

edited by Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael

Canada

AND THE

**Third
World**

80-06-19

CANADA AND THE THIRD WORLD

To Professor
Nicolai Hovhannessian

With my
Very Best Wishes
Tareq Small

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Y. Ingham & Co. \$.

Canada and the Third World

EDITED BY
PEYTON V. LYON AND TAREQ Y. ISMAEL

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Macmillan of Canada
Maclean-Hunter Press

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ISBN 0-7705-1039-6 cloth
ISBN 0-7705-1040-X paper

Printed in Canada for
The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited
70 Bond Street
Toronto, Ontario M5B 1X3

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CANADA AND THE THIRD WORLD

Preface

Although the literature on Canadian foreign policy is now fairly extensive, few studies have focussed on relations with the Third World. This book has brought together a number of experts with the objective of providing an overview of Canadian policy in the Third World from a variety of perspectives.

Conditions and attitudes in the Third World, and the responses to them of the industrialized world, have changed at an increasing tempo during the three years that this volume has been in preparation. The editors are especially grateful to the authors who completed their chapters by the original deadline, and had later to undertake substantial revisions. They also wish to thank Professor Barrie Morrison who, late in the day, agreed to fill in for a delinquent contributor. Although most of the chapters deal with Canada's relations with a specific fraction of the Third World, economic development is common to all of them, and so important that Clyde Sanger was asked to write a critical analysis of Canada's aid program.

Canada and the Third World was initiated by Professor Tareq Y. Ismael. He was subsequently joined as co-editor by Professor Peyton Lyon who, because of Dr. Ismael's absence in the Middle East during 1973-74, assumed most of the editorial chores. Both wish to express their appreciation for the friendly encouragement and editorial skill of Mrs. Diane Mew.

PEYTON V. LYON

Introduction

What is the "Third World"? Although a term of relatively recent coinage, it has already acquired the confusion of connotation characteristic of most of our political vocabulary. This confusion is not necessarily a bad thing. John Holmes, for one, has welcomed it on the grounds that "it makes confrontation difficult."¹ For the purposes of this volume, however, we must settle on a definition, or at least indicate the countries that we are including under the "Third World" label.

The expression appears to have been employed first by the French;² "Tiers Monde" was a deliberate echo of the "Tiers Etat" of 1789 formed to represent the majority of the nation who were claiming equal rights with the established "Etats," the nobility and the clergy. The association of the two terms is apt; the Third World embraces the majority of humanity that now aspires to rights and living conditions comparable to those already enjoyed by the industrialized nations of both East and West.

Until after the Second World War, most of the Third World countries were colonies; indeed, many authorities hold that the experience of having been a colony in relatively recent times is an essential criterion for membership in the Third World. A prevailing assumption among imperial nations

used to be that the "uncivilized" inhabitants of the colonies were probably quite content, and should be, with a vastly inferior share of the world's supply of material goods. Having achieved formal political independence, however, and membership in the United Nations, the ex-colonies are now demanding equity in material terms. Increased travel and the media remind them of the vast and growing gap in the living standards prevalent in the Third World compared to the industrialized countries. The insistent call for a "New International Economic Order" boils down to the demand that the principles of equitable distribution that are now generally accepted *within* advanced societies should be adopted on a global basis, that the economic system established by the developed countries, and operating in their interests, must yield to one that more adequately recognizes the claims of the deprived majority in the international community.

Most of the newly liberated colonies chose to resist polarization into either of the two military blocs that characterized the cold war era. For many, the "Third World" thus became synonymous with "non-aligned." Although of diminishing relevance in a period of détente and diffusion of power, the non-aligned criterion remains popular in the Third World countries, especially in those that aspire to mould the non-aligned into a cohesive political force. The Third World is thus often regarded as a grouping of uncommitted countries that, while borrowing some values from both "capitalist" and "communist" camps, insist on the right to be selective, to build on their own indigenous traditions, and to stand aloof from the cold war power game.

In some contexts, the "Third World" seems roughly equivalent to "non-white," and race is certainly a factor in the tension among the three "worlds." A number of white nations, however, are accepted within the Third World, and racial tension among non-white peoples is far from negligible. Similarly, although "North-South" is now frequently used as a means to express the dichotomy between the rich developed countries and the Third World, dozens of Third World members are found in the northern hemisphere, while several non-members, such as Australia, are well to the south.

China considers herself part of the Third World and ostentatiously offers leadership to the poor, oppressed and non-aligned. If a low per capita GNP is taken as the central criterion, China certainly belongs, and her claims are sometimes accepted by governments of the Third World. The editors of this volume were tempted to include a study of Sino-Canadian relations, if only because of their exceptional interest. However, despite the fact that the Chinese subsist at a low material level, China has few of the other criteria for Third World membership. She was never completely colonized; she aspires to leadership of one bloc; and she is herself a significant source of economic assistance for a few developing countries. Canada's interest in China, moreover, derives not from her poverty but rather from her massive power, present and potential.

Alone of the countries of mainland Europe, Yugoslavia is often accepted within the Third World grouping, but her relations with Canada are not treated in this volume. Most Third World countries deny the legitimacy of the white minority regimes in the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia. They consider, however, that geographically and ethnically, if not yet politically, these territories belong to their "world." We shall accept this view.

The one characteristic common to most of the Third World is grinding poverty. This is also the characteristic that sets it apart from the other "worlds" and most demands the attention of affluent nations like Canada. A relatively recent development, however, has complicated this criterion: the sudden rise in the price of oil, and the consequent achievement of great per capita wealth by a small number of Third World countries. These countries, it has been frequently argued, must now be considered separately, and some authorities employ the concept "Fourth World" to make the distinction. As of 1975, however, this term has not achieved common currency, and we shall not use it.³

Canadian policy-makers employ "Third World" with little pretence of precision. For them it serves chiefly as a stylistic variation for the "underdeveloped," the "less developed" or, more optimistically, the "developing" countries: the areas

where hunger is still general, and mass starvation, epidemic, and social turbulence are ever-present possibilities.

The most frequent current usage, and the one adopted in this volume, is to consider as the Third World all of Central and South America; Asia (apart from China, Japan, Israel and the U.S.S.R.); Africa; and the Caribbean and Polynesian Islands.

The average income in most of this area is about one-twentieth the average Canadian income. In spite of a per capita rate of economic growth in the developing countries of almost 3 per cent, the gap in income between the developed and developing nations continues to widen. If present trends are allowed to persist, the annual income at the end of the century in countries with a total population of over two billion will still average less than \$200; for about half of these countries, the figure will be less than \$100.⁴ Compared to the overwhelming need, the flow of development assistance from industrialized countries has been sadly inadequate; in many areas, new inflows are now more than matched by outflows of interest payments on earlier "assistance." Although a few Third World economies gained dramatically by the jump in the price of oil, most of them were hit especially hard; aid from the OPEC countries, while not insignificant, has failed to come close to compensating the most affected nations for the increased cost of essential imports.⁵ Even more disturbing, as these lines are written, is the possibility that changing climatic conditions in Africa and elsewhere, coupled with increases in the cost of food, will cause millions of deaths through starvation.

Large portions of the Third World are gaining in cohesion, and the member governments are increasingly effective in their combined efforts, through the Committee of 77 and other agencies, to gain the attention of the First and Second Worlds.⁶ However, despite this growing unity, the Third World has provided the setting for virtually all the wars, both civil and interstate, that have cost millions of lives since 1945.⁷ Expenditure on arms represents a serious drain on Third World budgets, and the area remains the likeliest location for further armed conflict. The ruling elites in the Third

World cannot escape blame for this situation, but also at fault are the examples set by the developed countries, some of the conditions imposed by the former colonial powers, and continued interference by First and Second World governments.

THE CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT

The essays that follow thus deal with Canada's involvement with the half of the human family that has more than its share of misery, and far less than an equitable portion of the means to improve its position. From the perspective of self-interest, narrowly defined, this half consists of the nations that Canadians could ignore with least cost or risk. Over 90 per cent of Canada's trade, vital to her high living standard, is with other developed countries, especially the United States. Nor does this situation seem likely to alter greatly. Canada's alliance with the Atlantic powers, and her modest but increasing relations with the Communist countries, are of obvious relevance in creating for Canadians a secure external environment. The vast majority of immigrants to Canada (at least until recently) have come from Europe where, along with the United States, Canada possesses the closest historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Relations with Third World countries are not only less extensive but, by any practical test, less essential to Canada.

This is not to suggest that these relations are trivial. Long before Canada maintained diplomatic relations with any of them, except through London, individual Canadians had established their own links as missionaries, traders, investors or tourists, and a modest stream of Third World immigrants was bound for Canada. In the five years 1970-74, Canada sold a yearly average of \$882 million worth of goods to Third World aid recipients, and bought from them goods worth an average of \$521 million per year.⁸ Canadians have become major investors in the Caribbean and parts of Latin America. The thousands of Canadian missionaries serving in the Third World have been joined by many more Canadians in the employ of voluntary agencies, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), or the United Nations. Over seven hundred young volunteers, and a few older ones, are

working in the Third World under the sponsorship of the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO). In 1971, more than 35,000 Third World citizens entered Canada as landed immigrants; thousands of others, who had come as visitors, were permitted to stay.⁹ By 1974, nearly half the continuing immigrant stream of 203,214 originated in Third World countries, a factor in the increasing racial tension in some Canadian cities.¹⁰

Official Canadian relations with the Third World, although starting much later, developed rapidly. The first Canadian diplomatic mission in the area was a legation in Brazil, opened in 1941, and the first High Commission was established in New Delhi in 1947. By 1974 Canada had thirty-eight ambassadors or high commissioners resident in the Third World, and maintained relations with sixty other countries in the area through multiple accreditation. Other Canadian officials worked closely with representatives of Third World governments in the United Nations and related agencies, in the institutions of the Commonwealth, or in l'Agence Culturelle et Technique de la Langue Française, established in 1970 to perform a function in "Francophonie" similar to that performed by the Commonwealth; the first Secretaries-General of both the commonwealth and l'Agence were Canadian citizens, Arnold Smith and Jean-Marc Léger.

Development assistance

Canada's principal involvements in the Third World are now as a peacekeeper and a major participant in international economic development. In 1949 she assisted in setting up the Colombo Plan for economic assistance, largely to Commonwealth countries in Asia. Subsequently, Canadian aid has been channelled to other areas as well, such as the Caribbean, Africa and Latin America, and through multilateral agencies such as those of the United Nations. The quality of Canadian aid, including many of the terms on which it is granted, compares favourably with the aid of other donors; the ratio of grants to loans, for example, is exceptionally high; a large portion of the loans bear no interest and are repayable over fifty years with an initial ten years of grace. These terms are

softer than those of almost any other donor and mean that the grant element in the Canadian loans is about 90 per cent.

By contrast, the amount of Canadian aid for long compared unfavourably with that of other donor countries. In 1961, for example, Canadian official aid amounted to a mere .19 per cent of GNP; the comparable figure for the United States was .73 per cent; the United Kingdom .66 per cent; France 1.7 per cent; the Netherlands .62 per cent; Germany .83 per cent; and Japan .48 per cent.¹¹ Even when it is recognized that aid statistics often contain considerable padding, and that some of the leading donors possess residual colonial responsibilities and aspirations, Canada's relative performance in gross terms has been decidedly unimpressive. More of her aid, moreover, has been tied to her own products and services than that of any other donor except Australia; tying, according to expert estimates, reduces the value of aid by about 20 per cent.¹²

Canada's performance has greatly improved in recent years, both absolutely and relatively. Prime Minister Trudeau, on assuming office in 1968, caused disappointment by refusing to reaffirm the unfulfilled pledge of the Pearson government to attain the U.N. approved target (.7 per cent of GNP) by a specific date. In international matters, however, Mr. Trudeau frequently delivers more than he promises, and his government has increased its aid allocations by from 15 to 20 per cent a year, even during a period of severe budgetary constraint. This increase has coincided with a drastic drop in the flow of American aid caused by a loss of support in both Congress and the public. Although exposed to a great deal of the U.S. media, Canadians have fortunately failed to share the U.S. mood. By 1974, Canada's official development assistance had increased to .51 per cent of GNP and her ranking, by this crude test, had risen to eighth among donor countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.¹³ Canada's aid allocation for 1975-76 was set at \$903 million and the .7 per cent of GNP target, recommended by the Pearson Report for 1970, may well be attained by 1980. At the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974, Canada pledged one million metric tons of food grain an-

nually for each of the next three years to help meet the worsening conditions in the Third World caused by the rise in the cost of oil and some other commodities.¹⁴ The terms of Canadian aid have also been liberalized; the proportion of bilateral aid needing to be tied has been reduced to 80 per cent; the proportion given through multilateral agencies increased to over 25 per cent; and Canada is now willing to meet transportation costs. In September 1975, the government announced a new strategy for international development cooperation that promised greater assistance to the very poor, and an increased focus on food production and distribution, rural development, education and training, public health and demography, and shelter and energy.

Canada's most imaginative initiative in the development field was the establishment in 1970 of the International Development Research Centre. Although its board is international, and its charter permits outside financing, its total budget (\$22.6 million in 1973-74) has thus far been provided by Canada. The Centre assists the developing countries to apply science and technology to their problems primarily as *they* define them, and most of its research takes place in the Third World. Another instance of Canadian pioneering is in collaborating with non-governmental organizations (NGO's). These are especially effective in social development, and about half the \$30 million spent by CIDA in support of Canadian NGO's goes for this purpose; another third goes to education. Although government financing of private agencies, especially church groups, can give rise to domestic political controversy, the experiment appears highly successful.

By 1974, at the special session of the United Nations devoted to the problems of development, it was widely recognized that aid from the industrialized countries, even if it could be doubled to meet the .7 per cent of GNP target, was sadly inadequate to meet the needs of the poor nations. The Third World countries had become far more assertive in demanding changes in the international monetary system, and the establishment of producer cartels and other means to transform the old economic system into one more consistent with their interests. Indeed, it had long been conceded that

often the best way to assist developing countries is to facilitate their exports by the elimination of tariffs and other impediments to trade. "Trade not aid" is a good motto for those who have the interests of the undeveloped at heart and believe that permanent dependence upon the "generosity" of others is inconsistent with the self-respect of both donor and recipient. Freer trade, although it may necessitate painful short-term adjustments in some industries, is also in the economic interests of the developed nations.¹⁵ Politicians, however, encounter less resistance to increases in aid, the costs of which can be widely spread, than to proposals for tariff cuts or quota removals that might necessitate the curtailment of a domestic industry, however uncompetitive. The Canadian textile industry, for example, is concentrated in relatively few constituencies and the retraining or relocating of its workers would seem a manageable task. Nevertheless, even Prime Minister Pearson, heavily committed to international development, had little success in liberalizing textile import policies. Canada's position in successive UNCTAD conferences, where the "trade not aid" theme has been stressed, has often disappointed the developing nations. She was slow to adopt the generalized scheme for preferences in favour of the less developed countries (LDC's), and made a significant retreat (with respect to rubber footwear) soon after. Her attitude to producers' cartels has been strongly negative. In extenuation, it has been explained that Canada's record is no worse than that of other developed countries, and her spokesmen have been exceptionally honest in promising at UNCTAD sessions only what they know they can deliver. Furthermore, it is argued that opening the relatively small Canadian market, which would force the closing of some industries and compound Canada's employment problem, might make little difference to the export prospects of the LDC's which need access to the really substantial markets of the European Community, Japan and the United States. It is nevertheless embarrassing that Canada, frequently a loud advocate of freer trade, should appear reluctant to alter her tariff structure in ways that would assist the LDC's.

Even more troubling to Canadian consciences should be

their nation's exceptionally influential performance in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. This negotiation, convened in Caracas in 1974, is working towards a comprehensive treaty that is likely to establish national control over a substantial portion of the seabed, the two-thirds of the earth's surface that was formerly the exclusive property of no nation. This has been aptly described as "the largest territorial grab in history," and Canada stands accused of "leading the pack."¹⁶ Already blessed with more land-based natural resources per capita than almost any other nation, Canada is claiming ownership rights to a larger portion of the ocean bed than any other country—an exclusive economic zone out two hundred miles from the world's longest coastline, the continental margin which extends up to another four hundred miles, and certain rights in the seas beyond. This would add about 40 per cent to Canada's existing real estate, and give her a giant share of the twenty trillion dollars' worth of minerals and oil believed to lie on the ocean floor.

At the time of writing, most of Canada's claims seem likely to win acceptance, a tribute to her diplomacy and also to the good reputation she has earned in the past as a supporter of international institutions and developmental assistance to the Third World. Canada, indeed, is believed by some observers to be the most influential participant in this historic set of negotiations. She has supported a proposal that an international agency should administer part of the wealth of the deep seabed in the interest of the poor nations, but is doing so with none of the commitment and energy that she has characteristically displayed in the creation of other new institutions, such as the United Nations, NATO, or L'Agence Culturelle et Technique de la Langue Française. Worse, if Canada's claims are accepted, and extended to the other coastal states as well, the portion of the seabed left as the "common heritage" to be administered for the benefit of the poor countries will only consist of a derisory percentage of the available wealth, and the least accessible. Nowhere else is there another unexploited resource that might significantly alter the gross disparity in wealth that now disgraces mankind. Assuming that the seabed resources are not greatly ex-

aggerated, their assignment to the resource-poor members of the Third World would greatly reduce, and perhaps in time eliminate, the need for developmental assistance from the rich nations. The time to commit these resources is now, before the wealthy coastal countries like Canada come to rely on them for the maintenance of their own inflated living standards, or private interests are allowed to acquire vested rights that would be difficult to change.

Canada's extraordinarily greedy stand on this issue has occasioned little criticism at home or, more curiously, in the Third World. In part, this is because a few Third World countries, such as India, have long coastlines and stand to gain from the extension of national control. Others, especially the very poorest of the land-locked nations, lack the expertise that would inform them of the stakes at issue, and also the diplomatic capability to register effective claims. This, however, does not exonerate Canada. As already noted, Prime Minister Trudeau's performance in many situations is far more internationalist than his early neo-isolationist rhetoric. In this instance, the opposite is the case. In several moving speeches, he has recently called for "an acceptable distribution of the world's wealth";¹⁷ if "Canada's presence in the world" were to be judged by a "single criterion," he hoped that it would be its "humanism, its pursuit of social justice." "Canadian foreign policy would be meaningless," he continued, "if it were not caring," and "our compassion must have no geographic focus."¹⁸ His government's new aid strategy generally measures up to this standard. However, its policy on the seabed, where its influence could be decisive, stands in flagrant contradiction. And it has eased the adoption of more selfish policies by other countries, notably the United States. Unless this policy is transformed, Canada's reputation in the Third World seems certain to suffer.¹⁹

Peacekeeping

Canada's most prominent involvement in the Third World has been her enthusiastic support of peacekeeping operations, all of which have occurred in this area. She became an active peacekeeper for reasons very different from those that

explain her support of international development. While initially her foreign aid was largely a manifestation of her attachment to the Commonwealth, especially her desire to assist the United Kingdom meet its postwar financial obligations, Canada became the world's most ardent peacekeeper through her concern about global security and her extraordinary commitment to the United Nations; no country has been more consistent or generous in its support of the world organization. However, while her original motivations were different, Canada now supports U.N. peacekeeping for much the same reasons as those for which she supports international development.

Canada has supplied troops for all the U.N. peacekeeping operations of any significance; in the process she has gained more first-hand knowledge about their modalities, possibilities and limitations than any other country. In September 1975, nine Canadians were still serving with UNMOGRP (Military Observer Group) established in Kashmir in 1949, and another twenty were with UNTSO (Truce Supervisory Organization), Palestine, 1954. A Canadian, General E. L. M. Burns, was the first Commander of UNEF (Emergency Force), Sinai, 1956, the most significant of all the peacekeeping operations; up to 950 other Canadians served with UNEF at any one time until its expulsion in 1967; UNEF was revived in 1973, and in 1975 numbered 838 Canadians among its personnel; a further 151 belonged to UNDOF (Disengagement Observer Force) in Syria, set up shortly after UNEF was revived. In September 1975, 527 Canadians were serving with UNFCYP (Force in Cyprus) which was established in 1964, down from the original Canadian contingent of 1,130.

Up to 310 Canadians helped man the controversial ONUC (Operation in Congo), 1960-64. Much smaller numbers served with other United Nations teams that have also completed their assignments: UNOGIL (Lebanon), 1953-59; UNTEA (West New Guinea), 1962-63; UNYOM (Yemen), 1963-64; and UNIPOM (Pakistan), 1965-66.

Canada also helped man the three ICSC's (International Commissions for Supervision and Control, often referred to as ICC's), tripartite teams set up by the Geneva Conference of

1954 to observe the "peace" in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos; at the peak of their activity in 1955, 170 Canadians, one-seventh of whom were professional diplomats,²⁰ were engaged on these Commissions. By their disbandment in 1973, the total had dwindled to 15. In the same year, however, Canada sent out 290 diplomatic and military personnel to form part of the quadrapartite iccs (International Commission for Control and Supervision) agreed to under the Paris accord for Vietnam that was negotiated in late 1972. These were withdrawn in July 1973, and the Canadians were replaced by Iranians. The United Nations bore responsibility for neither the tripartite icsc's (Canada, India, Poland) nor the quadrapartite (Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland) iccs.

In 1964, the peak year of peacekeeping activity, 2,122 Canadians were serving under the United Nations flag or with the icsc's in Indochina. By September 1975, the number was down to 1,547, still the largest national component of the 8,673 men serving the United Nations as keepers of the peace.

Participation in peacekeeping has cost the Canadian taxpayer several hundred million dollars and has imposed strains on Canada's modest military establishment; at least one U.N. request—for additional Francophone specialists during the Congo operation—had to be turned down. The greatest cost imposed by the peacekeeping role, however, is the luxury of being able to take bold stands on the rights and wrongs of the issues at stake. Any international force that seeks to interpose an insulating presence, or to supervise an uneasy truce, must be acceptable to all the contending forces. Its component elements must be recognized as impartial, at least with respect to the immediate area. In the conduct of their duty, peacekeepers may well be required to assign blame for specific violations. They must strive to avoid, however, the appearance of partisanship in the basic issues under dispute. Not every nation need exercise this restraint. It might, in fact, be highly desirable if the spokesmen of a large majority of nations expressed moral judgments with clarity and vigour. The point is that the same nation cannot aspire to play the roles of both peacekeeper and judge—to remain ac-

ceptable to the contending forces while publicly moralizing—especially if this calls into question the basic principles, or legality, of one of the sides to the dispute.

Canadians do not find this elementary proposition easy to accept. While generally enthusiastic about the peacekeeper role, and enjoying the prestige it has brought their nation, they frequently display impatience when their leaders appear reticent in apportioning blame for threats to the peace. During the 1956 Suez crisis, for example, the St. Laurent government was strongly criticized within Canada for not taking a more forthright stand; while some critics wanted Canada to support a clear-cut censure of the British, French and Israeli aggression, others complained that Canada had failed to back her motherlands to the hilt. Both camps failed to recognize that the low profile initially adopted by Canada's representatives had been an essential ingredient in their later success in both establishing and manning the emergency force. Nor had the lesson been learned by 1967; in the weeks preceding the Six Day War, the government acted repeatedly in a manner that reflected the pro-Israel sentiment of the Canadian public. There should have been little surprise, therefore, when Cairo, having asked for the withdrawal of UNEF, invited the Canadians to be the first to leave. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the government managed better in maintaining a posture of impartiality, and the only resistance to its participation in the restored UNEF came from the Soviet Union; this was relaxed when Canada agreed to share the vital backup role with a Polish contingent.

Canada's impartiality, and also her credibility, was again called into question by the government's decision, in July 1975, to request the United Nations to postpone the conference on crime that had long been scheduled for Toronto in September. The proffered excuse was that the government believed the international climate to be unconducive to constructive debate. Any chance this might be believed, however, had already been dissipated by prior publicity given to threats by some members of the Canadian Jewish community to demonstrate against the presence at the conference of representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

that had been granted observer status by a large majority in the U.N.; an impending election in Ontario, and the strong opposition of the Conservative government of that province, also appeared to be persuasive considerations. The federal government made it clear that any PLO representatives who had not been charged with terrorist activities would be permitted to attend the postponed conference if it were held in Toronto, or other U.N. conferences scheduled for Canada, such as Habitat 76. Nevertheless, the request for the postponement, and the apparently false excuse, damaged Canada's relations with the Arab countries and weakened her credibility within the United Nations, increasingly the political arm of the Third World majority. One must question the wisdom of the Third World governments who in 1975 were not only using the United Nations to muster economic pressure on the richer countries but moving towards the expulsion of Israel, an action that would inevitably prejudice support for the United Nations in countries like the United States and Canada. On the other hand, if Canada aspires to closer relations with the Third World countries, she must continue to take U.N. participation seriously. It is scarcely a valid objection that the Third World is now using its majority to pursue its own aims; the United States and her allies, including Canada, behaved in somewhat the same manner during the years they constituted the majority in the U.N.; furthermore, Canada claims a substantial share of the credit for the expansion of membership beginning in 1955 that led to the Third World dominance of the General Assembly.²¹ If, in particular, Canada wishes to preserve her acceptability as a peacekeeper, she must demonstrate her independence of domestic minorities, including ethnic groups, that inhibit the pursuance of constructive policies in such problem areas as the Middle East.

A different sort of difficulty in peacekeeping was posed by the unusual composition of the three control commissions set up by the Geneva Conference in 1954 to supervise the peace in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Their membership was based on the troika formula: one representative from each of the cold war blocs, Canada and Poland, presided over by a

neutral, India. The Poles were totally consistent in championing the communist case, while the Indians seemed primarily concerned to preserve their public posture of non-alignment. Although the Canadians sought to report as objectively as they do in the course of their U.N. assignments, and often supported findings critical of the Americans and South Vietnamese, they were frequently manoeuvred into arguing the anti-communist case to ensure balance in the ICSC decisions and reports. In the course of doing this almost every Canadian diplomat who served on the ICSC's became more sympathetic to the South Vietnamese regime and the American involvement in the area than most other members of the Canadian political elite. This ultimately led to controversy within Canada, and complicated relations with India, but it did not destroy Canada's reputation as an exceptionally well qualified and objective keeper of the international peace.

After the establishment of the Cyprus operations in 1964, the demand for U.N. peacekeeping appeared to decline. Moreover, after President Nasser of the United Arab Republic requested and obtained the withdrawal of UNEF in 1967, Canadian enthusiasm for peacekeeping considerably dampened, and the Trudeau government, which took office the following year, articulated a more skeptical attitude. However, it maintained the Canadian forces already in the field, and the general expectation was that Canada would again respond sympathetically in the unlikely event of new requests for men and matériel. This proved to be the case when, in January 1973, Canada was asked to supply 290 men to the reconstituted peace supervisory operation in Vietnam. Although few of the precise, tough conditions laid down by Ottawa had been met, and the arrangements seemed no more workable than those set up under the Geneva accord, the government accepted the assignment for a trial period of sixty days, which was subsequently extended. All parties to the Vietnam conflict, and many other governments, had urged Canada to take part, evidence that the international community still accepted her exceptional credentials as a peacekeeper and supervisor. Doubts were expressed within Canada, most keenly by the diplomats who had experienced eighteen years

of frustration on the old ICSC's. The majority of Canadians, however, agreed that Canada had little alternative but to undertake once again the role that the world had come to expect of her.²² Having urged the Americans to withdraw from Indochina, moreover, Ottawa was in a weak position to refuse participation in an operation designed to facilitate that withdrawal, especially at a time when the agenda of the U.S.-Canadian difficulties was distressingly long. The armed forces were eager to accept the assignment if only to demonstrate their continuing relevance. Once again the Canadian contingent of diplomats and soldiers showed itself to be the most resourceful, and the most determined to implement the letter of the agreement. There was widespread disappointment, but little criticism, when the government announced that the blatant failure of the Vietnamese factions to cease fighting, coupled with stultifying divisions within the ICSCs, made it advisable to withdraw the Canadian contingent at the end of July 1973. Mr. Mitchell Sharp, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, expressed the hope that any future peacekeeping in which Canada participated would be under the auspices of the United Nations, a condition met by the reconstructed UNEF that returned to the Middle East in 1974.

The outstanding contribution made by Canadian soldiers and officials to successive U.N. missions in the field has been matched by the endeavours of Canadian politicians and diplomats to negotiate the establishment of peacekeeping operations, generally under emergency conditions, and also to place the entire function on a less ad hoc basis. Canada's part in setting up UNEF was recognized by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to her Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson; less well remembered, but also outstanding, was Canada's role in organizing the Cyprus operation in 1964 that narrowly headed off war between two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece. Soon after becoming Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson convened a conference in Ottawa to which were invited all the governments that had supplied forces for U.N. peacekeeping operations; this was part of a serious but unsuccessful campaign to provide standby forces and procedures that would always be available in a crisis to the United

Nations. Within the organization, Canada has persisted in pressing for a better institutional underpinning for peacekeeping, and sounder financing to which all members would contribute. Since 1964, she has earmarked a brigade of her own troops to be available for U.N. service, and the hotly contested unification in 1964 of the Canadian armed forces had as one of its primary objectives the enhancement of Canada's peacekeeping capability. No other nation has done as much as Canada to convert the United Nations into an effective instrument for the containment of local disturbances by the interposition of international forces designed to police truce agreements and inhibit the intrusion of other nations, especially the super powers. This activity, a source of pride to many Canadians, has helped generate a sense of distinctive national identity. It has also served to make Canadians more aware of the Third World. Although clearly less naïve in its expectations, the Canadian public in 1975 still appears firm in its general support of the peacekeeping function.

Race and Commonwealth

For most Africans at least, the acid test of a white, developed nation's sensitivity to the concerns of the Third World has become its stand on the issues of racial injustice and lingering colonialism. Canada's record in this sphere has been mixed; it is not yet clear that she will pass the test. In the United Nations, she has become less inhibited about supporting resolutions designed to apply pressure on governments that practise harsh racial discrimination against their black majorities. In late 1973, Mr. Sharp, defying considerable criticism within Canada, announced that the government would allow non-military aid to go to Africans suffering as the result of the efforts of the remaining white regimes to suppress liberation forces. Canada, however, had long appeared reluctant to go beyond mere words, and the change in her U.N. voting record scarcely suggests a more sympathetic attitude to the Third World than that of the majority of developed nations. Her insistence upon fostering trade with South Africa, contrary to the entreaties of most of the African governments, is particularly difficult to reconcile with her official protestations of

support for racial equality and closer ties with the Third World.

Canada's performance within the Commonwealth is more encouraging. She has been one of its staunchest supporters for about five years; even earlier she made herculean efforts of diplomacy to stave off its break-up over the issue of race. Prime Minister St. Laurent's common sense and friendship with Nehru helped keep India within the club. Prime Minister Diefenbaker is credited with maintaining Commonwealth cohesion by easing South Africa's departure without allowing the issue to polarize the members along race lines. Prime Minister Pearson was repeatedly called upon to exert his diplomatic talents to keep the Rhodesian issue from becoming fatally divisive. Prime Minister Trudeau performed a similar function during the 1970-71 controversy over the sale of British arms to South Africa, and now seems especially enthusiastic about the multiracial character of the Commonwealth. Most of his extensive travels during his first term were to Asian members of the Commonwealth, and he dispatched his personal adviser on foreign affairs, Dr. Ivan Head, on a number of missions to Commonwealth governments, mostly in Africa. A former Canadian diplomat, Arnold Smith, is widely credited with not only organizing the Commonwealth Secretariat but retaining for the Commonwealth the support of almost all of its Third World members. Canada was the most prompt in accepting large numbers of the Asians expelled from Uganda in 1972; although most were well qualified as immigrants, the action in a year of high unemployment, and a general election, called for political courage on the part of the Trudeau government. Canada still has some distance to go, however, if she is to demonstrate that her primary concern is the dignity and welfare of the other races, and warmer ties with them, rather than a merely sentimental desire to keep the Commonwealth going.

Canada's interaction with individual regions and nations within the Third World is the concern of the succeeding chapters. Striking variations will be revealed. Relations with the developing members of the Commonwealth, for example, have been much more extensive and intimate than those with

the nations of Latin America. In some countries, such as Sri Lanka, Canada's activity has been largely confined to development. In the Middle East, by contrast, peacekeeping has predominated, and attempts to promote a settlement through the United Nations. In the nearby Caribbean, Canada has not only concentrated the highest per capita share of her external assistance, but maintains a number of special military and economic arrangements; Canadians, major investors in the area, are sometimes accused of being "imperialistic," or even "racist"—a rude but perhaps salutary shock to a people who had too readily imagined that all foreigners liked them and recognized the nobility of their motives. Canadians have long been interested in, and acceptable to, the nations of Anglophone east and west Africa, but Ottawa now recognizes a compelling case for the generation of equally substantial ties with the former French colonies in the continent. To demonstrate that Canada's aid policy reflects her bicultural nature, and thus contributes to national unity, the government has been trying to balance Canada's relations with members of the Commonwealth by maintaining comparable relations with members of the much younger Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique des Pays Francophones. Closer Canadian relations with Latin America have been advocated as another means to placate Canadians of Latin origin, but in this they have been far less effective. While increasing, Canadian interest in Latin America still falls embarrassingly short of Canadian rhetoric.

The bulk of Canada's external aid has gone to India and Pakistan. Partly for this reason, she has been compelled to concern herself with the disputes over Kashmir and Bangladesh, but this involvement has occasioned relatively little controversy within Canada. The situation with respect to Indochina is different; while little aid has been sent, Canada's long and frustrating membership on the three control commissions imposed strains on her relations with other countries, notably India and the United States; it also tended to discredit her external activity in the eyes of many of her own people, some of whom concluded, wrongly, that Canada had become an accomplice in American aggression. The at-

tempted secession of Biafra, and Ottawa's reluctance to act contrary to the wishes of the Nigerian government, was another of the relatively few instances when relations with countries in the Third World caused acute controversy within Canada.

In spite of the variations noted above, Canada's involvement in the Third World remains primarily that of an affluent, secure nation with countries enduring poverty, instability and, too often, open conflict. She is widely perceived as inoffensive and well-intentioned. While rightly considered by Arab countries to be pro-Israel, and suspect for different reasons in some Caribbean circles, Canada's involvement in the Third World is generally welcome. Most often it is actively solicited. Her close associations with the United States, and membership in NATO, are rarely, if ever, a handicap. On occasion they may even prove to be an advantage; Canada has interested the decision-making elites of Third World countries in good part because she is believed to be both sympathetic to their aspirations and in possession of exceptional access to the major capitals of the western world.²³ On balance, the benefits gained by Canada through alliance participation has probably made it easier for her to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping, military training in developing countries, and other forms of development assistance. She has no imperial tradition to live down, and her relations with Third World countries have been at least as easy and as warm as those of any other developed nation.²⁴

THE CASE FOR CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT

It is easier to explain why Canada's official involvement with the Third World is generally acceptable than why that involvement should exist in the first place, and be on the increase. The most obvious reason for a minimal concern is that virtually all developed nations are now contributing to development in the Third World. Canada would be subject to a good deal of international criticism if she opted out completely. While easily exaggerated, the force of world opinion, channelled through agencies such as the United Nations and the OECD, cannot be lightly dismissed. This factor, however,

explains only a modest part of the interest shown by an affluent North American nation—one with serious internal problems, and few aspirations to be a global power—in the well-being of Africans, Asians and Latin Americans. If she wished, Canada could shift to Third World policies that would be much cheaper, and she would not suffer greatly thereby.

Statements by government officials, and also independent observers, present a confusing variety of reasons for Canadian concern about development, racial equality and peace in the Third World. They are especially profuse and contradictory in the matter of development assistance. In part this arises out of a failure to distinguish between the considerations that led to the start of the program, early in the cold war, and those that sustain it today. More confusion is caused by the fact that some commentators seek to explain why they think Canadians in general are supportive, while others give the reasons they themselves find convincing. Some of the difficulty may stem from different perceptions of the facts of the situation within Canada and abroad, or from different roles in the policy-making process. Role, however, provides an uncertain clue to the public position an official will take. In bargaining within the bureaucracy, for example, CIDA officials, as might be expected, fight hard to see that the interests of developing countries come first; in interviews, however, and in statements for public consumption, the same officials frequently feel compelled to stress the advantages to Canada in terms of economic gain, military security and influence. Canadian diplomats, who characteristically seek to shape the aid program in ways that enhance Canada's prestige and their own foreign contacts—to make aid serve as a "diplomatic calling card"—tend in conversation to be emphatic that the only important reason for aid is to satisfy the philanthropic impulses of the Canadian public. The characteristic input into the policy process of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (ITC) is the contention that foreign aid can and should be made to serve the interests of Canadian industry. Fierce interdepartmental conflict often results. In public, however, ITC spokesmen generally sound

much like those of CIDA. It is seldom easy to be confident about motivation, even when the persons under study are trying to be candid. One suspects, moreover, that public differences about aid are more apparent than real—that almost all the Canadian officials concerned with the Third World believe that development assistance is self-evidently right,²⁵ and their differences are largely about the best tactics to sell the “self-evident” case to the public. Often the advocates appear to be adjusting their pitch to the presumed prejudices of a particular audience.²⁶

Does this apparent confusion about motivation really matter? Surely, it may be argued, results alone count; different groups respond to different appeals, and even the same individual in different moods may be responsive to different arguments. On the other hand, inconsistent advocacy can well stimulate doubts, and cynicism may result from failure of exaggerated predictions. Confused, conflicting rationalizations are likely to give rise, as Grant Reuber has demonstrated,²⁷ to confused, conflicting policies. It clearly does matter if the central criterion is to be Canada’s national interest, or that of the recipient country; if our first aim is to be stability in the Third World, or economic well-being; if we are to concentrate on areas where the needs are greatest, or where aid is most likely to assist economic takeoff. We cannot deal here with all the relevant questions, but an examination of several of the contending justifications for aid and peacekeeping should bring out important aspects of Canada’s involvement in the Third World, and contrast it with her activity in other areas.

The standard explanations rest on two seemingly inconsistent propositions: one camp maintains that involvement in the Third World is Canada’s interest, the other, her duty. Some authorities, such as former External Affairs Minister Sharp, have sought to obliterate the distinction.²⁸ “Interest” can be defined, and often is, so broadly that it embraces virtually every motivation. Although it generally connotes something concrete, enduring and demonstrable, in fact it can be just about as slippery as any other word in our political vocabulary. To say that an action is in a person’s or nation’s

“interest” is to say very little unless the commentator goes on to spell out his or her values. The national interest, in the last analysis, is little more than what the nation says it is, and that can vary with time, mood or circumstance. For the purpose of rational discussion, however, it is useful to respect the common sense distinction between “moral” acts undertaken because the actor perceives them to be the dictates of conscience, with little or no thought of earthly reward, and those initiated in the reasonable expectation that they will bring the initiator gains other than the satisfaction of a deed well done, or the respect of others. Among acts classified as moral, it might also be well to include those expected to bring rewards that are so long-term, diffuse or incalculable that alternative courses of action would bring more certain gains: acts, for example, that might help over a very long period to transform human society and make the world a pleasanter, safer place for succeeding generations.

The Canadian interests said to be promoted by external aid and peacekeeping include: Canadian living standards, by increasing trade and opportunities for profitable investment; security, by strengthening stability in the external environment; and political leverage, by acquiring influence over the decisions of other governments and international bodies. Let us consider these one by one.

Increased productivity in the Third World, and significantly rising living standards, may well create new markets. This prospect is especially attractive to Canadians who, in the interests of national independence, are anxious to diversify their trading relationships; the present concentration of two-thirds of Canada’s exports and imports in one market, that of the United States, poses a greater limitation on her freedom of action than does the fact of foreign ownership of a substantial part of her industry.²⁹ Through support of peacekeeping operations, Canada may help to create the stability in the Third World necessary to economic growth; helping to train Third World armed forces may serve the same purpose; capital assistance is intended to strengthen the economic and social infrastructure essential to a productive economy; technical assistance provides necessary expertise and manage-

ment skills; gifts of food not only relieve starvation but may also enable the recipients to conserve foreign exchange for purposes related to economic growth; tariff concessions facilitate specialization and sound development.

Occasionally doubt is articulated that it really is in the interests of Africans, Asians and Latin Americans to foster economic growth, especially if this entails the wholesale adoption of foreign techniques and values. We are certainly presumptuous whenever we claim superiority for the values and methods characteristic of our industrial civilization, and seek to impose them on others. Indeed, right within the western countries there is now considerable skepticism about the blind worship of economic growth, or the stress upon individual acquisitiveness. Moral difficulties are largely avoided, however, if the key decisions are left to the peoples of the Third World, especially in those countries where the ruling elites enjoy a genuine measure of popular support. In practice, almost all Third World spokesmen have expressed the desire for economic development,³⁰ and a substantial majority have sought assistance from Canada. Moreover, while some authorities have become pessimistic about the ability of foreign aid to accelerate development, results in a number of areas have been encouraging, and Canadian programs generally enjoy a sound reputation.

More serious doubt arises whenever one tries to justify Canadian aid in terms of Canada's economic interest.³¹ This is not because the cost has been exceptionally burdensome; it is, in fact, never nearly as heavy as global figures might imply,³² especially when there are slack factors of production, and the aid is tied, as most of Canada's has been. Trade with developing countries has increased, and some of this increase might well persist if and when Canadian aid is discontinued. Canada's general trading position would probably improve if economic takeoff occurs throughout the Third World.

The correlation between Canadian aid and enduring trade, however, remains tenuous. It is by no means established that extending aid is an effective means to earn gratitude; even if one assumes that it is, gratitude is often short-lived and a weak basis for subsequent commerce. Aid is a sounder long-

term investment if it means accustoming the relevant elite groups in the recipient countries to one's language, techniques and equipment; it may well pay Germany and Japan, for example, to train young African, Latin American and Asian engineers to think "German" or "Japanese" in their professional activity. Canadian equipment, however, is seldom distinctive, and the command of the English or French language enables the Third World purchasers of the future to do business just about as easily with more prominent suppliers of industrial equipment than Canada.

Even if the amount of Canadian aid were to be doubled, or tripled, it would still be unlikely to make an important difference in the rate of economic growth in the Third World as a whole. These countries depend on their own resources and efforts for an estimated 96 per cent of their economic development, and Canada contributes only about 7 per cent of the remaining 4 per cent that comes from all the developed nations, or about one-fourth of 1 per cent of the total development budget. To the extent that Canadians are motivated by the desire to improve their own material well-being, more certain results would be obtained by concentrating expenditures upon the home front. Economists appear to be correct when they maintain that "foreign aid almost certainly makes Canada worse off economically in the long run and in the short".³³ CIDA itself has acknowledged that "the economic arguments for aid are not very strong."³⁴ Economic arguments are certainly valid and useful in demonstrating that the costs to Canada are not nearly as great as the total figures would imply, and they may reassure those who believe that we can ill afford to be generous. The economic arguments lose credibility, however, if advanced as the primary reason why Canada should extend aid.

Contemporary commentators frequently claim that the east-west tension characteristic of the cold war has yielded to an even more threatening north-south confrontation. Prime Minister Trudeau, for example, speaking in Edmonton in 1968, held that:

... in the long run the overwhelming threat to Canada will not come from foreign investments or foreign ideologies, or even—with

good fortune—foreign nuclear weapons. It will come instead from the two-thirds of the people of the world who are steadily falling farther and farther behind in their search for a decent standard of living.³⁵

As a means to dramatize the morally repugnant gulf between the affluent third and the hungry two-thirds of mankind, such rhetoric may serve a useful purpose. If, however, it is intended to suggest that this gulf poses a serious threat to the physical security of the developed nations, especially those of North America, it is wide of the mark. Even if the poor of the world were to concert their forces, it remains difficult to imagine a plausible scenario in which they could pose a serious military threat to either of the two major nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, or to any neighbour of a super power that it chose to protect. Even if the technically advanced nations were to abandon the awful power of nuclear fission, or other Third World countries were to emulate India by developing a modest nuclear capacity, North America and Europe need have little fear of a military attack directed at their heartlands from the poor nations of the world.³⁶ The "North's" head-start in weaponry of almost all types is too substantial.

In 1973 a group of Third World countries dramatically demonstrated their capacity to impose severe economic hardships on many of the industrialized countries, and also to exploit this capacity to exert political pressure. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of oil, and the Arab members also imposed a ban for some months on sales to countries, such as the United States and the Netherlands, that they accused of being too friendly to Israel; although the situation was ambiguous, it now seems clear that Canada was also an intended target of this pressure. The action by OPEC has had a tremendous impact upon the already strained international monetary system, and has underlined the extreme vulnerability of Japan and most of western Europe to changes in the supply of energy. However, although OPEC members have been generous towards some of the developing countries, and have won widespread applause in the Third World for their bold blow against the

established economic order, the consequences of the price increase in oil have been felt most severely within the Third World. Canadians and Americans have been properly concerned about the shock to the global monetary system, and they continue to face the possibility of severe short-term energy shortages, but their position in the longer run is far less vulnerable than most developed countries to the economic pressures that might be exerted by the Third World providers of basic resources, such as oil.

Still less need North America fear the security consequences of the growing unity of the Third World as reflected in majority votes in the United Nations critical of the industrialized countries. One can have considerable sympathy for the tactics of the Third World governments, and hope that most of the claims that they are articulating through the U.N. forum will be heeded by the "have" countries. It may even become difficult to cultivate friendly relations with the less-developed countries unless membership in the United Nations, increasingly "their" club, is taken seriously. The fact remains that decisions of the General Assembly may be, and habitually are, ignored by individual members with impunity. Even the threat of expulsion, although a cause for concern, appears to hold little terror. The current consensus is that, while its specialized agencies are increasing in effectiveness, the United Nations' influence on issues of peace and war is being eroded by the blatant discrepancy between voting strength in the General Assembly and the realities of power.

A more threatening scenario is one in which major war is triggered by a Third World conflict into which the major powers are drawn because of prior commitments to different factions, or by the emergence of a power vacuum. The possibility of such a conflict certainly remains a valid reason for giving the United Nations the capacity to interpose peace-keeping forces in a hurry. On the other hand, the super powers and China have made evident by their increasing caution in the Middle East, Indochina and Africa, that they do not intend to be drawn by their allies, or by instability in the Third World, into mortal conflict with one another. The danger of world war starting in this way was never great, and

is diminishing. To the extent that it remains, Canadian action, or inaction, seems unlikely to be decisive.

It is, moreover, far from established that nations with rising living standards are more stable and pacific than those that are poor and stagnant. The opposite may be closer to the truth. In any case, Mitchell Sharp has emphatically and properly rejected the notion that Canadian aid should seek to promote the status quo in the Third World: "The assumption that the developed nations' interests are served best by maintaining the status quo is both arrogant and unfounded," he has stated, along with the hope that Canadian aid would give some people "the sinews they need to rise and cast aside the cruel weight of unjust and unprincipled government."³⁷ He has also observed that "successful revolt, like successful government, calls for effective infrastructure, the kind of thing aid programs are designed to provide."³⁸ Whatever the impact of development upon political stability, it remains very difficult to demonstrate that instability in the Third World poses a serious threat to Canada's security, or that her aid program and peacekeeping could do a great deal to counter such a threat if one were to develop.

Early in the cold war it was believed in western capitals, including Ottawa, that security would be endangered if many of the Third World nations were to join the communist bloc; to prevent this happening, or even to lure non-aligned nations into the western camp, was undoubtedly an important consideration in allocating aid. As late as 1969, an internal CIDA document could still contend that the first objective of Canada's aid was

to establish within recipient countries those political attitudes or commitments, military alliances or military bases, that would assist Canada or Canada's western allies to maintain a reasonably stable and secure international political system . . .³⁹

By the late sixties, however, this was far from representative of Ottawa thinking; indeed, Canadian policy-makers had never been as eager as many of their allies to purchase alliance support through foreign aid. One highly respected ex-official, John Holmes, went so far in 1965 as to suggest that the West should tell the Third World that

we no longer cared about their alignment. If they wanted to turn to the Communists for help . . . that was their business . . . such a policy . . . would clear the air of charges of neocolonialism, and we might begin to enjoy the plight of Moscow and Peking trying to cope with too many clients.⁴⁰

In *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, published in 1970, the government explained that "Canada's development assistance will tend to be concentrated in countries whose governments pursue external and internal policies that are broadly consistent with Canadian values and attitudes."⁴¹ In context, however, this did not signal a serious intent to influence the political attitudes of the recipients of Canadian aid, which include nations of such diverse political systems as Cuba, Indonesia and Tanzania.

Proponents of aid, even those who play down economic and security considerations, still claim on occasion that it provides Canada with the ability to influence her external environment. "Aid programs," according to a CIDA document, "serve not only to help increase Canada's influence within the developing world, but also within the western alliance."⁴² *Foreign Policy for Canadians* makes a similar point, but more modestly: "Within international organizations, Canadian policy positions and views on development questions will be related to the size and effectiveness of the Canadian assistance program."⁴³ Professor Triantis has gone so far as to contend that influence *must* be the primary motivation for economic aid; after discussing the "philanthropic motive," and contending that "aid entails economic loss for Canada," he concludes by the process of elimination that the principal reason for aid is "political," by which he means obtaining influence over the governments of the developing nations.⁴⁴

Donor governments are generally unwise to advertise favours they have gained, or hope to gain, in return for assistance to Third World countries; such advertising makes it more difficult for recipients to be responsive. Even in private, however, experienced Canadian officials tend to be skeptical about the correlation between aid and influence. Goodwill is transitory. Recipients are understandably determined to demonstrate that they have not compromised their independence

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and, in consequence, may well become even less inclined to act in accordance with the donor's wishes. This is a more relevant consideration in the case of super powers, especially the United States, but even the efforts of a middle power to influence the internal or external behaviour of recipient governments can quickly become counter-productive; if the aid is minor, attempts to attach strings invite ridicule; if the aid is significant, the sensibilities of the recipient are likely to be heightened by that fact alone. The donor's leverage could be considerable in the short run if the aid is vital to the recipient's survival in a military confrontation, and alternative sources are unavailable or awkward. Even in such extreme circumstances, however, the donor may encounter frustration, as was demonstrated by Cairo's request in 1972 that the Soviet Union remove most of its personnel from Egypt.

Canadian aid is rarely crucial, and it is widely acceptable on the assumption that Canada lacks the interests or ideological commitment that would tempt her to exploit development assistance, or peacekeeping, as a means to influence the policies of weaker powers.

The fact that Canada has become a major donor in some areas, notably the Caribbean, Francophone Africa and South Asia, certainly facilitates contacts with local decision-makers, and members of the Department of External Affairs frequently seek to ensure that Canadian aid takes a form that lends itself to publicity and enhanced prestige for Canada and her representatives. Aid may on occasion increase the disposition of the leaders of recipient countries to listen to Canadian views on matters that are not of supreme importance to them, such as Arctic pollution. Sometimes adjustments in the flow of aid have been implemented, or threatened, in order to influence the conduct of recipient governments towards their own populations; one instance came during Pakistan's bloody but vain effort to prevent the secession of Bangladesh. However, even when such leverage is attempted in conjunction with other donors, the results have been meagre.

There is little risk in requesting recipient governments to support Canadian moves in the international arena so long as it is not suggested that compliance is a condition for aid. There is also little reason to expect significant results. Canada

is now one of India's primary sources of developmental assistance, and high Indian officials once described their relations with Canada as better than those with any other foreign power; this did not, however, dispose the Indians to cooperate with the Canadians in carrying out their joint responsibilities for the supervision of the 1954 Geneva Agreements for Indochina. Nor did it enable Canada to persuade India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which meant a great deal to Ottawa, or to resist the temptation to blast her way into the "Nuclear Club." (Since the Indians concede that plutonium for their nuclear devices comes from one of the reactors supplied by Canada, and that many of their nuclear technicians were trained in Canada, their insistence upon becoming the sixth nation with an independent nuclear capability left Canadians with a strong sense of betrayal.) When, in 1973, the oil-producing Arab governments announced discriminatory reductions in exports, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, summoned to his office the Ambassadors of Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria to stress that Canada expected favourable treatment in acknowledgment of the economic aid she had extended. It seems improbable, however, that these governments went to bat for Canada in their dealings with their Arab brethren that really mattered—those that possess oil.

Canadian economic assistance to Francophone West and Central Africa was intended to counter de Gaulle's campaign, aided and abetted by a number of Quebec politicians and officials, to gain international status for that province. And it disposed at least one African government to be helpful to Ottawa at a crucial moment.⁴⁵ In general, however, Canadian diplomats, including those with experience within the United Nations, report little success in enlisting support from recipient nations. Nor are there many occasions when the actions of Third World governments impinge significantly upon important Canadian interests. As a means to gain influence, especially influence that might be exploited in bargaining situations vital to Canada, the extension of military or economic assistance to the Third World must be judged expensive, uncertain and inefficient.

Any attempt to explain Canada's Third World involvement

in terms of national interest, as that term is commonly understood, is thus unpersuasive, or at best seriously incomplete. If the objective is to enhance the wealth, security or influence of Canada, it is easy to think of more certain means than the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars on foreign aid or peacekeeping. There is an important secondary sense in which it is in Canada's interest to augment her activity in the Third World, but enough may have been recorded to establish that the only really compelling motive is moral, or humanitarian. This has been aptly described by Clyde Sanger as "the Himalayan answer: we give aid just because the developing nations are there, with all their mountainous needs so visible even from a distance."⁴⁶ The brotherhood of man is either self-evident, or non-existent. It is subject to neither scientific nor logical proof. If it is accepted, it follows that the affluent have the duty and privilege to share with the hungry and oppressed, wherever they exist. Can any morally sensitive citizen of the rich, developed world accept with equanimity the growing gulf between his or her standard of life and that of the majority of mankind? Almost as self-evident is the duty to foster global conditions in which all nations can maintain a tolerable existence without having to rely permanently on the generosity of others.

This philosophy appears to be shared by most of the Canadians responsible for determining policies towards the Third World. No matter what their private calculations of personal or national interest, or the case for involvement they choose to present for public consumption, the policy-makers accept that the industrialized nations have a responsibility to assist, if requested, in the economic development of the Third World and in the curtailment of violence. Canada's responsibility, in fact, is exceptionally strong. She is not as wealthy as her giant neighbour, and is faced by serious problems in overcoming regional and ethnic disparities within her own territory. On the other hand, compared with most peoples, her wealth is immense, and her security in recent years has been largely provided by others, or by geography; moreover, her domestic problems are probably less serious than those confronting the United States. That the Americans became

over-involved in some parts of the world, notably Indochina, is now rarely questioned, but their withdrawal may well proceed farther than is consistent with the general interest. The reduction in the American aid program is especially unfortunate. Other developed countries, less generous in the past, will have to take up the slack if economic development in the Third World is not to suffer a severe setback.

In his argument that "political" considerations far outweigh the "philanthropic" in determining Canadian aid policy, Professor Triantis flatly denied that "Canadians feel solidarity with others." Since the government is simply the "agent of the people," he reasoned, its motivation must also be "political" rather than altruistic.⁴⁷ Democratic governments do not generally feel bound to act in accordance with the wishes of the majority of their citizenry on every issue; most progressive measures have in fact been introduced by elected representatives whose knowledge and social conscience were more highly developed than their voters'. The limitation of the death penalty is an excellent contemporary example. Politicians would be unwise, of course, to get too far out of step with the electorate, but there is no evidence that granting assistance to the poorer nations, either in the form of economic aid or peacekeeping, has cost votes. Occasionally a political figure will argue that "charity begins at home," and federal leaders may well interpret demands for tax reductions, greater transfer payments to the provinces, or increased expenditure on domestic undertakings, as indirect pressure to curtail external programs. Canada's native peoples are becoming more assertive. Moreover, a few voices, some of them serious, have cast doubt on the effectiveness of economic aid and U.N. peacekeeping.

On the other hand, both aid and peacekeeping have enjoyed strong support from the Canadian press and public opinion.⁴⁸ The community of Canadians pressing the government to augment its involvement in the Third World has always included the churches and voluntary agencies; it is being strengthened by returned CUSO volunteers and many others with first-hand knowledge of the problems of the developing peoples, and sympathy for their needs. Although

many Canadians appear to have an exaggerated view of the scale of their nation's contribution, and cannot be said to be pressing for an increase, politicians need not be taken seriously when they blame public resistance for the shortcomings in Canada's program. Moreover, the records and platforms of the principal opposition parties, the Progressive Conservatives and New Democrats, indicate that they would be at least as likely as the Liberals to continue with programs of developmental assistance, and to support peacekeeping undertakings.

The policy-makers are under some constraints. Economic interest groups, for example, lobby the government to have their products or services favoured in Canada's aid program. The government encounters exceptionally strong regional opposition whenever it attempts to alter tariffs or quotas to facilitate imports of manufactured goods from the Third World. On a small range of specific issues, it may be further constrained by other elements of the Canadian population. The extraordinary demand to supply the Biafran secessionists, for example, stemmed largely from church groups that have been active in bringing the Gospel to the inhabitants of the area. Similarly, while not all Canadian officials would admit that they have been partial to Israel, they readily concede that the much greater strength of the Jewish minority compared to the Arab inhibits policies that might appear to favour the Arab cause. No government in Ottawa is now likely to antagonize Quebec opinion by reducing aid to Francophone countries relative to other recipients.

In spite of such considerations, which go far to explain the precise form taken by Canada's external activity, Ottawa policy-makers have been relatively free from domestic constraints when determining the broad lines of their policies towards Third World countries. They are, moreover, better informed than the masses about Third World needs, and more subject to the social pressure exerted through the criticism and exhortation of political elites in other countries; it is uncomfortable to be the representative in international gatherings of a wealthy, secure nation that refuses to shoulder a reasonable share in programs designed to lessen disparities

or reduce violence. However, most Canadian officials and politicians not only favour a generous response to the needs of the Third World, but would probably continue to do so even if they were not subject to external pressure, or were unable to see clear advantages in terms of Canada's national interest. It is, in their eyes, primarily a matter of self-respect, or conscience.

This, paradoxically, brings us to the one national interest that is clearly served by an enthusiastic, active involvement in the problems of the Third World—Canada's interest in maintaining national independence and national identity, two closely related objectives. While relations with the developing countries are unlikely ever to become so substantial that they might provide in themselves an adequate counterweight to Canada's overpowering relations with the United States, increased association with them, especially if well publicized, can at least relieve the defeatism that comes from contemplating the many tendencies toward integration in North America. Even if changes are only marginal, they can have considerable psychological importance. The basis for really substantial countervailing relations are largely with western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Japan, but Canada can ill afford to neglect links with third countries anywhere, especially if these can be fostered without augmenting frictions with the United States.

Even more significant than the consciousness of a meaningful involvement with non-North American peoples is the image we have of ourselves. If Canada is to survive as a separate entity, it is important that we have some sense of uniqueness, at least with respect to our immediate neighbours. Genuine elements of Canadian distinctiveness are sufficiently rare that each should be cultivated with care. One of the most distinctive characteristics of Canada in the last thirty-five years, and the finest, has been her internationalism. At home, obliged to accept the presence of at least two national cultures, we have made a virtue of maintaining an environment that is more hospitable to a variety of cultures than the "melting-pot" to the south. Externally, Canada has often been the world's most enthusiastic, and consistent, sup-

porter of international cooperation. In the United Nations, the Commonwealth, Francophonie, NATO, GATT, OECD and other international groupings, Canada has discovered a rewarding vocation in being one of the most effective and reliable promoters of the general interest. Since the end of the Second World War, this "voluntarism" has never been exceptionally burdensome, but it has helped give Canadians a sense not just of separate identity but of purpose—a purpose that renders worthwhile the costs of independent nationhood.

In the postwar decades, when the threat to global security appeared critical, Canadians distinguished themselves as promoters of both collective security and collective defence. As the perceived threat of communist aggression grows less, a greater international concern has become the widening discrepancy between the wealth of the developed nations and those that remain economically retarded. If Canada wishes to maintain her reputation for good international behaviour, she will need to devote greater effort to strengthening relations with the Third World. A Canada that did more to close the gap between rich and poor countries, and to contain violence, would be more secure in her identity and more confident of an independent future. Of even greater significance, she would be contributing to a safer, saner, more equitable world.

NOTES

1. John W. Holmes, "The West and the Third World," in *International Journal*, vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter 1965-66), p. 22.
2. Yves Lacoste, *Géographie du sous-développement* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968), p. 14.
3. At the 1975 Couchiching Conference, the theme of which was "Canada and the Third World," a poll of the participants revealed that only half could recall encountering the term "Fourth World"; of these, most assumed that it represented the poorest of the poor countries, the incorrigible losers, with per capital GNP's below \$100 per year and little prospect for growth. Only one-fourth of the participants considered China to be part of the Third World; several suggested that it should be regarded as the "Fourth World." Some authorities use "Fourth World" to designate the newly rich, former members of the Third World, such as the Arab oil-producing nations. In view of this confusion, the term will not be employed in this volume.
4. These predictions are based on figures given by Robert S. McNamara,

President of the World Bank (*Globe and Mail*, March 9, 1973. "McNamara urges richer countries to meet foreign aid obligation").

5. "During 1974 the rise in oil prices alone wiped out the total value of all aid to the 41 poorest countries; in addition, food and fertilizers cost them an extra \$5,500 million. . . . To stand still in 1975 they ought to receive about \$30,000 million instead of the current level of \$12,000 million. . . ." (Guy Arnold, "Oil—key to a new world economic order," *Montreal Gazette*, Sept. 9, 1975.)
6. Although still called the "Committee of 77," by 1975 the membership had risen to about one hundred. A slightly smaller body, the "Group of Non-Aligned Countries," meets at summit level every second year, and more often at the level of foreign ministers. Its ideological bias is indicated by the fact that at its meeting in Lima, in 1975, Cuba, North Korea and Yugoslavia were represented, but neither South Korea nor Brazil.
7. John Gellner, a leading Canadian commentator on strategic matters, estimates that since 1945 there have been seventy wars, all but three in the Third World.
8. About 7 per cent of Canada's exports go to the developing countries while only about 2 per cent of theirs go to Canada. This is far less than is the case with most other industrialized countries, probably because Canada obtains substantial quantities of tropical products from the United States, while her main exports are raw materials and foodstuffs that are not in strong demand in the developing countries.
9. Statistics Canada, *Canada Yearbook 1973* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973), p. 235. The regulations under which many tourists were permitted to remain were drastically tightened in 1972, and this means of entry now seems effectively closed.
10. Immigrants from Europe totalled 78,373; the United States, 27,329; the Caribbean, 23,329; Asia, 48,143; South America, 12,849; Africa, 8,669; Australia, 2,808; Oceania, 1,419.
11. Keith Spicer, *A Samaritan State?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p. 41.
12. This is not necessarily because Australia and Canada are more self-seeking than other donors. Rather, because their manufactured products tend to be higher in price, they do less well when recipient countries are permitted to place their orders freely. See below, pp. 277-306, for a discussion of the consequences of tying Canadian aid.
13. The countries giving in aid a larger percentage of GNP than Canada were: Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, France, Australia, Denmark and Belgium. Preliminary estimates for 1975 suggest that Canada may rise to fourth position.
14. Canada, Department of External Affairs, "The Elimination of Man's Oldest Scourge and Most Persistent Enemy—Hunger," *Statements and Speeches*, 74/13, November 6, 1974. Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, A. J. MacEachen, to the World Food Conference, Rome, November 6, 1974.

15. See Economic Council of Canada, *Looking Outward*, 1975, pp. 61-83 for a cogent argument in favour of free trade for Canada.
16. Peyton V. Lyon, "Canada seen leading the grab for the seabed," *Globe and Mail*, March 20, 1975, p. 7. The case for national control over fishing within a broad coastal zone is considerably stronger, at least until a viable international agency can be established; if swift action is not taken, some important species may be eliminated. Concern for this possibility, however, and the current plight of Canada's east coast fishermen, should not blind us to the more significant, and less defensible, claims that Canada is making to the ocean bed.
17. Notes for Remarks by the Prime Minister at the Mansion House, London, England, March 13, 1975, pp. 7-9.
18. Notes for Prime Minister's Remarks to the Canadian Jewish Congress, Toronto, June 16, 1974, p. 4.
19. Already Canada's position has been criticized as greedy by several Third World delegates to the Law of the Sea Conference. See "Droit de la Mer: demandes canadiennes jugées excessives?" *Le Devoir*, March 20, 1975.
20. The total number of Canadians who served on the three ICSC's from 1954 to 1972 was 1,482. Nearly 200 of these were Foreign Service officers, about one-third of the officer strength at that time of the Department of External Affairs.
21. James Eayrs, *Canada in World Affairs Vol. 9: October 1955 to June 1957* (Toronto: Oxford University Press; 1959), pp. 217-26.
22. According to a poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in March 1973, the decision to participate in the ICCS was favoured by 53 per cent of the Canadian public and opposed by 39 per cent; the percentage in favour rose to 56 per cent among Francophones and 71 per cent among the university educated. (*Ottawa Citizen*, April 7, 1973.)
23. In 1970 the Tanzanian government declined to renew a contract with Canada for the provision of military training, and Canada's membership in NATO, along with Portugal, is believed by some observers to have been a contributing factor. Others deny this. It was, in any case, an exceptional case.
24. Some observers might argue that Sweden's relations with the Third World have been easier, and indeed they have been in some countries and on some issues. There is little in Sweden's relations, however, to compare with Canada's intimate collaboration with a substantial part of the Third World through the institutions of the Commonwealth and l'Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique des Pays Francophones.
25. Interviews with over two hundred senior decision-makers in Ottawa in the summer of 1975 revealed that a substantial majority believe that the primary aim of Canadian developmental cooperation is, and should be, the improvement of living conditions in the Third World. (See the forthcoming study by R. B. Byers, T. C. Hockin, David Leyton-Brown and Peyton V. Lyon).
26. The president of CIDA once explained that "... if the philanthropic or humanitarian motives were clearly defined in the public mind in terms of costs and alternatives, it would probably result in a diminution of their support for external aid as a means of expressing their philanthropic motives." M. E. Strong, "Canadian Assistance to Developing Nations," speech to the University of Ottawa, Information Division, CIDA, November 1970, p. 8.
27. "The Trade-offs Among the Objectives of Canadian Foreign Aid," in *International Journal*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Winter 1969-70), pp. 129-141.
28. House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, November 24, 1970, pp. 20-28. Mr. Sharp contended that stressing the national interest "could mean that [our policy] could become even more idealistic. If one of our national objectives, for example, is to help in removing poverty in the world, that is a national objective."
29. For a discussion of this point, see Peyton V. Lyon, *Canada-United States Free Trade and Canadian Independence* (Economic Council of Canada, 1975), pp. 32-34.
30. Any doubt on this score should have been eased by the demands for increased development assistance supported in the General Assembly, in 1974 and 1975, by all the LDC's.
31. For example, CIDA, in a release of early 1973, said that "nearly 70 cents of every dollar Canada spends on foreign aid goes for Canadian goods and services. . . . We are not following a policy of charity begins at home. But there is no doubt that the foreign aid program benefits the Canadian economy." *Globe and Mail*, March 9, 1973, "Benefits for Canada."
32. Professor G. K. Helleiner estimates "that aid, as commonly understood, amounts to slightly over one-third of what the much publicized statistics make it seem. . . ." He objects in particular to the practice of including private investment flows: "According to the accepted OECD and UNCTAD definitions", he reasons, "the world's leading aid recipient today is Canada." (author's italics), "The Development Business: Next Steps", in *International Journal*, vol. 25, no. 1, Winter 1969-70, pp. 163-66.
33. G. L. Reuber, "Trade-offs Among the Objectives of Canadian Foreign Aid," p. 1930.
34. Cited in Clyde Sanger, *Half a Loaf* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), p. xi.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
36. One cannot, of course, rule out suicidal acts. It is conceivable, for example, that a country might be driven by poverty to such anger or desperation that it might indulge in acts of nuclear terrorism. Even in this awful event, however, Canada seems unlikely to be a prime target.
37. Sanger, *Half a Loaf*, p. x.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
39. *Ibid.*, p. xi.
40. John W. Holmes, "The West and the Third World," p. 40.
41. Department of External Affairs, *Foreign Policy for Canadians: International Development* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), p. 12.

42. *Canadian Assistance and Developing Countries*, January 1963, p. 6.
43. *Foreign Policy for Canadians: International Development*, p. 13.
44. S. G. Triantis, "Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid," in *World Politics*, vol. 24, no. 1 (October 1971), pp. 1-18.
45. Niger, having accepted Canadian aid to build a highway of debatable economic utility, was instrumental in persuading other francophone countries not to support Quebec's claim to equal status with Canada.
46. Clyde Sanger, *Half a Loaf*, p. xii.
47. S. G. Triantis, "Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid," p. 2.
48. In a Gallup Report issued on January 8, 1975, for example, 72 per cent of Canadians were reported as agreeing that developed countries must share in the responsibility for meeting the problems faced by the underdeveloped countries. A subsequent report on January 11 indicated that 53 per cent favoured an increase in Canadian aid while 35 per cent opposed.

BARRIE M. MORRISON

Canada and South Asia

This essay explores the relations of Canada with the major countries of South Asia—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. However, the development of Canada's relations with any one country in South Asia makes little sense when viewed in isolation. Canada acts on an international stage filled with players of greater stature and commanding presence. We have been schooled to move with care, modulate our voices, restrain our ambitions in the presence of others. So it is also with India, Pakistan and the other states who move in an international system within which they must act with circumspection. Viewed from this perspective, the relations of the South Asian countries and Canada are often affected by decisions taken in other capitals as well as by the general trends in international affairs. So this analysis traces the historic development of our relations and their present state within the changing environment of the international system.

After the Second World War efforts to rebuild imperial control in Asia ran into the settled hostility of the former colonials as well as the opposition, both direct and oblique, of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both of the new continental super powers were opposed to the smaller European states holding as exclusive preserves large tracts in Asia. In

part because of this opposition, there emerged in the place of the prewar empires a set of successor states modelled on the older European, American and Japanese examples. The new states lacked the established political, educational and economic systems to support the governmental structure which was hurriedly elaborated to administer the former colonial territories. However, for the creation of a new international system based on independent sovereign states, rather than on European and Japanese-controlled overseas empires or upon extended Soviet-communist or United States-corporate dominance, the viability of these successor states was essential. Canada's leaders recognized this; they also realized that our own newly won independence would best be preserved in a world populated by other independent states and, conversely, that any sustained drive to dominate smaller states by a major power would jeopardize that world and the future prospects of Canadian independence. Such a perception guided Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, Escott Reid and others in their support for the United Nations as a forum for sovereign nations to meet and resolve their differences, wherever possible, and motivated their support for the admission of India, Pakistan and Ceylon to the Commonwealth on terms of equality.

The menaces of the cold war, both real and imagined, delayed the realization of an international system based on independent states. Canada and many other countries were enlisted more or less willingly as junior partners in one or other camp, abandoning much of their freedom of diplomatic action and subordinating their national independence in the name of the "free world" or "communist solidarity." The earlier purposes of strengthening the South Asian states so that they might play a constructive role in interstate relations was now overlaid by the anxiety that their low level of national integration left them vulnerable to subversive movements as well as to Soviet and/or Chinese influence. American development assistance was expanded with the justification that a short period of large-scale government aid would strengthen the governments of South Asia, help keep them out of the communist camp and hasten the day when their economics

would move towards self-sustaining growth. The Canadian development program followed. Aid levels were increased, forms of assistance that would attract favourable public notice in Asia were sanctioned, terms of repayment were softened and the proportion of outright grants expanded. India, judged to be politically the most significant country in the long term, received most assistance, although Pakistan, judged by the Americans and conservative Canadians as militarily more strategic and worthy, also received substantial aid. Ceylon was left to the British and received only a small share of Canada's aid.

By 1969 the Nixon administration had begun to de-emphasize the cold war, seeking to find some means of reducing the U.S. political, economic and military liabilities in Vietnam and elsewhere in the world. Détente with the Soviets was in the air; Kissinger travelled to Peking; the Nixon "shock" of devaluation was administered. In the United States' assessment, the significance of India and Pakistan declined once relations improved with the Soviet Union and China. The earlier hope that foreign aid would stimulate the Indian and Pakistan economies was judged to have been illusory. Consequently, aid to the South Asian countries was reduced sharply in 1969. Canada, who had built up her aid levels stimulated in large measure by the American example, and convinced by the supporting arguments, found herself with a development assistance program which now lacked a plausible justification. The rug had been pulled out from under our programs in India and Pakistan.

Canadian uncertainty was increased by the intellectual confusion created by the foreign policy review by the Liberal government in 1970, by the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the independence of Bangladesh, as well as by the growing body of opinion that development assistance was not in fact helping the South Asian countries to develop because of the recipients' incompetence, the self-serving restrictions on aid imposed by the donors, the structure of the international market economy, or even because of the sheer immensity of the task. The search for a rationale to justify existing programs or to provide plausible arguments for change was

complicated by India's detonation of a nuclear device, particularly at a time when their food-grain production and international balance-of-payments situations were disastrous. Humanitarian and moral arguments which had been used to win public support in Canada for development in the past rang hollow in face of the Indian government's apparent lack of concern for its own people. Nor did the record of Pakistani governments in Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province or earlier in its former East Wing (now Bangladesh), recommend a humanitarian rationale for Canadian policies. The only viable justification for continuing the present programs was a return to the pre-cold war goal of trying to build an international system on the basis of sovereign, independent states.

TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, 1947-54

In the first years of independence, India, Pakistan and Ceylon were preoccupied with establishing an effective government capable of controlling fissiparous minorities and taking over essential administrative functions such as maintaining order, collecting revenue, providing security. In the midst of these attention-absorbing tasks, little time and energy remained to think through appropriate policies for interstate relations. It was India who first sought to establish her independence as an international entity and gain appropriate status for herself in the world. The Pakistanis and Ceylonese, both apprehensive of India's intentions, were torn between the desire for independence and the advantages of having their security underwritten by the British. Moving cautiously, each disengaged from the British while slowly working out their own foreign policy. By the early 1950s all three states had established distinctive policies of their own. These were not to last. By 1954, when the United States made available military and development assistance on an immense scale, India and Pakistan allowed the prospect of receiving such apparently inexpensive assistance to unbalance their international relations, to bring them into deepening dependence, and to impair their political development. Ceylon remained to one side, relatively untouched by the

cold war and an area where, proportionately, the British retained their greatest investments and closest interests.

India

The government of India had to start a foreign office and diplomatic service with the limited experience of a few officers who had been attached to British overseas missions to protect Indian interests. Nor was there any bequest of policies from the viceregal government except to protect the northern approaches through the supervision of weak client states.¹ Everything else remained to be determined. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who acted as his own Minister of External Affairs, was assisted by a small group of officers headed by Girija Bajpai, the Secretary General at the Ministry. By 1955, the Ministry had opened 78 foreign missions. To staff these posts and man the Ministry in Delhi there were only 184 permanent officers supplemented by 32 temporary appointments. (By way of comparison, Canada in 1955 had 298 permanent officers while operating 59 posts, including consulates.) To bolster the senior ranks, a number of Nehru's political confidants were successively posted to the more important world capitals: Madame Pandit (Nehru's sister) to Moscow, New York and Washington; K. M. Pannikar to Peking and Cairo; R. K. Nehru (Nehru's cousin) to Peking; Krishna Menon to London and New York. Given the weakness of the new service and the appointment of political followers to senior ambassadorial posts, it is not surprising that India's foreign policy was largely determined by Nehru himself.

The nationalist movement, which had been channelled into the Congress Party, had aroused great expectations for the new state. As its first objective, India wanted to clear out the British imperialists, to remove them from the Indian Civil Service, the army, the education services; Indians must be seen to be masters of their own house. There was a measure of hostility, for it was popularly believed that the British had cheated Congress of its full inheritance by encouraging the Muslims to demand a separate state of Pakistan. Problems such as the division of accumulated sterling credits and

Government of India liabilities to the former British civil servants added current irritation to the bitterness of the past. Churchill's diehard imperialism and his access to the councils of the Western powers did little to ease Nehru's apprehensions. When discussions were underway in 1949 concerning India's place in the postwar Commonwealth, Nehru adamantly refused to have any part of an association in which the former imperial symbols would have a place. The crown, the Emperor-King, British subjects—all such concepts redolent of the imperial connection were cleared away by India's assertive republicanism. In this historical context the Indians began to work out their new relation with Britain and to the other powers holding imperial remnants in India.

Looking eastward across the Bay of Bengal, Indians saw the white European powers, stubbornly struggling to re-establish their prewar positions in Asia. Nehru, who early in his political career had attended meetings in Europe of the League Against Imperialism, identified the struggle of other Asian peoples for independence as a part of a world-wide phenomenon. Solidarity with fellow Asians which drew together diverse strands of thought in India was an attractive intellectual position. It united Rabindranath Tagore's views of the spiritual east rising to instruct the materialist west with the more mundane views of the popular Subhas Chandra Bose who led the Japanese-backed Indian National Army. Put in stark terms, it called for "Asia for the Asians." The Dutch were to leave Indonesia; the French, Indochina; the British, Malaya. Curiously, little early attention was paid to the Americans in the Philippines. The freeing of China from foreign dominance was hailed as a major advance for Asians.

As India was implacably opposed to efforts of the European powers to hold territory in Asia, she was also intensely suspicious of western proposals to fashion new alliances. Concern with renewed European dominance over the subcontinent and Asia led India to view with apprehension the development of the cold war and its extensions into Asia. For Nehru, the United States was not only the bastion of democracy, but also of "free enterprise" and "capitalism," which were directly related to the neo-imperialism of the late nine-

teenth century. The combination of American racism and the building of a network of bases as part of her forward perimeter in the Pacific led Nehru to speak of American imperialism in Asia in a press conference on November 12, 1948. On the other side, the Prague coup d'état, the Berlin blockade, the continued occupation of northern Iran, and the holding of the Japanese northern islands demonstrated Soviet determination to build its own forward perimeter in Europe and Asia at the expense of the independent national life of smaller countries. Moreover, Russia was India's near neighbour and the spectre which had troubled a succession of British commanders in India. Nehru was reported in an article in the *Economist* of April 23, 1949, to be nervously aware of the Soviet's expanded area of control. While the Soviet struggle for distinctive forms of political and economic organization in the 1920s and 1930s was appealing to Nehru, he had only contempt and anger for their agents in India, who had collaborated with the British before independence and who had supported the Telengana rising in Hyderabad after the British withdrawal.

India's rejection of the British connection (save for tenuous links through the Commonwealth and sterling bloc) and the perception of continued European dominance over parts of Asia, growing American involvement—both military and political—and Russia's extension of power, led Nehru to choose a position of non-alignment. It was not a policy of isolationism or neutralism but rather the determination of India's position issue by issue, thus avoiding a permanent and subordinate position in the following of one or another super power.

The reality of the concept to Nehru was well illustrated by his visit to Washington in October 1949, when he was courted by Truman and Acheson for the West and, according to the press reports, was sounded out on a Pacific Pact to further economic and political cooperation. Nehru refused to make any commitment, even though he was beginning to seek American technical and economic assistance. A more significant expression of non-alignment was India's refusal to vote at the U.N. with the Western powers in condemning the

Chinese entry into the Korean War in October 1950. Later, in 1951, the positive side of non-alignment was illustrated when India attempted to enlist Canadian collaboration at the U.N. for a joint initiative to break the deadlock on disarmament. The instructions to the Indian delegate were based on the assumption that a bloc of non-aligned and smaller countries could exert moral pressure on the super powers to reduce their arsenals. This "positive side of non-alignment," as a succession of Indian spokesmen called it, fitted well with India's active participation in the United Nations. India valued her position in the U.N. and worked with Canada to make the organization a success. Nehru paid tribute to the close collaboration of the two countries during Prime Minister St. Laurent's 1954 visit to India when he said that there "are few countries with whom we had such close contacts in our working at the United Nations as with Canada. . . . We found the kinship of spirit with representatives of Canada there and elsewhere."² India sought and gained a position in the Security Council in 1949. Later, B. N. Rau of India was named to the three-man committee set up by the Security Council to explore the possibility of a ceasefire in Korea. Indians participated in the peacekeeping missions in Egypt, the Congo and Indochina. A succession of politically influential Indians were appointed as delegates to the U.N. General Assembly. They led their country's delegation in speaking out on a great variety of matters: racism, colonialism, disarmament, the seating of China, and other matters.

However, India's participation in the U.N. was not simply to demonstrate the positive side of non-alignment, for since the Security Council resolution of April 21, 1948, the Kashmir issue had been before the United Nations. India's setting of pre-conditions before implementing the U.N. resolution to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir and her consequent verbal and procedural duelling with Pakistan kept India deeply involved in the activities of the General Assembly. Rather, it was in the specialized U.N. agencies—UNESCO, WHO, FAO—that Indian representatives played a leading role among the Afro-Asian nations which gave added credibility to their claims to non-alignment.

From the drive to gain a complete freedom and to exercise independence sprang the concept of non-alignment and active participation in the United Nations and other international bodies. Intertwined with both concept and actions was a deep-seated pride in India's historic civilization. While a new nation, it was an ancient culture tracing its unbroken life in the subcontinent back through four millennia. In antiquity, Indian civilization yielded pride of place to no other. For contemporary Indians, the scant attention which their claims to a place in the councils of the world received was a source of great frustration. The acceptance of China and France as members of the select Great Five and the exclusion of India which had provided much of the munitions and many men in the Middle East and Far East during the Second World War was at the least unwarranted and, Indians suspected, a deliberate denial of India's rightful place as a "Great Power." The credibility of her present claim to Great Power status might be in question but in the future there would be no doubt. Nehru, speaking in 1954, stated that China was already a power to rival the Soviet Union and the United States and he went on to prophesy that in time the fourth great country of the world would be India.

I am not speaking in any sense of vainglory and all that. But I am merely analysing the situation that given—and much has to be given—economic growth, unity and other factors, by virtue of general outturn [*sic*], capacity, the ability of the people, their work, the geographical situation and all that, countries like India and China, once they get rid of two things, foreign domination and internal disunity, inevitably become strong. There is nothing to stop them.³

Pakistan

Within South Asia, Pakistan was less powerful than India.⁴ Where India was concerned to establish its independence of the former imperial powers and the new super powers, Pakistan was preoccupied with the Indian "threat." Independence was of less significance than security. Essential to this security was the creation of a strong government. However, Pakistan lacked a well-established political elite, such as had been built up in India within the Congress Party; after the

death in 1948 of the leader of the Muslim League and the first Governor General Mohamed Ali Jinnah, political power became the prize for competing political factions. Transient coalitions were built among Sindhi merchants, emigrés from India, Punjabi landlords, Bengali lawyers and others. Also, the political traditions upon which the constitution was to be based were uncertain. Should it be fashioned from the British parliamentary tradition or draw upon the great and complex Islamic tradition? If the latter, which tradition—Baghdad, Mecca, Cairo or Ankara? Should it be a unitary or federal state and if the latter, what kind? While the political coalitions melted, mixed and crystallized and while the constitutional debate staggered from impasse to deadlock, the life of the state was in grave jeopardy. The two essential functions of state—orderly administration (law and order, finding a place for the millions of refugees, tax collection) and defence (against internal disorders, against venturesome tribesmen aided by Afghanistan, and against India who was aggressively rounding out her borders)—were left to the veterans of the Indian Civil Service and to the army. These two groups which came to run the new state of Pakistan were almost entirely made up of West Pakistanis or Urdu-speaking emigrés from the former United Provinces who had moved to West Pakistan.

While the Pakistan Civil Service was being organized, the army rebuilt, and the other apparatus of the state assembled, the leadership felt itself faced with the active hostility of a more powerful India. With the burden of five million refugees, the knowledge that they had lost heavily in Kashmir and the rankling memories of Hindu hostility, Pakistan had no reason to be optimistic about Indian intentions. Moreover, there was a deep-running suspicion that India might connive with some East Pakistani leaders to bring about the political separation of the two wings. These suspicions surfaced in 1954 when Fazlul Huq, the former mayor of Calcutta and the leader of the United Front party, came to power in the East Wing. His party's Twenty-one Point program included item 19:

Secure all subjects, including residuary powers, except Defence,

Foreign Affairs and Currency, for EAST Bengal, which shall be fully autonomous and sovereign as envisaged in the historic Lahore Resolution, and establish Naval Headquarters and an ordinance factory in East Bengal so as to make it militarily self-sufficient.⁵

In May 1954, the Huq provincial ministry was labelled as treasonous and was superseded by General Iskander Mirza and his troops. The nine million Hindus in East Pakistan, among whom were many with family and property on both sides of the border, were seen by West Pakistanis, who judged loyalty to Pakistan by hostility to India, as real or potential Indian agents who would have to be constantly watched.

Deeply suspicious of Indian designs on their new state and painfully aware of their military inferiority in arms and organization, the Pakistan leadership cast about for allies. Their first hope was Britain and the Commonwealth. At the Commonwealth Conference in 1949, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan made clear that Pakistan expected the Commonwealth to provide assistance if any member was threatened by aggression. The draft declaration's paragraph, "They remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations which has proved its value as an instrument for free cooperation in the pursuit of peace, security and progress," was judged by Ali Khan as too weak and he urged that the members should commit themselves to mutual assistance. Nehru objected, and with the earlier history of Canadian objections to imperial defence before them, the conference turned down Ali Khan's plea and then went further by substituting "liberty" for "security."⁶

Subsequently Ali Khan argued that the Commonwealth should collectively guarantee Pakistan's territorial integrity. Specifically, Pakistan pressed for inclusion of the Kashmir issue on the official agenda of the Commonwealth Conference of 1951. When this was omitted, Ali Khan refused to attend until he was offered the solace of a round of unofficial talks. By this time Pakistan's hope for support from the Commonwealth had dimmed. In place of firm written guarantees and conflict-resolving machinery, she was offered only a handful of vague reassurances.

The second hope of Pakistan for guarantees of her territory and the recovery of the lost Kashmir was the United Nations. Persistently in the General Assembly, Pakistan called for enforcement of the agreement between India and Pakistan to conduct a free and impartial plebiscite among the Kashmiris to determine their future allegiance. Resolutions by the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan endorsing this position were passed in August 1948 and January 1949. The Pakistani spokesmen argued that it was then the responsibility of the Security Council to ensure that both parties carried out their undertakings. Failure of the U.N. to go beyond maintaining an observer corps in Kashmir drove the Pakistani leadership to the conclusion that only where the interests of a great power were at stake would the U.N. take decisive action. (The subsequent Security Council resolution on Kashmir of January 1957 was accepted as a propaganda victory but of little value in gaining a fair settlement on Kashmir.) As the U.N. reluctance to act consistently on security matters became evident, Pakistan began to explore other means of providing for her own defence.

One alternative was Islam. From 1947 to 1952 Pakistan signed treaties of friendship with eight Muslim states and visits were exchanged between heads of states and governments. Pan-Islamic cultural associations were encouraged and a series of Muslim economic conferences were convened in Karachi. This culminated in 1952 when Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, sent invitations to the heads of governments of twelve Muslim states to inaugurate a continuing consultative body for the Muslim world—"a Muslim Commonwealth." As only seven of the twelve accepted and as a number of these accepted with reservations, the proposal was abandoned. Moreover, even though Pakistan lent uncritical support to any and every Muslim country engaged in a dispute with non-Muslims—Indonesians against the Dutch; Tunisians, Moroccans and Algerians against the French; Iranians, Egyptians, Yemenis and Saudi Arabians against the British; and all Arab states against Israel—she found scant support among her Muslim brethren on the Kashmir dispute. In fact, Egypt developed closer rela-

tions with India than she was ever to have with Pakistan. By 1953 or 1954 Pakistan's hope of using her Islamic connections to gain support against the Indian threat had waned.

The most successful effort by Pakistan to find support against India came with her entry into a military alliance with the United States. When the Eisenhower administration came to office in 1953 and the former Pakistani ambassador in Washington was recalled to take over the prime ministership, the stage was set for an understanding. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who visited Karachi in May 1953, stated that "the strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against communism."⁷ In 1954 and 1955 Pakistan signed mutual defence agreements with the United States and joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact. While the Pakistani leadership was interested in military and economic assistance, they also expected the United States to be more sympathetic to Pakistan's Kashmir case. The SEATO Council's discussion of the Kashmir issue and what the Pakistanis interpreted to be support for their position was the only known diplomatic dividend received. However, the military assistance, which mounted during the years to about \$2 billion, and the economic aid, mounting to over \$1 billion, provided more substantial support for Pakistan than it had received from any other source.

Ceylon

Independence came to Ceylon as a by-product of the British decision to quit India. There was no developed nationalist leadership which had mobilized mass followings or prepared domestic and foreign policies for the new country to follow.⁸ As Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake surveyed the scene in 1947, Ceylon was surrounded by states in conflict—India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia—while lacking the means to defend either herself or the exposed ocean routes upon which her commerce depended. The Prime Minister concluded that, "I see at the moment only one country with sufficient interest to defend us at their expense, and that country is Great Britain."⁹ Protection from external threat, freedom of the seas,

support for internal security forces, preservation of advantageous markets for tea and rubber, access to friendly advice and assistance in establishing her international relations—all these combined to persuade the Ceylonese leadership that the British and the Commonwealth connection could be useful and would not endanger Ceylon's independence. The convening of the Commonwealth Conference in Colombo in January 1950, where the idea of the cooperative economic development of South and Southeast Asia was discussed and endorsed, reinforced Ceylon's commitment. As U.N. membership was denied to Ceylon through a succession of Soviet vetoes in August 1948, December 1948 and September 1949, the Commonwealth remained the best international institution within which the Ceylonese might participate in multilateral problem-solving.

Canada

The Canadian government, safe behind the Pacific and with no commitments to colonial regimes, early identified the efforts of the imperial powers to hold territory in Asia as leading to conflict and encouraging more radical nationalist movements. This view, while muted in public statements, led the Canadian leadership to sympathize with the Indian analysis of the postwar Asian situation.¹⁰ This shared anti-imperialist position in turn led the Canadians to work with the Indians in the United Nations and in the Commonwealth to encourage the withdrawal of the "white" powers from Asia and the rapid international recognition of indigenous Asian successor states. This was part of a long-term Canadian policy to prevent the division of the world into hostile blocs of "coloured" and "white" nations, or of rich and poor, while simultaneously strengthening an interstate system composed of free, sovereign states.

Moreover, it was recognized that if the new Asian governments were to be viable they must be able to offer economic and social benefits to their citizens. As Europe was helped by Canadian Mutual Aid, the Export Credit Insurance Act and loans (which in sum constituted the greatest per-capita contribution of any nation to postwar reconstruction) to forestall

political weakness and to foster Canadian trade relations, so Asia, and in particular India, was to be helped. India was favoured as one of the largest nations in the world with the potential of becoming a centre of regional strength and as a state with which Canada had established relations during the war including trade relations. (Locomotives had been shipped, wheat and flour had been supplied which together with other goods amounted to nearly \$174 million during 1944 alone.)

Given this orientation, the specific events in Canada's early relations with the South Asian countries fall into a comprehensible pattern. Canada welcomed the prospect of the South Asian states joining the Commonwealth at the 1947, 1948 and 1949 conferences and was willing to have the terms of association modified to accommodate Indian and Pakistani republicanism.

The Indian National Congress leadership which was committed to their country becoming a sovereign democratic republic did not at first see how India could continue within the Commonwealth. At the Commonwealth Conference of 1948 Nehru, Mackenzie King and, subsequently, St. Laurent sympathetically explored the benefits and liabilities of the Commonwealth relation. Nehru saw that a loosely structured Commonwealth and the Canadian view of its future could be reconciled with the Congress Party's position. At the April 1949 Commonwealth Conference, with strong Canadian support provided by Lester Pearson, the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Indians agreed to recognize the British sovereign as "the symbol of the free association of its [the Commonwealth's] independent member nations and as such as Head of the Commonwealth." In part to strengthen the value of the new relationship Canada decided to participate in the Colombo Plan for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. This decision led to the contribution of \$25 million a year to development. The offer of wheat and flour during the Bihar famines of 1951 reflected the same concern. Consultation and cooperation with the Asian Commonwealth members at the United Nations made it easier for Canada to support India's candidacy for a post on the Security

Council in 1949 and for Benegal Rau and Lester Pearson, the permanent representatives, to cooperate on the Korean ceasefire committee in 1950-51. This cooperation with India led subsequently to service together on various other United Nations' committees and special forces. It also made General McNaughton's task of working out the terms of plebiscite in Kashmir in early 1950 at the request of the Security Council even more delicate. Consultation through two outstanding Canadian High Commissioners in New Delhi, Warwick Chipman (1949-52) and Escott Reid (1953-57), and reciprocal visits by Nehru to Ottawa in 1949 and St. Laurent to South Asia in 1954, gave the Canadians an assurance that they understood Indian views and that there was mutual respect on either side. This contact helped give the Canadians a sense of distinctiveness in their foreign policy while helping the Indians to relate to the Western countries. Behind the well-turned phrases of mutual compliments lay the reality of a relationship which admittedly had to be constantly nurtured but which kept both Canada and India engaged in a multi-state, multi-subject intercourse, keeping their national life more open and receptive and preventing the Canadians from sulking behind mounds of unsold wheat or the Indians retreating into a solitude of impoverished moral rectitude. The fact that India did not close itself off as Burma did is in some measure due to the effort and patience that Indians and Canadians put into their relations.

Canada's relations with Pakistan and Ceylon were much less intense. Both countries began to receive modest amounts of Canadian economic aid through the Colombo Plan and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan visited Ottawa in 1951, the year following the appointment of a Canadian High Commissioner to Karachi. Generally there was sympathy and interest but nothing approaching the level of involvement with India.

THE COLD WAR AND SOUTH ASIA, 1954-69

By 1954, three important separate decisions had been taken which gave the next fifteen years a distinct character. Nehru decided to emphasize heavy industrial development, recog-

nizing that India was falling behind China in the basic industries needed to build a powerful state; Pakistan decided to enter into a military alliance system sponsored by the United States as a means of offsetting India's growing strength; and the United States identified Pakistan as an ally in her efforts to contain the communist menace and India as a major prize which must not be allowed to fall to the communists.

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These three decisions worked together to increase the United States' involvement in South Asia. It led the Indians to solicit development assistance from all quarters which, over the years, led to deepening foreign indebtedness and a loss of freedom of action in parts of their economic policy. The United States, with her large holding of surplus food grains, her immense financial resources and her preponderant influence with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, assumed a position as the economic patron of India. The Pakistanis similarly found their development program increasingly dependent on the Americans while their military establishment was largely supplied from the United States. Between 1955 and 1965, \$1.5 billion worth of tanks, planes and a submarine were delivered to Pakistan by the United States. The delivery of this military equipment into the hands of an unpredictable government which India regarded as its chronic enemy led the Indians to increase their expenditures on imported military equipment and on the build-up of an indigenous arms industry. Both of these responses used scarce foreign exchange and depleted available foreign credits.

Canada, which had earlier agreed to support economic development in South and Southeast Asia through the Colombo Plan as a means of containing communism and offsetting the "neutrality" of Asia, was carried along in the deepening American involvement in South Asia. The most expensive and visible forms of Canada's assistance ever given to the South Asian countries were prepared at this time: Kundah Hydro-Electric Power Development in India (\$44 million disbursed between 1955 and 1965) and the Warsak Hydro-Electric and Irrigation project in Pakistan (\$38 million disbursed between 1952 and 1959), steam locomotives to India

(\$21 million disbursed between 1952 and 1955) and the Canada-India Atomic Research Reactor at Trombay (\$11 million disbursed between 1958-65). These projects represented 76 per cent and 51 per cent of the total of power and transport allocations to India and Pakistan respectively in the period 1950 to 1966.¹¹

India

By 1954, India was planning a massive drive to industrialize. First priority was to be given to the build-up of basic heavy industry—iron and steel production, coal production, hydro-electric power, machine-tool plants and other related industries, which would strengthen the foundation for a modern economy.¹² Where the First Five Year Plan (1951-56) had spent Rs. 179 crores, i.e. 10 million (or 7.6 per cent of total outlay) on industry and mining, the Second Plan called for the investment of Rs. 890 crores (or 18.5 per cent of total outlay). The new plan, which was primarily the work of P. C. Mahalanobis, a socialist and a renowned statistician, was clearly influenced by the Soviet experience which had emphasized investment in heavy industry. Both Nehru, who was chairing the Planning Commission, and Mahalanobis were convinced that the economic development of India required centralized planning and extensive government investment and, further, that the Soviet model was the most appropriate one for India to follow. In the winter of 1954-55 a team of economists and statisticians from the Soviet Union, including experts from the government planning agency, worked with Mahalanobis at the Indian Statistical Institute. (More concretely, the Indians began negotiations for Soviet assistance in building a steel plant in September 1954 which led to the agreement for the Bhilai plant involving credits of Rs. 64.38 crores.)

The reasons behind Nehru focusing his attention on development cannot be known for certain. However, we do know that Nehru, Panikkar, Menon, Bajpai, Mahalanobis and others were troubled by the growing armed strength of India's two most powerful neighbours, Pakistan and China. Both these countries were being governed by regimes whose

aspirations were great and whose actions were unpredictable by the Indians. Moreover, both countries had unreconciled claims on territory held by India.

Of the two countries, Pakistan was of greater concern, on account of the danger raised by American arms shipments. Nehru was aware of discussions about arms aid for Pakistan in the Eisenhower administration early in 1953. By 1954 public opinion was alarmed and, with the Dulles policy of regional defence pacts, Indians had visions of the cold war being brought to her borders through a Pakistani-American alliance. Vice-President Radhakrishnan, in March 1954, was reported to have been so deeply concerned that he pleaded with the U.S. ambassador to do everything in his power to postpone the actual delivery of arms in Pakistan. Radhakrishnan went on to say that Nehru felt that he was being "persecuted" by the Americans for his failure to support American policies.

India's other neighbour, China, while of less immediate concern, represented a greater potential challenge to India's political and international future. China's unity and strength made a deep impact upon Nehru during his visit in 1954. He became convinced that it was necessary to strengthen India economically before her relations with China became closer. While the Chinese were seen by Nehru to be temporarily dependent on the Soviet Union, they were struggling toward military and economic self-sufficiency. Chinese power had been demonstrated in 1950 by the military occupation of Tibet, the extinction of Indian trade rights and the crushing of rebellious elements in 1952-53. At greater distance but more impressive was the Chinese rolling back of the U.N. forces in Korea.

The connection between the arming of Pakistan and Chinese strength with the drive to industrialize India can be found in Nehru's speeches. In October 1955 he said, "We cannot even maintain our freedom and independence as a nation without the big factory and all that it represents."¹³ During the budget debate in 1956, he said that there can be no true military strength if "the army depends on outside factors, foreign machines, foreign economy, foreign help. Such a

country is essentially a dependent country, though called independent."¹⁴

To build successfully an enlarged and modernized heavy industrial base, India would need foreign assistance. Financial aid such as the Soviet Union offered for Bhilai was essential, as was technical and training assistance. Other forms of aid, including raw materials, food grains, technical training programs, could be put to good use either directly or indirectly in the drive to industrialize. Indian foreign policy was directed by Nehru toward the new objective of enlisting aid for India's development program which, in turn, was partially designed to meet the challenge of her two most threatening neighbours.

While foreign assistance began in 1950 when the Commonwealth countries agreed upon a plan for "the Co-operative Economic Development of South and Southeast Asia," it was not until 1954 that aid on the scale of the earlier Marshall Plan aid for Europe became available in South Asia. As suggested above, the Soviet Union decided in 1954 to make a major commitment in South Asia. Not only did India receive credits and assistance to build steel mills, but she gained support for two other factories to be constructed in the public sector in 1954-55. At the same time the U.S. Congress authorized a new aid category of Special Economic Assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1954. This provided for funds to promote economic development and to assist in maintaining economic and political stability in underdeveloped countries. In the same year the Agricultural Trade and Development Act (P.L. 480) was passed which provided for shipment of surplus food stocks in return for credits in the recipient countries' currencies. In 1955 British aid was stepped up from the modest level of 1950-51 to form a significant contribution. Canadian assistance was also enlarged.

By 1956 and 1957, when the aid programs were well underway, India received an average of \$309.6 million per annum. Seven years later the magnitude of aid had trebled to \$1,100.5 million. The largest contributor was the United States which up to 1966 had extended \$6,810.2 million; about 55 per cent of this amount was food aid under P.L. 480. Much

of the non-food aid was scattered on small and medium-sized projects related to roads, railways, power projects, education and agricultural improvement. Little was allocated to the build-up of heavy industry. The Soviet's aid amounted to about \$806 million by 1966, or about 8 per cent of the total aid received. Soviet assistance was largely project aid for industrialization—metallurgical plants, coal mining, oil prospecting and refining—and was mainly in the form of tied loans repayable over eight to fifteen years in Indian currency. Canadian bilateral assistance for the period 1950-66 totalled \$332 million, or slightly over 3 per cent of all assistance supplied in this period.

Another principal source of assistance after 1958 was the aid consortium organized under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. However, even while Indian dependence on the major donors grew, she assiduously cultivated other sources such as Australia, France, Czechoslovakia, Japan, until by 1964 there were twenty-one bilateral and three multilateral programs operating in the country.

While the drive to industrialize was carried forward with assistance from abroad, India turned her diplomatic attention to countering Pakistani influence and limiting China. The Panchshila Agreement with China in 1954, the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Nehru visits to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in 1955, the Indian proposal for a Locarno-type pact with China and the United States to stabilize Southeast Asia in 1955, the Indian participation in Indochina peace-keeping, the objection to the SEATO Council issuing a statement on Kashmir in 1956, Nehru's visit to the United States and his protest about the regional pacts and America's China policy in 1956, the unconditional release of Sheikh Abdullah (the Lion of Kashmir) in 1958, the President's state visit to Indonesia in 1958—these and many other separate actions indicate the depth and nature of Indian concern.

The success in building up the armed forces and creating a defence industry based on modern heavy industry was achieved at the cost of continuing low agricultural productivity and growing dependence on imports of foreign food

grains. The foreign exchange costs of importing ever-increasing amounts of food effectively wrecked the Third Five Year Plan. The difficulties encountered were so severe the Planning Commission gave up preparing five-year plans and fell back on a series of one-year programs until the Fourth Five Year Plan for 1969-74 was introduced.

The crisis that came in 1965 was predicted years in advance by economists such as K. N. Raj and B. R. Shenoy. Simply put, they argued that Indian agricultural production was failing to match the growth of demand. This had two consequences. First, the country lacked adequate supplies of both food and raw materials such as jute, cotton and sugarcane. This meant that domestic prices tended to mount as consumers bid up prices in spite of government controls, and also that food had to be imported to offset shortages in domestic output. The real situation was made obvious to all in the drought years of 1965-66 and 1966-67 when terrible food shortages brought a leap in food prices and widespread rioting. Secondly, the relative neglect of agriculture, the basic industry of 80 per cent of India's population, meant there was a lack of market demand for much of the industrial production. Production and consumption are mutually dependent and so the relative stagnation of agricultural incomes undermined the effectiveness of the investment programs in industry. However, this imbalance had existed since 1956, if not before. As long as harvests were good and cheap imported food grains available, the defects in the "big push" industrial strategy were not fatal to the program.

Cumulative pressure began to build in 1964. The deepening dependence on foreign grain grew through 1966 after which it began to taper off as is revealed in Table 2:1.

Table 2:1 — Net Imports of Cereals into India (millions of tons)

1954	0.84	1959	3.87	1964	6.26	1969	3.85
1955	0.71	1960	5.14	1965	7.45	1970	3.58
1956	1.44	1961	3.49	1966	10.34	1971	2.03
1957	3.65	1962	3.64	1967	8.66	1972	0.48
1958	3.22	1963	4.55	1968	5.69	1973	3.60

SOURCES: *Economic Survey 1969-70*, p. 73, quoted by Nayar, *Modernization*, p. 187; and *Economic Survey 1973-74* (New Delhi: Government of India), p. 65.

The bulk of the imported food grains came from the United States and Canada. On September 8, 1965, shortly after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war, Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced the American government's decision to suspend both military and economic assistance. Rusk said, "We cannot be in a position of financing a war of these countries against each other. Nor can we be in a position of using aid under circumstances where the purpose of the aid is frustrated by the fighting itself. . . ." ¹⁵ President Lyndon Johnson laid down conditions for the resumption of military and economic aid, among which was some appreciation by India and Pakistan of American efforts to defend Southeast Asia from communism. In February 1966, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey visited India and requested some overt Indian support for the United States in South Vietnam. The Indians were advised that medical, hospital or humanitarian contributions would be acceptable. What assurances the Americans gained from the Indians are not known, but American economic aid was resumed in 1966.

Through 1966 and 1967 massive shipments of food grains went to India to offset the threatened famine following upon two successive poor monsoons. In 1967 it was estimated that one-fourth of the U.S. wheat crop was going to India. This massive assistance was extended under new conditions that India should concentrate its development effort on improving agricultural output. In short, the U.S. government began to tell India how to allocate its resources for development. The setting of conditions was bad enough, but when Johnson continually held back food supplies until he was convinced that India was doing all it could to improve production, that stirred deep resentment among the Indians.

As the external debt repayment charges mounted, India found that nearly one-fifth of her exports were committed, so that there was little foreign exchange free for the purchase of food grains on the commercial market. India saw herself in the same relationship to the United States as many poor peasants found themselves with the village money-lender. They were being drawn even more tightly into a dependent relationship. In part on the advice of the Americans, the

repee was abruptly devalued and the remainder of the Third Five Year Plan was cancelled.

From this date, 1966, India embarked on a drastic overhaul of her development program which was designed to reduce dependence on foreign assistance, both financial and in food grains. This overhaul culminated in the Fourth Year Plan which set out the lessons of the past and the new objectives:

The continuity [of a moderate rate of growth] is likely to be threatened if instability emerges because of the weakness on the food front and too great a dependence on foreign aid. The Fourth Plan aims at acceleration of the tempo of development in conditions of stability and reduced uncertainties. It is proposed to introduce safeguards against the fluctuations of agricultural production as well as the uncertainties of foreign aid in the period of the Fourth Plan. Together with programmes of increased agricultural production the Plan provides for the building of sizeable buffer stocks to even out the supplies of food grains and other measures to stabilize food grain prices and the price level in general. Further in regard to the financing of the Plan emphasis is being placed on additional mobilization of internal resources. . . . Dependence on foreign aid will be greatly reduced in the course of the Fourth Plan. It is planned to do away with P.L. 480 imports at the end of the next two years. Foreign aid net of debt charges and interest payments will be reduced to about half by the end of the Fourth Plan compared to the current level.¹⁶

Judging from their overt behaviour, the new Indian leadership (Indira Gandhi took over on the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966) had concluded that dependence on foreign countries, particularly the United States, was as great a threat to India's freedom of action as was Chinese communism or Pakistani militarism. The deepening American entanglement in Vietnam, with the mounting evidence of a calculated, technologically-backed intimidation of North Vietnam, alarmed Indians, for it suggested that a new imperialism was extending its hold over Asians. The international institutions which had promised in 1947 to usher in a world of negotiation and peaceful resolution of conflict—the Commonwealth and the United Nations—were seen to be ineffective or mired in legalisms, and so were of little help to India. The international development agencies, the IBRD, OECD, and the Colombo Plan, either lacked the resources or were under the influence

of the United States. In either case they could not, by themselves, serve India's need. Neither the positive nor the negative aspects of non-alignment had gained India reliable allies with any substantial resources.

Persuaded that dependence on the Americans would diminish her own freedom of action and yet aware of the shortcomings in her own defence industries, the Indians turned increasingly to the Soviet Union. The Russians had by this time fallen out with the Chinese as well as being suspect by the Pakistanis because of the Soviet's military assistance to Afghanistan. This made relations with the Soviet Union more attractive to the Indians, who entered into arms agreements in 1962, 1964 and 1968. Through these agreements India received the advanced MIG-21s, the SA-2 guided missiles and the SU-7 fighter-bombers. In the period 1965-69 over \$100 million worth of major arms per annum was supplied by the Russians to India.¹⁷ The volume of Soviet economic assistance also increased and in 1966-67 the total of Soviet loans and grants exceeded that of any other country save the United States.

As India turned towards the Soviets, the Nixon administration, which was predisposed to Pakistan, began systematically to cut its assistance, as is revealed by Table 2:2.

Table 2:2 — United States Economic Aid Commitments to India (\$ million)

1962	744	1965	697	1968	619
1963	685	1966	901	1969	442
1964	663	1967	583	1970	439

SOURCE: Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers* Table 1-A, p. 226.

Canada, however, not only maintained but increased her level of support. The annual figures for bilateral disbursements were 1968-69 (fiscal year) \$74 millions; 1969-70, \$88.6; 1970-71, \$103.1; and 1971-72, \$101.5.¹⁸ The Canadian arguments in favour of high aid levels were varied. One popular one was that the Americans had misunderstood their own true interests and that Nixon and Kissinger had overridden the knowledgeable advice of the State Department. It was pointed out that if India failed to meet her mounting problems of population growth and social justice, it would fall

prey to left-wing, communist movements and would be taken out of the camp of free nations. This would be disaster for the West. Therefore, it was Canada's responsibility to help fill the gap left by the American aid retrenchment in the hope of inspiring other wealthy nations to follow our example. At the same time we should continue discreetly to support the wiser heads in the State Department and wait for the White House to recognize the West's true interests.

Pakistan

For Pakistan, the signing of the 1953 and 1954 agreements with the United States helped strengthen the hand of the military, marked a major shift in foreign policy and set the stage for the coup d'état of 1959.¹⁹ Entry into these agreements had been vigorously pushed by the then Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan. As one biographer writes,

The United States military aid without which the Pakistan Army could not have been equipped and reorganized to its present shape, was made possible through the initiative and efforts of General Ayub. The idea was born in his mind and it was through his negotiations with American political and military leaders that the United States invited Pakistan into a Mutual Defence Pact.²⁰

Shortly after, the role of the military in government was strengthened. In October 1954, Ayub Khan was named to the cabinet and the following year the former Defence Secretary, General Iskander Mirza became acting Governor General and then President under the 1956 constitution. Gunnar Myrdal comments that the effect of the alliance with the United States

was not to lessen but to increase Pakistan's burden of military expenditures. This, in turn, strengthened the size and position of the officer corps whose ties were with the most conservative sections of society. Thus the Mirza government, which struck the blow at the ramshackle facade of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan, openly represented the combined power of the higher civil servants, army officers, big industrialists and landlords.²¹

To meet the additional expenses occasioned by the arms build-up and by American military aid, and to finance her development activities, Pakistan had to expend foreign cur-

rency. With declining export earnings after the Korean War boom, exchange reserves were depleted and Pakistan turned more and more frequently to foreign sources for assistance. This increased from \$10 million a year in the early 1950s to \$650 million a year by the mid-1960s. During these years, more than one-third of gross investment was financed by foreign funds. Initially, the foreign exchange came principally from the United States—\$380.9 millions in grants and loans out of a total of \$456.4 million during the years 1954-58. During the same period Canada, who was the second largest source, contributed \$45.1 million, approximately 10 per cent.

The heavy dependence on the United States lasted until after the U-2 incident in May 1960, when the Ayub Khan government concluded it would be wise to reduce Soviet antagonism and diversify its sources of aid. Towards the end of the year, Pakistan had sufficiently mollified the Russians to receive a credit of \$30 million for oil exploration. The Sino-Indian war, and consequent flow of military aid from the United States to India, upset the Pakistanis. President Kennedy's disregard of his earlier personal promise to Ayub that Washington would consult before shipping arms to India further angered the Pakistani leader. The suspicion that the Democratic administration would prefer to support India rather than the military regime of Pakistan was confirmed for Ayub by the joint U.S.-U.K.-India air defence exercise in 1963, and by the long-term agreement to supply arms to India in April 1964. Pakistan began to search for new and more reliable allies against India and alternate sources of aid.

Earlier advances which had been made to China were followed up and in December 1962, Pakistan's shifting orientation was marked by the signing of the Sino-Pakistan agreement to demarcate their borders. The initial agreement with China was soon followed by a \$60 million interest-free loan, a statement of intent to improve trade, the signing of an air agreement and by an increasing number of cultural, scientific, educational and athletic exchanges. China's hostility to India, coupled with her armed strength and willingness to provide both military and economic assistance, made her an attractive alternative to the United States.

Complementing the improvement of relations with China

was the renewal of diplomatic and trade relations with Afghanistan and the establishment of closer relations with Iran, Nepal, Ceylon, Burma, and the Soviet Union. This process of "normalization," as it was termed by the Pakistani officials, included an effort to keep in step with the majority of Afro-Asian nations on international questions. These moves were probably designed to demonstrate Pakistan's independence of the West and in particular of the United States, and to forestall Indian efforts to regain a place as leader in the Third World.

The U.S. administration responded by withdrawing a \$30 million grant to develop Dacca airport, by asking for postponement of Ayub's visit to Washington in 1965, and by delaying for two months the meeting of a group of Western nations, including Canada, who were pledged to aid Pakistan. On the latter point, Ayub Khan spoke with bitterness in his broadcast to the nation on August 2, 1965. He rightly pointed out that funds had been pledged to India well in advance and went on to say that he had made it abundantly clear to President Johnson

that economic assistance was one thing and political dependence quite another. While countries strive for freedom in order to develop, they will not seek development at the cost of freedom. The country's economic progress and the prosperity of its people are of the utmost importance, but its security and independence came first. . . . I said, we are looking for friends, not masters.

In September 1965, when the Indo-Pakistan war broke out, the U.S. embargo was more troublesome for Pakistan, for it cut off the flow of military supplies and, in particular, replacement parts upon which the army and the air force were dependent. When Ayub visited Washington in December 1965 to explore further assistance, he resisted American pressure to provide support for the United States in Vietnam and came away empty-handed. Johnson succinctly conveyed the results: "President Ayub came here asking for nothing, save understanding and he is carrying that back with him."

While the cutback in aid was not completely restored, actual disbursement levels in 1967 and 1968 were only 10 per cent lower than the average for 1961 through 1965. However,

with the Nixon regime in 1969 there was a sharp cut in both commitments and disbursements. The situation is revealed in Table 2:3.

Table 2:3 — Commitments of United States Economic Aid to Pakistan (\$ million)

1962	416	1965	342	1968	353
1963	350	1966	142	1969	80
1964	371	1967	230	1970	213

SOURCE: Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, 1972, p. 227.

While American aid was reduced first under Johnson and then Nixon, aid from the Soviet Union and East Europe nearly doubled to an average of \$43 million per annum in the last half of the decade 1960-70. Aid from China increased dramatically, \$200 million being committed in 1970. Aid channelled through international agencies and grew by only 13.8 per cent in the second half of the decade; it is doubtful if this increase did anything more than offset the decline in the purchasing power of the dollar.

Ayub now spoke about Pakistan's "bilateral" policy through which it sought to be friends with all those who could help her without entering into any exclusive alignments. He saw no reason why Pakistan should be expected to break completely with the United States if it was to receive economic and other support from China or the Soviet Union. The easing of the cold war and the jealousy the super powers had exhibited if any client state began to look elsewhere for political and economic support made it possible for Pakistan to assume a more non-aligned position. (It is noteworthy that the Pakistani leaders and writers avoided any use of the term "non-aligned," for it bore the Nehru imprint.) There were relatively slight shifts of policy marked by the dismissal of Bhutto in 1966 and the pro-Western Finance Minister Shoaib's gain in power. These did not alter significantly Pakistan's newly independent international stance.

Unfortunately, the increasing independence of her foreign policy was paralleled by the growing numbers of politically alienated within the country. The numbers of educated un-

employed increased, fed by a growing number of graduates. From 1950 to 1963 the number of students attending post-secondary institutions trebled to about 180,000 while job formation lagged. Literacy had spread to reach over one-third of the male population. Newspapers in the various vernacular languages—Bengali, Sindhi, Punjabi, Baluchi, Pushto, and Urdu—circulated more widely and carried more commercial advertising. The mass of people were better informed and had growing aspirations. Economic development had brought rising incomes to the majority of the population in both provinces of Pakistan, but particularly in the Western wing.

While incomes generally rose, Mahbub-ul Huq of the Pakistan Planning Commission was calling attention to the concentration of wealth in the hands of the notorious twenty-two families of West Pakistan. The conspicuous wealth of one of Ayub's sons became an embarrassment to the father. The growing consolidation of a small wealthy class, together with the conviction spreading among the educated classes outside of government that the country was being run, not for the sake of Pakistan, but for the benefit of those in power, led to the student uprisings in Rawalpindi, Lahore and other cities in West Pakistan in 1968.

The student leaders demanded a sharing of political power—direct elections, responsible and representative government and an end to press censorship, as well as redress for particular student grievances. The personal regime of Ayub was rejected and the army leadership moved by naming General Yahya Khan as his successor who pledged himself to restore a direct electoral system and to convene a new national assembly to draft a constitution. There followed a period of intense political discussion which further roused the sense of grievance felt by the East Pakistanis that they were being exploited by West Pakistan and that their leadership was being denied a voice in the government of the country. The subsequent elections of 1970 brought a decisive victory for the East Pakistan-based Awami League which had fought the election of a platform calling for a large measure of provincial autonomy.

Ceylon

Even before the 1956 election returned the left-leaning S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike government, Ceylon had begun to move away from the sheltering British military and diplomatic umbrella. In 1952 she entered into a trade agreement with China which exchanged rubber for rice. After the signing of the SEATO agreement in 1954 the Ceylonese Prime Minister spoke out against the build-up of military blocs in the area. By 1956 Ceylon decisively turned away from the British connection, and the base at Trincomalee and the airfield at Katunayake were both taken over from the British in 1957. Bandaranaike also undertook to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow and Peking. This more independent position was rationalized, following the Indian lead, as being non-aligned. Bandaranaike urged that the proper role for a country such as Ceylon was to become the Switzerland of Asia: friendly relations with all and hostility for none. The new position was expressed through repeated calls for the suspension of nuclear testing, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Asia, the closure of all foreign bases, and participation in a succession of conferences of non-aligned countries. The most serious consequences of Ceylon's new policy was the decision to set up the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation in 1961 which led to conflict with Caltex, Standard Vacuum and Shell Oil, to their nationalization, and to the suspension of assistance from the United States in February 1963. The Canadian government increased its assistance and picked up projects for the runway extension and terminal construction at Katunayake airport which had been dropped by the Americans. This was the single largest expenditure by Canada in Ceylon, running to about \$3½ million and was almost certainly designed to keep open the doors to the West.

Canada

Canada, aside from its role as a giver of aid, had little involvement in South Asia since the mid-1950s. It was rather in their positions on international issues elsewhere in the world that they began to diverge. The generally amicable relations between the Indian and Canadian political leaders and senior

civil servants which had been built on cooperation in the Commonwealth conferences, the U.N., and shared concerns over Korea and Suez began to deteriorate under the strain of divergent interests in the Indochina International Control Commissions. More specifically, middle and senior officers in External Affairs and in the Canadian armed forces were thrown into continuous contact with their Indian and Polish opposite numbers under conditions of physical stress and of professional frustration. Over the years of Canada's participation from 1954 to 1973 there were about thirty-five Canadian civilians and over a hundred military personnel on the commissions at any given time. In the course of nearly twenty years many hundreds experienced the frustrations of the posting. Officers who served under the chairmanship of the Indians became increasingly critical and hostile. Some Canadians found the Indians alternately arrogant and patronizing or friendly depending on whether or not they needed Canadian cooperation and logistic support. Personalities and cultural styles were blamed for more fundamental differences about the role of the commissions and the situation in Southeast Asia. The Indians saw that the French imperial role was increasingly being taken over by the Americans. They recognized that Indochina was important to India and they were convinced that the future of the region lay with the nationalist movements such as that led by Ho Chi Minh. They judged the various white powers would eventually be driven out or leave, their puppets would collapse and national revolutionaries would form the governments. In contrast, the Canadians, affected by the cold war orthodoxy of the Americans and observing the penetration of the North Vietnamese into the South, saw the conflict as between communist subversives and the quasi-legitimate successors to the French. Communist actions in Malaysia, Korea and more particularly in Europe provided their historic reference. Few in the senior ranks of External Affairs had any direct knowledge of Southeast Asia, of the nationalist movements or any apparent appreciation of the Indian interpretation of developments in Indochina. With such divergence of political perceptions the problem of establishing and carrying

through agreed procedures for the operation of the Control Commissions was most difficult. Even now, many foreign service officers in External Affairs display bitterness over the Indian's behaviour. As far as many people in External Affairs and National Defence were concerned the special relations with India were finished by the mid-1960s.²²

Moreover, the earlier concept of Canada acting as a bridge between Asia and the West was soon outmoded by the multiplicity of contacts built by the United States with the South Asian countries. American economic assistance, military aid, Fulbright scholars, National Defence Education Act language fellows, USIS libraries, Pan American airlines and hotels, Peace Corps volunteers, AMOCO corporation and others were all in South Asia by the late 1950s. India and Pakistan for their part soon had many able spokesmen posted in Washington, New York, Paris and London explaining their respective views at great length. Canada was useful to the South Asian countries as an alternative source of aid—financial, technical and commodity—and continued to enjoy easy access to the offices of senior politicians and officials. But no longer was Ottawa regarded as the key to open doors in Washington. Moreover, as Moscow and Peking grew in importance the advantage of having a friendly intermediary in Washington declined.

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP AFTER 1969

A number of events have occurred since 1969 which have created much uncertainty about the patterns of international stratification, the leadership role of the United States, the domestic stability of the South Asian countries and the realism of Canadian foreign policy. This uncertainty also raises doubts about the appropriate relations between Canada and the South Asian States.

Former colonies, or less powerful nations, among the African, Latin American and Islamic countries, and the Nordic countries, have all begun to act with less regard for the wishes of the major European countries or the United States. The Bretton Wood agreements, the Kennedy GATT round, the operation of the International Monetary Fund and most noticeably the operation of the United Nations, have all been

severely criticized and, in some measure, altered by the actions of these former minor actors on the international stage. The American capacity to exercise leadership has been diminished by her role in Vietnam, relations with Cuba and Chile, support of Israel and the oil companies in the Middle East, investment in South Africa and two successive devaluations and tightening of non-tariff trade barriers, combined with the loss of moral authority after Watergate. The 1971 insurrection in Sri Lanka (Ceylon); the replacement of the Ayub Khan regime, the breakaway of East Pakistan and constitutional reorganization in Pakistan; the chronic state of near collapse and declaration of emergency in Bangladesh; a runaway inflation, famine, growing militarism and the rise of protest movements in India—these were only the most dramatic events indicating increased domestic stress. The sharp worsening of the international balance of payments, joined with heavy foreign debts, threatened all the South Asia states with international bankruptcy, forced retrenchment of development programs and aggravated domestic problems. Within Canada the Trudeau government launched its foreign policy review and sought to deduce policy from the hexagon of first principles or themes: fostering Canadian economic growth, safeguarding sovereignty and independence, working for peace and security, promoting social justice, enhancing the quality of life, and ensuring a harmonious natural environment. Little further progress was made in redefining policy, though both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of External Affairs had carried through separate internal policy reviews by 1974 which not only had to confront the changing world order and the lack of realism of *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, but also the fact of India's nuclear device.

South Asia after 1969 and in the future

Political instability stalked the subcontinent. While its origins were many, it was related to the discontent of groups who felt themselves by-passed by the benefits of independence and economic development.

The most dramatic case was Pakistan. The reduction in the

value of American aid, the failure of the expensive army to gain a victory over the Indians in 1965, the concessions at Tashkent in 1966, the mounting evidence of corruption in the regime, including Ayub Khan's family, and, most importantly, the resurgence of East Pakistani discontent after 1965, led directly to the mass protest movements of 1968-69 and General Yahya Khan replacing Ayub. In November 1969, Yahya Khan promised direct elections with adult suffrage for the new National and Provincial Assemblies. Representation in the National Assembly was to be by population rather than by East-West parity, which would give the Bengalis a majority of the seats. The right freely to engage in electioneering was conceded and campaigning for the October 1970 election began. The years of a muzzled press and intimidated political oppositions seemed to be coming to an end. Nine political parties and numerous independents vied for the attention of the newly enfranchised electors. In the East Wing the Awami League, a coalition of a wide range of supporters of Bengali rights, campaigned on the issue of increased provincial autonomy. Its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, rallied increasing support for the Awami League's program.

In the West, the promise to restore the four provinces, each of which was to have its own assembly, increased the difficulty of devising an electoral program which would appeal equally to Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans and others. The Pakistan People's Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, even though lacking a clearly defined program, attracted much support in the Punjab and Sindh from those seeking an alternative to the rule of generals while favouring modernization. In the elections, postponed until December 1970, no party gained general support through all the provinces of the West, though Bhutto's party won 81 seats of the 138 general seats (not included are the 13 seats reserved for women). In the East the Awami League took 160 of 162 general seats. The absolute majority which the Bengali-based Awami League had won meant that Mujibur Rahman would be the Prime Minister and would be entrusted with the task of drafting a new constitution unencumbered by the need to win and hold

the support of other parties. This prospect was so disturbing to the entrenched ruling elements and to Bhutto and his supporters that they began to call for some power-sharing arrangement which would give the representatives of West Pakistan a voice in the new government. When this was rejected by Mujib, Bhutto put great pressure on Yahya to postpone the calling of the National Assembly until Mujib was prepared to share power with West Pakistanis. The postponement of the National Assembly session led to widespread, rebellious demonstrations in East Pakistan, and to the Pakistan army's crack down of March 25, 1971. From these events flowed the declaration of independence of Bangladesh, the flight of millions of refugees and the intervention of India, first through support for the Bangladeshi freedom fighters and then by direct military action. When the Pakistan army surrendered in December 1971, the way was open for the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh.

Once the excitement at the creation of the new "Golden Bengal" died down, the tough and intractable problems with which the former Pakistani regime had half-heartedly wrestled overwhelmed the new state—population growth, poorly developed resources, low levels of human skills, inappropriate social and political conceptions. Worst of all, the new state had no means of meeting these problems, for the basic organizational structure for problem-solving had never been created. The political repression of the past, together with the press censorship, control of the universities and the emasculation of local government, had successfully prevented any realistic analysis of the problems, emergence of a national leadership and mobilization of support. The Bengalis had focused their attention on the fight for provincial autonomy and freedom from the dominant West Pakistanis. Little thought had been given to the national future save by a small group around the newspapers *Ittefaq* and *Holiday* and by some dissident academics.

Not only was Bangladesh as little equipped to take on the responsibilities of self-government as Pakistan had been in 1947, she also faced divisive domestic problems rather than rallying external threats. Domestic issues which require the

displacement of vested interests are more difficult to resolve than problems that lie outside the society. The Awami League, a loose association committed only to gaining more freedom for Bangladeshis, was unable to provide any coherent, strong leadership. The reconstruction and resettlement of 1972, the drought of 1972, the international price rises beginning in 1973, the widespread flooding of 1974, joined with chronic shortages and sporadic famines, constantly kept the government off balance unable to carry through the basic tasks of analysis and organization. The incapacity of the government encouraged domestic disorder and civil unrest, hoarding, black marketeering and smuggling. Law and order teetered on the brink of breakdown. In the eighteen months before November 1973 it was estimated that there had been 7,700 murders of which as many as 2,000 are thought to have been political murders. The declaration of a national emergency in January and the assassination of Mujibur Rahman in August 1975, revealed the desperation of the situation.

While the Bangladesh state tottered towards collapse, responsibility for the truncated Pakistan was assumed by Bhutto and his party which had held a majority of the West Pakistan seats in the National Assembly. In spite of the loss of the East Wing, with a sizeable part of the army and the near bankruptcy of the treasury, the government apparatus was intact. Bhutto took over as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator (subsequently becoming Prime Minister) and in short order had dismissed generals, restricted the movement of wealth out of the country, taken over the management of twenty major private firms and carried out a purge of the senior civil service. However, there remained the two major related problems: to rally class and regional support for the new government and to redirect an enlarged development effort to offset the loss of the East Wing while at the same time encouraging balanced growth and a more equitable distribution of benefits.

The Prospects of successfully managing the country's development were clouded by the very rapid population growth.²³ The 1972 census reported a 51.3 per cent growth of

population since 1961, while the nineteen largest cities (excluding the National Capital Territory) grew by 67.9 per cent. The growth rates of the population as a whole and of the major cities were the highest in South Asia. The extent of unemployment was not known but was surmised by both the Planning Commission and a World Bank team to be running as high as 30 per cent of the labour force. Real wages in industry were stationary or declining. The land redistribution promised during the elections of 1970, twelve acres for each cultivator, has not been implemented and only modest reforms have been instituted. While Pakistan's trade has been successfully reoriented towards the Middle East and Africa, the interest and amortization payments on her foreign debt will shortly exceed 30 per cent per annum of the gross earnings of her foreign trade. Thus, in spite of earning over \$1 billion through stepped-up trade, increased agricultural production and a 100 per cent devaluation, indebtedness will be a major drain on the foreign exchange balances. The prospects are slight of being able to mount a rural economic and social development program capable of providing employment, improving health and education standards, reducing both mortality and natality and thus slowing both the rate of population growth and of migration to the cities. It is made more unlikely by Bhutto's preference for administrative rule rather than political mobilization and by the absence of a cadre of political workers sharing well-defined goals. Moreover, opposition to the government is growing, for "it is as repressive and authoritarian as any that has ruled Pakistan since independence. The walls of major cities—as in the days of Ayub Khan—are full of painted slogans demanding release of political prisoners, end to dictatorship and oppression and arbitrary arrests, and calling for freedom of expression and of the press."²⁴ Guerilla bombings break the quiet in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province, while the Marri and Mengal tribes have taken to the hills, tying up about 20,000 Pakistani troops. Bhutto's great energy, intelligence and charisma, backed by the undoubted efficiency of the purged Civil Service, will keep the state apparatus functioning and will gain time for a development program but may

well impede the growth of local institutions needed to carry out rural development. This growing problem, joined with the provincial tensions, is likely to keep Pakistan unsettled for years to come.

India for her part is in the most perilous condition since independence. In spite of the military victory of 1971, the intractable problems of population growth, soaring unemployment, continuing urban in-migration of the unskilled, faltering agricultural growth, and top-heavy bureaucratization join to grind India's hopes of progress into dust. The working of these millstones has been occasionally obscured by dramatic events such as the explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974, or the improvement of relations with Pakistan in late 1974, or the assumption of emergency power in June 1975. Nonetheless, they continue to operate and the hopes of "abolishing poverty" or of "gaining independence" from aid donors, the two election promises of 1971, which were repeated in the new Five Year Plan, remain illusory. Political opposition, while temporarily quietened by emergency regulations, is more hostile than before. The trade unions are embittered by the breaking of the railway strike of 1974 and imprisonment of their leadership. Until censorship was imposed the news of urban terrorism and political assassination had been increasing, notably that of the Minister of Railways in January 1975. And a growing political polarization is drawing the Communist Party of India into a closer alliance with the Indira Congress, pushing the right wing parties to contemplate a coup and an army takeover. While the political leadership sporadically strives to strengthen the organization of the governing Congress, the absence of a coherent ideology related to practical policies makes it difficult. The only articulated goals around which the Party is presently being rallied is a vague state socialism and the desire to stay in power.

The budget priorities of the central government reveal an unwillingness to lead the state governments in an energetic, sustained drive to improve agricultural production. The risks of alienating the political support of the rural elites and of disturbing the supply of cheap food for the cities stall structural

reforms and changes in price policies in agriculture. Funds committed to agricultural development in 1973 were about \$1.03 billion, while in 1974 they had shrunk to about \$850 million. In the face of starvation deaths reported in October 1974 (in the hard-hit district of Cooch Bihar in northern West Bengal a Congress M.P. estimated there were three thousand deaths) and reported shortfalls of food grain production of 10-15 million metric tons, it is scarcely surprising to hear vociferous criticism of government. Moreover, defence expenditures have grown. As one writer puts it, "Defence expenditure which absorbed close to two per cent of our GNP in 1961-62 now absorbs 3.7 per cent of the same. Whereas it absorbed about 30 per cent of the Central government's (allocable) expenditure in 1961-62—and much less in earlier years—it now absorbs 42 per cent of the same."²⁵ (India's defence budget and manpower have both grown more rapidly than Pakistan's and, probably, China's over the decade 1961-70.)

Commentators in New Delhi speak with respect of the frenetic balancing act that keeps the Government and the nation together but point out that no one in power is thinking about the future of the country or what policies are possible to improve future prospects. One such commentator ruefully remarked that long-range planning meant six weeks. The lack of sustained attention to fundamental problems, coupled with a lack of analysis and a coherent, practical ideology to guide action is setting the stage for radical solutions more fundamental than the assumption of dictatorial powers.

In Sri Lanka the situation is more hopeful, though still politically troubled. The 1971 rural insurrection which caught the government off-guard forced recognition of the acute unemployment problem, relative rural impoverishment and the maldistribution of income and opportunities.²⁶ These issues are being faced by a left-wing coalition headed by Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike.

In power since 1970, the coalition, which includes the Moscow-oriented Communist Party, has moved to conciliate the dissident youth of the 1971 insurrection and to carry through reforms of rural society. Spurred on by the criticism

of the newspaper *People's Force*, edited by Mrs. Bandaranaike's son-in-law, Kumar Rupasinghe, a clearer sense of direction has emerged in the ruling coalition. Strenuous efforts to attain food self-sufficiency are being pushed. Any land beyond a minimal house plot that is not under cultivation is liable to be planted to food by anyone, subject only to a nominal rent to the owner. From 1972 to 1974, one-sixth of the total cultivated land, some 600,000 acres, has been taken over by the government under land ceiling laws and transferred to cooperatives and individuals willing to farm it. This was, proportionately, the most widespread land reform in all of South Asia. However, coupled with efforts to redistribute land and increase food output, there has been a crackdown on opponents of the regime. Some opposition newspaper editors are in jail and press censorship is tighter than at any time since British rule. The attempts of political opponents to rally a following are subject to police harassment and government obstruction. Concerned reporters foresee a gradual movement towards more authoritarian rule and the dismantling of parliamentary democracy.

In the face of the mounting political challenge of the alienated within each of the South Asian nations, what does the future hold? There are certain large trends which foreshadow a more troubled future. The population increases and the low rate of job formation will multiply the numbers of unemployed. Many of the unemployed who are drifting into the cities will be ready for desperate adventures and radical politicians on both left and right will attempt to recruit them for their movements. The police and army backed by the resources of the well-established state apparatus, who in turn will be supported by a wide spectrum of foreign governments, including Canada, will alternate repression with moderate reforms. However, the numbers of the unwanted and unemployed will probably continue to grow, forming a larger proportion of the population. Governments will concentrate their limited resources on critical areas vital to the economy and on politically supportive elements in society and so regional and class disparities will grow more acute. However,

I believe that sooner or later the right to a living through gainful employment for all citizens will be accepted by governments and the necessary reorganization of the economy will be carried through. This may come in many guises, through creeping socialism, fascism or revolutionary communism. The country with the most conspicuous success in breaking down the entrenched structures of a society, and rescuing overpopulated agricultural countries out of the condition of mass unemployment and political alienation, has been China. Her example has great appeal.

Among the South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has made greatest progress in providing employment, in containing the population growth in rural areas, in investing in the health and education of its people and in reducing its birth rate. Possibly Sri Lanka will demonstrate an alternate route to breaking the vicious circle of poverty and overpopulation. No other central or state government in South Asia has actually undertaken realistic programs to provide employment and reverse the growing disparity of income and resources among its citizens. Given the present structure of their political support, none are likely to do so in the immediate future.

Canada's present and future interests in South Asia

In addition to the anticipated futures of the South Asia nations, some other determinants of present and future Canadian policy might be mentioned: for example, the interpretation of recent experiences with South Asians, the specific interests of Canadian organizations, and the breadth, realism and attractiveness of our vision of the future of the relationship.

By the late 1960s, with the cut in American assistance to South Asia, the unpleasant experience with the Indians in Indochina, the general doubts about aid which led to the Pearson Commission report of 1969, efforts were being made to clarify Canadian policy. Certain ideas and phrases began to circulate in the bureaucracy, such as the search for "a new and more mature relationship" with South Asia. It was not clear what was immature about the earlier relation though the accompanying gloss suggested that it was the hoped-for shift

from aid to trade, which would apparently mark the coming of maturity. Concern was also expressed about the unending flow of assistance and thought was given to establishing some criteria for terminating aid. Had India crossed the threshold into "self-sustaining growth"? The early successes of the high-yielding varieties of food grains suggested that food aid could truly be stopped as the Indians had predicted. The Indo-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh in 1971 and the Indians' impressive and decisive victory gave credibility to the view of many in government that Canada had gone unnecessarily far in her support of India. The enthusiasms of some Canadian officers for India and Indian culture provoked a reaction of skepticism and a questioning as to Canada's true national interests in the region. In an effort to resolve this uncertainty External Affairs commissioned a review of Canadian policy towards South Asia in 1973. In the course of the study various views emerged which can be simplistically grouped into two: that India was the "sick man of Asia" whom it was futile to try to help, particularly when there were other healthier and more energetic nations, notably China; and that India had a persistent vitality which in the long run would enable her to play a significant role in world affairs and Canada would be well advised to maintain any advantages she presently enjoyed. The "sick man" group generally favoured a retrenchment of aid and a hard-nosed bargaining for commercial advantages which was reflected in a criticism of CIDA's operations and sympathy for the efforts of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce to promote exports. The "Indianists" judged that development assistance had become a permanent feature of international relations and saw a long-term realignment of world power taking place with the relative rise in significance of the larger Third World countries, including India and Pakistan. Their perception was essentially political rather than economic. For both groups any talk of a special relationship had ended.

This internal dialogue was broken into by two events: the price rise of petroleum products in 1973, and the explosion of the Indian nuclear device in 1974. The rise in oil prices had two immediate effects. First, it demonstrated the dependence

of the world's industrialized economies on raw materials produced in the Third World and so underlined the plurality of forms of international power and its diffusion around the world. Secondly, it raised the suspicion that economic development was conditioned by outside forces over which the developing nations had no conceivable control. Thus, failure in development was not solely due to the "softness" of the states of South Asia but was also caused by the structure of the world's economy. This perception generally strengthened the position of those who recognized that development assistance was simply a modest device for offsetting a discriminatory world system. CIDA's position was strengthened and ITC's lost cogency.

The second event, the Indian nuclear explosion of May 1974, was acutely embarrassing to the Canadian government. Canadians, faced with American criticism for supplying nuclear assistance to India, had chosen to understand the signed agreements and early personal assurances of the Indian leadership to mean that India would use the technology exclusively for peaceful purposes and avoid ambiguous actions that would embarrass the Canadians. The explosion was regarded as a breach of the implicit, if not explicit, understanding. Mitchell Sharp explained on May 18 that the Canadians could not distinguish between peaceful and military explosions. The long-standing cooperation which dated back to 1955 and which had supplied the Canada-India Atomic Reactor at Trombay, the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project reactor, and had trained hundreds of Indian scientists and technicians, was terminated. Talks planned for the rescheduling of commercial loans were cancelled by the government. Subsequently the loans were rescheduled and restricted forms of nuclear cooperation were resumed.²⁷ The explosion affected the dialogue on the future of Canada's relations with South Asia by dramatically demonstrating the technological and, indirectly, military preponderance of India in South Asia, while once again underlining the manifold ways in which international power, which had been a near monopoly of the North Atlantic club and the Soviets, had spread.

The understanding and interpretation of these particular

events was conditioned by the perception of Canadian, partisan and departmental interests in South Asia. For future relations the specific interests of Canadian organizations are relevant. These can be learned from their reports, public positions on specific issues and interviews with their leaders. In the course of conversations in the Spring of 1974 with the executive officers of over thirty organizations, and with some of our political leaders in Ottawa it was soon clear that few Canadians have an interest in our relations with other states anywhere in the world save the United States. Africa, Latin America and all of Asia are marginal to the international programs of the major national associations. Within Asia the area of greatest present interest was India, though many associations hoped to develop relations with Japan and China.

Each of the professional and union associations—the Nurses' Association, the Medical Association, the Teachers' Federation, the Association of University Teachers, the Bar Association and the Labour Congress—was interested in the terms of immigration for Asians into Canada. The Medical Association and the Nurses' Association have both issued official statements calling for a restriction of the inflow. The Teachers' Federation declined to discuss their position. The lawyers were awaiting the Green Paper while the University Teachers' were more concerned with providing refuge for academics persecuted in other countries. The Labour Congress was watchful but had not taken up an official position.

Beyond the interest in immigration, only the Nurses' and Teachers' associations had active international programs financed and staffed by their members. Both programs were concerned to improve the training and standards of fellow professionals in the Third World and both were assisting in the development of professional associations overseas. The Teachers have worked in India but have found the Indian National Association ineffective and the stronger State Associations difficult to reach. In consequence, they have found it easier to concentrate their efforts in the Caribbean and more recently in the Commonwealth and Francophone Africa. The Nurses have sent staff members to India to provide assistance in family planning but have no other direct relations with

South Asian nurses. As a founding member, the Canadian Nurses' Association actively participates in the Commonwealth Nurses Federation where they relate to the South Asian nurses' associations. They have found that the Caribbean and African associations are so eager to obtain assistance that their staff time and energy are committed to these countries. The Canadian Labour Congress had a long-standing interest in strengthening the union structure in the Third World and strongly supported the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the organizational efforts of the large international unions and the activities of the ILO. (The International Confederation raises over \$2 million to support union organization and to fight economic and political repression.) In addition to its contribution to the Confederation, the Labour Congress supported training programs in Canada for union organizers from the Third World, though they could not readily say what proportion of the trainees came from Asia. However, in general their involvement was deepest with the United States, Europe, Mexico and the rest of Latin America rather than with Asia and Africa.

Another group of organizations are those with a humanitarian interest in the Third World. It includes religious orders, church groups, charitable bodies of great variety as well as service organizations, most of whom are members of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation. As of 1970, there were 104 such organizations making a contribution valued at \$39 million with an overseas staff of 7,587.²⁸ Of these agencies nearly a quarter were active in India while 10 per cent of cash expenditures on individual countries was spent on India. Pakistan and Bangladesh followed far behind.

In the last four years Canadian activities in India have declined. Charitable organizations such as the Unitarian Service Committee, who depend upon public donations stimulated by the portrayal of starving orphans and other equally piteous sights, have met with diminishing Indian cooperation. The Indian High Commission has refused to lend films and other materials while the government in India has created many difficulties. The Unitarian Service Committee is now closing out its Indian operations while Oxfam is shifting,

in part, to Bangladesh. This shift away from India by the charitable organizations, together with the earlier exclusion of the Canadian Universities' Service Organization, will reduce India's significance to Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's). While there is an increase in activity in Bangladesh, the overall trend would appear to be towards Sub-Saharan Africa and away from South Asia altogether.

However, for those agencies continuing in South Asia, their first concern is with trouble-free and assured entry to carry out their programs. Secondly, they are anxious to protect their sources of funds within Canada. As the Non-Government Division of CIDA has made matching grants, these agencies have expanded their programs, staff and central administrations. Now they are in a position of partial dependence on CIDA and would react sharply to cuts in their funding. Because of their wide and varied network of contacts throughout Canada and the creation of a coordinating agency, the Canadian Council on International Cooperation (CCIC), they could put much pressure on the government.

Another potentially influential Canadian constituency interested in South Asia is the university community. Through the Canadian Society for Asian Studies, with some two hundred and fifty members, and the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute with its ten member universities, there have been created organizations capable of focusing and articulating the interests of university people in South Asia. The principal concern of both bodies has been to secure and maintain free access for students to India and to encourage the government of India to renew its triennial financing of the fellowship and book-purchase programs. Recently the Shastri Institute has embarked on a continuing summer program to serve students from other universities and high school teachers which has involved them in travel to India. Because of their dependence on the continued good-will of the Indian leadership these groups have the potential for sympathetically presenting Indian views in the Canadian press and other popular forums. Canadian actions that were repugnant to the Indians and which could be construed as unfair could have repercussions for these organizations who might try to press the Ca-

nadian leadership for a revision of such decisions. There are smaller and less well-organized groups for each of the other major South Asian countries.

A third domestic group which will have a growing influence on Canadian policy is the South Asian immigrant community. Estimates of present numbers are very uncertain but it is thought to be approaching 100,000. The recent immigrants are well-educated and include numbers of small businessmen. They are politically alert and well-informed, unlike the earlier generations of immigrants, and they have already assumed positions of leadership in various communities—a Vancouver alderman, candidates for provincial and federal legislatures, and others. Concentrated in the larger urban centres, they are easily reached and rapidly mobilized on issues which concern them. From a reading of the *Canadian Indian Times*, a bi-monthly newspaper from Ottawa, and the *Indo-Canadian*, a monthly magazine published in Vancouver, the issues which concern the South Asian community are evident: immigration regulations, opportunities to maintain contacts with South Asia for family and marital reasons, equal access to employment and the profession, full civil and political rights, and friendly relations with India from where most of the immigrants have come. One would expect any move to redefine the immigration regulations to narrow South Asian migration would lead to many protests. In addition, any shift in government policy which was regarded as prejudicial to good relations with India could arouse criticism.

Yet another identifiable group with an interest in relations in South Asia are Canadian manufacturers and primary producers. They include companies with direct investments in South Asia such as Alcan, Bata and Montreal Engineering, or with licensing arrangements such as Perkins Engines, as well as companies that have gained a foothold in the South Asian markets such as MLW-Worthington, De Havilland Aircraft, MacMillan Bloedel and others. In addition, the Canadian Wheat Board, the Canadian Dairy Commission and other marketing bodies for primary producers have shipped many tons of their products. Those companies or agencies

which limit their activity to selling in South Asia regard it as a surge tank for their production. When there is a decline in demand in the domestic market, or in other historic markets, organizations such as Canadian Westinghouse, General Motors of Canada Diesel Division, and the Wheat Board, turn to overseas markets to take up their over-production. To gain access to these new markets the companies and agencies initially used the credit facilities of the Export Development Corporation (EDC) and when that source of underwriting dried up, they drew on the resources of the CIDA and its predecessor, the External Aid Office, to supply easy credit which was essential if they were to compete.

Moves to reduce the credits available to support Canadian producers through untying an increasing portion of official aid led to protests from the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. The Association recommended that no moves be made in the short term to further untie Canadian aid. For the longer term, they favoured the establishment of an advisory council to CIDA; such a council, which they hoped would be properly representative of the business community, would have responsibility for assessing the effects on the Canadian economy of proposed changes in foreign aid policy and programming. Clearly the Manufacturers' Association, speaking for its members, has an interest in Canadian development assistance to South Asia.

Far and away the most influential group interested in South Asia is the various departments and agencies of the federal government. Many organizations have programs with the South Asian countries directly or indirectly. Among them are External Affairs, CIDA, EDC, Departments of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Manpower and Immigration, Finance and National Defence—indeed, the list could be continued to include virtually every federal government organization, including the Bank of Canada, the National Library, the National Research Council and others.

There are several groups of departmental interests which vary in degree country by country but which exist with respect to each of the South Asian countries. There is a strong interest in developing export sales of manufactured goods or

of semi-processed materials on long-term contracts. Canada, burdened with an enormous net foreign debt (over \$1,500 per capita) which must be serviced largely by export earnings, is eagerly ranging around the world looking for promising markets. India, because of its size, diverse needs and absolute resources, is regarded as a promising future market even if past commercial sales have been small and erratic. Pakistan is also seen as a significant future market while Sri Lanka, because of its small size, and Bangladesh, because of its poverty, are of less interest.

The drive to find export markets is centred at ITC and EDC, though the need is apparently considered so great that CIDA and External Affairs have acquiesced in having their own principal missions diverted to increase export earnings. The push of ITC and EDC to increase sales is, however, limited by two conditions which lie outside Canadian government control: the willingness of the South Asian countries to buy Canadian goods and services; and the hesitancy of Canadian producers, particularly the manufacturers, to try and build up long-term commercial markets in South Asia. The South Asian countries are willing to trade with Canada if the terms are competitive and if there are reciprocal opportunities for sale to Canada. Other than providing export credits, payment insurance, advisory services and contacts, ITC and EDC can do little to influence the price, quality, and back-up service of Canadian exporters to South Asia. Nor can these agencies do anything directly to reduce Canadian tariff and other import restrictions affecting the entry of South Asian goods into Canada. Similarly, the reluctance of Canadian producers to organize themselves, either individually or jointly, to build up their long-term market position in South Asia undermines the efforts of ITC and EDC to gain new diversified markets for Canadian exports.

The concern for export performance spills over into the administration of the Canadian aid program through CIDA. Some 47 per cent (\$230 million of \$491 million allocated for development assistance in 1972-73) is spent in Canada to buy goods and services needed in the developing nations. Industry, Trade and Commerce attempts to ensure that a portion of

these grants and soft loan funds administered by CIDA are used for export promotion. James Whiteside, Deputy Chief of the Aid Operations Division of ITC, speaking candidly to the Ontario Export Forum said, "You see aid money is often a device, a tool, to get into the market, it is a toehold." And Whiteside continued, "... if it [an exporter's proposal] is just cold hard exports CIDA will probably have a nightmare over that one. But what we can do is turn it around—we can appeal to their sentiment in the sense that we say look if you put in there a technical assistance package to help these people identify what they want, or if you throw in a management contract so that we actually help them run the thing till we get it off the ground, I think we could sell it to CIDA."²⁹ There are a number of cases well known to CIDA field officers where coherent country development programs have been gutted by having their budgets diverted by headquarters into the purchase of unwanted Canadian goods and services.

The second major focus of interest in South Asia is development assistance which is centred in CIDA though it is shared by External, because aid is seen as one of the many dimensions of international relations. CIDA has grown rapidly in personnel and budget since its formation in 1968 from the earlier External Aid Office. In 1968 there were 363 employees of all grades and six years later, in 1974, there were 937. In that period the administrative and foreign service personnel have increased from 115 to 418. Appropriations have gone from \$223 million to \$522 million, with the voted administration budget leaping from \$3 million to \$15.7 million, a fivefold increase.³⁰ At the same time other departments and agencies have grown far more slowly and External Affairs' budget and personnel were temporarily cut back. The agency suffers from woefully weak policy formation and evaluation divisions. Rapid growth has also created budgetary problems in expending the sudden increases in money. The earlier vehicle for development assistance was technical training and assistance, and project assistance. Both of these forms of aid took a great deal of administrative time, and required many competent people, but generally did not permit the rapid disbursement of large sums of money. Commodity assistance

and program assistance, on the other hand, are economical in personnel but expensive in money. The shift in CIDA's orientation away from technical assistance and tied-project aid coincides with its increased allocations. It also coincides with a growing criticism of project aid, as well as of all forms of tied aid within the international aid community. South Asia, with its immense need for aid, its competent planners and economists, and its well-established accounting procedures for reporting on aid disbursements, made these countries promising recipients. In part because of these considerations, the absolute volume of aid directed to South Asia has continued to grow, though proportionately recent allocations to Francophone Africa and Latin America have grown more rapidly.

Interest in immigration is centered in the Department of Manpower and Immigration with some interest in Health and Welfare. In-migration from India has gone up year after year.

1966	2,233	1969	5,395	1972	5,049
1967	3,966	1970	5,670	1973	9,203
1968	3,229	1971	5,313	1974	12,868

When one adds in persons migrating from other parts of South Asia, as well as those who are born in South Asia but enter Canada from the United Kingdom, the United States, Fiji, Malaysia, etc., the figure for 1972 is over 10,000 while estimates for 1973 place the total at 15,000. (This figure is made up of 9,200 from India, 3,000 Indians from the U.K., 2,000 from Pakistan and 1,000 South Asians from all other sources.) However, this growing volume does not fill the Manpower and Immigration officers in Delhi and Islamabad with dreams of an ever-expanding role for their Department. Indeed, the current review of immigration policy may well reduce the volume of migration from South Asia and other populous areas where people are eager to come to Canada. In the administration of the present and any future programme, Manpower and Immigration is concerned to be fair, and to

avoid any charge of racial discrimination, as well as being responsive to internal expressions of concern for additional labour, the reduction of unskilled unemployment or the growth of social problems in our major cities.

In addition to Ottawa's interest in trade, development and immigration, there are the many functional interests over a wide range of Departments. Finance consults about the South Asians' position at the International Monetary Fund and their positions on monetary exchange rates. Defence watches the defence production of India, the arms supplies from the Soviet Union and China into South Asia, and possible arrangements with an ambitious and wealthy Iran. Transport seeks to ensure a share for Canadian carriers of cargo destined for South Asian ports, and so on. All of these interests, plus the more important trade and aid immigration concerns, are harmonized or at least reconciled by External Affairs. In theory, External is charged with the management of all of Canada's relations with South Asia. Its disinterested stance above the mission-oriented departments and agencies, its understanding of Canada's relative place in the world, and its expertise about the inner workings of the South Asian countries, are expected to give it the leading position in administering Canada's international relations. Unfortunately External Affairs has not taken its own professional responsibilities seriously. As of late 1973 no diplomatic mission was carrying out systematic analysis of political, economic and social trends in the countries to which they were accredited. Individual officers were writing thoughtful reports on specific issues but no one was monitoring the major trends within the various countries, preparing background studies, anticipating problems and thinking through possible Canadian responses. Sporadic attempts at economic analysis were undertaken in New Delhi but generally the mission fell back on the studies of the IBRD field staff or those coming from the government of India. Canadian analysis and background reporting were distinctly inferior to that of the Australians and the Americans.

A major handicap in carrying out high-quality analysis is the absence of systematic data collection on the various coun-

tries. Nor was the collection and analysis of data taking place in Ottawa. The Policy Analysis Group, when not being raided for assistance in coping with unexpected crises, was engaged in the study of larger questions, while the Special Research Bureau was largely given over to monitoring economic trends in Eastern Europe, with little linguistically competent expertise on other regions. In consequence, External Affairs is taken off-guard by the occurrence of the predictable: coups d'état in Chile or nuclear explosions in India. For the managers of Canada's external relations to be so ill-prepared to respond to large events in the world reflects adversely on the Department's analytical capacity and understanding of the world.

Furthermore, the lack of a coherent understanding and articulation of Canada's position in the world leaves the Department intellectually defenceless in its dealings with program-oriented departments. When faced by it with the hard-nosed arguments about balance of payments and domestic employment, External Affairs has no developed rationale to fall back on. Other than appeals to unverified public opinion, the only apparent guidelines for decision is a blending of the views of the various departments and some general concern for consistency with the past. There is no perception of the future. Yet, in spite of these grave shortcomings, the Department continues to exercise a mediating role because of its historic prestige and the outstanding quality of many of its officers.

Specific groups, organizations, governmental departments and agencies, however, have specific interests in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In general, these bodies are concerned to preserve access to the South Asian countries, to maintain and extend contracts, and to discharge those responsibilities which can be done conveniently through arrangements with the South Asian countries. However, aside from the migrants, the scholars and, possibly, the soldiers, there is no intrinsic interest in South Asia. If the needy, the markets, or the capacity to absorb aid were in some other subcontinent, Canadians could as easily be involved there. It is only our historical connection through the British Empire

which has encouraged Canadians to build and preserve relations with the successor states. Now that Canadians are extending their circle of interests to "Francophonie," to Latin America, and elsewhere, the earlier contacts with South Asia are gradually being matched in intensity by contacts in other parts of the world. South Asia simply becomes one of the regions of the world in which specific Canadian bodies have specific interests. It is no longer an area of unusual or unique interest nor, on the other hand, is it part of the world that can be ignored.

Future alternatives

Given the limited interests of Canadian organizations in South Asia, and also the prospects of increasing political unrest in that area, what are the appropriate policies for the Canadian government?

After 1947 Canadian strengthened her own international standing by supporting both the state formation in South Asia and the increasing participation of the new states in world affairs. Subsequently, when the division of the world into cold war blocs appeared imminent, and when economic development assistance promised to insulate the sub-continent from the spread of communism, we contributed heavily to the South Asian countries. This contribution not only preserved a modest place for us in the councils of the world but also allowed us to expand our trading network and move great stockpiles of surplus wheat. However, in the present and foreseeable future, when the most pressing problems of the South Asian nations will be on the domestic political front, there is no obvious role for any foreign power, including Canada.

However, a more assured and confident Canada has much to lose if the present international system should collapse or be refashioned to close off markets or dim the prospects of friendly relations. The price of a semi-isolation, such as that of the Soviet Union, China or Burma, for domestic development is immensely difficult to judge. Personally, I think that the toll of such isolation would come high for Canada, for aside from its economic costs it would at once reduce the op-

portunities for individuals and minimize the outside stimulus which offsets tendencies to provincialism and comfortable stagnation. If we are to remain open to other societies we must have relations with their governments. Yet the present pattern of relations is clearly not acceptable to many new nations. Many of the Third World countries are insisting that the international system can no longer work to the advantage of a minority; all four billion of the earth's inhabitants must be considered. The actions of the Seventy-seven at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the OPEC countries' continuing collaboration, the triggering of a nuclear device by India, the struggle for the political recognition of the Palestinians, the U.N. Assembly adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States—all these and many other separate events give substance to the general perception that the Third World countries seek to reform the international system.

The justice of their demands has been recognized by our leaders. Lester Pearson understood that the perpetuation of inequalities of wealth and power could destroy hopes for an orderly world. In "this relationship of overwhelming, one-sided power, the uncorrected market works as inequitably as it does, say, between landlord and *harijan* in an Indian village. . . . All the natural forces of a competitive and unequal economy favour the rich. Debt becomes not an ordinary commercial transaction but a desperate dependence of the pauper upon the rich man who can wait and cheat and sell him out. If we take away the fact of total inequality from our world's economic transactions we distort the harsh economic reality which underlies all our relationships whether of aid or trade or liquidity or debt."³¹ Pierre Trudeau recently wrote, "We need to change our attitude—to realize that too few of us have been enjoying too much of the world's wealth; to realize that too many countries for too long have not been able to participate adequately in the decisions that affect them."³²

If Canadian leadership acknowledges both the reality of the pressure for a major redistribution of economic and political power and also the justice of the claim for such a redistribution, then the only course of action is to respond sympathet-

ically to the claims of the Third World countries and cooperate in the realistic reform of our relations. However, as it is unlikely that the vision of a more equitable world order will be sufficient in itself to inspire our leadership to take initiatives for reform, we may expect to have political and economic leverage exerted. Primary producer cartels, further moves to control foreign investment, challenges to shipping conferences with protected high freight rates, creation of a truly international unit of exchange, stockpiles of food grains and subsidized prices, guarantees of stable prices for basic industrial products, longer term and softer credits, takeover of the functional agencies of the United Nations, pressure for disarmament and a realistic Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—all of these initiatives and many others will probably be taken by the Third World, including the South Asian countries, and they will expect Canada to respond constructively. It clearly will not be a pleasant experience for us or our leaders and it will undermine our recently acquired sense of confidence; nonetheless, this is the way that Canada's relations with the South Asian nations will probably develop in the future.

NOTES

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2. Cited in M. S. Rajan, in "The Indo-Canadian Entente," *International Journal*, xvii, 4 (1961-62), p. 372n.
3. High Commission in New Delhi to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 18, 1954; file no. 9126-40C.
4. A number of good studies of Pakistan and its foreign policy are available, such as: Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); and S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973); Canada's

- relations are discussed in Peter Harnetty, "Canada's Asian Policy: The Case of Pakistan," *South Asian Review*, Vol. III, no 2 (January 1970), p. 117-129.
5. Quoted by Keith B. Callard, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p. 7.
 6. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 252.
 7. Callard, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 19.
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 9. *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives*, vol. 1, c. 445.
 10. For general discussions see: Dale C. Thomson, "India and Canada: A Decade of Co-operation, 1947-1957," *International Studies* ix (April 1968), pp. 404-30; M. S. Rajan, "The Indo-Canadian Entente," *International Journal* xvii (1961-62), pp. 358-84; and *Canada in World Affairs* (Toronto, Oxford University Press), volumes iv, v, vi, vii and viii. Many other valuable studies are listed in Donald M. Page, *A Bibliography of Works on Canadian Foreign Relations 1945-1970* (n.p.), Canadian Institute of International Affairs (1973).
 11. Keith Spicer, *A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), Tables 6-2 and 6-3.
 12. Most useful accounts of Indian development are: Baldev Raj Nayar, *The Modernization Imperative and Indian Planning* (Delhi: Vikas, 1972); A. H. Hanson, *The Process of Planning: A Study of India's Five Year Plans: 1950-64* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Emile Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries* (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1973). Also see Ved P. Gandhi, "India's Self-Inflicted Defence Burden," *Economic and Political Weekly*, ix, no 35 (August 31, 1974), pp. 1485-1494, which offers the last word on the effects of defence investment on development.
 13. Speech at the inauguration of production at the Integral Coach Factory, Perambur, 2 October, 1955; quoted in B. R. Nayar, *The Modernization Imperative and Indian Planning* (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972), p. 16.
 14. Speech during debate on Demands of the Ministry of Finance, Lok Sabha, 21 March 1956, quoted in Nayar, *Modernization*, pp. 116-117.
 15. Quoted in Williams J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 205.
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 17. *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wicksell, 1971), Tables 16-1 and 16-2.
 18. CIDA, *Annual Reviews, 1970-71 and 1971-72*.
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 24. *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 5, 1974.
 25. Ved. P. Gandhi, "India's Self-Inflicted Defence Burden," *Economic and Political Weekly*, ix, No. 35 (August 31, 1974), p. 1491.
 26. See Morrison, "Asian Drama, Act II," pp. 5-26, for a fuller discussion.
 27. For a more complete discussion of the background and implications, see Barrie M. Morrison and Donald M. Page, "India's Option: The Nuclear Route to Achieve Goal as World Power," *International Perspectives*, July/August, 1974, pp. 23-28; and Robert S. Anderson and Barrie M. Morrison, "Power from Power: A New Scenario Emerges for India's Scientists," *Science Forum*, vol. 7, no. 6 (December 1974) pp. 10-13.
 28. v. *Directory of Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations Engaged in International Development Assistance*, Supplement 1971 (Ottawa: ccic, 1971), pp. 1-3 and note.
 29. Talk to the Ontario Export Forum, Toronto, April 1973; printed in *Last Post*, September 1973.
 30. Information supplied through the courtesy of Mr. James Steen, Information Division, CIDA.
 31. Lester B. Pearson, address to the Columbia University Conference on International Economic Development, February 15-21, 1970.
 32. *The New York Times*, January 26, 1975.

ROBERT O. MATTHEWS*

Canada and Anglophone Africa

Canadian contact with Africa was first established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by individual citizens who, as missionaries, geologists, explorers, and teachers, performed an important role in the social and economic development of Africa. Only quite recently, however, has the government of Canada established formal relations. Until the individual African territories achieved their independence in the late 1950s and the 1960s, official contact with Africa was perforce limited to the close commercial and diplomatic ties that Canada maintained with South Africa.

Since 1955 Canada has extended her direct relations with Africa both geographically and functionally. With fourteen permanent missions scattered throughout the continent, Ottawa can now maintain fairly continuous contact with the whole region. Simultaneously, Canada initiated and expanded a bilateral program of technical, capital and military assistance to many countries in Africa. From its modest beginnings in 1958, Canadian aid to Africa now exceeds \$100

* The author wishes to express his thanks to the Canada Council for a grant that enabled him to do most of the research for this chapter. He wants further to thank Mr. Arthur Blanchette, Director of the Historical Division, Department of External Affairs, for his assistance in helping the author work his way through departmental files.

million and embraces both Francophone and Anglophone countries. Over this same period there has occurred a marked expansion of commercial relations between Canada and Africa. Whereas in 1960 exports to and imports from Africa amounted to \$77.01 million and \$33.46 million respectively, they had grown to \$377.26 million and \$445.34 million by 1974.

In the pages that follow an attempt is made to describe in chronological fashion the manner in which Canada developed direct relations with one part of Africa—which for lack of a better term is here referred to as Anglophone Africa, but which includes not only the former colonies of Great Britain but also Angola, Guinée-Bissau, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Somalia.¹ At the same time, however, it is equally important to explain why successive Canadian governments first established, then strengthened, diplomatic, commercial, and other forms of relations with various parts of Africa. Despite the rhetoric of government officials, Africa has always been of marginal interest to Canada; our policies towards Africa were designed not so much to serve the needs of African states as the interests of Canada which, in this case, were only indirectly related to Africa. Indeed, our interests in Africa were, at least initially, derived in large part from our broader concern to maintain a strong and united alliance with the West (including Britain, France and Portugal) against the Soviet bloc; from a desire to foster the growth of the Commonwealth; from the necessity to search out markets for Canadian goods and services and outlets for Canadian investment; and from a deeply felt need to sustain a favourable image of Canada as a non-racist and forward-looking state. It is these larger world interests that account for the Canadian presence in Anglophone Africa.

ON THE PERIPHERY

Official Canadian contact with Africa was for many years indirect and sporadic. Ottawa had neither knowledge of, nor interest in, Africa and its problems. Except for a small amount of trade between Canada and South Africa, stimulated by a trade office established in Cape Town in 1907, there was no

intercourse between Canada and the "dark" continent. Far away and exotic, Africa impinged on Canadian interests only on the rare occasion when events or circumstances, such as a war or a military uprising, affected Canada's relations with other states, in particular the United Kingdom. Involvement in African affairs first arose from Canada's interest in non-African states, not from her interest in Africa *per se*.

Thus in 1884 when Britain was organizing a relief column for Gordon at Khartoum, Wolseley asked for a number of *voyageurs* to steer the party's boats down the Nile. In the end, the Governor General was able to raise 386 volunteers (Indians and lumbermen), though the idea of equipping and paying for a Canadian contingent was vetoed.² Again in 1899, under pressure from public opinion and the official opposition, the Canadian government decided to send a contingent of troops to support British efforts to win equal rights for her subjects in the Transvaal. By the end of the war over seven thousand Canadians had seen combat in South Africa. Despite this significant contribution, Canada played no part in directing the course of the war, or in negotiating the final peace. It was entirely a British affair; the war only affected Canada insofar as it created an excessive burden for the mother country.³

In the case of the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-36, Canadian opinion as well as policy illustrates the indifference and apathy shown towards Africa.⁴ Ethiopia was never itself at the centre of the debate in Geneva or in Ottawa. What was at stake was Canada's interest in the maintenance of peace at all costs and in the promotion of her own national unity. To Mackenzie King and his Liberal government the enforcement of economic sanctions (particularly in the case of oil) seemed likely to result in the extension of the war in East Africa to Europe; the fate of Abyssinia was not worth running that risk.⁵ In the event of war, the danger of another domestic political crisis occurring, such as the country had faced over conscription in 1917, was presumed to be extremely probable. For those few that opposed the government's policy, the tragedy of this whole affair was that it represented the final collapse of the experiment in collective security: the likeli-

hood of a world war was not thereby diminished but increased. In the end, Canada went along with the rest of the world and, at a Special Assembly of the League of Nations, Vincent Massey announced the government's decision to discontinue sanctions against Italy. Some two and a half years later, apparently to facilitate a proposed visit by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to Rome, Ottawa accorded formal recognition to Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.

TOWARDS A POLICY ON COLONIALISM

During the Second World War, Canada was asked by the British government on two different occasions (the winter of 1942 and January 1945) for its views on colonialism. Both times Ottawa expressed a reluctance to comment on the substance of colonial policy then under discussion between the United Kingdom and the United States. It was felt that responsibility for the development of such a policy rested with those governments alone that controlled dependent territories. Canada's interest in colonialism at that time was indirect; it was derived solely from Ottawa's concern to maintain friendly relations between London and Washington.⁶

This attitude of aloofness or detachment from colonial questions did not change after 1945. Since Canada had no dependent territories of her own, nor any aspirations to acquire them, her interest in the overall struggle for independence was indirect. The position she assumed and the policies she adopted were influenced by wider and less direct considerations: a desire to prevent the communist bloc from spreading its control over Asia and Africa; support for our Western allies, notably Britain and France; concern for the integrity and effectiveness of the United Nations; and Canada's own experience in decolonization.

Canada's experience in achieving full sovereignty was frequently advanced as an example to be followed and an explanation of our voting record at the United Nations. In fact, such reasoning provided a convenient justification for a somewhat reactionary colonial policy. Just as Canada had achieved her independence "through a process of constitutional evolution" rather than "a bitter physical struggle,"

argued Paul Martin, then Minister of National Health and Welfare, before the first committee of the General Assembly in 1952, so, too, should decolonization today be gradual and peaceful. Only in this way could the colonial peoples acquire the necessary maturity to run their own affairs and collaborate effectively with their "former protector." Whether for Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria in the 1950s or for Southern Rhodesia (henceforth referred to as Zimbabwe), South West Africa (Namibia), and the Portuguese territories in the 1960s, the ideal process of decolonization, according to Mr. Martin, involved moderation and "a constant awareness by the administering powers of the need for the maximum rate of progress in the countries under their authority" and, on the part of the colonial peoples, "good faith" as well as a commitment to avoid "reckless and destructive action."

The stance Canada adopted on most colonial issues was also explained in terms of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and the importance Canada attributed to a strong and efficient world organization. According to the Charter, the administering powers accepted an obligation to promote self-government for their dependent territories. Having agreed voluntarily and in good faith to these commitments, Canada reasoned, they should be left relatively free from outside interference to carry out this task. As Lester Pearson said before Parliament on December 8, 1952, "The Charter accepts and establishes them [the colonial powers] as the instruments for achieving this [independence]." Any effort made to broaden the supervisory powers of the General Assembly beyond those stated in Article 73 constituted an amendment to the Charter and was resisted. Canada thus opposed all attempts by non-administering states to elevate the Special Committee on Information (set up in 1949) to the status of a U.N. organ comparable to the Trusteeship Council. With respect to trust territories, Canada argued that the Council (where administering and non-administering states were equally balanced) should be left free from interference by the General Assembly to decide on matters of detail.

By 1959, however, at the fourteenth session of the General

Assembly, Canada co-sponsored a resolution which set up a committee to establish guidelines to allow the Assembly to determine whether or not a territory was non-self-governing. Canada thus moved from a position of strict reliance on legal obligations to one that took into account the changing political conditions of the world organization.

The position that a member state assumes at the United Nations is obviously influenced by its wider foreign policy interests. These interests may be, and often are, in conflict with one another. In deciding what policy to adopt a country must assess the relative importance it attributes to each of these interests—an assessment which may well vary over time. Canadian policies towards colonialism have reflected Ottawa's efforts to match her voting record against a continually changing mix of broader interests.

From 1945 until 1959 Canada's policy of "disinterested detachment" in colonial affairs⁷ attempted to balance her political and strategic interests in a strong and united Western alliance with some concern for the legitimate demands of colonial and ex-colonial territories for independence. In fact, this usually meant that Canada agreed to the inclusion on the agenda of the matter under discussion (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, apartheid) and to the Assembly's competence to discuss the issue, but opposed (or abstained on) any resolution that harmed or embarrassed her NATO allies. Canada supported moderate initiatives that offered some satisfaction to Arab, Asian and African states by encouraging colonial powers to press on towards self-government, but only as long as no timetable for achieving independence was specified. Reluctant to annoy her NATO allies, or openly disavow her non-European Commonwealth partners, Canada's aim during this first period was to remain aloof, to avoid situations (such as membership on committees) where her "impartiality" might be compromised.

By 1960 the tide of anti-colonialism could no longer be resisted without considerable cost to Ottawa's interest in maintaining good relations with the new states of Africa and Asia, many of which were also members of the Commonwealth. With new High Commissions in Accra and

Lagos and a Consulate General in Leopoldville, the government of Canada was now exposed to African views and African pressures. In addition, the threat of communism to the Western world at this time seemed less likely to arise from military conquest in Europe than from the use of more subtle political, economic, and diplomatic instruments in Asia and Africa. The Department of External Affairs wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from using the colonial issue as a means of fostering anti-Western feelings among the states of Africa and Asia, and therefore tried to persuade these countries of Canada's "genuine" interest in wishing to promote the evolution from colony to nationhood for subject peoples everywhere who desire that status, and at a rate of development governed only by practical considerations of internal stability. The times had changed, and if Ottawa hoped to retain any influence in Africa and Asia (and in the Commonwealth), Canada had to change her policies as well.

Thus at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, Canada endorsed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which recognized the right of all peoples to self-determination, and the obligation of all colonial powers to take immediate steps to transfer power to their dependent peoples, "without conditions or reservations." This shift in Canadian policy is perhaps best reflected in the contrasting positions assumed on the Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian questions in the 1950s on one hand, and on those dealing with Portugal's African colonies, Zimbabwe and South Africa in the 1960s on the other.

The North African issues presented Canada with the difficult task of reconciling her political and strategic interests in a strong and friendly France with her interest in securing the support or benevolent neutrality of the countries of Asia, Africa and the Arab world in the cold war. The solution to this dilemma was to give first consideration to France's position. If the latter was not too strongly opposed to inscription, discussion or even the passage of a mild resolution, Ottawa was prepared to favour these steps. But if France was firm in her opposition even to inscription, the Canadian government

resisted such an initiative. France, it was felt, was "aware of the need to relate its policies to the necessities of a changing world" and was embarked on a course that would result ultimately in the satisfaction of the dependent peoples. French intentions and good faith were therefore not in question. It was a matter of promoting change peacefully, an aim that was not likely to be "spurred on in the right direction by discussions in the United Nations, or by the adoption of resolutions unacceptable to the party principally concerned." Time, patience and moderation were required if a viable policy and harmonious society were to be created.⁸ The end result was that Canada's voting record, particularly on the Algerian question, more closely resembled the colonial powers' position than that of the anti-colonial majority.⁹

Portugal's African colonies

The Canadian position on Portugal's African colonies, at least after 1960, illustrates the change in our policy towards colonialism. From 1956 until 1960 the government supported the Portuguese contention that it alone could decide whether its "overseas provinces" were an integral part of the state of Portugal or non-self-governing territories within the terms of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. At the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, Canada endorsed Resolution 1541 which approved a set of principles to guide members in determining whether an obligation existed to transmit information under Article 73, paragraph (e), but abstained on a subsequent resolution that listed Portugal's colonies as non-self-governing. In April 1961, following the disorders in Angola, the Canadian delegate voted in favour of a resolution (1603) that called upon Portugal to introduce reforms in Angola, and set up a committee to investigate the matter more fully.

Ottawa's position on the question of Angola was clearly ambivalent. On one hand, it was argued by the Department of External Affairs, to endorse the resolution on Angola would set an awkward precedent for the United Kingdom, which was then involved in intricate negotiations over the future of some of its remaining colonies. It would also seriously

complicate relations with a NATO ally, Portugal. On the other hand, there were serious disorders in Angola; Portuguese colonial policy was clearly outdated and unenlightened; and it would prove embarrassing to Canada (both at home and abroad) not to support the proposed mild resolution. On balance, it was decided to break with the past and pointedly condemn one of Canada's allies in the Western camp. In effect, Canada recognized that Angola was a non-self-governing territory, and that the people of this colony had the right to eventual self-determination. Unlike the earlier North African cases, Portugal was not allowed to hide behind the shield of domestic jurisdiction. "In view of the provisions of the Charter, the international repercussions of the situation and its significance for peace in Africa and in the world," the United Nations was properly concerned with the question of Angola and its peaceful solution.¹⁰

In the following ten years Canada has favoured at least fourteen General Assembly resolutions which, among other things, requested states (particularly NATO members) to deny Portugal any support or assistance which she might use for the suppression of the peoples of her non-self-governing territories; urged Portugal to undertake extensive political, economic and social reforms; established a special training program for territories under Portuguese administration (including technical education, education for leadership and teacher training); condemned the colonial wars being waged by Portugal; recognized the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples of Angola, Guinée and Mozambique for their right to self-determination; and called upon all states to increase their moral and material assistance to the peoples of Portugal's African colonies fighting for their freedom. On the other hand, Canada voted against only three resolutions, all of which specifically implied that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. On eight other occasions, Canada abstained.

Undoubtedly such a catalogue of U.N. resolutions and of Canada's response to each provides an indication of the overall spirit of this country's approach to the whole matter. But U.N. resolutions are usually recommendations; they do not

create binding obligations. And frequently a country may support a resolution to indicate its agreement with the general aim, and yet register a series of significant reservations which reduce the importance of its positive vote.¹¹ Thus, through interpretation or simply by non-compliance with U.N. appeals, a country's support for a particular resolution can effectively be emasculated.

It is therefore necessary to describe what Canada actually did to give concrete expression to her disapproval of Portugal's colonial policies and to her sympathy for the aspirations of the African peoples. Verbal condemnation alone could not convince the Portuguese of the necessity to reverse their colonial policies, which were in fact a natural outgrowth of the authoritarian regime in Lisbon. The Canadian government did not, however, limit its response to disparaging remarks about colonialism. At least a year before member states of the U.N. were requested to deny Portugal support which she might use for the "suppression of the peoples of her non-self-governing territories," the Canadian Government suspended all shipments of arms to Portugal under the NATO mutual aid program.¹² At the same time it was decided that no arms or equipment would be sold to Portugal on a commercial basis if, in the government's judgment, they "would be used for military purposes in Portugal's overseas territories." This step was taken in November 1960 because Ottawa had learnt that some equipment sent from Canada had, contrary to an earlier understanding, been transferred to Angola. Contrary to false reports in 1966 and 1967 that sixty F-86 fighters bought in Canada had been sold by the Federal Republic of Germany to Portugal, successive Canadian governments endorsed and carried out this policy.

Canada did, however, oppose every effort to extend United Nations' pressures beyond those of moral suasion and a limited arms ban. In doing so she advanced various arguments to justify her position. For example, expulsion from the U.N. would isolate Portugal from the salutary influence of world opinion. Neither would economic sanctions be likely to be effective, even if universally applied, and they might harm the very people they were designed to serve. In

any event, only the Security Council can call for their use in the event of a threat to international peace, and in the Canadian view, the situation in Portuguese Africa did not "warrant a recommendation for action under Chapter VII of the Charter which deals with situations threatening the peace".¹³ Finally, Canada questioned the wisdom of breaking off trade with another country whose policies one does not like. For Canada, which depends so heavily on foreign trade, such a practice would have been very damaging.

On the other side of the ledger, Canadian support for the dependent peoples from Portugal's colonies grew only grudgingly and belatedly. In 1965 she voted in favour of setting up a program for Portuguese refugees, which in 1968 was included in the wider U.N. Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa. By the end of 1973 Canada had contributed nearly \$200,000 to this fund.¹⁴ But this assistance was for "refugees" from southern Africa; until recently, the government refused "to provide assistance to the various African liberation movements or to the Organization of African Unity".¹⁵ At the Commonwealth Conference held in Ottawa in August 1973, however, this position was appreciably altered. Despite its continued rejection of "violent solutions," the government was prepared to extend, if only indirectly, "humanitarian assistance to all those engaged in such efforts (struggle for self-determination)".¹⁶ According to one observer present at a press conference which followed the meetings, Prime Minister Trudeau distinguished between "freedom fighters" and "liberation movements"—the latter were acceptable, the former not. "If we can support them through humanitarian as opposed to military means," Mr. Trudeau said, "we [will] do so, but we are not going to supply hand grenades and so on to the freedom fighters."¹⁷

In the months that followed the government made much clearer how it intended to broaden the scope of its humanitarian assistance to southern Africa. At the U.N. and later in Ottawa the government declared that henceforth its support would go not only to the traditional U.N. or other internationally sponsored programs (such as the U.N. Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa, the U.N. Trust

Fund for South Africa, the U.N. Fund for Namibia, the Commonwealth Secretariat Fund for Rhodesian Africans, the International University Exchange Fund) but also, for the first time, to Canadian non-governmental organizations (such as OXFAM, the United Church, and CUSO) that are presently "assisting the efforts of the people of southern Africa who are involved in the struggle for human dignity and self-determination."¹⁸ As it became obvious what this new policy implied, several prominent newspapers (particularly the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star*) strongly attacked the government. Under pressure Mitchell Sharp, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, sent the whole question to the Standing Committee. After days of hearings, during which the opponents of humanitarian assistance to liberation movements were able to muster but one spokesman, it became clear that there was little opposition either within or outside Parliament. The subsequent election and the failure of Parliament to pass the estimates before its dissolution, left this whole matter in abeyance until the end of 1974. In the meantime, the revolution in Portugal and the subsequent granting of independence by the new regime to Guinée-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola have made such assistance unnecessary, at least as it applies to Portugal's colonies. Any Canadian assistance to these states will now have to be channelled through CIDA's bilateral or multilateral program.

Rhodesia

Ever since 1962, when the question of Rhodesia was first placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, Canada has endorsed the ultimate objective of majority African rule. "At a time when the principles of democratic freedom have been adopted throughout most of Africa," the Canadian delegate to the United Nations reasoned, "a minority of 200,000 obviously cannot expect to exclude a majority of 2.5 million indefinitely. . . ." In any event, he went on somewhat optimistically, "we do not believe that the present leaders of Southern Rhodesia intend" to retain white control permanently. "Even under the 1961 constitution, . . . it is anticipated that effective participation in the electoral process by a

substantial majority of the population will be achieved within the next decade." Thus, in the period prior to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), "the real issue is not whether Southern Rhodesia is moving in the right direction, but whether it is moving fast enough."¹⁹ In effect, Canada gave her full support to British policy in Rhodesia, which took the line that the peculiar constitutional arrangements existing in that territory meant Britain could only exert influence on the government of Rhodesia by persuasion and negotiation. Thus, at the United Nations, the Canadian delegate abstained on all resolutions during the period from 1962 to 1964 on the practical grounds that they were not likely to facilitate the private and informal consultations that were then proceeding between the British government and Rhodesia's white leaders.

At the same time Ottawa was aware of the importance that her Commonwealth partners from Asia and Africa (now a majority) attributed to issues involving racial discrimination. They did not share the same trust in the British government, which had after all left power in the hands of a minority in South Africa in 1910, and in Zanzibar in 1963. They were anxious to press for immediate majority rule. When Ian Smith came to power in Salisbury, committed to secure independence for Rhodesia, it became readily apparent that Canada could no longer sit on the fence and expect things to turn out alright. Prior to the 1964 Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers, a number of African countries voiced their demand for a full and open discussion of the question. Sir Albert Margai of Sierra Leone was reported as saying that he expected the senior, white members of the Commonwealth to act in such a way as "to maintain the confidence of myself and my brothers in Africa."²⁰

At the conference itself, Prime Minister Pearson, anxious to avoid a split along lines of colour, took the lead in suggesting that the prime ministers adopt a declaration of racial equality on which the Commonwealth would have to be based if it were to continue to exist. Applied to Southern Rhodesia this meant that independence would not be granted before sufficiently representative institutions were established. The

prime ministers thus expressed the view that an independent conference with representatives from all peoples should be held to seek an agreement on how Southern Rhodesia might best move towards independence "at the earliest practical time on the basis of majority rule."²¹ In order to strengthen the hand of the British government they also announced that a unilateral declaration of independence would result in "economic and political internal difficulties" for Southern Rhodesia.

At the Commonwealth Conference in June of the following year, Canada reaffirmed her opposition to UDI and her support for the principle of eventual majority rule, though not necessarily before independence. It further pressed the new Labour government of Great Britain on the urgent need for a constitutional conference. A Canadian official even suggested that the British put troops and a fighter squadron in Zambia in order to strengthen their bargaining position. In keeping with this general attitude, the Canadian delegate at the United Nations voted on October 12, 1965, for a moderate resolution which condemned any attempt on the part of the Rhodesian government to declare its independence unilaterally and pressed Britain to do all it could to prevent such an outcome. On November 5, however, Canada voted against a more extreme resolution which called upon Britain to employ all necessary means, "including military force, to end discrimination and violence in Southern Rhodesia."²²

On November 11, 1965, UDI was declared. The reaction of the world (including Canada) was immediate. On the same day Prime Minister Pearson announced Canada's intention not to recognize the so-called independent state of Rhodesia. He further declared that the government would withdraw its trade commissioner from Salisbury, bring an end to Canadian aid and export financing facilities, place an embargo on arms and military equipment to Rhodesia, and cancel previously applied preferential duties. On November 20 the Security Council passed a resolution recommending that "all states . . . do their utmost in order to break all economic relations." In keeping with Canadian support for the United Nations, the government undertook to place a ban on the import of

Rhodesian sugar (November 26), ferrochrome, chrome ores, asbestos and meats (December 8), which together constituted over 90 per cent of Rhodesia's exports to Canada in 1964. Finally, on February 3, 1966, the Prime Minister announced the government's decision to place a ban "on all imports into Canada of goods of Rhodesian origin and on all exports from Canada to Rhodesia with certain limited exceptions." Most of the remaining contacts and transactions (both public and private) between Canada and Rhodesia were ended with the adoption of Orders-in-Council on February 21, 1967 and December 20, 1968. These measures were taken in response to the Security Council's call for selective sanctions (in December 1966) and for comprehensive sanctions (in March 1968).

The government's reaction to the Rhodesian crisis was the result of several considerations. In the first place, it was basic Canadian policy to support "the U.N. in grave situations of this kind," and thus to anticipate or comply with the requests and subsequent demands of the Security Council to cut off all ties with Rhodesia. Secondly, Ottawa believed that if it and other white members of the Commonwealth did not take such a stand, "the integrity and unity of the Commonwealth would be impaired as it has never been before. . . . Nothing less than the interests of the Commonwealth is involved in this situation."²³ (This must have been made patently clear to Prime Minister Pearson at the two Commonwealth conferences held in January and September, 1966.) Thirdly, through the press and correspondence, the government was made aware of Canadian disapproval. It felt obliged to express in some concrete fashion the public's abhorrence of racial discrimination.

Pressure therefore had to be brought to bear on the illegal Smith regime to convince it of the necessity of returning to the status quo ante UDI (as well as to convince the African states of the West's sincerity). Moral suasion had failed; diplomatic isolation alone was not likely to succeed. This only left the application of economic, financial or military sanctions. Economic and financial sanctions were therefore selected as the least objectionable of the alternatives available, for force was to be avoided if at all possible.

In fact, the government has gone to great length to explain its resistance to the use of force. In the first place, the removal of the Smith regime by force would involve not simply a police action but "a full-scale invasion and war causing bloodshed and widespread damage." Canadians "could not ignore the human and material cost of such action inside and outside Rhodesia."²⁴ Secondly, there was the problem of mounting a sufficient force. Neither the U.N. nor Great Britain were prepared to embark on this course. For the U.N. to act there had to be agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council on the necessity to use force and on the methods of recruiting and of employing such a force—an agreement that did not then exist. As for the United Kingdom, its government has clearly stated that it would only employ force "as a last resort for restoration of law and order". Finally, the Canadian government has adopted the British line of argument that sanctions (first voluntary, then mandatory) would, if applied universally and faithfully, grind the Smith regime down.²⁵ To abandon sanctions too hastily for this riskier and more costly course of action was considered unwise.

At the time of writing, ten years later, sanctions have not yet achieved their ultimate objective of majority rule.²⁶ But they have kept some focus of world attention on Rhodesia; encouraged internal opposition to the white regime; and imposed high costs on Smith for his refusal to comply with world opinion. If Canada is indeed sincere in her support of sanctions, she must ensure that (in the words of the 1973 Commonwealth communique) "further efforts [are] made to render sanctions more effective pending an acceptable solution." In the first place, the government must actively discourage Canadian firms, such as Bata and Falconbridge, from maintaining their present investment in Rhodesia and, as in the case of Alcan's sale of aluminum rods to the Portuguese for the Cabora Bassa Dam, from extending indirect support to the Smith regime. Secondly, an effort must be made to close up the gaps left by the total refusal of South Africa to comply with U.N. demands and by the failure of several other countries (notably the United States) to enforce sanctions fully.²⁷ If the proposed Constitutional Conference between the white

regime and the African nationalists does take place and if a settlement acceptable to all the people of Rhodesia is reached, these considerations will no longer matter. In the meantime, Canada must not lower her guard but maintain maximum pressure on the Ian Smith regime.

South Africa

Canada's policies towards the various South African issues raised at the United Nations must be set within an historical context.²⁸ Only in this way can the ambivalence of Canadian policies, at least in the 1950s, be properly understood. The close historical and commercial ties established with South Africa over the last half-century have created a legacy and an interest that Canadian policy-makers cannot readily dismiss.

Canada has maintained relations with South Africa since the turn of the century. At first those direct links were largely commercial in nature. The first trade office in Africa was set up in Cape Town in 1907. Two years later a second one was established in Durban, but this was closed down in 1913. In 1934 another trade commissioner was appointed to South Africa, this time to Johannesburg. Active promotion by these representatives, coupled with a favourable trade agreement negotiated in 1932, led to a rapid increase in Canadian-South African trade. In fact, since 1945 South Africa has constituted one of Canada's ten most important markets. In addition to Canada's interest in trade with South Africa, the need for diplomatic representation became increasingly evident, particularly after the start of the Second World War. On September 11, 1939, Mackenzie King announced in the House of Commons the government's intention to appoint high commissioners to South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland. Their principal function was to report on events in the dominions "through Canadian eyes" and to facilitate "rapid and confidential communication with the other dominions."²⁹ Canada's first High Commissioner to South Africa, Dr. Henry Laureys, took up his post in early 1940.

To these commercial and diplomatic ties must be added the historical bonds of friendship that resulted from membership in a common alliance during two world wars and from close

cooperation in a common effort to secure dominion autonomy and independence from London. General Smuts and Mackenzie King viewed the centralizing efforts of Great Britain with similar misgivings. The Commonwealth of Nations as it emerged in 1931 was in large part the product of their joint efforts. In the immediate postwar years South Africa's geographical location also enhanced its strategic value for the Western world. If, in the event of a major war, the Suez Canal were closed, oil from the Middle East would have to be shipped around the Cape and protected by bases in South Africa.

Thus, by 1945, relations between Canada and South Africa had become extensive, important and close. Founded on a common historical experience, similar institutions, a community of interest and outlook shared by Commonwealth countries, and on trading and financial links, this relationship was something that Canada wanted to preserve and promote. And yet, since 1946 South Africa has been a constant thorn in the side of Canadian policy-makers. The latter have had to reconcile Canada's obvious interests in maintaining and fostering warm relations with South Africa, on one hand, with on the other her distaste for racial discrimination, her support for the United Nations and a multi-racial Commonwealth, and her desire to contain the spread of communism throughout Africa and Asia. Prior to 1945 most Canadians thought that the racial problem in South Africa involved relations between Afrikaner and British. Since then, however, the question of the non-white population could no longer be ignored. It emerged at the surface of South African politics and affected Canada's previously harmonious relationship with that country.

Despite their friendship for South Africa and recognition of the difficult problems involved in rooting out prejudice in that country, the government and people of Canada could not help but disapprove of any country that enshrined racial discrimination as a principle of government. Furthermore, South Africa's racial policies were bound to have an adverse effect on the Commonwealth. India and Pakistan identified with and supported the Asiatic population in South Africa. If

Canada and the older white members chose to identify with the ruling South African elite, the Commonwealth might fall apart and Canada's interests in Asia and Africa would be dealt a serious blow. In the East-West struggle for the "minds of men," the Soviet Union would inevitably capitalize on such a situation.

Finally, the government had to concern itself with the overall impact of the dispute on the United Nations. Since 1945 Canada has placed considerable faith in the U.N. as a means of promoting world peace and of reconciling differences between nations. She could not therefore stand idly by while South Africa totally ignored the recommendations and opinions of the world organization.

Canadian policies toward each of the three issues involving South Africa have reflected these conflicting interests. But as long as South Africa remained within the Commonwealth, Canada was not prepared to push her criticism too far for fear that this might seriously affect the harmony of the association. To criticize Pretoria openly was to undermine a basic principle of the Commonwealth, that of non-intervention in the affairs of one of its members, and might, it was thought, increase rather than reduce the intransigence of the South African government. On the other hand, if subtly and quietly suggested, disapproval might strengthen the hand of the more liberal white population. Thus, for reasons of practicality and constitutionality, Canada chose in the period from 1946 to 1960 to interpret the role of the U.N. in these questions as extremely restricted.

The treatment of Indians in South Africa was first placed on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly in 1946 at the request of the Indian government. The second issue, racial conflict in South Africa, which was really nothing more than the extension of the first, was raised for the first time at the seventh session of the Assembly on the grounds that racial conflict in South Africa was creating "a dangerous and explosive situation which constituted both a threat to international peace and a flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are enshrined in the Charter of the U.N." On both these issues the

Canadian position remained essentially the same until 1960. In the first place, Canada did not question the right of the Assembly "to discuss and make recommendations for the peaceful adjustment of any situation", but she did feel that "a distinction must necessarily be drawn between the right of the Assembly to discuss any matters within the scope of the Charter and its competence to intervene."³⁰ Since there was a wide divergence of views as to the competence of the Assembly in this matter, and in the absence of an authoritative legal opinion, the United Nations (Canadians felt) should not proceed beyond discussion and the expression of concern. Canada therefore abstained on those resolutions that singled out South Africa for criticism, set up bodies to investigate the situation or called upon Pretoria to amend its policies. The United Nations should, the Canadian delegate to the Ad Hoc Committee argued, "attempt the possible, rather than the impractical."³¹

At the same time the government could not totally disregard Canadian and world opinion. When confronted with racial policies which ran so entirely counter to the purposes of the U.N. Charter, Canada could remain silent only at the risk of losing domestic and international support for its other objectives. Thus Canada felt compelled to support those resolutions which called upon all member states to bring their policies into conformity with their obligations under the Charter.³² When this was found to be impossible, the government resorted to abstention—what one Canadian diplomat referred to as a "responsible silence or even more a respectable kind of studied restraint"—and in doing so, aimed "to convey a sense of reproof, or at least withhold the degree of sympathy for South African problems which they believe might be expected from a fellow-member of the Commonwealth."

The third and final issue involving South Africa at the United Nations was that of Namibia. The former German colony of South West Africa was designated a Mandate Territory under the League of Nations at the end of the First World War and placed under the "tutelage" of South Africa. When in 1945 the South African government proposed that Namibia

be incorporated into South Africa (a possible interpretation of the 1919 compromise) the United Nations, with Canada's support, strongly resisted such a step. Instead it recommended that the territory should be made a trust under the terms of the U.N. Charter. While Canada thought this would be the most desirable course of action, it did not feel South Africa was in any way legally obliged to comply—a position which found later support in the first Advisory Opinion of the International Court on Namibia. The court did, however, argue that South Africa had continuing responsibilities under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the mandate; and that the supervisory powers of the League had been transferred to the United Nations.

Neither Canada nor the U.N. could disregard an Advisory Opinion, for its was "an authoritative statement of law." Since South Africa consistently denied that the U.N. had any authority with respect to Namibia, the Canadian delegation found it difficult not to oppose her Commonwealth partner. She did, however, attempt to moderate extreme proposals and intemperate language. A peaceful solution to the problem was possible only if South Africa were prepared to respond to moral suasion. The U.N. must be careful, a Canadian delegate argued, "not to adopt too inflexible a position which would prevent progress towards a solution however far from ideal that solution might be . . ." ³³ By 1960, it had become obvious that the failure to reach agreement was not due to the immoderation of the anti-colonial majority but to the intransigence of South Africa, which had introduced into Namibia during this same period its own despised system of apartheid.

South Africa's domestic policies also seriously affected relations within the Commonwealth. In fact, it was events in that association that in turn influenced Canadian policies at the United Nations after 1960. In March 1960, at Sharpeville, South African police opened fire on a crowd of peaceful demonstrators, killing seventy to eighty people. While the Diefenbaker government was still not prepared to make a diplomatic protest, it was obliged to agree to a special parliamentary debate on the question (April 27). Both Mr. Pearson

(for the Liberals) and Mr. Harold Winch (for the CCF) expressed their horror at recent events in South Africa and their belief that the continuation of apartheid would jeopardize the future of the Commonwealth. Mr. Diefenbaker took note of these views but rejected as impractical any idea of "throwing South Africa out of the Commonwealth," or of an economic boycott. Informal discussions at the forthcoming Prime Ministers Conference, he felt, would be the best way of conveying Canada's views.

On May 16, 1960, Prime Minister Diefenbaker reported on that conference to the House of Commons. He pointed out that he had held two lengthy and private conversations with Eric Louw, South Africa's Foreign Minister, and had left him in no doubt as to Canada's views on apartheid. Referring to the communique, which among other things emphasized the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth, the Prime Minister noted that when South Africa became a republic it would require the assent of other members of the Commonwealth. "Unless significant changes occur in the Union Government's racial policies," Mr. Diefenbaker wrote Harold Macmillan in the fall of 1960, "Canada cannot be counted on to support South Africa's re-admission to the Commonwealth."³⁴

Despite Mr. Diefenbaker's record as a champion of human rights, and his outspoken criticism of South Africa, he was not anxious to assume responsibility for South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth. If at all possible he would prefer that at the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference (March 1961) an effort be made to avoid abrupt action, to defer for the moment any decision on South Africa's membership as a republic in the Commonwealth, and simply put South Africa on notice again that its future in that association was in jeopardy. This hope was also shared by senior members of the Department of External Affairs, who wanted to find some way (a nine-power statement to which all but South Africa could agree, for example) to keep South Africa in the group. They were particularly concerned with the unfortunate precedent that the expulsion of South Africa might set for the future.

On Wednesday, March 15, 1961, after three days of discussions, Prime Minister Verwoerd informed the other prime ministers "that in the light of the views expressed on behalf of other member Governments and the indications of their future intentions regarding the racial policies of the Union Government, he had decided to withdraw his application for South Africa's continuing membership of the Commonwealth as a republic." In fact, Dr. Verwoerd must himself accept a good part of the responsibility for the failure to reach a mutually acceptable solution. If he had been more reasonable, more conciliatory in his attitude towards the newer, non-white members of the Commonwealth, a compromise papering over the obvious differences among the membership might still have been attainable. In the end, however, Canada and the other members of the Commonwealth were obliged to recognize, if somewhat reluctantly, that if South Africa had remained, the Commonwealth would necessarily have broken up.

Although Prime Minister Diefenbaker had not gone to the conference with the express intention of forcing South Africa's withdrawal, once a compromise proved impossible he did play an important role in bridging the widening gap between the old white dominions and the new non-white members of the Commonwealth. In his own words,

I took the position that if we were to accept South Africa's request unconditionally our action would be taken as approval or at least condonation of racial policies which were repugnant to and unequivocally abhorred and condemned by Canadians as a whole. Speaking for Canada . . . I pointed out that we were opposed to racial discrimination, and made it clear that I could not approve any formula or solution which did not maintain beyond any doubt that non-discrimination in respect of race and colour is an essential principle of the Commonwealth association.³⁵

Whoever was responsible for the final outcome, and whether or not it was inevitable, are less important than the outcome itself. In the end, a general consensus emerged that racial discrimination was inconsistent with membership in the Commonwealth. Once publicly committed to the principle of racial equality within as well as between nation-states,

the government of Canada could hardly fail to apply this principle with equal force in its approach to the South African questions at the United Nations, to the problem of Southern Rhodesia and to the issue of Portuguese colonialism. Now that South Africa was no longer a member of the Commonwealth, Canada's earlier hesitations about intervening in the domestic affairs of a fellow member did not weigh as heavily in her calculations. And given the increased importance of African and Asian states in the United Nations, it was in Canada's best interest to adopt a more critical stand at the U.N. on the issues involving South Africa.

Since then Canada has not hesitated to speak out openly and critically about South Africa's policy of apartheid. As in the past, she has been prepared to take into account the difficulties involved in introducing reforms into South Africa, but she has demanded some evidence that Pretoria was working towards the gradual improvement of the situation. Instead, what Canada has found is a government committed to the consolidation and promotion of discrimination.

However, Canada and most Western countries continue to disagree with the Afro-Asian majority on the means most likely to change this situation. In particular, the former have opposed the use of force or coercion against South Africa unless it can be shown that a threat to the peace exists. In speaking before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly in 1963, Prime Minister Pearson argued: "The Charter does not require or even authorize sanctions, such as expulsion, to be applied merely because one Member of the U.N. follows policies, such as apartheid, considered abhorrent and degrading by others."³⁶ The application of sanctions would not only be unconstitutional (unless a previous determination were made by the Security Council); it has also been argued that they would be counterproductive, ineffective and detrimental to Canadian (and Western) interests.

In considering the question of sanctions most governments feel that some effort must be made to estimate the practical effects of such an action. To exclude South Africa from the United Nations might well isolate that country from public exposure and external contacts. Speaking on the question of

South Africa's expulsion, Paul Martin argued that its policies of apartheid were "more likely to be modified if they [were] kept under close scrutiny by the United Nations"³⁷ Opposition to trade and financial restrictions has also been justified on similar grounds. Trade with South Africa in peaceful goods, and unlimited investment in that country will, it is hoped, highlight the contradictions of apartheid and thus eventually undermine it. The historical record, however, offers an opposite conclusion: "it suggests that [foreign] investment is content to coexist with a pattern of repression which has intensified during the very years that this investment has increased most rapidly."³⁸

The government is on much stronger grounds when it argues against the use of sanctions because they are unlikely to be effective. Earlier, and even present-day, experience in collective sanctions illustrates the incredible problems involved in mounting a comprehensive or even a limited ban on commercial and financial activities. To be effective any such ban must be applied by all member states. As long as the major industrial countries which have substantial dealings with South Africa do not accept the need to apply sanctions against South Africa, Canadian efforts to that end would, the government has contended, serve little purpose other than to convince Canadians of the righteousness of their stand. And yet, despite the obvious holes in the arms embargo, Canada has continued to support the 1963 Security Council call for a ban on the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. And on November 2, 1970, the Trudeau government announced plans to stop selling military spare parts to South Africa, a step which apparently cost Canada a major contract. The French and Germans profit at the expense of potential Canadian exporters. Obviously, in this case, ineffectiveness alone does not justify our inaction.

Perhaps the most obvious reason why Westerners (including Canadians) oppose the use of sanctions is that such a step would be costly. In a moment of complete candour, Prime Minister Diefenbaker noted that if sanctions were applied to South Africa, they "would have the effect of denying to Canadians business to the extent of perhaps \$40 or \$50 million a

year."³⁹ The present Liberal government made it equally clear that it was unwilling to intensify its "support of the principle of freedom" because of the interests of many "businessmen who see better-than-normal opportunities for trade and investment in the growing economy of the Republic of South Africa."⁴⁰ Few governments are prepared to antagonize important domestic interests in order to obtain limited foreign policy objectives. Thus, despite the inconsistency involved, the Canadian government publicly condemns Pretoria, while at the same time it encourages potential investors in South Africa, actively promotes trade between Canada and South Africa, and extends to South African goods preferential access to Canadian markets in return for similar treatment by the South African authorities.

During this same period Canada's position towards Namibia has shifted as well. By the end of 1961 Canada had accepted self-government and independence as the ultimate objective, rather than continued international accountability. Previous reservations on the grounds of practicality were set aside: for example, the government endorsed a general Assembly request that the Special Committee on South West Africa undertake the tasks entrusted to it by an earlier resolution "as fully and expeditiously as possible," with or without the cooperation of South Africa. Similarly, in 1962, Canada supported a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to establish an effective U.N. presence in Namibia.

Canada had changed her position, it was agreed at the Fourth Committee on March 23, 1961, "in the belief that under the mandate system the supervision of the League of Nations was intended to be effective and genuine, not a purely theoretical or formal kind of supervision." Sensing the mood of the times, Canada was anxious to move along with it, to oppose South Africa's policies of apartheid as applied to Namibia, to help to improve the lot of the people in that territory, and ultimately to assist them to achieve their independence.

To attain these objectives, the General Assembly had sought support from the International Court. When the court dismissed the South West African cases in the summer of

1966, a new stage was begun: On October 27, 1966, the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly passed Resolution 2145 by which the Assembly declared South Africa's failure "to fulfill its obligation" and decided to terminate the mandate and to establish an Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa to recommend to the General Assembly "practical means by which South West Africa should be administered" until independence. The Canadian government gave its full support to this resolution because it believed that South Africa had, by her actions, forfeited the moral and legal right to continue her mandate. Canada even agreed to become a member of the Ad Hoc Committee.

When that committee made its report to the Assembly, three separate proposals were put forward: One (advocated by Canada, the United States and Italy) recommended further study of the question; the second (endorsed by the Latin Americans) proposed a number of steps to bring about independence but made no reference to the Security Council; and finally, the Afro-Asian proposal, eventually adopted, recommended the creation of a Council for Namibia to administer the territory until independence, and requested the Security Council "to take all appropriate measures to enable the U.N. Council . . . to discharge [its] functions and responsibilities . . ." Canada abstained on that resolution, since the Council had little hope of carrying out the task entrusted to it and because the situation did not constitute a threat to international peace and security under the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter.

Even when the Security Council took up the matter, called on South Africa to withdraw from the territory and threatened to take further action in the event that South Africa failed to comply, the Canadian government made it clear that this in no way committed it to enforcement action. In the words of the Canadian delegate to the Fourth Committee, "The U.N. was founded to promote peace in the world, and this should be its task with regard to Southern Africa. It should promote change but not violence."⁴¹ The government did, however, feel obliged to give effect to the International Court's latest Advisory Opinion (June 21, 1971), according to which it is the duty of all member states of the United Nations

"to recognize the illegality and invalidity of South Africa's continued presence" in Namibia and "to refrain from lending any support or any form of assistance to South Africa with reference to its occupation of Namibia."⁴² In the past Canadian trade representatives in South Africa had actively promoted trade and investment in Namibia. Since the Advisory Opinion, the government has distinguished between commercial and financial dealings with South Africa (which are legitimate and acceptable) and those with Namibia (which are now discouraged). Although the government has made no public declaration of its new attitude towards Namibia, it has quietly made known its unwillingness to assist or provide advice to companies that may wish to trade with or invest in Namibia. If they choose to go ahead anyway, they do so at their own risk: the Export Development Corporation will extend no credit to exporters to this area or insurance to potential investors against the risks of war, revolution or military uprisings. Official discouragement has, however, deterred neither Falconbridge nor Noranda Mines from investing in the mining industry in Namibia.

Summary

At the United Nations, Canadian policy towards colonialism has thus undergone since 1945 an important transformation. Initially aloof, legalistic in their approach, and sympathetic to the colonial powers, Canadians have since 1960 endorsed an active and interventionist role for the General Assembly in speeding up the process of decolonization. This shift was made possible, indeed necessary, by the altered political realities of the United Nations. In the face of a vocal anti-colonial majority, and the obvious intransigence of the remaining colonial powers, Canada could no longer afford to rely on appeals for moderation and on the constitutional defences of the U.N. Charter. It was not a question of Canada taking the lead at the United Nations, or responding particularly to the needs and aspirations of the African peoples. Rather, Canada recognized that if she did not wish to find herself placed in the ranks of the colonial minority, she had to reverse her earlier policy of "disinterest" and "neutrality."

Having retreated from a restrictive interpretation of the rel-

evant U.N. Charter provisions, there still remained for Canada the difficult question of deciding on what occasions and to what extent the United Nations should intervene in colonial and racial matters. Towards this end Ottawa evolved a set of guidelines to serve as the basis for Canada's future attitudes and policies towards such questions. These have involved: (1) outright condemnation of colonial rule and racial discrimination; (2) unrestricted trade in peaceful goods and unlimited investment; (3) opposition to "violent solutions," and (4) as a corollary to the preceding principle, resistance to the use of sanctions, except where there exists an unmistakable threat to international peace and security. In recent years, however, it has become all too apparent that these principles are often inconsistent with each other, if not actually mutually contradictory. As was evidenced by the public debate over humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements, the next few years will be spent in resolving these contradictions.

INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER

Canadian involvement in and knowledge of African affairs were extremely limited throughout the first decade after the war. As long as Africa was shielded from outside influences by the protective curtain of colonialism, Canada was neither able nor required to establish close and direct relations with that continent. When a question concerning Africa did impinge on officialdom in Ottawa, it was usually within the context of the United Nations and involved deciding how to vote on such matters as the disposal of the Italian colonies or the unification of the Ewe people. Since Canada had no direct interest in these matters, decisions could usually be made with reference only to general principles and to practical considerations. What detailed information was needed could easily be attained from the Canadian High Commissioner in Pretoria, from Canadian posts in London, Paris, Brussels and Lisbon, and from U.N. documentation.

By 1955, however, the Canadian government had come to realize that it could no longer remain totally detached from African affairs. At the United Nations, Canada had assumed a more active role in the Fourth Committee, which was

spending more of its time on African issues. Earlier expectations that African colonies might achieve self-government and independence in forty to fifty years' time had now to be revamped. The British had already announced their intention to grant independence to the Gold Coast by the end of 1956, to Nigeria by 1958 or shortly after, and to the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in the early 1960s. And Great Britain's accelerated policy of decolonization had, in turn, inspired nationalist movements in neighbouring French, Belgian and Portuguese colonies.

The prospect of a precipitous European withdrawal from Africa obviously concerned officials in Ottawa. They feared that the Soviet Union might take advantage of the resulting power vacuum. Predisposed to join the ranks of the anti-colonial powers, the new states of Africa were bound, it was feared, to be susceptible to communist propaganda and infiltration. Unless countries like Canada, which had neither colonial possessions nor colonial aspirations, showed confidence in these new countries, adopted imaginative programs of economic assistance, and thus actively promoted the model of a capitalist and liberal democracy, the West could not hope to contain communism in Africa.

It was against this background that the Department of External Affairs gave serious consideration to the establishment of diplomatic relations with African countries. Until then Canada was represented diplomatically only in Pretoria (1946) and Cairo (1954). There were also trade posts in Leopoldville (1946) and in Salisbury (1955). The first question that arose was the relative importance of Africa. Since Canada's material and manpower resources were not unlimited, the government had to decide whether to open additional posts in Asian and the Middle East rather than new ones in Africa. On one hand, it was felt by some members of the department that Africa was less exposed to communist pressure than Asia and, except for North Africa, should therefore be low on Canada's list of priorities. On the other hand, the British were extremely anxious that Canada help to fill in the gap left by their departure. By establishing relations with Africa (particularly British West Africa), Ottawa could

indicate to Africans her confidence in their ability to rule themselves; emphasize the importance Canada attached to the Commonwealth; and illustrate to Africans that Canadians were relatively free from race prejudice. In addition, formal relations with Africa would provide Canada with listening posts on a continent of growing importance, as well as opportunities to expand trade with an area of vast resources and large markets.

Since 1957, Canada, either directly or through dual and multiple accreditation, has extended diplomatic relations to the whole of Anglophone Africa as well as to Ethiopia, Somali and Liberia. While the reasons for opening each post varied in accordance with individual circumstances, the general political considerations mentioned above seemed to have been the overriding ones. Thus, in Ghana, where the first diplomatic establishment in black Africa was opened by Canada in the fall of 1957, our direct interests were at the time unimportant. Trade with Ghana was slight and, though there was some room for expansion, this alone did not seem to justify the early establishment of a diplomatic mission. Similarly, since there were few Canadians in Ghana, the need for consular services was not pressing. Neither were there any aid projects in process, nor the immediate prospect of any—though the Volta River scheme promised to establish an important Canadian stake in Ghana in the future. It seems apparent that this decision was therefore made largely on political grounds: the Canadian government, urged on by the British, were anxious to ensure that the Soviet Union did not supplant British influence in the area. They were also aware of the symbolic importance of Ghana as the first black African state to emerge from colonial rule. Prompt action would, it was felt, signal Canada's interest in and sympathy for the new state of Ghana, and underline the reality and utility of the Commonwealth.

In April 1960, Mr. Thomas Carter was appointed Commissioner to represent Canada in Lagos, Nigeria. At independence this post was raised to the rank of High Commissioner in keeping with Canada's policy of giving precedence to establishing relations with Commonwealth countries. It was

also consistent with the importance of Nigeria as a new state in Africa. As the most populous, and one of the largest, countries on the continent, Nigeria was destined to play an important role in Africa, in the Commonwealth and among the underdeveloped countries. Of lesser importance in Canada's calculation were the presence of Canadian missionaries and the promise of a large market for Canadian goods.

Two years later a High Commission was set up in Dar-es-Salaam. Since Canada had no representatives in East Africa, it was perhaps obvious that as the first British colony to achieve independence in that region, Tanzania (or Tanganyika as it was known then) would be selected.⁴³ From there Canada could observe events within that region of Africa, in particular the creation of a future East African Federation. Ottawa was also impressed by Julius Nyerere as a man of principle and reason, committed to the development and maintenance of democratic institutions within the Commonwealth. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Tanzania thus symbolized our recognition of its independence and our support for its future.

Though Canada did not establish an embassy in Addis Ababa until 1966, the matter had been under consideration for some time. Since 1945 there had been a substantial Canadian community (mainly teachers) in Ethiopia. Technicians and experts from Canada also served with U.N. agencies in Addis Ababa. But these Canadians never created a burden for the British, who carried on whatever consular work was required. In fact, the Canadians in Ethiopia felt that their individual interests were best served by not having a diplomatic representative in Addis, for otherwise their motives for being there might have been brought into question. And what little trade existed was apparently handled quite adequately by Canada's commercial secretary in Cairo, who was accredited to Ethiopia as Trade Commissioner. Since Canadian trade with and aid to Ethiopia in 1966 were still very small, the decision to set up a diplomatic post there (accredited to Somalia from 1968 until 1974, when accreditation was shifted to Dar-es-Salaam) can only be explained in general political terms. It reflected our recognition of Addis Ababa as

an important centre of African affairs (the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity and the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa) and Emperor Haile Selassie as a respected and influential leader in African politics.

In contrast with the earlier posts, the ones opened in Nairobi (1967) and in Lusaka, Zambia (1972) were set up in part to administer existing aid programs. It was certainly expected that aid would be accorded to Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Ethiopia in due course, but at the time diplomatic relations were established the extent of our assistance to these countries was limited to small-scale technical assistance programs. In Kenya and Zambia, however, aid programs were well under way. For the fiscal year 1966-67 alone the Economic Aid Office had allocated over \$2 million for Kenya. In Zambia, several significant projects had been launched before 1972, and in October 1971, a CIDA office was set up in Lusaka. In addition to this consideration, the decision to open a High Commission in Zambia, which was made as early as 1966, reflected the government's policy "to demonstrate its continuing support of the cause of freedom and equality in southern Africa."⁴⁴

An expansion of the number of diplomatic missions (permanent and non-permanent) throughout sub-Saharan Africa reflects the importance Canada attaches to Afro-Canadian relations.⁴⁵ The ability of these missions in turn to promote warm and extensive relations and to provide the information required at home to decide on matters of policy depends on the number, quality and experience of the Canadian personnel both in Africa and at headquarters. In contrast to 1960, when the department had nine officers in three sub-Saharan posts, there are now fifty-two foreign service officers in fourteen missions; twenty-six of them are distributed among the seven missions dealt with in this chapter. In addition, there are seven CIDA personnel, nine trade representatives (five in South Africa), and three immigration officers (all in Nairobi). In Ottawa, African affairs are now dealt with by the Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs. The African section is divided into two different divisions: Africa I which includes Anglophone Africa, Portugal's former colonies, Ethiopia,

Somalia and Mauritius; and Africa II which encompasses all the former French, Belgian and Spanish territories in Africa. Each of these divisions has five officers.

As relations with Africa are so recent, it is not surprising that relatively few officers have served more than one tour in Africa. Thus in Africa I at present, three officers have spent from two to three years in one African country, while the other two have had no direct experience at all. The consequences of such a situation are, as one author has recently argued, "serious," for "the Department lacks sufficient staff with adequate knowledge of [the] region to digest information received in Ottawa from abroad."⁴⁶ Nor can the department always post officers abroad, or to the United Nations, with previous experience in African affairs. It might be expected that this situation would improve over time, once the department had time to take an active line in meeting this need for regional and functional specialization. The evidence to date is mixed. On one hand, it would seem that the department continues to emphasize personnel recruitment and training of a broad and generalist character. On the other hand, with increasing emphasis on the integration of Canada's foreign relations, an effort has been made through the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations to select as ambassadors senior men from other departments whose skills or training suit the particular interests Canada may wish to promote in a given country. Until now the only instance of such a cross-appointment in Anglophone Africa is the former High Commissioner in Ghana, Mr. Noble Power, who had previously served with CIDA. It is too early to determine whether this appointment is just a token gesture or a trend to be followed more frequently in the future.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Both Canada and Africa are extremely dependent for their prosperity and development upon foreign trade and foreign capital (though Canada exports some capital as well). It was perhaps in this context that various Canadians have alluded to the direct relevance of Canada's own experience in development and thus to our deeper understanding of the prob-

lems that now confront Africa and Asia. Whether Canada has displayed this sympathy for the problems of the underdeveloped countries cannot be easily determined from a survey of Canada's relations with a limited number of African states. The broader questions of Canadian policies towards trade, investment and development are dealt with elsewhere in this book. This chapter can at best outline the nature and quality of Canada's economic ties with one part of Africa.

Through commercial agents in Africa,⁴⁷ commercial agreements,⁴⁸ and participation in trade fairs Canada has sought an outlet for her industrial products as well as her mineral, agricultural and forestry resources. In return, she has purchased from Africa those goods that she is unable to grow or produce. Initially, trade with Africa was very small; in 1960 it amounted to little more than \$100 million (both exports and imports), and of this almost three-quarters was with South Africa. Since then trade has grown substantially; by 1974 total trade with Africa exceeded \$800 million. South Africa's share of this had fallen to 25 per cent, while Nigeria's had increased to 10 per cent. Although there has been a substantial increase in absolute terms in Afro-Canadian trade, in relative terms it has remained fairly constant—slightly more than 1 per cent of Canada's total world trade. In relation to other regions of the third world, Africa has fared quite well; only in the case of Asia has the rate of increase been more rapid.

There do exist, however, some restraints on both the import and export sides. With respect to the former, the marked increase (see Table 3:1) can largely be accounted for by oil imports from Nigeria and Angola, sugar from Mauritius, and a mixed package of goods from South Africa. Together these four territories provided over 80 per cent of Canada's imports from all Africa in 1974. Other African states have had less success in selling their products to Canada. This is largely due to the fact that Canada's needs for the goods they primarily export (such as cocoa, coffee, palm oil, cotton and tea) are already met from well-established markets in the United States, the West Indies and Latin America. On the other hand, the poor states of Africa offer Canada an extremely small market for the sale of her goods. In fact, Cana-

dian exports to Africa have not risen as quickly as our exports to other regions of the third world. Not only are the markets quite small; Canadian companies have also had a difficult time in making inroads into them, since prior to independence they were often monopolized by firms from the metropole.

Only South Africa and Nigeria constitute at present an important market for Canadian goods. Since 1970, however, Canadian exports to South Africa have fallen off drastically. In 1972, for the first time, Canada's imports from there exceeded her exports to that country. The rapid decline in Canadian exports can partly be explained by the fact that South Africa can produce and therefore no longer needs to import aluminum pig ingots. It is also the result of a political decision on South Africa's part to direct her trade more towards countries that have been less critical of her domestic policies. In the last two years Canadian exporters have managed to regain some of their losses. With her large population, Nigeria also offers an important market for Canadian goods. Between 1970 and 1974 Canadian exports to that country have more than doubled. This phenomenal increase, however, can be accounted for almost entirely by the purchase of locomotives which was made possible by a \$20 million loan to Nigeria in 1971. In the future Nigeria will undoubtedly require spare parts to service this equipment, but Canadian exports may well decline to roughly the \$10 million level they had reached in 1971 if additional outlets are not found.

The importance of Canada's aid program as a short-term support for, and even a long-term stimulus to Canadian trade cannot be overlooked. Contrary to the White Paper's assertion that commercial considerations are largely unrelated to our aid policies, Canada's trade both affects and is very much affected by the Canadian development assistance program. From year to year, upward shifts in Canada's exports to individual countries can often be explained in terms of recently negotiated aid agreements. Following Mitchell Sharp's visit to Africa in March 1971, Canadian exports to Nigeria, East Africa and Zambia experienced a remarkable improvement. In each instance, the expansion was directly attributable to

Table 3:1 — Trade With Africa I

	Exports (\$'000)				Imports (\$'000)			
	1960	1970	1972	1974	1960	1970	1972	1974
Ethiopia	220	397	273	2,897	43	44	139	368
Somalia	2	22	265	368	—	—	1	2
Gambia	(a)	156	96	161	(a)	453	299	—
Ghana	3,879	6,076	8,739	20,548	3,127	6,996	11,956	7,426
Kenya	936	1,455	4,867	5,492	2,561	5,672	5,440	11,745
Malawi	(b)	380	356	599	(b)	433	942	514
Mauritius	77	378	261	1,563	2,100	14,831	18,129	76,704
Nigeria	2,305	8,160	20,920	23,314	4,358	44,558	60,778	53,754
South Africa	52,655	104,005	43,795	90,446	11,482	45,702	58,942	116,797
Rhodesia	4,088	15	17	—	981	1	5	7
Sierra Leone	641	912	274	633	5	.7	3,214	3,255
Tanzania	143	633	8,327	11,913	1,834	4,034	4,144	9,112
Uganda	86	1,121	789	695	1,277	7,832	4,478	3,549
Zambia	(b)	4,967	1,764	23,518	(b)	14	29	18
Commonwealth n.e.s.	200	313	8,578	680	5	3,623	5,852	15,330
Angola	67	628	742	2,041	209	9,634	45,145	94,483
Mozambique	3,145	2,299	1,178	2,750	1	1,254	3,831	4,404
Portuguese Africa n.e.s.	279	368	342	741	—	.4	—	95

(a) Prior to January 1, 1963, trade figures for Gambia were included under "British Africa, n.e.s." or "Commonwealth, n.e.s." n.e.s. stands for "not elsewhere specified."

(b) In 1960 trade figures for Rhodesia, Malawi and Zambia were included under "Rhodesia and Nyasaland." The total figure was placed under Rhodesia since most of Canadian trade then was with that territory.

SOURCE: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Trade of Canada*, Vol. 1, 1960-64 (Ottawa, 1969), pp. 42-51.
Statistics Canada, *Trade of Canada*, "Exports by Countries," (Ottawa, 1972, 1973, 1974)

the loans and grants that Mr. Sharp announced during his trip. Similarly, the \$30 million loan to Botswana to finance the construction of a thermal power plant and transmission lines has resulted in an increase in our sale of turbines, generators and transformers to Botswana in 1972 (listed in Table 3:1 as part of "Commonwealth, n.e.s."). As long as the government requires that two-thirds of its bilateral assistance must be tied to the purchase of Canadian goods, some Canadian industries will inevitably profit from the aid program. While such a policy may be welcomed by these industries, it does, however, reduce the value of our aid.⁴⁹

A final aspect of Canada's trade with Africa is the nature of the goods exchanged. Except from South Africa, Canada tends to import raw materials (such as wood, metals and wool) and agricultural products (such as cocoa, tobacco, sugar and tea), while her exports consist mostly of manufactured or processed goods (such as agricultural machinery, industrial equipment, ships, paper and planes). For some observers, such a pattern of exchange is by definition exploitative, the logical outcome of an aggressive capitalist economy. For others it is mutually beneficial, and represents a natural consequence of the law of comparative advantage. This controversy in fact ranges from a statistical debate on the historical trends in the terms of trade, to an ideological polemic on the merits of two opposing economic systems. Without joining this debate, some consideration should be given to an aspect of this question which has a direct bearing on Canada's relations with Africa: the fluctuation of world export prices from developing countries.

The economies of most African countries are dependent upon raw materials and foodstuffs, the prices of which are notoriously unstable. Since this instability can seriously disrupt their development programs, an effort has been made to stabilize export prices. Canada's position on this question has been ambivalent. On one hand, she tends to feel that free trade is the best way to benefit both consumer and producer. And yet, she has entered into several international schemes designed to stabilize export prices (the International Coffee Agreement, for example) and in 1973 took an active part in

the negotiations leading up to the international agreement on cocoa—an agreement which will affect much of her trade with Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

Canada's ambivalence towards international commodity schemes is perhaps best illustrated by the position she has adopted on sugar. Although Canada played a leading role in negotiating the International Sugar Agreement in 1968, and subsequently signed and ratified it, officials in Ottawa have tended to view it as a means of guaranteeing supplies for importing countries at a stable and reasonable price, rather than as an instrument for improving the terms of trade of less developed countries. In 1973, for example, when an effort was made by sugar-exporting countries to increase the ceiling price of sugar fixed by the agreement in order to compensate for losses incurred by devaluation of the dollar, Canada strenuously objected. Similarly, at the conference recently held in Geneva to renegotiate the agreement, Canada's position on the range of prices to be paid for sugar was unrealistically low; she failed to take into account the prices the less-developed countries would have to pay for semi-processed and manufactured goods and the importance of sugar exports for countries like Mauritius, Swaziland and Cuba. In short, Canadian negotiators tended to neglect the interests and needs of the poorer countries. If Canada is, as she claims, committed to the promotion of social justice in the world, then the government cannot allow the narrow interests of a few sugar refiners and industrial users to determine commercial policies which affect not only the broader Canadian public but the welfare of the less-developed countries as well. Nor can she continue to extend Commonwealth preference to sugar imports from South Africa, thus discriminating against such countries as Cuba in favour of a country whose policy of apartheid we have officially condemned.

Canada's economic relations with Africa also include the direct investment of Canadian firms in the productive processes of individual African countries. To obtain much more than a broad overview of these activities, however, is impossible. Except for South Africa, figures are not available for investment in individual countries. In the words of one

government publication, "Disclosure constraints of the Statistics Act preclude the quantification of Canadian direct investment" in developing countries other than Mexico, the Bahamas and Bermuda.⁵⁰

The total aggregate investment by Canadian firms controlled both in Canada and abroad increased from \$20 million in 1949 to \$118 million in 1969, the most substantial increase occurring since 1965. Despite this growth in absolute terms, Canadian investment in Africa amounted to only 2.3 per cent of Canada's total foreign investment in 1969 (as compared with 2.2 per cent in 1949). The most striking feature of this investment in Africa is its concentration in South Africa (see Table 3:2). At the end of 1969, Canadian direct investment in South Africa had reached \$70 million, or 59 per cent of her total direct investment in Africa. The balance was spread over ten other countries of which six were members of the Commonwealth.⁵¹

The largest investors in South Africa include the Aluminum Company of Canada, which now operates three plants in the republic as well as a rolling mill in Nigeria (Port Harcourt) and an affiliate in Ghana (Tema) to manufacture aluminum products; the Ford Motor Company of Canada, which has had an assembly plant at Port Elizabeth since 1923; Falconbridge Nickel Mines, which also has operations in Namibia and Rhodesia; Massey-Ferguson, which also owns or partially owns subsidiaries in Algeria, Malawi, Morocco and Rhodesia; and a number of smaller companies such as the International Nickel Company, Bata, Rio Tinto, Robert Morse Corporation, Consolidated-Bathurst, and Deleuw, Cather and Company of Canada. In addition, Manufacturers' Life and Sun Life Insurance companies operate in South Africa, though this does not involve the investment of Canadian funds. Outside of South Africa, most of Canada's investment is located in former British colonies and focused largely in mining. In addition to Alcan's operations in Ghana and Nigeria, Frobisher Limited is involved in mining and exploration activities in Zambia, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia. Finally, there are a number of Canadian firms active in Liberia, such as Canadian Industries, which operates an explosives

and chemical products plant at Harket, and the Liberian Iron Ore.

Table 3:2 — Canadian Direct Investment in Africa, 1965-69
(millions of dollars)

		1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
By Canadian enterprise controlled in Canada	South Africa	7	7	11	14	14
	Other	36	39	42	36	34
By Canadian enterprise controlled in all foreign countries	South Africa	25	29	36	44	56
	Other	4	4	3	12	14
Total Canadian enterprise controlled in all countries	South Africa	32	36	47	48	70
	Other	40	43	45	58	48

SOURCE: Statistics Canada, *Canada's International Investment Position, 1926 to 1967* (Ottawa, 1971), pp. 168-69.

Western (including Canadian) investment in South Africa has recently come under considerable attack. On general grounds it has been argued that such investment has not undermined but in fact shored up the white supremacist regime in Pretoria. The belief that foreign companies are acting as peaceful agents of change in South Africa cannot be sustained by the facts. Instead it would seem that such a claim is only a convenient smoke-screen for an extremely profitable operation.⁵² During the past year or so, these same firms have in fact been charged with taking advantage of a cheap and controlled labour market to maximize their profits. In Great Britain, Adam Raphael's articles in the *Guardian* revealed that most British firms paid their workers below the so-called poverty datum line. A similar attack was launched on Canadian firms by Hugh Nangle in a series of articles in the *Montreal Gazette* in June 1973. His investigations of six Canadian corporations with subsidiaries in South Africa showed that only one of them "pays all workers above the recognized wage necessary for an African family to avoid malnutrition."

In Britain, the public was alerted, and a parliamentary committee was set up to look into the conduct and activities of British firms. By contrast there was little or no reaction in

Canada. On two separate occasions, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, was questioned in the House of Commons on the government's position with respect to the activities of Canadian firms in South Africa. The government, Mr. Sharp responded, was concerned with conditions in South Africa and had in the past (1971) urged a number of Canadian firms operating there "to act as good corporate citizens in ways that will make the Canadian people proud of them."⁵³ But beyond that point the government could not go. Ottawa could not be expected either to encourage or to discourage investment in South Africa. Nor could she ask corporations to act in a manner that was contrary to South African law. In short, when opinion at home or abroad was stirred up by the conduct of Canadian corporations abroad, the government would do what it could to minimize the resulting bad publicity, but it was constrained from doing anything more by the ground rules of the economic system, which discourages, even prevents, intervention in corporate affairs.

Foreign investment in general has fallen into disfavour. For the developing countries in particular it is feared that foreign investment will erode their independence, distort the growth of their economy, and ultimately lead to a drain on their balance of payments. For most of these countries, the solution to this problem does not lie in nationalization but in minimizing the negative effects of foreign investment. To bargain effectively with the multinational corporations these countries require the very skills, expertise and knowledge they often lack. Given Canada's own fears about becoming a satellite of the United States, it might be expected that this country would take an active part in assisting the developing countries to achieve the best bargain with prospective investors. Instead, Canada seems to have done all she can to promote unlimited Canadian foreign investment, while paying little or no regard for the need to instruct and guide foreign investment.⁵⁴ Thus, for instance, the Export Development Corporation, which replaced the Export Credit Insurance Corporation in 1970, offers insurance to Canadian investors against the political risks of expropriation, inconvertibility,

and insurrection, revolution or war. Similarly, CIDA provides a program of pre-investment assistance to Canadian businesses "to encourage them to establish or expand operations in the Third World."⁵⁵ One can only hope that in the present discussions about foreign investment in both the OECD and the United Nations, Canadian representatives will show as much concern for establishing a set of international guidelines for Canadian and other foreign investors in developing countries.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ECONOMIC AID AND MILITARY SUPPORT

One of the primary reasons advanced for opening new diplomatic posts in Africa was the need for Canadians on-the-spot to evaluate and administer expected aid projects and programs. In fact, aid to and diplomatic representation in Africa were simultaneously given serious consideration for the first time in the fall of 1955. If Canada wished to be effective, it was argued, she could not confine her activities to diplomacy but would have to give more tangible evidence of her interest in the welfare of the African people. At this time, the principle issue at stake was not whether aid to Africa should be forthcoming but what form it should take: bilateral assistance, a program limited to Commonwealth donors and recipients, a broader Colombo-like plan, or an extension of Canadian support for the activities of the U.N. and its specialized agencies in Africa.

No decision on this matter was taken at that time. As long as the African territories remained colonial dependencies, there was little Canada could do other than extend aid to Africa through the United Nations. The question only emerged as a practical consideration with Ghana's independence in March 1957. It was from the Canadian delegation to Ghana's independence celebrations and, after September 1957, from the Canadian High Commissioner in Accra that the government received first-hand information on the needs and expectations of the first new black African state. Nkrumah appeared to be friendly towards the West and committed to cooperative relations within the Commonwealth. To overcome his pressing political and economic problems he

would require outside help and sympathy. In particular, the departure of British colonial administrators would leave serious gaps within Ghana's civil service and technical staff.

The new Conservative government decided, under these circumstances, to initiate an interim program of aid to Ghana and the West Indies—Commonwealth countries which were not covered under the Colombo Plan. In a statement to the House of Commons on January 30, 1958, Sidney Smith, the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, announced his intention to seek parliamentary approval for \$150,000 for technical assistance to these two territories. To provide the services of Canadian experts and to train Ghanaians in Canada would be, according to Mr. Smith, "the most effective way in which Canada could give an indication of its encouragement and support for this new state. . . ."⁵⁶ In 1959 this limited Canada-Ghana technical assistance program was expanded "to include all Commonwealth regions which have not until now benefitted from Canadian bilateral aid." In contrast with the previous year's allocation of \$135,000 an amount of \$500,000 was requested to finance this scheme, which was to be known as the Commonwealth Technical Assistance Programme.⁵⁷

In this way Canada took her first modest step in the development of an aid program for Africa. Two primary considerations seemed to have been behind this important decision. On one hand, the government realized that the newly emerging states of Africa were committed to the development of their economy and to the improvement of their standard of living. This would involve the investment of large sums of capital, something which these countries could not generate from their own limited resources. The West must therefore be prepared to step into the breach. "Otherwise," so Mr. Smith argued, "these underdeveloped countries . . . may be prone to accept blandishments and offers from other parts of the world."⁵⁸ Aid to Africa was thus conceived as a necessary way of keeping the communist bloc out of Africa—or, perhaps more realistically, of counterbalancing the effect of Soviet propaganda and Soviet aid.

Aid was also seen as an inevitable outgrowth of the Com-

monwealth relationship. Ghana and other African territories, as they became independent, were bound to expect tangible benefits from this association. If the Commonwealth was to be something more than a social club, the rich, developed members would have to accept certain responsibilities towards their poorer partners. Commonwealth ties thus not only determined the focus of Canadian aid in Africa (at least until the mid-1960s); to the extent that Canadian officials felt the association worth perpetuating, these ties directly prompted the granting of aid itself.

These remarks are not meant to imply that Canadians were unconcerned with the plight of the African people. Humanitarianism did and still does play a role in the government's thinking about aid, but more often as a form of justification after the fact than as an inspiration for its initiation. Other considerations, such as economic self-interest, became more important as the size and direction of Canada's aid shifted. As long as this aid took the form of technical assistance, there was little benefit that could result to individual Canadian companies. Once Canada began to participate in capital projects, the tying of its aid to the procurement of Canadian goods and services would directly assist her own firms in expanding their overseas markets.

Since 1958 the Canadian program of assistance to African countries has grown in size, changed in character and broadened in scope. From its single focus on Ghana, the Canadian aid program, which after 1960 was called the Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan (SCAAP), was extended to encompass all the Commonwealth countries in Africa as they became independent. The following table provides an indication of the scope and magnitude of Canadian disbursements to Commonwealth African countries between 1969 and 1974. Among these countries, however, Canada concentrated her aid, first in Ghana and Nigeria in West Africa and, in more recent years, on Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in East Africa. (The aid program in Uganda was suspended in January 1973 when conditions there made it impossible for Canadian advisers to carry on their assignments effectively and in safety. Two air traffic controllers did in fact stay on and

a number of scholarships were offered to Ugandans wishing to study in Canada.)

Table 3:3—Canadian Aid Disbursements to Africa (millions of dollars)

	1969	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74
Nigeria	4.63	6.63	12.13	12.61	11.98
Ghana	4.44	7.01	10.01	9.21	9.66
Tanzania	2.24	3.12	6.02	6.22	17.67
Kenya	1.99	2.07	2.53	2.25	6.19
Uganda	1.17	1.84	1.53	1.66	1.15
East African Community	.24	3.14	11.27	1.87	2.50
Zambia	—	—	—	2.10	2.35
Other countries	1.02	1.27	6.34	17.52	11.67

SOURCE: CIDA *Annual Review*, 1971-72 (Information Canada, 1972), p. 78, and CIDA, *Taking Stock, a Review of CIDA Activities 1970-74* (Ottawa, 1975), p. 42.

Other Commonwealth countries have been eligible to receive Canadian assistance. Thus Sierra Leone, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as non-Commonwealth countries such as Liberia and Ethiopia, have received modest amounts of technical assistance, while students from these countries have studied at Canadian universities. Canada has even supported important individual projects, such as the recent \$30 million loan to Botswana for the large hydroelectric and agricultural project at Shashe. In keeping with its policy of supporting regional institutions, CIDA has also provided considerable support to the East African Community in the development of commonly-held railway, civil aviation and telecommunications facilities; to the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; and to the African Development Bank.

As the scope of SCAAP has broadened, so too has its size. In 1958-59 Canada's assistance to Ghana (the sole recipient in Africa) was \$135,000. During the next eight years the total disbursements to Anglophone Africa amounted to slightly less than \$35 million. The corresponding figures for 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974 were \$25.08 million, \$49.83 million,

\$53.44 million and \$62.67 million, respectively. Despite this remarkable rate of growth, Canada's aid to the population of Commonwealth Africa on a per capita basis still falls behind the regional programs for Francophone Africa and the Commonwealth Caribbean, though well ahead of those for Asia and Latin America.

The character of Canada's aid to Africa has also changed. Initially, it was felt that Africa's basic needs lay in technical and educational rather than in capital assistance. (It was Prime Minister Diefenbaker who, at the Montreal Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference in September 1958, had suggested "a broad and reciprocal Commonwealth program of scholarship and teaching fellowships." From this suggestion resulted the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan, which began operations in 1960.) In explaining the decision to concentrate on training in technical assistance and education, Mr. H. O. Moran, then the new Director of the External Aid Office, noted that earlier experience in Asia had taught Canadians "that little purpose is served in giving capital projects to countries before they have people who are competent to operate and maintain them."⁵⁹ Thus in the first five to six years of its operations, SCAAP gave high priority to technical and educational assistance. In 1967, the peak year, there were 166 advisers and 339 teachers from Canada at work throughout Commonwealth Africa, and 661 Anglophone African students at Canadian universities. By 1973 the corresponding figures for each category had fallen to 109, 186, and 486 respectively.

Technical assistance remains important even today, but it no longer overshadows economic or capital aid. Often, in fact, the two are closely integrated into the same project. For example, Canada contributed over \$1 million towards the construction, equipping and staffing of the Technical Training Centre in Accra. Similarly, CIDA is today assisting Zambia with staff and advisers in setting up a system of trade, technical and technological schools throughout the country. At the same time, it has extended some capital to the Zambian government to help construct the Institute of Technology. Nonetheless, in the more developed countries, capital assistance plays an increasingly important role. In Nigeria, for in-

stance, Canada has been involved in the construction and equipping of a telephone exchange in Lagos and twenty-five satellite exchanges elsewhere in the country. She also extended a \$20 million loan to enable Nigeria to buy 54 diesel-electric locomotives. In Ghana, Canada has constructed a transmission line linking Dahomey and Togo to the Akosombo generator station, and is involved in an aerial topographical survey of the southeast region. In Tanzania a \$2 million development loan allowed that country to buy equipment and material for its electrical needs, while Canada has recently agreed to develop a new and purer water supply system for Dar-es-Salaam.

The requirements of African states were not restricted to technical and managerial skills, capital assistance, and easy access to foreign markets and foreign capital. Their primary goal of economic development could not be reached in conditions of disorder and anarchy. If they hoped to attain sustained economic growth, it would be essential for these countries to possess at least a modest but efficient military or paramilitary force to maintain order and stability.

Canadians were certainly not unaware of, or unsympathetic towards, this basic need. At various times in Canada's own history the armed forces of Canada have had to assist the civilian government in crushing a rebellion, stamping out subversive forces, and generally in providing a basic framework of order. Since 1960 events in Africa have confirmed (for government officials) the continuing validity of this simple truth, and helped to erode their early reluctance to become involved in the military affairs of other countries. The Congolese crisis had a particularly profound impact on Ottawa. It illustrated that economic and social progress could only be achieved on the basis of internal stability. But it also pinpointed another real danger: that "civil strife constitutes an open invitation to outside intervention, and carries with it the possibility of international conflict."⁶⁰

The question of military assistance to non-NATO countries had been an issue for several years but was not finally resolved until 1961. Until that time assistance was extended to various countries but only on an ad hoc basis, and many more requests were turned down than granted. By 1969 the

Department of External Affairs had become deeply concerned at Canada's repeated refusals to the requests by certain Commonwealth countries (particularly Ghana) for military aid. The stumbling block lay in the Department of National Defence, which argued that Canada did not have the necessary facilities and manpower to provide such assistance.

Finally, on June 1, 1961, the cabinet gave its authorization to the training of military personnel from Commonwealth countries, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence. The immediate occasion for this decision was the request from Ghana for Canadian assistance in training its armed forces. In fact, it would seem from available evidence that the real decision on this question was made by Prime Minister Diefenbaker when he met Kwame Nkrumah at the Commonwealth Conference in March 1961. The decision also set the stage for later agreements with other Commonwealth countries. Since it followed so closely after the mutiny of the Congolese armed forces, there is little doubt that this and subsequent events in the Congo influenced the thinking of cabinet members. But their support for military assistance to non-NATO countries was also occasioned by the fear of communist intrigue and infiltration. Since the United States was, for obvious reasons, unacceptable as a donor of aid in such a sensitive area as defence, it was left to the smaller nations of the West like Canada to fill in the vacuum left by the withdrawal of British officers and training facilities. Indeed, Canada was urged by the British and Americans to provide such assistance to both Ghana (1961) and Tanzania (1964).⁶¹ It could not have escaped Ottawa's attention either that in providing such assistance Canada would be demonstrating in yet another way the usefulness of being a member of the Commonwealth. Indeed, in the initial submission to cabinet, the proposal was for aid to all non-NATO countries. Cabinet decided to offer such aid only to Commonwealth countries. This policy would further serve Canada's self-interest through the support of her own arms industry; military aid programs have promoted the export of Canadian-designed transport aircraft, particularly, the De Havilland-built Caribou, Otter and Buffalo.⁶²

From this complex of motivations emerged Canada's program of military assistance to Commonwealth Africa. Its scope and importance are illustrated in Table 3:4. In most instances Canadian assistance was limited to the training of officer cadets and senior staff officers from Africa in Canadian military colleges. This has been the case with Kenya, Uganda and Zambia. In February 1962, Canada also agreed to train in Canadian defence establishments thirty-two Nigerian cadets from all three military services. Subsequently, two Canadian naval officers were sent to Lagos for training purposes. With Ghana, however, Ottawa signed a Technical Assistance Agreement on January 8, 1962, to provide up to thirty Canadian officers and men to assist in the training of a Ghanaian officer corps and of technicians for the armed forces. Since 1966 a few members of the Ghanaian army have come to Canada for advanced training. Although this program in Ghana was gradually scaled down until by 1971 only one Canadian officer remained in Ghana, there is now under active consideration a plan for Canada to assist the Ghanaians in building and staffing a military college.

Table 3:4

Country	Number of students trained in Canada ^a	Major equipment	Cost (\$)	Term
Ghana	18(2)		.78 million	1961-
Kenya	1(5)		2,800	1969-
Nigeria	69(2)		45,000	1962-70
Tanzania	370(10)	4 Caribou aircraft 8 Otter aircraft	17.6 million	1965-70
Uganda	(2)			1970-
Zambia	31(14)		30,000	1966-

a) The figures in brackets are rough estimates of the number of students trained in Canada since 1969, and are derived from the Department of National Defence publications, *Defence 1971* and *Defence 1972*. According to a communication to the author from the Department of External Affairs, the total expenditures for the military assistance training program in African countries in 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73 were \$336,000, \$335,000 and \$224,000, respectively. The estimated cost for this same program in 1973-74 was \$221,000.

SOURCE: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes and Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 23 (February 4, 1969), pp. 848-49.

By far the most ambitious program of military assistance was to Tanzania.⁶³ The immediate occasion for the Tanzanian request for such help was the mutiny of its armed forces in early 1964, though the question had been under discussion since 1962. Nothing concrete had emerged from these discussions, however, since in Canada the Department of Defence had resisted the expansion of its operations and in Tanzania the government was anxious to form a regional federation before developing its military forces. But in January 1964, after it was clear that federation would be delayed, the army mutinied. Humiliated by the necessity of calling in British forces to restore order, President Nyerere was anxious to rebuild a new army that would be both reliable and efficient. After Sweden turned him down, Canada was approached. In a statement to the House of Commons on September 22, 1964, Paul Martin announced that Canada had received such a request and that to consider carefully this question, the government had despatched a survey team to assess the situation and determine Tanzania's needs. The cabinet endorsed the survey team's findings, which recommended that Canada should contribute (both in Tanzania and in Canada) to the military training of Tanzania's armed forces and advise Dar-es-Salaam on the planning and organization of its defence organization. In addition, it was agreed that Ottawa would build, staff and pay at least the foreign exchange costs of a military academy.

The subsequent dispute between Tanzania and West Germany over the establishment of an East German consulate in Dar-es-Salaam resulted in the abrupt termination of an air training plan between these two countries. On being approached, Canada agreed further to cooperate with Tanzania in equipping and training an air transport wing for the army. Initially, much of the training would be done in Canada, but ultimately a team of fifty-five Canadians would go to Tanzania to take up the task of training four hundred Tanzanian air and ground crew. Including both programs, Canada's aid would involve some ninety persons in the field and cost roughly \$15 million over the first five-year period.

Both agreements were to last five years but could, if the two parties thought it desirable, be extended. But in the

spring of 1969 the Tanzanian government informed Ottawa that it wished to terminate the program. Canada clings today to the view that it was Tanzania which chose to end the agreement. By contrast, some Tanzanians have argued that this formal request was a way of letting Canada off the hook in a friendly fashion. The truth probably falls somewhere in between these two explanations. Both parties were equally glad to see the agreement come to an end. On one hand, Tanzania was upset with the unnecessary delay in building the military academy; disillusioned by the unwillingness of Canada to train and equip a Tanzanian tactical air force squadron; sensitive to the slightest encroachment on its newly won independence; and—given the increasing importance of the liberation war in Mozambique and Tanzania's involvement in it—suspicious of Canada as an ally of Portugal in NATO. On the other hand, Canada was generally disillusioned with all forms of "peacekeeping" activities after her forces had had to withdraw from the Sinai in 1967; concerned about the growing number of Chinese involved in training the Tanzanian military forces; uneasy about being attached to an army that might come into direct conflict with Portugal; and hopeful of finding a way to cut back on military expenditures. Despite the termination of these agreements, Canada has at the request of Tanzania, kept two of its military personnel in Dar-es-Salaam, while as many as ten Tanzanians have received training in Canada.

The new Trudeau cabinet had initially decided in the summer of 1969 to phase out all existing military aid programs by 1972-73, and not to begin any new ones. Under pressure from various sources the government reconsidered and in December 1970 (some two months after the Quebec crisis) approved a modest program, not to exceed \$500,000 each year, for training in Canada and advisory work abroad. It is under this framework that several Canadian officers have remained in Ghana and Tanzania and that numerous cadets and officers from African countries (Ghana, Gabon, Swaziland, Zaire, Uganda, Zambia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia and the Cameroons) have studied at Canadian military establishments.⁶⁴

Finally, some mention should be made of the role of volun-

tary agencies in contributing to the needs and goals of the African states. Religious organizations, universities⁶⁵ and a multiplicity of other agencies, ranging in size from CUSO to the Catholic Women's League of Canada, have raised in total over \$40 million for all the developing world and sent some five thousand Canadians to serve overseas. According to Mr. Angus Archer, Executive Director of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), about 44 per cent of these funds and people are directed towards Africa.⁶⁶ But the contribution of these agencies to development, and to Canada's relations with Africa and the rest of the developing world, cannot be measured simply in terms of money and personnel abroad. Many of these organizations have begun to realize that they should be concerned with public education at home as well as development abroad. An informed and committed Canadian public can compel the government to improve its policies towards aid, trade and development. Thus, as participants in development abroad and as pressure groups at home, the non-governmental agencies can and do affect Africa-Canadian relations and exert some influence on Canadian policy-making.

INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES AND POLICY-MAKING

Early Canadian detachment from African affairs has thus given way to active involvement. This shift in policy was made possible by the withdrawal of the colonial powers from Africa. That Canada seized the resulting opportunity to establish relations with the new states of Africa was by no means inevitable; it was the result of deliberate choice and reflected the importance that Ottawa obviously attached to Africa—if not for itself, at least in the context of broader political concerns.

A country's policies and actions usually reflect those interests that her government and people feel are worth preserving or promoting. At least initially, Canadian interests in Africa were indirect—an outgrowth of Ottawa's interest in a prosperous and peaceful community of nations. Neither the Canadians in Africa nor the prospect of African immigrants to Canada seemed to warrant a sizable and permanent presence

in that continent.⁶⁷ Nor was there much evidence that Africa could contribute significantly to the material well-being of Canadians. Except for South Africa, trade with the continent was slight and the prospects for its growth not much better. Even in 1975, Africa is no more important in relative terms as a market for Canadian goods or as a source of scarce materials than it was in 1960. Nor has Canadian capital found an important outlet in Africa. Relatively low rates of return (outside South Africa) combine with high risks to discourage investment.

Similarly, Canada's security interests were not directly affected by forces and events within Africa. In fact, the nation's interest in protecting its sovereignty and independence was later interpreted by the Trudeau government in such a way as to discourage Canadian involvement in African affairs. Canada's unwillingness to intervene in the Nigerian civil war was not unrelated to the potentially explosive divisions within her own territory. To interfere in what Lagos and most African states considered a domestic matter would not only damage Canada's image in Africa, but also weaken the force of those arguments advanced by Ottawa to dissuade African states from involving themselves in our own constitutional problems.

Even though Canada had few direct interests in Africa, she was nonetheless deeply concerned with what happened there. Events in that continent could, as the Congo crisis was to demonstrate, disrupt international peace. Canada's interest in maintaining peace among free nations (though sometimes at the cost of an unjust status quo) was reflected in her support of the United Nations and, in particular, the Commonwealth. Both these institutions constituted effective instruments by means of which the world community could prevent or control conflicts when they arose, and, it was even hoped, eliminate the fundamental economic, social and psychological causes of war. Above all, Canadian attitudes and policies towards Africa were influenced by our image of the Commonwealth as a device through which to promote the peaceful transition from colony to independence and to transcend global divisions along lines of ideology, race, language, geography and

wealth. We have already seen how the importance attached to the Commonwealth as a multi-racial association led to South Africa's withdrawal and fostered a more critical Canadian stand at the United Nations on issues involving race discrimination. Similarly, in 1970-71, the proposed British arms sale to South Africa under the terms of the Simonstown agreement threatened to divide the association along lines of colour. A compromise formula, to which Prime Minister Trudeau contributed in an important way, was worked out at Singapore. A study group was set up to consider "the factors affecting the security of maritime trade routes in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans"; and, at the same time, the conference accepted a new declaration of principles which obligated each member of the Commonwealth not to "afford to regimes which practise racial discrimination assistance, which *in its own judgment*, directly contributes to the pursuit or consolidation of this evil policy." In spite of Prime Minister Trudeau's contempt for Canada's previous attempts at "role-playing," he did play an important part in securing agreement for this precise wording of the declaration of principles. In particular, the addition of the italicized words, which left each country the judge of its own actions, made it possible for Great Britain and Australia to accept the statement.⁶⁸

The very existence of the Commonwealth had also been endangered by Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence for Rhodesia. For the Commonwealth to survive, its members were obliged, at the very least, to repudiate UDI and take all steps (short of the use of force) to achieve majority rule. Indeed, it was Canada's prime minister, the late Lester B. Pearson, who at the Lagos Conference in January 1966, helped to persuade the African and Asian members not to push for military intervention on the grounds that economic sanctions would end the rebellion "within a matter of weeks rather than months." Aside from applying sanctions, several of the richer members (including Canada) came to the support of Zambia, which had been adversely affected when Rhodesia cut off the supply of oil to that country. At the end of 1965, and for several months in 1966, Canada provided four Hercules aircraft to transport oil from Leopoldville to

Lusaka. Shortly after the Rhodesia-Zambian border was closed in 1973 to all traffic, Canada offered \$8 million to help Zambia improve existing and develop alternative transportation routes.

No country's foreign policy can be based solely on moral principles. Neither can it totally ignore the values on which its own society is based. Recognition of the role of moral principles in Canadian foreign policy was noted by Mr. St. Laurent, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, in his now famous address at the University of Toronto in 1947. This same theme was later echoed in the Gordon Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects and, although altruism was downgraded in the government's recent White Paper, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, it has largely been maintained in practice. Given the importance that Canadians attribute to the human individual, his rights and his welfare, it was to be hoped that Canadian foreign policy would reflect the same values. In fact, they have found expression in Canada's aid policies, in the emergency program developed to assist the drought-ridden countries bordering on the Sahara, and in the government's willingness to accept some six thousand Asian refugees from Uganda as landed immigrants. This latter decision was undertaken at a time when unemployment in Canada was extremely high and had become an issue of some importance in the 1972 election campaign. Against this consideration must be placed the fact that Canada took only the wealthy, well-educated refugees.

A country's goals and policies give form and expression to its underlying interests. It is therefore not surprising that Canada's principal objective in Africa has been the promotion of orderly and peaceful development. Such an aim served our interest in international peace; African development was also in conformity with Canadian moral values, and helped promote Canadian trade and investment. Through programs of technical, economic and military assistance successive Canadian governments have sought to provide African governments with the means by which they can meet the needs and expectations of their populations. It was thus hoped that Soviet and Chinese influence would be partially counteracted,

while gradual and well-balanced development would reduce the likelihood of disorder and violence. To the extent that these programs were directed toward Commonwealth countries, they served also to enhance the prestige and strength of that association.

When domestic order did collapse and civil strife erupted, Ottawa's principal concern lay in isolating the conflict from the cold war. If international approval could be secured, then Canada was prepared to endorse and materially support intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Thus, following the July 15, 1960, Security Council resolution, Canada agreed to assist the Secretary-General of the United Nations in providing the Congolese government with the technical and military means to enable it to resume control over its territory. In the following months Ottawa provided emergency food supplies and medical aid; loaned four RCAF North Star aircraft to help transport supplies and equipment for the U.N. force from Pisa to Leopoldville; and sent a detachment of signallers to fill the essential role of maintaining communications for the force. In this way Canada assisted the United Nations (including many African states) in containing a civil war and thus in reducing the chances of a superpower confrontation.

When U.N. approval for intervention could not be achieved, however, the Canadian government chose to sit on the sidelines. Thus, Mr. Trudeau and his colleagues resisted all entreaties by the opposition, and by churches and other groups, to intervene actively in attempts to settle the civil war which raged in Nigeria from July 1967 until January 1970. The government even refused to take the initiative in having the issue of the war inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly. From soundings at the United Nations, it discovered that such a step would have been "totally unsuccessful."⁶⁹ If Canada were to act at all, the government argued, such action must be effective. Humanitarian concerns alone did not justify Canadian intervention in the internal affairs of another country, particularly if that intervention would only harm Canada's influence elsewhere.

As Canada's response to the Nigerian civil war suggests,

interests may often conflict with rather than complement each other. In that event, a country may find it the better part of wisdom not to act at all. Canada's early detachment from colonial questions at the U.N. reflected such an ambivalence, and resulted in inaction. Or, alternatively, a nation may pursue separate goals and undertake different policies that lead in quite opposite directions. One goal or policy may thus partially or entirely cancel out another. In attempting to promote Canada's economic prosperity, the government has, for instance, formulated and implemented trade and investment policies that undermine the effectiveness of her aid programs. Similarly, Canada's economic assistance may both stimulate development and foster instability and insecurity. Finally, in its policies toward southern Africa the government has sought "to work both sides of the street."⁷⁰ It has voiced strong support for self-determination, blocked the flow of arms to Portugal and South Africa, and observed U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. But, at the same time, it has pursued economic benefits in this area through "normal business channels." Until now, Ottawa has been able to straddle the fence and thus effectively serve its contradictory interests in supporting self-determination, on one hand, and in serving the business community's expectations of "better-than-normal opportunities for trade and investment in the growing economy of the Republic of South Africa," on the other hand.⁷¹

Canada's policies toward Africa have quite obviously been influenced in a significant way by events and forces outside Ottawa's control. In fact, Canada has rarely taken bold initiatives on her own, but has been satisfied to adjust to situations or crises as they arise at home or abroad. This may be the fate of all small or medium-sized countries since they can hardly expect to mobilize sufficient power to exert influence on an area so far away. This argument may, however, constitute at times a convenient excuse for inactivity or maintaining existing policy.

Canada's approach to Africa cannot be explained solely in terms of her rank and size in world politics; some reference must be made to the way in which decisions are made in Ot-

tawa. Three characteristics of this process emerge from the study of Afro-Canadian relations. Above all, decisions on African questions tend to be made on a piecemeal basis. Either because of the pressure of work or because the Department of External Affairs lacks enough well-informed personnel, decisions tend to be taken in an ad hoc, pragmatic fashion. At no time has the government looked at Africa and its problems in a comprehensive way. Prior to the opening of a High Commission in Ghana, the Department of External Affairs did give serious consideration to Canada's relations with an "awakening Africa." At that time an attempt was made to determine what interests Canada had in African and then whether or not it was advisable to establish diplomatic relations with, and an aid program for, Ghana. Since then our relations with Africa have just grown in response to pressures either from abroad or at home. Canadian interests and objectives are often perceived only after a policy is decided upon, rather than in some logical sequence before.

A second characteristic of the Canadian approach to African questions has been its emphasis on practicality. In Ottawa and at the United Nations, Canadians have adopted a realist's view of policy-making. Other things being equal, a policy is adopted only if it is likely to be effective in achieving its stated goals. The moral correctness of any action tends to be measured in terms of its success rather than against abstract standards. Thus various Canadian governments have refused to support U.N. resolutions which call upon member states to impose sanctions against Portugal or South Africa. Similarly, the Liberal government refused to intervene in the Nigerian civil war because that would not have contributed to its settlement. Politics is, after all, the art of achieving what is possible rather than what is desirable. However, by focusing only on the existing situation, Canadians tend to accept the status quo; often fail to perceive the undercurrents of change; and thus lose opportunities to alter present conditions. Canadian policy toward southern Africa is typically characterized by this "critical acceptance" of the status quo.

A final characteristic of the decision-making process that emerges from this study is the limited range of participants

engaged in the making of African policy. Decisions have tended to be made by a handful of politicians and top-level civil servants. Formulated by the latter, policies were either sent on to the Minister and the cabinet for their approval or, if they were routine and did not break with past policy, carried out directly. Under the St. Laurent and Pearson administrations the Minister and his civil servants shared many of the same views on foreign relations and African affairs; their relations were therefore warm and cooperative. When the Conservatives came to power in 1957, and particularly after Mr. Green moved to the Department of External Affairs, this relationship changed. Because neither Mr. Diefenbaker nor Mr. Green had the same knowledge and experience as their predecessors, they often left the department a freer hand to carry on the day-to-day business. But, on occasion, they intervened and acted contrary to the advice of their bureaucratic advisers. This seems to have been the case when Mr. Green chose the Cameroons as the site of Canada's first diplomatic post in Francophone Africa rather than Senegal or the Ivory Coast as the department preferred. On the issue of South Africa's readmission to the Commonwealth, Mr. Diefenbaker took in the end a tougher line than his advisers, who wanted above all to find some compromise formula that would satisfy both South Africa and the more militant members from Asia and Africa.

Policy-making was thus limited to this charmed circle. Parliament and its Standing Committee on External Affairs played little part in the formulation of policy. (The only instance when the opposition seemed to have had any influence at all was during the Nigerian civil war.) In general, it merely served as a platform from which the government could announce its new policies (ban on arms sales to Portugal and South Africa, opening of a new diplomatic post in Africa) and a forum in which the opposition could prod the government into revealing its intentions.

Outside Parliament, the only groups that have had a sustained impact on governmental policy towards Africa are those of the commercial and financial communities. Both because Canadian political leaders are themselves drawn

from or simply identify with this sector of society, and because these groups possess concrete, specific and clearly defined needs, Canadian policies strongly reflect their particular interests. The fact that Ottawa still accords South African goods preferential access to our markets, despite South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, illustrates their obvious strength.

Participation by other interest groups in the decision-making process has been sporadic and ineffective. In part, this has been due to the fact that Canadians in general knew and cared little about Africa. Our interests there were indirect and rarely impinged on the daily life of the average citizen. The same comment could be made today of the broader public. The media's coverage of African affairs is poor and often emotional. Uninformed, the public is aroused only when a Canadian citizen is shot on the "mysterious" Zambezi River or put in prison without trial, or when immigrants from Uganda threaten to steal their jobs or add a new burden to the public purse.

But over the last decade there has developed an "attentive public" made up of individuals and a variety of intermediary groups (voluntary associations, churches, and spontaneous groups which spring up for some specific purpose). This public is well informed, has often had direct experience in Africa, and is deeply concerned with how Canada acts towards that continent and its problems. Its members, individually or collectively, have sought access to the "closed-circuit decision-making" process,⁷² but with only occasional success. In 1961, for instance, the Canadian churches with missionaries in Angola (Baptist, United Church) played some part in the eventual government decision to support a General Assembly resolution which called upon Portugal to introduce reforms into Angola and set up a committee to investigate the whole question. They not only provided government with first-hand accounts of the uprising and of the subsequent Portuguese repression, but also organized a campaign through letters, delegations and the press to secure a favourable governmental response.⁷³

The only other occasion on which interest group activity

has had a noticeable impact on government policy was during the Nigerian civil war. This has been the subject of an excellent study whose conclusions only need to be underlined here.⁷⁴ For a brief period in the summer and fall of 1968 and again just before the war ended in January 1970, a variety of institutional and spontaneous interest groups were able—through questions in Parliament and the active use of the media—to heighten the decision-makers' "perceptions of the issue as a politically sensitive one" and thus compel Ottawa to respond to a limited number of their demands. The government did provide medical and food supplies, offer the use of Canadian aircraft to airlift assistance to refugees on both sides, and generally supported the humanitarian involvement of the world community. But beyond that point the government would not go. Public support for the more extensive demands of these interest groups could not be sustained, particularly in the face of the Biafran leader, Colonel Ojukwu's unwillingness to negotiate a scheme for daylight airlifts. The absence of any sustained public pressure, together with an unfavourable external environment, precluded more extensive Canadian involvement.

Aside from these two instances, this attentive public has had little impact on policy-making as such. At best, it has acted as a warning signal to officials and politicians alike. On certain issues, Ottawa now knows that there exist various groups across the country that can and will express their views when the circumstances warrant it. The position of these groups is often known well in advance and, if the government wishes to avoid controversy and public criticism, it will take this into account in its calculations. That is not to say that the views of these articulate groups have carried the day. Indeed, they rarely have. Witness, for example, the refusal of government to end preferential trade treatment to South African goods despite the publicity accorded the Black Paper⁷⁵ and the open hearings on southern Africa held by the Standing Committee of the House of Commons in June 1971. It simply means that these views, unexpressed in the past, can no longer be totally ignored. In fact, the record of these interest groups in securing a change in government policy—

whether over Rhodesia, arms sale to South Africa, Portugal's African colonies, or the issues of trade, aid and development—has not been very impressive and certainly does not justify optimistic conclusions about the potential role of Parliament and the effective influence of pressure groups in Canadian foreign policy. Since the interests they represent are, in contrast with those of the business community, general, indirect and diffuse, the government has been able to deflect or deny them with relative impunity. Except on the rare occasion when the general public is aroused, the government (including the bureaucracy) is left relatively free to make and implement foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

The "disinterested detachment" of Canadian policy-makers in the 1950s has given way in the 1960s and 1970s to an active involvement in Africa and its many problems. Since 1957, as we have demonstrated, Canada has both broadened and intensified relations with Africa. Her network of diplomatic missions, her aid programs and the range of non-governmental activities now constitute a direct interest which, if only by force of its own momentum, Ottawa considers worth preserving and even promoting. Indirectly, Canadian involvement in African affairs has been linked to our membership in the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations.

As a result of our expanding aid program to Africa, our moderately critical stance on colonial and racial issues, and our middle-power status, Canada now enjoys a reputation in Africa as a friendly power, one that is well-disposed towards assisting these new states in overcoming their problems. During his visit to Canada in 1969, for example, President Nyerere singled out Canada for her "understanding of the emerging Third World," her "respect for the principles of national sovereignty," and her "acceptance of the principles of human equality and dignity."⁷⁶ Whether this favourable image is retained, however, will depend on Canada's willingness and ability to respond to African needs and expectations in the future. In particular, it will depend on how

Canada resolves the contradiction between her verbal opposition to white rule in southern Africa and her economic policies of support; and on the overall mix of policies Ottawa adopts towards the Third World.

Recent events have transformed quite radically the configuration of forces in southern Africa. In particular, the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Lisbon in April 1974, which itself was precipitated by prolonged and costly colonial wars in Africa, resulted in the granting of independence to the Portuguese colonies of Guinée-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. Quick to perceive the consequences, South Africa launched a campaign to curry favour with the black African states that would soon surround her. In this search for a *de-tente* Pretoria has pressed Ian Smith to enter into negotiations with Rhodesia's African nationalists, granted increasing autonomy to her so-called Bantustans, removed some of the most petty forms of her apartheid policy, and showed a greater willingness to entertain discussions on the whole question of Namibia.

Has Canada kept pace with these dramatic changes? To what extent do present Canadian policies reflect this altered situation? On the question of Rhodesia, Ottawa did agree at the 1975 Commonwealth Conference held in Jamaica that, if negotiations between the black nationalists and Ian Smith collapsed, the moral responsibility for a renewed campaign of armed struggle would necessarily fall on the white minority regime. Canada further agreed to maintain and strengthen the applications of sanctions against Ian Smith and to compensate Mozambique for any losses she may sustain if she cuts off Rhodesia's access to the sea. Given the fact that negotiations have reached an impasse, at least temporarily, the Canadian government is likely to be pressed into extending humanitarian assistance to, in addition to its actual moral support for, the Zimbabwean liberation movement. Despite the apparent division within the ranks of the nationalist movement, and the obvious attempt by Smith to exploit their differences, Ottawa should support the Rhodesian nationalists in their struggle for majority rule.

The government's position on Namibia is more ambivalent.

While Canada accepted the International Court of Justice ruling of 1971 that South African occupation of Namibia was illegal, she has consistently refused to recognize any obligation on her part to prevent Canadian corporations from exploiting Namibia's natural resources in cooperation with South Africa and has failed as well to extend even humanitarian assistance to the Namibian peoples engaged in the struggle for freedom. At a time when Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa may well be prepared to sacrifice Namibia "on the altar of southern African detente,"⁷⁷ a more forceful stance on the part of the major Western states (including Canada) could well tip the scales in favour of independence. Surely, it is particularly short-sighted and inconsistent with her support of the United Nations and the International Court that Canada permit her citizens and her corporations to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of U.N. resolutions.

The most difficult problem, and the one least amenable to change, is South Africa's internal policy of apartheid. Although South Africa has made advances towards black Africa with a view to establishing a detente in the whole area, she has not significantly altered her domestic policies of discrimination. The promise of "independence" for the Bantustans and the removal of the most blatant and offensive discriminatory policies are but empty gestures designed as propaganda and not indicative of any serious intention to change. Canada is therefore likely to come under severe pressure from Third World countries and from her own public to refrain from any activities which implicitly constitute support for South Africa's policy of apartheid. She will undoubtedly be urged to end the preferential treatment she extends to South African goods, to desist from encouraging trade and investment (particularly in the border areas of the homelands), and thus remove the most obvious ambiguities involved in her present approach towards South Africa.

Canada's record on development questions is no less open to criticism. Although our bilateral aid to Third World countries (including Africa) has increased significantly in both absolute and relative size over the last few years, it still falls considerably short of the target recommended by the Pearson

Commission and approved by the United Nations. More importantly, its impact has been seriously reduced by the "tying" provisions of our aid program and by commercial policies that deny Third World products adequate access to Canadian markets. As Allan MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, testified before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on April 10, 1975, Canada's "development assistance will have to be assessed in a wider framework that includes varied instruments of economic advancement for developing countries: access to industrialized markets, transfers of technology, the regulation and taxation of transnational corporations, the pricing of raw materials and so on." In contrast with this unequivocal statement on Canada's intentions, however, her record of actual performance is marked with ambiguity.

If Canada and other developed countries fail to "cooperate" fully with the developing countries of the Third World, to respond genuinely to their demands for a new international economic order, the inevitable outcome will be a confrontation between rich and poor. It is surely in Canada's self-interest, as well as in keeping with the values to which we subscribe, to help Africa to achieve self-sustaining development.

NOTES

1. As strange as this grouping of states may appear, it corresponds to the administrative divisions within the Department of External Affairs. All the African states that are dealt with in this chapter fall under the responsibility of the Departmental Division, Africa I.
2. See G. P. deT. Glazebrook, *A History of Canadian External Relations*, 2 Vols. (Toronto, 1966), I, 243-44; and C. P. Stacey, *Records of the Nile Voyageurs 1884-85* (Toronto, 1959).
3. Glazebrook, *External Relations*, I, 245-48; and W. S. Evans, *The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism: A Story and Study* (London, 1901).
4. Ernest Lapointe put the matter most bluntly when on September 9, 1935 he said: "No interest in Ethiopia, of any nature whatever, is worth the life of a single Canadian citizen. No consideration could justify Canada's participation in such a war . . ." Quoted in James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto, 1965), p. 4.
5. The government's lack of concern for Ethiopia was reflected most clearly in their open repudiation of an initiative taken by Dr. W. A. Riddell, the Canadian representative in Geneva, to extend sanctions to include oil.

- "This disavowal," as L. B. Pearson described it years later in his memoirs (*Mike*, Vol. 1, p. 99), "played an important part in destroying any remaining hope that strong sanctions, collectively and effectively applied, would force Italy to halt its military aggression against Ethiopia."
6. The Canadian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 had taken a very similar view towards the colonial question. Canada had no territorial designs of its own, Sir Robert Borden made quite clear. But he was prepared to support the claims of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to retain the German colonies they had occupied during the war, so long as this did not upset the "goodwill" and improved "understanding between Great Britain and the U.S." The mandatory system of the League of Nations served as an effective compromise. It managed to conciliate Woodrow Wilson's anxiety over territorial annexation without restricting the mandatory powers' real authority over their dependent territories. *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol. 2, *The Paris Peace Conference of 1919* [Ottawa, 1969], pp. 13, 14. See also G. P. deT. Glazebrook, *Canada at the Peace Conference* [Toronto, 1942], pp. 89-92.
 7. This phrase was first used by F. H. Soward in his study with Edgar McInnis entitled *Canada and the United Nations* (New York, 1956), p. 207. It later reappeared in his article, "Canada and 'Colonialism' in the United Nations," in Robert M. Clark, ed., *Canadian Issues: Essays in Honour of Henry F. Angus* (Toronto, 1961).
 8. Statement by the Canadian delegate, the Honourable Roch Pinard, to the First Political Committee on February 9, 1957.
 9. On seven different votes on the Algerian question, from 1955 to 1961, Canada voted in favour of three resolutions, against three and abstained on one. By contrast, the United States voted against only one, but abstained on four and favoured two.
 10. Statement by the Canadian delegate, Mr. Brooks, before the plenary session of the General Assembly on January 26, 1962.
 11. The speech delivered by the Canadian delegate to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly explaining his country's vote on the resolution concerning Portuguese territories is an excellent example of this tactic. Accepting the resolution as a whole, Canada expressed disagreement with paragraph 2, which designated the national liberation movements from Portugal's African colonies as the "authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the peoples of these territories"; doubts about "violent solutions to these problems and to references in this resolution which imply support for such activities"; and, finally, opposition to any attempt "to interfere with trade in peaceful goods with Portugal and her territories."
 12. It was first announced by Prime Minister Diefenbaker in the House of Commons on June 24, 1961.
 13. Paul Martin, *House of Commons Debates*, 1963 Vol. VI, p. 5451, December 5, 1963.
 14. For a complete compilation of Canada's contributions to the various U.N. programmes for Southern Africa, see "Assistance to the Victims of

- Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, Information on Funds and Programmes," pp. 24-29, 43-45. This document is a revised version of a paper prepared by the U.N. Secretariat for the International Conference of Experts held in Oslo, Norway from 9 to 14 April, 1973.
15. *House of Commons Debates*, 1971, Vol. IV, p. 3819, March 1, 1971.
 16. The communique was reprinted in whole in *The Times* (London), August 11, 1973.
 17. Quoted in an unpublished paper by Douglas G. Anglin, "The Significance of the 1973 Commonwealth Conference for Southern Africa," September 12, 1973.
 18. Statement of the Canadian delegate on the Trusteeship Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1973.
 19. Statement by the Canadian delegate, Mr. Barton, to a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, June 19, 1962.
 20. *The New York Times*, July 10, 1964.
 21. Quoted from the Commonwealth communique in a statement to the House of Commons on July 17, 1964, by Prime Minister Pearson, reprinted in the Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, No. 64/15, p. 6.
 22. See *Canada and the United Nations*, 1965 (Ottawa, 1966), pp. 30-31.
 23. Statement by Paul Martin before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, April 4, 1966, reprinted by Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, No. 66/16, p. 3.
 24. See Address delivered to the United Nations Security Council on March 20, 1968, by the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
 25. See, for example, the statement made in the Fourth Committee by the Canadian Representative, Mr. Marvin Gelber, on October 16, 1969. *Press Release*, No. 20, Canadian Mission to the United Nations.
 26. This still remains Canadian policy, though in supporting British policy on several occasions Ottawa has backed away from its endorsement of the principle of NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority African Rule). At the Commonwealth Conference held in January 1969 in London, Prime Minister Trudeau took the position that NIBMAR should not become either a panacea or an obsession. He would accept something less if, and only if, the alternative contained real guarantees for eventual majority rule. On November 19, 1971, the Canadian delegate to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly abstained on a resolution which reaffirmed the principle of NIBMAR on the same grounds, adding also that the resolution under consideration called on Canada to affirm a major element in a future settlement between Rhodesia and Britain just at the moment when negotiations were in process. A few days later, the Smith-Home agreement was concluded. Despite its failure to meet the NIBMAR provision, Mr. Sharp felt that Canadians "cannot substitute our judgement for the judgement of the Rhodesian people themselves." In later taking note of the Pearce Commission's report on the unacceptability of this agreement to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, Mr. Sharp stated in

- the House of Commons on May 24, 1972 that Canada would "continue to support the aim of democratic majority rule for Rhodesia."
27. See Guy Arnold and A. Baldwin, *Rhodesia: Token Sanctions or Total Economic Warfare* (London: The Africa Bureau, 1972).
 28. In one very obvious sense Canada's policies toward South Africa should not be considered as part of Canadian attitudes toward colonialism. South Africa has been a sovereign, independent state since 1910. The issue involved in South Africa is therefore not one of self-determination and independence, but arises from the flagrant abuse of human rights. But these legal differences are more than offset by the essential similarities of the situations in Rhodesia and South Africa. In the words of the Government's White Paper on Foreign Policy, "each is governed by a white minority whose prosperity and power is based on command of the resources of the country and on the subordination of a black majority . . ." (U.N. Booklet, p. 18.) The Canadian government has in effect accepted the tendency of Africans to couple together the issues of apartheid and colonialism.
 29. Quoted in H. Gordon Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad* (Toronto, 1945), p. 175.
 30. Statement by Paul Martin before the Ad Hoc Political Committee on November 19, 1952.
 31. Statement by Canadian delegate, Mr. Cote, before the Ad Hoc Political Committee on November 27, 1953. The danger of deciding how to vote on the basis of whether South Africa was likely to listen or not to the appeals of the Assembly was stated clearly by the *Winnipeg Free Press*, November 12, 1947. Such a policy means in effect "that a state should no longer be visited with the Assembly's disapproval provided it has the tenacity to resist the Assembly's decisions with sufficient obstinacy."
 32. See, for example, the statement made by the Canadian delegate, Mr. McCordick, before the Special Political Committee on October 31, 1957. When, at the next session of the General Assembly, a resolution emerged that was likely to receive wide support, leaving Canada alone with a few hardy colonial powers, the government broke with its tradition of abstention to support Resolution 1248. This resolution did express regret at South Africa's refusal to respond "to appeals of the General Assembly that it reconsider governmental policies which impair the right of all racial groups to enjoy the same rights and fundamental freedoms." At the fourteenth session, however, the government returned to its usual practice of abstention.
 33. Statement by the Canadian delegate to the Fourth Committee, Heath Macquarrie, on October 13, 1958.
 34. Quoted in Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961* (London, 1972), p. 293.
 35. House of Commons *Debates* (1960-61), Vol. III, p. 3081.
 36. Statement by Prime Minister Pearson at a plenary session of the General Assembly on September 19, 1963.
 37. House of Commons *Debates* (1963), Vol. v, p. 5197.
 38. Young Women's Christian Association, *Investment in Oppression* (Toronto, 1973), p. 20.
 39. House of Commons *Debates* (1962-63), Vol. III, p. 2531.
 40. Department of External Affairs, *Foreign Policy for Canadians: The United Nations* (Ottawa, 1970), pp. 19, 20.
 41. Statement made by Marvin Gelber before the Fourth Committee on October 16, 1969.
 42. Quoted in S. Slonim, *South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute* (Baltimore, 1973), p. 337. On July 30, 1971, the Canadian government informed Pretoria that it no longer recognized South Africa's jurisdiction over Namibia.
 43. The High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam was accredited to Uganda and Kenya from 1963 until 1967. From then until 1972 he was also accredited to Zambia. Since 1970 he has also been responsible for Mauritius.
 44. *Foreign Policy for Canadians: The United Nations*, p. 20. Canada is represented in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland through accreditation by its ambassador in South Africa rather than by its newly appointed High Commissioner in Zambia. It is to be hoped that in time this unfortunate position can be changed.
 45. In addition to our permanent and non-permanent missions in Africa, Canada maintains contact with Africa through visits either from African leaders to Canada (such as President Nyerere's in the fall of 1969) or by Canadian officials to Africa (such as Mitchell Sharp's visit to West, East and Central Africa in March 1971).
 46. Philip Stigger, "A Study in Confusion: Canadian Diplomatic Staffing Practices in Africa and the Middle East," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. v, No. 3 (1971), pp. 261-62.
 47. At present there are commercial secretaries in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Nairobi, Lagos and Lusaka. There was one in Salisbury from 1955 until 1965, as well as one in Accra from 1957 until 1970. It was recently reported in an Angola newspaper (February 1973) that Canada had appointed an honorary commercial representative in Luanda, Angola.
 48. These agreements were, with the exception of the 1955 agreement with Ethiopia, worked out with the colonial power and simply ratified after independence. To all the former British colonies (except Rhodesia since November 1965) Canada extends the Commonwealth tariff—even to South Africa. Many of the Anglophone African states extend to Canada most-favoured-nation treatment. With the other African states Canada operates under the most-favoured-nation clause.
 49. In the words of Professor G. K. Helleiner, tied aid "builds in imported components and high cost spare parts, and makes it very difficult to develop local material using employment-creating technologies . . ." Testimony before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 35, October 6, 1970, p. 319. Some improvement has occurred in the procurement terms of Canada's aid program. In 1970, the government decided to untie up to 20 per cent of the total bilateral allocation, channel roughly one-quarter of

- its aid through international organizations, and pay shipping costs on goods sent as part of its development program. The most recent government statement on this whole question commits Ottawa to "liberalizing the CIDA procurement regulations by immediately untying its bilateral development loans so that developing countries would be eligible to compete for contracts" and to "consider untying to other donor countries in selected cases where this can demonstrably bring significant results to the development program." CIDA, *Canada: Strategy for International Development Cooperation, 1975-80* (Ottawa, 1975), p. 32.
50. Statistics Canada, *Canada's International Investment Position 1926 to 1967* (Ottawa, 1971), p. 74.
 51. Although official statistics are not available for the period since 1969, Canadian investment in Africa outside South Africa has increased substantially over the last few years. In particular, Alcan has recently invested close to \$100 million in a multinational aluminum project in Guinea, while several Canadian firms have started new operations in Nigeria. Taking these new developments into account, it can be seen that Canadian investment is no longer as concentrated in South Africa as it formerly was.
 52. See the YWCA report *Investment in Oppression* and Ruth First, et al., *The South African Connection* (London, 1972).
 53. *House of Commons Debates*, 1973, July 9, 1973, p. 5408. In the wake of the 1971 shareholders' protest against Alcan's sale of aluminium rods to Portugal for use in the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam and of the growing concern over the policies of Western corporations operating in South Africa, the government approached a number of Canadian firms with direct investment in South Africa. An official from the Department of External Affairs presented each of the Canadian companies with a package of material and suggested that they would be well advised to establish conditions in their South African plants which were consistent with Canadian standards and expectations. The message was clear: it was in their interest as well as the Canadian national interest to improve the wages and living conditions of their employees to the extent legally possible. If they failed to do so, the government could not do anything more to change the behaviour of its national corporations in South Africa, but the corporations themselves would have to answer to their shareholders and to the public.
 54. A noticeable exception to this generalization is seen in the provision by Canada to Tanzania over the last few years of legal expertise to advise Tanzanians on negotiating all foreign contracts.
 55. CIDA *Annual Review, 1971-72* (Ottawa, 1972), p. 67.
 56. *House of Commons Debates, 1957-58*, Vol. IV, p. 4016.
 57. *Ibid.*, 1959, Vol. V, p. 5174.
 58. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, February 26, 1959, p. 1405.
 59. House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 6, May 26, 1961, p. 159.
 60. Statement by W. B. Nesbitt, Vice-Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, in the General Assembly, April 4, 1961, reprinted by the Department of External Affairs, *Statement and Speeches*, No. 61/4.
 61. In explaining why Canada offered to train and organize the Tanzanian armed forces, Paul Martin observed in the Standing Committee that this decision was based in the first place on a genuine desire to assist Tanzania "in providing conditions of security and stability in which economic and social development programs can be carried out." But it was also due, he went on, to the fact that "we appeared to be the Commonwealth country from which the assistance would be most acceptable. Had we not done so, it would have probably been given by certain communist countries, including China." *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 6, July 4, 1967, p. 106.
 62. See SIPRI, *The Arms Trade and the Third World* (Stockholm, 1971), pp. 283-94, particularly, Table 8.1, p. 284.
 63. For detailed accounts of this program, see Alexander Donald McKay, "The Canadian Military Training and Advisory Programme to Tanzania, 1965-1970" (MA thesis, Carleton University, October 1971); and Hugh Winsor's article in *The Globe and Mail*, May 10, 1969.
 64. *Defence 1971* (Ottawa, 1973), p. 27, and *Defence 1972* (Ottawa, 1973), p. 77. The cabinet apparently decided in 1970 to permit the extension of military aid to Francophone as well as Anglophone countries in Africa.
 65. In a recent study, *Canadian Universities and International Development* (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, Ottawa, 1970), Norma Walmsley has described the involvement and interest of Canadian universities in international development. Among those universities with projects in Africa are included Manitoba (Kenya), McGill (Kenya), St. Francis Xavier (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), Toronto (Nigeria, Tanzania), Western (Ghana), and York (Kenya). See, in particular, Chart One, pp. 256-60.
 66. See his testimony before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 3 (March 11, 1970). For a complete list of non-governmental organizations engaged in development assistance, see the CCIC's Directory, published in 1970.
 67. Since 1972, however, the number of immigrants from Africa has risen dramatically. From 2,000 or so on the average in preceding years, the numbers increased to 9,162, 8,669, and 10,450 in 1972, 1973 and 1974, respectively.
 68. On Trudeau's role at the Singapore conference, see W. A. Wilson's article in the *Montreal Star*, January 30, 1971, p. 31.
 69. Statement in the House of Commons on November 26, 1968 by Prime Minister Trudeau, reprinted by Department of External Affairs, *Statement and Speeches*, No. 68/19.
 70. This suggestive and colourful phrase is the title of an article by John Saul in *The Canadian Forum*, March 1973.
 71. *Foreign Policy for Canadians: The United Nations*, p. 19.
 72. The term "closed-circuit decision-making" process is used by Franklyn

evolutionary process in achieving external sovereignty, is yet another source of interest. To this must be added the fact that Canada has no colonial past but her own, and displays no "imperialistic" ambitions.

Thirdly, Canada's sociological experiment—her endeavours to cope with a diversified cultural community—is another reason why multi-ethnic Francophone African states are encouraged to establish closer relations with her.

Fourthly, Canada's diplomatic presence and activity, particularly in the general realm of "la Francophonie," constitute new elements in the Francophone Africans' attempts to diminish their dependence on France or Belgium.

Fifthly, Canada's economic, financial, technological and professional capabilities, clearly viewed in terms of international assistance, have been and remain a major influence on their attitude towards Canadians.

Finally, the psychological and cultural factors in the establishment of these ties must be emphasized. The search for more international elbow room, especially with a new understanding North American state sharing in part the same language, represents the single most important motive in the setting up of this bridge that is "le rapprochement canado-africain."

On Canada's part, the search for a new equilibrium between the formulation and the implementation of her foreign policy, and for alternative expressions of international responsibility is at the root of this new involvement in Francophone Africa. The foreign policy review² stated in 1970 that there was to be only one national policy, one with domestic as well as international manifestations; thus Ottawa has had to give factual meaning to this theoretical concept. "La Francophonie" and Francophone Africa were obvious areas for new activities. On the other hand, another factor that had to be taken into account was the transformation of French-Canadian society and its desire to look abroad in a "spirit of giving and receiving" in order to achieve more sovereignty and to share its competence and expertise.³

Moreover, Canada has been looking for new ways to express and communicate her personality, individuality and

responsibility in the world. Ottawa looked at Francophone Africa as an area where such expressions could take place, while helping directly in the progress and development of several French-speaking African states.⁴ Francophone Africa represented a natural new field for Canada's increasing aid program as well as another area of cooperation for Canadian expertise.

Finally, in the extension of its relations with Francophone Africa, Ottawa found another way to assert its sovereignty and to express its desire to diversify its foreign policy and trade.

FRANCOPHONE AFRICA: THE MILIEU

A recurrent misconception is the assumption that Francophone Africa is a homogeneous entity. This can only lead to simplistic judgments. Most of the twenty-one Francophone states did not obtain their independence until 1960, and are still searching for their identity.⁵ Francophone Africa presents a spectrum of heterogeneous countries and territories, from Tunisia on the Mediterranean to Madagascar close to the Indian Ocean, from the desert of Niger to the equatorial forests of Cameroun, from the humid, low countries of the Ivory Coast to the temperate plateaux of Senegal.

It is illusory to look for a common definition of Francophone Africa. On the one hand, the populations are extremely diversified with memories of defunct empires and different religious practices—Animist, Moslem and Christian. There are hundreds of different unwritten languages: Ivory Coast, for instance, counts seventy-two different dialects spoken within its frontiers, while Cameroun counts more than sixty.

The revenue per capita and the level of education vary considerably from one country to another. For example, Gabon has an annual per capita income of \$400, whereas Upper Volta's is only \$50. In fact, only Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mauritania, Congo, Zaïre and Cameroun have a revenue per capita over \$100. The percentage of children attending school in Gabon is about 85 per cent, whereas it is only 10 per cent in the Central African Republic and in Niger.⁶

Ivory Coast and Cameroun have achieved a remarkable degree of economic growth in the last few years, whereas it has been very slow in the other countries, especially those afflicted by drought. Zaïre occupies a place of its own. It is the only country in Francophone Africa that has had a surplus in its balance of trade since 1969. The coastal states are privileged when compared to the land-locked countries. The absence of outlets to the sea is a source of major problems for Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, Central African Republic, Rwanda and Burundi.⁷

On the other hand, most of these states have similar problems: economic difficulties based on monocultures, high levels of unemployment and illiteracy, and general monetary and financial dependence upon external countries. Moreover, most of the states of Francophone Africa share a common colonial past, similar political institutions and educational systems of French inspiration, public offices governed by statutes drafted by French councillors, a managerial staff and an elite trained in the "grandes écoles" and faculties in France and the general use of the French language in the public services—even if only 16 per cent of the total population speaks French. These characteristics have led many international observers, and even the Africans themselves, to conclude that the real independence of these states is far from being achieved.⁸

Many tend to include the Maghreb in Francophone Africa. In fact, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are very different politically, economically, socially and linguistically. Mauritania is an "intermediary state" between the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) and Black Africa; this desert country, the existence of which has long been contested by Morocco, has for this reason more links with Senegal than with its northern neighbour. However, a Moroccan-Mauritanian reconciliation has recently led to the establishment of official contacts between the two countries.

Togo and Cameroun—former German colonies and later territories under French trusteeship—have not experienced the same historical evolution as the other colonies which used to be part of French West Africa (AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF).

Ex-Belgian territories are often included in "the greater Francophone Africa," but Zaïre, Rwanda and Burundi have been differentiated by Belgian traditions and institutions. Even though French-speaking, they have always shown a certain distance vis-à-vis the ex-French territories.

Even amongst the countries which used to be an integral part of French West Africa (Guinea, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Dahomey, Senegal and Mauritania) and French Equatorial Africa (Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic and Chad) the common regional institutions have nearly all disappeared. Some of the countries have radically detached themselves from the others on the ideological plane. Guinea, for example, refused to join "la Communauté" in 1958.

Mali was another country to manifest total independence vis-à-vis France, at least until 1968, when President Modibo Keita was overthrown. Similar feelings existed in other Francophone African states, especially in the République Populaire du Congo (Brazzaville) which is strongly influenced by the communist camp. In 1973, both Mauritania and Madagascar withdrew from the "Zone franc."⁹ In fact, the Malagasy Republic does not really belong to the same group. Although it is associated with several Francophone institutions, its people are not Africans and do not wish to be considered as such. Madagascar is a world in itself. The Comores and the Seychelles also represent special cases.

One must not forget that La Réunion Island, which has the status of an Overseas Department, and the French Territories of Afars and Issas also form part of so-called Francophone Africa. Finally, Mauritius, though part of the Commonwealth, participates in several institutions of the Francophone states, such as l'Organisation Commune Africaine, Malgache et Mauricienne (OCAM).

This brief description should suffice to show that Francophone Africa is much more balkanized than it is generally believed; and Canadians who live or travel on the continent realize that very rapidly.

SETTING UP OF CONTACTS

Private

Private Canadian citizens were in contact with Francophone

Africa for many years before Ottawa started to take an active interest in this part of the world.¹⁰ In fact, Canadian missionaries settled in Africa as early as the 1860s. During the early twentieth century, hundreds of them answered the call of their colleagues from France and Belgium and flowed into Francophone Africa and the Malagasy Republic where they established schools and hospitals. By 1960 there were more than two thousand Catholic missionaries working in Africa as well as hundreds of missionaries from other denominations. They can be found in almost every Francophone African state.

Official

In addition to private contacts, Canada was in touch with Francophone Africa between 1945 and 1960 through the United Nations and other international organizations. Canada contributed to the United Nations development schemes and to various food-aid programs. She also contributed through the auspices of the World Bank, the International Development Association and specialized agencies such as UNESCO, FAO, WHO and ILO which were operating in Francophone Africa before the period of independence. This kind of aid was later extended through the Economic Commission for Africa and the consortia and consultative groups established by the World Bank and the OECD.

Before 1960, the Canadian government was under little pressure to involve itself directly in Francophone Africa. Except for major events such as the Algerian war and the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, Ottawa was hardly concerned with the area. In fact, an official Canadian role in that part of the world was nearly impossible to implement, at least in the French colonies. On the other hand, a Canadian trade commission was established in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) as far back as 1946. Moreover, during the long Congolese crisis, Ottawa made an important contribution to the U.N. operations for the maintenance of peace in this troubled part of Africa.¹¹

Following a Canadian mission to Africa headed by Ambassador Pierre Dupuy, Canada established, within the Canadian External Aid Office a new "regional" assistance program

for the benefit of Francophone Africa. In 1962, Ottawa inaugurated in Cameroun its first embassy in the area. The choice of Cameroun as a diplomatic post was the result of a personal choice by the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Green, who disagreed with the Department's recommendations that the first embassy be opened in Senegal; during earlier sessions of the U.N. Mr. Green, due to the alphabetical order, had sat next to the Camerounian delegate with whom he could converse in English, much to his surprise. Mr. Green was pleased to hear that Cameroun was a bilingual country just like Canada. It was quite easy to convince Prime Minister Diefenbaker that the simplest way to establish an official foothold in Francophone Africa was to choose a country where English as well as French were official languages. This choice, based on these subjective and rather dubious criteria, nevertheless proved to be fruitful in practice. This move was followed by the establishment of multiple accreditation of Heads of Post in other countries, sometimes with strange results: the Ambassador for Ethiopia, for instance, became responsible for the Malagasy Republic and until 1974, the Ambassador to Spain was also the Ambassador to Morocco, ignoring the difficult situation existing between Rabat and Madrid over the Spanish Sahara.¹²

Canada is now accredited in all French-speaking African states and has resident ambassadors in Zaïre, Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Direct and continuous contacts with most of the other states are achieved through the presence of "officials" and "semi-officials" of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) who coordinate Canada's aid program in each country.

For their part, Algeria, the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Upper Volta, Tunisia and Zaïre have appointed ambassadors in Ottawa, while a few other states, taking advantage of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, have asked their representative there to act as consuls, or have appointed honorary consuls. As for the other states, their ambassador in Washington or at the United Nations is usually accredited to Ottawa as well.¹³

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

MULTILATERAL, POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC

Until 1967, Canada's attitude towards the evolving situation in French-speaking Africa could be well defined as a wait-and-see policy. Admittedly, the independence movement of 1960 was followed by quick Canadian recognition, and the Dupuy mission. The Congolese crisis also brought about an important Canadian involvement, but only as a front for the U.N. peace-keeping operation. In fact, between 1960 and 1967, the new African regimes and Canada went through a slow process of mutual discovery. The Quiet Revolution in Quebec, Expo 67, the Centennial celebrations (which brought to Canada for the first time official representatives from most Francophone states of Africa), the attitude of the few African states which were tempted to establish direct ties with Quebec, and the setting up of several public and semi-public international institutions within "la Francophonie" combined to bring about a radical change in Ottawa's position.

Paradoxically, even if Ottawa still considers that this area of the world is not one of the most important in its international relations, it remains true that for a few years "la Francophonie" and French-speaking Africa represented a serious cause of concern and one of the main international and national preoccupations of Ottawa.¹⁴ Canada's action to suspend diplomatic relations with Gabon in 1968, following its decision to invite Quebec rather than Ottawa to the *Conférence des Ministres de l'Éducation Nationale des États d'Expression Française d'Afrique et de Madagascar*, was a clear indication that the federal government was worried about what was taking place in Francophone Africa. The same concern existed, but to a lesser extent, during the two Niamey conferences of 1970 and 1971 which brought about the creation of the *Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique*, in which only Canada became a full member while Quebec was accepted in a lesser category as an individual "Gouvernement participant."¹⁵

In fact, Canada's relations with French-speaking Africa have been influenced by two considerations: domestic-political problems, and tension with Paris—especially after de

Gaulle's "Vive le Québec libre" speech in July 1967. Quebec's desire to establish, with de Gaulle's assistance, direct ties with the Francophone states and organizations encouraged Ottawa to use a carrot-and-stick approach and develop its own "Hallstein doctrine."¹⁶ Such an attitude had a double effect. On the one hand, African states came to appreciate more fully the situation existing in Canada and, on the other hand, their requests for assistance were received more favourably by a federal government which had shown a minimal interest in them until the Quebec-Ottawa imbroglio erupted.

In the early sixties the new provincial government under Jean Lesage was already looking towards France and other French-speaking countries. Sometime after the proclamation of the "Délégation générale du Québec" in Paris, in 1961, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, then a member of the Quebec cabinet, echoed the calls of President Bourguiba of Tunisia and President Senghor of Senegal for the establishment of an association of "la Francophonie" in which Quebec would become a member. He pursued his ideas in a series of speeches in Quebec where he stressed Quebec's right to undertake international activities within the fields under her jurisdiction. This is exactly what happened when Quebec sought and concluded a cultural entente with France in 1965. This caused great consternation in Ottawa, which nevertheless succeeded in reaching an "umbrella agreement" with Paris covering such ententes.¹⁷ After the establishment of a Department of Inter-governmental Affairs in Quebec in April 1967, and a special bureau to welcome foreign officials at Expo 67, including several French-speaking African Heads of State, Quebec initiated direct exchanges with Francophone Africans.

In other circumstances, such exchanges might not have created any problems, but the whole political climate in the evolution of Quebec-Ottawa relations had already begun to deteriorate at the end of the Lesage regime and during the new Daniel Johnson administration. De Gaulle's visit to Montreal; the publication of René Lévesque's manifesto calling for a sovereign Quebec; Daniel Johnson's plea for "Égalité ou Indépendance"; the publication of the report of

the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism stressing the gravity of the Canadian crisis; the setting up of constitutional conferences—all these domestic phenomena formed the background and the climate for the rapid evolution of "les relations canado-africaines," especially during the international conferences of "la Francophonie" which took place between 1968 and 1970 in Francophone Africa.

In February 1968, for the first time in its history, Quebec was officially and directly invited by Gabon to attend the Conférence des Ministres de l'Éducation Nationale des Pays Africains et Malgache. The Libreville government did not send an invitation to Ottawa, which tried in vain to receive one. The Quebec delegation, headed by Jean-Guy Cardinal, then Minister of Education, left for Gabon without listening to Ottawa's warning. At Libreville, Cardinal was welcomed with full honours. The Quebec delegation was given treatment identical to that accorded the other delegations. The flag of Quebec flew side by side with those of the other sovereign countries. The presence of Quebec at this conference was received with reserve by some participants, and with sympathetic, if not enthusiastic, approval by others. France's Minister of Education, Mr. Alain Peyrefitte, declared that "avec l'entrée du Québec dans la communauté, la Francophonie vient de franchir une étape décisive."¹⁸ Mr. Cardinal took part in the debates¹⁹ and behaved like the representative of a sovereign state because the conference's subject was education which, under the British North America Act, falls under provincial jurisdiction. It also became known after the conference that Quebec would establish its own assistance program in Gabon. In fact, a medical team was sent by Quebec, and a group of Gabonnais came to Quebec for medical training.

Nine days after the Libreville conference, on February 19, Ottawa sent a strong note of protest to Gabon. Ottawa noted that the government in Libreville had no right to invite Quebec directly to attend an international conference nor to consider Quebec as a sovereign state.²⁰ Mr. J. E. Thibault, who had just been appointed Canada's ambassador to Gabon, was told by Ottawa not to present his letters of

credence to the President until that country reconsidered its attitude and expressed official regrets to the Canadian government. Canada did not in fact "sever" but rather "suspended" its diplomatic relations with Gabon. Libreville reacted by saying that Ottawa had committed "an inamicable gesture towards the whole community of French-speaking nations."²¹ Quebec supported Gabon's position and called Ottawa's break with Libreville both "prématuré et inopportun" at a time when negotiations were taking place in Canada to determine a new distribution of power between Ottawa and the provinces.

Prime Minister Pearson justified Canada's action by saying that the government of Gabon had acted in a way which was neither in conformity with the principles of international law nor with the maintenance of close and friendly relations between the two countries. While some approved Ottawa's view²², others ridiculed the action on the grounds that Canada's decision was out of all proportion to the provocation, or that Ottawa was punishing Gabon for an act planned by de Gaulle.²³ Ottawa was resorting to this tactic in order to let it be known that the same thing would happen if other African states should be tempted to imitate Gabon. At the same time the federal government began a new courtship with Francophone African states by sending the Chevrier mission to several capitals with promises of important aid programs. The result was that Ottawa succeeded in being invited to other conferences of the same nature. Moreover, Gabon resumed its normal diplomatic relations with Ottawa a year and a half later, once de Gaulle had resigned in France.

During that period, Ottawa undertook several steps to reach agreement with Quebec. Prime Minister Pearson wrote several times to Premier Johnson to that effect. Ottawa published two White Papers entitled *Federalism and International Relations* and *Federalism and International Conferences on Education*, to put her case and propose areas of agreement. The election of Prime Minister Trudeau in Ottawa, and the replacement of Daniel Johnson in Quebec by Jean-Jacques Bertrand, opened the way to a settlement. In the meantime, several provocative incidents in Canada ("l'affaire Rous-

sillon"; the promotion of the French "Conseiller général" in Quebec City to the rank of "Ministre plénipotentiaire"; the visit solely to Quebec of the French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Jean de Lipkowski; and the confrontation between Quebec and Ottawa during the constitutional conferences) and in Africa further conferences of "la Francophonie" showed that the domestic political problems within Canada and the tension with Paris had a direct impact on the evolving "relations canado-africaines."

The government of Zaïre, which had been made responsible for the 1969 education conference, had originally agreed to send an invitation only to Ottawa but it was learned later that France had exerted pressure on the Standing Secretariat to make sure that Quebec would also receive an invitation.

Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Bertrand agreed there would be only one delegation from Canada, but several problems arose due to the fact that the head of the Quebec delegation, Jean-Marie Morin, Minister of Education, spoke of one Canadian representation with two delegations, a federal and a Quebec one. It is important to note that Ottawa succeeded thus in introducing the concept of provincial representatives in the Canadian delegation. Moreover, Premier Louis Robichaud of New Brunswick acted as co-chairman of the delegation with Mr. Morin. Several federal civil servants, including Marc Lalonde, then Special Adviser and Head of the Prime Minister's Office, were also present. Ottawa made its view clear to all African states and to France that in future Ottawa wished to make certain there would be only one Canadian delegation comprising representatives of the provinces alongside representatives of the federal government.

During the second meeting of the constitutional conference in Ottawa, a few weeks before the convening of the Niamey Conference in 1969, Quebec tabled a *Working Paper on Foreign Relations*, in which was restated the province's position and its firm desire to play a direct role in the organization of "la Francophonie" and to extend its own program of assistance to some French-speaking African states. The proposals were received coolly in Ottawa, for it was then that President Diori of Niger extended both to Ottawa and Quebec an invitation

to attend the preparatory conference to study the possibility of creating a commonwealth of "la Francophonie."

After numerous discussions, it was officially agreed that the Quebec delegation would form part of a common Canadian delegation; in other words, Quebec would be represented in the same way as Ontario or New Brunswick, which had not received similar invitations. Gérard Pelletier, leader of the Canadian delegation held that there was "one Canadian delegation of which three provinces form an integral part." Even if Mr. Masse claimed that he was speaking only for Quebec, Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Bertrand had reached an agreement before the departure of the Quebec Minister. This represented another concession on the part of Quebec. At Libreville, Quebec was alone. At Kinshasa, it accepted co-chairmanship with Ottawa's appointed representative. At Niamey, Quebec's delegate was subordinate to the federal representative.

The atmosphere in Niamey was not conducive to an early solution of the Ottawa-Quebec rivalry.²⁴ Several incidents, including singer Pauline Julien's shout of "Vive le Québec libre" during one meeting (she had been invited by President Diori of Niger to sing at a special cultural gala but, after her vocal outburst, he cancelled her participation), gave Africans the idea that Canadians were not able to solve their own internal problems. The conference finally appointed a Québécois, Jean-Marc Léger, as Provisional Secretary-General with the task of drawing up the statutes of the proposed Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique. It was then decided that another meeting would take place, again in Niamey, the following year in order to study the proposals.

In the meantime, Quebec sent notes to all the delegations saying that the governments that had participated in the first Niamey Conference should be able to become parties to the Convention and acquire membership in the Agency. It seemed that Quebec and Ottawa were heading for another show-down over the composition of the Canadian delegation.²⁵ Nothing came of it, however, because Premier Bertrand chose to announce that elections—which he lost to Robert Bourassa's Liberals—would be held a few weeks later.

Obviously Mr. Masse could not attend the conference since he had been given the responsibility of writing the electoral platform for the Union Nationale party. Instead, Quebec announced that Mr. Julien Chouinard, Secretary-General of the Quebec Executive Council, would head the Quebec delegation. An agreement was finally reached on March 13, 1970, as to the composition of the Canadian delegation. The federal Secretary of State, Gérard Pelletier, was again named chairman of the delegation, which included representatives of Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba.

After a few days of feverish negotiations, it was agreed to set up the Agency.²⁶ Canada adhered to the Convention but Quebec was given the status of "Gouvernement participant." Two years later, a few days before the General Meeting of the Agency held in Ottawa and Quebec, the federal and Quebec governments concluded a special agreement which clarified the position, privileges and responsibilities of Quebec in the Agency.²⁷ It is worth noting that when Gérard Pelletier signed the Convention in Niamey on March 20, 1970, his signature was followed by those of the four provincial delegates. This gesture reminded international observers of what had taken place at Versailles in 1919 when the Dominions were allowed to add their signature under that of Great Britain.

In the following years, due to the fact that Premier Bourassa was determined not to be drawn into an open conflict with Ottawa on the African scene, Quebec tried to reach agreements with the federal government not only as far as international conferences of "la Francophonie" were concerned but also with respect to the implementation of several assistance programs in French-speaking Africa. A de facto situation was also created with the appointment of a Quebec representative to the staff of the Canadian embassy in Ivory Coast.

Ottawa made certain that Quebec representatives would be included in every delegation to conferences taking place within "la Francophonie," especially in French-speaking Africa. As a result, Africans, Canadians and Québécois began to meet regularly on several committees, commissions and conferences of the Agency.

With the encouragement of most French-speaking states, Canada has also been invited to participate in several new institutions in Africa, such as the Conférence des Ministres de la Jeunesse et des Sports des Pays d'Expression Française. Here again, Ottawa's assistance is sought and generally given. The result has been that Canada has become more visible, more active and, in several cases, more influential in the drafting and implementation of multilateral programs directly affecting African states in numerous fields, such as university training, radio and television, audio-visual programs, and telecommunications where Canadian and French interests often conflict. The following list of Francophone organizations to which Canada belongs shows the extent of this cooperation:

- Agence de Coopération culturelle et technique
- Association des Communautés de langue française
- Association des Ecrivains de langue française
- Association des Fonctions publiques partiellement ou entièrement de langue française
- Association des Sociologues de langue française
- Association internationale des Avocats de culture juridique d'expression ou d'inspiration française
- Association internationale des Historiens et Géographes de langue française
- Association internationale des Journalistes de langue française
- Association internationale des Parlementaires de langue française
- Association internationale de Solidarité francophone
- Association des Universités partiellement ou entièrement de langue française
- Communauté radiophonique et télévisuelle des programmes de langue française
- Conférence des Ministres de l'Éducation nationale des États africains et malgache d'expression française
- Conférence des Ministres de la Jeunesse et des Sports des États africains et malgache d'expression française
- Conseil international de langue française
- Fédération internationale des Professeurs de français
- Fonds international de Coopération universitaire

Institut international de Droit d'expression française
 Organisation internationale des Jeunesses francophones

Canada's consultation with French-speaking states reached an operational level within several multinational institutions (including the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies) but bilateral political relations have evolved much less rapidly. This is due to the fact that there are very few political issues between Canada and French-speaking Africa. In recent years, Ottawa has agreed to establish joint commissions with Tunisia and Algeria, reflecting a common intention to increase economic, technical, financial and cultural ties. The Maghreb countries, including Morocco and a few other African states, have also demonstrated a firm desire to discuss with Canada international problems, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the future of the Spanish Sahara, the relations between Africa and the European Community, the European Security Conference, and the situation prevailing in Southern Africa, with a view to influencing Canada's attitude on these matters.

For its part, Canada, while not wishing to become directly involved in African politics, has been trying to build up confidence in order eventually to raise with these states questions of interest to her discussed in international political circles such as disarmament, law of the sea, and international communications, not to mention the promotion of the French language in international organizations.

On the cultural side, bilateral relations with Francophone Africa started from nil and have evolved quite rapidly although Canada has given more importance to the cultural activities sponsored by the various public and semi-public multilateral institutions of "la Francophonie." Nevertheless, the coming and going of official missions, the presence in Canada of several hundreds of students and "stagiaires"; the more than two thousand Canadian teachers, experts and missionaries in Francophone Africa; the creation of several "associations d'amitié canado-africaines"; the activities of the Canadian Association of African Studies; the organization of conferences, colloquia dealing with African subjects; the setting up of information centres in embassies; exchanges of youth like Jeunesse-Canada-Monde; exchanges of radio and

television programs, and of films through the CBC and the National Film Board; itinerary exhibitions and a better-informed press—all these have contributed to create a better awareness of Africa in Canada and vice versa.

The development of African studies and research in Canadian universities and the establishment of "twinning projects" have also contributed to closer cultural ties. In addition to the fact that the Université Nationale du Rwanda was launched by a Canadian, Father Georges-Henri Lévesque, every French-speaking Canadian university is now directly involved in Francophone Africa: Laval University in Zaïre, the University of Montreal in Algeria and Ivory Coast, the University of Quebec in Morocco and the University of Ottawa in Dahomey and Niger. Sherbrooke University has set up training programs for Africans in Canada, similar to the Institut de Coopération Internationale in Ottawa.

Above all, the organization of the first Festival International de la Jeunesse Francophone²⁸ in Quebec City in the summer of 1974 showed the public the extent to which French-speaking Africans were interested in Canada and vice versa. The "Superfrancofête," as it was called, polarized the attention of the French-speaking Québécois for several days and proved unquestionably that relations with Francophone Africa were now a well-established phenomenon even if, due to all sorts of constraints, these ties remain modest in comparison with those with France.

The growth of these exchanges will oblige the Canadian government to take a closer look at the whole question of consular relations and immigration. The number of requests from aspiring immigrants, especially from Tunisia and Morocco, has been increasing in recent years. Some African states, interested in attracting Canadian tourists, have lifted visa requirements but Canada hesitates to reciprocate.

In the economic field, Canada's relations with French-speaking Africa have been extremely meagre. There are many obstacles to a rapid extension of economic ties, especially with countries south of the Sahara; the situation is different in the Maghreb and, to a certain extent, in Zaïre. Distance, costly transportation, and the absence of direct links by air or

by sea must first be reckoned with. In the second place, historically, most of French Africa's trade has been with France and other European countries and preferential-tariffs are given to European products and vice versa through the "accords d'association" with the European Economic Community. Thirdly, the control of most private enterprises and banks by French interests constitutes a strong impediment to the development of trade and investment in this part of the world. It is not surprising, given these circumstances, that Canada's trade with Francophone Africa still represents less than 1 per cent of her total imports and exports.²⁹

The rapid increase in Canada's aid program, as will be shown in the next section, represents a new element that should stimulate trade, and eventually investments. Moreover, the role of the Export Development Corporation and the opening of lines of credit to some African countries, constitute further incentives to trade. The increasing role of Canadian banks in extending loans (for the building of a railroad in Guinea, for example) will prove to be another stimulant. With the growing interest shown by Canadian firms either on their own or within the framework of the expanding aid program, one can expect an increase in Canada's trade with Francophone Africa. But this will represent, for a long time to come, a small percentage of Canada's total imports and exports.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Canada's assistance program is, and will remain throughout the 1970s, her main instrument of bilateral relations with Francophone Africa. Between 1960 and 1968, Francophone Africa received only \$300,000 annually for technical assistance. In 1973, however, five years after the Chevrier mission which launched most of the important projects in the area, Francophone Africa has been allocated one-fifth (\$80 million) of the total CIDA Budget.³⁰

Canada is rapidly becoming, next to France and to the Fonds Européen de Développement, the single most important donor country in some states of Francophone Africa. The reasons for such a rapid Canadian involvement were de-

scribed above, but it must be emphasized that Ottawa has been careful since 1972 to maintain a balance between Francophone and Anglophone Africa.³¹

Canada's official aid program is of course formulated and coordinated by CIDA. However, several other entities, such as the Quebec government, more than one hundred voluntary organizations, institutions such as SUCO (Service universitaire canadien Outre-mer), the Canadian universities, the Mouvement Coopératif Desjardins, and several consulting firms, are now all involved in Francophone Africa.³²

Several thousand French-speaking Canadians have been working in the area for some time. Their voice, especially upon their return to Canada, has often been an influential factor in increasing Canadian cooperation in that part of the world. The following table shows that Canada has extended aid—in some cases very little—to each of the twenty-one Francophone states and Mauritius. Nevertheless, the most important projects have been mainly concentrated in the seven countries where Canada has an embassy. Dahomey, Niger and Rwanda, and recently Madagascar, also figure in this list, while most of the other countries of the Sahel (Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad and Mauritania) were offered assistance through the regional program set up to cope with the drought.³³

Canada's bilateral assistance takes four forms:

- 1) technical assistance (teachers and experts in almost every country), including training in Canada and in other African countries;
- 2) food and other commodities (Sahel and Maghreb);
- 3) financial aid (soft loans, lines of credit and grants); and
- 4) economic assistance:
 - a) for infrastructure such as:
 - roads (la Route de l'unité et de l'amitié canadienne in Niger);
 - telecommunications (Ivory Coast and Zaïre);
 - geological surveys (Niger, Upper Volta);
 - electrical power lines (Tunisia, Togo, Dahomey);
 - b) for production in the fields of:
 - forestry (Chad, Zaïre, Algeria);

- fisheries (Senegal);
- agricultural development (Tunisia, Morocco, Madagascar);
- c) for social services such as:
 - schools, institutes and universities (Senegal, Cameroun, Dahomey, Rwanda, Gabon, Morocco, Algeria);
 - hospitals and health units (Tunisia, Senegal, Dahomey);
 - libraries (Ivory Coast);
- d) for equipment (Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Niger, Mali).³⁴

Table 4:1

Country	Pop. mid-1970 (millions)	Total Aid (millions)	Aid per capita	Technical Assistance (millions)	%	Other types of Aid (millions)	%
Algeria	14.330	4.825	.34	1.092	22.63	3.733	77.37
Burundi	3.544	.223	.06	.222	99.55	.001	.45
Cameroun	5.836	4.551	.78	2.151	47.26	2.400	52.74
Central African Republic	1.552	.245	.16	.237	96.73	.008	3.27
Chad	3.596	.257	.07	.244	94.94	.013	5.06
Congo Rep.	.899	.114	.13	.109	95.61	.005	4.39
Dahomey	2.708	2.250	.83	.335	14.89	1.915	85.11
Gabon	.310	.374	1.21	.373	99.73	.001	.27
Guinea	3.980	.014	.00	.014	1.00	-	-
Ivory Coast	4.941	6.517	1.32	1.580	24.24	4.937	75.76
Malagasy Republic	7.310	.613	.08	.565	92.17	.048	7.83
Mali	5.018	.762	.15	.228	29.92	.534	70.08
Mauritania	1.170	.584	.50	.159	27.23	.425	72.77
Morocco	15.495	4.282	.28	1.012	23.63	3.270	76.31
Niger	4.020	7.085	1.76	1.022	14.42	6.063	85.58
Rwanda	3.596	1.821	.51	.882	48.43	.939	51.57
Senegal	3.870	5.564	1.44	1.733	31.15	3.831	68.85
Togo	1.956	2.200	1.12	.411	18.68	1.789	81.32
Tunisia	5.075	13.557	2.67	1.806	13.32	11.751	86.68
Upper Volta	5.384	.975	.18	.316	32.41	.659	67.59
Zaire	18.800	1.065	.06	.573	54.80	.492	46.20
Total	113.390	57.878	.51	15.064	26.02	42.814	
Other & Unallocated				1.152	.775	.377	

SOURCE: Canada's Report to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). CIDA: Information Division, 1972.

These examples of completed or well-advanced projects show that while making an effort to develop projects in areas where she has already achieved a relative degree of success and expertise at home, Canada has had, as a result of an ever-increasing number of requests, a full range of activities, providing all of the twenty-one countries are looked at in a global perspective. However, taken individually, each state, while being satisfied with what has been achieved, is anxious to get more assistance.

This places Ottawa in a difficult situation for it is not able, due to budgetary and human constraints, to give a quick and affirmative response to all requests. Nevertheless, Canada has taken steps to cope as rapidly as possible with urgent situations such as the drought in the *Sahel*, where she has provided large amounts of food and transportation (planes and trucks) to get them to the deprived population in 1973 and 1974.³⁵

Canada's aid program went through four different stages before attaining its "cruising speed" around 1974. Between 1960 and 1968, due to a lack of communication, knowledge and well-formulated requests, Canada's assistance consisted mainly of technical advice and food aid. The next two years, 1968 and 1969, marked the launching of important projects and the setting up within CIDA, under the leadership of Maurice Strong, of a special division for Francophone Africa.

Between 1970 and 1971, as a consequence of the review of Canada's development policy and with the appointment of Paul Gérin-Lajoie at the head of CIDA, the program in Francophone Africa developed very rapidly,³⁶ while African countries, through the expansion of the institutions of "la Francophonie," were becoming better acquainted with Canadians and as a result, eager to set up diplomatic links and achieve a higher place among CIDA's priorities. It was during that period that CIDA, taking advantage of the experience acquired during the previous years, decided to take a harder and closer look at most requests. Until 1970, Canada maintained an open and responsive attitude to almost every formal call for assistance from Francophone Africa. Leaders like President Bourguiba of Tunisia, Ahidjo of Cameroun, Diori of Niger, Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Senghor of

Senegal, who personally came to Canada and asked for assistance, eventually received it. It was the same for several Canadian institutions which were ready to undertake, on their own or for CIDA, projects in Francophone Africa. The funds were available and, as a result of criticism expressed in Quebec, Ottawa was keen to launch numerous projects. It was then a race to make up for lost time and to reach a balance with the amount of aid spent in English-speaking Africa. Several CIDA officials were appointed at this time to Francophone Africa.

This next phase (1972-1973) brought another reorganization of CIDA's machinery³⁷ and formulation of new terms of reference to deal with French-speaking Africa; the philosophy of the so-called "integrated projects" (building, staffing and training in a particular sector) became all the rage. For its part, the Department of External Affairs appointed a working committee to review the whole range of Canada's activities in Francophone Africa. Areas of specialization and concentration were clearly defined and decisions taken concerning the coordination of action among External Affairs, CIDA, Industry, Trade and Commerce, Immigration, Finance, Treasury Board and the Export Development Corporation. This period marked also the beginning of regular official consultations with France on subjects of mutual interest concerning international assistance in Francophone Africa. At the same time, the newly created International Development Research Centre (IDRC), set up by Parliament, began to operate in a few French-speaking states.

Canada then decided to join the Special Fund of the African Development Bank and undertook to give assistance to other regional organizations such as the Liptako-Gourma (Mali, Upper Volta, Niger), the Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad (Niger, Chad, Cameroun) and the Association des Universités Africaines, while encouraging projects involving French-speaking and English-speaking states like the Ghana-Togo-Dahomey electric transmission line, and the opening of navigation on the Niger River (Niger and Nigeria).

This period was one of rapid growth which, on the one hand, brought great satisfaction to both Canada and several

African states because they could finally see the realization, or at least the start, of several projects. On the other hand, a great deal of frustration was expressed, both at home and abroad, over the length of time required in the implementation of Canada's programs. But the drought in the Sahel, and the energy crisis, encouraged Canada to offer immediate emergency relief and to establish a program for "the most disadvantaged countries in the world" which included eight countries from Francophone Africa, four of these located in the Sahel region.

The year 1974 marked a year of profound re-evaluation within the overall drafting of a Canadian development strategy for 1975-80; new guidelines were established for the forthcoming years. At the same time, it was a year during which Canadians—French-speaking Canadians in particular—became fully aware of their place and role in Francophone Africa.³⁸ This was especially evident during the Quebec Superfrancofête mentioned above.

While Canada's cooperation with Francophone Africa was picking up momentum in 1974, numerous questions were raised in several circles, ranging from Canada's motives in extending her assistance, to the degree of efficiency of its institutionalized machinery for coordinating and implementing its aid programs. Others questioned the relevance, the performance and the quality of several projects and their impact on the less-privileged populations of Francophone Africa.

To what extent should Canada develop her assistance to regional groupings? How far should coordination go with other industrialized countries, like France and Belgium? Are the present conditions of aid (such as local costs and expenses charged for transportation of food aid) compatible with African financial capabilities? Should more attention be given to the social impact of aid and the recurrent expenses generated by these programs? What about the problems resulting from the tying of aid and the burden of debt? On the whole, should CIDA leave to other Canadian institutions the task of implementing Canada's programs in Francophone Africa, while remaining the main conceptualizing and coordinating agent? What are the limits and the constraints of Canada's co-

operation in this part of the world? Are there any alternatives to the present programs?

Even if clear answers can be formulated on paper, it is not certain that they could be applied to the whole of French-speaking Africa. Besides, numerous non-Canadian elements have to be taken into consideration. The political climate within each Francophone state; each country's desire to increase or diminish its ties with Ottawa; the new French policy of cooperation towards Africa initiated by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing; the new agreements between French-speaking and English-speaking countries on the one hand and with the EEC on the other; the role of several regional, continental and international agencies; the attitudes of other donors—all these circumstances may modify or change radically one or more of Canada's assistance programs in Africa. Moreover, domestic phenomena such as the Canadian mood and the state of the economy, the situation in the province of Quebec, and the attitudes of several associations, institutions and firms, may also influence directly the course of Canada's aid program in this part of the world.

But there is no doubt that, whatever happens, the opinions of the Africans themselves ought to be taken more and more into account, even to the point of involving them in the preparation of assistance programs to make sure that local resources are fully utilized, and that their economic planning and their attempt to lessen their dependence on others be fully considered.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Canada has every reason to diversify her ties and encourage private and semi-private Canadian institutions to develop contacts with Francophone Africa, to assure that the official "cooperation link" is not the only one in that part of the world. At the same time, it is evident that several French-speaking African states expect too much from Canada and are developing "never-to-be-fulfilled expectations." After all, in the field of technical assistance, the human resources of French Canada are limited in number and scope in many areas, and it is unrealistic to think that all the available ex-

perts and specialists can be personally involved in a program of cooperation in Francophone Africa.

The reverse of the coin is also true, and may present a problem very soon. With the increasing involvement of private firms in Africa, it is clear that most of them are there for their own financial benefit. In that respect, it would be wise that their economic and financial activities be clearly supervised by the Canadian government—at least when this activity is within the framework of Canada's international development programs—to make certain that the first to benefit from Canada's assistance will be the Africans themselves.

The politics of trial and error which marked the sixties have not yet been completely wiped out, but it is clear that Canada's policy towards French-speaking Africa will be less and less one of impulse and response to incidents and requests, and increasingly one reflecting a concerted and planned approach. Rather than simply reacting to Francophone Africa, Canada is going to act according to a better-articulated policy implemented by newly institutionalized machinery both in Canada and abroad. This was made clear in the announcement, in the spring of 1975, of a set of priorities for Canada's international assistance programs.

The development of such relations should be considered as a normal dimension of Canada's foreign policy, and a formal gesture towards the Third World and "la Francophonie." It remains to be seen if these activities will always prove to be advantageous both to the African states and to Canada.

Any policy which fails to take into account the determination of Francophone Africans to make their own decisions in their own way, and at their own pace, is bound to generate frustrations. Moreover, it is clear that a policy for Francophone Africa cannot be defined without taking into account its desire for closer ties with their English-speaking neighbours. Canada has a special role to play in this regard.³⁹

It is also apparent that a policy which would include the Maghreb in the so-called French-speaking states of Africa is bound to be very ambiguous. In this spirit, the more Canada develops its ties with Francophone Africa, the more these relations will have to be viewed and spelled out within a bi-

lateral and a regional context, without naturally diminishing the importance given to multilateral organizations. In fact, each Francophone state wants to be considered individually by Ottawa or, at most, be looked at in the smallest possible regional context, like the Maghreb, the Sahel, the Conseil de l'Entente Ivory Coast, Togo, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger or Central and Equatorial Africa.

Consequently, Canada's policy *vis-à-vis* French-speaking Africa will have to be open-ended, flexible and decentralized in its decision-making process and implementation, at least at the level of the main areas within Francophone Africa, while clearly fostering horizontal economic ties and development among and with other African states. While recognizing the merits of the so-called integrated projects and the need for some kind of specialization, Canada will have to continue to be responsive to immediate needs and requests.

CONCLUSION

We may conclude with the following points: first, Canada's role in Francophone Africa is now a significant part of Canada's foreign policy. The trip of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, to Francophone Africa in April 1975 confirmed once more Ottawa's intention to develop its ties with these states.⁴⁰ Second, such a role is, in general, sought, welcomed and warmly appreciated by French-speaking states. Third, Canadians, especially in French Canada, take for granted that such ties, at least in the field of international cooperation, will grow rather than diminish. Fourth, while claiming that she wishes to use multilateral channels more fully, Canada will definitely have to develop its bilateral ties with French-speaking African states. Fifth, despite the previous point, Canada will not in the foreseeable future greatly expand the number of her embassies in Francophone Africa, whereas more and more African states may wish to be represented in Ottawa. Sixth, while the prospects for trade with the Maghreb are increasing, a similar trend is not likely to develop with most of the French-speaking countries south of the Sahara, with the exception of Zaïre.

Canada enjoys relatively high prestige in Francophone

Africa. As a result of the work previously done by the missionaries and other voluntary organizations, the Canadian government has been able to play a constructive role in the development of several countries and in the expanding activities of the institutions of "la Francophonie." If analysed individually, several of Canada's activities, methods and attitudes remain problematic; they ought to be reconsidered and, in some cases, modified. There is no doubt, however, that overall these relations have developed in the right direction. One can hope, but not predict, that this happy state of affairs will continue to be the main characteristic of "les relations canado-africaines" in the future.

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Canada and Latin America

Latin America, unlike other regions of the Third World, has long been of interest to Canadians and their political leaders. In the years since the British North American colonies first began to talk about Confederation there has been a tendency in Canada to turn toward Latin America whenever the more traditional lines of economic and political relationships have been threatened. These traditional lines have been Canada's relations with Britain, the Commonwealth, the United States and Europe. Latin America has so often been regarded as the mystical Eldorado that would furnish the wealth if Canada lost her traditional markets that it has recently been suggested that "Canadians should be beginning to feel that Latin America is the Cinderella of their foreign relationships."¹ There is certainly ample evidence to support that position.

Latin America is, of course, not an easy region to define. People outside the region have preferred to use the term "Latin America" to differentiate it from North America or Europe. Canadians have tended to follow this simplistic approach to a complex and diversified region. It has been easier than to try to separate the twenty individual republics that make up the core of the region. This has resulted in distortions of view that have led many Canadians to lump Argen-

tina, a sophisticated and advanced nation, with some of the less-developed countries like Honduras or Paraguay. Canadians have often found themselves ill at ease in cosmopolitan Buenos Aires or bustling Sao Paulo, Brazil, just as they would find Tegucigalpa, Honduras, or Asunción, Paraguay, very provincial.

The Latin American republics fall into four distinct categories based on their size, economic wealth and cultural level. Brazil, whose citizens are Portuguese-speaking, joins Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico, the leaders among the Spanish-speaking republics, in comprising the most powerful group. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru and Uruguay are countries which are not as powerful but which exercise considerable influence in the region. Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay have been the least successful in modernizing their societies. The sobriquet, "banana republic," so often heard in Canada to refer to Latin American countries as a whole, might well be applied to some of the above countries, if only because they have had to rely on bananas as a major export (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are the specific countries).² Haiti, the most African country in the Americas, is regarded as part of Latin America because of its French colonial background. It has developed quite differently from its neighbours.

The Canadian approach over the past century has been directed toward both the region as a whole and some of its individual parts. In the way that Canada is not closely involved with all the European countries, so have her policies and activities developed in the western hemisphere, where Canadian-U.S. relations are paramount.

Canada's hemispheric relations with countries other than the United States have tended to focus on the larger and more important countries: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba and Mexico. Individual Canadians or Canadian firms, on the other hand, have been active at one time or another in almost every one of the Latin American republics. The presence of a strong regional organization, founded in 1889 on the initiative of the United States which was seeking increased trade in Latin

America, has also obscured Latin America for Canadians. The Pan American Union (PAU) and its successor, the Organization of American States (OAS), have often prevented Canadians from seeing that the regional organization is not Latin America. Over the years many Canadians have not wanted to become involved there, because they have assumed that to do so would mean having to join the PAU or the OAS. But the latter issue did not really become important to Canada until the late 1930s. By that time a certain pattern in Canadian-Latin American relations had already developed. It centred on trade and investment.

The Fathers of Confederation, very worried in 1865 about the rumours that the United States intended to abrogate the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, decided to send a mission to seek increased trade with the Spanish and British Caribbean, Brazil and Mexico.³

This first Canadian mission south of the Rio Grande established a pattern for future missions. It sailed during the cooler months for warmer climes; it recognized that there were markets for Canadian products that the tropical countries did not have; in return the tropical communities could provide Canadians with their produce; and it demonstrated that Canadian-Latin American trade was already considerable but that the extent of the trade was hidden because so much of it came and went through U.S. ports.⁴ Finally the mission, while enjoying the delights of Rio, Havana and elsewhere, and having established that contact so earnestly sought, returned home to make their report. The report was duly noted and filed; the commissioners, having done their duty, turned their attention to local politics and federal issues. They could do so because the fears of loss of the U.S. market failed to materialize.⁵

In later years other major official or semi-official missions would go south (1930, 1940-41, 1946, 1953 and 1958), and the results would be the same. In fact, the statements made in later years have a familiar ring to readers of that 1866 report.⁶ The last and largest mission left Canada in late October 1968, on what was called by External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, "a voyage of discovery!"⁷

Latin America, of course, has been "discovered" many times before by Canadians and never quite so intensely as during the first twenty years of this century. At that time Canadian entrepreneurs, inspired by an American engineer, F. S. Pearson, used their surplus capital to invest in Latin America. These men—Sir William Van Horne, William Mackenzie, Donald Mann, James Ross, R. B. Angus and E. R. Wood, among others—invested in what they knew best: railway building and electric power.⁸

Railway building went on in Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico and Brazil. Electric power was developed in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. In general, these activities contributed to the establishment of Canadian banks in the region, the Royal Bank first going into Cuba in 1899 and then extending its branches as far south as Argentina by 1920.⁹ The Bank of Nova Scotia, the Bank of Montreal and the Canadian Bank of Commerce also went into Mexico and the Caribbean.

Life assurance companies also began operations in Latin America in the early years of this century. Sun Life, Manufacturers' Life and several others all tried the market in the years before the Second World War.¹⁰ With their activities, the growth of Brazilian Traction, the work of Montreal Engineering, the banks, the Massey-Ferguson operation in Argentina and the various Canadian enterprises in Mexico, there came to be a considerable Canadian presence in Latin America at a time when Canada was still a thinly populated country. For that reason much of the management of these activities was not in Canadian hands, and one was more likely to find himself dealing with a Scot or an Englishman or, perhaps, an American or a European. And there was some justification for including Canadian activities under "British Investments" when discussing foreign business in Latin America. Canadians supplied the capital and conducted the administration in the Canadian head office, but they were less likely to be in the field.¹¹

The Canadian government also had little involvement in these affairs. The diplomatic issues that did arise, as in the case of the problems incurred by Canadians during the Mex-

ican Revolution, were handled by British officials in accordance with the imperial relations of the time. Only in the trade sphere did Canadian officers serve in Latin America. The Trade Commissioner's Service began sending representatives south at the turn of the century. They located in various centres and their job was to report on opportunities for Canadian trade. They had no diplomatic status but could and did serve as contacts for Canadians. Several of these commissioners remained for years in their posts, possessed unique knowledge and had influential acquaintances in a culture where knowing people is almost a necessity for obtaining one's ends.¹²

The German conquest of Western Europe altered the Canadian involvement in Latin America. Like the threat of the loss of reciprocity with the United States, the loss of European markets forced the government to consider alternatives. At the same time certain Latin American countries had been pressuring the Canadian government to establish formal diplomatic relations with them. But the government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was quite prepared to take its time about it all. King was never one to be rushed into the unknown, and for the majority of Canadians in 1939, Latin America was still virtually unknown. Canadians did go to movies so that they had Hollywood's image of what Mexicans were like, especially Mexicans who tangled with their cowboy heroes! Needless to say, the movies merely reinforced an educational system which tended to denigrate Hispanic civilization. The "Black Legend" existed in Canada as it did in Britain and the United States.¹³ The latter country has also been used as an excuse for not knowing more about Latin America; and it is possible to assume that this is a reasonable position, because the very size and importance of that nation in the hemisphere and the world has tended to obscure her southern neighbours. Whatever the lack of Canadian interest in Latin America before 1939, there were about to be some changes.

Over the years in which King had been involved in the politics of Canada the country had had several feelers regarding Canadian participation in the inter-American system. As long

ago as 1910 the then U.S. Secretary of State, Elihu Root, had ordered a "twenty-second chair" with "Canada" inscribed on it in anticipation of the dominion's joining the twenty-one American republics around the conference table of the new Pan American Union in Washington.¹⁴ During the interwar years there was some interest in having Canadian participation in the various "Pan American" meetings and even a flutter of speculation about Canadian membership, but the fact remained that Canada prior to 1926 was not even remotely a republic. And in any event, as will be seen, there would remain some doubt as to what Canada's status *vis à vis* the United Kingdom really was even after the Balfour Declaration of that year had declared the dominions to be "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another" and to the United Kingdom.¹⁵ Between 1926 and 1939 there were several proposals made in PAU circles to invite Canada to join, but the United States in particular was disturbed at the prospect of having the British Empire, in the guise of Canada, included in a Western hemispheric organization.¹⁶

Canada had taken advantage of the Balfour Declaration to begin to expand its own diplomatic presence abroad. It established missions in London, Washington, Paris and Tokyo, because, as Mackenzie King declared to the Commons, she "was situated, so to speak in the centre of the four great powers that are instrumental in controlling world affairs. . . ."¹⁷ In 1939 Canada opened relations with Belgium and the Netherlands. Where she had no missions the British government continued to represent Canadian interests.

Closer relations with Latin America came up in early 1938 when the Brazilian government proposed an exchange of missions. It went so far as to propose that should Canada not want to limit her mission to Brazil that the Brazilians would be satisfied to have a Canadian minister for "eastern South America." The mission would, of course, be based in Rio.¹⁸

The Canadian government took note of the proposal, but the Prime Minister in his capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs was not prepared for such a step. Brazil was persistent, however, as it turns out because of the ambitions of a secretary to the foreign minister who hoped to head the

mission to Canada.¹⁹ Even the threat of unilateral action on Brazil's part did not push the Canadian government into an exchange of missions.

Argentina made discreet inquiries in February 1940. Her government wanted an exchange of missions, but was not prepared to do so on a unilateral basis.²⁰ The very fact that the strongest of the Spanish-speaking nations now joined Brazil in urging diplomatic relations placed considerable pressure on King and his advisers. However, Europe was still in the limbo of the "phoney war" and External Affairs had neither the funds nor the staff for expansion. Therefore Canada was not prepared to move.

The German victory in June 1940 changed the European situation rather dramatically but not enough to move King into any drastic action. In August, in response to a question on South American representation by Howard Green, he mentioned the possibility of an exchange with Argentina and Brazil in the House of Commons,²¹ but in private he was himself "inclined to doubt the wisdom of making an appointment at this particular time. South America will be a trouble zone while the war continues."²² He was primarily concerned about the cost but his department advised him that these could be handled through the savings made by the closing of the European posts.²³ King finally agreed to an exchange with Argentina and Brazil in October 1940 and he announced the decision in the Commons on 14 November.

Once the decision to exchange missions with Argentina and Brazil had been announced the Canadian government found itself under pressure to expand further its relations in Latin America. Chile quickly sought an exchange of missions and she had the United States on her side.

In early February 1941, Norman Robertson, who had recently become Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on Skelton's death, reported that Jay Pierrepont Moffat, the U.S. Minister to Canada, had called on him. Moffat had just returned from a visit to Washington and carried a communication to the Canadian government from the U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The latter hoped that Canada would give favourable consideration to a diplomatic exchange with Chile.²⁴

Hull was not, however, the man most intimately involved in U.S.-Latin American policy matters. That role belonged to Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary, and it was Welles who had much to do with the shaping of Canada's future role in the region. In the Chilean case he informed Canadian officials, a few days after the Hull message, that it was important for hemispheric defence that Canada "meet Chilean susceptibilities in this matter by including Chile in the projected diplomatic representation in South America."²⁵

The Canadians resisted this argument at first because of expenses and lack of personnel. Robertson even said that Mexico had higher priority than Chile. And so the matter stood until June, when a memorandum arrived on the Prime Minister's desk recommending that Argentina be asked to consent to Canada's minister to that country being accredited to Santiago on the basis of the already established principle that Argentina and Chile joined Brazil in being Latin America's "ABC Powers."²⁶

The memorandum was the result of obvious discussions between Canadian and U.S. officials, which had even seen President Roosevelt enter the affair by writing to King:

As you know, I have "hunches"—not always good but sometimes accurate. . . . My present "hunch" is that it would help if Canada could take a greater part in the struggle between the forces of totalitarianism and the forces of democracy that is now being waged in Latin-America. . . . Canada can help. You know the methods by which Canada can be of help better than I do.²⁷

Back of that broad statement could be seen the fine hand of Welles, whose pressure apparently had inspired Robertson to hint that instead of applying pressure on specific problems U.S. goals might be better served by such a statement.²⁸ External Affairs advised the Prime Minister, on Chilean recognition, that "The United States has virtually requested Canada to do it." It salved King's qualms by pointing out that this action would be in accordance with both the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park declarations on hemispheric defence.²⁹ King decided to establish relations with Chile.

The United States did not stop trying to influence Canadian-Latin American relations with its success over the Chilean issue. It also had a decisive role in keeping Canada out of the

PAU at the one and only time the Canadian government decided that it was willing to commit itself to full membership in that organization.³⁰

Probably the most definitive statement on the Canadian position both before and after the attempt to join the Union or the OAS was penned by Skelton in answer to a query as to the government's "official attitude" towards the PAU from another department. Skelton answered that Canada cooperated in organizations where there was some value to Canadian interests, but such cooperation was judged on its merits. "The one general statement that might perhaps be made [he noted] is that *we refrain carefully from becoming involved in any political commitments*" (my italics).³¹ But in late 1941, Canada was prepared even to accept those political commitments, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which had brought the United States into the war. The government was also helped in its decision by a certain enthusiasm for membership among some of the members of the Department of External Affairs, particularly Jean Désy, the Minister to Brazil, Hugh Keenleyside, an Assistant Under-Secretary, and Escott Reid, who had recently returned from the Canadian Trade Mission to South America.³² However, the immediate reason for considering this momentous decision was an upcoming emergency meeting of PAU foreign ministers at Rio de Janeiro in early 1942 to consider hemispheric defence matters. King's advisers thought Canada should be invited because it was involved in defence. Since most of the Latin American countries were still neutral, Canada could also serve as support for the United States in trying to bring the neutrals over to the allied cause. At the same time arguments for not attending included: not having available first-class men to go; and that attendance would mean membership in the PAU and Canada was not yet ready for that. Listing all the pros and cons of attendance, however, showed that the pros greatly exceeded the cons and obviously King, who was always reluctant to join before, found the pros persuasive enough to agree to membership.³³ On 16 December, Canada sought an invitation to the conference and at the same time informed Désy in Rio that if it were thought "advisable you may also tell the Brazilian authorities

for their confidential information that Canada would be prepared to accept an invitation to join the Pan American Union."³⁴ Canada unfortunately had not discussed this decision with U.S. officials. The following day Désy received another cable saying "technical obstacles [had arisen] which would be difficult to overcome in time for us to participate in the proposed conference."³⁵ The "technical obstacles" were, of course, the United States government.

The U.S. Minister to Ottawa had learned of the Canadian proposal on 16 December and had expressed his regret that the Canadian government had not discussed the matter with him. He had reminded Robertson of previous reservations on the part of the United States and suggested that Hume Wrong, the Canadian Minister in Washington, discuss the issue with Welles.³⁶ Wrong did so on the 17th and reported Roosevelt had told Welles to reply to the Canadian initiative along the following lines: "Position of the United States in inter-American collaboration is based on inter-American agreements and these make it absolutely impossible for any government to be represented at the forth-coming conference, other than the American republics."³⁷ The United States was principally concerned that a debate over Canadian membership might obscure the larger war issues and that Canada's presence might be a foot-in-the-door for the United Kingdom's involvement in hemispheric affairs.³⁸

The Canadian Prime Minister was not surprised at Roosevelt's decision, and perhaps was secretly glad not to have had the issue go further. He told External Affairs that he wanted Roosevelt notified that he understood the American reaction and stated:

I would like the President to know that it was only the thought of possible cooperation in a matter which would be helpful in U.S.-South American relations (in the light of previous conversations on this point) which caused me to acquiesce in the suggestion put forward to have Canada participate if this were thought advisable.³⁹

The matter did not end there. Its impact on the Department of External Affairs was considerable. Not only was the Prime Minister disturbed by the pressure from the Department,

which had apparently moved him beyond his normal discretion in such matters, but members of the Department were angered by what they considered an "about-face" on the part of the United States. They were perhaps more confident in their independent status from Britain than were American policy-makers. Both Roosevelt and Welles were not convinced of this independence and saw Canada too easily influenced by Britain.⁴⁰

During the 1940s Canada extended her formal relations to other Latin American republics. Mexico and Peru exchanged ambassadors with Canada in 1944, and Cuba and Canada established legations in 1945. The initiative for these exchanges originated in each case on the Latin American side.⁴¹ But they were not the only nations to seek that exchange: Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominion Republic, Costa Rica and Uruguay had all made overtures. The Canadian reply in each case was the honest one that personnel factors and more pressing commitments would prevent Canada from further expansion in the area.

Latin America was not particularly important to Canada in the immediate postwar world. Canada was involved in seeking peace and security through the United Nations and North Atlantic alliances.⁴² The need for strengthening her position in Latin America was no longer pressing because Europe was reviving and Canada fell back into a prewar pattern of involvement in Europe, the United States and the British Commonwealth. In the latter instance she was particularly interested in the development process which led to her establishing the Colombo Plan relationship with Asia. Thus Latin America had to wait until some trade or political problem would revive interest in the area. Such a problem emerged in late 1951 as government officials met to review Canada's Latin American relations in the light of Canada's "policy of peace through strength." They thought a mission to Latin America "which would attempt to consolidate our trade position, to discover new trade possibilities, [and] to emphasize Canada's goodwill towards Latin America" would assist in furthering that policy. As the proposed mission was to emphasize trade contracts, the officials urged the appointment of the Trade minister as head of the mission.⁴³

C. D. Howe, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, agreed to the proposal. Government officials and leading businessmen joined him on the tour, which finally got underway in the winter of 1953. The mission visited Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay. In the case of the latter two countries, Canada formally established diplomatic relations with them just days prior to Howe's visit. The mission apparently went very well and one businessman was moved to say, "I have returned from Latin America with the firm conviction that . . . the long-term potential of these markets is very great. . . ."⁴⁴

The Howe mission was the high point of the St. Laurent government's interest in Latin American affairs. It never went far beyond having once again been a friendly trip to the warmer southern hemisphere during the height of a Canadian winter. It might even be said that this lack of initiative in Latin America provided the St. Laurent government's successor, the Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker, with a possible alternative to the traditional liberal policies. Certainly Diefenbaker was looking for something different in foreign policy directions, yet Latin America came only slowly to be a point of focus during the Conservative period.

After Diefenbaker had firmly established control by sweeping the 1958 election, Sydney Smith, former President of the University of Toronto and the new External Affairs minister, visited Brazil, Peru and Mexico. He was the first Canadian foreign minister to visit the region. While he is reported to have been uncomfortable among the highly cultured ambassadorial community in Rio,⁴⁵ he nevertheless returned to Canada interested in the possibilities of membership in the OAS. He had, of course, been exposed to the usual pleasantries, a part of the lexicon of Canadian official visits to Latin America, that demonstrated "an awareness or increased acceptance of Canada in Latin America."⁴⁶

Smith died shortly after his return and his successor, Howard Green, was the one who was to become involved in the OAS issue. He also had to face the implications of the victory of Dr. Fidel Castro and his allies in Cuba. The victory, which

would lead to a radical alteration in the island republic, would also affect nations beyond its borders. And Canada was one of those nations.

At first Canada was moved very little by the interest in Latin America shown by Conservative foreign ministers or the Castro victory. The October 1959 visit of Mexico's President, Adolfo López Mateos, one of a small band of Latin American presidents to have made the journey north to Ottawa, hardly stirred a ripple. *Time*, whose American publisher would push closer Canadian-OAS ties until its "Canadian" section's "repatriation" to Montreal in 1962, was forced to acknowledge that the lack of interest in the visit "underlined anew that Canadians look south very little beyond the U.S."⁴⁷

Events in 1960 brought Latin American affairs to a new peak in Canadian interest. Mr. Green launched the debate in January of that year. While he lacked experience in foreign affairs, he had been interested in Canadian foreign policy for many years. In fact, he had first urged Canadian entry into the PAU seventeen years before and his recent U.N. involvement as Canada's senior representative had shown him that the Latin Americans and the Canadians both wanted a better and more secure world. Latin American support on his U.N. initiatives impressed him, as did the fact that he was embarrassed by their comments decrying lack of Canadian contact and involvement with the region. Whether or not the comments were just polite conversation of the more traditional nature that one might expect from Latin Americans (there is, of course, the other side of the coin, for how many Latin Americans know much about Canada?), Mr. Green took them seriously. He became a champion of closer Canadian-Latin American ties. His January speech to a Vancouver audience was his first real shot in his campaign.⁴⁸

The March visit of the Brazilian foreign minister and Prime Minister Diefenbaker's own trip to Mexico provided the opportunity for leader-writers and columnists to discuss the pros and cons of OAS membership and/or Latin American involvement. Most of the comments urged some Canadian role.⁴⁹ Mr. Green made his own major trip to South America

in May in order to attend Argentina's 150th anniversary as a republic. He also visited Chile after a devastating earthquake and had the RCAF wing in supplies. He returned to Ottawa via Peru more determined than ever to take decisive action.⁵⁰

Green established a separate Latin American Division in the Department of External Affairs. No longer would a single officer in the American Division have responsibility for the entire area; now there would be a small staff to do so. Green also intended to complete the establishment of official diplomatic relations with the remaining countries. He accomplished this by the autumn of 1961. In 1960 Canada joined the Pan American Institute of Geography and History, and in 1961, the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).⁵¹

The OAS question was one of the major highlights of the 1960-61 period. Green had "heard endless arguments" why Canada should join and had been sympathetic, but was not yet convinced.⁵² His interest was public knowledge as he openly discussed the idea of membership. This provided a reason for any number of journal articles and editorial comment.⁵³ The major arguments used were the following:

For membership:

1. Canada is part of the hemisphere and ought to accept her responsibilities in it as a developed and prosperous country.
2. Membership would increase trade opportunities.
3. Canadians would be exposed to new societies and cultures.
4. Membership would enhance Canadian prestige in the region.
5. Canada ought to contribute to the social evolution of Latin America.

Against membership:

1. Canada was already committed to the United Nations, the Commonwealth and NATO and would not be able to undertake increased responsibilities.
2. Canada might find itself having to take sides in disputes

between the United States and Latin America which might hamper her policies in other areas. If she supported Latin America it might hurt Canadian-U.S. relations. If she supported the United States she might anger the Latin Americans.

3. Canada already had ties with Latin America and had established her image there as responsible nation.
4. Canadians knew little about the area.

Green was determined to wait for evidence that a majority of Canadians favoured joining because he saw it as a big step in Canadian foreign policy. Paul Martin, who had also staked a claim for membership in his long maiden speech on foreign policy in 1936, argued that he did "not think that in these matters a government must always wait for the expressed opinion of the people. In foreign affairs a government must fearlessly assume a position of leadership."⁵⁴ The debate, however, was purely academic in more ways than one, because the United States once again became involved in the membership issue in such a way as to defuse the Green initiative.

The United States, as has been noted, had prevented Canada's joining the PAU in 1941, and Mackenzie King had been reluctant to accept the changing American view that emerged in the postwar period. Even Sumner Welles had expressed himself in favour of Canadian membership in 1947. In 1948, at Bogotá, Colombia, the old PAU had been restructured and become the OAS. The technical difficulties of having a monarchy belong to a republican organization no longer applied. But Canada and Canadians were not interested until the issue became important as a result of Green's initiatives. The United States, on the other hand, as the only "have" nation among twenty-one OAS members, was anxious to share the financial burden. Canada was the only prospect. Therefore President Kennedy thought it appropriate to invite Canada to take on its hemispheric responsibilities in a speech before the Canadian Parliament.⁵⁵ That was a mistake. The Diefenbaker government was not prepared to be pressured and Green was surprised at Martin's suggestion that "we should at once have jumped through the hoop when the President of the United States made this suggestion."⁵⁶

While the government did not want to appear to be bowing to U.S. pressure, certain groups in Canada were willing to accept the Kennedy invitation. The Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, and the Student Christian Movement urged acceptance.⁵⁷ But they had formulated these positions before the January 1962 consultative meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, which suspended the Cuban government from participation in the organization.

Canadian-Cuban relations demonstrate that over the years there has been mutual interest in each other. Not only did Canadians and Cubans seek early trade ties back in 1866, but Canadians had volunteered to fight on the side of rebels seeking to overthrow Spanish control in the Ten Years War (1868-1878) and in the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898). On the other hand, Cuban intellectuals and politicians had long studied Canada's steps toward dominion status and knew a great deal about Canada. Many Canadians had gone to the island after independence, some to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the presence of the U.S. military government which controlled the country from 1898 to 1902, others to settle and work there. These ties may have had only peripheral influence in the post-1959 debate on Cuba, but clearly the presence of the Royal Bank, the Bank of Nova Scotia, several life assurance firms, and Canadian-Cuban trade relations had some bearing on the issue.⁵⁸

Canadians, of course, had been exposed to the extensive publicity given the Castro movement against the Batista dictatorship of Cuba. There was considerable sympathy in the country.⁵⁹ The interest increased as the new Castro government began to alienate the United States and to nationalize American properties. The Cuban government also moved to closer contact with the Soviet Union. By mid-1960, the U.S. government had responded to these actions by cancelling Cuban privileges in the U.S. sugar market.

The increasing estrangement between Cuba and the United States offered the Diefenbaker government two opportunities. One was the prospect of increased markets in the island; the other was an opportunity to demonstrate Canada's independence from U.S. foreign policy.

George Hees, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, met

with Cuban officials in late autumn 1960 and stated that "Canada couldn't do business with better businessmen anywhere. . . ."⁶⁰ This statement received considerable attention both in Canada and the United States, and permitted a number of writers and politicians to express their views on future Canadian-Cuban relations. The opinion was divided: some felt that Canada's position might seriously affect Canadian-U.S. relations and thought that Canada ought to be cautious about trying to take advantage of the break between the United States and Cuba. Others thought it important to maintain contact.

Canadian opinion was generally opposed to the OAS decision to suspend Castro's Cuba. The Diefenbaker government's Cuban policy, while not very popular in the United States, was approved in Canada, and not even the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 altered that view. There appeared to be a general consensus that that crisis was controlled by the Soviet Union and the United States. It is worth noting that after the missile crisis Canadian-Cuban relations virtually ceased to be a public issue. When the Liberals gained power in 1963, they did not alter the previous policy. The fact that Canada was one of the two American nations to still recognize the Castro government may have indeed been a source of pride as well as a concrete example of Canadian independence. But this recognition was careful not to be too loudly trumpeted nor was it intended to be radical. Both the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments were very careful not to praise the direction of the Cuban revolution. Both governments recognized the right of the Cuban people to seek their own solution, but neither government was prepared to support its foreign manoeuvres. Nor would Canadian governments permit the sale of arms and strategic materials to Cuba. Pearson pointed out that "in so far as our trade relations with Cuba are concerned we are not shipping anything to Cuba that is on the Allied Prohibited List, nor are we allowing Canada to be used as a base for the shipping of machinery and stuff of that kind from the USA via Canada to Cuba."⁶¹

The Pearson government was not as excited about the possibilities of Latin America as the previous one had been. This

was very natural in that the new Prime Minister had been intimately involved in the shaping of Canadian foreign policy during most of the Liberal era after 1935. The Diefenbaker interlude had been a reaction to the traditional Liberal policies. Pearson, himself, had not been very keen on Latin America and especially when U.S.-Canadian relations were involved. He had gained the impression over the years that the U.S. State Department "was more concerned with consulting their Latin American than their Canadian friends." Latin America certainly played little part in the years he served as Canada's Foreign Minister.⁶²

Pearson, unlike King, preferred not to hold the dual portfolios of Prime Minister and External Affairs. The latter post went to Paul Martin, who had spoken over the years in favour of Canadian membership in the inter-American system. Perhaps too much has been made of Martin's 1936 maiden speech, for in that address he discussed far wider issues than Canadian-Latin American relations. They, in fact, received very little space in that discourse. But Martin's mere presence in the new post raised the possibilities of achieving his acknowledged ambition to take Canada into the OAS.⁶³

The OAS question came up shortly after the Liberal government took power. Diefenbaker challenged Pearson to state his position on membership and Pearson, of course, chided the new Leader of the Opposition for having avoided making such a statement during his own government's rule. Pearson preferred to wait and see what the new criteria for membership would be because of the emergence of the new states (in the British Caribbean).⁶⁴ This, of course, was delaying action. And during the next four years Pearson and Martin would make the usual polite comments on the possibility of Canadian membership, but would go no further. Rumour had it that Martin could not carry the Cabinet along with him.⁶⁵ In any event, his cause was made the more difficult by the crisis in the Dominican Republic during the late spring and early summer of 1965. However, Canada sent an official observer for the first time to a major OAS conference that November.

Canada did take a significant step with regard to Latin

America in December 1964. That was the month in which she agreed to provide funds for development assistance to the region on a bilateral basis through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The bank would select and process the loans, but Canada would have to approve the projects. At the same time any loans had to "be used for the purchase of goods and services in Canada under a competitive bidding system among Canadian suppliers." Canada was the first non-member of the OAS to enter into such an agreement and began to contribute \$10 million per year to the Bank. This step reflected the enlargement of the Canadian external aid program and was in conformity with a general trend within Canada to expend funds on development. Latin America had for some time been recognized as an area in which such funds could be directed.⁶⁶ The advent of Pierre Elliott Trudeau as leader of the Liberal party and Prime Minister in 1968 led to a reappraisal of Canada's foreign policy.

Trudeau's interest in Latin America may well have resulted from a number of factors. There has been much written and stated about a certain supposed affinity between French Canadians and Latin America. This is the *Latinité* concept that holds that peoples of Latin origin have some common heritage that differentiates them from others. This idea is not widely held in French Canada, but over the years it has had enough support among intellectuals to make it part of their view of the world.⁶⁷ And as editor of an important and influential journal, *Cité Libre*, Trudeau included occasional editorials and articles on Latin America. They tended to reflect a sympathy for social and economic changes. The one editorial on Canada and the OAS favoured membership because Canada was an American nation, but it also was concerned that Canada retain its freedom to make its own policies and be free to disagree with the other members.⁶⁸ Trudeau also recognized that Canada, as an American nation, had much in common with all the nations in the hemisphere; each one was having to build a new society in a New World and we could all learn from each other.⁶⁹

In addition to Trudeau's own personal views based on limited experience in the area, one of his closest friends and

political colleagues, Gérard Pelletier, had long had an interest in closer contact and knowledge of Latin America. During his period as editor of the large Montreal daily, *La Presse*, Pelletier had posted a correspondent to the region. This proved too costly. Pelletier had also served as Martin's Parliamentary Secretary with responsibility for Latin America. Martin, of course, was little inclined to hand over responsibility, but Pelletier did have an opportunity to visit several countries in late 1967.⁷⁰

Latin America in 1968 was clearly a region which had immense social and economic problems. Not all the countries were underdeveloped, and Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had developed an industrial base as sophisticated as any in the world, but there remained even in these three countries great imbalances between rich and poor. The new Prime Minister was also concerned about the imbalance in the world at large. Latin America fit nicely into the Trudeau's view of Canada's need to expand its foreign aid programs.

Trudeau announced his decision to review foreign policy on 29 May 1968. He told Canadians that:

We have to take greater account of the ties which bind us to other nations in this hemisphere—in the Caribbean, Latin America—and of their economic needs. We have to explore new avenues of increasing our political and economic relations with Latin America where more than four hundred million people will live by the turn of the century and where we have substantial interests.⁷¹

Latin America, therefore, was to receive special attention, along with Canada's relations with the Pacific Rim, with Europe, the United Nations and Canada's overall development policies.

In October 1968, the first phase of this review of Latin America began in earnest by the dispatch of the largest mission ever sent to the area. The "travelling circus," as it was affectionally called, had some thirty civil servants who represented economic, diplomatic, cultural and commercial spheres. Five cabinet ministers participated in the tour, which lasted a month, and visited nine countries. It was, according to the Trade Minister, Jean-Luc Pépin, a "new peak"

in Canadian-Latin American relations. The experience was certainly "new" for most of the travellers, but the account of the mission, which described the trip and outlined the government's general position that it would like to develop more trade, aid and cultural contacts, bore a remarkable resemblance to the report made by the members of that first mission to the region in 1866! In fact, the report sounded all too familiar to reports from all the major previous missions.⁷²

Even before the tour had left, civil servants had begun collecting material for inclusion in the final review. In March 1969, as part of the Trudeau program to bring in outside opinion from the academic, business and cultural community, External Affairs Minister Sharp and the majority of civil servants on the trip met with eighteen individuals experienced in Latin American affairs. The major discussion appeared to centre around the OAS. Trudeau was not alarmed by the idea of membership, provided Canada had clearly established her own policies so that she could operate independently of the United States. The debate was vigorous and prolonged, but it was clear that the supporters for membership were having more success than the opponents. Sharp told reporters the "weight of non-government people there was in favour—though not all by any means—of joining the OAS."⁷³ Certainly the impression gained was that Minister Sharp found the supporters of membership more persuasive than the opponents. But the general discussion had really been no more than a reiteration of previously and often long-held views on the subject.⁷⁴

The next stage of the review was the preparation of the final report. That took more than a year. *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (FPC) became public in the late spring of 1970. *FPC-Latin America* was the little green booklet, and it proposed few changes from previous policies and activities. Canada, which had had trade and investment ties in the region for more than ten decades, was to try to expand them. The government proposed to increase external aid both inside and outside the BID. It did not intend to seek membership in the Bank "because . . . the Bank would absorb a relatively high proportion of Canada's total development assistance bud-

get."⁷⁵ Nor was the government going to seek membership in the OAS; it preferred to avoid the political aspects of full participation, although it did intend to seek membership in more of the organization's subsidiary bodies. This decision was, of course, a demonstration of the continuity of Canadian policy toward Latin America as was, in fact, virtually the whole production. Where *FPC-Latin America* differed slightly from previous statements was in a willingness to include cultural cooperation alongside the emphasis on trade, investment and development activities. Clearly that has an important place in a region in which culture has always had a more significant role in the outlook and attitudes of society than has commerce or technology.

Even before the final publication of the review, Trudeau's government had demonstrated that it had recognized that Latin America was not monolithic and not to be treated so. It closed Canada's embassies in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Uruguay. The government did so because the staff in these embassies was subordinate to Canada's ambassadors in Venezuela, Colombia and Argentina. The money saved by their closing apparently enabled the government to carry forward its "bilingual character" approach to foreign policy, for the government had opened embassies in Francophone Africa and at the Vatican.⁷⁶

The government's actions toward Latin America since the publication have been more positive. On 30 June, 1970 Canada proposed to the OAS General Assembly that she be admitted to the not yet created position of "Permanent Observer." Jean-Pierre Goyer, Sharp's Parliamentary Secretary, in speaking for Canada, apologized to those in attendance that had expected Canada to seek full membership but stated:

. . . that it will be recognized that Canada is a middle power whose resources are stretched in a number of ways, and that it will be understood that it is the Canadian Government's desire to move as quickly and as constructively as possible in the direction of full cooperation in the hemisphere. It is in that spirit . . . that I venture to express the hope that, because of the happy coincidence in time of this OAS meeting and the recent announcement of certain aspects of Canada's future foreign policy, today's session may fairly be

regarded as marking a new departure in relations between Canada and its fellow members in the new world.⁷⁷

Almost ten months later, Goyer's successor as Parliamentary Secretary, André Ouellet, reiterated Canada's position to the first ordinary session of the General Assembly at San José, Costa Rica. That Assembly approved the idea of Permanent Observer status and in January 1972, in Washington, Canada officially sought that status from the Permanent Council of the OAS. On 2 February Canada, with Israel, Spain and Guyana officially became Permanent Observers. It may be said that Canada had provided leadership in obtaining this status, which had also seen Spain very active because of her own increasing desire to reestablish closer ties with her former colonies.⁷⁸

Canada has also continued to join inter-American organizations. In 1971, she joined the Pan American Health Organization, and in the following year she joined the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. More important perhaps than any of these steps, including Permanent Observer status, was the decision to seek membership in the BID. The government had not planned to do this in its policy statement, but it apparently found that the old system was not meeting its aid goals. She joined in January 1972 as a full, non-borrowing member. This meant committing the nation to \$100 million over a three-year period as well as having another \$202 million on call.⁷⁹

Over and above this major step in the development process, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has been involved in bilateral assistance as well. As part of the government's announced program not to spread the assistance too thinly, CIDA selected Brazil, Central America, Colombia and Peru as the countries "which most need and can most effectively utilize Canadian technical assistance." But CIDA has been flexible in this regard and Canada also has programs among others in Cuba, Haiti and Paraguay. The basic criteria for aid is based on what the government thinks Canada can do well—education, agriculture, fisheries, forestry and public administration.

While the Trudeau government emphasizes the develop-

ment needs in its program and this satisfies an altruistic urge in Canada, that altruism has to be paid for. Therefore Canada has tried to expand her external markets. There was some criticism of the emphasis on trade and investment in FPC, but that emphasis was realistic. Canada has traditionally concentrated most of her trade on internal markets and on the United States: more than two-thirds of her foreign trade is with that country. Canadian-owned businesses have generally been content to have it this way. Unlike 1866 and 1940, the Trudeau foreign policy toward Latin America was not based on a possible loss of major Canadian export markets. However, in August 1971, when the U.S. government imposed a 10 per cent charge on all imports (and did not exempt Canada) that act showed how vulnerable is a country that largely depends on a single market.

Table 5:1 — Canada's Trade with Latin America (\$ millions)

Country	1944		1972	
	Exports to	Imports From	Exports to	Imports From
Argentina	3.6	9.5	63.5	11.7
Bolivia	.2	.014	1.6	.9
Brazil	7.3	7.2	87.8	61.7
Chile	1.6	.72	10.3	6.5
Colombia	2.2	13.7	28.7	30.4
Costa Rica	.3	1.3	7.1	10.3
Cuba	3.7	4.2	57.8	11.1
Dominican Republic	.39	—	14.4	4.5
Ecuador	.3	.56	5.3	10.7
El Salvador	.27	2.5	4.0	3.7
Guatemala	.34	2.6	4.7	6.8
Haiti	.5	2.0	5.1	1.7
Honduras	.1	1.3	3.0	19.4
Mexico	6.2	13.1	100.0	52.9
Nicaragua	.25	—	2.1	2.6
Panama	.67	.006	7.8	3.7
Peru	1.3	.09	60.3	9.2
Uruguay	1.3	.24	2.3	.5
Venezuela	1.8	13.8	102.5	357.9
Totals	32.7	78.6	612.9	660.3

Canadian-Latin American trade has remained at approximately the same level in percentage terms for more than a

generation; it has stood at about 3 to 4 per cent in total volume of international trade.⁸⁰ As Table 5:1 demonstrates, there has been an increase in the value of the trade since the Second World War but the trade is more in Canada's favour in 1972 if the large importation of Venezuelan oil (\$340 million) is taken into consideration.

Canada's largest export in 1944 was paper, followed by agricultural implements, non-ferrous metals, sewing machines, seed potatoes, wheat and flour, dried fish, pipes and tubes, and asbestos. Because of the war rubber manufactures and automobiles and automobile parts, which had been important exports, had dwindled. Twenty-five years later automobiles and their parts were the number one export, followed by newsprint, non-ferrous metal goods, aircraft equipment and parts, farm, industrial, and construction machinery, steel products, asbestos, wood pulp, wheat and flour, plastics and synthetic rubbers, office machines and seed potatoes. There had been only a few additions to the type of exports of a generation before.⁸¹

Canada, on the other hand, imported primary products from Latin America. Venezuelan oil has led the list for years; in 1938 it was 60 per cent of the total value of imports and in 1972, 54 per cent. That percentage will undoubtedly have a spectacular increase as Canada pays the high petroleum prices current since late 1973. Coffee from Brazil, Colombia and Central America has been the next major import, with bananas from Ecuador and Central America third in importance. These three items alone account for roughly 80 per cent of Canada's imports from the region. The other major imports have consisted of fresh fruits, vegetables and fibres from Mexico. Sugar from Cuba and the Dominican Republic has been a minor but significant import.⁸² These sugar producers have had to compete with Commonwealth preference which favours Commonwealth imports. This has been particularly confusing to Latin America exporters because they see the Republic of South Africa, a country which chose to withdraw from the Commonwealth under pressure from Canada and others, still selling her sugar in Canada under Commonwealth preference. Cuba, for example, buys over

\$50 million worth of goods in Canada, but only sells a limited amount of sugar here and would like to have an opportunity to sell more. She suffers a chronic balance of payments as a result and would like to have more Canadian dollars, given her dependence on the Soviet Union, to purchase more Canadian products. In recent years Cuba has made overtures to Canada in this regard and her government's decision to assist Canada by taking the FLQ kidnappers of James Cross was probably motivated by the fact that Canada was in difficult straits and Cuba could help a friend, however strait-laced and formal that friend.⁸³ The 1975 exchange of trade missions, the large line of credit Canada extended to Cuba, and the establishment of a ministerial-level committee show that both countries are determined to strengthen further their ties before the United States and Cuba re-establish relations.

Cuba is not alone in wanting to increase its exports to Canada. Alert Canadian businessmen and government officials have been urging for years that there be an expansion of the trade in both directions but there has been a conservatism in the business communities in Canada and Latin America concerning the possibilities. *FPC-Latin America* urged more effort, especially in trying to find markets for Latin American products in Canada, "so long as the legitimate interests of Canadian producers are safeguarded. . . ."⁸⁴ To that end the federal government has set aside funds in CIDA to assist Canadian businesses to investigate possible opportunities, especially investments, in Latin America, and has provided funds for assistance to Latin American exporters to enter the Canadian market.

The government has also provided a grant to the Canadian Association for Latin America (CALA), an association founded in 1969 by a group of leading business leaders, in order that the Association could establish wider contacts in Canada and in Latin America. The government seconded a senior official from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce to CALA in 1972 and in early 1973 sponsored a series of seminars across the country in order to acquaint businessmen with the opportunities in Latin America.

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For years there has been talk of establishing much closer

contact with Mexico. Certainly there has been some Canadian presence there in the business and investment field since the turn of the century, but both governments for one reason or another have not had very close contacts. The Canadian government, in consultation with Mexico, decided to alter this lack of communication and in October 1971 the two countries held the First Canada-Mexico Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa. The nature of the meeting is reflected in the fact that both countries had their ministers of trade and foreign affairs present. The following spring Mexico sent a large trade mission to Canada, its first. The meetings plan to continue on a more or less permanent basis. They hope to resolve the "statistics" dilemma that plagues the balance-of-payments question. Mexico runs a considerable deficit in its trade with Canada. Canada argues that this deficit is taken care of by the some 100,000 Canadians who go off to Mexico each year, the same argument the United States uses when negotiating with the Mexican officials.

Canadian tourists in Latin America are of a fairly recent origin, if numbers is the criteria. In the last decade there has been a significant upsurge in Canadian travel to Mexico and more Canadians are discovering the splendours and attractions of Central and South America. Most of the travellers to Mexico are seeking sunshine and warmth and are apparently not as interested in understanding and exploring the civilizations they visit. Fortunately, they cannot always escape exposing themselves to the society and an increasing number of Canadians are becoming more familiar with Mexico. Other areas are still exotic and there is a certain standoffishness about the region, as the tradition of military *coups d'état* and military governments persists.

Canadians are also befuddled by the evidence of corruption that prevails at frontiers, in negotiating contracts and in brushes with the law. They might perhaps realize that the corruption has its institutional origins centuries before and has come to be an accepted way of life, just as the military coup has its origins in the past. The Latin Americans have rarely been successful in building a democracy on the autocratic foundations left over from the colonial period. Not all

military governments or dictators are necessarily bad nor are they necessarily good. Each one has to be studied on its own merits. This, of course, requires time and effort, and until recently few Canadians have wanted to learn more about the region.

Some Canadians have taken the time, however. Diplomats, businessmen and missionaries have all been involved in the region. None in great numbers, as yet, but since 1960 the numbers have increased, especially among diplomats, and trade and development officials. The numbers of missionaries has increased as well. There are probably about 2,300 missionaries in Latin America, the bulk of them representing the Roman Catholic Church. In 1970 there were 1,902 Catholic missionaries spread throughout the republics, the majority based in Haiti, Peru and Brazil (1,153). This was almost double the number that were there in 1961. The missionaries are located in 212 different areas, and of that number only 54 had been established prior to Pope John XXIII's appeal for help in Latin America.⁸⁵ The Canadians, French and English-speaking, joined Spaniards, Belgians, Irish, British, French, Italians and others in trying to bolster the faith in Latin America, where the Church has all too often been identified with the oligarchs and the wealthy elites; it has not attracted nationals to the priesthood in the numbers needed to minister to the faithful. Canadians have often gone south to give spiritual succour, but have ended up becoming involved in social action. Father Charles Conroy's role as Mayor of a Peruvian town; the industrial school in the slums of Lima; the agrarian efforts in the Amazon; the cooperatives in Chile, Uruguay and elsewhere are examples of the work done by Canadian Catholic missionaries.⁸⁶

Protestants have been involved as well. The Canadian Baptists were among the first in the field when they went to Bolivia at the end of the nineteenth century. They are proud of their role in introducing the first agrarian reform program in Bolivia, which served as a model for the 1952 Revolution's own program. The United Church began its own mission in Brazil in 1961. Canadians of other denominations have been going to Latin America for many years, but usually they work

with U.S. citizens and their effort is North American rather than identifiable as a Canadian effort. Many of these missionaries, Protestant and Catholic, have had some training in agriculture, medicine or technical skills and thus have been among the first wave of Canadians involved in development.⁸⁷ The recent second wave has been secular and sponsored not by churches but by the Canadian government through CIDA or through the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO).

The Trudeau government has indeed demonstrated a willingness to involve itself in Latin America. It has done so in a way that is in conformity with the traditional Canadian approach, and while one can say that *FPC-Latin America* was a remarkable reflection of previous statements by former governments, one has to admit that the Trudeau government has moved fairly rapidly to carry forward its proposals. Action replaced platitudes.

Canadian-Latin American relations have not always been marked by platitudes and rhetoric, but there has been more talk than substantive actions. There are many reasons for this, but the fact is that Canada has been a relatively small country whose interests have naturally enough been parochial. Latin America has been number five in Canada's priorities, behind her relations with the Commonwealth, Europe, the United States and the United Nations. Yet as the 1960s and the early 1970s demonstrated, events in Latin America can have a profound impact on Canada. Anyone who lived through the tense days surrounding the U.S.-Soviet Union negotiations over Cuban missile sites or who remembers what happened after Che Guevara became a martyr to revolution in the eastern slopes of Bolivia's Andes, will recognize that events outside Canada can effect what happens in this country. The FLQ kidnappers of James Cross in October 1970 probably learned that technique from the success of Uruguay's Tupamaros and Brazilian urban guerrillas. Three years later a minority Liberal government felt the pressures brought on by events in distant Chile, where the Chilean armed forces overthrew a democratically elected government and proceeded to impose military rule. Many Canadians

were shocked at this because Chile had long been noted for its democracy. Many were also disturbed because the deposed government had been a coalition of left-wing radicals determined to bring social change to the republic. The Liberals do not appear to have been in danger of falling over the issue, but the government's formal recognition of the military regime and the reluctance with which it moved to permit political refugees to come to Canada did arouse controversy in the House of Commons and in the mass media. The Chilean crisis proved, as had the others, that Canadians could not ignore what was going on in Latin America; to do so might lead to embarrassing or even dangerous incidents.

Latin Americans have not been very interested in Canada either. They, too, have been parochial by preferring to look to the United States and Western Europe. In general they also know little about their own immediate neighbours, and when they do look at them it is not always favourably. Mexico is regarded with suspicion by Central Americans; they see her as an imperialist power. Argentina has long been distrusted by her neighbours and now she in turn is very disturbed at the thrust of Brazil into what had normally been Argentina's sphere of influence. There are other tensions in the region as well.

Canada must be aware of these developments. She must also be aware of future trends in the Caribbean, where Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba will all be trying to exercise their influence in the years ahead. Canada has some concern about what happens in the region as she has citizens working and living there. Canadian businesses and banks continue to function where they can, but as in Cuba in 1960 the banks have had to negotiate withdrawal or, as in Venezuela in 1971, become a local operation (Banco Royal Venezolano, C.A.) where the Royal Bank of Canada holds 20 per cent capitalization, the maximum limit for foreign banks.

The major Canadian-chartered international corporations such as Brascan (Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company's new name), Alcan, International Nickel, Massey-Ferguson, among others, have been in the process of adapting to the increased nationalism that exists in Latin America as

elsewhere. Brascan, Alcan and International Nickel, for example, have hardly qualified as Canadian-owned corporations, although recent efforts on the part of management of Brascan and International Nickel have increased Canadian control. The former has, however, long been identified with Canada. It faced the prospect of nationalization in Brazil in the early 1960s but the change in government, as the military took control in 1964, prevented that. Since then, Brascan has been broadening its base from utilities into other areas, such as food-processing and beer. In line with Brazilian government legislation granting concessions to corporations that invest in the poor and depressed Brazilian northeast, Brascan has gone into that area to look into agricultural possibilities.⁸⁸

Brascan, Falconbridge and International Nickel alone account for about one billion dollars' worth of investment in Latin America, specifically in Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. But because they are "international" in their involvement and not specifically "Canadian," it is unlikely that Canadians will be overly concerned about their future unless they have direct investment in the companies. Normally, the Canadian government has behaved correctly in cases of nationalization and let the companies negotiate with the foreign governments. This is as it should be. The major corporations are well aware that the Latin American countries now prefer that corporations have the interest of the countries in which they operate at heart and so they are being more careful to identify with the nations in which they have investments. Canada cannot come to their rescue. If Canada's closing of her embassy in the Dominican Republic in 1969 in the face of Falconbridge Nickel's some \$250 million investment in that country is any clue, she will not.

Falconbridge has, perhaps, more protection from the Dominican government's 9 per cent involvement in the project that it could receive from the Canadian government. In the same way Brascan has perhaps hurt its image by being too closely identified with the Liberal party (Mitchell Sharp and Robert Winters had both held high posts in the company) and left an impression, however false, that it could expect favourable support from the Canadian government in the event

of problems in Brazil.⁸⁹ It would be unlikely to find the Canadian government being more than correct in such a situation.

The Trudeau government recently took a position on questions of "expropriation without adequate compensation" at a June 1973 meeting of the BID in Kingston, Jamaica. Canada was reported to believe that the BID should not "be used as a lever and a whip to punish recipient countries involved in 'bilateral' disputes over expropriation and compensation." This led to an opposing view by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, George Schultz, who held that the United States would veto proposed loans to such countries. Since the U.S. supplies some 80 per cent of the funds in the BID's Fund for Special Operations, she has held the right of veto from the beginning. The *Financial Post* reporter in Washington saw the disagreement as possibly causing an impact in other aspects of U.S.-Canadian relations. Should this occur, then it would substantiate the position long-held by some opponents of OAS membership that Canadian involvement in the inter-American system could not but lead to difficulties between Canada and the United States. On the other hand, Canadians may be overly sensitive when taking contrary positions to those held by the United States. In this case, however, the Canadian position was in conformity with its traditional policy of not getting too excited about mingling business and politics. Unfortunately, the U.S. role in Latin America has been just as traditional in mixing business and politics!

What the recent Canadian initiatives will mean in terms of future relations with Latin America is hard to say. There is an obvious reluctance on the part of businessmen who have not been involved in the area before to explore opportunities there. Canadian intellectuals tend to regard Latin America as on the fringes of civilization. The main reason studies of the region have any place in university curriculum is because of the awakening of interest in the Third World brought on by an increase in available funding for the hiring of faculty in these areas. (No Latin American university has special courses on Canada.) Latin America is of peripheral interest to Canadian civil servants and politicians. That is not to suggest that a civil servant who has responsibility for a Latin Ameri-

can office or who is serving his country in the region is not working to his utmost. He undoubtedly is, but his involvement is usually limited to three or four years before he is transferred to another post at home or abroad.

Latin America is likely to remain a region that is of some interest to a few Canadians, but for the majority it will not likely be a focus of interest except in a time of crisis. Such a crisis might include representing the Commonwealth side in disputes between Guatemala and British Honduras (Belize) over Guatemala's claims to that territory or in territorial claims between Guyana and Venezuela. Where Canada will find her most significant relations will be at the bilateral level with Mexico, and three or four other countries of similar size and importance in the region. These relations will include trade, investment, development assistance and a mutual desire to maintain stability in the world at large, and not just in the hemisphere.

NOTES

1. Peter C. Dobell, *Canada's Search for New Roles* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972), p. 115.
2. Mr. Diefenbaker referred to Canada's becoming another "banana republic" during the October 1970 crisis when the Trudeau government suspended civil liberties under the War Measures Act. At the time Canada joined nine other American countries which were then under similar government authority. Argentina, Brazil and Cuba, for example, hardly qualify for that title.
3. J. Castell Hopkins, ed., *Canada, An Encyclopaedia of the Country, the Canadian Dominion considered in its historic relations, its natural resources, its material progress, and its national development* (Toronto: Linscott, 1900), p. 300; for a complete account of the mission see *Report of the Commissioners from British North America appointed to Inquire into the trade of the West Indies, Mexico, Brazil* (Ottawa: G. E. Desbarats, 1866).
4. *Ibid.*, p. 11, says "The trade which exists between Cuba and British North America is already very considerable, although its full extent and value do not appear in the published statistics of our commerce, in consequence of a large portion of this trade having hitherto found its way to seaports of the United States in transit from Cuba to the British Provinces, and vice versa." William J. Patterson (*Commercial Relations bet. Brazil and Canada with Supplementary Information relating to Trade with the West Indies* [Montreal: D. Bentley, 1880], p. 5), also points this out. Compare the above positions with the 1970 *Foreign Policy for Canadians-Latin America* (hereafter cited as *FPC-Latin America*) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), p. 31, to see how little has changed.
5. Hopkins, *Canada*, p. 300.
6. J. C. M. Ogelsby, "Relaciones Canadiense-Latinamericanas pasadas, presentes y futuras," *Estudios Internacionales*, v (abril-junio 1972), pp. 69-71.
7. Quoted in Dobell, *Canada's Search*, p. 116.
8. L. C. and F. W. Park, *The Anatomy of Big Business* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1962), p. 136.
9. Clifford H. Ince, *The Royal Bank of Canada, A Chronology, 1864-1969* (Montreal: Royal Bank, 1969), p. 109.
10. Graeme S. Mount, "Aspects of Canadian Economic Activity in the Spanish-Speaking Caribbean," *Laurentian University Review*, v (November 1972), pp. 89-92.
11. J. Fred Rippy, *British Investments in Latin America, 1822-1949. A Case Study in the Operations of Private Enterprise in Retarded Regions* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1966), pp. 243-45. F. J. Mulqueen, "A Canadian Enterprise Abroad," *Canadian Banker*, v. 59 (Winter 1952), pp. 36-40.
12. Public Archives of Canada (PAC), O'Hara to Chisholm 27 June 1928, RG 20 B1 (v. 8-12467); Canadian Manufacturers' Association's Commercial Intelligence Committee report and correspondence in PAC, RG 20 B1 (v. 3 A 710).
13. The "Black Legend" is an anti-Hispanic legend going back to the period of early Spanish settlements in America. While aimed at Spanish-Indian relations, it grew into a general dislike by North Europeans of Spain, Spaniards, and their descendents. Much of this dislike centred on the Protestant-Roman Catholic, and Anglo-Spanish rivalries in the post-1550 period. The tradition established in English-speaking countries is what I call the "Sir Francis Drake syndrome." That syndrome regards the English as clean-cut, honest and brave, while the Spanish are brutal, dark and dirty. For an example of this approach, see Marjorie W. Hamilton, *Pirates and Pathfinders* (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1954), a popular text in the Ontario public school system used by almost a generation of students. A recent article by Christon I. Archer ("The Transient Presence: A Re-Appraisal of Spanish attitudes toward the Northwest Coast in the Eighteenth Century," *B.C. Studies* [Summer 1973], p. 3) points out that recent works on British Columbia describe the Spaniards as "indolent," "brutal," "high-handed"; stereotyped images without sound foundation, at least in the B.C. case.
14. On the "twenty-second Chair" and Canadian interest in the Pan American Union, see John P. Humphrey, *The Inter-American System: A Canadian View* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1942); Marcel Roussin, *Le Canada et le système interaméricain* (Ottawa, éditions de l'université d'Ottawa, 1959); Eugene H. Miller, "Canada and the Pan American Union," *International Journal*, III (Winter 1947-48), pp. 24-38.
15. Ogelsby, "Relaciones," p. 76, fn 28. From personal experience I have found that many Latin Americans still tend to use the subjunctive tense (which implies doubt) when discussing Canadian independence from Britain.

16. Douglas Anglin, "United States Opposition to Canadian Membership in the Pan American Union: A Canadian View," *International Organization*, xv (Winter 1961), pp. 2-6. Canada did join the Pan American Postal Union in October 1931. Senator Beaubien's cable announcing that adhesion is in PUBlic Archives Record Centre (hereinafter cited PARC) 265366. 265366.
17. H. Gordon Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad, From Agency to Embassy* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1945), p. 236.
18. Wilgress to Skelton, 7 February 1938, PARC 282693.
19. O. D. Skelton Memorandum, 9 September 1938, PARC 282693.
20. Norman Robertson to Skelton, 5 April 1940 and Massey to SSEA, 2 May 1940, PARC 282658.
21. *Debates, House of Commons* (hereinafter cited as *Debates*), III, 1940 (6 August 1940), p. 2537.
22. King to Skelton, 13 August 1940, PARC 282693.
23. Memorandum to Prime Minister, 10 August 1940, PARC 282693.
24. Robertson Memorandum, 8 February 1941, PARC 282909.
25. Memorandum to Prime Minister, 15 February 1941, PARC 282909.
26. *Ibid.*, 17 June 1941.
27. Quoted in Anglin, "Opposition," p. 8. Anglin's article is excellent on this subject. It is based on Moffatt's papers in the Harvard University Library.
28. *Ibid.*, fn 29.
29. Memorandum, 17 June 1941 PARC 282909.
30. Welles also had a role to play in Peru's desire to establish relations with Canada. Hume Wrong to Robertson, 14 May 1942, PARC, External Affairs (hereinafter cited as EA) 1570-40.
31. Skelton to Wodehouse, 4 April 1940, PARC 265542.
32. Robertson, who was not keen on membership, reported to Moffatt that Désy and Keenleyside were (Anglin, "Opposition," p. 10). See also Reid's position in Memorandum of 31 October 1941, PARC 283130.
33. Memorandum, 10 December 1941, PARC 283130.
34. "Chronology of Canada-Pan American Union Relations," PARC 283130.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Anglin, "Opposition," p. 10.
37. "Chronology . . .," PARC 283130.
38. Anglin, "Opposition," p. 10. Such an attitude was not far wrong in Winston Churchill's view and may have influenced Roosevelt in this regard. Churchill is reported to have told King during a 1944 conversation that on the possible U.N. "regional council in the Americas, we in Britain hope that Canada would represent Britain." Blair Fraser, *Search for Identity* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1967), p. 79.
39. King's notes on Memorandum, 17 December 1941, PARC 283130.
40. Anglin, "Opposition," pp. 10-12.
41. Castillo Najera to Mahoney, 27 December 1940, and Wrong to Robertson, 14 May 1942, PARC, EA 1570-40; British Legation (Havana) to SSEA, 25 April 1942, PARC, EA 289-40.
42. Prime Minister St. Laurent established his government's policy in a statement to a press conference in Washington on 12 February 1949 (*External Affairs*, May 1949, p. 33). Miller, "Canada and Pan American Union," pp. 25-28.
43. Memorandum, 19 June 1952 (declassified) on projected trade mission, PARC, EA 11563-3-40.
44. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 5 March 1953.
45. Related to the author by Arthur Irwin (interview of 25 July 1968), former ambassador to Brazil, who represented Canada there at the time of the Smith visit.
46. Trevor Lloyd, *Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959* (Toronto: Oxford, 1968), p. 228.
47. *Time* (Canada), 26 October 1959, p. 18.
48. *Vancouver Province*, 9 July 1943; *Globe and Mail*, 7 January 1960. Mr. Green stated his views on his interest in Latin America in an interview with the author on 20 August 1968.
49. See, for example, *Vancouver Province*, 9 April 1960; *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 April 1960; *Ottawa Le Droit*, 26 April 1960. *Globe and Mail*, 15 March 1960, was not interested in OAS membership, a position that it has held for a number of years.
50. Interview of 20 August 1968; *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 May 1960; *Time* (Canada), 6 June 1960.
51. In 1961 Canada exchanged relations with the nine remaining countries. It opened a mission in San José, Costa Rica, whose ambassador was accredited to Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and El Salvador. Canada's ambassador in Colombia was accredited to Ecuador, the ambassador in Mexico was accredited to Guatemala, the ambassador in Peru was accredited to Bolivia and the ambassador in Argentina was accredited to Paraguay. *External Affairs*, XIV (May 1962), p. 165.
52. *Time* (Canada), 6 June 1960.
53. *Vancouver Sun*, 17 June 1960. J. C. M. Ogelsby, "Canada and the Pan American Union: Twenty Years On," *International Journal*, XXIV (Summer 1969), pp. 573-74.
54. *Debates*, IV of 1960-1961 (26 April 1961), pp. 4027-28 and 4403. Martin's maiden speech is in *Debates*, IV of 1936 (18 June 1936), 3879-84. Martin touched on possible membership or at least participation in advisory conferences of the PAU in a paragraph on p. 3884.
55. Peyton V. Lyon, *Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963* (Toronto: Oxford, 1968), p. 523; Ogelsby, "Pan American Union," p. 576. Kennedy asked A. D. P. Heeney, the Canadian ambassador, if it would be all right to raise the issue. Heeney saw no reason for not doing so.
56. *Debates*, VIII, 1960-61 (11 September 1961), p. 8203.
57. Canadian Labour Congress press release of 16 May 1961; *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 1 December 1961; Student Christian Movement's National Council resolution of November 1961.
58. R. M. Will, "Economic Aspects of Canadian-Latin American Relations," *International Journal*, xv (Autumn 1960), pp. 346-54; Adèle Lauzon, "La mission américaine du Canada," *Cité Libre*, XI (décembre 1960), pp. 19-21;

- and Barry Lando, "Is Cuba a Communist Beachhead?", *Saturday Night*, (12 November 1960), pp. 21-23.
59. *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 January 1961; *Le Devoir*, 21 avril 1961; *La Presse*, 14 mars 1961; *Toronto Telegram*, January 1961; *Globe and Mail*, 5 January 1961, illustrate this point of view.
 60. John T. Saywell, ed., *Canadian Annual Review* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 137; *Time* (Canada), 19 December 1960 and 26 December 1960. *Le Devoir*, 5 février 1962. Among other newspapers commenting on the OAS decision were the *Globe and Mail*, *Toronto Telegram*, *Montréal Le Nouveau Journal*, *Quebec Chronicle*, *Time* (Canada), 9 February 1962; François Piazza, "Punta del Este: La Farce est jouée," *Cité Libre*, xiii (mars 1962), pp. 18-19.
 61. Quoted in Heath Macquarrie's paper delivered before Second Inter-collegiate Conference on Canadian-American Relations, 24 February 1967, p. 13.
 62. Mike, *the Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), I, p. 269.
 63. *Globe and Mail*, 6 May 1963; Charles Lynch in *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 July 1963; "Le Canada et l'OEA," *Relations*, no 276 (décembre 1963), p. 342.
 64. *Debates*, I, 1963 (16 May 1963), p. 65.
 65. Charles Lynch in *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 August 1966.
 66. See, for example, comments generated by Kennedy's invitation of 17 May 1961. Canadian opinion was not opposed to assisting Latin America, but was generally opposed to doing so if it meant bowing to U.S. pressure to join OAS.
 67. Iris S. Podea, "Pan American Sentiment in French Canada," *International Journal*, III (Autumn 1948), pp. 334-48; J. C. M. Ogelsby, "French Canada and Latin America," *Canadian Forum* (September 1969), pp. 132-35.
 68. Compare the editorial position of "Le Canada et l'OEA," *Cité Libre*, xv (octobre 1964), pp. 2-3, with Trudeau's position in 1968 (*Globe and Mail*, 5 April 1968).
 69. *Toronto Telegram*, 25 April 1968. Compare this position with that of Mr. King in the Commons in March, 1939: "We realize that in many cases these people are facing problems similar to those that Canadians have to meet, and that the solutions they have found, or are striving for, have significance for us." Cited in Humphrey, *Inter-American System*, p. 267.
 70. Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy, A Study in Decision-Making* (Toronto: Oxford, 1972), p. 47. This book is very perceptive concerning Trudeau's impact on the entire foreign policy review. Pelletier to author in interview in August 1967.
 71. Quoted in Dobell, *Canada's Search*, p. 115.
 72. Ogelsby, "Relaciones," pp. 69-71.
 73. *Toronto Star*, 10 March 1969.
 74. The author was in attendance at the meeting and this is his personal impression.
 75. *FPC-Latin America*, p. 28.
 76. This is an impression gained from the government's activities in these areas during the autumn of 1969. *Globe and Mail*, 4 November 1969.
 77. "Statements and Speeches" No. 70/10 (Information Division, Department of External Affairs). It is worth noting that in both cases of Canada's approach to the OAS the Minister delegated the job to a Parliamentary Secretary. This suggests the importance of the act may be secondary to other Canadian external interests.
 78. "Statement" (SSEA) of Ouellet, 15 April 1971; Associated Press release of 21 January 1962; "Statement" (SSEA) of Paul St. Pierre to General Assembly of the OAS, 15 April 1972, p. 1.
 79. "Canada and Latin America" (a background paper prepared by Latin American Division, Department of External Affairs, 8 March 1973).
 80. Colin I. Bradford, Jr., and Caroline Pestieau, *Canada and Latin America: The Potential for Partnership* (Toronto: Canadian Association for Latin America, 1971), p. 84.
 81. The 1944 statistics are from Arthur L. Neal, "Canada's Trade Ties with Latin America," *Canadian Geographical Journal* (August 1945); the 1972 figures are taken from the *Report*, Department of Trade and Commerce, Latin American Division, 1973.
 82. "Some Aspects of Canadian Trade with Latin America," a 1966 report of the Latin American Division, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce.
 83. Personal conversations with Cuban and Canadian officials.
 84. *FPC-Latin America*, p. 18.
 85. "Canadians in Latin America," *Bulletin* No. 104 of the Latin American Office of the Canadian Catholic Conference.
 86. Father Charles Conroy, *Peruvian Journal* (Montreal: Palm Press, 1966); "From Machetes to Mechanized Farming in the Andes," *Cooperation Canada* (November-December 1972), pp. 24-27; Edgard Salazar Yañez, *El Instituto de Capacitación para el trabajo industrial "Jesus Obrero"* (Comas, 1967); interviews with missionaries in Santiago, Chile and Montevideo, Uruguay in 1971-72.
 87. See my chapters on the Baptists and other missionaries in *Gringos from the Far North: Essays in the History of Canadian-Latin American Relations, 1866-1968* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976).
 88. *Brascan Annual Report 1972* (Toronto, 1973).
 89. John Sokol, "Canada's Missing the Boat in the Dominican Republic," *Commentator* (April 1970), pp. 10-11. See the article on Brascan in *Last Post* (March 1973), pp. 29-39, for an opposition view to the company's role in Brazil.

HEATH MACQUARRIE

Canada and the Caribbean

With no area of the Third World has Canada had more interest and closer contacts than with the Caribbean. This is especially the case with those communities which were or are British dependencies.¹ For most of her history, Canada's interest in the western hemisphere extended no further south than the Rio Grande. Continentalism in reality meant an overwhelming preoccupation with the United States and a sustained lack of concern about Latin America. Our tepidity regarding membership in the Organization of American States (OAS) is typical of Canadian remoteness from those people euphemistically referred to as our "hemispheric neighbours."²

Nevertheless, although it fell far behind Westminster and Washington in our priorities of attention, the Caribbean area has for many years stimulated the interest of Canada and Canadians. Long before Confederation, in the heyday of their prosperous "wood, wind and water" economy, the northern Atlantic colonies were carrying on a significant trade with the southern islands. Schooners from Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island carried fish, livestock, lumber and other staples to the West Indies and returned with rum, molasses, sugar and spices. The Maritimers' continuing predilection for rum seems to indicate

that in this exchange their northern traders got the better of the bargain!

Maritimers are sometimes accused of romanticizing the past and retrospectively overrating the importance of their commercial ties with the Caribbean, but it is nevertheless true that the people of the seaboard provinces did have close ties with the colonies of the sparkling Caribbean. A succinct and sensitive appreciation of this relationship was made a few years ago in Halifax by the late Robert Winters, then Minister of Trade and Commerce and a native of Lunenburg, Nova Scotia.

In this part of our country, there is a special consciousness of the importance of our relations with the West Indies. These provinces are separated from the West Indies by about 2,000 miles of ocean, but for our people the sea has from the earliest times been a highway rather than a barrier. In the days of Nova Scotia's preeminence in the carrying trade, many Maritimers were familiar with the West Indian islands—more so, in fact, than with other parts of our own vast country. At the time of Confederation, one man out of eight in Nova Scotia was working full time in the carrying trade and many participated in it for part of the year. There were indeed few sea-going men in this Province who did not sail to the West Indies at one time or another. I think it is these contacts more than anything else which have contributed to the feeling of closeness between the Maritime Provinces and the British Caribbean. It could have been that the rum we took in trade helped the spirit of conviviality, but I must remind you at the same time that over the years we have had a strong branch of the WCTU in Lunenburg. My own lifelong interest in the West Indies was initially stimulated by hearing about my father's travels as a schooner captain fishing on the banks in the spring and summer and plying the West Indies trade in the fall and winter.³

But the merchants of Halifax, Saint John and other northern centres had stiff competition from the vigorous traders of the Thirteen Colonies. The "Bluenosers" were top-notch sailors and their schooners could hold their own with any ships on the ocean, but Boston was closer to the West Indies than Halifax and the more productive economy of the Thirteen Colonies could provide a wider range of trading goods than was available in the poorer northern colonies.⁴ As the sugar islands concentrated more and more on one-commodity

production, their interests in imports deepened. It was, therefore, inevitable that Nova Scotia and the other northern colonies would have to fight hard for their share in the lucrative trade with the communities on the Spanish Main.⁵

The Revolutionary War naturally had profound effects upon the trading relations between the Thirteen Colonies and the West Indies, but it did not usher in a great upsurge of trade for Nova Scotia nor was that province able to fill the vacuum created by the temporary withdrawal of the significant trade from the rebellious colonies to the West Indies. Nova Scotia had at times trouble enough finding food stuff for its own people and once again it was too far away to muscle in on the opportunities which might have been available. Even after the separation of the Thirteen Colonies, Nova Scotia still had but a limited share of the West Indies trade, although it did well in the sale of lumber and fish. For a time, an important development in the Nova Scotian economy was the increase in ship-building, stimulated by regulations that American trade might flow to the West Indies only if carried in British ships. Of course, vessels constructed in Nova Scotia qualified in that category. The outbreak of the Napoleonic War in 1793 required concentration of British shipping in the European war zone and restrictions against the United States shipping were relaxed. Indeed, they were relaxed so much that the merchants of Halifax established a committee on West Indies trade with the object of excluding all foreigners from commercial dealings with the British West Indies, and confining that intercourse to communities loyal to the Empire.

In the curtailment of American trade with the West Indies, the British authorities did not always exert themselves as vigorously as these Nova Scotian merchants would have liked. The effects of the Napoleonic Wars and the American response to the trade embargoes enforced by the belligerents did bring to the Atlantic provinces some substantial benefits.

For some time Nova Scotia reaped the advantages of an entrepôt trade in accepting United States goods for re-export to the West Indies. But while this was a period of increased commercial activity for Nova Scotia, it did not bring on a glorious age of expansion or abundant prosperity. The Mari-

timers did not oust the Americans as the great traders with the West Indies, and it would have been naive to expect it. The provinces and people of the North Atlantic seaboard had disadvantages then from which they still suffer. They are too far away, too poor and too often taken for granted.

These references to early efforts to overcome geographic disadvantages are significant as harbingers of later sustained efforts to overcome them by use of tariff preferences and subsidized shipping services. While the other residents of the British North American colonies, the Canadians, may not have had the romantic or sentimental ties with the West Indies, and may have preferred rye to rum, their commercial and political leaders were none the less interested in increasing trade opportunities with the West Indies. In 1855, the Province of Canada sought to negotiate a preferential tariff with the West Indies, but this initiative was quashed by the British government which still adhered to the policy of Imperial Free Trade.

But the Canadians' interest was not dissipated and in 1865 they joined with the Maritime provinces to send a high-level mission to the Caribbean to seek out market opportunities there. Discussions of tariff levels were undertaken with various spokesmen of the islands and the Caribbean areas.

In 1885, the government of the Dominion of Canada renewed its interest in the West Indian area through the appointment by Prime Minister Macdonald of Sir Francis Hincks, former Governor of Barbados, as adviser on West Indian affairs. According to Professor Duncan G. Fraser, one of this country's most astute and knowledgeable students of West Indian-Canadian relations, the appointment of Hincks, the old-time politician and railway promoter, was of considerable significance in the life of the new Dominion.

The timing was propitious; for during the 1880's there was much interest shown in both Canada and the West Indies for closer commercial and political arrangements between the two areas. And of course there was no economic conflict between them. From the West Indian point of view Hincks' appointment was most welcome, for at that time West Indian sugar producers were urgently in need of new markets. Free-trade Great Britain had begun to import bounty-fed

European beet sugar in place of West Indian cane and the West Indies needed to offset this lost market. At this time there were of course no Canadian sugar beet industries. From the West Indian point of view closer political and commercial ties would mean a guaranteed outlet for sugar, and in both Barbados and Jamaica it was suggested that the West Indies might well become a Canadian province. Discussions of an informal nature were held, but the matter of political union was very quickly dropped. Interest was then concentrated on trade; and the arrangement of a commercial agreement between Canada and the West Indies on a basis of reciprocity continued to attract attention. Nothing came of these proposals immediately, because during the 1880's and 1890's the Colonial Office would not sanction any arrangements which would involve the creation of differential duties in favour of Canada.⁶

In 1886, J. T. Wylde visited the islands to seek to stimulate interest in closer commercial ties with Canada. In 1889 and 1890, George Foster, Minister of Finance in the Macdonald government, made an extended tour of the Caribbean area. Among other things, he successfully urged the subsidization of steamship lines by the Canadian government in an effort to promote closer ties between the areas. In 1893, six commercial agents were appointed by the Canadian government in the West Indies, beginning a trend which saw a greater emphasis upon commercial rather than political contacts with the region.

In 1898, the Laurier government made a unilateral preference grant to sugar coming into the Canadian market from the West Indies area. As Professor Fraser points out, this was probably as much "a declaration of Canadian fiscal independence as it was a gesture of help to the West Indies. But, it was most important from the point of view of Canadian-West Indies relations, for it resulted in the creation of firm trade links between Canada and the British Caribbean."⁷

Sugar was very much to the forefront in considerations of West Indian-Canadian commercial policy. In the 1880s and 1890s discussion of the question was complicated by the repercussions of American foreign and commercial policy. For a long time, the United States had discriminated against the best sugar from Europe which had been sustained by subsidies granted domestic producers in several countries.

Against this, the Americans had to use tariffs to protect their own domestic sugar-cane industry. In the process, however, the West Indian producers gained a protective market in the United States and this was a bonanza for them. But the Spanish-American War and the commercial, if not political, annexation of Cuba and the Philippines left the West Indian producers on the outside. It was the aftermath of this ebullient expression of American imperialism which prompted a vigorous effort on the part of the West Indian sugar producers to enter the Canadian market.

THE CONFERENCE SERIES

In January 1890, a preliminary conference concerning trade between Canada and the West Indian colonies was held in Barbados. The Canadians, in an effort to forestall the difficulties which would result from separate negotiations between their government and that of each colony, proposed that a Royal Commission be appointed to study the whole question. The British government acquiesced in this suggestion, and in May of 1909 indicated its willingness to appoint such a commission and press for the inclusion of W. S. Fielding and W. Patterson, ministers of Finance and Trade and Commerce in the Laurier government. The British, not surprisingly, also accepted the offer of the Canadian government to assist in the defraying of the expenses of its own members plus one-third of all other commission expenses.

It was ironic that the Laurier government, which had been involved with apparently some genuine interest in discussion of reciprocal trade with the West Indies, should be swept from power because of their advocacy of reciprocity with the United States. Thus it was the Borden government which represented Canada in the negotiations and deliberations which followed the preliminary discussions of 1909 and the recommendations of the Royal Commission. But the new government hailed the move as a contribution to strengthen Empire solidarity.

The Speech from the Throne opening the first session under Borden's prime-ministership contained this paragraph: The advantages that would result from a wider exchange of products

between the various countries of the Empire are undoubted, in view of the wonderful variety and extent of those productions, and negotiations have been opened for improved trade arrangements with the British West Indies and British Guyana which should prove advantageous to those colonies as well as to this Dominion.⁸

The mover of the address in reply to the Speech from the Throne, R. B. Bennett, M.P. for Calgary, in the course of a long and fervent speech said:

It is important if we are to bring about that commercial and organic union of the British Empire of which I think we all have a strong and abiding hope, it must be done through commercial means. The genius of Pitt, the genius of Chamberlain, the genius of other great English statesmen has foreseen the extraordinary possibilities of uniting the overseas dominions with the mother country to commercial ties and commercial bonds. It is essential that we in Canada, as the greatest partner, should extend our trade so far as possible among the British dominions and with the motherland. I hail consequently that reference in the speech from the Throne with regard to increased efforts to promote our trade with the West Indies and British Guyana, as an indication of a desire on the part of the administration to expand our trade in those directions.⁹

The 1912 Canada-West Indies Conference was held behind closed doors but a verbatim account of the sessions was recorded and later published as a sessional paper. Sir George Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce, presided over the Conference, which met for a week in Ottawa with a final day's sitting in Toronto. His colleagues, the Ministers of Finance and Customs, were also members of the Canadian delegation. The Caribbean representatives were from Trinidad, British Guiana, Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, Dominica and Montserrat.

After vigorous and sustained arguments, a series of tariff preferences was agreed upon, and commitments were made to concerted action towards improving communications and transportation facilities between Canada and the southern colonies. Adequate cable connections and swifter, more commodious shipping service were agreed upon. Without much debate or any great haste the conference agreements were enacted into legislation in the Canadian Parliament. The

outbreak of the First World War naturally had a profound effect upon the economics of Canada and the Caribbean, but a look at the trade statistics would indicate that the agreements entered into at the 1912 conference did contribute to a modest growth in trade between the northern Dominion and the Caribbean area.

In its final year of office the Union government of Sir Robert Borden brought the question of Canada-West Indies relations formally before Parliament. On May 31, Sir George Foster advised that although the 1912 agreement still had two years to run, a new conference was being held to make new and broader agreements.

The 1920 conference met in Ottawa for twelve days with Sir George Foster again serving as chairman. Number seven of Foster's proposed ground rules was an intriguing one; it called for majority decisions but also provided an overall Canadian veto.

Perhaps Canada's growing experience as an international host was shown in the more elaborate opening ceremony which included a welcome from the Governor General, the Duke of Devonshire, as well as from Robert Borden, the Prime Minister. Borden's unpretentious common sense was shown in a portion of his welcoming speech when he was referring to increasing trade between the two regions:

The opportunities are so obvious that it strikes me we should be rather derelict to our duty if we did not take advantage of them. We cannot grow sugar and bananas and various other articles that might be enumerated with any degree of success in this country—not in the open air, at least—but we have all varieties of products that grow well in a temperate region. You, on the one hand, have what we require and cannot produce; we, on the other hand, have some articles which you require and cannot produce.¹⁰

Foster then expressed particular satisfaction over the fact that representatives from British Honduras, Bahamas, Bermuda and Jamaica, all areas unrepresented in 1912, were present at the 1920 gathering. He noted that progress in improving trade had been satisfactory, but not as satisfactory as it might have been nor as they had wished in 1912. He believed that the conference was held to examine the reasons

for the "apparent and comparatively small increase of business" between the two areas and to seek remedial measures.

He expressed the hope that there would be improvement in the preferential tariff and again as in 1912 underscored the Canadian government's interest in improving facilities for communication and for a better cable-telegraph and post service.

Although the 1920 conference seemed to have a heavier concentration on business than on political emotions, Foster, the old United Empire Loyalist, did ring the imperialist theme.

We are all Britons, and we are all loyal and true to the one Empire and to its central authority. We are allied not only by that spirit and that sentiment which is a deathless one and a very important one, but there are also other interests that are formed and can be increasingly formed between us. Between us and you there intervenes a large and most prosperous and most important country, the United States of America. We trade largely with the United States of America, and amicably. You trade largely with the United States of America, and equally amicably; and both of us to our mutual advantage. But that does not prevent us at all from looking upon that immense amount of trade that we do with the United States, which is not within the Empire, and making in a perfectly reasonable and neighbourly way arrangements by which we can do more of that trading between the parts of the Empire and less of it with the United States of America.¹¹

The Canadian government's conference commitments in reference to transportation were generous and for this the government was criticized. In the House of Commons a few days after the conference C. C. Ballantyne, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, ran the gamut of sharp opposition queries, but he stated that without the projected role for the Canadian merchant marine the success of the conference would have been unlikely. Jamaica, he said, would not have given Canada a preference if it had not been for the *quid pro quo* of transportation facilities to be made available by Canadian ships.

It might be said that the emphasis on shipping services had a variety of motivations. Ballantyne was right in recognizing

that Canadians were feeling nationalistic stirrings in the aftermath of the First World War and the Canadian role in peacemaking. There was also the mundane consideration that it had been considered wise not to cut down abruptly the production of Canadian shipyards in the period of high unemployment immediately following demobilization. Thus there had been a heavy turnout of Canadian ships and it was not so difficult to find bottoms for the West Indies service. The 4,575-ton *Canadian Voyageur* and the 8,408-ton *Canadian Pioneer* were launched in November and December of 1918 and the *Voyageur* was on the West Indies service in February 1919.

What might be described as the final meeting in the first series of conferences was held in Ottawa in June of 1925. The conference convened on June 19. The Canadian delegation consisted of six Ministers and six Liberal M.P.'s listed as parliamentary associates. One of these, H. J. Logan of Cumberland, Nova Scotia, had earlier been in the Caribbean area conveying the Canadian government's invitation to the conference.

In his speech, the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, noted with approval the increase since 1920 in the volume of Canada flour sold to the West Indies as well as the sharp increase in Canada's purchases of West Indian sugar. He also touched on the imperialist theme:

These figures indicate very clearly that we have only to know of the opportunities, and to seek the different ways and means of meeting them in order to furnish a greater trade to the mutual advantage of both. We are citizens, as I have already said, of the same great Empire; we are under the same flag. Whatever we do in the matter of increasing trade between ourselves, will, we believe, not only be serving our mutual interests, but will assist in developing a community of interest within the Empire itself, and that is all to the good for all concerned. [Applause]¹²

The opening statement for Canada was given by Herbert Marler, M.P. for the Montreal constituency of St. Lawrence-St. George. And as a member of Parliament but not a member of the government he made it clear that he was not speaking "definitely and absolutely for the Government of Canada."

He and his parliamentary colleagues were acting as advisers to the government.

In his lengthy speech Marler made an exhaustive analysis of the trade development since the first agreement. He noted the heavy proportion of West Indies trade with the United Kingdom and the United States and sought greater purchases of Canadian manufactured goods by the Caribbean buyers. Marler's directness is shown in his reference to sale of meats:

Take up the question of meats: What do we export from Canada? We exported over \$29,000,000 worth of meats. We find that we sold you only \$250,000 worth of meats, and you imported nearly \$3,000,000 worth. You bought from the United States nearly \$2,500,000 worth of meats, and we would like to sell you that \$2,500,000 worth here from Canada.¹³

A little later he declared: "As I stated a few moments ago, perhaps stated in too greedy a way, we want to keep not only the part of your trade which we now have, but we want to capture all your trade, particularly the imports taken by you from the United States of America."¹⁴

Again, as always, the great shadow of Uncle Sam hovered over the Canadian and West Indian economies.

The Canadian government's desire to increase trade with the Caribbean was underscored by Marler's indication that the government was prepared to give a substantial subsidy to two shipping services, one serving the West and the other the Eastern Caribbean.

In their responses to Marler's opening statement the West Indian delegates also asserted that it would be unrealistic to expect increased trade without the provision of improved transportation facilities.

In the aftermath of the 1925 conference the Canadian government gave high priority to the provision of ships and ushered in the era of the "Lady Boats" which finally had as many as five ships on the service. Statistics on the movement of goods and people show substantial growth in both. Throughout the Caribbean one finds today a strong feeling of nostalgia for the days when the "Lady Boats" brought the people of the northern and southern communities closer together. By the end of the Second World War the ships were

no more and the heyday of West Indies-Canada steamship service was at an end.¹⁵ The technology of transportation in the 1970s seems far removed from that of the 1920s and 1930s. Yet even in the jet age and the era of the supertanker, the fast and efficient marine transportation of goods and people remains a basic requirement for any full-scale development of the potentiality for maximum commercial exchanges between the Caribbean and Canada.

The Second World War, like the First, was followed by profound economic and political changes in both Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean. Its aftermath brought new dimensions and new concerns to the long-standing relationships. Like other parts of the British overseas domain in the late forties and early fifties, the Caribbean communities were much concerned about their developing political status. In January 1958 a new Commonwealth state, the Federation of the West Indies, was formed comprising, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, Grenada, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. But the ambitious Federation had a brief unhappy existence and after its collapse in May 1962 the larger island and mainland territories moved toward independence. The smaller ones sought as much sovereignty as the realities of economic and geographic magnitude would allow. Thus Canada found herself dealing with rapidly changing communities and a new type of Caribbean leader. Through her external aid programs and a variety of bilateral agreements, Canada sought to assist the small southern polities gain a measure of economic self sufficiency.

In 1958, the Diefenbaker government inaugurated a special program of aid for the Commonwealth Caribbean. A sum of \$10 million was made available over a five-year period. A residence of the University of the West Indies was constructed at Mona, Jamaica, water and port facilities were upgraded, aid was given to elementary schools, port and water surveys and two ships were provided to meet the internal communication needs of the new federation.

The boats were appropriately named the *Federal Palm* and *Federal Maple*. The Commonwealth Caribbean was the first

area outside the Colombo plan to be designated for such a comprehensive and concentrated aid program.

In 1966, Prime Minister Pearson presided over a heads of government meeting in Ottawa attended by representatives of Canada, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, British Honduras, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. This conference produced a number of commitments. There was discussion of the perennial topics: sugar, bananas, immigration, improved transportation facilities. The conference also called for increased levels of assistance for the non-independent territories. Special consideration was devoted to further programs of assistance to the University of the West Indies and the desirability of further strengthening the cultural ties between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean. Efforts were to be made to stimulate private investment in the Caribbean area.

Although future meetings were forecast, none has been held. Presumably, Canada is willing to respond to any request for another meeting but Caribbean leaders have not suggested it.

POLITICAL UNION?

This brief historical outline would be incomplete without some reference to the question of political union with Canada of some of the Caribbean islands. At no time was there anything even close to the likelihood of such a development. But the idea was proposed and given some passing consideration. In the years following Confederation as the new dominion was reaching westward and northward to occupy half of the continent there were a few Canadians whose expansionist range embraced the southern isles. The Canada First Movement in the 1870s called for "closer trade relations with the British West Indies, with a view to a closer political connection." An early and eager advocate of union was A. Spencer Jones, a supporter of the Conservative party and an associate of bankers and insurance men who were beginning to establish financial beach-heads in the Caribbean. Jones, a tireless publicist, in a letter in the *Toronto Mail*, wrote of an ex-

panded dominion which would soon extend to "a great South as well as a great West," in which "Legislators . . . from the smiling fields of Ontario and the ancient cities of the St. Lawrence . . . shall sit in Parliament with their fellow British-Canadians from the lands of perpetual summer."

He also broke into print in the Caribbean press, with the *Colonial Standard* and *Jamaica Despatch* of Kingston carrying his views and editorializing that Jamaica would pass either to the United States or Canada. The *Standard* preferred the latter in order that the Empire ties might be retained without having to endure "the clique of Imperial and Colonial officials." Jones pressed his views on individual political leaders in the West Indies and found favourable response among some of them. Michael Solomon, a former member of the Jamaica Legislative Council, in June of 1884 headed a group of Jamaican proprietors in waiting on Lord Derby, the Colonial Secretary, to press the cause of Jamaican federation with Canada. Derby was far from enthusiastic, caring little for federations, especially if they involved the inclusion of "any more black men." He did, however, indicate that the Colonial Office would not put up any road blocks if Canadian and Jamaican leaders could agree, but declared that the question was one in the competence of the Ottawa government. There was little likelihood of the Canadian government moving either far or fast on the question. Sir Charles Tupper, Canada's High Commissioner in London, was asked by Prime Minister Macdonald to discuss Solomon's proposal with Derby.

While the correspondence on the subject indicates something less than total rejection of the idea, it does show that southern expansion was low on John A. Macdonald's priority list. His Finance Minister, S. L. Tilley, believed that Canada would lose about \$2 million in customs revenue by union with Jamaica. Hincks, the Prime Minister's adviser on West Indian affairs, was also against the idea. The *Toronto Globe* described the suggestion as fraudulent and designed to bolster Sir John's ego and buttress his waning commercial program.

Macdonald's disinclination for closer ties with the West

Indies was not due solely to his preoccupation with serious domestic problems. The press of Canada were almost universally hostile to the idea, basing their opposition on racial, political and economic grounds.

Solomon, who became an elected member of the Jamaican Legislative Council, moved in that body that "political and commercial federation with the Dominion of Canada" would be "for the general interest of this Island." He found no supporters. Some members expressed the fear that Jamaica's agriculture interests other than sugar would suffer from competition with Canadian farm production and that even sugar might not be safe should the dominion develop a refined beet-sugar industry. The Kingston *Daily Gleaner*, unlike its competitor the *Standard*, was vigorously opposed to union which it viewed as British trickery to unload Jamaica. If that were the case, argued the *Standard*, better to have annexation with the United States which might be of some benefit to Jamaica rather than tacking the island on to Canada "as a sort of hospital for Canadian Government rheumatics."

Despite the enthusiasm of its few advocates the Canada-Jamaica union project fell to the ground because of hostility or indifference in both communities. In 1885 Jamaica did send a delegation to Canada to discuss reciprocity but that was probably a ploy to help strengthen its hand in discussions of the same subject with the United States. In any case, the delegation never did meet with the Canadian government, which at the time was heavily involved in dealing with the second uprising of Louis Riel.

While the discussions of the union of Jamaica and Canada were more sustained, there were from time to time advocates of joining other Caribbean colonies with the fast-growing dominion on the northern side of the United States. At different times the Bahamas and Barbados figured in these speculations which, however, received something less than serious consideration in Ottawa or southern political circles.

In perusing the whole record of Canadian-West Indies relationships one finds only one occasion when the prospect of political union was ever seriously considered as a real possibility in ruling circles in Canada. This was while Sir Robert Borden was still Prime Minister and viewing the world with

the internationalist outlook gained through his powerful and successful assertions of Canadian independence at London and Versailles.

The First World War and the years following brought traumatic changes in the outlook of Canada's leaders and her people. After the heavy and painful involvement of many thousands of young Canadians on the battlefronts of Europe and the successes of Borden in achieving recognition of his country's right to membership in the international community, Canada could never be the same again. Sir Robert Borden, who described himself as both an imperialist and a nationalist, had led the fight for a Commonwealth of autonomous, juridically equal dominions with sovereignty over foreign as well as domestic affairs. But the assertion of intra-Commonwealth autonomy did not for him suggest a move towards a detachment from the councils and affairs of the Commonwealth. The idea that Canada might take over Britain's responsibility in the Caribbean was something worthy of consideration and the record shows that the matter did receive careful attention. But there was no ground swell of enthusiasm over the suggestion either in Canada or in the West Indies and the temptation to join the other victors in seeking territorial aggrandizement was resisted.¹⁶

In the domestic crises which faced the Union government in its final days and the tepid isolationism of the Mackenzie King era, no such international initiatives were even remotely likely and thoughts of Canadian expansion southward passed into limbo. But sporadically the old notion emerges still. With the collapse of the West Indian Federation there were suggestions that some of the smaller islands might find their future through economic or political union with Canada. A private members' resolution in the Canadian House of Commons in 1968 stating,

That, in the opinion of this House, the Government should consider the advisability of taking an initiative in seeking to promote closer relations with the former British possessions in the West Indies which have not yet attained independence and further that, if the residents of these islands so desire it, economic and political union of these islands with the Dominion of Canada be negotiated at an early date at the proper constitutional levels.¹⁷

received generally sympathetic consideration from the few M.P.'s who participated in the debate.

The most forthright and dramatic overture came from the tiny Turks and Caicos Islands in 1973. The state council by formal vote suggested union with Canada as the desirable constitutional goal for the colony. In July of the same year a five-member delegation of the Canadian branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association visited the islands as guests of the council. As members of a parliamentary organization which is appropriately precluded from a policy-making or official status they were able to appraise the needs and desires of the little colony with utmost freedom of movement. They were able to have a thorough discussion of the islands' problems without suggesting any abandonment of Canada's long-time reluctance to give even the appearance of a willingness to become an imperialist power in the Caribbean.¹⁸

At the present time the prospect of any Caribbean area becoming a province or territory of Canada is far beyond practical consideration. Future developments might alter the situation and there may be many changes ahead in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Some pragmatic Canadians are wondering if in an era of increasing affluence and longevity Canada might not benefit from having in her own dollar area a southern vacationland. For the imaginative and the visionary the door to closer Canadian Caribbean association remains at least ajar.

THE CARIBBEAN AREA

It is easy to fall into the error of referring to the Caribbean area as if it were one homogeneous community with identical interests, similar historical background and unanimity of outlook. Considering the heterogeneity and strong regionalism within their own country, Canadians should be especially alert to the fact that great diversity exists among the political entities within the Caribbean area. While it might have been more cozily convenient for the conduct of Canadian-Commonwealth Caribbean affairs if the federation had held together, it would however have constituted something of a political miracle had that exercise in federation been an instant success.

There are, of course, traditions, needs and problems which

the component parts of the region have in common. But the differences and contrasts are striking. In area the range is from Guyana (83,000 square miles) to Bermuda (21 square miles). Jamaica has 4,411 square miles; Montserrat has 33. The population of Jamaica is nearly two million; Turks and Caicos only 6,000. Trinidad and Tobago is a nation of 1.1 million; the Cayman Islands list a population of 10,000, just 1,000 more than the British Virgin Islands.

While the Caribbean area belongs to the developing world, there are wide divergencies in economic strength and potential. The per capita income of Trinidad and Tobago is three times that of St. Lucia and nearly twice that of Barbados, which itself is regarded as one of the "have" communities of the region. Jamaica is developing a broadly based economy with projected petrochemical and oil refining components. Some of the small islands are still painfully dependent upon a narrow range of agricultural production, be it sugar or bananas.

In their political development, there is also wide variation. Some of the smaller less-developed islands are British colonies, with administrative and executive authority residing in British-appointed officials. Others are self-governing in all matters exclusive of foreign affairs and defence. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago became independent in 1962, Guyana and Barbados in 1966. On July 10, 1973, the Bahamas joined this group. Belize, formerly British Honduras, is next in line for independence but the un-neighbourly posturings and mutterings of a nearby nation are causing some anxiety. Guatamala is asserting that as the residual legatee of Spain's claims she is entitled to a large portion of Belize's territorial domain. Not surprisingly, the leaders of Belize do not contemplate with pleasure the withdrawal of the British presence being followed by the movement of Guatamalan forces over their border. Belize has been seeking and obtaining the support and solidarity of other Commonwealth Caribbean communities in the face of this threat, but in realistic terms the declared hostility of Mexico to Guatamala's imperialistic ambitions may be more comforting.

Table 6:1 gives some notion of the composition and diversity of the Caribbean Commonwealth area.

Table 6: 1 The Commonwealth Caribbean

Country	Capital	Leader	Date of Last Election	Approximate Population (1973)	Area (sq. miles)	Per Capita Income (1972)*
Jamaica	Kingston	M. N. Manley, Prime Min.	Feb. '72	2 million†	4,411	\$1,116
Trinidad & Tobago	Port of Spain	Eric Williams, Prime Min.	May '71	1.06 " †	1,864	1,310
Guyana	Georgetown	L. F. S. Burnham, Prime Min.	July '73	770,000‡	83,000	400
Barbados	Bridgetown	Errol Barrow, Prime Min.	Sept. '71	240,000‡	166	800
Bahamas	Nassau	Lynden O. Pindling, Prime Min.	Sept. '72	200,000§	4,404	2,240
Grenada	St. George's	E. M. Gairy, Premier	Feb. '72	95,000†	133	250
<i>West Indies Associated States</i>						
Antigua	St. John's	Vere Bird, Premier	Feb. '76	74,000†	171	379
Dominica	Roseau	Patrick John, Premier	Apr. '75	73,000†	289.5	280
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	Basseterre	Robert L. Bradshaw, Premier	Dec. '75	65,000†	153	350
St. Lucia	Castries	J. G. M. Compton, Premier	May '74	107,000†	238	370
St. Vincent	Kingstown	M. Cato, Premier	Dec. '74	91,000†	150.3	240
<i>British Dependencies</i>						
British Honduras (Belize)	Balmopan	R. N. Posnett, Gov., George Price, Premier	Oct. '74	132,000†	8,866	670
Montserrat	Plymouth	P. A. Bramble, Chief Minister, W. H. Thompson, Gov.	Sept. '73	12,000†	37.5	n/a
Bermuda	Hamilton	Sir Edwin Leather, Gov., The Hon. Jack Sharpe, Premier	June '72	55,000†	20.6	4,190
Cayman Islands	George Town	K. R. Crook, Gov.	Nov. '72	11,000†	100	n/a
British Virgin Islands	Roadtown	W. W. Wallace, Gov.	June '71	12,000†	59	n/a
Turks and Caicos	Grand Turk	A. G. Mitchell, Gov.	Sept. '67	6,000†	192	n/a

* \$U.S. (approximate)

† U.N. estimate, 1973

‡ U.N. estimate, 1974

§ Government estimate, 1974

SOURCES: Leaders and areas: *The Statesman's Year-Book 1975/1976* (London: Macmillan, 1975)GNP per capita: *World Bank Atlas*, 1974 ed., IBRD: Appraisal of Caribbean Development Bank, 3/76Population: U.N., *Statistical Year Book*, 1974Elections: *World Almanac*, 1975/1976 (Garden City: Doubleday)*Europa Yearbook 1975: A World Survey* (Detroit: Gale)

NON-COMMONWEALTH AREAS OF THE CARIBBEAN

Although through governmental conferences and special agreements and programs the Canadian contacts with the Commonwealth Caribbean have become particularly close, we cannot disregard the other areas. Indeed, it may well be that in the near future there will be a significant increase in comity and commerce with such countries as Cuba and Haiti.

Cuba

The Pearl of the Antilles is by far the largest island in the West Indies, with an area of almost 45,000 square miles and a population of 8,660,000. As one of the last of Spain's possessions in the western hemisphere, its development was long retarded by the repressive administration of Madrid's illiberal and acquisitive ruling classes. The Cubans' struggles for independence were long and bloody and liberation was not fully achieved when their Spanish overlords were driven out by the Americans in the war of 1898-99. Although there were dramatic improvements, especially in the realm of sanitation and transportation, the hegemony of the United States became repugnant to many Cuban patriots. But the eventual withdrawal or diminution of American tutelage did not bring anything close to an enlightened indigenous rulership in Cuba. Some of the most notorious Latin American dictators were those ruling in repressive brutality in Havana.

Although the nationalist aspect of his revolution appeared to be subsumed by ties with international communism, and big power politics at the time of the missile crisis, Fidel Castro has brought about a massive upgrading of the economic well-being of his fellow citizens. It would appear that the present Cuban regime, although it romanticized the Che Guevara era with its credo of the export of Castroism to the rest of the hemisphere, is giving priority to building a strong domestic economy. Cut off by the American embargo from the great U.S. market and isolated by many of the member states of the OAS, Castro's Cuba had to rely heavily on the communist bloc. Its drive for production for export is an impressive demonstration of economic organization. With improved relations with important Latin American states and a realistic readiness to trade with capitalist countries, Cuba is today an

important potential trading area for Canada.¹⁹ Recent statistics show a significant Canadian-Cuban trade. Cuba's highly successful cattle herds owe much to purebred Canadian stock. The import of seed potatoes has also been important. There would seem to be a sizable potential market for Canadian mechanical equipment suitable to a modernization of Cuba's fishery and agricultural production.

When Cuba was practically "frozen out" by all states of the western hemisphere, Canada continued to maintain diplomatic and commercial relations with Castro's republic. In 1972, the independent member states of the Commonwealth Caribbean jointly extended diplomatic recognition to Havana. This should make some contribution to the widely cherished goal of increased intra-Caribbean trade. Canada's retention of diplomatic contact with Cuba proved its usefulness during the 1970 crisis when the kidnappers of British diplomat James Cross were transported to Cuba with the full and efficient cooperation of Havana's popular and efficient ambassador Dr. Jose Fernandez de Cossio. Without a doubt, Cuba's cooperation made easier a situation difficult and embarrassing to the Canadian government.

In the post-Nixon era there have been indications that Washington might move to abandon its largely futile boycott of Cuba. The Canadian government and, to a lesser degree, the private sector, have moved to strengthen Canada's economic and commercial ties. Loans by the Export Development Corporation, visits from the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce and other cabinet members demonstrate the very high priority Cuba has assumed in Canada's foreign policy considerations. It is clear that had we been prepared to take that long-pondered step of joining the OAS, such action would have been forestalled by that organization's refusal to lift the trade and diplomatic embargo on Cuba despite the disregard for it shown by many OAS members.

Although some in the Commonwealth Caribbean may regard with a touch of jealousy Canada's seeming preoccupation with Cuba, there is certainly much wisdom in consolidating our good relations with the largest of the West Indian islands.

The Cuban government is determined that there shall be

no return to the pre-Castro days when Havana was something like the Babylon of the Caribbean, where crime and pleasure were big business for foreign interests. This sentiment and the dedication to the production of export goods has discouraged any build-up of the tourist industry. But Cuba has in plentiful variety all the attractions for those who are partial to the Caribbean. Charter airflights have taken some Canadians down and the results have been eminently satisfactory to visitors and hosts alike. The establishment of direct regularly scheduled air links between Cuba and Canada will mean a substantial increase in the movement of people between the two countries.²⁰

A most impressive program has been conceived by CIDA and the technical faculties of the University of Havana whereby a number of Canadian professors will spend an academic year conducting post-graduate classes at Havana. The Cubans regard Canadian input so highly that they have arranged for the potential students to learn sufficient English to be able to take instruction in the language of the visiting Canadian professors.

Haiti

For years this impoverished country has been effectively isolated from much of the international community and its rough dictators were shunned by most of the world leaders. The most significant Canadian involvement in Haiti has been in the voluntary sector. For many years there has been a concerted missionary aid and education program supported by the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, especially its Quebec dioceses, and CIDA has aided the Canadian church-inspired school construction program in Haiti.

Under the regime of the new president for life Jean-Claude Duvalier, there is a new climate of stability which has already helped bring Haiti back into the mainstream of international affairs. In July 1973, Canada and Haiti signed a bilateral technical agreement under CIDA and it is likely that steps will be taken to upgrade our diplomatic mission in Port au Prince.²¹ With Canada's long established interest in having a meaningful Francophonic content in its external aid program it might

be that Haiti too could become an object of greater Canadian interest in involvement. Much will depend on the political conditions in the little republic.

Dominican Republic

The other occupant of the island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic, has, like Haiti, held something less than a commanding position in Canadian foreign policy considerations. The long years of the Trujillo dictatorship were not conducive to winning friends for the Dominican Republic on the international scene. Roman Catholic churches, especially in the Maritimes, have shown an interest in the country and have sent a number of teachers. Canadian banks and insurance companies have been there for some time and in recent years some CUSO personnel have served in the little country. Trade between the two countries, although increasing, is still insignificant.

Other Islands

Airline connections allow Canadians to obtain convenient flights to the tiny remnants of ancient empires remaining to continental European countries. The Dutch islands of Curaçao and Aruba are popular tourist attractions. Martinique and Guadeloupe are becoming more popular vacation spots with French-speaking Canadians. There are also good connections with Puerto Rico, show window of American Caribbean policy, and the island is on the winter route of affluent Canadians.

But, with the exception of Cuba and possibly Haiti, it is the Commonwealth Caribbean that will maintain Canadian interest and test Canadian ability and intentions.

1970 AND AFTER

In late February 1970 a surging crowd went on the rampage through downtown Port of Spain, attacking business houses and generally creating such disorders that the Trinidad and Tobago government declared a state of siege and called out riot squads of police and those military forces which remained loyal to the establishment. The long-time Prime

Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, dealt sternly with the disturbers of the peace; there were imprisonments and purges of portions of the armed forces which had been adjudged sympathetic to the rioters.

The Trinidad riots, which went on for several days, were in part a response to the arrest and trial of a number of West Indian students involved in the sit-in at Sir George Williams University in Montreal which eventually resulted in the destruction of the institution's computer centre. The Trinidad and Tobago government had paid the fines of Trinidadian students arrested for their involvement in the Sir George fracas. The emotional impact of the fusion of black power and student revolt which rocked Sir George Williams was also in part responsible for the hostile reception given Governor General Michener when he visited the University of the West Indies in February 1969.

While the Trinidad disturbances were miniscule compared with many of the outbreaks in the volatile Latin American world, they brought into sharp focus some of the fundamental social and economic problems, not only of Trinidad and Tobago but of the Commonwealth Caribbean generally. They led also to a serious reappraisal of Canada's policies and postures toward the Caribbean area. The "February Revolution" was an explosion of a portion of society irritated by unemployment, economic deprivation and resentment of their seemingly more prosperous fellow citizens. It also had overtones of black power and hostility to white and foreign social and economic dominance. Canadians who had grown accustomed to hearing "Yankee go home" sentiments expressed in many parts of the world were startled to learn that Trinidadians were smashing the windows of branches of Canadian chartered banks and other Canadian business establishments in their capital city.²²

Today, throughout the Caribbean, the evidence of the response of Canadian business to the outburst of 1970 is plain to see. The Royal Bank of Canada is now the Royal Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. Sister institutions have made similar adjustments to the sensibilities of the local population. Banks are incorporated locally and 51 per cent of their shares made

available to local citizens.²³ There has also been an acceleration in the process of recruiting and promoting Caribbean staff. In Guyana, the powerful Alcan bauxite enterprise was nationalized by the government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham. There is nothing in their record to lead anyone to believe that Canadian businessmen abroad are a combination of St. Francis of Assisi and Santa Claus. But if they do not behave as good corporate citizens in foreign lands, they show an astonishing insensitivity to one of their own country's major economic anxieties.

That the dramatic events of 1970 were but the outward manifestations of a situation which had been developing for some time is apparent from a study of the Canadian Senate's Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs. In February 1969, that body launched a study of Canada-Caribbean relations which continued until April 1970. The range of the committee's inquiry is indicated by the number and variety of competent and informed witnesses heard, including professors, bankers, ministers, CIDA officials, Caribbean-based business executives, church leaders, CUSO officials and newsmen.

The Canadian senate is not universally regarded as an exceptionally dynamic or productive legislative chamber, but the work of some of its committees has been of most commendable merit and value. In its careful appraisal of Canadian-Caribbean relations the foreign affairs committee made an outstanding contribution. The report, along with the Hansard record of the committee proceedings, still stands as a definitive work and its progressive practical recommendations reveal a sensitive comprehension of the Caribbean area and Canada's relations thereto. The Senate Committee's report was all the more valuable because the Trudeau government's White Paper *Foreign Policy for Canadians* had virtually ignored the Caribbean.²⁴

In its introduction, the Committee report set out the comprehensive nature of its inquiry and concern:

The committee's decision to embark on a close and full study of Canadian relations with the Caribbean area was based on the belief that the region has a special importance and significance to Canada. As the Caribbean was not one of the areas to be given particular atten-

tion in the Government's foreign policy review, the Committee felt that there was need for a separate study of trends in the relationship. Subsequent events have demonstrated that the study was a timely one, with changes of great significance for Canada underway in the region.²⁵

While predicting the likelihood and desirability of expanding Canadian involvement with non-Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, the committee concluded that Canada's special concentration in the Commonwealth countries should continue to prevail. Taking note of social tensions in the Caribbean the report noted:

The committee's approach has also been long-range attempting to project present trends and assess the likely future directions of the relationship. The Committee has, therefore, been concerned with the anti-Canadian aspects of the recent disturbances in the region, while viewing them in the perspective of the long-term relationship. This is not to underestimate the urgent importance of these demonstrations. The Committee believes that they are a clear warning that many of the comfortable assumptions of the past are dangerously inappropriate in the current Caribbean context. These disturbances have alerted Canadians generally to rapidly changing conditions with important implications for Canada. To this Committee, they have pointed up the urgent need for an official re-assessment of Canada-Caribbean relations.²⁶

The Senate committee made numerous recommendations with many helpful suggestions on a host of special Canada-Caribbean problems or interests. Its main thrust appears in the six general recommendations of the report.

1. The Senate Committee concludes that Canadian policy toward the Commonwealth Caribbean has lacked consistency. Canada should decide to manifest special concern for the area and such a policy would be valid, valuable and in the best interest of all concerned. There is now an urgent need for a clear determination by the Canadian Government of its future strategy toward the area.

The Committee recommends that Canadian policy, while placing increased value on relations with all countries of the area, continue to reflect this country's special links with the Commonwealth countries of the region.

2. A consistent policy of special concern implies a partnership that can only be maintained through continuous consultation and co-

operative planning. Paternalism and unilateral decisions and actions must be avoided at all costs.

3. The time has come to resume multilateral discussions at the political level between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. This would allow the participants to follow up on the projects undertaken at the 1966 Conference, engage in frank exchanges on current issues, and set directions for the future. The Canadian Government should, therefore, discuss with the Commonwealth Caribbean Governments the re-convening of a conference at either the Heads-of-Government or Ministerial level.
4. Canadian policy must recognize and respect the distinct character and diverse aspirations of the countries and territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Canadian encouragement of regional co-operation must therefore be undertaken with great care, so as not to infringe upon the sovereignty of self-determination of the countries concerned.
5. The possibility of constitutional links between Canada and the countries of the Caribbean area should be re-appraised by the Canadian Government. This prospect now seems remote, but the Canadian Government should be prepared to discuss proposals for closer economic and political association between Canada and countries of the area.
6. In view of the distinct trends within the area Canada can expect continuing, and even growing criticism and hostility from some sectors of opinion in the Caribbean. Persistent efforts will be required to keep this situation in perspective and forestall excessive reactions on the part of the Canadian public or other damaging effects on good mutual relations. It is important to demonstrate that Canada, while interested in stability in the Caribbean, is not committed to the status quo and recognizes the case for progressive change.²⁷

The committee proffered suggestions in several areas of importance and sensitivity in Canadian-Caribbean relations.

TOURISM

For some of the Caribbean countries tourism is their prime source of foreign exchange and is therefore regarded as a major industry. Even in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, with their more diverse economic base and broader infrastructure, much attention is given to the development of tourist attractions. Belize, with its alluring coral reef and

glorious beaches, will soon become a mecca for vacationers.

But thoughtful Caribbean leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the dangers of overdependence on the tourist industry. More important than the obvious hazards of competition and weather uncertainty is the potential for social dislocation inherent in structuring one economy on the tastes and spending habits of foreigners. Many small communities find the effects of a mass influx of outsiders more than the mores of the indigenous society can bear. Organized pleasure factories like casinos are strongly opposed by some Caribbean authorities.

Without question the most serious aspect of tourism in the Caribbean is its evocation of colour bias and racism. At the tenth Caribbean Regional Conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association held in July 1973, the executive director of the Caribbean Travel Association made available a pungent and provocative article on the tourist industry which, *inter alia*, stated:

One can only be astounded how little work has been done on the crucial interaction of tourists on their host society. For instance, we badly need good observational studies on the Caribbean industry where tourists have been important for a number of decades. Many people would argue that it was probably not accidental that the rich tourist haven, Bermuda, should recently have seen the murder of its Governor. Incoming tourists, rich, arrogant and white would seem to have become widespread figures of resentment in societies which are racially complex and where there is a growing awareness of the meaninglessness of much political independence when important industries (like tourism) are basically in foreign hands. Local citizens find memories of the old ways and plantation economy too close to the surface to allow them to accept willingly new subservient roles of boot-blacks, waiters and prostitutes.²⁸

But despite the dangers and misgivings, the Caribbean area, like much of the Third World, will continue to regard tourism as one of the most likely growth areas in the foreseeable future. With modest success through CIDA, Canada has sought to assist in the development of more trained personnel in the field of hotel and resort management in the area. Some Canadian hotel chains have established locations

in the Caribbean but the tentacles of the giant world conglomerates have reached the Caribbean as well as many other tourist areas.

Perhaps Canada's major impact on the Caribbean tourist industry will be through her citizens who are drawn south by the lure of the "sun, sea, sand and sex" of the Caribbean area. It would be naive to suggest that the Canadian abroad is superior to other tourists but there is some ground for believing that their popularity rating is higher than that of the nationals of most other countries. Only the attitudes and deportment of our people can assure the continuance of this favoured status. The Senate committee did, however, suggest two areas whereby the Canadian government could assist the Caribbean tourist industry. One was to direct more Canadian aid to the production of consumer goods and construction materials related to the industry; the other was to increase the duty-free exemption of Canadian tourists returning from the Caribbean. If they should look at the situation three years later, the committee might be able to measure some progress on its first recommendation but none on its second.

Because overpopulation and high unemployment are problems facing most parts of the Caribbean, the question of emigration is a most serious one. Their total land resources are small at best, and a considerable portion of their limited area is unsuited for cultivation and the support of population. The rural sections are losing population, the cities are becoming crowded and in large centres like Kingston the situation has brought severe social strain. While the governments of the area are striving to strengthen their economies in the labour-intensive sector and some are giving attention to family planning, the available labour force is likely to exceed the job opportunities for a long time to come.²⁹

Although Guyana, with its low population density, has offered its help as an outlet for the surplus population of other areas in the region, the immigration into Guyana has not yet become substantial. With the United Kingdom no longer the country of the open door, Canada has assumed greater importance as a land of opportunity for emigrating West Indi-

Table 6.2 — Immigration to Canada from Belize (British Honduras), Bermuda, Guyana and the Caribbean Islands

Country	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
British Honduras (Belize)	5	8	10	33	23	43	68	53	34	21	74
Bermuda	82	120	198	179	192	222	204	174	120	282	215
Jamaica	912	1,214	1,407	3,459	2,886	3,889	4,659	3,903	3,092	9,363	11,286
Trinidad	467	775	1,113	2,325	2,393	5,582	4,790	4,149	2,739	5,138	4,802
Tobago	4	5	14	15	26	49					
Barbados	422	560	699	1,181	821	1,242	853	677	534	800	790
Anguilla	—	—	4	7	6	3	4	6	4	5	6
Antigua	35	52	50	114	148	196	149	136	121	196	202
Bahama Islands	21	22	30	74	61	136	129	108	102	235	129
Barbuda	—	—	—	2	—	3	—	1	—	—	—
Cayman Islands	—	1	5	6	5	14	1	9	1	8	9
Dominica	22	22	42	105	99	152	107	68	63	99	173
Grenada	32	48	82	139	120	281	203	187	153	352	399
Montserrat	17	19	12	25	26	62	29	30	22	25	37
Nevis	1	6	6	15	18	28	12	15	21	—	—
St. Kitts	22	38	40	107	63	183	130	85	76	164	118
St. Lucia	31	41	52	135	73	148	86	83	58	92	138
St. Vincent	82	117	185	250	220	361	281	234	178	387	487
Turks & Caicos Islands	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
Virgin Islands, British	1	1	—	3	1	9	16	9	10	24	20
Br. West Indies, n.e.s.	3	5	4	—	3	—	1	5	9	47	10
Guyana (Br. Guiana)	614	609	628	736	823	1,865	2,090	2,384	1,976	4,808	4,030
Total	2,773	3,663	4,582	8,910	8,007	14,468	13,812	12,317	9,313	22,046	22,926

SOURCE: Tabulation of Landing Records.

ans. At one time Canadian immigration policy was criticized for discrimination on colour lines, but now that this reprehensible ingredient has been removed from our immigration standards and replaced by a skill criterion the Caribbeans have another and equally understandable complaint. While recognizing and appreciating the fact that the new policy has allowed for substantially larger emigration to Canada, it is still their concern that the outward movement of their skilled people will seriously weaken their own society. Canadian aid towards West Indians seeking education and training at our universities and technical colleges has abetted this brain drain.

The immigration question is one requiring careful consideration and consultation among Canadian and Caribbean governments and the outlook is reasonably hopeful. A helpful portent is CIDA's increased emphasis on augmenting the indigenous personnel and facilities of the University of the West Indies, allowing it to provide better educational opportunities for Caribbean young people on their own soil. The continuation of the successful programs of bringing West Indian agricultural workers to Canada for the harvest season will ease the strain in the near future at least.

No government can legislate good manners or good citizenship and it must be admitted that some West Indians are unhappy in Canada. The efforts of the ministries of Manpower and Immigration and Secretary of State to assist the adjustments of West Indian immigrants to Canadian life and the encouragement of their unique and lively cultural expressions should be continued and improved.

TRADE

In spite of the long years of efforts by governments and individual businesses, the dramatic increase in Canadian Caribbean trade and profit sharing has not materialized. Nor is the picture today particularly rosy. Trade statistics for recent years do not show the fulfilment of the dreams of those who planned special measures and policies at the 1912 and subsequent conferences.

It is exceedingly difficult to forecast overall trends in our

mutual trade patterns. Despite soothing reassurances from Ottawa and London, it is doubtful if there is any clear appreciation of the impact which Canada's export trade will feel as Britain settles into the European Economic Community. Nor can the Caribbeans be complacent in the contemplation of the disruption of their trade patterns consequent upon Westminster's move. Their own common market community is in its infancy and even their free trade agreement (CARIFTA) functioned too briefly for in-depth assessment of its usefulness. Thus we are faced with a period of uncertainty and unanticipated readjustments.

It is likely that Canada will have to strive as never before to diversify her markets. The Caribbean will need all the resources which economic coordination can give them. Within a very short time Canada may be compelled to put new vigour and initiative into an effort to penetrate new markets in the Caribbean and elsewhere.

In addition to the traditional tough competition from the United States, Canadian exporters are now losing ground to Japanese, West German and other vigorous competitors for the Caribbean market. The Canadian private sector must sharpen its pencils and its initiative, and the government, through its aids to export industries, must do its part. Also, we must show more readiness to purchase the products which the Caribbean community has available for export to Canada.

The question of sugar is exceedingly complex, with a variety of international agreements, the pervasive influence of giant cartels, conflict between cane and beet production, and the dramatic stresses and strains within the industry in many sugar-producing countries including those of the Caribbean. But it is clear that sugar is an irritant to Canadian-Caribbean relations. In 1950, 60 per cent of Canadian imports of raw sugar emanated from the West Indies; in 1970, this proportion had dropped to a mere 5 per cent.

Following the Canada-Commonwealth Caribbean Prime Ministers' conference in 1966, Canada instituted a program providing for direct annual payments to each of the sugar-producing Caribbean Commonwealth governments to an

Table 6.3 — Canada-Commonwealth Caribbean Trade Statistics (\$ million)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
<i>Canadian Exports</i>									
Jamaica	33.5	39.1	34.3	40.4	46.5	39.2	38.5	41.9	45.1
Trinidad	23.3	20.1	16.2	19.4	21.2	20.3	21.2	26.9	25.8
Guyana	9.9	12.1	9.1	8.3	12.2	6.6	5.7	7.7	10.5
Barbados	8.1	8.4	10.1	9.7	11.0	11.2	11.0	15.3	13.2
Bermuda	7.4	7.4	7.1	9.0	11.1	13.0	12.4	11.1	13.1
Bahamas	10.8	10.2	12.7	15.2	16.5	15.2	13.0	13.9	16.3
Leewards and Windwards	8.8	8.7	8.4	10.3	14.0	9.8	10.8	10.5	12.5
British Honduras (Belize)	.9	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5	2.1
	102.8	108.2	99.3	113.0	134.2	116.9	114.2	128.8	138.6
<i>Canadian Imports</i>									
Jamaica	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Jamaica	37.3	31.9	33.9	46.0	27.1	28.6	19.6	n/a	n/a
Trinidad	16.0	18.7	19.9	17.7	7.5	7.7	13.6	13.5	22.3
Guyana	28.1	30.0	29.4	33.9	28.8	25.1	15.9	14.4	14.2
Barbados	2.3	3.1	1.5	1.5	1.6	2.5	2.0	3.2	4.5
Bermuda	.8	.3	.4	.3	.2	.2	.3	.6	.6
Bahamas	1.2	2.2	3.1	4.4	6.5	20.9	16.7	10.9	20.9
Leewards and Windwards	.9	1.4	1.3	2.4	3.3	2.4	5.5	2.3	.6
British Honduras (Belize)	1.5	1.9	2.5	2.5	3.0	3.5	2.7	3.1	1.8
	89.1	89.5	92.0	108.7	77.8	90.9	76.3	48.0	64.9

amount equal to the duty collected on Canadian imports of West Indies sugar (29 cents per hundred-weight up to a maximum of two hundred and seventy five thousand metric tons). In April 1970, Canada unilaterally abrogated this agreement which was to be replaced by a \$5 million fund to assist the development of agriculture in the Caribbean Commonwealth territories receiving bilateral aid. This abrupt move was denounced by Commonwealth Caribbean heads of government and bitterly criticized in the Caribbean press. Senator Paul Martin was sent to the Caribbean on a good-will placating mission and Canada agreed to continue the subsidy until the Tariff Board handed down its report.³⁰

Caribbean Commonwealth spokesmen are never reluctant to express their resentment at Canada's heavy purchase of sugar from South Africa which still retains the same tariff preference it had while a Commonwealth member.

The Senate committee took note of "the excellent and highly competitive rums from the Commonwealth Caribbean" and called for a reappraisal of the agreement on labelling which the 1966 conference introduced as an aid to the sale of this famed product. There is evidence that in some provinces the rum from the Caribbean gets short shrift.³¹ A recent tendency on the part of some West Indian rums to "Canadianize" by blending with the far less appealing product of Canadian distilleries looks like an attempt at short-range advantage which will work against the interests of the Caribbean industry in the long run. Their highly prestigious brand names will not long retain their consumer preference, as discriminating rum drinkers negatively assess the blended products.

The Caribbeans have long been dissatisfied with Canadian purchases of their bananas and little improvement has followed the 1966 conference commitment in this connection.³² Before the Canadian market will be able to take more of the Caribbean exports it must free itself from tight consolidation with the American markets and the overpowering domination of joint banana corporations.

While it is essential that we avoid grasping at oversimplistic solutions, it seems manifestly clear that the agencies of gov-

ernment must be seriously brought into play if we are to make any meaningful improvement in Canadian-Caribbean trade. Rather than abandoning ship-building subsidies, the Canadian government should increase them and give priority to having fast commodious ships in the Caribbean service equipped with all the most modern devices for controlling temperature and atmospheric conditions. In the age of large cargo planes there are good prospects for air shipment of live-stock and other items which benefit by rapid transport. The government should continue and further its policy of assistance to Caribbean airports and seaports.

Belatedly and inadequately the government has taken steps through the Department of Regional and Economic Expansion to redress the economic recession which national tariff and commercial policies have helped to fasten upon the Atlantic region. Of utmost priority would be measures to assist the seaboard provinces to generate their own economic prosperity. In an earlier day it was an advantage to be on the Atlantic. Steadily since Confederation location has worked as a disadvantage to the Maritime provinces. Through encouragement by subsidies, export aid, leadership and marketing, the Atlantic Ocean could become once more a corridor of commerce. An enlarged north-south trade would strengthen the Atlantic economy and thus the national economy, as well as assist powerfully the development and strengthening of the economic institutions of the Caribbean countries.

But while increased trade and commerce are vital, they are but a part of the story of Canada-Caribbean relations. Despite disappointments and irritants over the years, the goodwill existing between the Caribbean countries and their northern neighbour was never stronger. West Indian leaders declare publicly and privately that "Canada is our best friend." The opportunities for Canada to make an effective contribution to the land of the calypso are immense. As a developed country not cursed with an imperialist background and with intensive and valuable experience in external aid programs, Canada can indeed play a major part in the Caribbean sector of the Third World.

In an earlier age the common bond of empire was consid-

icy. If we cannot be successful in this area where so many factors are conducive, our prospects of significant achievements in other areas are not really bright.

NOTES

1. There is some uncertainty in defining the bounds of the Commonwealth Caribbean. The Bahamas is often regarded as not being in the area. Bermuda is rarely included. For the purposes of the paper both are considered as belonging. The expression "West Indies" is often taken to comprise only the islands but mainland British Guiana always attended the Canada-West Indies conferences.
2. Heath Macquarrie, "Canada and the OAS: The Still Vacant Chair," *Dalhousie Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1 (Spring 1968).
3. Papers from a conference organized by Canadian National Commission for UNESCO, and Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, published by Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, May 1966, p. 42. This was a most useful conference featuring Caribbean and Canadian academics, economists and politicians.
4. Nova Scotians would aver that they were better sailors. The famed *Bluenose* repeatedly defeated the American challengers in the races for the International Fisherman's Trophy.
5. UNESCO conference papers, p. 23.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
8. Canada, *Debates of the House of Commons (1911-1912)* Vol. 1, p. 8.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 26-27. Twenty years later Bennett was to preside over an Empire and Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa which brought about substantive intra-commonwealth preferences.
10. Report of the Proceedings of the Canada-West Indies Conference 1920 (Ottawa: King's Printer), p. 5.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
12. Report of the Proceedings of the Canada-West Indies Conference 1925, (Ottawa: King's Printer), p. 4.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
15. Some of the ships were destroyed by enemy action in the Second World War. By 1949 all were sold, scrapped or otherwise put out of commission.
16. At Versailles, Australia and the Union of South Africa had acquired former German territories as mandates.
17. Canada Debates, 1968, Vol. VI, p. 6377.
18. In this case, too, there is the pertinent fact that the United Kingdom holds jurisdiction. In the face of a clear-cut and popularly based desire on the part of one or more of the small islands Canada might find refusal somewhat embarrassing.
19. In 1971 Canada exported \$56 million worth of goods to Cuba and imported \$10 million.
20. Halifax would like to be the Canadian port of entry and departure but Montreal is more likely to be closer.
21. At the present time Canada is represented by a chargé d'affaires who is a member of our mission to Havana, but the ambassador is resident in Havana and accredited to both countries. Fortunately both the chancery and residence in Port au Prince are ample and it would not be at all difficult to have an ambassador accredited solely to Haiti.
22. The uprising was not merely an expression of anti-white sentiment. There were also overtones of the tension between islanders of African descent versus those of East Indian ancestry.
23. There is no reason to believe that the people of the islands have not bought sufficient shares to bring indigenous ownership even close to the 51 per cent.
24. Even in the booklet devoted to Latin America the Caribbean rates about four lines.
25. Canada, *Senate Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Senate of Canada on Canada-Caribbean Relations* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 31.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
28. Louis Turner and John Ash, "The Golden Hordes." Earlier publication data not made available.
29. In Jamaica one sees bill boards showing a thoughtful attractive girl and the caption "You don't have to become pregnant."
30. Although this report was issued in 1971 its recommendations have not yet been reflected in Canadian government tariff changes.
31. Liquor is sold by provincial authorities and some of them seem more responsive to the high pressure tactics of the agents or salesmen of Canadian distilleries.
32. Clause 6 of the trade protocol called for an agreement "To endeavour to revive the banana trade and to bring about increased sales of bananas to Canada from the commonwealth countries of the Caribbean." Canada, *Debates*, p. 7534, July 11, 1966.
33. The party system is generally healthy with viable opposition parties functioning in and competing for legitimate control of the legislature. The long-sustained rule of Dr. Eric Williams in Trinidad and Tobago and the ballot boycott by the opposition in the last election have made for a serious situation in that country. Opposition leader Cheddi Jagan, after another decisive defeat in 1973, also seems to be heading for a similar withdrawal tactic in Guyana.
34. Canada is accorded observer status at the CPA meetings of the Caribbean region. Ottawa has also hosted meetings of Caribbean M.P.s.

TAREQ Y. ISMAEL

Canada and the Middle East

The Middle East is the region of the Third World in which Canada has played its most active role. At times it even provided considerable leadership. As with other parts of the Third World, however, Canada lacks vital interests in this area. Nor does its role derive from direct interaction with the Middle East nations. How did it happen, then, that Canada played such a significant role in an area strongly identified with big-power international politics? It is surely an expression of the uniqueness of the modern international system that Canada could be a significant actor in an area so far removed from her geographically, strategically, diplomatically and commercially.

Canada has actively participated in the formulation and implementation of decisions that have profoundly affected the peoples of the Middle East. How? She has played an active long-term role in the most sensitive issue of the area (and possibly of the world) in the postwar era: the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Canada's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict was summarized by Mr. Paul Martin, former Secretary of State for External Affairs, when he stated before the fifth emergency special session of the United Nations on June 23, 1967:

My country has been closely associated with the United Nations' ef-

forts to mediate in Palestine. A Canadian served on the United Nations' Special Commission on Palestine in 1947. Canada was associated with negotiations which subsequently took place at the third session of the Assembly which led to the resolution of November 29, 1947. We served on the Security Council in 1948-49, when the Palestine question was among the most important to be considered and when the armistice agreements were arranged, we provided one of the early Directors-General of the United Nations' Relief and Works Agency and, a little later, the chief-of-staff of observers since 1954. The present Prime Minister of Canada, Lester Pearson, took an intimate part in the negotiations which led to the establishment of UNEF. Canada supplied the first commander, General Burns, and a sizeable contingent to the force.¹

How did Canada get involved in the frenetic Arab-Israeli conflict? Through her position in the United Nations. Since its founding, Canada has been one of the organization's staunchest supporters, working enthusiastically to establish it as a viable instrument of world order and peace. The Arab-Israeli conflict was in fact the first major issue to come before the U.N., and Canadian policy-makers, the late Lester B. Pearson in particular, saw in the issue the first real challenge to the U.N.'s purported role of world mediator and peacemaker. How the U.N. responded to the challenge of the Palestine issue, and the role it played in the consequent Arab-Israeli conflict, are matters that Canada played a significant role in determining.

The Palestine issue became a major concern of the United Nations General Assembly as early as 1946-47. Pearson, then Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, headed the Canadian delegation to a special session of the General Assembly summoned on April 28, 1947, to study the problem. Since Mr. Pearson was serving as chairman of the Assembly's Political Committee, his prominent long-term role in Canada's involvement in the Palestine issue was thus initiated. The committee was shortly superseded by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in May 1947, on which Canada was also a member.²

The Canadian delegate to UNSCOP, Justice Ivan J. Rand, an ardent admirer of the Jewish people, voted with the majority of the committee to submit a report calling for the partition of

Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, to be linked by a ten-year economic agreement, and for the international control of Jerusalem.³ A minority plan supported the formation of a federal government in Palestine composed of autonomous Jewish and Arab states.⁴

The partition plan was energetically supported by the Zionists as the fruition of their goal to establish a Jewish national state in Palestine, and, perhaps more importantly, by the United States who brought her considerable influence in world affairs to bear on the matter. On the other hand, from the onset the plan was bitterly opposed by both the Arab majority within Palestine and by the neighbouring Arab states. In effect, then, the partition plan proposed a solution to the Palestine dilemma that was strongly opposed not only by the majority of the Palestinian population (i.e., the Arabs), but also by all the nations surrounding Palestine. Yet, in spite of this opposition, and Arab declarations that any attempt to violate the integrity of Palestine would be challenged, the plan was adopted.

Fearing for the fate of partition in the face of Arab hostility, Mr. Pearson proposed to the Palestine sub-committee that the Security Council carry out partition under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.⁵ This authorizes enforcement action to deal with threats to the peace as well as breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. In effect, Mr. Pearson hoped to establish a broad parameter for the U.N.'s legal authority to implement partition and to ensure that it could maintain effective control during partition. But the United States, more skeptical of Arab capabilities to challenge partition effectively, and anxious to keep the issue out of the direct supervision of the Security Council where the Soviet Union might exercise power, opposed this proposal.⁶ As finally constituted, the provisions for implementation established a five-man commission, named by the Assembly but responsible to the Security Council. The only power of implementation provided by the plan was in the case of a threat to peace, under Article 41 of the Charter which authorizes an economic and diplomatic boycott and other measures short of the use of armed force.⁷

The partition plan went before the General Assembly in November 1947. Mr. Pearson, at times "acting in a personal capacity rather than in the name of his government,"⁸ was prominent in elaborating and clarifying the plan of partition. Robert Spencer comments that, during a deadlock between the United States and the Soviet Union over the time of terminating the mandate, "thanks to Mr. Pearson's energetic intervention," a compromise was reached. For his efforts, Mr. Pearson was "dubbed by Canadian Zionists as the Balfour of Canada. In the struggle to secure acceptance of the partition plan, his influence had been of importance . . . it was perhaps decisive."⁹

When the partition plan was accepted by the General Assembly, the situation in Palestine completely deteriorated. Civil war broke out between the Arab and Jewish communities, and the partition plan became a dead letter. In May 1948 Israel declared her independence, opened military action in Jerusalem in an attempt to secure control—contrary to the provisions of the plan—of the holy city and moved troops into the Arab sections of Palestine. The neighbouring Arab states declared war on Israel and mobilized their forces, and the Palestine problem became the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 had several ramifications. First, Israel approximately doubled the size of the territory allotted to her in the partition plan; secondly, the Palestinian state, which the partition plan provided for the Palestinian Arab population, never came into existence: the territory of this proposed state that was not seized by Israel during the war was awarded by the U.N. to the neighbouring Jordanian state; thirdly, Israel demonstrated her overwhelming military superiority *vis-à-vis* the combined power of the neighbouring Arab states; and finally, as a consequence of the war, over one million Palestinian Arabs became homeless refugees dependent upon world philanthropy for their survival.

Canada, as a member of the Security Council, contributed to the achievement of a ceasefire and truce, and urged the adoption of a "pragmatic" position by the United Nations. This included the recognition of the power realities of the situation. Thus, Mr. Pearson called upon the Arabs to recognize

the existence of Israel as an established state and appealed to Israel not to take advantage of her military superiority to take over almost all of the Holy Land. Mr. Pearson proposed a compromise between the Soviet demand that boundaries be established according to the letter of the partition plan, and the British proposal that settlement be based on the report of the U.N. mediator Count Bernadotte (who proposed substantial changes in the borders). It was the explicit position of Canada that minor border rectifications would be the extent of modifications that could be properly allowed in the 1948 situation, and that such changes did not constitute a legitimate *casus belli* for the Arabs. Therefore, Canada was willing to support a settlement on the basis of the *de facto* boundaries in preference to a renewal of the fighting and a further deterioration of U.N. initiative in the area. On November 22, 1948, Mr. Pearson told the first committee of the General Assembly:

We must deal with the fact that a Jewish state has come into existence and has established its control over territory from which it will not be dislodged and we must address ourselves to the problem of regulating the relations of this community with its neighbours. I do not deny for a moment that this is a difficult circumstance for the Arab states to accept but it is nevertheless the case, and it does not seem to me that the United Nations would be doing these states any service if it encouraged them, or even permitted them, to continue their efforts to destroy by arms the Jewish state.¹⁰

Canada's position on the Palestine issue reflected the interaction of her vital interests as well as her U.N. involvement. The history of accommodation and conflict with the two states most important to her security and economic health—the United States and Great Britain—has strongly influenced Canada. Through policy coordination, Canada has attempted to maintain the special relationships with both.¹¹ Thus, when the major English-speaking powers are unconcerned with an issue, Canadian policy may be formulated independently. When they oppose one another, Canada may have room for manoeuvre but is compelled to keep them from drifting too far apart. And when, as in the Middle East, the issues are of major importance to both countries, and they are in substantial

agreement, the Canadian position is perforce constrained. At the time of the 1947 crisis, the United States was committed to the support of Zionism; and Britain, in an attempt to salvage some remnant of her reputation with the Arabs, and to curb Zionist excesses, came into conflict with both the United States and the Zionists. Canada, on the other hand, had virtually no interests or experience in the Middle East, apart from its strong interest in the United Nations. Mr. Pearson's highly effective role as mediator derived from his conciliation of U.N. *vis-à-vis* big power interests. The Zionist cause had much sympathy within Canada, and Mr. Pearson was *a priori* in favour of partition, as he himself has admitted:

I have never wavered in my view that a solution to the problem was impossible without the recognition of a Jewish state in some form in Palestine. To me this was always the core of the matter.¹²

Hence, there was little debate within Canadian circles about the efficacy of the partition proposal. What mattered to Mr. Pearson was to establish a strong basis for United Nations action, and to reconcile this with big power interests.

During the period from the end of the Palestine war to the Suez crisis, the Middle East situation continued to involve Canada's interests, but not substantially. The addition of Turkey to NATO and the creation of the Baghdad Pact were viewed with interest but no real concern.¹³ On the Palestine issue itself, the Canadian involvement was primarily limited to the contribution of a director to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and, in 1954, the appointment of General E. L. M. Burns to head the truce supervisory forces. While other Canadian officers served with these forces, the appointment of General Burns made the Canadian role much more visible. The issue itself continued to be of concern to the United Nations, and Canada remained active in the General Assembly. The only major event in which Canada participated was the negotiation leading to the resolution, passed by the General Assembly on January 26, 1952, continuing the Conciliation Commission in existence. Canada, pursuing its usual role as mediator, secured a modification of the resolution passed by the committee which made it at once more certain of passage and less critical of Israel.¹⁴ Whether or not the

Canadians were correct in thinking that the draft resolution could not secure adoption, it is probable that an open breach between Israel and the United Nations was forestalled. With these few exceptions, the Canadian government had demonstrated little concern for Middle Eastern affairs up until 1955.

THE SUEZ CRISIS

Canada's role at Suez has been examined in some detail, partly because General E. L. M. Burns of Canada was head of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in 1956, and partly because of the interest taken by Mr. Pearson in the crisis.¹⁵ Canada's position as linchpin was called into play because of two circumstances: first, as a member of NATO, the Commonwealth and the United Nations, Canada was unable to avoid some involvement; secondly, and more important, as an ally and close associate of the United States and Britain, and also with historic ties to France, Canada's own interests were keenly engaged in a solution of the conflict.

The Suez situation was remarkably complex; the motives for the actions of the nations involved were varied and the conflict was not simply over the apparent object of the dispute: the Suez Canal. On February 28, 1955, the Israeli army attacked a military post in the Gaza Strip, then administered by Egypt. The attack was a reprisal raid, but larger and better executed than most actions of that nature. From the time of that raid, the position of the Egyptian revolutionary government was very difficult. Because the size of the raid had convinced Egypt's leaders that there was an imminent threat of invasion, Egypt sought arms in the world market. The arms were eventually obtained from the Soviet Union in the famous Czech arms deal of September 1955. The resultant Middle East arms race increased tension. In addition, Soviet-U.S. relations were strained by the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, and a series of incidents led to the cancellation of the American offer to arrange financing for the Aswan High Dam. For both political and financial reasons, the Nasser regime thereupon nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. During the next three months, while various negotiations failed to achieve agreement between Egypt and

the majority of the chief users of the canal, England, France and Israel conspired to invade Egypt, their chief aim being the overthrow of Nasser. On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded Egypt, followed two days later by French and British forces. Strongly criticized by most of the nations of the world, including both the United States and the Soviet Union, London, Paris and Tel Aviv were persuaded to withdraw their invading forces back to the Egyptian-Israeli boundary.

Aside from a relatively minor domestic contretemps concerning the export permit issued by the Liberal government to a private company wishing to ship fifteen Harvard trainer aircraft to Egypt, Canada showed little concern in the early states of the crisis.¹⁶ Some of the principles underlying Canadian participation in the area were revealed by this incident, however, and are of considerable interest. The Canadian government believed in maintaining a balance in the matter of arms between Israel and the Arab states. To this end, it permitted the shipment to either side of defensive armaments, such as anti-aircraft guns, and spare parts for existing arms. The government also perceived Israel as being in the weaker position, hence requiring proportionately more arms to maintain the balance. Thus, in 1955, of \$2 million in arms shipped from Canada to the Middle East, about \$700,000 (the Harvard trainers) went to Egypt, and about \$1.3 million to Israel (chiefly anti-aircraft weapons, ammunition and spare parts). After the conclusion of the Czech arms deal, which the Egyptians perceived as a defensive measure, Canada granted an export permit for twenty-five F-86 jets to Israel at America's request.¹⁷ However, this shipment was cancelled when Israel proved itself, in October 1956, capable of offensive action.

Because Canada was not a major user of the canal, the Canadian government was not a direct participant in the negotiations that followed between Egypt and the principal users. At this point it appears that Canada, in frequent consultation with Britain and the United States, accepted the contention of these states that if the control of the canal devolved solely upon Egypt, the consequences would be pernicious for the security of Israel and the nations of the NATO alliance. Canada did not, however, view the question of formal control as of

critical importance. Its main concern was the prevention of serious Commonwealth discord. This resulted in action to forestall any divisive consequences of the impending crisis; the concern increased as it became apparent that India assessed the issue very differently from Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Despite the adherence of India and Ceylon to a minority report, Canada publicly stated on August 30 its support for the majority report of the London Conference that was negotiating the issues. Mr. Pearson appeared to attribute the failure of the negotiations to President Nasser.

The aim of the Canadian government remained fairly constant after news of the invasions was received, but a greater sense of urgency and concern was felt about the critical nature of the rifts within the Western alliance and the Commonwealth. Mr. Pearson's aim was to bring NATO and Commonwealth members together again inside the Western alliance and restore peace in the area on terms which everybody could accept. From the beginning, Canada's preference for multilateral action and a practical solution which would provide for the means of its achievement was evident. The idea of an international force to stabilize a ceasefire line was raised at the first Canadian cabinet discussion of the situation.

When Mr. Pearson left Ottawa for New York to attend the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, he intended to suggest that the United Nations, in effect, assume direction of the Anglo-French forces, and use them to fulfill their avowed intention—to stop Israeli-Egyptian fighting. However, upon arriving at the United Nations, Mr. Pearson discovered that the moral indignation of the members directed against the French and British made such a plan impossible. The first resolution adopted by the Assembly called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces, and was sponsored by the United States. Sixty-four delegations voted in favour; Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand and Israel voted against, Canada abstained. This abstention revealed Canada's position of balance: not between Arab and Israeli, but rather between Britain and its supporters on the one hand, and the remainder of the world, especially the United States,

on the other. Canada was seeking a compromise between the aims of the British and French aggression and resistance to it by the majority of nations. She could not afford to antagonize either camp. Mr. Pearson when explaining his abstention stated that, "We support the effort being made to bring the fighting to an end. We support it, among other reasons, because we regret that force was used in the circumstances that face us at this time."¹⁸

Aside from his regret that Britain and France chose to use force to settle the issue, and his chagrin at the lack of consultation with the members of the Commonwealth by Mr. Eden, Pearson appeared to be sympathetic to the intentions of the invading powers. On November 29, he declared, "I do not for one minute criticize the motives of the governments of the United Kingdom and France. . . . I may have thought their intervention was not wise, but I do not criticize their purposes."¹⁹ Mr. Pearson's suggested solution, a peacekeeping force, was eventually adopted and put into effect. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established largely as a result of his initiative. It permitted the orderly withdrawal of France, Britain and Israel, while disguising the fact that a primary reason for their withdrawal was the opposition of the United States to the actions of its allies. While the French and British were defeated, and the Egyptians saved from disaster, the Canadians did manage to save face for their allies. This became clear when, on October 31, Mr. Pearson told John Foster Dulles, "We are interested in helping Britain and France. I would like to make it possible for them to withdraw with as little loss of face as possible, and bring them back into realignment with the U.S."²⁰ This attitude was also expressed in a later speech in the House of Commons. On November 27, 1956, Pearson said of the evening of the Canadian proposal for an emergency force, "The talk was strong and the danger of a rash—as we would have thought it—condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors was very real. The situation was deteriorating and the communists were working feverishly and destructively to exploit it."

Two basic features of Canada's orientation toward the Mid-

dle East are apparent from her actions at the time of the Suez crisis. The first of these is that Canada still had, in essence, no Middle East policy beyond a desire for peace and balance. The second is that Canada's orientation evolved as a reaction to the changing relations among her allies and associates, rather than in response to the situation in the Middle East. Canada made a major contribution to the founding and staffing of UNEF, for which Mr. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1957. However, Canada's primary concern was not the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but rather the resolution of the cleavages between the Western alliance and within the Commonwealth. In a word, Canada wanted to solve a NATO and Commonwealth problem, not the Arab-Israeli problem. On November 27, Mr. Pearson stated in the House of Commons, "Our purpose was to be as helpful to the United Kingdom and France as we possibly could. . . . We have had many expressions of appreciation [from London] for the line we have been trying to follow, and which has been helpful in the circumstances to the United Kingdom and France."

The Canadian position, while more favourable to Britain and France than the stand adopted by Washington and most of the Afro-Asian nations, was far less favourable to Britain and France than most of Canadian public opinion. The *Vancouver Province* carried the disapproving headline, "Canada Turns Her Back on U.K.," while the *Globe and Mail* also attacked the government's position in an editorial on November 3. Both felt that the abstention by Mr. Pearson on the U.S. resolution urging the withdrawal of all military forces was far too much influenced by the American position, and far too little supportive of Britain. The assumption of British and French aggression which prevailed in most of the world was apparently not shared by a majority of Canadians, as indicated by newspaper editorials and commentaries at the time and interviews conducted by the author with Canadian political leaders. Most Canadians, it appears, were in favour of supporting, or at least approving, British actions, and only a small minority favoured condemning the British action as a violation of the principles of international collective security

and international law. In the ensuing political campaign, the Progressive Conservatives exploited the issue, probably to some effect.

Furthermore, the Cabinet had not been entirely as one on the matter. Mr. St. Laurent, the Prime Minister, was apparently more disturbed by the British and French action, and more likely to oppose it on moral grounds, than was Mr. Pearson. Mr. St. Laurent took the position that the French and British were in violation of international law and the fundamental principles of the United Nations, which was a mainstay of Canadian policy, and should therefore be strongly opposed. Mr. Pearson, on the other hand, was more inclined to be concerned with the consequences of the French and British looking bad and thus embarrassing their allies.²¹

The fact that a compromise position prevailed would indicate that, on Middle Eastern questions, where no firm position had evolved due to the intermittency of Canadian involvement, the influence of personality was strong, and Lester Pearson was able to play a dominant role in the formulation of Canada's position.

The years after Suez saw a decline in Canada's influence in world politics. Whether one attributes this to the fall of the Liberal government and the accession to power of the inexperienced Diefenbaker Cabinet, or to an inevitable attrition of Canada's power due to general changes in the world situation, it is widely accepted that Suez represented the high point of Canada's global diplomacy. Thereafter, the consequences of the Suez War and other events increased the constraints upon Canadian policy that we discussed earlier.²² The Middle East was relatively quiescent during this period as Egypt was busy rebuilding after Suez and attempting to institutionalize its union with Syria (which lasted from 1958 until 1961). The turbulent events of 1958 in the Middle East²³ and the resultant changes in the politics of the area concerned Canada little; the volume of *Canada in World Affairs* for 1959 to 1961 hardly mentions the region, noting that the most important Middle Eastern issue for Canada was the problem of raising sufficient money in the United Nations to pay for UNEF.²⁴ However, during the winter of 1966 and the spring of 1967,

the Middle East crisis became acute, and Canada was again a member of the United Nations Security Council.

THE 1967 WAR

Throughout 1966 and early 1967 raids and counter-raids continued to erupt along the Israeli, Syrian and Jordanian borders. In November 1966, Israel conducted a full-scale attack on the Jordanian village of al-Samu which killed eighteen Jordanians and caused considerable damage to the village. Jordan brought the matter to the Security Council and Israel was censured by the Council (14-0-1, New Zealand abstaining).

The raid significantly increased tension in the Middle East, and was followed in April 1967 by a serious armed clash involving forces of Israel and Syria. In this incident Israeli aircraft, after downing six Syrian MIG fighter aircraft, swept over Damascus in a demonstration of Israeli air power.²⁵ This incident aroused comment from General Odd Bull (head of the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization, UNTSO), and Secretary-General U Thant, who circulated a document about it to all Security Council members on May 8.²⁶ The Canadian delegate, Mr. George Ignatieff, was President of the Security Council for the month of April. Although he recognized the serious nature of the incident, he did not call a meeting of the Council.

With tensions in the Middle East inflamed by these events, Nasser was informed in mid-May of heavy Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border.²⁷ To forestall an Israeli attack on Syria (with which Egypt had a military alliance), Nasser ordered the withdrawal of UNEF forces from the Egyptian-Israeli border on May 16 so that Egyptian troops could assume positions there.

On May 18, U Thant acceded to the Egyptian request and ordered the withdrawal of UNEF forces, touching off a storm of protest in the United States, Britain and Canada. Although most of the member nations of the world organization, and all the other members of the UNEF force, agreed with U Thant that the terms of UNEF's tenure on Egyptian soil guaranteed no circumscription of Egyptian sovereignty (and therefore had to be withdrawn upon Egypt's request), the United States, Bri-

tain and Canada maintained that U Thant should have referred the matter to the Security Council or the General Assembly.

It was Mr. Pearson's view that Egypt did not have the right to call for the withdrawal of UNEF forces. Although in 1956, regarding Egyptian acceptance of the UNEF force on its territory, he had stated that "no infringement on sovereignty is involved,"²⁸ in July 1957 he commented, "Egypt has the right to be consulted and to agree to the entry of an international force, but having given that consent as she did she has no right to control the force, to order it about, to tell the force when it shall leave."²⁹

Similarly, in the May 1967 crisis, Secretary of External Affairs Paul Martin contended in the House of Commons that only the U.N. General Assembly or the Security Council could order the withdrawal of UNEF forces. He stated that Canada would attempt to persuade the Security Council to keep UNEF from being withdrawn. On May 20, 1967, headlines in the *Montreal Star* read "Canada fights to keep U.N. in Mid-East." The paper reported that Mr. Martin went to New York with new proposals for the maintenance of a U.N. presence in the Middle East, and that there were other ideas and possibilities for maintaining this presence.

On May 22, President Nasser announced closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, and made the following comment on the attempt to keep UNEF forces in Egypt:

On May 16 we requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. . . . A big worldwide campaign, led by the United States, Britain, and Canada, began opposing the withdrawal of UNEF from Egypt. Thus we felt that there were attempts to turn UNEF into a force serving neo-imperialism. It is obvious that UNEF entered Egypt with our approval and therefore cannot continue to stay in Egypt except with our approval. A campaign is also being mounted against the United Nations Secretary General because he made a faithful and honest decision and could not surrender to the pressure brought to bear upon him by the United States, Britain and Canada to make UNEF an instrument for implementing imperialism's plans.³⁰

President Nasser's accusation was more than mere inflammatory rhetoric. At its initiation at the turn of the twentieth

century, the Zionist movement had depended upon British support. Britain's assistance to the movement was accompanied by her own increasing intervention in the Middle East. Following the Second World War, Britain's support of Zionism was superseded by that of the United States. Thus, President Nasser's view of U.S. and British motives *vis-à-vis* the UNEF expressed the lack of confidence that the Arab world had long held in them.

That President Nasser pointed to Canada along with the United States and Britain should have indicated the precariousness of Canada's role as a neutral in the Middle East conflict. Apparently it did not. On May 26 President Johnson flew to Ottawa to confer with Prime Minister Pearson, whom he described as "one of the great living experts on that part of the world, that now concerns us so much."³¹ The two leaders discussed the need to re-create an effective U.N. presence in the Middle East. According to *The Times* of London, Pearson assured Johnson that the Canadian contingent in the defunct UNEF would remain in the Middle East as long as possible in case it should be required to support any new peacekeeping arrangements. Three days later, Nasser ordered UNEF's Canadian contingent of eight hundred men to leave Egypt within 48 hours because of the Canadian government's "biased stand in favour of Israel."³²

Although Mr. Pearson commented that this was "based on a regrettable misunderstanding of Canadian policy,"³³ it appears more likely that Mr. Pearson failed to perceive the Arab view of the Middle East crisis. While his efforts on the UNEF issue arose from his sincere desire to give form and substance to the U.N.'s peacekeeping role, nevertheless he failed to address himself to the issues between the Middle East antagonists. His position on the UNEF placed in question the sovereignty of Egypt at a time of national crisis, and therefore was untenable to the Arabs. Furthermore, the alignment of Canadian policy with British and American policies—Israel's closest friends in the international arena—was interpreted by the Arabs as Canadian collusion in a British-American attempt to forestall Nasser's aid to Syria which the Arab world believed to be under threat of a massive Israeli invasion. Mr.

Pearson and the Canadian public were greatly angered by the summary dismissal of the Canadian contingent, for they failed to understand the Arab interpretation of Canadian policy. This is evident in Pearson's assurances to Johnson four days after Nasser's speech; these undermined any role Canada might have played in the crisis and were the immediate cause of the expulsion of the Canadian contingent.

Because the Arab states now identified Canada with American and British policy in the Middle East, the Canadian peacekeeping role and Lester Pearson's role as mediator were severely restricted. During the 1967 war, and following Israel's spectacular six-day blitzkrieg of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces, Canada was involved with the deliberations on the Middle East in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, but she was unable to assume the significant role she had played in the 1948 and 1956 crises. Mr. Pearson attempted again to act as mediator, suggesting on May 30 a compromise based on concessions by both sides, on June 5 calling for a big four summit meeting to seek peace in the Middle East, and on June 8 outlining a six-point plan for peace. But Canada's role in the Middle East was bankrupt, with the Arab world viewing her as "a stooge of the Western powers who seek to colonize the Arab world with Israel's help."³⁴

Canada's position during the debate of the Arab-Israeli conflict by the fifth emergency special session is of interest because it reflects her general orientation without being overshadowed, as in 1948 and 1956, by considerations external to the Middle East. One constant Canadian concern was to reach an agreed solution of the fundamental political problems underlying the conflict. In 1956, Mr. Pearson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated before the General Assembly: "I consider that there is one great omission from this resolution . . . it does not provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a ceasefire will be only of temporary value at best."³⁵ In 1967, Mr. Martin also spoke before the emergency session, of removing the long-term causes of the crisis, as well as its immediate effects.³⁶

What this has meant is, first, that Canada has pressed for a political settlement of the entire question and second, that Canada has, in most cases, sought to avoid censuring or condemning parties to the dispute on the grounds that this tended to render more difficult the solution of long-term problems. However, on a few occasions, discussed later, Canada did vote to condemn various Israeli actions.³⁷

Canada supported, and continues to support, the Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which calls for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the occupied territories, as well as for a political settlement, freedom of navigation and the recognition of secure and recognized boundaries.³⁸ On July 14, 1967, the Canadian representative to the fifth emergency special session stated that Canada "regards withdrawal of forces as one of the vital elements in any enduring settlement in the Middle East." At that time, Canada supported a Pakistani resolution opposing Israeli efforts to modify the status of Jerusalem.

The reasons for the Canadian position were summarized in remarks made by Mr. Martin, Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Beaulieu of Canada during the debates in the General Assembly's fifth emergency special session. On June 23, Mr. Martin expressed the opinion that "no one government can . . . be held wholly responsible for what has happened." He stated that the two basic principles underlying peace and security in the area depended upon the recognition of the existence of the State of Israel, and the obligation of Israel not to violate the territory of its neighbours. This position was in line with the Canadian policy of 1956. After discussing the role of the international organization, Mr. Martin turned to conditions for the settlement of the immediate crisis. He said, "If peace and security in the area are to be assured, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, vital as it is, must be related to the other basic issues involved." These included right to territorial integrity and innocent passage, a solution to the refugee problem, and the preservation of the rights of religious interests in Jerusalem. On the vital question of the refugees, Mr. Martin stated: "It would be an illusion to go on believing that the problem of refugees will simply be solved on the basis of their return to Israel. Similarly, Arab States could not be expected to

shoulder alone the burden of resettling and integrating in Arab countries those refugees who might make this choice." Part of Mr. Martin's enunciation of the Canadian position was reiterated by Mr. Ignatieff on July 3; with reference to several draft resolutions, he said they "suffer from the basic defect that the withdrawal of Israeli forces, vital as it is, is not related to the other basic issues involved, which, in our view, are essential to any enduring settlement and which are taken up in the draft resolution put forward by the Latin American delegations."

The major issue before the United Nations, however, was the question of Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian, Jordanian and Egyptian territories she occupied in the war. On this issue, Mr. Beaulieu summarized Canada's position:

Canada has made it clear that it regards withdrawal of forces as one of the vital elements in any enduring settlement in the Middle East . . . respect for the territorial integrity of the nations of the Middle East, including provision for security and international supervision of frontiers, is one of the principles which Canada believes must be adhered to if a just and lasting solution is to be found to the present crisis.

The official Canadian position on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories was thus to tie it to the settlement of other issues, a position similar to that of the United States and one favoured by Israel. The major point of agreement was that other matters were as important as, or more important than, the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

The Sudanese Prime Minister, M. Ahmed Mahgoub, argued the general Arab opinion that the "first order of business—as in 1956—should be the withdrawal of foreign forces from Arab territory." It is obvious that Canada was well removed from this position.

On the other hand, Canada's position has been identified by Arthur Lall, former Permanent Representative of India, as closer to the West European approach than to the American.³⁹ The major distinction Lall finds between the two approaches is twofold. First, the U.S. approach defined no immediate, pragmatic steps to "alleviate the situation, to reduce tensions, and to help the movement in various ways toward a more stable peace." Secondly, United States failed

to take a clear stand on the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The West Europeans favoured complete withdrawal, with additional and immediate action to relieve tensions. The Canadian position, while firmly in favour of full withdrawal, tended to agree with the United States on the need for long-term solutions, and proposed a more prominent role for the United Nations than was envisaged by either the United States or the West Europeans. It is perhaps significant that Lall, in his analysis of national positions, proceeds from the Russian and Arab positions at one extreme to the Israeli position at the other, with the United States next to the Israelis, and Canada between the United States and the Europeans.⁴⁰ We do not conclude from this that Canada had formally agreed to align its position with the United States. Rather the two countries appear to share a particular historic orientation to Judaism and Zionism, one that also underlies the similar policies of all the West European states.

In the debates at the reconvened Security Council session in October and November of 1967, the Canadian position came more closely into alignment with that of the United States, perhaps because of the narrowing scope of the alternatives before the Council. The summer's sessions of both the Assembly and the Council had established quite definite limits to a solution which could command majority support of the United Nations' membership. The continuing urgency of the situation was impressed upon the Council by the necessity to deal with violations of the ceasefire between Israel and Egypt. The UNTSO forces, including Canadians, were moved to the Suez Canal line to maintain the ceasefire, but this was obviously a stop-gap measure. In November, a draft resolution was proposed by India, Mali and Nigeria, setting out the principles upon which there was general agreement, and proposing that a special representative of the Secretary-General be dispatched to the area to conduct negotiations. The United States proposed a draft resolution very similar in both substance and language, but which made no explicit reference to the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces.⁴¹

The Canadian position in the Arab-Israeli dispute may be further defined by the actions taken by Canada in response to

the various ceasefire violations which have occurred since November 22, 1967.⁴² On March 21, 1968, Mr. Ignatieff pointed to "a mounting number of incidents of infiltration and sabotage on the Israeli side of the Israel-Jordan sector." Three days later, after voting for a resolution condemning Israel for a major military action in Jordanian territory, he referred to his earlier statement, and disapproved of violent "incidents, whatever their source." On April 27, 1968, Mr. Ignatieff regretted the Israeli decision to hold a military parade in Jerusalem, including the occupied parts. Later, in May, he opposed a resolution condemning the actions of Israel with regard to Jerusalem on the ground that this might lead to sanctions against Israel. In explaining his vote in favour of a resolution condemning Israeli air actions in Irbid and Salt, the Canadian representative stressed "that the gravity of the situation in the Middle East results from breaches of the ceasefire on both sides." On December 30 and 31, 1968, just before leaving the Security Council, Canada unambiguously condemned Israel for the attacks on the Beirut Airport as "unprecedented and out of proportion to any provocation offered."

THE 1973 WAR

When the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war broke out, Canada attempted to apply the formulas and strategies developed during the previous Middle East crises. Immediately following the outbreak of war, Mitchell Sharp, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, called for a ceasefire and expressed the hope the dispute would be submitted to the United Nations. He further urged that any settlement should be based on Resolution 242 of the Security Council. On October 8, he stated that reports indicated that the fighting was started by the Egyptians and Syrians; however, he noted, the important issue was to stop the fighting. Canada, he announced, was contacting the great powers in an attempt to use the U.N. machinery to halt the war.

On October 10, only four days after the war had started, and before Canada had been asked, an External Affairs spokesman indicated that Canada would take part in any

peacekeeping operation in the area. Press opinion in this period appeared to be strongly pro-Israeli. Much of this reached the Arab embassies and provided yet another indication of Canada's pro-Israeli sympathies. Meanwhile, the next day, Mr. Sharp denied the report that Canada would send troops to the area and said a peacekeeping force would only be dispatched if both sides would agree to a definite peace.

By October 15 the smoke of battle had more or less cleared. Israel appeared poised to defeat Syria in the north and a bloody stalemate had emerged in Sinai. In the Commons, Robert Stanfield, Leader of the Opposition, asked if Canada would be willing to send a peacekeeping force. Mr. Sharp replied Canada would participate in the U.N. operation; he also said he did not wish to exaggerate the part Canada would play in any settlement. Also on the 15th, Egypt reacted to statements in the Canadian press by issuing an angry statement condemning Canada's biased stand. Apparently anticipating a significant Canadian role, similar to those in past Middle East crises, the House of Commons met on October 16 for a special debate on the Middle East. Mr. Sharp opened the debate by noting it was the government's policy that any lasting settlement must be based on Resolution 242 of the Security Council, as it alone had received wide acceptance; it was also its policy that Israel had the right to exist behind secure and recognized boundaries. On peacekeeping, he stated "we could envisage a contribution to peacekeeping if desired and required by the parties as well as the continuation of peace observation operations." Mr. Claude Wagner, the Conservative foreign affairs critic, contended that the policy must be based on the principle of "Israel's right to exist," and that it would be impossible for Canada to maintain a perfect balance between the two warring sides. The spokesman for the New Democratic Party, Mr. Andrew Brewin, concurred with Mr. Sharp that only Resolution 242 could form a basis for peace. Meanwhile, press speculation had begun on the form that the inevitable peacekeeping force would take. Canada, however, had not yet been asked to contribute to such a force, and no ceasefire was yet in effect.

By October 22 the initiative for peace was clearly in the

hands of the big powers, who succeeded in arranging a ceasefire between the warring states. The war could not have continued much longer in any case, owing to the extreme depletion of the armies of both sides. It was apparently assumed in Ottawa that with the ceasefire would come peacekeeping and automatic Canadian participation. A debate was scheduled in the House for that day. It began with the Secretary of State for External Affairs welcoming the call for a ceasefire by the Security Council. Mr. Sharp promised that Canada would consider participation in any force that could, in her view, play a useful role, but he dropped his earlier demand that such a force would only be sent if profitable negotiations were undertaken. Mr. Macquarrie, speaking for the Conservatives, indicated that a force would be welcomed, a sentiment also affirmed by spokesman for the New Democratic and Social Credit parties. On October 25, when the Leader of the Opposition asked if Canada would participate if requested, Mr. Sharp reiterated that Canada would only participate if it could be useful. In fact, the External Affairs Department was struggling to "get Canada in." On the 26th it became clear in the House of Commons that Canada had not in fact been asked to contribute to the force, and that Egypt might possibly have registered objections to her participation. Outside the House, the press raised serious objections to sending a peacekeeping force. The *Globe and Mail*, for example, stated in an editorial that the unfortunate experience of Vietnam, and the damage done to Canada's reputation, should surely have been sufficient for Mr. Sharp. Finally, on October 28, after Canada's public announcement that an airborne brigade was ready, the Secretary-General forwarded a request to Canada for troops. Canada announced it would give the request the "most urgent consideration." On the 30th, Mr. Sharp reported in the House that Canada would participate for an initial six-month period on the following terms:

1. Full backing of the Security Council;
2. Full cooperation of the parties involved;
3. The ability to function as an integrated and efficient military unit;

4. Full freedom of movement and communications;
5. All relevant immunities.

In November it became apparent that Canada was not wanted by Egypt partly as a result of its performance in 1967 and partly because it felt that Canada was an extension of the United States. Throughout the month it became increasingly apparent that Canada in fact had to talk the U.N. into taking her. On the 9th it was reported that only a personal call from the Secretary-General to Sadat had saved Canada's international face. Articles in the *Globe and Mail* entitled "Canada Goes Abegging," and "Begging for UNEF Role" in the *Calgary Herald*, confirmed this view, and the government was attacked severely in the House by Tory critic Claude Wagner for "dragging us through a process of inspection and approval on the part of the Soviets and Egyptians." Poland, it was later announced, had been included to balance the supposedly pro-Western influence of Canada.

Canada's problem in securing inclusion in the peacekeeping operation, with the attendant charges of External Affairs bungling, were mirrored in another major controversy to emerge as a result of the war: was Canada the victim of the oil embargo or was she not? Throughout 1968-1973, Arab oil had become more important to Eastern Canada. By 1973 it accounted for 25 per cent of Canadian oil imports. Yet there were no Canadian embassies or even consulates in the major Arab oil-producing states. If Canada was on the blacklist there were no direct diplomatic channels to determine why. The first questions were raised in Parliament on October 17, a few days after the first announcements of an oil embargo on nations friendly to Israel. Mr. Stanfield asked whether the government had contingency plans to meet the eventuality of an Arab embargo against Canada. Energy Minister Macdonald replied that there was a 45-day supply of crude oil, and a 100-day supply of heating oil. He noted that the market for oil was "tight" and Canadian buyers had encountered difficulty. He further announced that he would attempt to secure Venezuelan oil in a short-term agreement; in this he had no success and was obliged to warn of possible rationing. Following announcements by the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) that countries friendly to Israel could expect to be cut off from oil shipments, the government attempted to get clarification. On October 24 it was reported that American companies were diverting tankers of Arab oil headed for Canada to New York. Mr. Macdonald responded to queries from press and Commons that he had no such information, although coincidentally he had met with U.S. Energy Adviser John Love on the same day. On the 25th it was reported in the *Globe and Mail* that Abu Dhabi had stopped a shipment of oil to Canada. Mr. Macdonald commented: "There was no reason to expect a cutback. Our people take the line that Canada does not take an anti-Arab line. We were very friendly to Israel but that does not mean we are against the Arabs." Later that day in the House, Mr. Stanfield accused the government of misleading the people in telling them that the oil boycott was not directed against Canada. On the same day, it was reported that Mr. Sharp called in the Arab ambassadors for a meeting. Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and Tunisia attended. Mr. Sharp informed them that he assumed Canada would not be a target of the oil embargo because of her friendly relations with the Arab countries and impartiality in the dispute with Israel, noting Canada's economic aid to the Arab countries of North Africa as evidence of Canadian sympathy for the Arabs. He asked that Ottawa's "concern" be expressed to the ambassadors' governments.

On October 26 the government announced that it had heard varying reports about the state of affairs in Saudi Arabia, but that it was now reliably confirmed Abu Dhabi had stopped a shipment of oil. In the House, Mr. Sharp expressed his inability to comprehend the Arab states' action. The following day the Arab Information Agency, in response to queries by reporters, replied that the Canadian government had taken the same stand as that of Holland which had been cut off from oil shipments. Further, on November 1, the Egyptian Ambassador to the U.N., Mr. Neguid, said that unless Canada took positive steps to change its policy it could expect continuing disruption of oil shipments. Mr. Sharp initially thought that the suspension of oil shipments was a mistake because of the destination of Portland where the

Canadian pipeline is located. Arthur Blakely, in an article published in the *Calgary Herald* on November 7, summed it up well when he referred to "Canadian Ostrich Diplomacy." Canada at that time had no representation in any of the oil-producing nations, with the exception of Iran; furthermore, Mr. Sharp was unable to fathom how the Arab states could view Canada as anything but neutral. In fact, in Arab eyes, claimed Blakely, Canada is a fence-sitting neutral "who tries to duck the whole issue."

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli war occurred in a significantly different setting for Canadian policy-makers than any of the three previous Middle East wars. First, Canada was not a member of the Security Council. With no effective position of influence, the big powers virtually excluded Canada from the important negotiations. Secondly, Canada had lost the image of neutrality that had sustained Canadian policy in the 1956 crisis. Finally, Canadian interests were directly involved by virtue of the oil embargo. Canada was surprised and shocked to learn that the Arabs not only did not think of her as neutral, but in fact viewed her as within the enemy camp. In Canada the media were clearly pro-Israeli. Parliamentary debates were dominated by impassioned warnings that Israel was in danger, notably from NDP leader David Lewis and later, in December 1973, John Diefenbaker. The war did point out one thing clearly: Canada's voice in international affairs, especially in the Middle East, was well past the zenith of 1956. Her impotence and lack of understanding of Middle Eastern affairs was illustrated only too well by the floundering which occurred when Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia suspended oil shipments to Canada.

In November 1974, the Palestine issue again came before the United Nations when Yasar Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, addressed the United Nations General Assembly. The Canadian mass media reacted vehemently against Mr. Arafat's appearance. In the subsequent debate on the Palestine question on November 22, Canada abstained on a resolution passed by a vote of 89 to 8 (37 abstentions), declaring that the Palestinian people have the right to independence and sovereignty. In a second resolu-

tion, passed by a vote of 95 to 17 (with 19 abstentions) granting the Palestine Liberation Organization permanent observer status, Canada voted with the opposition. Echoing the sentiments of Canadian mass media in general, the *Globe and Mail* complained that these resolutions "institutionalized terrorism."

The granting of permanent observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization set the stage for a major controversy in Canada within the following year. Canada was scheduled to host a U.N. Crime Conference in Toronto, Ontario, in September 1975. The accordance of observer status to the PLO gave it the right to attend U.N. conferences in an official capacity. However, Premier William Davis of Ontario, in a blatant effort to win Jewish votes in a forthcoming provincial election, challenged the PLO's attendance at the conference. The Ontario government and Jewish organizations brought pressure on the federal government to bar entry of PLO delegates to the conference to Canada. However, acceptance to host a U.N. conference is unconditional, with neither the conference agenda nor participants subject to the host country's discretion.

The Canadian Cabinet, in a pale attempt to forestall any policy decision, requested that the conference be postponed for one year. This was in effect a cancellation of the conference, since it was recognized that the U.N. was unlikely to accept a postponement. Indeed, the U.N. Committee on Conferences didn't even vote on the Canadian request for postponement. Rather, the original conference schedule was maintained and the site was changed to Geneva. The tactic of postponement, however, did serve to allay domestic pressures to bar the PLO, while at the same time preserving Canada's right to host a U.N. Conference on Housing scheduled to be held in Vancouver in 1976. Had Canada opted to either bar the PLO or cancel the conference, such a move would have abrogated the scheduling of this conference. As a *Globe and Mail* editorial (July 23, 1975) pointedly asked, however, "If the PLO decides to come to Vancouver, will the Government be any more prepared to take a stand then?"

The government's acquiescence to domestic pressures *vis-*

à-vis a U.N. commitment revealed clearly Canada's inability to come to terms with its brokerage role in the Middle East as a neutral mediator supporting United Nations' efforts in the area. While newspaper editorialists lamented this undermining of Canadian support for the U.N., and senior diplomats in the External Affairs Department regarded the decision to effectively cancel the conference as a betrayal of Canada's thirty-year commitment to the U.N., the decision actually reflected the consistency of the Canadian approach to the Middle East, based as it is on pragmatism rather than policy and embodying a clear point of orientation rather than neutrality.

Further confirming the basic Canadian commitment to the cause of Zionism was the government's consternation over the U.N. resolution calling Zionism a form of racism passed by the General Assembly on November 11, 1975. The resolution passed by a vote of 72 to 35 with 35 absentions and 3 absences, in effect reflecting Third World support and Western rejection of the resolution. Canadian and United States' representatives in the U.N. denounced the resolution in emotionally charged speeches. In an unprecedented move, the Canadian House of Commons on November 12 unanimously condemned the resolution as dangerous to the survival of the world organization and charged the "ganging-up" of countries—notably African—to pass resolutions "contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter."⁴³

PROBLEMS OF CANADIAN NEUTRALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Canadian position on the 1967 and 1973 wars is indicative of a larger problem, of which Suez provided a telling example. Essentially, Canada's role in the world is defined by reference to the United States and Europe, as Europe replaces Britain as an object of orientation. Canada's position in the Middle East, therefore, cannot be defined in terms of Middle Eastern conditions. Rather, her position is defined by the result of forces far removed from the primary centre of the dispute.

Canadian objectivity is certainly unstable in terms of its orientation to the major actors in the Middle East. The term "un-

stable" indicates the tension between Canada's aspirations to objectivity and its inherent difficulty in perceiving the situation in terms that permit an unbiased approach. A variety of historical events and attachments predispose Canadians, consciously or not, to perceive the world as do the inhabitants of Britain and the United States, as well as other European states. The Christian religion is a factor, and its orientation to the Holy Land; this was evident in Lester Pearson, the chief architect of Canadian policy on the Arab-Israeli issue, who wrote of himself:

I must admit that I became emotionally involved in a very special way because we were dealing with the Holy Land—the land of my Sunday School lessons. At one stage of my life I knew far more about the geography of Palestine than I did about the geography of Canada. I could tell you all the towns from Dan to Beer-sheba but certainly not all from Victoria to Halifax. I think that in the back of my mind I felt I was concerning myself with something close to my early life and religious background.⁴⁴

The Second World War, and Western civilization's guilt over an age-old anti-Semitism which had culminated in genocide, the consequent sympathetic view of Zionism, ethnocentrism and a European view of Asian and African peoples—these lead Canada to a position compatible with the basic premises of the Israeli argument. A well-organized and generously financed Zionist lobby, in Canada supported by an influential and wealthy Jewish community, maximize the inherent cultural bias of Western civilization to create public sympathy with Israel, and to apply pressure on the Canadian government to support that country. In *Canada's Search for New Roles*, Peter C. Dobell commented on the influence of the Zionist lobby:

It is . . . an important factor in Canada's international posture that it has constantly shown more sympathy for Israeli than for Arab positions in the Middle East conflict. While Canada was a member of UNEF in the Middle East, a supreme and not always successful effort was made to maintain a neutral stance. But since the expulsion of UNEF in 1967, there has been no strong argument for restraint, and the well organized Jewish lobby in Canada has pressed relentlessly for support of Israel. . . . The remarkable influence of Canadian Jews

comes less from their numbers—about 175,000 in 1961—than from their wealth, their financial support of the Liberal party, their superb organization and their concentration in the large cities which vote Liberal. Their relative impact is the greater because there are fewer Arabs in Canada, and they are, moreover, dispersed, divided among different religions and sects, less well organized, and much less wealthy.⁴⁵

In a similar examination of the problem of maintaining neutrality, Charles Lynch noted several important factors. The first is the pro-Israel lobby; the second, the propaganda supporting the Israeli position, uncountered by similar Arab efforts, leading to acceptance of the Israeli view of the conflict; the third, the ties between Canada and Israel that are not matched between Canada and any Arab state; and finally, the Zionist organizations, by lionizing Mr. Pearson and other Canadian leaders, create the appearance of a commitment to Israel, and thereby render relations with the Arab states more difficult.⁴⁶

Major Canadian political figures frequently address organized Jewish groups. Most of these are Zionist in their sympathies and it is about Israel that they wish to hear the political leaders speak. Typical of what they hear was Mr. St. Laurent's speech in October 1956 to the eleventh plenary session of the Canadian Jewish Congress:

Although the main impetus toward the creation of a Jewish state, apart from that given by persecution, has always come from within the Jewish communities themselves, and it is to the Jewish initiative, Jewish sacrifice and Jewish endeavour that Israel chiefly owes its being, a considerable amount of outside help has also been contributed, through the United Nations and otherwise. Where Canada is concerned, this help has been given gladly.⁴⁷

Just prior to the 1967 war, however, these addresses took on a more cautious note, indicating that a cabinet formula was being adhered to in all public statements. On May 15, 1967, for example, Secretary of State Martin addressed a Negev Dinner in Hamilton, Ontario, and on May 25 was scheduled to address a similar gathering in Montreal; the addresses, prepared by Mr. Martin to present the government's Middle East policy, stressed Israel's responsibilities as well as her

rights in the area.⁴⁸ At the Hamilton dinner, for example, he expressed his pleasure at Israel's announced intention not to develop nuclear weapons. In the other speech, he summed up as follows:

So long as Israel's neighbours, or some of them, refuse to recognize the right of Israel to exist as a state, then we move from one crisis to another. We have already moved from one to another over the last ten or fifteen years. Israel, of course, also has the basic obligation, which I am sure she accepts, to live without provocation and threat to her neighbours, and in accord with the United Nations decisions which gave her birth.

This statement is an exact duplicate of Mr. Pearson's speech before the Commons on the previous day.

Thus, while Canada consciously seeks to fulfill a peacekeeping role in international affairs, such a role in the Middle East—an area greatly in need of peacekeepers—has been circumscribed by Middle Eastern perceptions of Canadian partisanship in the area. Israel's views of Canada were indicated when its government bestowed on Mr. Pearson an honorary fellowship of the Weizman Institute for Science in December 1968, and the Zionist Organization of America awarded him the Theodor Herzl Award for "commitment of Jewish freedom and Israel" in early 1969.

ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF CANADA

During the summers of 1971, 1972 and 1973, the author interviewed 423 residents of Beirut, Lebanon.⁴⁹ This was not a representative sample of Lebanese or Middle Eastern Arabs but concentrated on opinion leaders. The sample included 36 diplomats and high-level policy makers, 98 journalists and publicists, and 289 members of the informed public selected on the basis of their association with either the American or the Arab University of Beirut; both universities have student bodies drawn from all over the Middle East.⁵⁰

Within the informed public category, there was a surprisingly good level of general knowledge about Canada, although knowledge of Canadian politics was sketchy.⁵¹ Of the 289 respondents in this category, 187 knew that Canada had been involved in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East;

182 felt that Canada had been neutral in Middle East matters until 1967; of these, 97 thought Canada has retained her objectivity until 1969. One hundred and forty-four believed that Canadian policy could still change to a more objective view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Concerning Canada's ability to act independently, 91 respondents believed her to be a satellite of the United States, while 31 thought that the United Kingdom controlled Canada. Only 41 believed that Canada could act independently. The remainder gave no answer.

The political knowledge of the 98 journalists⁵² and publicists was more comprehensive than that of the informed public, but their assessment of Canadian policy in the Middle East was similar. All of the journalists, compared to 187 of 289 of the informed public category, knew that Canada had been involved in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. Only 11 believed that Canada was neutral in its Middle East policy. Although 57 thought that Canada had been neutral until 1967, 61 felt that Canada was strongly influenced by other powers. This group also perceived a change in Canadian policy since 1967. Considering their control over the sources of public information, it seems likely that their position has been widely and persuasively disseminated.

The sample of diplomats and high-level policy makers was composed of 8 ambassadors, 8 councillors of embassies, 3 attachés, 4 foreign office undersecretaries, 2 aides, 4 press secretaries, 5 ex-prime ministers and 2 ex-vice presidents. Because of their positions in the policy machinery, their views of Canada are particularly significant. Of the 36, 25 felt that Canada had been neutral and had operated in good faith before 1967; 3 felt that Canada had been biased; the remaining 8 refused to speculate. With reference to the period since 1967, 19 felt Canada to have been controlled by big powers and 7 that Canada had chosen independently to oppose the Arabs; 10 thought that, while Canada was "controlled," its choice to oppose the Arabs had been made freely. This consensus concerning Canadian hostility, from this evidence, was almost entirely attributable to the events following the initiation of the 1967 crisis.

The views reflected in this survey parallel those which ap-

pear in the published opinions of the Arabic press and government leaders. Until President Nasser denounced the Canadian attitude in 1967, the general view of Canada held in the Middle East was one of neutrality, influenced by Canadian participation in UNEF, UNOGIL and UNTSO. Other features of Canadian policy, as expressed in the United Nations and other public statements, were less well known. Canadian policy was seen as a neutralism founded on disinterest, rather than on a balance of motivations.

A PERSPECTIVE OF CANADIAN MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY

We have already noted that Canada had no Middle Eastern policy as such; she had no ties, attachments or important interests in the area, apart from minimal diplomatic arrangements, until 1973 when oil emerged as an important Canadian interest. What Canada has had is an intense United Nations' policy that finds its fullest expression through Middle Eastern issues. This points up the principal characteristic of Canada's diplomacy in the Middle East—the fact that it is secondary in Canadian thinking. In consequence, Canada has used Middle East crises to advance Canadian aims in other contexts: for the augmentation of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role; for the development of a Canadian peacekeeping role in international affairs; for prestige and influence within the Commonwealth and NATO. Because Canada had no major interests in the area until 1973, and most Canadians were unconcerned, the complexities of the Middle East conflict have not been of particular importance in Canadian policy. This point is clear in Professor R. A. Spencer's analysis of Canada's role in the partition plan in 1948:

... for Canada to assist in securing acceptance by a slim majority of a resolution which had no real hope of being fulfilled was a dangerous example of reaching an agreement for agreement's sake, and was both a betrayal of the role of the middle power and in defiance of the repeated declarations on the need for keeping United Nations' actions within the realm of the practicable.⁵³

The success or failure of a policy and its outcome is measured by Canada in terms foreign to the Middle East. Thus,

Canada's Suez policy was not successful in settling the Middle East problem, but because the primary interest of Canada lay in Commonwealth and NATO relations, and the role of the U.N., it was regarded as a brilliantly successful chapter in Canadian policy. Also, the dismissal of Canadian troops from Suez in 1967 was regarded less as a failure of Canadian neutrality than a failure of U.N. authority. Following the dismissal, Mr. Pearson declared that Canada would require "a basis of U.N. authority" before taking on another emergency mission.

In 1973, the issue was significantly different. Canada's interests were involved directly in the oil embargo, and the policy of a very dubious neutrality directly impinged upon this interest. While in 1973 Canada attempted to apply the old formulas of mediation through the United Nations and to assume the traditional Canadian role of peacekeeping, it was painfully evident that, lacking a Security Council seat, Canada was not useful to the big powers; and Canada was embarrassingly excluded from the major peace initiatives in the Middle East.

It may be argued that even had Canada acted differently, little would have been different in the Middle East. But Canadian policy was an important factor in the outcomes of 1948 and 1956, and possibly could have been in 1967 if Canada had not lost her image of impartiality. What all this means, then, is that Canada has played an important role in the Middle East—literally affecting the lives of millions of Middle Easterners in the most direct manner—yet Canadian policy has never seriously addressed itself to Middle Eastern issues. Canada has been neither objective in the Middle East nor neutral, as is popularly thought. Essentially, she has been relatively disinterested in Middle Eastern issues, and thus comparatively dispassionate toward the positions of the antagonists. But Canada has keenly pursued interests elsewhere, including the satisfaction of domestic pressures within her own borders, via her policy in the Middle East. And when very real Middle Eastern interests emerged in the 1973 crisis, Canada was virtually ineffective in dealing with the issues within a framework of national interests and power realities.

Following the debacle of Canadian policy in the 1973 crisis, Canada moved to broaden its representation in the oil-producing countries. Embassies were opened in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and a number of business, parliamentary and academic delegations were sent to the area to increase mutual good-will and investigate areas of expanding relations, particularly trade relations. Finance Minister John Turner, returning from a seventeen-day tour of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait and Iran in April 1975, chided Canadian business and the government for not taking advantage of the expanding Middle East markets. With huge excess oil revenues to spend, the Middle East countries offer Canada a much-desired market for its own technology and industrial production. Mr. Turner's trip points up Canadian interest in the Middle East markets. As he noted, "Oil-exporting countries are interested in doing business in Canada to protect the purchasing power of their oil."⁵⁴ The future, then, may witness Canada developing important trade relations in the Middle East, and pursuing policies that are not only cognizant of its own interests but also better informed on the issues in the Middle East.

NOTES

1. *Bulletin of External Affairs*, published by the Department of External Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 8 (August 1967), p. 310.
2. F. H. Soward and Edgar McInnis, *Canada and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan, for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956), p. 199.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.
4. United Nations Document A/364, 1947.
5. *New York Times*, November 5, 1947.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, November 26, 1947.
8. Maurice Western, "Canada's Role in the Second Assembly," *International Journal*, Vol. III, No. 2 (Spring 1948), p. 126.
9. *Canada in World Affairs from NATO, 1946-1949* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 145-47.
10. A/AC. 13/32, United Nations GAOR. 11, ad hoc commission on Palestine Question, pp. 209-301.
11. Edgar McInnis, "A Middle Power in the Cold War," in Hugh L. Keenleyside, et al., *The Growth of Canadian Politics in External Affairs*, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960), pp. 142-48.
12. Mike: *The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, Vol. 2, 1948-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 217.

13. B. S. Keirstead, *Canada in World Affairs, September 1951 to October 1953* (Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1956), pp. 100-102.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.
15. James Eayrs, *The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); E. L. M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (London and Toronto: Harrap, 1962); Robert W. Reford, *Canada and Three Crises* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), pp. 73-146; see also James Eayrs, *Canada in World Affairs, 1955-1957* (Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1969), pp. 182-193, et passim, for a reliable account of the crisis, which I have drawn on in the discussion which follows.
16. Donald C. Masters, *Canada in World Affairs, 1953 to 1955* (Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), pp. 177-180. The lack of Canadian involvement in this period may be seen from the space devoted to it by Mr. Masters; these four pages, and not complete pages at that, are the entire discussion of Canadian Middle East policy in this comprehensive survey.
17. *Mike*, Vol. 2, pp. 223-24.
18. Canada, Department of External Affairs, *The Crisis in the Middle East, October-December 1956* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), p. 9.
19. Eayrs, *Canada in World Affairs* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 185. This was elaborated on in *Mike*, p. 273.
20. Terence Robertson, *Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1964), p. 188.
21. Dale Thomson, *Louis St. Laurent: Canadian* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 461-69.
22. Reford, *Canada and Three Crises*, pp. 134-43, 149-53.
23. In February 1958, Egypt and Syria formed the U.A.R. in response to which Iraq and Jordan proclaimed a union. In May civil war broke out in Lebanon, leading to the landing of U.S. Marines at Beirut and British paratroops in Jordan. On July 13-14 a revolution in Iraq ended British influence in that country and led to the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad pact.
24. Richard A. Preston, *Canada in World Affairs, 1959 to 1961* (Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1965), pp. 240-241.
25. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, *Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967*, Adelphi Papers, No. 41, October 1967 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 14.
26. Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 2-3, 8-9.
27. Howard and Hunter, *Israel and the Arab World*, p. 15.
28. Eayrs, *The Commonwealth and Suez*, p. 327.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
30. *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 23, 1967.
31. *The Times* (London), May 26, 1967.
32. *Al-Ahram*, May 29, 1967.
33. *The Times*, May 29, 1967.
34. *Al-Ahram*, May 29, 1967.
35. GAOR/1st emergency special session/1956, pp. 35-61.
36. Paul Martin, "Middle East Question." A speech delivered at the Fifth Emergency Session on the United Nations General Assembly, June 23, 1967; Canada, Department of External Affairs, p. 1, et passim.
37. Israel, in fact, has been rebuked, censured or condemned by the principal organs of the UN no less than fifteen times, more than any other country in the world. United Nations Documents; Resolutions S/1006, S/1045, S/2157, S/3139/Rev. 2, S/3378, S/3538, S/5111, 997 (ES-1), 999 (ES-1), 1002 (ES-1), 1120 (XI), 1123 (XI), 1124 (XI), 114 (S-2), S/4785. These are the resolutions passed from 1948 to 1965, and do not include those passed after 1965.
38. Robert L. Elliot, Chief of the Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs, in a personal communication to the author, March 23, 1971.
39. Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis*, pp. 134-38, 145-46.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-52, passim.
41. The Canadian delegate expressed a preference for the United States draft; Canadian Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 71, November 9, 1967, p. 3.
42. We refer here to a few of these, to which the head of the Middle East Division, Department of External Affairs, has drawn our attention.
43. *Globe and Mail*, November 13, 1975.
44. *Mike*, Vol. 2, p. 213.
45. Peter C. Dobell, *Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era* (London: 1972), p. 17.
46. Charles Lynch, "Our War Pains," *Ottawa Citizen*, June 6, 1967.
47. Bernard Figler, "History of the Zionist Ideal in Canada," *Canadian Jewish Reference Book and Directory* (Jewish Institute of Higher Research, Central Rabbinical Seminary of Canada, 1963), pp. 93-94.
48. "Peace in the Middle East," (May 15, 1967); and "The Situation in the Middle East," (May 25, 1967); both available as Department of External Affairs Press releases.
49. There were 18 Iranians and 3 Kurds, while the remainder were Arabs from all over the Middle East, including 3 Israeli Arabs. Of those who gave their religious affiliation, 41 were Christians (20 Catholic, 4 Maronite, 14 Orthodox and 2 Protestant); 51 Shi'ite Muslims; 68 Sunni Muslims; 6 Druses; 2 Zoroastrians; 2 Haha'is; 9 Alwis; 1 Yazidi and 10 Atheists.
50. It was felt that a sample which was well-educated was likely to be both informed and politically active, and thus more likely to have knowledge and opinions about Canada than the general public. Of the informed public category 103 had a high school diploma, but less than four years of college; 97 had a BA; and 89 had an advanced degree (MA or PH D). The sample was fairly evenly distributed among the age groups from 20 to 51. Of those in this category who identified political affiliation, 40 were as-

sociated with New Left groups, 12 with traditional Left groups; 114 with moderate, 29 with conservative and 8 with radical Right groups.

51. Only six of the sample had ever been to Canada. One hundred five were able to name more than one Canadian city, while only 77 could not name any city. Thirty-two respondents were able to correctly identify Ottawa as the capital of Canada but 75 suggested another Canadian city. While only 4 of the respondents knew that there were ten provinces in Canada, 107 identified Quebec as a province, 29 Ontario, and 15 Saskatchewan. Asked to name the basis of the Canadian economy, 82 cited wheat and oil, 23 oil alone, and 39 wheat alone. The rest were not sure. This result is somewhat surprising; the Middle East's interest in oil might have been expected to produce a higher awareness of the competition, but Canadian wheat was better known than her oil.
- Only 32 respondents could name a Canadian party; of these only 9 could name all of them (at the federal level). One hundred two of the respondents thought that the FLQ was a federal political party. With reference to Canadian political leadership, the politicians named, and the numbers identifying them, were as follows: P. Trudeau, 107; M. Sharp, 53; P. Laporte, 54; L. Pearson, 61; R. Lévesque, 22; J. Diefenbaker, 11; T. Douglas, 6; P. Martin, 8; R. Stanfield, 39; and D. Lewis, 2. Apparently Mr. Sharp's visit in 1969, and the murder of Mr. Laporte, had received attention in the area. Mr. Trudeau is very well known. The most interesting feature of the responses is the high level of familiarity with Quebec and the political situation in that province.
52. These included 30 politicians, 31 print journalists, 16 persons connected with radio and television, 7 editors of papers and journals, 4 publishers and 10 poets.
53. Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
54. *Globe and Mail*, May 3, 1975.

CLYDE SANGER

Canada and Development in the Third World*

*I sit at my table, en grand seigneur,
And when I have done, throw a crust to the poor;
Not only the pleasure, one's self, of good living
But also the pleasure of now and then giving.
So pleasant it is to have money, heigh ho,
So pleasant it is to have money.*

Arthur Hugh Clough, 1819-1861.

The poet, sitting in his Florentine café, was being a satirist. The attitudes he was mocking have, for the most part, been driven underground—although Canadian food aid was still being delivered in the 1970s with big maple leaf flags and our country's name printed largely on the sacks of flour. We generally prefer to "do good by stealth," not only in the recipient countries but also back in Canada. The Canadian people have not been told much about their government's program of development cooperation with the majority of humanity, beyond some incoherent snippets of news such as a press release on a new line-of-credit to Gondwanaland or a film-

*This chapter, which was completed in mid-1974 and updated in early 1975, necessarily contains some statistics a year or two old. The references to the CIDA Strategy Paper 1975-80 were made on the basis of seeing preliminary drafts and do not constitute a critique of the document that was issued in September 1975.

clip shown by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation about sending a bee-keeping expert to Azania.

A preliminary question, therefore, has to be asked: Is it, or is it not, important for this subject to be publicly discussed and for Canadian policies to be reviewed and intelligently criticized outside some tight government circles? One would think there could only be a single answer to this question. At the outset of the report of the Sub-Committee on International Development Assistance¹ of the House of Commons in May 1971, the members say they strongly endorse as "a major priority" the task of "awakening the interest and involvement of the Canadian people;" and later, while acknowledging that the program has a large measure of support from the Canadian people, they add that they are "deeply concerned that much of this support is somewhat passive and acquiescent."

Yet the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has acted in an equivocal way. It has funded since 1972 a number of voluntary agencies and community groups that have programs of "development education" in towns across Canada. The CIDA president since 1970, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, is a politician and a publicist by nature; he has given frequent speeches and interviews about aspects of the Agency's program, and has encouraged other CIDA people to do likewise. But this effort falls short of achieving the real *involvement* of the Canadian people: they are being informed, rather than consulted.* They were, for example, being asked to applaud the fact that the CIDA program in 1973-74 provided more than 48,000 man-years of jobs in Canada, rather than being consulted about the more basic question of whether tying our loans to the provision of Canadian goods and services, for instance locomotives or teachers, and thus creating jobs for Ca-

*Mr. Gérin-Lajoie did stage a high-level consultation with a score of international experts at Val David in late 1972, but the subsequent labour of building a strategy for Canada's development assistance program for 1975-80 was not shared with those international experts or the few private Canadian citizens who were invited to Val David, let alone the outer circles of voluntary agencies and Cross-Cultural Learner Centres who heard not a whisper of this strategy paper until it was virtually a completed document.

nadians, is the most effective way of helping the poorer countries.

CIDA has often received advice to keep quiet about what it was doing. Professor Triantis, one of the academic consultants engaged in 1969 to help CIDA prepare for the general foreign policy review which took the shape of the six booklets published in June 1970, strongly advised CIDA to "keep a low profile", otherwise, he suggested, there would be misunderstandings and negative reactions. To a degree he was right. There were bound to be Canadian taxpayers who became angry at hearing that, while their own Rideau River remains polluted, \$31 million is to be spent on providing clean drinking water along a forty-mile pipeline to the inhabitants of Dar-es-Salaam. And it was only a matter of time before the CIDA program came under a general, but not very penetrating, attack as it did in December 1974 and January 1975 by staff writers on the *Ottawa Citizen* and *Ottawa Journal*.

But once the aid budget passed the landmark of half a billion dollars in 1973, there was no way back to silence and peaceful obscurity. CIDA and its allies have to go on and explain why they think projects of "social development" are as important as the more accepted support for assistance to encourage economic growth. Was it really unfortunate that Mr. Gérin-Lajoie's invitation to three M.P.'s to join him on a visit to North Africa seemed to backfire when the M.P.'s returned from Tunisia saying that some of the CIDA advisers admitted to being racists and unable to work well with Arab colleagues? The M.P.'s' comments may have been simplistic on this and other issues, but they highlighted misgivings that have been held inside CIDA about technical assistance and they may well have accelerated reform.

In any case, this critical essay is being written in the belief that a large program of cooperation with many countries is *not* a private matter for a few Ottawa officials; rather it is the concern of people across the country. It will not argue whether we should have a program at all, or examine Canadian motives and interests in financing such a program. That has been thoroughly done in the introduction. Instead, I shall press two points. First, while CIDA's general philosophy about

development cooperation (instead of "aid") is excellent, and while its stated intentions for programs are often admirable, it will not be able to carry out an effective job in supporting development in the Third World so long as most of CIDA's aid remains tied to the purchase of Canadian goods and services. It will suggest that the combination of changes proposed by CIDA carries the clear implication that much larger amounts than the present 20 per cent of bilateral allocations (this 20 per cent now amounts to \$115 million a year) need to be offered on untied terms; and yet this implication is not being recognized. Secondly, there needs to be an integral strategy for development cooperation, covering many areas of Canadian government policies: trade, investment and monetary and immigration policies, as well as what is strictly CIDA's own program.

TIED AID

Quality as crucial as quantity

On the way to elaborating these two main points, it is necessary to review the present program—to give some assessment of its quality as well as its volume, and some idea of the criteria that have been used in selecting recipient countries (politely called "development partners") and the sectors in which Canada is prepared and able to help.

Normally only the *quantity* of an aid program has been given prime public attention. A great deal of targetry is practised by archers at the United Nations: the most generally accepted target is 1 per cent of GNP for all transfers of resources from a rich country, or a target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for official development assistance (ODA)—that is, assistance on concessionary terms. The greatest marksman of them all, Robert McNamara, set up and achieved his separate targets for the first five years as President of the World Bank Group, including doubling the volume of loans around the world.

But the virtue of achieving such figures, without any other considerations, has been properly called in question. When colonial Portugal headed both tables of so-called "donors," some other standards needed to be applied. As for the World Bank Group, Escott Reid has pointed out that in 1971-72

some \$976 million (or about half the total lending by the Group that year) went to Mexico, Iran, Turkey and Brazil—countries, he added, that were "not noted for their devotion to McNamara's new gospel of development,"² that includes a concentration on improving the conditions of the poorest sections of society. The planning of projects that should yield returns in the form of more jobs and a better distribution of national income requires, says Reid, a much greater investment of staff time for each million dollars lent than do large loans for railways, highways, telecommunications and so on, which have made up the great bulk of Bank Group lending. Consequently, in pursuit of large figures of disbursements, the Bank Group has tended to ignore projects to relieve unemployment and help people in their immediate, ordinary lives.

The same criticism can be made of parts of the CIDA program. For example, a loan of \$30 million to the Botswana government to enable it to buy power-generating equipment for the new copper-mining industry at Selibe-Pikwe serves many purposes in a political sense. It helps to push bilateral disbursement figures up swiftly: thanks almost entirely to this loan, Botswana was third in rank of recipients in 1972, after India and Bangladesh. Since Botswana is also one of the twenty-five designated "least developed countries" and a hostage-country in the thick of the racial confrontation in southern Africa, Canada can claim extra credit for making this loan. On the other hand, by putting all the Canadian funds into a loan for machinery and not apparently caring about the social problems that are undoubtedly being created because of the new mine, Canada can hardly claim to be taking an integrated approach to Botswana's development. Of course, the loan is "tied aid" and much of the machinery is therefore being bought in Canada; whereas a far smaller amount of accompanying funds, to alleviate the problems of squatters who are swarming to Selibe-Pikwe in vain hopes of obtaining jobs among the few thousand made available, would have required much more staff time inside CIDA and no return for Canadian business firms, since the money would presumably have been spent on local costs.

Let us briefly note, therefore, that official development assistance disbursements rose from \$391.9 million in 1971 to \$713 million in 1974, and that this figure represented 0.50 per cent of Canada's GNP. By then the volume of disbursements matched the appropriations which Parliament had voted for that year, and the process of drawing down the "accumulated undisbursed balance" of previous years began. Having said that, we shall concentrate on quantity no further, but rather on quality.

In strictly financial terms, Canada's development assistance has been excellent. In 1973 nearly half the program consisted of grant funds, while of the sixty loans which comprised the rest of the program fifty-three were extended on the softest terms (no interest, ten years' grace and fifty years' maturity) and only seven on the harder terms of three per cent interest, seven years' grace and thirty years' maturity.³ One of the toughest problems of the poorer countries during the 1970s is to arrange the repayment of debts already incurred; some \$8 billion a year is now being returned to the rich countries in interest and principal repayments, and a large factor in the fall of the Busia government in Ghana was the odium it incurred with its own people in trying to meet these commitments to Britain and other countries. The softness of Canadian terms, therefore, is universally appreciated. Canada has also been quick to join in talks on rescheduling debts for countries such as India and Pakistan.

In spite of being deeply in debt, many developing countries are acutely short of foreign exchange. This condition has become even graver since the rise in oil prices. Two different ways of alleviating that condition are to buy more of these countries' products, and to offer them development assistance, which amounts to giving them substitute foreign exchange. A third means would be a reallocation of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) on the International Monetary Fund, the \$9 billion worth of "paper gold" that have been issued in three slices since 1968, two-thirds of which has been allocated to the rich trading nations.

Canada has not taken any initiative in international discussions on the allocation of SDR's to the developing countries,

and she has been slow to help these countries improve their exporting know-how and their marketing skills to take advantage of lower tariff barriers; she was also one of the last rich countries to implement her offer of tariff reductions under the Generalized Preference Scheme.* But in the second category of help, offering development assistance as a substitute form of foreign exchange, Canada has been busy. Besides food aid, which still accounts for more than \$200 million a year†, there have been large commodity loans, which have allowed India in particular to obtain fertilizers and industrial raw materials, and lines-of-credit to other countries such as Indonesia and Ghana which have gone through difficult times. These agreements benefit Canadian farmers and mining companies as much as they benefit the recipient countries; the single part of these arrangements that brings no benefit to Canada is the payment of shipping costs, which we began to undertake after 1970.

Another attribute of the Canadian program is the comparative absence of political strings. There are, of course, two ends to any piece of string and, since this chapter involves an attempt to look at the Canadian program from the recipients' end, we should note that one or two countries—notably Niger and its former President, Hamani Diori—have been skilful at tugging Canada along into a political bargain favourable to themselves. In return for some timely, if modest, help in 1970 in getting Canada accepted as a full member of the Francophone states' Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (while Quebec, despite French manoeuvrings, was given lower status as "a participating government"), Canada became deeply involved in a large development assistance program in Niger. This includes some \$31 million to help build the Route de l'Unité et l'Amitié, a 265-mile road

*It did so only in April 1973, more than three years after being promised. Because of the trebling of wheat prices, however, the volume of food aid has been greatly diminished. Since November 1974 Canada has committed herself to providing one million tons of grain a year for three years.

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linking Gouré and the eastern part of Niger around Lake Chad to the more populous areas westward. Whether this road will prove to be an expensive bit of nonsense, leaving herdsmen and others to continue their trek southwards into Nigeria along more natural routes, will be interesting to watch; Canadian officials, at first doubtful of its economic worth, were eventually convinced by President Diori when he drew the analogy of the Canadian Pacific Railway being undertaken to bind another nation together. Could those Canadian officials have retorted that it might be wiser to be less nationalistic and yield to considerations of regional development for that whole area of West Africa? They didn't, and a long, empty road appears to be being built.

Some of those most concerned to assure developing countries that aid is coming without political strings have advocated that a far greater proportion of funds, from Canada and other donor countries, be delivered through multilateral channels such as the World Bank Group, the United Nations agencies and the four regional development banks. Canada has steadily increased her multilateral contributions, and disbursed \$302 million through these channels in 1975-76. There are certain clear advantages of developing countries in securing multilateral rather than bilateral assistance. One is that it is either completely untied aid, with contracts going to international tender, or (in the case of most donors to the regional development banks) the recipient of a loan is allowed to procure the necessary goods from any regional member of the bank. Another advantage is that these regional development banks are a symbol—and, one hopes, will soon be part of the substance—of self-reliance among countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

However, there are certainly political strings attached to some multilateral institutions, since the United States has a preponderant vote in the loans extended by the World Bank Group and the Inter-American Development Bank's own Fund for Special Operations (FSO). It is disturbing to note that neither Peru nor Allende's Chile received any World Bank or FSO loans for three or four years: Canada, in putting \$24 million into the FSO account in 1972, was in effect tying this

money to United States policies. One comes to the curious conclusion that, at least in some cases, bilateral aid washes cleaner. Whether for this reason or, more likely, for reasons of wanting to keep a Canadian identification on most of its aid, Canada has decided that never much more than 25 per cent of the total program shall consist of multilateral grants and loans.

A great deal has been written elsewhere about the selection of countries in which Canadian assistance is being concentrated.⁴ Members of Parliament, including the trio who visited North Africa in September 1973, tend to think the program is not concentrated enough and is too lightly spread to be effective. This is a predictable reaction to learning that Canada in 1974 had some sort of a bilateral program in sixty-seven countries, in contrast to the Swedish program in only about twenty countries. But a slightly sharper look at the figures would show that many Canadian programs are tiny, and that two-thirds of the bilateral ODA funds were allocated from 1972 to 1974 to only ten countries, in order of magnitude: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Tanzania, Ghana, Niger and Sri Lanka.*

In the 1970-71 CIDA annual review,⁵ five main criteria were cited for selecting what were then called "countries of concentration." It was said that the most important criterion was "the economic needs of that country, and Canada's ability to meet those needs"; the second most important was a (slightly disguised) political criterion, "the importance which Canada attaches to helping that country's development," and included historical links. Taken together, the two criteria produced a list heavily weighted towards the Commonwealth countries in Asia, and later in the Caribbean and Africa, where Canada has established diplomatic missions whose heads would then proceed to agitate quietly for assistance to the country of their accreditation. In 1968, while Lester Pearson was still Prime Minister, there began the move to increase the program in Francophone Africa so that it matched in size the program in Commonwealth Africa. By

*After the rise in oil prices, Mr. Gérin-Lajoie assured M.P.'s in 1974 that assistance to two oil producers, Indonesia and Nigeria, was being reassessed.

1973-74 both sections of Africa, although disparate in population, were the recipients of almost equal amounts of grants and loans. Francophone Africa received \$66.6 million and Commonwealth Africa \$62.6 million.

In that year, only \$12.7 million was disbursed bilaterally in Latin America, although considerable Canadian funds had flowed through the Inter-American Development Bank. From 1969 the criterion of needs had been invoked to exclude from bilateral assistance those Latin American countries where the GNP per capita exceeded \$500: Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela. But in 1973 a decision was made in CIDA to boost the Latin American program as quickly as possible to a level of \$50 million annual disbursements. One factor prompting this decision was strong pressure from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce on CIDA to offer loans at about 5 per cent interest to middle-income countries which might be sweetened into becoming good markets for more Canadian exports. Another factor was CIDA's own decision to make its Latin American program more closely linked to Quebec, where there is greater concern for Latin America than there is in the rest of Canada, and therefore to create a program mainly run by Francophone officers. Out of this decision flowed ambitious plans such as the \$3 million project to help Peru establish its own form of CEGEPS based on the Quebec experiment with junior colleges. Whether this greatly expanded program in Latin America, a region of well-known difficulties for development planners (particularly those who aspire to being "agents of change") can be effective in the early years is doubtful. What seems clear is that the criteria set out in 1969 have had their parameters broadened so far as to become almost meaningless. Practically any country in the Third World, except the Arab oil states and North Korea, seems now on the list for consideration for Canadian assistance. There may, therefore, be as many aid recipients in a few years' time as there are today, even if there is more program focus.

The *content* of the program provides the other set of threads to hold the fabric of CIDA's work together—the woof that binds the warp yarn of the selected countries. Canada has always tried to assist particular sectors in which she believed

she had special competence. Heading the areas of particular competence in 1973 were the provision of transport and communications equipment, of fertilizers and raw materials and equipment and of food aid (which made up 23, 19 and 13 per cent respectively of the total value of the bilateral program). She has also put considerable loan funds behind the development of energy resources—more generating units for India's Kundah Dam, transmission lines in Tunisia, and so on. There will probably be more support soon for other types of resource development, such as minerals, in which again Canada has had long experience and can claim "special competence."

Defenders of the present provision under which 80 per cent of Canada's bilateral aid funds are tied to the procurement of Canadian goods and services sometimes use this argument about "sectors of excellence" to suggest the effects of aid-tying are not as bad as critics assert. They contend that developing countries soon discover the sectors in which Canadian expertise is unchallenged and Canadian materials are internationally competitive in price and quality; they then apply to Canada for a loan or grant to buy these materials. It is clear there is some foundation for this argument. On the other hand, it does not cover the whole range of capital goods; Canada cannot, for instance, supply water-pipes to Tanzania at a competitive price, or school buildings of appropriate design and material to the Caribbean. Critics may also retort that, if Canada is so sure of its competitiveness or pre-eminence in these sectors, it might have the courage to untie its bilateral funds to the same degree as the Swedes have done—that is, offer funds for a particular sector but allow the recipient to look anywhere in the world for the best bargain.

The authors of the 1971 parliamentary report* laid heavy stress on "the urgent need for the creation of the vast number of productive jobs needed to avert the social danger of mass unemployment in many developing countries." That very

*No apology is made for quoting frequently from the Report of the Commons Sub-Committee on International Development Assistance which held hearings between December 1969 and early 1971. It was an excellent report and contained many worthwhile recommendations, which received too little notice.

month, there had been an armed revolt of unemployed youth in Sri Lanka. They also plucked a phrase out of the testimony of Maurice Strong, the previous CIDA president, to be the underlying theme of the whole report: "a much more human attitude toward development." And the report stressed at the outset "the need for a broader conception of economic development to encourage the adaptation of modern industry and technology to the values of different societies and cultures."⁶

These three phrases carried wide implications for the Canadian program. Within its limits, CIDA has begun to move in the direction pointed by the M.P.'s. In its Memorandum to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD summarizing the 1972 program, CIDA added a two-page annex on plans to alleviate unemployment.⁷ It cites as useful measures in this area the decision to concentrate more on agriculture, and the projects of rural electrification which may help to establish labour-intensive small-scale industries. However, it seems unlikely that Canadian help in tropical agriculture is ever going to be a large sector of the program, so long as it is tied to Canadian goods and services. In 1972 it amounted to less than 2 per cent of the total program and no more than 3 per cent in 1973, the largest projects being forestry studies in Latin America and the supply of storage silos in Algeria. As for "a much more human attitude towards development," the memorandum includes the calculation that nearly 12 per cent of total commitments in 1972 (some \$45 million) went to projects of "social infrastructure." These projects include the construction of high schools and technical colleges in the Caribbean and Kenya, and water supplies elsewhere in Africa. (Some of the water supply projects, and some airport extensions in the Caribbean, might more properly be labelled support for tourism, but CIDA has preferred to list them in the less controversial categories of transportation and social infrastructure.)

The task of encouraging the "adaptation of modern industry and technology to the values of different societies and cultures" implies the giving of financial support to people born in those societies and imbued with those cultures. CIDA, however, is inhibited from such local-cost financing by the tied aid provisions, in the same way that it is limited in what

it can do to create agricultural and other productive jobs in developing countries. In practice, therefore, it has mainly left the encouragement of adapting technology, as well as agricultural research which could provide many new jobs, to the International Development Research Centre that is not tethered by tied aid provisions.

Technical assistance and tied aid

The most identifiable part of the Canadian program is its technical assistance section. Even though the need for expatriate technical assistance, either of advisers or of educators, has been eliminated in almost all of Asia in recent years and has not existed to any degree in Latin America, the demand is still considerable in Africa and the Caribbean. The reason is different in these two areas: while in Africa there has been a real lack of their own trained and experienced people, in the Caribbean the need for expatriate advisers and teachers has for the most part been created by the exodus of skilled local people leaving for more lucrative prospects in the United States, Canada and Britain. In 1974 a total of 22,605 people who were citizens of Commonwealth Caribbean states arrived in Canada as landed immigrants. This Caribbean "brain drain" is a warning that Canada cannot separate her planning of development assistance from her immigration policies.

The number of Canadians abroad under contract with CIDA began to decrease after 1972. Figures in successive CIDA annual reviews (1972-73 and 1973-74) show that there were 1,130 advisers and educators on assignments abroad on January 1, 1972, but only 974 abroad one year later, and 854 on assignment on New Year's Day, 1974. The biggest group of these have been educators in Francophone African states, and they still made up more than 40 per cent of the total program in 1974. The students and trainees from developing countries who are supported by CIDA funds rose from 2,345 during 1972 to 2,614 in the following year.*

*The DAC Memorandum gives much higher figures, and says that there were 444 Canadian advisers and 1,155 educators abroad during 1972, 419 advisers and 970 educators during 1973. The DAC statistics tend to give an inflated figure in technical assistance, since they list those abroad at any time during the twelve months and therefore can be covering two years of placements in many countries.

CIDA's technical assistance program is the most controversial aspect of its present work. It has been very expensive, reaching a peak of \$65.6 million in 1972; in 1971 it had cost \$48.8 million with only 95 fewer Canadians abroad and with 87 more foreign students on their hands. In 1973, when numbers abroad dropped by nearly 20 per cent, the cost fell by 12 per cent. Part of the increase of cost per head is due to greater specialization, which requires more high-priced personnel. Nevertheless, since CIDA contract personnel are paid at Canadian rates (even maintaining the differentials between provinces for teachers from Ontario and the Maritimes!), a developing country gets one Canadian for the price of two people from Britain or three from another part of the Third World. But as the money that pays these salaries is a tied grant from Canada, the developing country has no choice.

Many of the economists, lawyers, engineers, town planners, doctors and teachers who have been sent abroad by CIDA have been first-class and worth every dollar. But there has also been no lack of rotten apples to spoil the barrel. The "racism" discerned by the M.P.'s who visited North Africa among some CIDA workers there did not, unfortunately, surprise officials involved in recruitment and orientation. A survey done in mid-1972 of the views about CIDA personnel that were held by Canadian missionaries with long service in those countries is very revealing, even after allowing for the missionaries' own bias. After a certain amount of praise, the fifty-three missionaries who responded reflected concern that often "mature experts" found it hard to listen and to understand local issues, were insensitive to the new culture around them and (especially if there was a group of Canadian families in the area) retreated into an affluent expatriate "colony" of their own. They suggested that the one- or two-year terms of service were too short to learn how to do a job sensitively and therefore effectively, the standard of living of CIDA contract personnel was too high to fit the life of those countries, and the in-country training of Canadian newcomers was inadequate. In contrast, they had almost unadulterated praise for the workers recruited by Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO). These serve on a quite different footing—as

employees of the host government or a local institution, they are paid at local rates, and the vast majority of them are unmarried—and can relate better to the local people.

The observations of many other people would bear out the missionaries' views. In its "Strategy for 1975-80," CIDA is trying to meet these complaints: it thinks that people from developing countries should take more responsibility for the recruiting of Canadian teachers and technical experts, and should play a more active role in briefing Canadians when they reach their country of assignment.

The main headache about foreign students supported by CIDA funds is the question whether they will return to their own country and remain there, after finishing studies in Canada. The temptations to stay in Canada are great. They have gone through a course of studies devised for North American life, they have seen the opportunities and the living standards here, they have made a number of contacts. Even if they do return to their home region, as they are bonded to do, they are quite likely to be disoriented and may soon decide to emigrate back to Canada. There are no accurate statistics to show the size of this problem, but an inspired guess is that the brain drain (immediate and delayed) is as high as 15 per cent of all Third World students who come to Canada, and considerably higher for those from parts of Asia and the Caribbean.

How does anyone deal with this problem, since it touches a basic freedom, the freedom of movement? One means is for CIDA greatly to increase its support of "Third Country Training." By financing a student in university or technical courses in his own home region, CIDA can certainly make the available funds go further and can probably ensure that the student takes courses more relevant to a future career in his region, and is therefore less likely to emigrate. Support of Third Country Training has been increasing: CIDA finances students at such places as the University of the West Indies, the University of the South Pacific, and the Asian Institute of Technology at Bangkok. But it has been a slow increase, for only 408 students (or about 13 per cent of the total funded by CIDA) were doing Third Country Training in 1974. The plan for

1975-80 seems to be to limit training in Canada to those "counterpart personnel" who are being prepared for jobs in projects and programs supported by CIDA in their countries, and to increase Third Country Training to the maximum possible extent.

The implications behind both the plans for more in-country briefing of CIDA workers, and the intention to increase Third Country Training for students from the smaller countries, are that a good deal more money will need to be spent on "local costs." Once again, it is a challenge to the present provision that ties 80 per cent of bilateral funds to Canadian goods and services.

Another call on untied funds will come when CIDA begins to deal directly with non-governmental organizations in developing countries which do not necessarily have a Canadian partner organization to apply for funds on their behalf. At present there are about 120 Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGO's) that have active programs of international development. They range from big agencies such as CUSO which, with its Francophone counterpart, has about 875 volunteers abroad in 1976, to others such as the Saskatchewan Cooperative Credit Society that sends a small amount of cash to Zambia every year. It is through these Canadian groups that the NGO Division of CIDA channelled \$31.8 million a year in matching funds in 1975-76; these funds made it possible for the non-governmental organizations to spend \$66 million in projects of international development. There seems no dispute over the fact that this NGO program has been an outstanding success in getting Canadian funds out to the grass roots level of development; together these organizations can weave a network that outdistances any links which governments make. Most of the present NGO funding is in practice untied aid. However, the CUSO program, costing CIDA more than \$8 million in 1975-76, is very much tied aid: its money is predominantly spent on the recruitment and transportation of its (Canadian) workers.* The system does not at present

*Since 1973 CUSO has been moving energetically into the funding of small-scale projects that have originated in many cases as an extra activity of a CUSO worker. This excellent innovation has meant the host country gets more "mileage" from a CUSO placement—and untied funds. Some 150 projects were undertaken in the first two years.

embrace indigenous NGO's in developing countries that have no links with Canadian organizations; an initiative by CIDA to make direct contacts with them was being planned in 1975 and will almost certainly mean an important expansion of the untied program.

The International Development Research Centre provides a cheerful contrast with much that has been described above. It was launched in 1970, after a lengthy and constructive debate in the Commons committee which studied the bill establishing the Centre as a public corporation with a broad mandate "to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions." Years later it was still in many people's minds being confused with CIDA, partly no doubt because the initials are similar and partly perhaps because the IDRC budget appropriation from Parliament (\$19 million in 1974-75 and \$27 million in 1975-76) is for convenience made an item in the grant-aid vote of the parliamentary appropriations to CIDA. But in structure and in operations it is a quite different entity. It has an international Board of Governors and an international staff. It is not an agency of the Canadian government, although there is close cooperation and representatives of four government departments attend the monthly project committee meetings. Perhaps most important of all, it has great flexibility because its funds are completely untied. It can pay for a Swedish architect to adapt a "compost toilet," widely used in rural parts of Sweden, to the tropical climate of Tanzania; or for an Australian plant breeder who has experimented for years with pasture legumes in dry parts of Queensland to use his knowledge for the benefit of Caribbean islanders who want to improve the pastures on their coral soils. Mostly, however, it is supporting research workers in developing countries in learning to solve their own problems. Since IDRC was born out of the frustrations which its real founder, Maurice Strong, encountered as CIDA president up to 1970, it is happily free of many constraints which still hamper CIDA's operations.

The IDRC was also fortunate in being set up after there had been wide acknowledgement of the imbalance between the

amount of research being done in the industrialized countries and the tiny amount carried out in the poorer countries, and also after recognition that this tiny amount had produced great dividends: the high-yield varieties of wheat and rice developed in Mexico and the Philippines are the outstanding example. So, from the outset, discussions about the Centre took for granted that the great majority of research projects would be carried out in developing countries, even though the headquarters was established in Ottawa and eleven of the twenty-one governors were to be Canadians. Then, in framing the Act establishing the Centre, Parliament explicitly enjoined it "to assist the developing regions to build up the research capabilities, the innovative skills and the institutions required to solve their problems." This has been interpreted by the IDRC President, David Hopper, and his senior staff to mean placing the main responsibility for the definition and management of research projects—whether in agriculture or forestry, population studies or social sciences—in the hands of indigenous research workers. It has also meant a considerable investment in training young scientists of Africa, Asia and Latin America by practical experience on a project. This sometimes follows some theoretical training abroad, possibly in Canada, but quite likely instead in some neighbouring Third World country. A few Canadians are working full-time on the site of some major projects, but only in cases where there is a crucial need for an expatriate.

During the first four years of IDRC operations about 13 per cent of program funds were spent in Canada, to support research at Canadian universities and institutions that was directly backing up projects started in the Third World. (This does not mean that there is no benefit, or spin-off, to Canadians from IDRC operations. Work done on the control of blackfly, although designed to reduce the scourge of river blindness in West Africa, has obvious application in Canada; and the hybrid cereal triticale may thrive as well in Alberta as it is doing in Mexico and Ethiopia.) The flexibility which the Centre has enjoyed would never have been possible if its funds had been tied to hiring Canadian scientists or providing Canadian equipment. It would have had to operate under

tight constraints and could never, for instance, have focused upon the development of agriculture and forestry in the semi-arid tropics, since there is hardly any Canadian competence in this area. Under such constraints, the Centre could never have done an effective job nor won its enviable reputation.

Returning to CIDA, its "Strategy for 1975-80" contains, as "an extremely important component, . . . the fostering of research programs designed to enhance an indigenous capability in the Third World." This is both an endorsement of the IDRC program and, since IDRC is a public corporation deciding on its policies and projects independently, it is also a vow to give more support on CIDA's own account, probably by CIDA buttressing the core budgets of research institutes while IDRC finances the more innovative projects. In 1974 CIDA allocated \$4.5 million in support of international agricultural research.

But this too requires untied funds. To the list of progressive measures that make that requirement we can add two other trends in CIDA's program. One of those is the delegation of greater authority to the field missions—the Canadian embassies and High Commissions in the Third World—to approve projects: the missions are likely to ensure that more funds are disbursed in the country to which they are accredited, rather than remain in Canada. The other is the trend towards offering program support, the support of a broad sector of a country's development schemes rather than a specific project. While program support can take the form of a line-of-credit for a shopping list of goods to be bought in Canada, it is quite as likely to be support for a local institution.

The list of progressive measures which will require untied aid is thus a long one. To recapitulate: more program support, more delegation to field missions, more support of local research, more emphasis on "social development" with a particular concern for creating jobs in developing countries, a new direct link with indigenous NGO's instead of always working through Canadian voluntary agencies; more in-country orientation of Canadian advisers and educators, and much more emphasis on training students in their own region under the Third Country Training program.

If at the same time you subtract from the "tied aid" side of the ledger to take account of the declining volume of (Canadian) food aid, only one conclusion is possible. This is that it will be impossible for CIDA to carry out an improved bilateral program revamped in this way without a far greater proportion of untied funds than the present 20 per cent.

Yet Canadian leaders are not even advocating further untying, let alone negotiating seriously with other donor countries. Rather, the reverse. When he appeared before the Commons External Affairs Committee in May 1973, Mitchell Sharp went out of his way to speak in favour of tied aid, on the grounds that it provided a means for Canadians to identify themselves with (and therefore approve of) development taking place in far-away countries. Two years later his successor as External Affairs Minister, Allan MacEachen, told the same committee how important it was to "adapt our development aid to new needs and conditions." But he avoided specifics and did not mention untying. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie was even blunter than Mr. Sharp when he spoke to the Montreal Board of Trade in May 1973. After saying that CIDA funds had in three years served to buy \$251 million worth of Canadian foodstuffs and \$155 million worth of Canadian commodities, as well as millions more in STOL aircraft and communications equipment and so on, he went on to claim that "for many business enterprises CIDA is a major customer" and a few Canadian businesses would "find it difficult if not impossible to remain economically viable" without purchases from CIDA. He added the somewhat contradictory comment that it was not CIDA's task to be "the main supporter of otherwise unviable Canadian industries whose produce has to be dumped on the less industrialised nations." But his major point came when, after calculating that CIDA would be responsible for 48,000 man-years of jobs worked by Canadians in 1973-74, he called for the businessmen's support on the grounds that "if CIDA were to close down or reduce its programs of development assistance abroad, the Canadian economy would suffer considerable strain both in terms of markets and in terms of jobs."

Much of what Gérin-Lajoie said is based on supposition. It

is known that, for every dollar which Canada has contributed to the World Bank Group whose tenders go out to international bidding, her business firms have won back only about 35 cents in procurement. But this cannot be made a projection of what would happen if CIDA bilateral funds were untied. In fact, the opposite may be argued. It may be precisely because these Canadian firms have such an easy source of contracts in CIDA's tied projects that they fail to compete vigorously in international tendering. Again, it is mere supposition that particular Canadian firms would suffer considerable strain if the CIDA program were reduced, or untied. No analysis has been done of the proportion of the total business of, say, the Northern Electric Company or the Canada Wire and Cable Company or Acres International coming from CIDA contracts over the last five years. A full study of the total business done by all the engineering and construction firms and suppliers employed by CIDA is needed before anyone can know at all certainly who might be hurt, and to what extent, by the untying of aid. Even then, if most of these firms excel (as Mr. Gérin-Lajoie declares) in producing those items which CIDA buys, they should not be overconcerned about international competition.

These suppositions relate to untying aid funds to the point where businesses in other industrialized countries might compete for procurement. Several of the progressive measures envisaged in the CIDA strategy for 1975-80 involve untying funds only for local payments in the recipient country or procurement in a country neighbouring it. These funds would certainly be lost to Canadian business, but would the change be so difficult to present to Canadians for approval? Clearly the M.P.'s who subscribed to the Sub-committee Report in 1971 did not think so. For they wrote firmly: "The Canadian Government should proceed without delay to untie Canadian funds for procurement in other developing countries. This step . . . should not impede agreement on generalized untying." CIDA has followed this exhortation to the point of untying most of the funds it has contributed to the regional development banks, but it has not yet untied any bilateral funds to permit procurement in other developing countries

(except on an individual project basis, by using the general 20 per cent provision). Canada, in fact, has been more cautious than the M.P.s would have been, and more apprehensive about a Canadian backlash. It might be thought time enough, after four years, for officials to catch up with the attitudes of Parliament.

AN INTEGRAL STRATEGY: TRADE, INVESTMENT AND ALL

The need for an integral strategy has been affirmed many times. The Commons Sub-Committee for example, said this was "probably the point which has emerged most frequently and forcefully in the course of the whole inquiry."⁸ A preamble to the CIDA Strategy document, as drafted in August 1973, puts the point with extreme clarity: "Development assistance cannot be compartmentalized and kept separate from the other relationships between the rich and poor which involve trade, commodity agreements and monetary arrangements. These relationships, in their overall impact on the development potential of the Third World, are substantially more important than development assistance."

A few figures will explain these comments. In 1972 the export earnings of all the developing countries amounted to about \$68 billion, and some \$51 billion worth of goods were sold to the industrialized countries of Western Europe, North America and Japan.⁹ After the rise in oil prices, the total earnings leapt in 1973 to \$101 billion, of which \$76 billion was sold to industrialized countries. The export earnings in trade to the industrialized countries in these years were six to eight times greater than the amount of official development assistance which flowed to them from the sixteen main Western donors (\$8.6 billion in 1972, \$9.4 billion in 1973). At least half of that official development assistance was tied aid that provides jobs for people in the donor countries rather than in the recipient countries. The exports, on the other hand, provide not only foreign exchange for the poorer countries to use as they will, but jobs to relieve their alarmingly high levels of unemployment. Obviously, in a general sense, trade is worth far more to the developing countries than aid.

Canadian trade with developing countries is well below the

average among the industrialized states of the west. Only Switzerland and Austria take a smaller proportion of their imports from developing countries. Moreover, the proportion of Canadian imports from developing countries has gone down strikingly—from 11.5 per cent to 8.6 per cent—during the 1960s when Canada was supposedly getting to know the developing countries better, and helping them towards self-reliance. Canadian imports from developing countries in 1973 amounted to more than \$2,200 million and in January-September 1974 to \$3,200 million. Much of the increase, however, is due to the rise in oil prices, and when Canadian oil imports are subtracted, the total imports for 1973 and January-September 1974 fall to \$1,320 million in both cases. It is still a substantial figure, compared with the aid flow. Foreign exchange earnings from non-petroleum trade with Canada are worth more than twice the value of the CIDA program, and at least four times when petroleum is added.

No serious effort has been made to help the developing countries improve their trade. The various means by which it may be improved have been recounted many times, and some minor action taken. Some of the poorer countries have benefitted from the few commodity agreements in force: the Cocoa Agreement, first signed in 1973 after sixteen wearisome years of negotiations and now revised to a higher range of floor-ceiling prices, should end the wild fluctuations of that commodity and give producer countries a steadier foundation for financing their national development. The Generalized System of Preferences, a clutch of varying offers by the richer countries to lower tariffs on a range of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, is beginning to open northern markets for the more industrialized of the developing countries. The poor countries also managed to press a foot in the door of the rich men's club when the Group of Ten accepted that international monetary reform was not the exclusive concern of themselves and allowed the group's expansion into the Committee of Twenty.

But there is more hole than net in this patchwork of measures. Negotiations to renew or rewrite the International Sugar Agreement broke down in October 1973, and Canada,

the largest buyer under the agreement, was accused of taking an especially hard line against the producer countries. Producers enjoyed a windfall when sugar prices soared during 1974, but they again faced an uncertain future in 1975 when prices dipped and they had no floor price guaranteed. Although Canadian tariffs are almost non-existent against unprocessed agricultural goods from tropical countries, the barriers start rising steeply with any degree of processing. Promises were made to tackle this question during the current round of GATT negotiations, but this remains just a promise. Among the non-tariff barriers is the invisible (but very palpable) barrier that consists in ignorance about the Canadian market; and this leads to the question of whose job it might be—that of Industry, Trade and Commerce or of CIDA—to try to pass on that know-how to Third World exporters.

Both the Commons Sub-Committee¹⁰ and Gérin-Lajoie have argued that Industry, Trade and Commerce should play a positive role in this work. To quote from the latter:

The suggestion is advanced that Canadian Trade Commissioners (who are, of course, trained with the aim of promoting Canadian exports) should look upon their job much as "a two-way street" and spend perhaps as much effort in helping exporters in the less favoured countries where they are posted find markets for their products in Canada. If this suggestion is taken up, the change it represents could be part of the consolidation of a new form of diplomacy. In this new form, a diplomat will see himself as a world citizen first, a representative of his country only secondarily; he will be as concerned with the welfare of the people in the country of his current diplomatic accreditation as he will be with the welfare of his own people.¹¹

No visible action has so far followed this idealistic talk.

CIDA claims to be the voice of the developing countries in Canada. In the same paper in 1971, Gérin-Lajoie affirmed that CIDA:

... is the single representative which the less favoured countries have in Canadian Government councils . . . Unlike any other department, it does not start from the springboard of representing Canadian interests abroad, so much as from the other end of representing certain interests abroad—that is, the interests of the world's poorest people—back to Canada.¹²

This is true and important, but it requires that CIDA officers have the solid knowledge about the issues of trade and investment in developing countries that will enable them to be listened to with respect at inter-departmental meetings. The Agency has been slow to build up its Policy Branch which should be the storehouse of this knowledge. In 1973, for instance, CIDA lacked any collection of statistics on the balance of payments situation of the twenty or thirty developing countries with which it was mainly involved. At the micro-level, it has studied how to help a country like Algeria expand its exports, and financed marketing studies for two Latin American countries. But, considering the resounding way in which CIDA has at times proclaimed itself the voice of the developing countries in Canada, these are hesitant ventures and it is deplorable that CIDA had apparently little to say about the renewal or non-renewal of the sugar agreement, a matter which was of great importance to its Caribbean development partners.

The same holds in matters of Canadian private investment in developing countries and of immigration into Canada. The book value of Canadian direct investment in developing countries stood at \$1.8 billion in 1973, some 7 per cent higher than the previous year. The increase was due both to retained earnings and new capital flow (\$75 million and \$50 million respectively).¹³ These are not small figures, and this investment must be having some impact on the development of the recipient countries. Sometimes it is not the best conceivable, for instance, if it is in a capital-intensive venture. Sometimes the investment casts a general shadow over relations between the two governments: so far Canada has been involved in no incident that compares with the ITT in Chile or the International Petroleum Company in Peru, but Guyana's nationalization of the Alcan subsidiary, Demerara Bauxite, and Jamaica's subsequent brush with the same company should give a warning of other clashes to come.

Similarly, the increase in the number of immigrants from Third World countries to the point where they account for more than one-quarter of the total immigrants received in Canada each year surely means that immigration policies are a matter that affects CIDA and Canada's general relations with

developing countries and their national planning. CIDA's immediate concern is whatever brain drain its practice of training foreign students in Canada may prompt; but its general concern should go beyond that fraction to the total movement of population.

The Commons Sub-Committee recognized these connections. It warned that "a more comprehensive view of development cooperation will require a CIDA input in many areas of policy which have traditionally been reserved to other departments. This, in turn, will lead to overlapping responsibilities and, on occasion, to actual conflicts of interest."¹⁴ It suggested that it would be unhealthy, as well as unrealistic, to expect the development viewpoint always to prevail at such times, but the M.P.s said they hoped the government would always give full consideration to the welfare of developing countries whenever any such policies are discussed.

This is the nub of an integral strategy for development cooperation. Who is heeded in interdepartmental committees—either at cabinet level, or in the "Aid Board" (a group of deputy ministers chaired by the CIDA president), or in its sub-committees? This partly depends on personalities, their knowledge, and the respect they command. But it also depends upon the weight and influence of various government departments, and this means that representatives from Industry, Trade and Commerce and Finance generally act as the heavy elder brother at these meetings. As the M.P.'s observed in their report, the "managers and advocates of development assistance are not yet fully established in the governmental apparatus."¹⁵ One result is that the interdepartmental committees tend to face in only one direction: the other departments will all have their say about the CIDA program, but they do not expect CIDA to voice opinions on subjects which they consider properly their own.

Early in 1975 a positive move was taken. Another interdepartmental committee was set up, but on this occasion its *raison d'être* was to cover, not just the CIDA program, but the whole range of relations with Third World countries. The Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations with Developing Countries (ICERDC) was given the task of organizing a coordinated Canadian policy on important occasions—for

the May 1975 Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference, for example, and the fourth U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. Under the chairmanship of Basil Robinson, the Under Secretary for External Affairs, it gave sanction to CIDA's plea that all areas of contact with developing countries were related, and all departments should consult together on their particular approach. When Mr. MacEachen spoke to the Commons Committee in March 1975, he mentioned the Robinson committee and added:

We must consider ways and means to expand our economic relations with the Third World beyond aid; more trade, of course, but also more industrial investment, joint ventures and transfers of technology on mutually acceptable terms. . . . It is possible to talk about the condition of the developing world apart from the aid question; it is a new context, and possibly a fruitful context.¹⁶

Despite this example from the top, the old attitudes at operational level in departments will be changed only with difficulty. These attitudes were strongly illuminated by James Whiteside, a senior officer in ITC International Financing Branch, the section most involved in liaison with CIDA. He told a meeting of the Ontario Export Forum:

What we at Trade and Commerce have been trying to do is to move CIDA into certain areas where they are more commercially oriented. We were saying to CIDA basically, "Look, you take so much money and go out into the world and do good, but we would like some for export." And I think we are getting some headway. . . . There is not a day gone by when we don't call CIDA and talk to them, but we don't talk cold hard businessmen's language, we talk the soft development stuff, you know, and they like it. . . .¹⁷

The gap is plain between the cynicism of Mr. Whiteside's talk and the rejection by many in CIDA of a Canada-centric view of development. The M.P.'s saw this and argued that, while the Agency needed to improve its base of knowledge and expertise, "the other departments themselves should become increasingly sensitive and responsive to the 'developmental' implications of their policies."¹⁸

Until that day comes, Canada, for all her virtuous protestations, will not have discarded the robes of Arthur Hugh Clough's grand seigneur, sitting at his café table and throwing crumbs to the poor.

Table 8:1—Canadian International Development Agency: Bilateral Disbursements (in \$ millions)

	1973-74	5-Year Average 1968-72
<i>Asia</i>		
India	69.28	89.10
Pakistan	38.51	26.14
Bangladesh	58.27	(48.29)†
Indonesia	21.64	5.06
Malaysia	2.31	2.40
Sri Lanka	5.65	5.89
South Vietnam	2.76	2.05
Thailand	.42	1.14
Sub Total—Asia	203.78	146.85
<i>Francophone Africa</i>		
Tunisia	13.06	7.20
Cameroon	3.92	3.21
Zaire	3.54	.89
Ivory Coast	4.23	2.51
Niger	8.40	4.19
Morocco	5.55	2.85
Senegal	5.62	3.15
Sub Total—Francophone Africa	66.65	34.00
<i>Commonwealth Africa</i>		
Ghana	9.66	6.95
Nigeria	11.98	8.36
Tanzania	17.67	3.89
Kenya	6.19	2.03
East African Community	2.50	3.33
Sub Total—Commonwealth Africa	62.67	31.90
<i>Commonwealth Caribbean</i>		
Jamaica	3.24	3.27
Trinidad/Tobago	.90	1.34
Guyana	2.85	2.55
Barbados	2.93	.85
Leeward/Windward	.36	4.06
UWI	.99	1.06
Sub Total—Commonwealth Caribbean	15.51	14.38
<i>Latin America</i>		
Brazil	1.03	2.91*
Colombia	3.71	4.82*
Sub Total—Latin America	12.72	7.85
<i>Other Countries</i>		
Turkey	.03	3.03
Sub Total	6.61	10.35
Grand Total—Bilateral Programs	367.94	252.61

* Average for 1971-72 and 1972-73 only

† Average for 1972-73 only

Table 8:2—Trade with Certain Development Assistance Partners

	CY 1973	5-Year Average 1968-72	CY 1973	5-Year Average 1968-72
	Imports to Canada		Exports from Canada	
<i>Asia</i>	38.5	41.6	155.4	115.7
India	6.7	7.7	43.1	36.9
Pakistan	-	-	54.3	-
Bangladesh	3.1	1.7	17.6	12.0
Indonesia	54.0	30.3	28.7	14.2
Malaysia	7.6	9.2	4.4	6.1
Sri Lanka	-	-	1.7	3.0
South Vietnam	4.1	3.0	14.9	12.2
Thailand				
Asia	118.9	102.1	322.4	188.9
<i>Francophone Africa</i>				
Tunisia	-	1.22	13.6	4.8
Cameroon	3.5	.7	.7	1.2
Zaire	6.5	1.9	3.4	1.8
Ivory Coast	.8	1.7	2.3	1.2
Niger	-	-	-	-
Morocco	1.8	.6	3.3	2.2
Senegal	-	.2	3.4	.9
Francophone Africa	21.8	7.5	55.8	36.6
<i>Commonwealth Africa</i>				
Ghana	6.6	9.0	8.0	6.6
Nigeria	82.1	40.3	22.7	9.3
Tanzania	4.6	3.8	4.6	3.0
Kenya	10.0	5.0	5.7	3.5
Commonwealth Africa	135.7	71.3	49.6	26.1
<i>Commonwealth Caribbean</i>				
Jamaica	22.0	30.6	41.9	40.0
Trinidad/Tobago	13.5	13.5	26.9	19.8
Guyana	4.4	21.5	7.8	8.5
Barbados	3.2	1.8	15.3	10.4
Leeward/ Windward	2.3	3.0	10.5	10.7
Commonwealth Caribbean	48.5	73.3	103.9	91.0
<i>Latin America</i>				
Brazil	87.1	48.5	111.3	73.0
Colombia	32.6	23.0	33.7	22.8
Latin America*	253.7	103.8	343.9	176.6
Grand Total	578.8	368.7	876.0	561.5

*Includes only those to whom Canadian aid is going, i.e., excludes Venezuela, Mexico and Argentina.

NOTES

1. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Subcommittee on International Development Assistance; chairman Mr. Georges Lachance. Third Report to the House of Commons: Issue No. 29; 27 May 1971.
2. Escott Reid, "McNamara's World Bank," in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1973), p. 795.
3. Memorandum of Canada to the Development Assistance Committee, p. 10.
4. Professor Grant Reuber, for example, in his consultant's paper for the CIDA Policy Review in May 1969. His paper, "The Strategy and tactics for allocating Canadian funds to foster economic development," was made available in photocopy by the External Affairs Department in 1970.
5. "CIDA and the Developing World," p. 14.
6. Commons Sub-Committee report, "Highlights of conclusions and recommendations."
7. Sub-Committee report, paragraph 193.
8. Sub-Committee report, paragraph 82.
9. World Bank annual report, 1973, Table 2 on page 84.
10. Sub-Committee report, paragraph 92.
11. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, "Developmental Administration: CIDA in a changing government organization," paper to the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 8 September 1971. Published by CIDA as booklet, 1972; pp. 12-13.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
13. Memorandum of Canada to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Annual Aid Review 1973. Dated September 1974 and available on request from CIDA Information Division.
14. Sub-Committee report, paragraph 85.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Proceedings of Commons committee on External Affairs. Issues No. 5 and 6, March 11 and 13, 1975, columns 5:8 and 6:18 respectively.
17. Whiteside's talk in April 1973 was taperecorded by Peter Dorfman, and later printed in excerpts in the September 1973 issue of *Last Post*, page 50, under title of "See you in Bongo Bongo."
18. Sub-Committee report, paragraph 86.

DAVID VAN PRAAGH

Canada and Southeast Asia

The long struggle for the countries of formerly French Indochina largely shaped Canada's relations with Southeast Asia in the years following the Second World War.

From 1954 to 1973, Canada was not a belligerent in continuing wars in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia but a participant in international truce supervision. Particularly after the United States entered the Vietnam War in earnest in the mid 1960s, attempting to preserve the South against domination by the Communist rulers of North Vietnam, the Canadian role in Indochina was difficult and subject to varying interpretations.

Canadian trade and diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries have grown over the years, and aid to several nations in the region is significant. But more in a sense than even the United States, Canada has focused the attention she has paid to this part of the so-called Third World on Vietnam and the wider Indochina battlefield. To this extent, Canadians have not regarded Southeast Asia primarily as a developing region, although of course some of the problems of poor countries have been at the root of the fighting for Indochina.

Oddly, Canadian policy toward another region, one considered primarily as part of the Third World, was influenced by the frustrations encountered on the Indochina truce commissions. Canadian diplomatic and military officers who

served under Indian chairmen of commissions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia compiled a record of experience that contributed to disillusionment with India as a recipient of Canadian development aid.

The most important Canadian relationship affecting and affected by Canada's role in Indochina was the one with the United States. There was never any question about Canada being a member of the truce commissions as a Western nation and one close to the United States; this was the premise on which the late Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's suggestion of Canada for initial membership was accepted in Geneva in 1954. Canada was not meant to be "neutral," in the sense in which that word was thrown at successive governments in Ottawa by critics of both U.S. and Canadian policies in Indochina. Canada was meant to be objective and impartial, and successive governments claimed that they were, even when the United States was drawn more and more deeply into the Vietnam quagmire and became more and more sensitive about attaining what former President Richard M. Nixon called "peace with honor."

From the start, Canada played the part of the innocent and, if possible, helpful bystander. Canada had no great economic interests or cultural ties in Southeast Asia. The 1954 External Affairs Department press release announcing the decision to serve on the international commissions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia said: "Canada is geographically remote from Indochina and her collective security responsibilities in Southeast Asia are limited to those that arise from membership in the United Nations."

A little noted exchange of letters between two national leaders sums up Canada's problem during the two decades following signing of the Geneva Agreements on July 20, 1954, ending the war that drove the returning French out of Indochina. On January 24, 1966, Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, undoubtedly eager to bring the last anti-colonial movement in Asia to a successful conclusion, began a letter in these words: "I have the honour to call your attention to the war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists in our country, Vietnam. Over the past 11

years and more, the United States has been seriously sabotaging the 1954 Geneva Agreements and preventing the peaceful reunification of Vietnam in an attempt to turn South Vietnam into a U.S. new-type colony and military base . . ."

Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, replied on February 28, 1966: "I have read with interest your letter of January 24 which was addressed to Canada as a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam. You will not expect me to share the interpretation of the nature of the problem in Vietnam and the origins of the present conflict which is set forth in your letter. I do not believe, however, that it would serve any useful purpose at this time to dwell on our differences, other than to note that they exist.

"What concerns me, as it does the people of Canada, is the tragic toll in human suffering and the threat to international peace which the continuation of the conflict in Vietnam involves . . ."

Pearson went on: "Canada has at all times endeavoured to carry out its obligations in a spirit of objectivity and impartiality towards the facts as we know them."

As voiced by Pearson and his successor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and their External Affairs Ministers, Paul Martin and Mitchell Sharp, respectively, this continuing profession of good faith was sometimes open to question. Some Canadians charged with carrying it out seem confused about distinguishing it from U.S. belligerency. On balance, however, Canada appears to have been true to her word in joining with India and Poland in supervising the 1954 ceasefire agreements, and in participating briefly with Hungary, Indonesia and Poland in a new international commission created in January 1973 to oversee a new ceasefire agreement in Vietnam. Moreover, once Canada had a *locus standi* in Southeast Asia, she tried on several occasions to bring Washington and Hanoi closer to a peace agreement, or at least closer to an understanding of what continued fighting and bombing meant.

In the end, U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam under the 1973 ceasefire agreement, and North Vietnamese tanks and

troops combined with guerrillas of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South to capture Saigon from the American-supported government there on April 30, 1975. Shortly before, Khmer rouge forces completed their conquest of Cambodia, and in the months following Communist-led Pathet Lao forces took full control of Laos. North and South Vietnam were to be formally reunified on or soon after the first anniversary of Saigon's fall, and Hanoi's shadow also lengthened over Cambodia and Laos. If Canada took part of the blow to Western prestige from Communist victory in Indochina after nearly thirty years of fighting, none of the truce commissions on which she had served was operative when the end came.

Canada had never wanted to get involved in Indochina in any capacity.¹ It was a strange part of the world. Ottawa had no taste for cleaning up there after the war involving the French, and then trying to head off or pass judgment on the war involving the Americans, although assuredly this was better than sending combat troops. But Canada was forced to render judgments as the Western member of the tripartite truce commissions proposed by Chou at Geneva for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The Geneva powers appeared to assume that the commissions would not be needed for more than two years, although the Canadian government noted in accepting "this onerous but honourable assignment" that "we have no illusions that the task we are undertaking will be either easy or of short duration. . . ." Ironically as it turned out, approval of the principle of majority rule on the commissions was a factor in Canada's reluctant acceptance, as was the prospect that, as Pearson put it in a message to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Canada would be collaborating with non-aligned India.

The international commissions did not fail in their first six or eight years; indeed, the first three hundred days after the 1954 ceasefire in Vietnam brought notable success in separating and regrouping Vietminh and French forces, transferring administrations, freeing prisoners, checking on truce violations and overseeing division of the country at the 17th parallel. One of the biggest tasks was ensuring that more than a

half-million Catholics living in the North realized their wish to move South despite obstruction by the new Communist government in Hanoi. Notwithstanding the first signs of disunity on the Vietnam commission, Canada pushed successfully for this mass human transfer. Again despite disagreements, the commission actively investigated cases of denial of political rights in the South, demanding the release of political prisoners by the uncooperative government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

By June 1962, however, when Communist Poland dissented from a finding by India and Canada of unwarranted interference in the South by Hanoi, the Vietnam commission was not working. This was not simply because of that split or because from then on India and Poland tended to join against Canada. It was because, with mounting intervention by both North Vietnam and the United States, the commission could neither carry out its investigations nor expect its reports of truce violations to be heeded.

At the end of 1961 the commission had been denied the right to conduct inspections in the South. The 1962 report branded North Vietnam as an aggressor and accused South Vietnam of violating the Geneva Agreement by accepting large-scale U.S. military aid, including a ballooning Military Assistance Advisory Group, and thus entering into a military alliance. United States bombing of the North in 1965 divided the commission more bitterly than ever, with Canada as a minority of one insisting that this development be viewed "in context." That year, with the tempo of bombing increasing, commission teams were withdrawn from North Vietnam for their "safety." Canadian personnel on the three Indochina commissions, mostly military, dropped from a high of 170 in 1955 to 100 in 1962 and to 36 in 1971. After 1965 Canada was unsuccessful in pressing for commission investigations in the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.

A visitor to the Canadian delegation in Saigon from 1966 to 1972 was likely to find a dispirited group trying to put on a brave front but frustrated and angry at inactivity which, almost to a man, the Canadians blamed on the Indians. While the escalating war was the root cause of the commission's

mounting worthlessness, the refusal of India as chairman to permit even attempts to act without prior unanimity aroused Canadian exasperation. It was not exactly what the Indians did or didn't do that was irritating but the way they did or didn't pass on requests for commission investigations. India as chairman was in charge of commission administration. Delay and red tape, endemic in India and wherever Indian bureaucrats go, rubbed activist Canadians the wrong way in roughly the same manner as Vietnamese fish sauce was never going to mix with American ice cream-soda. In contrast, Canadian military and foreign service officers always knew where their Polish colleagues stood and usually respected their often diametrically opposed views.

As the commission grew almost completely sedentary, living and working quarters took on inordinate importance. Office space for the Canadians in an old South Vietnamese Army compound, like that for the other delegations, was cramped and dreary. Most Canadians lived in downtown Saigon hotels and, as their number dwindled, in only one, the sprawling Continental Palace, whose rococo colonial rooms were at least bigger than rooms assigned to the few Canadians left in Hanoi.² Villa No. 1 and Villa No. 2 were a different matter. The houses designated for the civilian head of the Canadian delegation and the military deputy, a major-general, were large and comfortable retreats among six villas, two for each delegation, in a separate, shaded Saigon compound.

It was natural for Canadians wherever they were in South Vietnam to mix with Americans, usually military officers of the same rank. Information and misinformation were informally exchanged, and probably the Canadians learned more about conditions in Vietnam than U.S. officers gleaned from their counterparts who had access to strange places such as Hanoi. It is difficult to know the extent of systematic conveyance of information or impressions. In 1970, this reporter unintentionally embarrassed a Canadian general who had just returned from Hanoi by walking in on him in Villa No. 2 in Saigon when he was about to sit down to lunch with the ex-Green Beret colonel who was in charge of U.S. military aid

to Cambodia. Having lunched with the same American in Phnom Penh the day before, I had an idea of how much he wanted to know about North Vietnamese military intentions.

Some people characterized this kind of friendly cooperation as spying. That may have been interpreting it too harshly. Whatever it was, it did not surprise any of the parties in Indochina, including Canada's partners on the commissions. It was one manifestation of Canada being an impartial observer and a Western ally at the same time—and undoubtedly of individual Canadians finding it easier to play the latter role. In 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau ordered Canadians in Indochina not to cooperate so closely with Americans; the reaction of U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon, for one American, was icy.

The first Vietnam commission died with a predictable but avoidable whimper in late 1972. India had fully recognized North Vietnam, elevating its diplomatic mission in Hanoi to an embassy while retaining a consulate in Saigon. The South Vietnamese government of President Nguyen Van Thieu retaliated by barring replacements for Indian personnel on the commission and finally ordered the Indians to leave altogether. The commission then passed a resolution transferring its headquarters to Hanoi—where it had started out, although the North Vietnamese didn't want it back—but not without India and Poland joining one last time in an attack on the U.S.-supported Saigon authorities for undermining the commission.

The last Canadian commissioner, R. David Jackson, replied: "The Canadian Delegation considers that any difficulties now confronting the Commission are essentially a reflection of the long-standing paralysis of its apparatus . . . the other delegations have for the past several years consistently refused to allow it to perform its prime responsibilities . . . the ICSC and the processes of consultation and control established by the Geneva Agreement of 1954 have to all intents and purposes been dormant for many years . . . the present disagreement between the governments of India and the Republic of Vietnam [is] a purely bilateral matter of no concern to the ICSC."

In Laos and Cambodia, the international truce commissions also had unhappy and unfruitful but nonetheless revealing histories. The commission in Laos passed into limbo twice, both times with more honour and dignity than the one in Vietnam enjoyed. Its work was suspended four years after the 1954 Agreements because there was nothing more it could reasonably do in a country not yet fully immersed in the expanding struggle for all Indochina. The 1962 Geneva Agreement on a neutral Laos reactivated the commission in Vientiane, a winsome little capital where the Canadians built a reputation for having the best officers' mess in town. But by 1966, when a one-year renewal of the commission's new three-year mandate ran out, the truce supervisory body in Laos was a dead letter.

Poland took the view that the commission had no role until the Pathet Lao rejoined the Royal Laotian government of Prince Souvanna Phouma. India, while recognizing that government—she had never recognized the government in Saigon—had no intention of going against Polish (and Soviet) wishes to keep the commission moribund while North Vietnamese troops in Laos increased in support of the Pathet Lao and in maintaining the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Canada insisted that the commission continue its work until it was specifically terminated by Geneva Conference co-chairmen Britain and the Soviet Union, or by the Royal Laotian government. After the last formal commission investigation and report in 1966, Canada accepted the idea of "observation visits" to trouble spots as an Indian compromise. But in early 1969 the Indians vetoed observation visits, too.

By the end of 1969, Canada announced she was withdrawing from the commissions in both Laos and Cambodia, ostensibly as part of an economy drive by Trudeau. Ottawa's real reason was its belief that the Canadian presence, although sharply cut in Laos in 1968, was contributing to the deception that the commissions were performing their duties when in fact India and Poland were preventing them from doing an effective job. Premier Souvanna, representing the neutral centre among warring Laotian factions, appealed to Canada to keep a "moral presence" in his hapless country, and a col-

onel and an enlisted man stayed on in Vietnam after a dozen other Canadians left in early 1970. Following a peace agreement in Laos in February 1973 and an agreement on a new coalition government under Souvanna in April 1974, and even after the Pathet Lao abolished the coalition and the monarchy and assumed full power in December 1975, the commission remained—but without the Canadians and without anything to do.

One of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's last acts as Cambodia's Chief of State before his country was dragged into the Indochina war was to oust the international commission at the end of 1969. Hardly as charitable to Canada as Souvanna was, he was the only leader in Indochina ever to attack Canada publicly for taking sides as a truce supervisor.

In January 1968, Sihanouk had made a deal in Phnom Penh with Chester Bowles, then U.S. Ambassador to India, designed to head off U.S. military intervention in Cambodia against Vietnamese Communist forces. It called for: (1) the United States making available to Sihanouk intelligence reports on these forces; (2) secret U.S. bombing of remote areas of Cambodia where these forces might be found (this later became one of the major indictments against the Nixon administration); and (3) strengthening the commission so it could effectively investigate violations of the 1954 Agreement on Cambodia by these forces.

Starting in 1966, India and Poland had blocked most Cambodian requests for commission investigation of alleged Vietnamese Communist violations; two investigations had been unproductive. As Communist incursions increased in 1968, the avowedly neutral commission chairman and the Communist member, much to Canada's disgust, refused even to hear witnesses offered by the United States to incidents involving alleged U.S. violations of Cambodian territory. In one such incident, fourteen Cambodian villagers had been reported machine-gunned to death by U.S. helicopters north of Svay Rieng, the so-called Parrot's Beak jutting to within twenty-five or thirty miles of Saigon. India and Poland also refused to accept Canadian minority reports as part of commission findings.

In early August, however, Sihanouk invited the commission to inspect Svay Rieng for Vietcong military installations pinpointed by U.S. intelligence. The bumptious Prince seemed to prejudge the results by proclaiming that they would disprove the U.S. charges. Still, there was just a chance that he was laying the groundwork for a breakthrough by the commission in line with his agreement with Bowles. But the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia that month before the truce supervisors could move; North Vietnam pointedly supported Soviet suppression of a troublesome neighbour and the chief Polish delegate in Phnom Penh had a long talk with Sihanouk. The Svay Rieng trip was called off, and Canada charged India and Poland with catering to Sihanouk's anti-U.S. brand of neutralism.

In May 1969, Sihanouk accused the Canadian delegation to the smallest Indochina commission of refusing to recognize "crimes committed by Canada's allies whenever Cambodia was a victim of American-Saigon forces." Canada nevertheless attempted to raise in the commission the growing Vietnamese Communist military presence in at least three Cambodian border provinces as a gross violation of Khmer territorial integrity. But India effectively blocked this last Canadian bid to make any of the 1954 commissions a useful instrument, and Poland eagerly concurred in Indian obstruction. On October 14 the Canadian government informed Sihanouk that its delegation would leave Phnom Pehn by the end of 1969. Five days earlier the Prince had announced that the whole commission would be out of Cambodia by then. He was out of power and in exile himself by March 1970; at the end of April, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces intervened in Cambodia. Whatever Sihanouk's motives had been,³ the bitter taste left by the Cambodia commission moved Canadian officials to express the belief more openly than ever that India and Poland saw no need for any of the truce commissions to be impartial, thorough or even honest, that Canada's partners only wanted to play out a farce. Canadian Commissioner Richard V. Gorham and his small staff left Cambodia as planned. Except for powerless Canadian entreaties, the commission had deliberately stood by and let the

last relatively peaceful nation in Indochina be sucked inexorably into war and wholesale destruction.

By the fall of 1972, Vietnam peace talks had been going on in Paris for four years following the Communist Têt offensive of 1968; U.S. forces in South Vietnam had been steadily and sharply reduced from a high of more than a half-million men as anti-war feeling grew in the United States and the world; and Nixon, elected in 1968 after President Lyndon B. Johnson announced he would not run again and would suspend bombing of North Vietnam, was campaigning for re-election. On October 26, Henry Kissinger, then his foreign policy adviser and negotiator in Paris, proclaimed that "peace is at hand."

Peace was not at hand. The Christmas bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area ordered by Nixon, reelected in November, was the heaviest of the North ever. Peace did not even come when the Vietnam Ceasefire Agreement and accompanying protocols were signed in Paris on January 27, 1973. But Kissinger's premature announcement set minds and machinery working overtime in Ottawa, because it was reported at the same time that U.S. officials assumed that Canada would serve on a new international truce commission in Vietnam.

Three factors governed Ottawa's thinking, and another was added when in Canada's federal election on October 30 Trudeau's Liberal party majority in the House of Commons was reduced to a minority needing the support of the New Democratic Party to sustain the government. These factors continued to be operative after 290 Canadians flew to Vietnam a few days after the Paris signing as part of a new truce supervisory organization with Hungarian, Indonesian and Polish delegations.

The first factor was Canada's bitter experience as the Western member of the old three-member Indochina commissions. When Kissinger and his deputy, William Sullivan, asked for the new truce body with Canada as a member, the External Affairs Department quickly formed a task force of experienced foreign service and military officers to plan for every contingency the new international group might en-

counter. These men were heartened by Trudeau's comments on the campaign trail to the effect that Canada would insist on certain conditions if she were to participate, and would want to be assured of the good faith of the signatories to a peace agreement because experience had "shown us that to try and supervise the peace that the parties themselves are not intent on keeping, is frustrating and often useless." When a list of Canadian suggestions for a strong and impartial truce commission was forwarded to Washington, however, the Nixon administration largely ignored it. State Department sources insist that Canadian sensibilities and suggestions were taken into account as much as they could be in the intense drive to attain Nixon's "peace with honour."

Impending trade talks with the United States were the second factor in Canada's consideration of a new role in Vietnam. Having urged the United States to get out of Vietnam, Canada could hardly refuse under any circumstances to help in the process. The North Vietnamese had crossed Nixon in the peace negotiations, or so he alleged, and had suffered renewed and intensified bombing. Would vital Canadian trade preferences be harmed by a vindictive President who didn't get the Canadian cooperation he wanted in Vietnam? This consideration came to merge with the new factor of Trudeau's political instability. But it was always speculative, as was the extent of popular opposition to Canada's new involvement in Vietnam.⁴ Unlike Pearson, Trudeau had always hung back from public or even private criticism of U.S. war policies. In cabinet discussions, several ministers responsible for economic affairs and Defence Minister James Richardson supported return of Canadian truce supervisors to Vietnam. The decision in January to go in for a trial period of 60 days, and one in March to extend by another 60 days with a possible 30-day "grace period," were conditioned by both U.S. pressure and world opinion in favour of a Canadian presence.

A third factor, which was almost instinctive in Canadian calculations, was the possible effect of the new truce organization in Vietnam on international peacekeeping or peace-observation missions generally and on Canada's part in such missions. Canada has participated in every United Nations

operation of this kind, from Kashmir to Cyprus. She was concerned that the new International Commission of Control and Supervision might set a bad precedent under unfavourable conditions. But Canada's bid for a higher authority to which the ICCS could report, either U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim or the Security Council, was turned down at the brief Paris peace conference immediately following the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement; only Britain supported Ottawa. Other Canadian "conditions" for effective international truce supervision fared little better.

The worst Canadian fears were realized almost as soon as operations started on the ground. Using helicopters operated by a charter airline called Air America—suspect because it usually worked for the Central Intelligence Agency—the new commission was more mobile than the old ones had ever been but not all of the twenty-six local team sites were occupied and it took time for even the seven regional headquarters to begin working. Even after unarmed truce supervisors were on the scene, fighting between the Vietnamese sides in the war continued and even intensified. In spite or perhaps because of an "open mouth" policy by Canada on the commission, four members with no chairman were unable to agree any more readily than had three members with a chairman, although many Canadians took quiet satisfaction in the fact that India was no longer present. External Affairs Minister Sharp acknowledged later that support of the Communist side in Vietnam by two commission members—Hungary and Poland—pushed the other two members—Canada and Indonesia—into seeming to back the other side. In fact, Canadian impartiality eroded faster than it ever had on the old commissions. This more than anything appears to have convinced the Trudeau government that Canada had to get out of Vietnam as quickly as possible. In pursuing this end, as intensively in its own way as the U.S. government got its troops out of Vietnam, the government opened itself to criticism that it did not do everything it could have done to make the new commission work.

Although Sharp and other Canadian spokesmen denied it, the conduct of Michel Gauvin, the senior Canadian on the

iccs, became embarrassing. There is no evidence to support the contention that he had been chosen for the job because he could be counted on to goad Communists into arguments. But one reason for picking the former Second World War combat officer and ambassador to the then-military regime in Greece was that he got along with military types. When the stocky Gauvin, sometimes wearing a baseball cap with four stars and the word *BOSS* on it, began talking as part of the "open mouth" policy about differences within the commission, the Canadian image in Vietnam underwent a change for the worse. The white blouses and dark green shorts, knee-socks and berets of his men—Vietnamese called them "white knees"—may have softened this image but did not alter the impression among some Indochina hands that Canada was trying too hard for effect.

When a commission helicopter was downed in Vietcong territory April 7, costing the life of a Canadian captain, Gauvin appeared eager to accept the U.S. story (later disproved by Canadian investigators) that the wreckage had been moved by Communist helicopters; he strongly suggested that North Vietnamese troops had shot it down. He supported U.S. charges that fresh North Vietnamese troops were infiltrating into the South. Interrogation by Canadian and Indonesian officers of four captured North Vietnamese led to a proposed commission report blaming Hanoi, at which representatives of Communist members Hungary and Poland balked in an angry dispute with Gauvin. Finally, when the Vietcong released two Canadian captains July 15, after holding them for seventeen days on the implied pretext that they were suspected of spying, Gauvin, in a burst of anger that he later regretted, characterized Vietnam as "uncivilized" and the officers' captors as "primitive."

To some, in short, it appeared that the Canadians picked quarrels with their colleagues to demonstrate the commission's futility and provide an excuse for leaving it. Whether or not this is true, Canada came close to losing her international reputation for impartiality as a peacekeeper. The Provisional Revolutionary government's initial response to Sharp's announcement in May of impending Canadian withdrawal after

a six-month stay was mild enough; it said Canada had "several times proved to be lacking objectivity and impartiality." During an untypically ostentatious flying tour of Saigon, Vientiane and Hanoi to seek opinions of what Canada should do, Sharp had received the impression from Premier Pham Van Dong that North Vietnam couldn't care less one way or the other. But the incident of the two captains indicated that the Vietnamese Communists had come to believe that Canada had strayed too far from the objective role of a Western truce supervisor.

By May it was safe to assume in Ottawa that strong feelings for continued Canadian participation in Vietnam trucekeeping had ceased to exist in Washington. All U.S. prisoners of war had been freed under nominal commission supervision, all U.S. combat troops had pulled out and it was clear that the iccs would or could do little to prevent continuing war in Indochina. In announcing on May 29 that Canada was taking the unprecedented step of withdrawing from a peace-observation group, Sharp suggested that other countries as well as Canada should conclude that such operations should be "truly international"—that is, under U.N. authority. (Ironically, the "international" nature of U.N. peace operations was thrown into question later in 1973, when after the Yom Kippur War Canadian troops were accepted as part of U.N. formations separating Israeli forces from Egyptian and Syrian forces only on condition that Canada, as a NATO member, be balanced by Poland, as a Warsaw Pact member.) With the iccs, said Sharp, "There was no chance whatever that our concept of an impartial fact-finding team reporting quickly and reporting to an international authority would be accepted."

It is nevertheless unlikely that the new Vietnam commission would have done anything at all if Canada had not jumped in immediately on approval of its cloudy, hopeless mandate. When Iran replaced Canada several months after the Canadians departed, the organization remained inactive. Sharp had told the Commons that "Canada would not take part in a charade [nor] tacitly condone inaction when [she] believed that action was required." The Canadians were certainly active! Sharp also asserted: "We have no need to listen

mutely . . . to any charges that we have acted partially; we can be proud of our objectivity in the Commission and of our attempts to see this impartiality as an integral part of Commission activities." Canadian impartiality in Vietnam was underscored before the start of the ICCS mandate in January when the House of Commons voted unanimously to deplore U.S. bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area after Kissinger had promised that peace was at hand.

On the day Sharp talked of a charade in Vietnam, former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who had abstained in the Commons vote deploring U.S. bombing, said that for long the United States "could not win, could not lose and could not leave." Canada was a witness to the United States finally leaving Vietnam as a combatant before she left herself as an overseer of a non-existent truce. Unfortunately, Canada's record in Vietnam was smudged when the end of the war came with astonishing swiftness in March and April 1975, and the United States finally lost. There were no Canadian truce supervisors in Vietnam then, and the commission might as well have been non-existent, too. But this offered all the more reason for Canada, as a member of Vietnam truce commissions for years and a nation which had withdrawn because of a conviction that peace wasn't workable, to say something to the world about the grossest violation of the 1973 and 1954 international accords on Vietnam: the blatant invasion of the South by more than a dozen North Vietnamese divisions. Although the United States asked signatories to the Paris Agreement to speak out, External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen declined to do so when pressed in the Commons. Prime Minister Trudeau made a comment to the effect that what was happening in Southeast Asia was too bad for the United States, implying that it was not really any of Canada's business after all.

These reactions were not consistent with the impartial words and actions of many Canadians who had served in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, or who had demonstrated that they cared about what happened to people in that part of the developing world. Nor was the manner in which the few Canadians in the new embassy in Saigon flew away in a Cana-

dian Armed Forces Hercules April 25, ignoring hundreds of Vietnamese whom they had told to come back to apply for visas, leaving behind Vietnamese staff employees who pleaded at the airport to be taken out of the country, taking with them instead two station wagons and crates of souvenirs. MacEachen said lamely a month later that Canada had not had the same power as the United States to cut through the emigration regulations of the crumbling Thieu government. This was not the only legacy from Vietnam to dismay many Canadians. Among the 3,000 or so Vietnamese refugees Canada agreed to take, from more than 120,000 who fled to the United States, was General Dan Van Quang, considered one of the most corrupt characters associated with Thieu; deportation proceedings against him were soon started.

There was one other dimension to Canadian membership in the international commissions, and that was its diplomatic potential. It was not spelled out in any of the Indochina accords. Canada, represented by Chester Ronning, was one of the fourteen participants in the Geneva Conference on Laos, often playing a constructive role in forging of the 1962 agreement on a "neutral" solution. Canadian attempts during the 1960s to have the Vietnam commission as a whole bring the warring sides together were unavailing. As a member of the new Vietnam commission, Canada attended the brief peace conference following signing of the 1973 Vietnam Ceasefire Agreement.

In two notable instances, Canada acted as a single commission member—or as a single Western nation with access to Hanoi—in the cause of bringing peace to Vietnam: the Seaborn mission in 1964-65 and the Ronning mission in 1966. Both missions failed to bring discernible movement toward this end and therefore, except as events in Canadian diplomatic history, deserve little more than footnotes in the tragic saga of war in post-French Indochina. But the later disclosure of the Pentagon Papers, or rather commentaries on them by some Canadians, blew up and distorted these missions, especially Seaborn's, removing them almost completely from the diplomatic perspective in which they belong.

If External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, when he talked at length about the Indochina situation to the Commons Committee for External Affairs in June 1965, had felt able to take M.P.'s into his confidence about the real nature of Blair Seaborn's visits to Hanoi, it is unlikely there would have been such consternation later. But Canadian sensitivities were bound to be aroused when it was learned that Canada's commissioner in Vietnam had conveyed five messages to the North Vietnamese leadership from the Johnson Administration, and had brought back Hanoi's reactions, just before the United States started bombing the North and in the months following. (Martin did not authorize Seaborn to pass on everything the United States wanted conveyed; some implicit and explicit threats to North Vietnam were omitted.)

A persuasive assessment of the Seaborn mission has been written by Paul Bridle, a Canadian diplomat experienced in Indochina and particularly Laos:⁵

The Canadian Government believed that, in allowing its representative to carry these messages and to report reactions, it would reduce the possibilities of misunderstanding, and it regarded this office as *consistent with its responsibilities as a member of the International Commission*. Although the role it undertook was delicate in the extreme, particularly in regard to reporting reactions, it is surely difficult to imagine the Canadian Government conscientiously refusing to discharge a function which is not uncommon when warring countries wish to communicate. It should also be borne in mind that *the Canadian Government was not fully informed by the United States Government of its plans and intentions and that it was understood throughout that Canada did not associate itself with the content of the messages passed*. (Italics mine)

The U.S. messages in effect warned of bombing if Hanoi did not curtail its activities in the South; attempted to obtain a North Vietnamese reply; informed the North Vietnamese once bombing had started that it had limited objectives; and proposed reciprocal moves toward peace. Bridle points out that the U.S. message about limited bombing also was conveyed through the Chinese embassy in Warsaw. The North Vietnamese never yielded and, after Seaborn succeeded in conferring with Premier Pham Van Dong in June and August, 1964, they took Seaborn down a peg or two by only permitting

meetings with liaison officers in December 1964 and March 1965, and finally with the Foreign Minister in May 1965.

On the basis of leaked top secret U.S. cables surrounding the Seaborn mission, Canada has been called a "stooge," a "spy" and even a "collaborator" of the United States in the bombing of North Vietnam. From what is known, none of these characteristics is remotely justified. If anything, Canada was a friendly but rather harsh critic of the United States as a combatant in Vietnam. We do not know everything; Canadian cable traffic, for one thing, has not been made public. But if U.S. diplomatic cables have been interpreted to make of Canada an accessory to war crimes, these same cables hold evidence of Canada's role, accepted by *both* Washington and Hanoi, as a valuable agent for potential peace at best, and an honest messenger at worst.

For example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, taking into account Canadian criticism of U.S. policy, cabled Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon May 22, 1964: "... in light of present Canadian attitudes we tend to see real difficulty in approaching the Canadians at this time with any message as specific as you suggest, i.e., that Hanoi be told by the Canadians 'that they will be punished.' "

Lodge replied to Rusk May 25: "It is not repeat not at all necessary that the Canadians either agree or disagree. What is important is that the Canadians transmit the message and be willing to do that and report back accurately what is said. ..."

The most quoted and controversial cable was sent by Undersecretary of State George Ball to Lodge on May 30, relating President Johnson's brief message with Prime Minister Pearson in New York two days earlier. Interpreting Johnson aide McGeorge Bundy's memo on the meeting, the cable said:

President told Pearson that he wishes Hanoi to know, that while he is a man of peace, he does not intend to permit the North Vietnamese to take over Southeast Asia. He needs a confidential and responsible interlocutor to carry the message of U.S. attitudes to Hanoi. In outlining the U.S. position there was some discussion of "carrots and sticks."

Pearson, after expressing willingness to lend Canadian good

offices to this endeavor, indicated some concern about this nature of "sticks." He stipulated that he would have great reservations about the use of nuclear weapons, but indicated that the punitive striking of discriminate targets by careful iron bomb attacks would be "a different thing." He said he would personally understand our resort to such measures if the messages transmitted through the Canadian channel failed to produce any alleviation of North Vietnamese aggression, and that Canada would transmit messages around this framework.

Ball's version of Bundy's account leaves Pearson sounding somewhat ambiguous. But given the war fever starting to run high in Washington—how high was not clearly discerned by outsiders until the Pentagon Papers on escalating the war were revealed—any explicit or even implicit approval by Pearson of prospective U.S. conventional bombing, or even reluctant "understanding" of it, surely would have been picked up in U.S. cables. At Temple University in Philadelphia in April 1965, while defending U.S. motives for intervention in Vietnam, Pearson incurred Johnson's wrath by calling for at least a pause in "iron bomb attacks" on the North.⁶

North Vietnam's attitude toward Canada appears more clearly indicative of the nature of the Seaborn mission. As relayed from Washington to Saigon, Seaborn cabled Ottawa after his first meeting with Pham Van Dong June 18: "Pham Van Dong read letter [of instructions] of May 30 from PM Pearson to myself carefully once and then quickly again. He said he greatly appreciated role Canada had undertaken to play, which he felt was important and desirable, and wished me also personal success in task. From tone of conversation thereafter, I believe Pham Van Dong has understood and accepted and perhaps welcomed my role as intermediary." Seaborn cabled that even after he had conveyed in the course of an hour-and-a-half conversation the U.S. warning that the war might be carried to the North, "Pham Van Dong seemed genuinely grateful for the mediary role Canada was trying to play and also I think USA desire to get message through."

Seaborn said after his last meeting in Hanoi, nearly a year later, that he was persuaded that North Vietnam was not

then interested in peace negotiations.⁸ But nowhere on the available record is there any sign that the North Vietnamese considered the Canadian mission anything less than a proper and honourable diplomatic function by a nation, in Seaborn's words to Pham Van Dong, enjoying a "close and friendly relationship" with the United States. There is every indication that Seaborn conveyed the truth as he saw it to both Hanoi and Washington, fully, professionally and accurately. Whether or not either side believed him—the Americans chose to reject his warning that bombing the North would be counter-productive—both sides escalated the war. Canada, through Seaborn, can be said to have tried to head off this eventuality.

Those who seem to have misunderstood Canada's role are Canadians who find Canada's relationship with the United States in almost any form a sellout of some kind. It probably is true that Johnson and his aides pursued a strategy which they believed would give them a pretext for escalating the war. It certainly is true that official U.S. readings of the situation in Indochina, disregarding realistic assessments such as most of those by the CIA, were based on wishful thinking, and reflected a hidden desire to make simplistic prophecies self-fulfilling. But there is simply no tangible support for the proposition that Canada under Pearson played a conscious role in shaping or implementing U.S. strategy. Of course Pearson and some other Canadian officials increasingly realized where U.S. policy was leading. But if anything this enhanced Canada's responsibility, as the Western member of the international commissions, to build conditions for peaceful disengagement by the belligerents. To obfuscate deliberately this subtle but comprehensible position is to do a disservice to Canada.

The China-born Ronning's two secret visits to Hanoi in 1966 were strictly a Canadian initiative aimed at providing good offices for starting direct peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam. While the Johnson administration formally approved of this effort, some U.S. officials privately disparaged it; curiously, this revelation in the Pentagon Papers provided yet another handle to critics who said Ot-

tawa was too close to Washington in Vietnam. The attempt by Ronning—an officially retired “old Asia hand”—to start a dialogue was ill-timed because neither side was then prepared to talk. The Canadian envoy’s cordial reception in Hanoi, however, was further evidence that the North Vietnamese did not consider that Canada, through the earlier Seaborn mission, had contributed to the then continuing U.S. bombing of their country.

Canada’s record in Indochina speaks for itself. It is not perfect. But an open-minded reading of it leads to the conclusion that Canada did as much or more than any other ally of the United States to criticize, privately and publicly, Washington’s conduct of the war; that Canada did as much or more than any other non-Communist non-combatant to seek a road to peace;⁹ and that Canada, far more than any of her partners on the 1954 commissions or the 1973 commission, tried to make impartial truce supervision work. What escapes those who reject the good faith of successive governments in Ottawa is that Canada had to do her best to make the international commissions work to avoid charges that she was taking sides.

In what might be called a cultural sense, Canadians could not help taking sides; they were naturally more at home with Americans in Vietnam than with Vietnamese. In 1973, when most Americans had left, the assertion of Western character almost caused Canada to lose her reputation as an international peace-watcher. But Canada got out before her avowed impartiality broke down. This Canadian withdrawal in July 1973 was a mark of independent thinking and action in Ottawa.

One criticism of Canada is that her presence on the 1973 commission for even six months enabled the United States to withdraw her last combat troops and recover surviving prisoners of war from North Vietnam. Is this a justifiable indictment? Was this not a primary objective of Hanoi as well as Washington? In a larger sense, U.S. military withdrawal was necessary for the restoration of sanity to the American body politic, which no Canadian can afford to ignore.

Canadians worked over nineteen years against almost im-

possible odds to put together a meaningful international presence in Indochina which would assist all sides in the wars to disengage militarily and come together politically. These efforts failed, not once but twice—in the deterioration of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and the more rapid breakdown of the 1973 Agreement on Vietnam. But Canada played a probably indispensable part in the limited progress that was made by the international commissions at different periods and places in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It is difficult to measure the deterrent value of these truce supervisory bodies. But as long as there was at least a chance they would investigate truce violations and point a finger of blame where justified, this was a factor that potentially offending sides had to take into account.¹⁰

Another likely benefit of Canada’s membership in the commissions was that the United States under Johnson did not ask Ottawa to send combat troops to Vietnam. Canadian troops probably would not have been sent had there been such a request, but relations with Washington might have been strained if Canadian truce-keeping responsibilities had not served as a legitimate reason for non-participation in the fighting. Unlike the Korean War in the early 1950s, when Canadian combat troops served with units from a number of other countries, there was no U.N. command in Vietnam.

Popular and official Canadian attitudes towards the Vietnam war were always ambivalent.¹¹ On one hand, despite Canada’s historic suspicion of the giant below the border, there was an underlying sympathy with U.S. efforts to fight communism in Asia. A constant source of amazement to Americans in Vietnam was the fact that Canadians with the international commissions, as individuals, were often more hawkish than many U.S. officers. On the other hand, traditional anti-Yankee feeling and the missionary streak in Canadian politics made for moral revulsion at many U.S. acts in Indochina. A number of commentators have made a persuasive case that “Vietnamization” of the United States contributed in large measure to growing Canadian nationalism. One result is the mea culpa school of thought about Canada’s role in Indochina.

External Affairs Minister Martin summed up the official view of the origins of the conflict and Canada's role on June 10, 1965,¹² when U.S. troops were starting to engage the "enemy" on a large scale in South Vietnam:

As far as Canada is concerned, we are not directly concerned in this crisis as one of the protagonists, and this, together with our independent position in Vietnam, gives us a certain freedom of manoeuvre. . . .

In our pursuit of a diplomatic solution there should be no misunderstanding of the root cause of the present hostilities . . . available evidence points unmistakably to the conclusion that what is happening in Vietnam today is an armed conflict, with its original roots in the theory and practice of so-called "wars of liberation," and clandestine but crucially important support from outside . . . there will be incalculable consequences for world peace . . . if North Vietnam succeeds in taking over the whole of Vietnam by force. . . .

Some people contest the claim that North Vietnam has been deeply involved in or indeed has instigated the war in the South. . . . This argument, I believe, is inadequate in its basis and is dangerous in its impact. . . . In the special International Commission report of June 2, 1962, India and Canada agreed there was evidence to warrant the conclusion that North Vietnam had, in violation of its obligations under the Ceasefire Agreement of 1954, encouraged, sponsored and supplied activities aimed at the overthrow of the authorities in the South. . . .¹³

The government of South Vietnam did not support the Geneva settlement and, it must also be remembered, neither did the United States. . . . In fact, there is evidence that the division of Vietnam was a bargain struck at Geneva between the French and the Chinese, the two traditional "imperialist" powers in Vietnam. This division [at the 17th parallel] was accepted by the North Vietnamese because they thought it would be temporary and that they would subsequently get what they wanted—the whole of Vietnam—by the kind of elections which were imprecisely referred to in paragraph 7 of the Final Declaration. . . . The South Vietnamese believed that such elections would amount only to a façade for a Communist take-over. . . . President Diem [who was overthrown and killed in November, 1963] reminded me . . . that there was need for the Commission to maintain its presence until such time as a truly objective election could take place. . . .

As a member of the International Commission in Vietnam we have had a firsthand and independent experience of the failure, on

all sides, to live up to the terms of the Geneva Ceasefire Agreement which it is the Commission's task to supervise but not to implement.

. . . We must observe and report the situation—in terms of violations of the Agreement—as we see it. . . . we have done so and will continue to do so in the hope that the objective and impartial discharge of our responsibility in the face of facts available to us may go some distance toward focusing international attention onto all the disturbing factors in the situation . . . of those countries with whom we are associated in the NATO Alliance, no one country has publicly taken a position basically different from the position taken by the Government of Canada.

What was the Canadian public to make of the government's insistence that it took an "independent position" in Vietnam at the same time as it scored North Vietnam's intervention as the "root cause" of all the trouble, including U.S. bombing of the North? Canada was carrying out her task on the commissions objectively and impartially, according to Martin, but in his opinion she was not different from any member of NATO in support of the U.S. view of war! Nor did Canada feel obliged to cut off the sale of arms to the United States although some Canadian-made military equipment was used in Indochina.¹⁴

Was this diplomatic doubletalk? Was Canada being a hypocrite in the international community? If the answer were yes, why should Canada have been so willing to criticize North Vietnam at the risk of being called a U.S. stooge? Why should the government have put all its cards on the table when it was patently difficult to match one set with another? Pearson wrote to Ho Chi Minh about reducing suffering and bringing about conditions for peace, while Martin spoke to M.P.'s about maintaining manoeuvrability and informing the world by "observing and reporting the situation as we see it." It is not naive to believe that this was *not* some kind of put-on. A realistic assessment is impelled to accept, with some reservations, Canada's policy throughout as the only one that she could have reasonably been expected to follow. Two unpublished telephone conversations in 1973 between President Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau, the first having to do with Canada joining the new Vietnam commission and the second, with Canada staying on 60 days until July 31 instead of 30 days

after her announced withdrawal from the commission would have taken effect,¹⁵ indicate the importance that was attached to Canadian participation in cooling off the war in Indochina. The wonder is that in trying to keep her balance on a narrow, torturous path, Canada did not suffer far more damage to her international reputation and self-respect.

It is hardly surprising that "normal" Canadian aid, trade and diplomatic relations with the developing countries of Southeast Asia for long took a back seat to preoccupation with this path. In fact, the way Canada was perceived by Southeast Asians and the way Canadians viewed Southeast Asia were appreciably influenced by the Canadian truce supervisory role in Indochina starting in the mid-1950s.

When Prime Minister Trudeau visited Malaysia and Singapore on the way to Japan in May 1970, for example, and when he went to Indonesia in January 1971 immediately after a Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Singapore, the subject on which his opinions were most earnestly sought was international supervision of a future peace in Vietnam. If some Canadians found it difficult to distinguish among various Southeast Asians, people in that part of Asia were apt to think of how Canada differed from the United States—if they thought of it at all—in terms of the unique Canadian position in Indochina as a non-combatant Western power.

Commonwealth ties with Malaysia and Singapore have developed apart from the Indochina context.¹⁶ Among recipients of Canadian economic assistance, probably only Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) has outdone Malaysia in appreciation of it. Trudeau and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore developed an intellectual relationship at the 1971 Commonwealth conference that helped cool racial passions among other national leaders and carried over to the bland Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Ottawa in August 1973. If Canada can be accused of taking political and military sides anywhere in Southeast Asia, it is in quiet support of the governments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore against Communist insurgency, although as a matter of

course Ottawa has backed away from any hint of a formal alliance or of joining Britain, Australia and New Zealand in protection of Malaysia and Singapore.

Another aspect of Canada's Commonwealth relations was profoundly influenced by her negative experience as a truce supervisor in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. India, chairman of the three international commissions set up in 1954, was for many years the largest recipient not only of Canadian economic aid to Third World countries but also of Canadian interest in development of poor nations. It was largely because of India, like Canada a federal parliamentary democracy in the Commonwealth, that Canadians often thought first of South Asia in Third World terms instead of Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America or even the Caribbean. It was largely because of Indochina that this focus changed, that Canadian goodwill and encouragement toward India were transformed into bitterness and distrust. India's underground explosion of a "nuclear device" in May 1974, using facilities, expertise and material provided by Canadian nuclear aid for peaceful purposes only, climaxed this process. If some Canadian officials could say then that they were not surprised by India's violation of a trust going back to Louis St. Laurent's belief in Jawaharlal Nehru's integrity, it is regrettable that Ottawa did not act sooner on the basis of Indian performance or non-performance in Indochina to cut off nuclear assistance.

It has been said with truth that a whole generation of Canadian External Affairs officers was turned off India by the non-cooperation they encountered over the years on the three-member truce commissions; with Poland taking a predictable Communist position, India's insistence that her "neutrality" as chairman demanded that she seek unanimous action usually meant no action at all. This soured Canada and Canadians on the most populous non-Communist developing country and contributed to an end to a "special relationship" even before the nuclear explosion and the effective destruction of Indian democracy by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in June 1975. It resulted in a greater Canadian realism about doing business with developing countries generally. The years of frustration in Indochina will have been a partial

blessing in disguise if Canada, in assisting governments of low-income countries to allocate economic development for the direct benefit of ordinary people—especially peasants with the potential to produce more food—insists that assurances in this regard be lived up to.

Canadian aid to Southeast Asian countries never approached the level of assistance to the Indian subcontinent, although both came under the Colombo Plan started in 1950. The only major capital project in Southeast Asia to which Canada pledged predominant support—when Trudeau visited Kuala Lumpur in 1970—was the Temengor hydro-electric scheme in an area of northern Malaya where Communist insurgents operate; the \$50 million promised is dwarfed by the amounts loaned much earlier for big power projects in India and Pakistan.

Nor, except as it may be reflected in the Commonwealth connection, has any Southeast Asian country's commitment to political democracy appeared to be the positive criterion for Canadian aid that India's former democratic practices ostensibly were. In fact, one could argue the opposite. Following Malaysia's most significant democratic exercise in elections in May 1969, Malays and Chinese engaged in bloody clashes and Malay leaders clamped temporary authoritarian rule on the federation. But this did not result in a suspension or reduction of Canadian aid to the authorities. Conversely, the overthrow in October 1973 of a coterie of short-sighted generals ruling Thailand did not spur the Canadian International Development Agency to consider more aid for Bangkok. On the contrary, as democratic processes were increasingly used in Thailand over the next two years with adoption of a new constitution and free elections, Canadian aid dropped to almost zero. The developing country in the region that has gained the most in Canadian favour in recent years is Indonesia, which is firmly under the thumb of another group of generals.

Trudeau's flying visit to Jakarta and Jogjakarta in 1971 signalled a surge of official Canadian interest in the most populous and richly endowed country in Southeast Asia. International Nickel Company had already pledged the largest

single Canadian private investment in the region, and one of the largest Western investments in Indonesian minerals, with a hard-won contract initially worth \$75 million to exploit nickel deposits in Sulawesi (Celebes). Following the fall in a bloody counter-coup of the Communist-leaning Sukarno in 1965-66, Indonesia's extensive natural resources were a factor in steadily increasing Canadian aid to the military-dominated government of President Suharto, who visited Canada in July 1975. From little more than \$2 million in 1969-70, Canadian assistance to Indonesia jumped to \$18 million by 1972-73, followed by a \$16 million line of credit for purchase of Canadian industrial commodities and equipment, and other development loans. Growth of a pulp and paper industry and development of civil aviation are official Canadian objectives along with support of Inco and several oil companies with Canadian interests operating in Sumatra. One of these companies, Asamera of Calgary, made one of the first production-sharing agreements with Pertamina, the state oil monopoly. Canada is a member of the Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia, a consortium of Western nations and Japan that has channelled hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Indonesia. There is little evidence that the Suharto government has spread the benefits of substantial Western aid and investment, and of mounting oil revenues, to millions of poor Indonesians. It has been efficient, however, at suppressing all protest and political opposition, and at detaining thousands of political prisoners in primitive conditions since the Communist coup attempt in 1965.

The most important military aspect of Canada's support for the governments of Malaysia and Singapore lies in development of the Royal Malaysian Air Force. C-41 jet trainers sold by Canada on easy terms were given the name *Tebuan* and used for bombing and strafing jungle areas in Malaya and Sarawak where Communist guerrillas were believed to be operating; there is no telling how many insurgents or innocent Malaysians were killed or wounded. The RMAF also was beefed up by a dozen De Havilland Caribous provided by Canada on similar terms; Trudeau flew in one in 1970. A Canadian air vice-marshal served as top adviser to the com-

mander of the RMAF in the late 1960s. Ottawa might well have authorized the sale of a squadron or two of CF-105 fighters to Kuala Lumpur if the Malaysians hadn't decided on another advanced jet.

While Canadian military assistance to Singapore¹⁷ was limited to training of some seamen, Lee Kuan Yew was once interested in buying the aircraft carrier *Bonaventure* from Canada, before she was relegated to scrap. In a non-military but no less vital field for Singapore, several De Havilland Twin Otters were obtained on favourable terms from Canada for a cargo airline designed for far-flung island-hopping before the operation was discouraged by Indonesia.

Unheralded Canadian aid to repressive governments in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore caused no stir at home, compared with the controversy raised by detractors of Canada's medical assistance program in South Vietnam. Of necessity this program was channelled through the Saigon government before it fell to the Communists. Nevertheless it provided humanitarian aid to thousands of poor Vietnamese, many of them sympathetic to, or even members of, the National Liberation Front.

In the mid-1960s, there could hardly have been a more severe or better informed critic of the U.S. military role in South Vietnam than Alje Vennema, a young Dutch-born doctor who headed a small Canadian medical team in Quang Ngai. Nor could a physician have been more dedicated to his mission than Vennema was to reducing the menace of tuberculosis in Central Vietnam. He helped tend victims of U.S. bombing and shelling in the general wards of Quang Ngai Hospital but his main job, and that of other Canadians, was to treat Vietnamese afflicted by tuberculosis, to set up a modern TB hospital and to immunize people against the disease in remote, often dangerous villages. Vennema was criticized within CIDA for being too outspoken. South Vietnamese troops used the roof of the Canadian hospital for a command post during Têt 1968, and Vietcong troops tossed a few grenades inside. The Têt offensive caused Vennema, who had left Vietnam for advanced medical training, to return and to recommend ending Canadian medical aid in

South Vietnam. But these facts did not diminish the value of the Canadian aid that continued to be given directly to suffering Vietnamese in Quang Ngai and at an impressive physical rehabilitation centre in Qui Nhon. These two Canadian-built clinics were in bitterly contested provinces.

By 1972, the last Canadian staff member had left both Quang Ngai and Qui Nhon. But models for TB control and for treatment of cripples, especially amputees, in a Vietnamese setting had been established, and young Vietnamese had been trained by Canadians to do the job. These facilities can be as useful in providing badly needed medical care as South Vietnam's new Communist rulers want them to be. Similarly, a third facility built with Canadian aid, in what was a relatively "safe" province in the Mekong Delta, was designed to train Vietnamese as paramedical personnel.

Canada offered economic assistance to North Vietnam in the 1960s but it was spurned. When diplomatic relations with North Vietnam were established in 1973, Canada offered aid as a contribution to international relief programs. While the future of the U.N. development plan for the Mekong Valley appeared more uncertain than ever after the end of the fighting, with cooperation between the new Communist states of Indochina and Thailand required, two dams in the plan, one in Laos and one in Cambodia, had received Canadian construction assistance during the Indochina war. Prospects for continuing or new Canadian aid appeared good in Laos, which CIDA continued to regard as a "country of concentration" even after the Pathet Lao takeover. Technical assistance was being offered in several fields, and Pathet Lao leaders were interested in obtaining Canadian help in exploiting hydroelectric, timber and potash resources.

Canada's aid to Southeast Asian countries, running at a total of more than \$15 million a year in the early 1970s, has included over the years nearly 2,000 Canadian technical advisers and university teachers; the training of more than 15,000 students; food (though nothing like the amounts provided to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka); forestry development in Malaysia; mineral extraction and logging in Burma (suspended or limited like aid from other

sources to that isolationist nation); regional development in Indonesia; and airport and road work in Thailand. It appeared after the war that Canada would not let her aid to Thailand dwindle away but might participate in a vast rural electrification project in the depressed northeast; the Thais, conscious of being on the "front line" in Southeast Asia, were trying to make a success of both an ambitious rural development program and constitutional democracy.

Apart from CIDA projects, the International Development Research Centre entered the field in the early 1970s, setting up its Asian regional office in Singapore and supporting research projects in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Laos dealing with food crops, effects of the Green Revolution, family planning, housing, regional cooperation, industrial expansion, urban squatters and geological data.

The Canadian University Service Overseas has made contacts in Southeast Asia of a different kind. The CUSO program in Thailand became perhaps the most successful one in Asia, making possibly a wider Canadian impact on the country than any official or commercial Canadian endeavour. It started later but lasted longer than the CUSO program in India; by the early 1970s more than fifty young Canadians were working informally each year with adaptable Thais in local conditions. Canadian volunteers also worked in Sarawak, Sabah and Malaya in Malaysia; briefly in Singapore; and, further afield than Southeast Asia, in Papua New Guinea (where many natives discovered that all whites are not Australian).

Canada's trade with nine Southeast Asian countries (there was virtually none with North Vietnam before the end of the war) has grown steadily, amounting to a two-way flow worth \$159 million in 1972 compared with \$62 million in 1962. Canada enjoys an overall trade advantage, making her appear vulnerable to the charge of using trade *and* aid in a way that increases inequalities and does not result in net transfer of capital to developing countries. Statistics Canada data show that Southeast Asian trade patterns vary sharply from country to country.

From 1962 to 1972, Canadian imports totalled \$540 million and Canadian exports \$640 million. Trade was virtually even in 1962 at \$31 million each way, while ten years later Canadian imports had grown to \$74.5 million and Canadian exports to \$84.5 million. In 1972 Canada enjoyed favourable trade balances with the Philippines (\$29.3 million worth of products sold to \$11.9 million worth of products bought), Indonesia (\$14.4 million and \$2.3 million), Thailand (\$11.4 million to \$3 million), South Vietnam (\$3.2 million to \$10,000), and Burma (\$1.6 million to \$9,000). Trade with Laos and Cambodia was almost nil. The two Commonwealth countries in the region commanded favourable trade balances with Canada in 1972, as in earlier years; Canada sold products worth \$15.3 million to Malaysia and bought products worth \$31.8 million, and exported \$9.4 million worth of products to Singapore while importing \$25.6 million worth.

If we exclude trade with Malaysia and Singapore, by far the two wealthiest Southeast Asian nations—Singapore is no longer a developing nation by U.N. criteria—we are left with a huge Canadian surplus in trade with the seven poorer countries of the region. In 1972, Canadian exports to these countries were worth \$60 million and Canadian imports from them only \$17 million, a ratio of three-and-a-half to one. For the period 1962 to 1972, this ratio stands at more than six to one, with Canadian exports worth \$471 million and imports only \$77 million.

Canada buys mainly tin, rubber and palm oil from Malaysia, and rubber, transistor radios and pineapple from Singapore, which is the entrepôt of Southeast Asia. She buys considerably less tin from Thailand. Plywood, pineapple and coconut are the main imports from the Philippines, while black tea comes from Indonesia. Canada sells a variety of finished products and food to Southeast Asia: newsprint and milk powder to South Vietnam (before the end of the war); wheat and mining drills to Burma; wood pulp and specialized metals to Thailand; newsprint, wheat and airplane parts to Malaysia; wheat, newsprint and trucks to Indonesia; newsprint and log processing equipment to Singapore; and wheat, trucks and newsprint to the Philippines.

For several years Canada's main diplomatic mission in Southeast Asia was located in Kuala Lumpur; as late as 1966 it was responsible for Canadian relations with Singapore, Burma and Thailand as well as Malaysia. But the embassy established in Bangkok in 1968 had grown by the mid-1970s to be the largest Canadian mission between New Delhi and Tokyo; it took over responsibility for relations with Rangoon in 1975, and for a time after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 it supervised aid and other Canadian ties with Dacca. A trade mission to Singapore was expanded until, in 1975, Lee Kuan Yew succeeded in his bid to have Ottawa elevate it to the same status as the high commission in Malaysia. The small Canadian embassy in Jakarta also has grown. In 1973, the long-standing consulate in Manila became a full-fledged embassy, reflecting the extent of trade between Canada and the Philippines and the substantial stream of Filipinos emigrating to Canadian shores. Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand maintain missions in Ottawa, and Singapore's ambassador to the United Nations is accredited to Canada.

Canadian delegations to the international commissions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia served diplomatic and aid as well as truce supervisory functions, and for years the one based in Saigon included several military and political officers resident in Hanoi. In fact the ICSC in Vietnam was first based in North Vietnam's capital, from 1954 to 1958. By the end of 1973, with the old commissions in Vietnam and Cambodia out of business, and the one in Laos inoperative, and with Canada having quit the new commission in Vietnam, there was no Canadian mission with a resident head in formerly French Indochina. Although Ottawa extended diplomatic recognition to Hanoi as well as Saigon in 1973, the Canadian ambassador to Thailand was accredited to South Vietnam, and the Canadian ambassador to China was accredited to North Vietnam—but was temporarily barred from entering while Canada declined to recognize the Provisional Revolutionary government in the South.

Less than a month after final Communist victory in South Vietnam on April 30, 1975, Canada recognized the PRG as the

regime in control. But the Canadian embassy in Saigon had been hurriedly abandoned on April 25. And plans were soon made in Ottawa to establish a new embassy in Hanoi that would be responsible for Canadian relations with an Indochina at peace, once South Vietnam was reunified with North Vietnam in 1976.

NOTES

1. See John Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour: Essays in Canadian Diplomacy*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), pp. 220-222.
2. Until 1958 the ICSC delegations, including Canada's, were based in Hanoi.
3. It appeared at the time that Sihanouk was trying to buy China's support against North Vietnam's domination by moving to minimize Soviet influence in the area as Geneva Conference co-chairman.
4. The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion reported in March 1973 that a Gallup poll showed 53 per cent of respondents supported Canada's participation in the ICSC and 39 per cent opposed it. "University-educated" support reached 71 per cent, and Francophone support 56 per cent. But popular support for Canada's withdrawal as measured by the Gallup poll was even greater.
5. "Canada and the International Commissions in Indochina, 1954-72", in M. W. Zacher and R. S. Milne, eds., *Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974). Bridle appears to have been one of the few Canadian External Affairs officers who held serious reservations about U.S. policies in Indochina, and was perhaps the only one to express them in print.
6. According to then Canadian Ambassador Charles Ritchie in an article in *Maclean's*, January 1974, pp. 35, 40, 41, Johnson was so outraged by Pearson's proposal that he may have deliberately delayed a pause in the bombing. See also Peyton Lyon, "Quiet Diplomacy Revisited," S. Clarkson, ed., *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* (McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p. 34.
7. The North Vietnamese Premier also noted, according to Seaborn: "As far as the ICSC is concerned, we are very glad to have you here. But don't put too many items on the agenda, don't give yourself too much work to do."
8. Cable from U.S. Embassy in Saigon to Washington.
9. Henry Kissinger finally had to go through Moscow and Peking to get a ceasefire agreement in 1973.
10. Chester Ronning, a distinguished Canadian diplomat with long experience in the Far East, said in early 1973 on the CBC radio program, "Cross-Country Checkup," that the ICSC should quickly take its place in the field because, in his view, it would serve as a deterrent against major military gains by Saigon's forces.
11. In the early stages of U.S. intervention, Canadian public opinion was

fairly supportive, and widespread public revulsion was slower in coming in Canada than in the United States. See the survey on "Public Opinion on US-Canadian Relations" in *International Organization* (Autumn 1974), pp. 661-65.

12. To the House of Commons Committee for External Affairs.
13. Paul Martin's references to the 1962 Commission report blaming North Vietnam for "aggression" tended, along with other public comments, to conceal his private criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam.
14. Had the Canadian government ever perceived the U.S. involvement in Indochina as "aggressive," it should have taken whatever steps were necessary to break off the extensive trade in weapons between Canada and the United States. However, this was never the case, even when Ottawa came to believe that the involvement had become tragically excessive.
15. A Nixon Watergate tape records that the President called Trudeau an "asshole" when he considered telephoning the Prime Minister at the time extension of Canada's stay in Vietnam was under consideration; a call was not put through on that occasion.
16. Canada also enjoys special ties with the British crown colony of Hong Kong, which is outside Southeast Asia for the purposes of this book. Hong Kong is the locale of a thriving Canadian trade mission, and of a gallant Canadian defence against Japanese invaders in 1941.
17. After the city state broke from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965.