), 'Peace Amidst Development,' *International Interactions* 6, no. 2, pp. 203-40.

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
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