

Debating European Security



1948
1998

Willem van Eekelen

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DEBATING EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1948-1998

Debating European Security, 1948-1998 is part history, tracing the interaction between the various organisations in the evolving context from the Cold War to the new international security environment, and part personal memoir.

The author covers actions in the Gulf, the Yugoslav crisis, Central Africa and Albania and the genesis of the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. He gives the arguments of the major players for acting or - quite often - not acting. On the personal side, Dr van Eekelen describes what he set out to do in WEU, pointing out where he succeeded and where he failed.

He tells how he stood at the Berlin Wall a few days after it fell, how Ministers Genscher and Van den Broek fell out with each other and how he fought for early intervention in Yugoslavia to stop the process of escalation.

A substantial final chapter analyses the future scope of European security. What are the limits of justified coercion and what constitute European security interests? And what will be the future of WEU which will celebrate its 50th anniversary on 17 March 1998? For the immediate future, it will continue its dual role as European pillar of NATO and the security and defence dimension of European integration but, over time, WEU is bound to merge with the European Union as the most comprehensive expression of stability and solidarity.

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DEBATING EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1948-1998

Willem van Eekelen

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*To Gerard, Peter Paul and Saskia
who may see a safer Europe.*

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Foreword

Lluís Maria de Puig
President of the Assembly
WEU

Willem van Eekelen is the only person to have participated in a three-fold capacity in the activities of WEU. As a parliamentarian, he was a member of the Assembly to which he presented a report in 1982 entitled "European-United States Cooperation for International Peace and Joint Security", in which he advanced his views on organising peace in a world which at the time seemed doomed for many years to come to be divided into two blocs. As Defence Minister of his country, he was a member of the Council of WEU. Finally, he chaired the Permanent Council as Secretary-General of the organisation from 1989 to 1994 and was in charge of the Secretariat of WEU during these five-and-a-half years of WEU's reactivation behind which he was the driving force. In military terms, this was the period in which WEU conducted its first more or less autonomous operations. In political terms, it was the time when the organisation strived to define its role within Europe, which was being built around the European Community, and within the Atlantic Alliance. This was also the period in which the ranks of what was a nine-, later ten-member defence organisation were swelled by seventeen associate and observer countries, nine of them former members of the Warsaw Pact and four of them neutral states, in an effort to extend the security long enjoyed by the western part of Europe to the whole of the continent. Thus Willem van Eekelen had unique experience to draw upon when writing this book.

1998 is the year chosen by governments to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the organisation, although it was not in fact created by the Brussels Treaty of 1948 but by the Paris Agreements which modified it in 1954. This questionable 50th anniversary is nonetheless an excellent opportunity to review the prospects that have opened up for WEU in the aftermath of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which has shown that the European Union is not yet ready to frame a common security and defence policy, and

of the NATO summit in Madrid, which in principle paved the way for the creation of a European security and defence identity within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

These two decisions mark the way forward for WEU. Its integration in the European Union has been postponed for an indefinite period, but its cooperation on the CFSP has become more necessary than ever, if Europe is to make its voice heard, particularly within NATO. WEU's dependence on NATO which, essentially because of the United States' contribution, is the only body capable of providing it with the necessary assets for any major peacekeeping or peacemaking operation, makes it all the more necessary for its members to pool their efforts to develop the instruments that are vital for a genuine European security and defence policy. Their Declaration of 22 July 1997 testifies to their determination to do so, although the pace of their efforts in this respect is regrettably slow.

One of the main merits of Willem van Eekelen's book is to give the full measure of the distance that remains to be travelled on the road towards this objective. While diplomacy sometimes enables countries of diverging views to reach agreement on a declaration of principles, it is an arduous task indeed to convince them to translate such principles into concrete action.

Often there is a temptation to reproach an organisation or its staff for the slow pace of progress. Willem van Eekelen's work admirably portrays the difficult task confronting the Secretary-General of an institution that is bound by its status of intergovernmental body to take all decisions by consensus. The Assembly always appreciated the Secretary-General's skill in performing this task and in obtaining, in the interests of WEU, as much as possible from member states. The Assembly's sometimes severe criticism of the Council was never directed at the Secretary-General in person. Indeed, it was always keenly aware of the determination with which he set about tackling all his responsibilities, not least that of providing parliamentarians with as much information as possible on the Council's activities. I personally was able to appreciate the pains he took to reply to their enquiries.

The reader of this book should not misunderstand the reasons for the constant tension in the relations between these two bodies of WEU. The Assembly's criticisms and suggestions are not governed by individual interests, but rather by the fact that the Modified Brussels Treaty which created the organisation made the Assembly the guardian of that treaty law, vis-à-vis a Council led by European enlargement to put the interests of the moment before compliance with the founding Treaty. When the Assembly draws attention to such issues as the Treaty's term, the inadequate guarantees for participation by a large number of countries in WEU's activities or the outdated nature of a given protocol, it is in no way calling into question the goals pursued by the Council, but rather asserting that they must be pursued in compliance with the law laid down by the founding Treaty. The Assembly, only too aware of the limits of its powers, can only

abide by the principle that a government is bound by the international agreements ratified by the national parliament from which it draws its members. It does not seek to erect these 50-year old texts as barriers to the ongoing development of Europe. Rather, it seeks to recall, not without justification, that there can be no true progress for Europe unless such progress is firmly anchored in law.

If the Assembly was able to render the organisation the services acknowledged by the former Secretary-General, by urging governments to take what often proved to be successful initiatives, it owes this to the independence it has always maintained with respect to those governments and even on occasion to the casual attitude it has shown to their representatives, as well as to the rigorous approach with which its members, in particular its rapporteurs, have tackled the subjects entrusted to them. A parliamentary Assembly content merely to echo the views of the Council, as indeed the Council has sometimes suggested it should do, would betray its goals and soon lose its authority.

For an international organisation composed of member countries with a long-standing democratic tradition, the tension between the Assembly and Council is only natural. Indeed, in the case of WEU it seems even to have been beneficial both to the organisation and to Europe. Such tension always arises in policy areas in which the Assembly considers that it has not only a right but also a duty to convey constructive criticism rather than facile approval to the Council.

Willem van Eekelen provides a lively and precise account of the period of his direct involvement in WEU activities, not only making an important contribution to historical research but also shedding valuable light on the issues confronting us today and in the future and on the ways to tackle them. Indeed, in spite of the changes in Europe, the issues and the solutions available to WEU for dealing with them remain very much the same. This is clear from the difficulties encountered by the Fifteen in Amsterdam, which show that problems for which no solution can be found in WEU are even more difficult to solve in a European Union framework.

The major feature of this book is clearly the detailed description of the WEU Secretary-General's relations with the representatives of the member countries. Few secretaries-general have shown such ability to blend their personal views with such concern for an accurate account of the facts. Willem van Eekelen performs a remarkable analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of member states' foreign policy and provides us with particularly valuable insight into the sometimes thankless, but immeasurably important task of a Secretary-General armed with an impeccable code of ethics, considerable political experience and great strength of character and of purpose.

The public at large, and the Assembly in particular, therefore have much to learn from a careful study of this book, and I consider it a privilege to have been asked to write the foreword.

Preface

For fifty years, the debate on European security has been dominated by the question of how the US could be kept involved in collective defence and what the Europeans should do themselves. When I was a member of the Netherlands delegation to NATO in the late 1960s and made responsible for nuclear planning, Ambassador Boon gave me *Le Grand Débat* by Raymond Aron to read. That was a debate about extended deterrence and the reliability of the American nuclear guarantee. After the end of the Cold War, collective defence no longer presented the overriding priority in national and transatlantic policies and the debate shifted towards the maintenance and restoration of peace and security outside our territory. Yet, again it was a question of who would do what in a fair sharing of responsibilities and force contributions.

This book traces the history of the debate since 1948 when the Brussels Treaty was concluded as a demonstration of European willingness to work together. Without it, domestic support in the US for the continuation of the Marshall Plan would have been more difficult. In 1949, NATO was created, associating the US directly with the defence of Europe, albeit in a less binding form than the Brussels Treaty. In 1954, after the failure of the European Defence Community, that treaty was modified to include Germany and Italy and to make German rearmament possible. Under the new name of Western European Union, Britain undertook the commitment of keeping four divisions and a tactical air force on the Rhine. That modification was the first time the Brussels Treaty was used as a reserve organisation, able to do things that nobody else was capable of undertaking. Other instances were to follow: WEU was a go-between for the European Community and the UK before the French veto on membership was lifted; it became a forum of politico-military cooperation in the 1980s when the European Political Cooperation had to content itself with the political and economic aspects of security; it organised European contributions during two Gulf crises when NATO was not able to move out-of-area; and finally it became a triple actor in the Yugoslav crisis - in the Adriatic, on the Danube and in Mostar.

Debating European Security sketches the arguments advanced after the fall of the Berlin Wall made all of us reassess the body of conventional wisdom amassed in the post-war period. My term-of-office as Secretary-

General started on 15 May 1989, a few months before the upheaval commenced. I was privileged to chair many brainstorming discussions and to help evolve a consensus on the role and place of WEU, which culminated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and was not substantially altered in Amsterdam in 1997. My book is partly a memoir of that period, with some very personal experiences of its ups and downs, telling what I tried to accomplish, where I succeeded and - more often - where I failed. The story also tells how national positions changed in the course of our meetings. I was the last person to demand rigid adherence to previously held positions - one of my ambassadors had rejected consistency as "the bugaboo of small minds" - but I often was reminded of the Romanian negotiator in CSCE, saying "*il faut vouloir les conséquences de ce qu'on veut*" ("you also have to want the consequences of your objectives").

The other part of the book is the history, not only of WEU, but of the complex interrelationship between NATO, the European Union, WEU, OSCE and the United Nations. Their relations have been heavily influenced by the emergence of new instabilities after the period of Cold War polarisation. They are also affected by the quickening pace of enlargement of NATO and EU, which makes the objective of "security through participation" a reality. For the EU the extension of solidarity eastward will be its major contribution to stability and thereby to security. In this respect, I regard the differentiated membership of WEU - with full members, observers, associate members and associate partners - a major success. Some have criticised it as becoming unwieldy, but I believe it to be appropriate to the needs of our time. The problem of many ministers coming to attend relatively short meetings is real, but common to all expanding organisations. It calls for different procedures, but cannot be used as an argument against an inclusive approach. Only in this way would WEU be able to act as both the politico-military component of the EU and the European pillar of NATO and also anticipate their respective enlargements.

Even in a no-threat environment, collective defence should not be dismissed, certainly not as the eastern borders of the European Union are touching Russia, but hopefully the implementation of collective defence will remain a transatlantic interest. A complete actor as the EU aims to be, cannot forego the defence dimension, but it makes sense to shape it through contributing to NATO. A major theme of this book argues that Europe - for the time being through WEU - should organise its inputs into Alliance consultations. As long as these remain absent, neither the European security and defence identity (ESDI), nor the reforms of the Alliance will move beyond the level of gimmicks and symbolism.

The publication of this book coincides with the 50th anniversary of WEU on 17 March 1998. The narrative is up-to-date and includes the Treaty of Amsterdam and the enlargements decisions of NATO and EU. An alternative title could have been *From Brussels To Amsterdam*, but I rejected it because I did not want to give the impression of being in the travel-book

business. In general, my journey follows a chronological sequence in order to take account of the interaction between the different organisations, but several subjects are discussed thematically. Separate chapters or sections are devoted to the actions in the Gulf, space activities, the Yugoslav crisis, the genocide in Rwanda and the chaos in Albania. This applies also to defence equipment cooperation, a stark example of the "either too late or not yet ripe" syndrome.

I am grateful to all those who helped me raise the profile of WEU. In the first place to the small team at the Secretariat for their loyal support. In a remarkably short time, we managed to create a WEU Institute of Security Studies of high intellectual standing in Paris, a competent Satellite Centre in Torrejon and a dedicated Planning Cell in our Brussels headquarters. I have greatly enjoyed working with them. The same applies to the WEU Assembly in Paris. I have tried to improve the relations between the WEU Council and the Assembly. I did not always agree with the views expressed in the Assembly, but having been a member myself in 1981-82, I have always appreciated its role as the only parliamentary body mandated by a treaty to debate issues of defence and security, and doing so on the basis of reports of high quality. I am grateful to the successive presidents Charles Goerens, Robert Pontillon (who died in office), Hartmut Soell and Sir Dudley Smith for their understanding and support. I knew the incumbent President, Lluís Maria de Puig, as a dynamic president of the Political Committee of the Assembly and greatly appreciated his willingness to write a foreword to this book.

Among the persons who have assisted me in writing this book I want to thank John Roper, former director of the WEU Institute of Security Studies, for commenting on an earlier version of the book, Nigel Shaw from the WEU Linguists division, for correcting the manuscript, Anne Harrington of CEPS for getting the book ready for the printer, and my part-time assistant Hans van der Lee, for additional research and typesetting the text.

Willem van Eekelen
February 1998

Chapter One The Early Years

After the end of the Second World War, the process of European reconstruction had a very difficult start. German industry had been destroyed but the victorious Allies fared little better. Feeding undernourished populations received first priority, but even a country like Britain, which had not experienced occupation and famine, still maintained food rationing in 1953. On the political side, the picture was almost equally bleak. The spirit of national cohesion against a common enemy rapidly faltered, old dividing lines reappeared and there was a real danger that the economic malaise would breed political discontent. Left-wing movements were gaining ground, especially in France and Italy, benefiting from the impressive role of the Soviet Union in defeating Germany, which softened the unattractive authoritarian features of the regime in Moscow. In those days the threat to Western democracy did not come from the outside, but from internal developments.

US Secretary of State George Marshall had the extraordinary perspicacity to assess correctly the nature of the problem, but also to propose a remedy which in scope and generosity has never been equalled. Of course, a free and democratic Europe also constituted an American interest, but the extent to which the United States was prepared to transfer resources to achieve its objectives was unprecedented. Its methods, too, were most original: American goods were made available and the proceeds of their sale in local currency could be spent on reconstruction, thus serving a double purpose. Secondly, the Europeans themselves had to play a major role in dividing the aid and monitoring progress, which led to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, the present OECD.

Marshall launched his plan in an address at Harvard University on 5 June 1947. To him it was also a last attempt to counter a permanent division of Europe. The Central European countries were included in his original design, but Moscow would not allow them to join. East-West relations had deteriorated constantly since the end of the Second World War, bringing Winston Churchill - then in opposition - to coin the phrase "Iron Curtain" in his speech at Fulton on 5 March 1946. On that occasion, he had appealed to the English-speaking peoples to erect a dam against Soviet ambitions. A year later, in April 1947, the failure of the Moscow conference to reach a peace treaty with Germany made the rupture among the former

Allies virtually irreversible. The universalist approach, founded on the United Nations to maintain peace and security, would give way to regional arrangements for collective defence.

Marshall operated with an extraordinary team. They were all brilliant. Dean Acheson as his deputy and later successor when Marshall moved to the Pentagon. Robert Lovett for political affairs, George Kennan at the planning staff and Charles Bohlen as the principal advisor on Soviet affairs. Marshall's address¹ was soft-spoken without rhetoric, but had an immediate impact in Europe, where Foreign Secretary Bevin was galvanised into action. Together with Bidault, his French colleague, he organised a meeting with Molotov in Paris, and after the negative Soviet reaction issued invitations to 22 countries, omitting Spain, but including Turkey. Washington left as much as possible of the preparation to the Europeans, because it was facing an uphill struggle to persuade Congress of the necessity to make a \$17 billion commitment over four years. A first hurdle was passed in December 1947, when Congress approved \$522 million to cover pressing needs in Italy, France and Austria until the end of March of the following year. President Truman started to refer to the project as the Marshall Plan, realising that in an election year with a Republican majority in Congress a plan carrying his own name would stand little chance. Marshall managed to establish a bi-partisan approach with Senator Vandenberg from Michigan, who was abandoning his former isolationist attitudes.

The US did not participate in the preparatory meetings in Paris, but was, of course, continually informed. The only points they wanted to impress, particularly on a reluctant France, was that Germany should be included in the recovery programme and that the Europeans listed projects that were likely to obtain Congressional support. Bevin, for his part, pointed out to Marshall that Western European countries needed reassurance on defence as well, if they were to have the confidence needed to make full use of American aid. The two agreed in November 1947 that Bevin would build up all he could in terms of Western European cooperation and then turn to Washington to show that this was not enough, but nevertheless a good basis for US commitments. That would be the only chance to convince a sceptical Congress that the traditional policy of avoiding alliance obligations in peacetime should be changed. Signs of European willingness to work together also were essential to obtain approval of the recovery programme.

In a speech to the House of Commons on 22 January 1948, Bevin said that the power politics of the Soviet Union required the progressive development of a "Western Union". As a first step, he argued that France and the UK, which in 1947 had already signed the Dunkirk Treaty between them, should conclude bilateral treaties with the Benelux countries as well, which later on could be extended to Italy. The Benelux governments, which while in exile in London in 1943 had drafted their economic union, took up the suggestion immediately and prepared a joint position which would

have great impact on the Anglo-French proposals and gave them a new direction. In the first place, they wanted an organisational framework instead of bilateral treaties. Secondly, at the initiative of Spaak, the economic dimension should be included, and finally the anti-German bias of the Dunkirk Treaty should be turned into an alliance *erga omnes*, particularly against Soviet expansionism. In his memoirs, Spaak recalls how Bevin - after making his courageous speech in the House of Commons, calling for the consolidation of Western Europe against the Soviet threat - almost shied away from the consequences.² During the negotiations he stated that nothing should be done to disquiet the USSR and therefore a reference to a possible German danger would be indispensable. His French colleague, Bidault, also had his moments of hesitation and feared a military response by Stalin to the European initiative. At first, France and the UK were not pleased with the Benelux reaction, but the communist coup in Prague of 22 February gave them the opportunity to embrace a multilateral framework without any loss of face. The US had greeted the Benelux proposals with enthusiasm. Negotiations started on 4 March 1948 in Brussels. The Benelux countries were united in a single delegation, sometimes referred to as "Spaakistan", prompted by the newly independent state of Pakistan. Their proposals were accepted by Britain and France, but the name "Western European Union" was rejected. Equally, the two larger countries wanted to maintain the mention of Germany as a possible threat. Conversely, the Benelux obtained restriction of military assistance to aggression against the territory of the member states in Europe; in the light of later developments it is interesting to note that they used the Falklands as an example of a conflict they would not want to be involved in.

The new treaty, signed on 17 March 1948, was short in length - only ten articles - but was wide in scope, covering political, economic and security issues. Its Article IV, later to become Article V, stated the principle that an attack on one would constitute an attack on all and contained an automatic military assistance clause. The treaty had a certain anti-German bias, but the collective defence article had general application.³ Washington was happy with the outcome. Only two weeks later, Marshall started discussions with Senators Vandenberg and Connally about ways to contribute to European security. Originally, Bevin had thought of extending the Brussels Treaty to the US, but by March advocated a regional Atlantic Approaches pact of mutual assistance under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.⁴ Tripartite meetings were held in Washington which included Canada.

At the outset, it was far from certain that a North Atlantic security system would emerge. Canada thought of including the Commonwealth members and Dean Rusk's Office of United Nations Affairs was in favour of a treaty with selected countries, but not necessarily on a regional basis. It seems that US officials originally favoured accession to the Brussels Treaty, but that Lester Pearson strongly objected: he saw no more reason for

Canada to do so than for Brazil or Australia. Having dropped the possibility, the US participants wondered whether a presidential declaration of support for Western European security under Article 51 of the UN Charter would not be sufficient, probably supported by a Senate resolution. Lovett, Bohlen and Kennan were not in favour of a treaty, partly because they doubted ratification by the Senate, partly because it would unnecessarily offend the Soviet Union. However, the argument against a unilateral US statement was the need for reciprocity in security commitments.⁵ On 11 June 1948, the Vandenberg Resolution was passed in the Senate, allowing the US to pursue the progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence, but also defining the limits of American commitments:

The association of the US with such arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid and as affect its national security.

In line with previous policy, going back to the Monroe Doctrine, it would not be acceptable to engage in automatic commitments to participate in foreign wars. In any case, the Senate wanted to preserve the right to declare war, which made it impossible to repeat the commitment of the Brussels Treaty in a transatlantic context. On 6 July, the US started negotiations with the ambassadors of the Brussels Five plus Canada, which received considerable momentum from the Soviet blockade of Berlin. Traffic over land between the West and Berlin had been partially interrupted since 1 April and became completely impossible by the end of June. The discussions produced a positive report in early September, but the subsequent negotiations dragged on, particularly because the French ambassador raised many points which were regarded as less than helpful by his colleagues.⁶ When the draft treaty was nearly completed, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Norway were invited on 16 March 1949 to accede to the treaty. They accepted and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty took place in Washington on 4 April 1949. The NATO version of Article V contained an element of discretion in agreeing, in case of armed attack, to take forthwith "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force". That was a disappointment for the negotiators, because it was not only weaker than the Brussels Treaty but also less than the Rio Treaty on Inter-American Mutual Assistance of 25 September 1947, in which each of the American states undertook "to assist in meeting the attack" in the exercise of the right of self-defence; there a decision whether an armed attack had occurred was made by a two-thirds majority of the members. Consultations between the State Department and the Senate had shown that stronger language would not be carried. In spite of the close link between the genesis of the two treaties, there was no reference in the Washington Treaty to the Brussels Treaty.

The NATO Treaty also covered a wider area than a military pact and in its Article 2 included undertakings on consultation, on democracy, on promoting conditions of stability and well-being and on economic collaboration. Acheson was wary of Senators "who were fed up with treaties for the improvement of the general welfare", but Canada prevailed.⁷

Originally, the Alliance did not envisage the creation of an integrated military structure. That came later as an effect of the Korean War, which had demonstrated the concrete possibility of communist aggression. For a short while, the Brussels Treaty moved ahead of NATO by creating a Western Union with an international command called Uniforce in Fontainebleau. On 30 April 1948, the five ministers of defence meeting in London had created a permanent military committee under the authority of the consultative council. While the British Prime Minister Attlee hesitated in taking on commitments on the continent, Bevin and, after some earlier reluctance, Field Marshall Montgomery took a positive attitude. Again American perceptions played a big role in their argumentation: Washington was concerned about the lack of European decisiveness in organising its own defence. Overcoming French reticence by Montgomery's proposal to base the command structure on the experience from the world war, three Allied commands were created on 4 October 1948: one for the land forces under General De Lattre de Tassigny; one for the air forces under Air Marshall Robb; and a third at a lower level for the navies under Admiral Jaujard. The French admiral was not allowed the title of Commander-in-Chief, but was called "Flag Officer Western Union". The objection came from Defence Minister Ramadier, who argued that the mission of navies raised issues beyond the Brussels Treaty. The British readily agreed. They were determined to restrict the authority of the new organisation. There should be no question of it giving instructions to member countries. Therefore, London preferred (sub)committees of national delegates to an international secretariat. For a while, there was talk of giving the supreme command to a US officer and General Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intimated that General Lucius Clay, the US military governor in Germany, would be available if asked. Politically, Washington was not enthusiastic to take on formal commitments and the matter was not pursued.

Montgomery reluctantly accepted the job of Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee.⁸ It was not an easy one. The Field Marshall wanted commands that had authority over their forces both in peace and war. The French general was not keen to develop a defence organisation under British leadership and argued that the chairman's role should only be a coordinating one. Moreover, Montgomery felt that the geographic area of the five participating states would be too limited to be effective. The best he could do was to develop a plan for a defensive line along the IJssel river in the Netherlands and down the Rhine to the French Alps, requiring some 34 divisions within three days and more to follow. Apparently the French Foreign Ministry was more positive about the Brussels Treaty as it wanted

to bind the UK into commitments for the defence of the continent,⁹ with the frontline as far eastward as possible, i.e. in Germany. Apart from the air force the French military had a preference for an Atlantic framework. The worsening of East-West relations made the insufficiency of European capabilities even more apparent. The Brussels five would hardly be able to mobilise ten divisions against continuously growing Soviet capabilities, including some 170 divisions. After the establishment of NATO, the need to continue the Brussels arrangements was not apparent to all participants. On 5 September 1950, the five ministers of foreign affairs decided to examine the possibility of merging the two treaties, but their study was overtaken by other events.

The first Soviet nuclear test in 1949 ended the short period of exclusive protection under the American nuclear umbrella and accelerated the drive for larger European conventional capabilities. President Truman had approved the dispatch of American reinforcements, but on condition that the Europeans themselves would do more. Without German participation this would be impossible and as early as 26 September 1950, the Allies agreed that Germany could contribute to the defence of Western Europe. International events, particularly the outbreak of the Korean War, resulting in a new perception of the Soviet threat, produced this turnaround. The Potsdam agreements had foreseen an indefinite demilitarisation of Germany and the signatories to the Treaty of Washington establishing NATO equally had implicitly excluded German rearmament. The question remained particularly sensitive to France, but thanks to the vision of Jean Monnet and the political courage of Robert Schuman this old problem was resolved by putting it into a new context. On 9 May 1950, Schuman proposed to integrate the industries most relevant to a military-industrial base in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The aim was that, by making it impossible to prepare for, war between Germany and France would never happen again. France accepted German rearmament on condition that it would be properly controlled. The ECSC materialised within a year with a treaty signed in Paris on 18 April 1951.

On the military side, France drafted the Pleven Plan for a unified European army, taking up a resolution introduced by Winston Churchill in the Council of Europe on 11 August 1950, calling for the immediate creation of a unified European army under democratic control. The plan responded to the US appeal a month later to consider German rearmament, but put it in the European context. Paris was pressing the US to move the line of defence against the Soviet Union as far eastward as possible, somewhere between the Rhine and the Elbe. Washington took the position that it could not be expected to defend European, particularly German, territory without the help of Germany. France was in a quandary, because German rearmament was unpopular at home. On the other hand, European integration had widespread support. Therefore, a European army might do the trick.¹⁰ Like the High Authority of the ECSC, the European Defence

Community (EDC) would have an executive commission with supranational authority. At first, building on an idea Churchill had included in his Strasbourg speech to have a European army under the authority of a European minister of defence, France had proposed a single commissioner. In the declaration of 24 October 1950 launching his plan, Pleven talked about a European minister of defence, responsible to a Council of Ministers and a common Assembly and disposing of a common budget. National units would be at the smallest possible level, an imprecision that would give rise to much debate within the French cabinet later. Equally, Pleven dropped the notion of a common uniform from the text suggested by Monnet.¹¹ In the end, agreement was reached on a board of nine commissioners without specific portfolios. Final authority came to rest with the Council of Ministers deciding by qualified majority.¹²

The original French draft had envisaged an assembly which would take over some of the competences of national parliaments. Belgium resisted because the Assembly would not be elected directly. The Italian leader De Gasperi, a keen partisan of a European Political Union with a common foreign policy and an elected parliament, persuaded Schuman that for the time being the Assembly should be the same as the ECSC Assembly with three additional members for each of the three large countries.¹³ Much discussion focused on the size of the German contribution and on the level at which national units would be integrated. Within the French government, opinions differed. Schuman obviously was in favour but wanted to create the ECSC before the EDC. His socialist colleague at Defence, Jules Moch, a veteran of two wars, was basically opposed, but made some tactical moves. In Washington, Marshall was more in favour of German combat teams, which could be organised more quickly, and opposed the creation of a European minister of defence. In Germany, Adenauer was very firm in rejecting rearmament in the form of national forces that were not part of a European army. When General Eisenhower was appointed SACEUR, he rallied to the idea of a European army in which there would not be a separate German component. In the final version of the EDC, national units would be at brigade level.

The need for German rearmament was highlighted by NATO's attempt to quantify its military requirements. A committee of three wise men - Harriman, Monnet and Plowden - recommended 100 divisions. The NATO ministers did not think this feasible and scaled down the force goal to 50 and 4,000 aircraft at their Lisbon meeting in February 1952. Ever since, the Alliance would be troubled by American complaints of Europe not doing enough for the common defence. These altercations became more serious as it transpired that even the lower goal was too ambitious. In fact, the number of ground forces committed to the defence of Europe would never exceed 24 divisions, including the US contribution. Another interesting feature of these early days was the good cooperation with France. Monnet's vision of European integration did not blur his assessment of the need to

involve the US in European security.

Ultimately, the proposed European Defence Community ran aground in the French parliament. Some still regret its demise, but with the benefit of hindsight one wonders whether it could have worked. Constructing a defence dimension without a political union seemed premature. Moreover, it contained an element of discrimination against Germany, which could not last. Germany would be a member of the EDC and the EDC would belong to NATO, but the other participants would also be members of NATO individually, while Germany would not. In the end, the original Acheson plan to admit Germany as a full member to NATO was accepted and the control of German rearmament was arranged through the Modified Brussels Treaty, which led to the creation of the Western European Union (WEU).



Chancellor Adenauer takes the German seat at the North Atlantic Council in 1955. (Photo: NATO)

In his memoirs, Sir Anthony Eden claimed that the idea to create WEU came to him in his bath, but the thought might not have been that original. Sir Frank Roberts recalled sending the Foreign Secretary a memorandum to the same effect some time before. The minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 27 August 1954 - several days before the French parliament voted to take the EDC off its agenda - also contain a suggestion by the then Housing Minister Harold MacMillan, to bring Germany into the Brussels Treaty.¹⁴ In any case, the brainwave in the bath, secondary or not, was brilliant. Britain, which had not participated in the EDC project, was rejoining European

defence and was even prepared to substantially increase the size of its army on the Rhine to four divisions and a tactical air force which would not be reduced against the wishes of the majority of the member countries. An early case of majority voting! With this commitment, France was ready to accept German membership of NATO. Germany and Italy were invited to join WEU. In NATO, no member state would be subjected to any controls. The Brussels Treaty was modified by taking out the reference to the case of a renewed German aggressive policy and replacing it by the objective to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. A new Article IV stated that in order to avoid any duplication with NATO commands, the Council and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, would ask the appropriate military authorities in NATO for any information and advice on military operations. In addition, the treaty created an Assembly, still the only one competent to discuss defence questions, and authorised the Council of Ministers to create subsidiary bodies. The latter provision was the basis for the establishment of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), to promote defence equipment cooperation. ACA was important in organising the inspection of force levels in a non-discriminatory manner. Its inspectors went to all member countries to see whether they did not exceed their reported strength, and in doing so for the Federal Republic of Germany automatically took the specific limitations on its armaments and the renunciation of the production of atomic, biological and chemical weapons into account.

The inspections assumed a somewhat surrealistic character because effectively most nations possessed fewer forces than they had reported and the Alliance would have been very glad if they had more. Nevertheless, experience with the techniques of inspection proved valuable in drafting the verification provisions of later arms control agreements. When I arrived at WEU the ACA had dwindled to a single Belgian officer conducting four inspections a year in German industry to verify the ban on the production of chemical weapons. After the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, these controls became completely redundant and the Permanent Council dissolved the ACA on 11 November 1997.

The Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty was signed in Paris on 23 October 1954. It was the cornerstone of a set of protocols and resolutions known as the Paris Agreements, which entered into force on 6 May 1955. Two months earlier in a message to the WEU governments dated 10 March 1955, President Eisenhower had confirmed the US commitment as follows:

To continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and

will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area.

In operational terms, WEU did not take off. Its military function was pursued in NATO, its social aspects absorbed in the Council of Europe and any economic ambitions transferred to the process of European integration, culminating in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. It was fair to describe WEU as a reserve organisation, available when needed because other arrangements were inadequate, but never in the foreground. It played a major role in making German rearmament palatable to all concerned, but receded into the background as soon as the necessary arrangements were made. It supervised the referendum in the Saar region, but the possibility of administering this region as a European district evaporated when its population voted to join Germany in 1955.

Political consultations did not amount to much, which became painfully apparent when France and the UK launched the Suez operation in 1956 without informing their WEU partners. The provision of Article VIII of the Treaty that member states could concert their policies in any situation remained a dead letter. A new opportunity for revival presented itself when President De Gaulle vetoed UK accession to the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1960, the Italian President of the WEU Assembly, Badini Confalonieri, had already suggested to make WEU the link between the EEC Six and Britain. This was done, but the meetings remained of an informative character, never becoming a venue for negotiation on points previously decided by the Six. After the French veto, their importance increased and the Council met quarterly at ministerial level, adding a day for economic issues. After the second failure of the British application, France insisted that the Council would revert to purely consultative meetings. When the UK entered the EEC in 1973, joining the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) a few months earlier, separate consultations in WEU lost any significance.

It would take until 1984 before revitalisation would become a serious issue. Again, the reason was the failure of a wider proposal. Foreign Ministers Genscher and Colombo had taken the initiative to extend the EPC to the field of security. Within the EEC, Denmark, Ireland and Greece, albeit for different reasons, were not prepared to go along and as a result the solemn Declaration of Stuttgart in 1983 did not go beyond the statement that the Ten would discuss the political and economic aspects of security, omitting the military ones. The seven member states of WEU did not reject the idea, although the enthusiasm of some of them was limited, to use a British understatement. As long as the Cold War continued, defence discussions outside NATO could become divisive, certainly as long as France maintained a negative position with regard to NATO's military integration and strategy of flexible response. Nevertheless, all agreed to discuss a new role for WEU at a meeting in Rome organised to celebrate the

30th anniversary of the Paris Treaties of 1954. At a German suggestion, the ministers of defence were invited to join their foreign affairs colleagues. Their joint presence would soon become one of the important features of WEU sessions. In an attempt to make WEU more effective, ministers agreed to meet more frequently and to reorganise the two existing agencies. At their next session in Bonn, three new agencies were created: one to study arms control and disarmament, one for armaments cooperation and one to study security and defence questions in general. A year later, in Venice, ministers decided to task the Permanent Council with a study to strengthen cooperation among the existing national institutes in the field of security and defence.

Unfortunately, this approach proved ill-fated. The mandates for the new agencies were insufficiently clear, too many staff members were taken over from the previous ACA and SAC and the Council took insufficient interest in their work. Nobody was impressed by the activities and in the end, the UK provoked a crisis by withholding its agreement to renew the contracts of the principal officers and showed its determination by allowing the contract of its own director of one of the agencies to lapse.

In 1987, the Netherlands Presidency managed to produce better results in two directions. Based on work during the previous Luxembourg presidency, they produced the Platform on European Security Interests, known as the "Hague Platform". In it, the members recognised the need for a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons, the continued presence of American forces in Europe and the defence of member countries at their borders. The fact that France agreed to these formulations provided both an important signal to the US and an alternative wording for the concept of Forward Defence employed in NATO. On the political side, the Platform was important for stating that European unification would not be complete as long as it did not contain a defence element. This phrase, accepted by London, would be an important argument in the later debate when the UK was taking a different approach.

The second development was the decision to coordinate the mine-clearance operation in the Persian Gulf during the war between Iran and Iraq, which will be discussed in the chapter on the Kuwait crisis.

Notes

1. Fully reproduced in Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Statesman 1945-1959*, Viking, New York, 1987.
2. Paul-Henri Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, Fayard, Paris, 1969, Vol. I, pp. 253-259. My account of the negotiations for the Brussels Treaty and the European Defence Community has drawn on "La Belgique et les efforts pour l'intégration militaire de l'Europe occidentale 1945-1955", an article authored by Prof. Dr. Luc de Vos, in *De Brialmont à l'Union de l'Europe occidentale*, Travaux du Centre d'histoire militaire, No. 22, 1988.
3. Escott Reid believed that this clause was adapted from the Anglo-Polish treaty of August 1939, which read "the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power". See *Time of Hope and Fear. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949*, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1977, p. 144.
4. Pogue, op. cit., p. 320. An aide-mémoire was presented on 11 March.
5. Reid, op. cit., p. 102 ff. A very readable and more recent account of the creation of NATO is *Forging the Alliance*, authored by Don Cook, Arbor House, New York, 1989.
6. Reid, op. cit., p. 114.
7. Reid, op. cit., p. 142. Reid himself thought that the non-military provisions should be even more extensive than in the Brussels Treaty, including burden-sharing and recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over justiciable disputes among the members (p. 137).
8. See Douglas L. Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance. A Study of Structure and Strategy*, Praeger, New York, 1991, pp. 106-107. His book contains an interesting chapter on the Western Union called "Defence by Committee", followed by an analysis of the tripartite NATO Standing Group in Washington entitled "A Structural Failure".
9. Patrice van Ackere, "l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale", *Que Sais-Je?*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, p. 23.
10. Guy de Carmoy, *Fortune de l'Europe*, Paris, 1953, p. 282. The story of the EDC has been told by Major-General Edward Fursdon in *The European Defence Community, a History*, MacMillan, London, 1980.
11. Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, Livre de Poche, 1976, Vol. 2, pp. 511-512.

12. The three large countries would get three votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands two each and Luxembourg one. The qualified majority for decisions including directives to national governments would be nine votes out of fourteen.
13. Monnet, op. cit., p. 565.
14. Sir Anthony Eden, *Full Circle. The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden*, Cassell, London, 1960, p. 151. In his book *Dealing with Dictators*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1991, p. 158, Sir Frank Roberts wrote that with Sir Christopher Steel, then ambassador in Paris, he developed a fallback position to the EDC. This was almost identical to the solution found in 1954, but was kept secret lest it might seem intended to undermine the Pleven Plan. I am indebted to Sally Rohan of the University of Wolverhampton for the reference to MacMillan in CAB 128/27 C.C. 57 (54), Public Records Office London. He "suggested that a NATO solution might be made more palatable both to French opinion and to the Labour Party in this country if, for this purpose, NATO could be made at least to appear to have been modified in the direction of the European idea. Was it possible for example, for Germany formally to adhere to the Brussels Treaty which continued to subsist within the North Atlantic Treaty."

Chapter Two

Arrival at WEU

In the spring of 1989, the outlook for WEU was not encouraging. The ministerial session in April had produced little results except for the invitation to Portugal and Spain to join the organisation. Things proceeded at a leisurely pace. The Permanent Council met every other week. The Special Working Group, where Foreign Affairs officials took the lead, and the Defence Representatives Group not more than once a month. To strengthen the link with capitals an Enlarged Council had been created, which met shortly before a ministerial session: each delegation was composed of the Political Director and a senior Defence official next to the Permanent Representative. Deadlock prevailed about the future of the agencies in Paris. France wanted their continuation, but the UK regarded them as useless. The time did not yet seem ripe to replace the agencies by a research institute, a solution advanced by the Assembly. The outgoing Secretary-General, Alfred Cahen, could point to the drafting of the Hague Platform and the mine-clearance operation in the Gulf, both in 1987, but his various initiatives to make WEU more substantial met with little success. His name continued to be associated with the Cahen Doctrine, postulating that WEU could only admit new members that belonged to both the European Community (EC) and NATO and were willing to engage in deeper defence cooperation. The doctrine was never formally adopted, but in practice continued to govern the decisions in subsequent enlargements. Cahen also left me innumerable anecdotes about public ignorance concerning WEU, such as it being confused with a telegraph company or - as in the case of the ribbon on the wreath for his predecessor Longerstaey - written *l'Union de Europe Accidentale*.

Sounding out the participating countries, France was the biggest proponent of WEU. Its governments had on different occasions made suggestions to revitalise the organisation and the idea of a charter - later platform - on European security interests emanated from Prime Minister Chirac during the first "cohabitation". In 1973, Foreign Minister Jobert had tried something similar with clear anti-American overtones. French enthusiasm, however, raised opposite concerns in the UK and the Netherlands, suspicious of French intentions to erode NATO. Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg were consistent in their pursuit of European integration which would require a defence component. Germany supported this view intellectually, but did little to bring it about. Obviously, it was preoccupied with events in Eastern Europe, but it also saw little scope for German

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participation in operations outside the NATO treaty area. During the Iran-Iraq war, Bonn did not join the mine-clearance operation and had to limit itself to the despatch of some ships to the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby freeing units from other partners to go to the Gulf. My friend and former colleague in the diplomatic service, Otto von der Gablentz, then German Ambassador to the Netherlands, summed up the situation soberly. His country regarded WEU as a talking shop, not useless but without a great future. Becoming Secretary-General could bring some intellectual satisfaction but little operational impact. Equally, Manfred Wörner, whom I had learned to appreciate when we were both Minister of Defence, saw little scope for WEU and would have preferred me to become Permanent Representative to NATO. That post, however, was not offered to me, nor the soon-to-become-vacant post of Ambassador to Washington. Minister Van den Broek had asked me to become a candidate for the WEU post and did not offer alternatives, nor did I ask. The prospect of being away from the Netherlands after twelve years in Dutch politics, ending with my resignation as Minister of Defence over the ill-fated passport issue, was appealing and I was prepared to try to make the best of it. If things turned out to be a great disappointment, I told Van den Broek, I would reserve the option of quitting after three years.

I arrived in London on 15 May 1989, scarcely three weeks before Solidarity triumphed in the Polish general elections and brought democracy back to the centre of Europe. Change was becoming irresistible. My first task was to bring a new focus to the activities, both substantially and institutionally. On substance, I felt that the WEU discussions, out of the limelight of any publicity, would lend themselves best to medium-term issues. NATO concentrated more on the short-term and had little time for the longer range, except in the periodic brainstorming sessions of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group. NATO also suffered from the difficulty of organising a common reflection which was not the subject of a drafting exercise in which national views rapidly became formal positions.

In WEU, the Special Working Group (SWG), bringing together heads of department from capitals and meeting on a monthly basis would be an excellent forum for a discussion of the European security agenda after the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). John Goulden, the UK representative, grasped the opportunity to end the UK Presidency with a substantial new endeavour which would not compromise NATO and would deal with questions that sooner or later would have to be addressed. What should our attitude be once CFE had established rough parity between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) in the categories of armaments with the clearest offensive characteristics: tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and possibly aircraft and helicopters? Should parity be followed by deeper cuts? Would there be a minimum beyond which a coherent Western defence would no longer be possible? What qualitative elements should be limited? How to deal with the

permanent asymmetries in the geographical situation between East and West and, in particular, how could the force generation capabilities of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation be regulated?

The conferences and seminars I had attended prior to taking office had demonstrated a considerable divergence of views among the Allies. As Minister of Defence, I had advocated a conceptual study and had supported the German proposal for a *Gesamtkonzept*, but was not impressed by the progress made. After the Reykjavik summit, confusion reigned, as many felt that President Reagan had come very close to demolishing the foundation of deterrence at the very moment that NATO seemed to have got its act together. On conventional forces, Washington judged the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) experience by and large as negative and remained sceptical as to the possibility of deep cuts. France had always opposed MBFR, partly because NATO would have to break out of any agreement as soon as the situation demanded the despatch of US reinforcements across the Atlantic. French concerns centred around the need for a global concept of arms control, including confidence-building measures and the importance of deep reductions. In addition, they argued that parity did not equal stability and that no moral equivalence should be given to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.¹⁵ While the Americans emphasised the priority of survivable missiles, the Germans concentrated on eliminating Soviet capabilities to launch a Blitzkrieg and thought it more important to justify nuclear deterrence in general than defending short-range nuclear forces (SNF) in particular.

By the end of 1989, the NATO discussion on a Comprehensive Concept was still stuck on the German wish to include a negotiation proposal for equal ceilings in SNF. While Germany was stressing that this would not represent a proposal for a third zero option, most of the other Allies feared that it would be very hard to prevent it from becoming one in the course of negotiations. On conventional forces, Germany had drawn three lessons from MBFR: it did not make sense to proceed without French participation; personnel did not represent an adequate criterion to limit Soviet offensive capabilities; and the zone of reductions should be wider than the two Germanies, Benelux, Poland and Czechoslovakia. All three points were taken care of in the Conventional Stability Talks (CST) which had succeeded MBFR in March 1989 and resulted in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, signed in Paris.

A breakthrough came when Moscow was prepared first to consider the principle of parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and later to concentrate on five categories of armaments which were most important in offensive operations. For a while, Moscow insisted that there was a balance of asymmetries and admitted only a superiority in tanks, but ultimately had to admit that the West suffered the biggest asymmetry of all in the form of the Atlantic Ocean restraining rapid reinforcements.

Nevertheless, it was not easy to get the study organised. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the UK Foreign Secretary, with whom I had worked together on the Single Act of Luxembourg, received me within ten days of my arrival in London and showed himself cautiously positive. He asked Goulden whether such a study would not be too academic. The reply was that he would have thought so six months ago, but no longer as CFE results seemed to be within reach. A medium-term study fitted in with Howe's description of WEU as a "ginger group", coming up with new ideas but not necessarily having to implement them. I remarked that no international organisation could live by ginger alone, but was happy with the green light. Equally, at a meeting in Brussels to prepare for the forthcoming Belgian Presidency, the Belgian and Netherlands representatives supported the proposal. At the next meeting of the SWG, the Italian delegate criticised most of the assumptions suggested in a UK paper but acquiesced after my appeal to focus on the objective and less on supporting arguments. Germany had sent a negative telegram questioning the utility of studying problems which should be decided only in the light of overall security developments in the 1990s, but was positive during the meeting and the French accepted the British paper as a good summary of the relevant issues.

In those days, two notions emerged during the discussions at various conferences: stability and defensive defence. I was never very keen on the word stability, because nobody was able to give me a precise definition. It reminded me of the giraffe: an animal easy to recognise but difficult to describe. Even that metaphor did not fully apply because the ease of recognition applied to instability rather than stability. Certainly, stability could not mean that the status quo was immutable. Later on I came to emphasise the non-military aspects, such as the rule of law, progress towards pluralistic democracy, democratic control of the military, good-neighbourly relations and a market economy, which could best be promoted by enlargement of the European Union. In the military field stability could be applied to several force relationships: of standing forces, out-of-area and more generally to crisis stability. Basically, it was thought to mean that neither side had an incentive to attack and, conversely, confidence in the capacity of available defences to contain an aggressor. In strategic terms, stability would exist only at very low levels of nuclear arsenals holding around 3,000 warheads. On the conventional side, the problem focused on defensive deployments.

In Moscow, a major proponent of defensive defence was Andrei Kokoshin, later to become Deputy Minister of Defence under Grachev. I first met him in April 1989, at a conference at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the German think-tank at Ebenhausen near Munich. Stocky, self-assured, with a crew-cut and aware of Western thinking, he tailored his proposals with an eye to both the Soviet military and Western strategists. He had studied the Battle of Kursk, where the Soviet army managed to hold its defensive positions against Germany, and the campaign at Khalkin Gol in

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Manchuria against Japan. As a result, he thought it possible to design defensive structures strong enough to repel aggression but limited in their counter-offensive capabilities to the restoration of the status quo ante. Counterattack should be possible only at the tactical level. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) invited the two of us to address the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during its annual conference in Oslo in 1989. I kept my commitment after becoming Secretary-General, as it fitted in with my interest in adapting strategy to the expected parity at lower force-levels. A crucial point would be how to avoid new instabilities in the force relationship, especially as increased mobility could compensate for the lower density of forces and change the force-to-space ratio of the battle. Defensive defence made sense when large forces were deployed in close proximity to each other, but would be less significant in a dispersed situation at lower levels of forces.¹⁶

Kokoshin's introduction was less important on defensive defence than expected, but contained some other interesting points. He argued that the calculation of defensive needs and its density depended on the firepower of the other side. An aggressor calculated his ammunition needs to break through the subsequent defensive lines and massed his troops in such a way as to translate tactical gains into operational success. That sounded rather theoretical. More important was the possibility he saw for establishing minimum deterrence in Central Europe in which the West could keep some short-range nuclear forces. He mentioned a range of between 500 and 1,000 km and claimed that the Soviet Union had stopped the modernisation of its land-based missiles. My own view was that for deterrence some nuclear capability should be kept. For preserving that specific role of nuclear weapons it did not make much difference whether the threshold for their use was high or low. More importantly, with rough parity of conventional forces, there would be less need to contemplate early use. Kokoshin also stated that, in its restructuring programme, the Soviet army was developing a prototype of a machine-gun-artillery division, which was already used in Asia, but would also be deployed in Europe.

As always in an academic gathering, any statement is open to questioning. Thierry de Montbrial, the stimulating and often provocative director of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), remarked that most European wars had been fought with roughly equal forces. Europe was in a state of maximum uncertainty and no single scenario had any peak probability. The best criticism of defensive defence came later from General Naumann in an Enlarged Council meeting of WEU. He argued that a military profile is defensive if it is unable to seize foreign territory. Forces themselves can always be used either defensively or offensively, especially in a micro-situation. At the macro-level, other elements come into play such as the capability to conduct combined arms operations, integrating land and air forces with the corresponding capabilities for reconnaissance, command and control, electronic warfare and deep-strike assets. These result in the

ability to conduct surprise operations and sustain them logistically, but also in strategic mobility and the rapid generation of forces in a crisis. In Naumann's view, arms control primarily addressed the micro-level and paid insufficient attention to the transit points to the macro-level. Notions of reasonable sufficiency sounded wonderful, but required meticulous consideration. Otherwise the balance between forces and space would be affected and stability could turn into instability. In that context, doctrines should not be examined separately from structures and transparency should be applied as widely as possible, ranging from budgets to mobilisation procedures. He cautioned against the model Kokoshin had developed, of a 50-km zone of thinned-out forces with mobile forces further backwards. This could put a premium on highly concentrated mobile forces and pre-emptive strikes leaving the defender no way of restoring the integrity of his own territory. To constrain those it would be important in future arms control negotiations to focus on force multipliers such as logistic arrangements, pipelines and mobile air defences which protected moving ground forces.

Analyses like these brought us back to earth, with our feet firmly on the ground. There was no enthusiasm for further deep cuts in the categories limited by CFE but rather a tendency to concentrate on the remaining military capabilities. My notes of that meeting read:

avoid stabilising alliances which no longer exist; get as many Soviet troops out of Central Europe as possible; maintain a freedom to mix for the West, allowing the US to effect the major part of the force reduction on the NATO side; keep the US in Europe in order to balance the Soviet Union.

1. The WEU Secretariat

In 1989, the size of the WEU Secretariat was amazingly small. The Secretary-General was assisted by a German deputy and an Italian head of the political division, who personally carried the title of Assistant Secretary-General (ASG). During my entire term of office, Ambassador Holthoff served as Deputy Secretary-General. Upon my arrival Franco de Stefanis was ASG, later to be succeeded by Paolo Casardi as Political Director without the title of ASG. The number four was a Briton, Diarmid Williams, who had moved up the ranks since 1965 and represented the institutional memory of the organisation. He headed the Council Secretariat which consisted of three committee secretaries: Béatrice Valleix from France, who dealt primarily with the bi-weekly Council meetings, Richard Tibbels for the Special Working Group (SWG) and Anthony Elford for the Defence Representatives Group (DRG), both from Britain. The Frenchman Arnaud Jacomet dealt with policy planning but in practice had his hands full with speechwriting and questions from the WEU Assembly. His written eloquence was a great help in drafting the information letters I frequently sent to the Assembly, giving

them more details than was possible in the formal papers subject to consensus among the WEU members. Press and Information was handled by Patrick Raes from Belgium and Administration and Personnel by former Dutch naval Captain Pieter Dierx, assisted by two finance officers and some administrative personnel. The small but very capable translation service was headed by Françoise Moore for French and Nigel Shaw for English.

We were housed in a prestigious, listed building on Grosvenor Place with poor sanitary facilities, dirty curtains and ragged furniture, which before the war had housed the Czechoslovak embassy. In fact, a documentary on the life of Benes was shot in the room of the Deputy Secretary-General. The main attraction of the building was a large ballroom-type chamber running along the entire width of the building, which was the regular meeting venue for the Council and its working groups. My own office on the second floor also served as the meeting place for confidential sessions restricted to ambassadors only. It overlooked the gardens of Buckingham Palace and my personal assistant occasionally reported sightings of the Queen's corgis.

Alfred Cahen had obtained the addition of the two British committee secretaries, but attempts at further enlargement met with negative responses from capitals. He had advised me to ask for a chef de cabinet to assist in my activities, but I had never been enamoured of the cabinet system, which we did not use in the Netherlands. As we were drawing down the Paris Agencies, however, financial objections could no longer be the determining factor. The UK delegation offered a management team to scrutinise my proposals for further enlargement, which I accepted. My staff was not enthusiastic about this survey, which was not repeated in the Paris Agencies nor in the Assembly, but I saw some merit in everyone having to justify his or her existence. The outcome was the approval of a junior officer in the policy planning section in the person of a very productive Luxembourger, Konrad Bruch, later succeeded by Stefan Müller. The functions of head of administration and of legal advisor were merged. The latter had been created in the past but had been left vacant in the dormant period of WEU. This combined function was performed by Franco Messineo, the only officer taken over from the Agencies. He replaced Captain Dierx upon his retirement.

Apart from this minimalistic addition, the survey was helpful in endorsing my views on making the organisation less vertical. My first remark on being introduced to my staff had been that there were too many chiefs and not enough Indians. The four most senior people seldom put pen to paper and all focused on the work of the committee secretaries coming up through the hierarchy. It seemed logical to separate the Council Secretariat from the Political Division, the former dealing with organisation and reporting and the latter primarily with substantial issues. Of course, in such a small organisation no division of labour should be rigid, but short lines of communication and instruction were needed to respond quickly. Moreover, it suited my habit to work directly with the action-officer on any given issue,

leaving to him the responsibility of informing his intermediate superiors. My experienced personal assistant, Mrs Danielle Eastwood, succeeded in Brussels by Mrs Marianne Gommans, managed to deal with the many appointments, visits and speaking engagements which I had to accept if WEU was to acquire a higher profile. I have been criticised for being away from the office a great deal, but I always kept in touch with my staff, which did not need lengthy instructions to know how to proceed. In any case, the function of public relations is an important task of any Secretary-General. Another is to take initiatives if he sees that if he does not do so, nobody else will. In this respect, my ministerial experience was a great advantage, for I knew most, if not all, of the members of the Ministerial Council personally before taking office. It helped that their staff knew that I could call their minister personally, even if I would do so only rarely.

A substantial increase of staff was only realised when Council and Secretariat moved to Brussels into a modern and well-equipped building. First a planning staff of some 40 military personnel moved in, later also a small secretariat of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the successor to the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). In the meantime, our own Secretariat gradually grew as well. A former German colonel, Peter Hesse, became head of the defence policy section. Robert de Meyier, a Dutch official, dealt full-time with the Space Group. Colonel Jean Gourmelen, put at my disposal by the French government, did invaluable work in the DRG, drafting the papers about how WEU would undertake crisis management, the terms of reference of the Planning Cell and later on our security regulations, an essential requirement for obtaining NATO information and documents. Richard Tibbels became head of the security policy section with Juan de Luis as his deputy. In the Council Secretariat, Diarmid Williams had Béatrice Valleix as his deputy and Isabelle MacDonald as number three. The policy planning section was headed as before by Arnaud Jacomet with his Luxembourg deputy.

The role of the presidency varies considerably among the various international organisations. The UN annually elects a president of the General Assembly and in the Security Council the chairmanship rotates among the members on a monthly basis. The Secretary-General heads a powerful bureaucracy, but does not preside over any meetings. In the OSCE, the position of Chairman-in-Office, changing annually, has acquired growing substance, even to the extent that it acquired non-consensual elements such as the despatch of personal representatives to crisis areas. The Chairman-in-Office represents the OSCE to the outside world; the Secretary-General largely plays a supporting role, although his influence is growing, as his staff is expanding. In the European Union, the presidency changes every six months, but chairs all meetings. Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers had no representative functions. The European Commission has the exclusive right of initiating proposals in the first pillar and, since Maastricht, the right of co-initiative in

the field of foreign and security policy; its Secretary-General plays an important role in coordinating the work of the Commissioners but, again, does not represent the Commission externally. The question of who represents the EU was a subject in the Intergovernmental Conference. In the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.8 (formerly J.5) confirmed that the Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the CFSP, but shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council, who exercises the function of High Representative for the CFSP, and if need be by the next member state to hold the Presidency. This amounted to a new troika, omitting the past Presidency.

The widest competence is given to the Secretary-General of NATO. He not only chairs the Permanent Council but also the Council sessions of Ministers or Heads of State and Government. Externally, he represents NATO and, with a mandate from the Council, conducts negotiations. The discussions between Secretary-General Solana and the Russian authorities on a new relationship with NATO are the most recent expression of this authority. During the period of Manfred Wörner, a double title was created: Secretary-General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

In WEU, the position of the Secretary-General was half-way between NATO and the European Community. He chaired the Permanent Council but not the ministerial meetings. Since the revitalisation from 1984, a new role was given to the Presidency. The Secretary-General obtained the approval of the Presidency before circulating agendas and most other documents. The Presidency also chaired most meetings of the ad hoc groups on crisis situations. I tried to counter this tendency, by taking the position that meetings taking place in the headquarters of the organisation should be chaired by the Secretary-General or one of his staff members. Even so, the representative of the Presidency would normally be the first to speak. Equally, the arrangements made for the Adriatic and Danube operations were largely carried out by Italy, through its diplomatic missions in the area. External representation remained for the Secretary-General, although he was often accompanied by diplomats from the country holding the Presidency, such as on my fact-finding mission to the new democracies of Central Europe and the meeting with the UN Secretary-General in New York.

Synchronisation of the presidencies of the EU and WEU had been an objective since the Maastricht European Council of 1991. It was realised only on 1 July 1995, when the Spanish Presidencies of both organisations coincided. No permanent solution was worked out for the occasions when the EU would be presided over by a country that is not a full member of WEU. The most practical solution would be continuation of the outgoing presidency of WEU with three months and advancing the next one with a similar period. If the EU resorts to team presidencies, the division of labour could involve the chairing of WEU by a member of the team who is a full member. All this remained theoretical, however, as the UK did not wish to continue the synchronisation and took its place in the WEU sequence after

Spain, while the EU was chaired by Italy. A fresh breakthrough was possible in September 1997, when the Permanent Council agreed a new sequence of presidencies from January 1999 when Germany will assume the function in both EU and WEU. The new sequence will follow the principle that the combination will apply to all full members of WEU. If a WEU observer takes his turn in the EU, the WEU presidency will be held following the present sequence in English alphabetical order. As a result, Greece and Italy will take the WEU presidency in 1998, Germany and Luxembourg in 1999, Portugal and France in 2000, the Netherlands and Belgium in 2001, Spain and Portugal in 2002 and Greece again in the first half of 2003.

Personally, I had little problem with the role of the presidency. It had the advantage of at least one country having an interest in making progress. A presidency of one year offered more scope than the six-monthly rhythm adopted from 1 July 1994 onward. In addition, the creation of a Politico-Military Group, which after my term not only dealt with relations with NATO and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) but also with crisis situations previously handled by ad hoc groups, reduced the role of the presidency. As the staff of the Secretariat-General was increasing, I felt that more use should be made of it. Some of the ministers with a long experience in the European Community, like Genscher, Colombo and Poos, occasionally tended to apply its methods to WEU, but their ambassadors helped me in maintaining the identity of our own organisation. Nevertheless, the importance of the presidency should not be exaggerated. The Secretary-General usually has a better knowledge of the issues at stake and of the member countries' views than a Minister, who has to chair a meeting in the midst of many other commitments. In this respect, the practice of NATO seems to be the best and most impartial.

In recent years the experience with the WEU presidencies has been less positive. After the excellent Italian and Luxembourg Presidencies and the unexpectedly constructive Netherlands Presidency of 1994, the tendency to ride hobby-horses has increased and programmes were formulated at the start of the six-month period that had no chance of being accomplished. At the same time, every member wanted to conclude its presidency with a lengthy declaration, even if there was insufficient substance to warrant this title. In a wider context it seems doubtful whether the growing complexity of EU matters should be left to a single-country-presidency, albeit only for six months. It might be preferable to have team presidencies of, say, four countries for a period of two years, who would then be able to divide the work and concentrate on their allotted parts. By giving the CFSP to the largest country in the team, possessing the best diplomatic network, this would also improve continuity and consistency of European diplomacy. The Treaty of Amsterdam did not take this road.

Twice-yearly the Secretary-General went to Paris for the better part of a week to attend the WEU Assembly and to make a speech. The relationship between Assembly and Council was always a difficult one. On substance,

I often found myself on the side of the Assembly which was pressing for more activities and pioneered the contacts with Central Europe, the creation of the WEU Institute of Security Studies and the Satellite Centre. The Assembly also wanted more money, but here I had to watch the equilibrium between ranks and pay of their staff and the people in the Secretariat. The only controversy I had with them was over the date of expiry of the WEU Treaty, 1998 or 2004. A meeting of legal experts of member states pronounced in favour of 1998. WEU was governed by the Modified Brussels Treaty - modified in 1954 when the organisation became WEU - but based on the treaty of 1948. The dispute was not all that important, because WEU would not necessarily end with the expiration of the fifty years for which the treaty was concluded. Article XII only provided that after fifty years a country could "cease to be a party thereto provided he shall previously give one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian government". A theoretical point of interest to the Assembly could be that with the later date its own existence would be prolonged as well. I always wondered whether that argument would be tenable if all contracting parties agreed to merge WEU with the European Union, but that contingency did not arise either.

Article IX of the treaty provided for an annual report from the Council to the Assembly. Like the answers to written questions, it had to be agreed by all the members. Owing to the difficulty of reaching consensus, the text was often not very explicit. For that reason, the information letters from the Secretary-General were important in supplementing what was made known officially. In addition, I sometimes appeared before a committee to discuss important questions and to express an informal view on future developments. At present, the Assembly has committees on political, defence, technological and aerospace questions as well as budgetary affairs and administration, and parliamentary and public relations.

2. Europe No Longer Divided

The acceleration of history in Eastern Europe took us all by surprise. Most of us asked the question how long Gorbachev's *glasnost* would remain limited to the Soviet Union and to what extent he would allow similar events in the satellite countries. The likely answer seemed to be that as long as the Communist parties remained in power, some reform would be permitted, but increasingly it became clear that the Kremlin had no vision and no alternative strategies. Economically, Eastern Europe was regarded as a liability, but politically the Warsaw Pact was assumed to remain the vehicle for Soviet influence. To Gorbachev's credit, we must admit that in foreign affairs he adjusted to realities even if they were contrary to his earlier aims and policies. When GDR citizens sought refuge in the West German embassy in Prague and Hungary renounced the treaty on tourism imposing controls on East German travellers (cleverly appealing to CSCE provisions), the Iron Curtain started to crumble, but Gorbachev did not

intervene. In Berlin the Wall opened and in Leipzig the crowd chanted "We are the people".

My wife and I were standing at the Potsdamer Platz a few days later. A long line of people came through, cashing in the welcome money paid out by the Federal Republic and buying first bananas and oranges, later electronic equipment. A British band was playing and soldiers were handing out hot tea, showing the flag in the most positive way possible. We were standing behind a couple with a young girl waiting for her Aunt Helga she had never seen. In the distance they spotted somebody who could be Helga, but was her hair that red? "No, it is not her." "Yes, yes, it is Helga." We had tears in our eyes when we saw them embrace and be reunited. On the way back to the airport, our taxi driver was less impressed. His wife had to stand in queues, his child had no place in kindergarten and all those Trabants polluted the air. Each point was marked with a powerful "Bah".

The fall of the Berlin Wall did not automatically imply unification. In fact, the Bonn government was very careful and did not want to push too hard. At the time many West Germans had their doubts. In June 1989, the moderate SPD parliamentarian, Professor Hartmut Soell, told me during the WEU Assembly that he did not envisage early unification, for it would create too many problems on the Western side. Even during our November visit to Berlin the renowned political scientist, Professor Löwenthal, did not believe in rapid unification: the people in East Germany would not want to become second-rate citizens in a unified country.

A few days earlier, the WEU Council of Ministers had held its regular meeting in Brussels on 13 November 1989. Minister Genscher was present and used the occasion to brief his colleagues and to dispel their anxieties. He stressed that developments in Eastern Europe were the result of consistent Western policies ever since the Harmel Report had stated the objective of a new peaceful order. Obviously, he understood that his colleagues wanted to know where Germany was heading. The opening of transit points met the first desire of the population which had staked its claim to freedom in an impressive and peaceful manner. The next step would be free elections which should not take place later than 1990, in order to maintain the momentum, but he was not yet clear about the role of the existing political parties. He expected reforms to continue in Poland and Hungary, to be followed by Czechoslovakia, and appealed for economic assistance to those countries.

At dinner that evening, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos, sketched a possible scenario. After the elections the parties would express themselves in favour of unification, the Federal Republic of Germany could not possibly oppose that and Gorbachev would accept it on condition that there was a neutral status for the whole of Germany. Then both NATO and the EC would be in disarray. Genscher doubted whether the process would go that quickly. Freedom had priority in the minds of men and women, who would care less about institutional arrangements. Equally, he did not believe

that Gorbachev would play on neutrality: it would not be in the Soviet interest as it would not provide greater stability. As early as 1987, Genscher had told Gorbachev that NATO constituted a double insurance: for us against an attack, for him against a single country becoming a threat. That was why, contrary to Chevènement, he did not believe that Moscow really wanted to push the US out of Europe. With an eye to his French colleague Dumas, who did not hide his anxiety about unification, even by osmosis, Genscher stressed the importance of the forthcoming European Council in Strasbourg giving a clear signal of continued European integration.



"Family portrait" on 13 November 1989 during the Belgian Presidency of WEU. From left to right: Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek; Netherlands Defence Minister Relus ter Beek; French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas (behind him UK Secretary of State Douglas Hurd); UK Secretary of Defence Tom King; Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens (behind him French Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement); German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Spanish Defence Minister Narcis Serra; Belgian Defence Minister Guy Coëme; Portuguese Defence Minister Nogueira; and the author. (Photo: Belga)

The French minister made his traditional point about the need to dissolve the military pacts, but weakened it immediately by adding that this would only be a long-term objective which could be realised only after Western Europe had organised its own defence. Genscher argued that the Soviets were flexible towards Hungary because it did not border on NATO territory and warned against trying to pry countries loose from the Warsaw Pact. According to his assessment Poland did not wish that either. The Netherlands Minister Van den Broek pointed out that, without the two pacts,

it would be impossible to reach verifiable arms control agreements.

This ministerial discussion was one of the best I attended. Normally, they were not so coherent and focused on one or two points that needed an immediate decision. Here WEU was most useful in providing an opportunity for in-depth reflection. Nevertheless, many aspects were not raised. How could German unification be realised when Soviet forces remained in the Eastern part? And what would be the basic security interests beyond which Moscow would not be able to go? In the past, Soviet forces in the satellite countries served three purposes: to support their communist regimes; to hold Western Europe hostage; and to secure a security glacis. Under present conditions only the last function still made some sense, but what use would it be under the expected agreement on parity of forces? In a conference of the Hans Seidl Foundation in Munich on 19 November 1989, the Soviet veteran Portugalov repeated Gorbachev's opinion in his book on *perestroika*, that only history would be able to judge the German Question. Somewhat philosophically he added that history was made by human beings and that at Wittenberg nobody had asked Martin Luther how things would proceed from there.

From Horst Teltschik's fascinating diary of the momentous 329 days leading up to German unification,¹⁷ we know that Portugalov subsequently travelled to Bonn and claimed that the recent developments in the GDR would have been unthinkable without the Soviet Union, let alone against its wishes. Teltschik called this revelation a small sensation, as it implied that Moscow identified itself with these developments and, with a reference to *perestroika*, even took responsibility for them. Portugalov, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a collaborator of Valentin Falin in its international department, added that Moscow was thinking about many alternative possibilities and did not exclude a German confederation as an intermediate situation.

This indication was the immediate reason for the formulation of Kohl's Ten Points of 28 November 1989 to clarify the policies Bonn would pursue and to answer some of the questions everybody was asking. They followed a dual approach: the way towards German unity in cooperation with the GDR and a framework for embedding this unity in an international framework. Practical cooperation should be pursued immediately to benefit the people on both sides, which could be extended as soon as a binding commitment to fundamental change in the political and economic system of the GDR had been decided and irreversibly set in motion. The next step should be a *Vertragsgemeinschaft*: an ever closer network of agreements at all levels, with common institutions. Subsequently, the Bonn government would be prepared to develop "confederal structures between the two states in Germany" (point 5). After stressing the need to incorporate the future architecture of Germany in that of the whole of Europe, the Chancellor described the European Community as a constant element of European development, which made the process of unification a European concern.

The CSCE process was central to a common European architecture and disarmament should be accelerated, as it would contribute to overcoming the division of Europe and of Germany. The final tenth point stated the objective of a federation as the outcome of this dual strategy.

Much diplomatic activity had taken place in the preceding weeks. Bonn had talked to everybody, but the declaration was the Chancellor's own conclusion on what would be attainable at this stage. It came as a surprise to everybody but was difficult to disagree with. In the Bundestag, the SPD spokesman, Karsten Voigt, immediately supported all ten points and offered his party's cooperation in implementing them.

In avoiding specific consultations on the text, Germany circumvented difficult arguments with its allies and scored the additional point that all Berlin powers were to be treated on an equal basis. In fact, the Soviet ambassador, Kvitsinsky, was received by Teltschik before he saw his British and French colleagues together. In addition, Kohl wanted to make his views known before Bush and Gorbachev would meet off Malta. Tactically, this was probably wise although it ruffled some feathers and led to concerns of growing German assertiveness. But Kohl's experience in international contacts had been mixed. On 18 November, Mitterrand had organised a summit dinner of the EC countries without any prior consultation with his colleagues. The Heads of State and Government had dined separately and did not invite the Foreign Ministers to join them before 11 p.m. Apparently, Mrs Thatcher did not like Mr Genscher to be present. But Kohl wanted to keep his hands free, especially with regard to EC members who bore no responsibility in and for Germany, and limited himself to an extensive briefing on recent developments. To the surprise of the assembled journalists, Mitterrand stated afterwards that nobody had raised the issue of German reunification. Nevertheless, Teltschik noted that Mitterrand, Gonzalez, Santer and Martens had been very friendly towards his boss, but Thatcher and Lubbers decidedly cool. Mitterrand might have been friendly, but his behaviour remained characteristically enigmatic. On 22 November, he decided only at the last moment to join Kohl in the European Parliament and not to leave it to Foreign Minister Dumas. The night before, and without prior information to Bonn, the visit of the French President to the SED party conference in East Berlin had been announced for 20-22 December, to be followed on the day of the Strasbourg visit by the news of his meeting with Gorbachev in Kiev on 6 December. Germany was puzzled by French intentions, especially as they held the current presidency of the EC.

The NATO Summit of 4 December was convened to enable President Bush to report on the Malta Summit, but also provided an opportunity to review the developments in Germany. In a bilateral on the eve of the meeting Bush estimated that it would take at least five years to reach the goal of a federation. Kohl admitted that economically it would be risky if unification would take place in two years' time, but warned that a

groundswell was starting in the East. In the meeting itself, Bush made four points: at the present time no vision of German unity should be advanced or excluded; unification should proceed in conformity with German commitments to NATO and the EC and take into consideration the rights and responsibilities of the Allied powers; in the interest of overall stability in Europe, steps towards unification should be gradual and in a phased process; and with regard to border questions, the Helsinki principles should be confirmed.

Kohl responded immediately and proposed to take the American statement also as a closing summary. He wanted to avoid any dilution in a subsequent discussion and had made clear already that his Ten Points did not envisage any precise timetable. But the Italian Prime Minister, Andreotti, persisted in asking whether self-determination would be only for Germans or also for Balts or Basques. According to him the right to self-determination had to be seen in the overall context of the Helsinki Final Act; all aspects had to be considered carefully so as to prevent governments losing control over events. Mrs Thatcher showed understanding for the Italian concerns and wanted to reflect on the Bush proposals. Apparently she wanted to play for time.

The next time came at the regular meeting of the European Council in Strasbourg which, under the shadow of German unification, took some positive decisions on deepening integration. A work plan for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was agreed. In December 1990, an intergovernmental conference would be convened, which would also have to cover the competence of the European Council (a German wish). The social charter was finalised and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) created. Kohl and Genscher were particularly happy that they had succeeded in including in the communiqué the wording from the letter on German unity of 1970:

We aim at strengthening the situation of peace in Europe in which the German people regain their unity in free self-determination.

It was added that this process should be peaceful and democratic, in the context of the CSCE Final Act, and espouse the goal of European integration. There was no reference to the security implications. Apparently, an attempt was made which foundered on Irish opposition, but nobody pressed it very hard.

These events have been sketched to show that German unity became the topic of the day and that the centre of activity was in Bonn. Germany wanted as little distraction from its main concern as possible. For that reason, Genscher did not want a communiqué at the end of the WEU meeting in spite of my efforts. Never an advocate of military measures, he did not want to blur the emphasis on integration through the European Community. As far as security was concerned, he was happy with the

phrase cooperative security, which combined the CSCE notions of cooperation and security and sounded very constructive. Conceptually, I preferred it to the illusory notion of collective security, which was supposed to work *within* a system, obviating the need for collective defence commitments. At least cooperative security suggested that its success depended on the contribution each country was prepared to make.

During the month of December 1989, the position of Gorbachev towards the Ten Points of Kohl was hardening as the situation in East Germany was getting out of control. Yet, his objectives remained unclear. An American evaluation of the Malta Summit described Gorbachev as a man in a hurry but without a plan, constantly fighting a conceptual battle with himself. In January, I met Manfred Wörner at the annual meeting in the Dolder Hotel above Zürich organised by the Swiss Ministry of Defence. He reported that Gorbachev no longer was insisting on the dissolution of the two military pacts. This raised the question of whether it was in our interest to keep the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Wörner clearly rejected any attempts to neutralise Germany or to make it belong to both pacts, but he could imagine a continued presence of Soviet forces for some limited time. In any case, the speed of German unification would be decided by the crowds and nobody else would be able to influence it much.

In the West, nobody would support any of these extreme options, but the idea of demilitarising the area of the GDR was seriously considered by some, including Henry Kissinger. There was much speculation on the minimum security interests of the Soviet Union. At the Dolder meeting, Malcolm Mackintosh, the Sovietologist in the UK Cabinet Office, described them as: maintaining the present frontiers, no independence for the Baltic countries, full access for Soviet forces to their bases and the development of a new deployment doctrine coupled with a notion of sufficiency. Another British expert, Chris Donnelly, estimated that the Warsaw Pact would cease to exist as loyalties would be redirected towards the preservation of national boundaries. In his opinion, the best Moscow could expect was a kind of Finlandisation of Eastern Europe and a GDR not linked with NATO and on friendly terms with the Soviet Union. My own opinion was more on the side of Annemarie le Gloannec, the perceptive French expert on Germany, who a few weeks earlier had said that German unification was inevitable as the GDR would no longer be able to cope on its own. At the same time, she expected the eastern part to change the character of Germany by strengthening the protestant and anti-liberal elements and emphasising the values of frugality and public spirit.

The status of Eastern Germany continued to preoccupy us at WEU. The Belgian ambassador in London, Jean-Paul van Bellinghen, took a personal interest in security matters and used his presidency to organise informal discussions among the permanent representatives. The WEU Council consisted of ambassadors who enjoyed the multilateral activities in WEU, but were not appointed for their security expertise. Several had been

political directors at home, like Richthofen in Bonn and Biancheri in Rome and had no problem in engaging in brainstorming meetings. Late in January 1990, at a breakfast session, Richthofen reported that now also the governing SED party in the GDR had expressed itself in favour of unification. This made the security arrangements more urgent. We were worried that the European Council paid little attention to security in supporting Gorbachev for a new relationship in a Common European Home. Although many joked privately about not wanting to live in a home with shady characters possessing dangerous weapons, much lip-service was paid to it in public. The notion went back to Brezhnev who talked about it as early as 1981, but it never attained any precision. It was broad enough to cover a variety of solutions and projected a positive image of the Soviet Union. Under its flag, Gorbachev could probe for promising avenues, but, I felt, in the end would be overtaken by events. I was duly impressed by his volatility at home in adjusting to pressures from different corners, but increasingly wondered whether his course would be sufficiently steady to maintain the support of his people. *Glasnost* became a success, but by 1990 *perestroika* had achieved very little.

Richthofen obviously had thought deeply about ways of avoiding the build-up of pressure for demilitarisation. Genscher had made some contradictory statements, saying on one occasion that a united Germany would remain in NATO but on another that NATO territory should not be extended to the Oder-Neisse. Those sympathetic to the German Foreign Minister called it "subtle ambivalence", but to others Genscherism became a dirty word. At a dinner of the political directors, the German participant Kastrup had tried to reassure his colleagues, but did not succeed entirely. In a meeting of the WEU Reinforced Council on 30 January, he had repeated that extension of NATO to the Polish border would affect the security interests of the Soviet Union. Now Richthofen floated the idea of reserving Central Europe for European forces, possibly in the framework of the future European Union. In answer to a question from his British colleague whether WEU could move its borders eastwards, he replied affirmatively, stressing that the German notion of security was more political than military. Biancheri had no objection to handling security questions within the Twelve if all were prepared to join. If not, it should be done in WEU. The Irish statement at the time of their referendum, that they would not enter NATO through the backdoor, and the way this was handled in practice made action at Twelve unlikely.

The 1990 Wehrkunde session in Munich was particularly important that year. It always provided an excellent opportunity for European-American discussions under the chairmanship of Ewald von Kleist, who as a young German officer had volunteered to blow himself up to kill Hitler. For a Dutchman, it was very interesting to see the inter-German and often also inter-American debates unfold. Stoltenberg, the German Minister of Defence who succeeded Wörner after having been Minister of Finance,

listed the new tasks for the West:

1. to maintain an adequate defence capability;
2. to share a framework for dialogue, negotiation and cooperation with Eastern Europe;
3. to develop and verify arms control and to widen the perspective of the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe;
4. to expand the security dialogue, to continue the CSCE process and to develop norms of international law;
5. to deepen the European Community; and
6. to ensure US participation in Europe.

Referring to President Bush's proposal to lower US forces in Europe, Stoltenberg argued that these should be embedded in the CFE Treaty and warned that a European security order could not consist of a power vacuum. In contemplating changes in NATO structures, he could envisage either a further development of the Eurogroup within NATO or of the Western European Union.

Lothar Rühl, who had been State Secretary under Wörner, made the point that territorial defence of a united Germany no longer would have a military component on its borders. Similarly, he did not see a long-term need for Moscow to station forces in Central Europe, but in return he questioned the wisdom of keeping US forces on German soil. It would be a wise demonstration of self-restraint to keep them elsewhere in Europe. In any case, a massive capability for forward defence and extending it eastward would delay the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Pointedly as always, Egon Bahr intervened by saying that in the FRG there was no impatience to achieve unification as in the GDR, but he did not believe in continued membership of NATO for a united Germany nor in a special status for the GDR. As far as the future size of the German forces was concerned, they could be as strong as the Europeans wanted: "anywhere between zero and 300,000. You name it." His SPD colleague, Karsten Voigt, took a different line by arguing that while a confederation could be compatible with membership of both pacts, a federal Germany could not. And he was against neutrality for it would amount to a *Sonderweg*, a special status, which would burden the future of Germany. Moreover, he feared that the people in the East would be less positive towards the ideals of European integration than Germans in the West.

In his reply, Stoltenberg argued that in a united Germany there could not be a zone of insecurity but hinted at the possibility of voluntary restrictions, like Norway's with regard to the Finmark region. He also wanted to reflect further on the successor negotiations to CFE in the light of the proposed US reductions.

The US National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, made an unusually positive speech on European efforts to integrate further: we support WEU,

the Franco-German cooperation and the nuclear deterrents of France and the United Kingdom. We appreciate the help extended in the Gulf. Institutional mechanisms of cooperation have to be sorted out and a more equal partnership is now at hand. In reply to my question on how to keep some order in the burden-sharing debate, Scowcroft said that the level of 275,000 had become unsustainable, but that the US also wanted to demonstrate to Moscow that they too were prepared to go lower. Technically speaking, the new level of US forces in Europe was a ceiling but it was meant as a policy floor for a permanent commitment, not to be measured against Soviet levels. And he ended with a remark that we would hear many times since from our American friends: the US was reaching out to Europe and would not repeat the mistakes of the past, but if there was a perception that the Americans were not wanted, there would be a sharp reaction at home.

My own intervention tried to make several points. In the first place, I felt the need to arrive at a common assessment amongst ourselves of what we regarded as legitimate Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe. Secondly, as the Soviet Union - through its size and geopolitical situation - would always pose a threat to Western Europe, we should work on the question of how Europe could live comfortably with the USSR on its threshold. This would require a web of interrelationships in the economic and political fields with the East and a collective security arrangement in the West which involved the US. Thirdly, Europe should define what kind of US forces it would need. Some changes in deployment could be contemplated. On the European side, the future was with multinational forces which would spread the responsibility for "out-of-area" operations, but also would apply to everybody within Western Europe, including Germany. Thus Germany would be kept firmly in the West without applying any form of discrimination or special status. Fourthly, as the policy options for Moscow were shrinking, future developments would not always represent the preferred scenarios in Moscow. Therefore, we should not pay any price for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe or for the erosion of the Warsaw Pact. Nor could German unification be subject to demands for neutralisation or similar constraints. NATO and the Warsaw Pact should not be put on the same level, which also meant that there was no necessity to withdraw US forces entirely when all the Soviet troops had gone home. And finally, German unification in the past had been regarded as a distant prospect which could be realised only in a completely different Europe in which borders had little meaning. Now German unification was imminent but the new arrangements in Europe were still unclear. I was not keen to resume the nuclear debate in the abstract without knowing the shape of CFE, for nuclear capabilities had to be a function of the new strategic situation. Besides, I expected Moscow ultimately to accept nuclear deterrence in a defensive strategy which had to make do without a broad glacis in Eastern Europe. Discussing these questions after the Wehrkunde session with Joe Fitchett of the *International Herald Tribune*, he summed up

the mood among the participants as expecting a majority among Germans in favour of some form of neutralisation.¹⁸

Zelikow and Rice for the US and Teltschik for Germany have given us fascinating accounts of the events leading up to German unification. The Two + Four idea originated in the State Department and was sold to the Europeans over various degrees of reluctance and the White House as well had to be persuaded to shed its fears of implications along the way. It was to deal with the external aspects of unification and Genscher accepted it as long as it was clear that the two Germanies would come first. His original idea was to have the outcome of the bilateral German negotiations blessed by the CSCE summit. Baker made the point to Genscher that the CSCE was not the appropriate place for determining Germany's future or managing Soviet concerns. He was concerned by the fact that the foreign ministers of the Twelve had already given their public agreement to convening a CSCE summit before the end of 1990 and insisted on several conditions being met, particularly the completion of the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. At first, Baker had accepted that NATO's jurisdiction should not be extended eastward, but later on amended this to apply to the stationing of foreign forces only.

Now we know how Soviet positions on German unification softened in the course of eleven months. Originally, Moscow was not prepared to envisage unification as a short- or medium-term possibility, then it demanded a neutralised status, but shifted to the option of membership of both alliances. When that did not prove feasible, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze sought to limit German membership of NATO to the political aspects, not allowing participation in the military integration. In the end, they settled for a Soviet military presence till the middle of 1994 and a permanent injunction against non-German NATO forces on the territory of the GDR. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the German corps stationed there could come under NATO but no foreign forces could be admitted. The lesson from this evolution is that one should never assume that the position of the opponent at the negotiating table will remain immutable, but also that a deal should be struck when further concessions become unlikely. That leaves, of course, a considerable margin of judgment as to where his bottom line might be. Western assessments varied even within the negotiating delegations. They remained divergent till the very end of the Two + Four negotiations when the UK held out against the limitations on NATO and obtained a possibility for temporary presence of NATO forces in Eastern Germany in the context of exercises.¹⁹

Before the happy ending, Alliance solidarity was heavily tested on several occasions. A difficult moment came at the Ottawa meeting on Open Skies when, in the margins, the NATO ministers were asked to endorse the Two + Four procedure. Ministers Andreotti and Van den Broek incurred the wrath of Genscher by not wanting to give a blank endorsement. He told them bluntly that they had no part in this game. The animosity between Van

den Broek and Genscher probably dates back to that incident. For WEU, the possibility of playing a role in Eastern Germany dwindled when a solution was found in the NATO context. In Ottawa, there was agreement that the guarantees of Article 5 should apply to the whole of Germany.

On 23 March 1990, the WEU Assembly held a special meeting in Luxembourg to which the German and Polish Foreign Ministers were invited. Minister Skubizewski referred to my ideas concerning the formation of multinational units and suggested a joint Polish-German military formation. Genscher hardly mentioned WEU and mostly talked about the European Community and the CSCE. Ambassador Richthofen had warned me beforehand that I would be disappointed. One parliamentarian sneered that we would be better off going to Vienna, where the CSCE held its meetings. The session nevertheless served a useful purpose by seating Skubizewski and Genscher next to each other and dispelling any doubt about recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the international border. The Russian speaker, Falin, tempered our optimism by a hard speech demanding a peace treaty with Germany and stating that independence for Lithuania could only be accepted as the outcome of a referendum.

In the margins of the parliamentary meeting, Skubizewski invited me to come to Warsaw, but I preferred to visit unofficially, preferably to deliver a speech at a symposium organised by a research institute. I knew that several member states did not want WEU to assume a high profile in Eastern Europe and I did not want to risk a negative decision on a proposal to go there. The Council was watching my travel programme rather carefully. After receiving some queries about planned visits, I had promised to periodically circulate my travel schedule, so that the ambassadors could make comments or suggestions concerning my contacts and remarks. But I did not want to ask for approval of the visit, which would have been necessary had it been regarded as an official one. I took the same line on visits to the Soviet Union.

My first journey to Moscow was in response to an invitation of the Soviet CSCE Committee to make a speech at the Diplomatic Academy. My programme for 25-29 April 1990 also included discussions at IMEMO, the Institutes for Europe and for North America, with Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky and with members of the Committee for Defence Questions of the Supreme Soviet. The most interesting meeting was with the Chief of the General Staff, General Moiseev. In my report to the Permanent Representatives, I described the conversation as follows:

General Moiseev was accompanied by Generals Chervov and Ladygin and an excellent interpreter (Lieutenant-Colonel). He was an attentive listener, took extensive notes and was very direct, almost aggressive in the hour and a half discussion. He started by welcoming me most warmly. The Secretary-General of WEU was not a regular guest and he was interested in a good dialogue.

Europe was now drawing attention from the entire world and the Soviet Union was interested in excluding confrontation and providing for European security.

In return, I explained the double function of WEU (European pillar of NATO and security dimension of the European integration), our Platform stressing the need for a continued US presence in view of Europe's geopolitical situation, the constant elements in NATO's role and the activities of WEU (security requirements 91-95, verification, study of the concept of multinational forces).

Moiseev concluded drily that WEU was an active unit within NATO which could only function with the support of the US. When I said that it was not quite like that, he asked whether WEU could provide for enhanced security of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. In any case, the WTO had never been exclusively military and NATO was not as political as some made it out to be. Many prominent American and British spokesmen stressed its military character. In any case, NATO could not guarantee Soviet security. In reality, the WTO was no longer in existence as a military alliance. President Bush had stated his expectation that it would be disbanded soon, but nevertheless wanted NATO to be stronger than ever before. Assisted by Chervov, General Moiseev gave some figures of NATO's strength. The Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be withdrawn by the middle of next year. The balance of forces was shifting in favour of NATO and after implementation of CFE, NATO would be stronger than the Soviet Union. In naval armaments, the United States was superior and it was urgent to include naval aspects in the negotiations.

Then there was the question of German unification. Reacting to my opinion that it should remain in NATO, he said that nobody could prove that such a link would be a lasting guarantee of German behaviour. Chervov interjected here that WEU claimed to represent the European dimension, but nevertheless remained closely linked with the United States. Moiseev asked whether, in my concept, Soviet forces could join the multinational forces, and fell into a short monologue. The Soviet Union had never threatened anybody and was now changing towards an entirely new system. He appealed to the West to treat the new processes seriously and to appreciate the Soviet search for new relations and stability. The West should not only say that Germany should be part of NATO, for what would that mean for the countries East of the Elbe? Germany had been the birthplace of fascism. The Soviet

Union had made enormous sacrifices in defeating it and subsequently there had been peace for 45 years. Now the Soviet Union demanded "doubtless guarantees" that German unification would not be harmful to Soviet interests. Otherwise twenty million Soviets would have died in vain.

I retorted that the situation was different now. The Federal Republic of Germany had an excellent record as a democracy, and a constitution with careful checks and balances. Moreover, it was integrated in the European Communities. I could not believe that the addition of 17 million Germans from the GDR would make a difference. Then I asked what sort of guarantees the Soviet Union was looking for. Moiseev answered that there should be no claims for a reconsideration of European borders, otherwise we would be back in 1939. When I said that nobody in the West, including Germany, entertained such claims Chervov interjected that I seemed to underestimate Germany. I stated that, in comparison to 1939, the Soviet Union was now a superpower and would remain the largest military power in Europe. In any case, NATO had always been a defensive alliance and no military expert could really attribute offensive capabilities to it.

Moiseev then started another monologue. NATO had 300 bases around the Soviet Union. Now there was talk of expanding NATO with Hungary and it was necessary to have a new look at the balance of forces, certainly if a united Germany would be in NATO and the Soviet Union was reducing its forces. The WTO was not yet a political organisation. In its top organ, only the Soviet and Polish leaders remained the same, there were many changes and civilians were replacing the military incumbents (which he seemed to dislike!). In Europe, the Soviet Union remained alone and would be faced with NATO superiority. Did the West have any doubts about the Soviet policy objectives after its proclaimed defensive doctrine and force reductions?

I replied that I did not believe in any aggressive intentions, but that any defence expert had to reckon with military capabilities and, for the time being anyway, the Soviet Union had superior forces. Yes, Moiseev said, "I have heard that argument. When (the French Chief of Defence) General Schmitt was here, he said the Soviet Union has more tanks, but then I said the West has more ships". I repeated my point of Western Europe's geopolitical situation and tried to return to future security arrangements. But Moiseev maintained that the WTO was constantly threatened and cited NATO's first-use doctrine. I bet him a bottle of brandy that,

in five years time, the Soviet Union would have resorted to some kind of flexible response/minimum deterrence strategy. I also said that defence budgets in the West were declining, which would be accelerated by the signing of a CFE agreement.

Moiseev regarded such developments as hypothetical and without guarantee. He also referred to the Chernobyl disaster to underline the vulnerability of modern society to conventional attack. Then he switched back to German unification and asked why Germany could not be a member of both NATO and the WTO. I found that a rather peculiar idea and asked what it would mean in practice. It would probably be better to disband the GDR army. Moiseev dismissed that as unacceptable to the GDR and contrary to what he called "equal distribution". He saw the need for a peace treaty. I contested that as not only impractical, but also redundant after the admission of both Germanies to the United Nations. As to the future, I referred to the standing commission which the CFE should set up for verification and possibly other tasks.

Moiseev concluded amicably by appreciating my knowledge of delicate issues and repeating that the German problem was very serious for the Soviet Union. He stressed the need for contacts as ours for understanding each other's position. At my departure, he presented me with a ceremonial dagger of the Red Army.

The NATO summit in London in July 1990 was useful in giving a signal to Moscow that the Alliance was changing, too. From the strategic point of view, I had some quarrels with the wording on nuclear weapons as a last resort (which indicated a prolonged war) and the brevity of the reference to forward defence (which was confused with forward deployment), but the message was clear. Apparently, it helped the Soviets to take the final step and on 19 July, Hofstetter was able to inform the SWG that NATO membership of the united Germany had been achieved. On 3 October we held a formal session of the permanent WEU Council to mark the day of German unity. In my opening statement I said that it not only heralded the end of the artificial and often cruel division of Germany, but also terminated the division of our continent. At midnight, we had witnessed the closing of the post-war period and the start of a new chapter in European history. As a European I felt moved and privileged to chair our Council meeting that day. All Permanent Representatives spoke and we issued a press release welcoming the statement made by the German ambassador that the united Germany is a full member of Western European Union.²⁰

3. Multinational Forces

My suggestion to concentrate on the formation of multinational units to respond both to German unification and the expected demand for out-of-area operations was slow in getting support. At the February 1990 Wehrkunde conference, I had breakfast with the Belgian Minister of Defence, Guy Coëme, and his Chief of Defence Staff, Charlier, as Belgium had the WEU presidency at the time. I got little response. General Charlier was worried about the announcement by President Bush that he would not modernise the land-based short-range nuclear forces and would limit US forces in Europe to 195,000. At that level, General Charlier no longer believed forward defence to be possible.



The author inspects the guard of honour at AFCENT headquarters at Brunssum, the Netherlands, accompanied by commander-in-chief General von Sandart. (Photo: AFCENT)

Equally, the CSCE doctrine seminar which was held at about the same time focused more on past doctrine than on its adaptation to the new situation. The Russians asked questions about FOFA, the American concept of attack on follow-on forces to unbalance the war machine of the Warsaw Pact, thereby giving the defence against the front-line forces a better chance. The US countered by enquiring about the notion of "counter-preparation" in Soviet handbooks and the role of "operational manoeuvre groups" in forcing deep penetrations of Western defences. In their view, the doctrine

of defensive defence had made little headway in practical implementation. The seminar had been useful in bringing military officers together who had never seen each other, let alone talked together. My own view was that, to become fruitful, it would be better on the next occasion to discuss at a somewhat lower level than Chiefs of Defence those aspects of doctrine and capabilities that one found particularly worrying on the other side.

Only when the prospect of a complete Soviet withdrawal from Central Europe firmed up was there growing support for multinational forces. Douglas Hurd, whom I visited on 1 March, was the first minister to show an interest, albeit at the Corps level and with the proviso that the US should be able to join at least some of the new formations. A meeting of the Defence Representatives Group brought agreement from General Charlier's representative as well as a positive response from Germany. Apparently, in Bonn there was appreciation for the argument that to maintain any form of stationed forces in Germany there should be equal rights among Europeans, and multinational units were the best way to demonstrate that to the public. In the Special Working Group, where the Foreign Office representatives take the lead, the German position was less committed. There, the UK representative, John Goulden, took the lead in arguing the political and arms control arguments in favour. Understandably, he wanted to build on what already existed, but the "layer cake" of a series of heavy national corps organised in army groups no longer seemed appropriate. It was geared to a massive threat from the East which was likely to become more remote, particularly in geographic terms. For land forces it should be possible to go lower than the corps level; he would not be dogmatic about the precise level where multinationality could best be applied. The problem of reserves, which had always weighed heavily on NATO's defence plans, would also become easier in a multinational structure as well as the pooling of long-range assets. At the same time, the UK thought it important to maintain a clear command structure compatible with the presence of the US Army Corps and able to receive reinforcements quickly in a crisis. The French reaction also was quite positive. Philippe Guelluy agreed that a new basis was needed for a continued force presence in Germany but also saw possibilities in the Mediterranean. The Italian, Migliorini, was more cautious about speedy implementation but was prepared to reflect on the idea.

At the Luxembourg session of the WEU Assembly in March 1990, I put the issue in a general context, concentrating on substance before devising the most appropriate institutional arrangements. WEU should do three things: Europeans should assume a larger part of their own security and the best way to avoid an uncoordinated reduction of defence efforts would be to develop multinational forces. These would not only provide a new basis for standing forces in Germany, but also elsewhere. We should avoid special regimes which would apply only to Germany. Therefore, it would be important to demonstrate throughout Europe that the application of military force would never take place on a purely national basis. Secondly,

Europe should identify the functions we should like the US to continue to perform as a complement to our own efforts. Obviously, this referred to nuclear deterrence and reinforcement, but also to certain high-tech capabilities. (Later I was to encapsulate this idea in a "new transatlantic bargain".) And thirdly, I felt that we should determine among ourselves which security concerns of the Soviet Union we would consider as legitimate after its forces had been withdrawn from Central Europe.

Several parliamentarians took up my points, and the reports by Wilkinson and Speed were favourable, but the ministerial session in Brussels of 23 April was rather disappointing about multinationality. A positive aspect was that, for the first time since the Luxembourg meeting of April 1987, a full communiqué was issued, which had been opposed by Germany at previous meetings. But on multinational forces Genscher reacted to my plea by saying that this was not the moment to do anything without the US. He would be prepared to consider multinationality if it would enhance efficiency, but not to appear reassuring towards the Soviets. Standing next to him at the family photo he told me that for the time being he did not want any military forces coming into Eastern Germany. The French Defence Minister, Chevènement, was also hesitant about the idea. He thought multinationality an ambiguous concept for France. The Franco-German brigade was inadequate and presented too many problems, especially at the logistic level; and if the level were too high it would appear as if France were re-entering integration. Therefore, he preferred new forms of cooperation such as a European satellite system for verification or long-range transport. For Spain, Defence Minister Serra was in favour of multinational forces which would provide a purpose for an international role for the Spanish forces, but his colleague at Foreign Affairs, Ordóñez, feared that public opinion would perceive it as accepting NATO integration. Not everything was lost, as Minister Coëme concluded that our study should be continued, but the ministerial communiqué did not refer to it and for WEU the momentum was gone. My disappointment about the lack of decisiveness in WEU grew even stronger when I learned that, at about the same time in NATO, the Defence Planning Committee had agreed to conduct a study on multinational forces. Nobody had bothered to inform us and even the Belgian delegate in the Defence Representatives Group did not know about it. Clearly, there was a lack of communication at all levels. Apparently, Washington, which in February still was negative about my idea of multinational forces had changed its mind. During a second visit I paid in March, Raymond Seitz, Assistant Under-Secretary for European Affairs, had listened attentively to my explanation. I noted his remark that the presence of American forces would acquire an even greater political importance, but that the US military were not yet used to such a new role. A German friend of mine attributed this change of mind to plans to reduce the American forces in Europe even further, to a level between 70,000 and 100,000 troops, which would make it impossible to maintain two army corps.

Similar considerations played a role in other countries, where declining defence budgets made it extremely doubtful whether their national corps could be maintained. Strategists at SHAPE juggled with various possibilities: a corps with German, Dutch and Belgian forces, a UK-Netherlands corps and, in southern Germany, a US-German and a German-US corps. One of the advantages would be that every country would remain able to participate at the strategic level in a corps headquarters. The seamless positioning of forces along the Iron Curtain, better known as the layer-cake, would no longer be necessary. Instead, SHAPE was thinking of pre-assigned assembly areas and manoeuvre areas and a Rapid Reaction Force of two divisions for use outside the Central Region.

Near the end of April the EPC foreign ministers had their informal "Gymnich-type" meeting in Luxembourg and discussed European security and defence. Early in May, Douglas Hurd wrote to his colleagues to sum up his ideas. He felt that we could not express in treaty form the idea of a European defence identity until we were clear what it would mean in practice. There was general agreement that a reformed NATO should make room for a larger European role, but this role was to strengthen the Alliance. In practice the WEU's defence role should be clarified as well as the circumstances under which WEU members might decide to take collective action. In the British view the defence of NATO territory would be the responsibility of NATO; the WEU role here would be "to encourage a more coherent European dimension in Alliance debates". Collective European military activity to protect our interests outside the NATO area would be for decision in WEU. Military operations would be coordinated to the greatest degree possible with those of other Allies and it would, therefore, be sensible to have full consultations within the Alliance before decisions were made in WEU. Military activity in Central and Eastern Europe was a special case, given the risk of escalation into confrontation with the Soviet Union. For this reason, it would make practical sense to ensure that any decision by the Europeans had the backing of other Allies, which underlined the need for a genuine effort to reach a joint decision in the Alliance.

On a second question - what forces the Europeans would have available and how these would relate to NATO forces - the UK envisaged an autonomous European Reaction Force (ERF) with a genuine capability for military action in a wide range of possible circumstances outside the NATO area. It would be separate from the NATO integrated military structure, although drawing its forces from units assigned to NATO as well as from other national units. Political control would be exercised by the WEU Council and a planning cell would develop contingency plans and organise exercises, coordinating its work with the NATO Rapid Reaction Forces planning cell, but remaining separate from it. Flexible arrangements would be needed to designate an ERF commander and headquarters, appropriate to each operation, and for deployment along forces of other Allies and drawing on their specialist military assets.

I was delighted to read the telegram which was very much in line with my own thinking of planning force packages for different contingencies including their command arrangements, transport, communications and logistics. For a while things seemed to go in the right direction.

The NATO study would eventually result in the creation of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). WEU would get a new momentum with the concept of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU), which was compatible with "double-hatting" for NATO and European missions. The ARRC was a catalogue of forces available for action anywhere in the treaty area or outside it. Before anybody else, London had grasped its significance in the new Europe and made its division in Germany the main contribution to the ARRC, thereby obtaining both its command and a rationale for keeping an army of reasonable size. France and Germany did not wait for an ERF to develop and pushed their bilateral cooperation to the level of the Eurocorps. This was a political move at the highest level, but some German frustration with overpowering British tactics on the ARRC may have enhanced their willingness to build the Eurocorps.

The WEU ministerial discussion in Brussels reviewed the situation in the CFE negotiations and their relation to the timing of a CSCE summit meeting. CFE was making progress on common ceilings for treaty-limited items, i.e. tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers, but was stalling on the inclusion of aircraft and helicopters. The French Minister, Dumas, accepted a link between a CSCE summit and CFE. He declared himself ready to subscribe to a CFE without limitations on aircraft, most of the other ministers were not. Hurd favoured holding a NATO summit first, by the end of 1990, and was against convening a CSCE summit without a CFE treaty being ready for signing. Van den Broek equally wanted to maintain a link between a conclusion of CFE and the CSCE summit, for otherwise the Soviets might abandon CFE at a time when the Warsaw Pact was unravelling. Like Genscher, who stressed that CFE in fact would give us more than parity with the Soviet Union, he did not expect that too many aspects would be pushed on to follow-on negotiations. As to a continuation of the arms control process, he favoured doing so at twenty-three, i.e. the members of the two pacts, as he found it difficult to imagine that the CSCE at thirty-five could provide the same degree of security we at present derived from NATO. The communiqué contained some linkage but in a rather soft manner:

Ministers stressed the importance they attach to the concluding of a CFE agreement and to the holding of the CSCE summit before the end of the year.

An important question was to what extent Germany would be prepared to provide assurances as to the size of its armed forces. Would it be possible to say that a united Germany would not maintain a larger army than the

Bundeswehr at present? Obviously, Bonn preferred to settle this through multinational arms control to avoid being singled out. In the Special Working Group of 31 May, the German representative said that Bonn was prepared to give up land-based nuclear missiles as they lacked any strategic role in the new situation. All that on the understanding that there would be a reciprocal agreement. The Netherlands took a similar view for the longer term, and regarded it as a consequence of the decision by President Bush not to modernise the short-range nuclear forces.

In May 1990, Presidents Bush and Mitterrand met at Key Largo in Florida. The French President talked in general terms of a renovation of the Alliance, but did not present any concrete plan. Instead he wanted a process of reflection, which according to his representative in the SWG could also open the possibility of military authorities meeting in a WEU context. Personally, I sympathised with the notion of a reform which would give shape to the European pillar, particularly in making joint inputs into NATO consultations. For that reason, I had supported the idea of a second Harmel report launched by François Heisbourg, Director of the IISS in London, and the subject of a session of experts at Ebenhausen. Manfred Wörner accepted the need for reform but told me by the end of May that he wanted to do it quickly and finish the review at the July summit. Following the French proposal would erode NATO completely through a prolonged period of uncertainty.

The French were unhappy by the cold shoulder given to their reflection proposal. While Germany was coming round to the idea of multinational forces, the French announced that on taking over the WEU presidency on 1 July 1990 they would not take any initiatives till after the NATO summit. And once the summit was over, they made it appear as if NATO had closed the door on a strategic review and multinational forces. The paradoxical result was that France first wanted to wait and see what NATO would be doing while the UK and Belgium saw some room for a European reflection on these issues in WEU. The British representative circulated a lengthy draft for a Declaration on a Peaceful Future. French reticence was to last for some time, exacerbated by the departure of Chevènement as Minister of Defence on 29 January 1991.²¹ His successor, Joxe, wanted to proceed carefully and maintained a close link with the Elysée. As late as 11 March 1991, Guelluy was still not able to give a French position on multinational forces. Somewhat cynically, he talked about the permanent fireworks created around the subject, but explained the difference between the pragmatic approach of the UK and the Netherlands and the political issue France was confronted with. For his country, the crucial question was whether a nucleus of European defence would be possible within the NATO system. A European rapid reaction force should respond to European institutions and be sufficiently visible, even if it started only modestly. But France had no intention of making existing arrangements in NATO more fragile.

After the NATO summit in London, we held a post-mortem during a

lunch discussion of the SWG on 19 July. These informal discussions in my office often were the most interesting parts of the meetings of SWG and DRG. Guelluy fulminated against the US, which had deliberately marginalised France, one of the countries which had the most to offer to European security. According to him, the US had made it clear that a move towards multinational corps meant more integration, not less, thereby shutting the door on any developments. Consequently, France had decided not to participate in any way in the strategic review. His German and Belgian colleagues tried to reassure him that nothing had been prejudiced. Champenois said that the first US draft had contained much greater detail on how multinational forces would operate, but that the Europeans had deleted this, precisely to keep doors open. Then I expanded my own ideas for the future of NATO. In my view, a solution of variable geometry could be found for multinational forces: those containing US forces would have strong links with SACEUR but purely European units could have much weaker ties. The NATO command structure was bound to change and be scaled down somewhat, which could be combined with making it more amenable to Europeanisation and French involvement. In any case, I expected the army group level to disappear.

Notes

15. Benoit d'Aboville at Round Table Conference, 18 November 1989.
16. Willem F. van Eekelen, "The Future of NATO and Warsaw Pact Strategy", in *Adelphi Papers*, No. 247, *The Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union*, Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of IISS, Oslo, September 1989, IISS, London, 1990, pp. 41-59. The Battle of Kursk became a turning point in the war, perhaps even more significant than Stalingrad. The Soviets had well prepared defences in depth and kept a strong strategic reserve. Yet, they were almost overrun. German sources point to Hitler's hesitation and final cancellation of the largest tank battle of the Second World War after the Allied landing on Sicily made him divert forces to southern Europe. See Lt. Col. Robert Brieger, "Die Schlacht von Kursk, Wendepunkt im Zweiten Weltkrieg", *Truppendienst* 3/1993, pp. 229-235.
17. Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage, Innenansichten der Einigung*, Siedler Verlag, 1991, pp. 42-44.
18. *International Herald Tribune*, 5 February 1990.
19. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed. A Study in Statecraft*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995.
20. The text of these speeches was annexed to my Information Letter to the Assembly, no. 12, doc. C (90) 105.
21. Chevènement's faction had voted against a resolution of support for the war on 16 January, because France would place its Gulf troops under US command, albeit for "specific times and missions". When resigning, Chevènement complained that the course the war had taken was threatening to distance France from the objectives set by the United Nations. See Laurence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991*, Faber and Faber, London, 1993, pp. 351-352.

Chapter Three Action in the Gulf

On 1 August 1990, Iraq attacked Kuwait and occupied it completely. For the first time since World War II, a larger country dismantled and annexed a small neighbour. The next day, the UN Security Council condemned the invasion, demanded that Iraq withdraw all its forces immediately and unconditionally and called upon both countries to begin immediately extensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences. On 6 August, UNSC Resolution 661 declared an economic embargo on Iraq by deciding that all states "shall prevent" the import of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and the sale or supply of any commodities or products, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.

When news of the aggression became known, my mind went back to 1987 when WEU undertook its first military operation during the Iran-Iraq war by organising the mine-clearance operation. After taking office as Secretary-General, I had attempted to do some contingency planning for a similar action in the Gulf region, but did not meet with a positive response. That particular operation had been so special that it would be most unlikely to repeat itself, the argument went. And other scenarios would be so different that they would not lend themselves to detailed planning. In later years, I would not accept such arguments which are a recipe for inaction. If there is a will to act, the lack of capabilities makes implementation very difficult and, if there is no will to act, the lack of available assets presents a convenient excuse. One of the lessons I was to draw from the Kuwait crisis was the need to identify some European capabilities and make them readily available for action "out-of-area".

Of course, the 1987 operation had been a peculiar one. Mines appeared in the Gulf, and some in the Red Sea, without anybody claiming responsibility. We all assumed that the Iranians wanted to disrupt Iraqi sales of oil. Similarly, oil tankers had been attacked to raise the risks - and insurance premiums - of Gulf sailings, compelling the US to "re-flag" Kuwaiti oil tankers. Iran never admitted laying the mines, which had produced a Kafkaesque discussion when the *chargé d'affaires* came to protest Dutch participation in the clearance operation. The meeting ended

quickly with my reply that I had expected appreciation for the removal of a danger affecting everybody. Indeed, the obstruction of free passage through international waterways was an important issue for the West as a whole, but certainly for Europe, which depended on Middle Eastern oil even more than the US. At first, our governments attempted to work through the UN, but when it became clear that no effective clearance operation could be expected from New York, the need for separate action became evident. At that time, as in 1990, NATO was still constrained from engaging in out-of-area operations. Internally, there was no consensus and externally the Third World feared that NATO involvement would draw them into East-West conflict. Some Western European countries had experience with intervention in other continents. Several had contributed forces to the UN operation in Korea, but together they had never assumed any responsibility. Mine-clearance would be the first instance.

In NATO's defence planning, European mine countermeasures had always received attention, for access to their ports had to be assured if US reinforcements were to be counted on. American methods of mine-sweeping concentrated on clearing the approaches to beaches for amphibious landings. They relied heavily on helicopters, working quickly but accepting some losses in the actual assault. For area clearance, mine-sweepers or mine-hunters were required and in that field the Europeans were better equipped than the US. No wonder, therefore, that Washington looked for European participation. They would have done so in any case, for the US Congress became increasingly critical of the lack of European solidarity in what they rightly perceived as common interests. But for mine-clearance the case was overwhelming.

In July 1987, the Netherlands had taken over the presidency of WEU, which fell on Hans van den Broek as Foreign Minister and myself as Minister of Defence. We were prepared to despatch two of our mine-hunters, one of the few successes in equipment cooperation by producing, together with Belgium and France, virtually identical ships. Our problem was how to ensure their protection. The Navy would not have minded sending a frigate as well, but that might have been too much in one go. Moreover, we wanted to stress the multinational character of the enterprise. The country best suited to provide protection was the UK, which already operated the Armilla patrol in the Gulf with four frigates. They also envisaged contributing three mine-sweepers. The other country with important assets in this field, including a support ship, the *Zinnia*, was Belgium, which however had no tradition of sending its ships outside the NATO area except to Zaire. Only close cooperation with others would enable its defence minister, François-Xavier de Donnée, to obtain the necessary parliamentary support.

My first step was to ask for a bilateral meeting with the British. Minister of State Ian Stewart who came over from London, obviously had a brief to remain cautious, but finally agreed to provide "close tactical coordination"

between the ships present in the Gulf. It was a brilliant phrase provided by the UK Ambassador in The Hague, Sir John Margetson, when the talks were stalling, and it was the minimum I needed to go back to my own cabinet and parliament. Belgium was happy with the same arrangement and De Donnée and I had a meeting with George Younger in Brussels on 15 October. The outcome was generally positive, but the British did not want to say anything publicly about the rules of engagement. The *London Times* had published an article saying that the British frigates were too busy to protect the Belgian and Dutch ships. Younger denied that emphatically and the Royal Navy spokesman declared that "in some circumstances" protection would be given. My own press interpreted that as "sometimes not", to which I replied that our mine-hunters would not enter the Gulf if there was an air or surface threat to cope with.

As long as the problem of protection was being sorted out, the Belgian-Dutch flotilla of four mine-hunters and a support ship would operate from the United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. We informed our WEU colleagues during the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 26-27 October and used the opportunity to explore with Younger what we could expect from the UK. He agreed to hold a tripartite exercise within the Gulf, provided it would be made public only after it had taken place. In the plenary Giraud, the French Minister, said that he had proposed a "bureau de coordination" for the Gulf operation, but that it had been rejected by London; as a result we could not go further than establishing a group of contact points in capitals. My Italian colleague, Zanone, told me that he was prepared to work closely with us and to exchange all relevant information, but that an arrangement for protection was resisted by Foreign Minister Andreotti, who was keen on preserving his neutrality in the conflict.

London worked seriously on the agreed exercise and offered a frigate to protect the Belgian-Dutch flotilla sailing through the Strait of Hormuz. I telephoned De Donnée, who also had the green light of his cabinet to enter the Gulf and we agreed to do so in the night of 19 November. If at any moment UK protection would fall away, our forces would head for Abu Dhabi. We kept our fingers crossed, the Netherlands Chief of the Naval Staff slept in his command post that night, but nothing happened.

A few days later Frank Carlucci, my classmate at Princeton and the new US Secretary of Defense, called to ask me to convene a meeting of the ministers contributing ships to the Gulf operation, in the margins of the Defence Planning Committee in Brussels on 1 December. Politically, it would be very important to be able to show to the US Congress that the Europeans were taking responsibility "out-of-area" in close coordination with the US. Seeing him one-on-one beforehand, Admiral Crowe, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thought that the Belgian and Netherlands ships could best operate from Dubai, which would minimise the protection problem. In the meeting during the luncheon interval, Younger confirmed

the continuing need of a mine countermeasures capability in the Gulf during 1988 and was prepared to consider a more durable command arrangement with us.

Our naval staffs, accustomed to working together, had interpreted their instructions in such a way that their ships would come under a joint and rotating command under the name of Operation Grotius. That was more than I had requested, but De Donnée and I were delighted about the positive turn in the UK position and flew to London to seal the final agreement on 21 January 1988. George Younger supported it, but ran into trouble when the outcome was reported to Downing Street. Back at the airport we were informed that a hitch had occurred. What was the matter? Mrs Thatcher did not accept the rotating command under which British ships would come under foreign commanders, even though this was common practice in NATO. In addition, the name Grotius was said to be not particularly appealing to her. Fortunately, the hitch was only temporary as the Belgian and Netherlands navies had no problem with permanent British coordination. When our ships sailed through the Strait of Hormuz, the most dangerous stretch if Iran wanted to retaliate, British frigates were in the vicinity and for the rest of the operation treated our mine-hunters in the same way as they did their own mine-sweepers.

The incident was typical of Mrs Thatcher's attitude towards WEU. Her Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, later wrote in his memoirs that "Margaret could never be trusted not to snort impatiently whenever the three letters WEU crossed her path".²² When I met her at the Queen's garden party in London after her retirement and mentioned my new occupation as Secretary-General, she exclaimed "How dare you accost me", followed by a long diatribe on how dangerous WEU was for maintaining US involvement in Europe. As she wore a large-brimmed hat and we stood closely together, I saw more of her hat than of her eyes, but my wife later reported on her vivid facial expression. At least her handbag did not swing into action.

In the Gulf, France and Italy provided both frigates and mine-sweepers, which continued to operate on a national basis. WEU provided a three-tier coordination framework including:

- high-level consultation involving political and military experts from both foreign and defence ministries of all WEU states;
- meeting of officers serving as contact points in their respective admiralties; and
- regular contacts between task force commanders on the spot.

Luxembourg made a financial contribution to the Belgian and Netherlands forces and Germany sent ships to the Eastern Mediterranean, relieving Allied ships going to the Gulf.

There was early agreement on a division of labour by delineating zones

for searching and clearing. But command and control remained national - except between the British, Belgian and Dutch - as did the rules of engagement. Protection of shipping was limited to merchant vessels sailing under the same flag. The notion of unity of command had not yet matured, primarily because the danger to the ships from other countries ultimately was not assessed to be high.

Looking back on this first experience, I formulated seven politico-military principles for concerted military action out-of-area:

- political objectives should be realistic in the light of changing military realities;
- institutional machinery should be set up to ensure political as well as military coordination;
- when sending forces into a region to protect specific national interests (such as shipping), that aim should be kept firmly in mind and the temptation to push for ambitious political or strategic spin-offs avoided;
- intelligence analyses and changing threat assessments should be immediately shared with allies;
- only first-rate units, equipped and trained to cope with the most intense and demanding levels of high-technology conflict should be deployed;
- non-provocative rules of engagement (ROE) should be set which incorporate the principle of minimum force, but which do not restrict the capacity of forces to defend either themselves or those under their protection. Without revealing details or insisting upon uniformity between national contingents, the general principles behind the ROE should be generally known, so as to prevent painful misunderstandings. The ROE should be regularly reviewed as the situation evolves; and
- the common objectives and reasons for deploying forces should be clearly understood by the international community.²³

The Iraqi invasion took place on 2 August 1990. It was condemned the same day by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 660, which called for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. On 6 August this was followed up by UNSC Resolution 661 imposing a complete embargo on imports from and exports to Iraq, except medical supplies and, in humanitarian instances, foodstuffs. It took a few weeks in August 1990 to mobilise WEU to take the Kuwait crisis seriously. I rang Guelluy in Paris as the French had taken over the WEU presidency, but he doubted whether WEU had a task here. He assumed the US would take action, bilaterally coordinated with some European countries, i.e. Britain and France. In Paris, as in most capitals, we were faced with the absence on holiday of most people familiar with WEU. It took till 21 August before it was possible to organise a ministerial meeting, to which observers from Denmark, Greece

and Turkey were invited. France had proposed to invite the three other EC members, Denmark, Greece and Ireland, but cables from Bonn and London insisted on the presence of Turkey if observers were invited. A representative of the US embassy in London came to see me to make the same point. Dumas accepted and welcomed Turkey gracefully, by saying that it was "particularly concerned" by the crisis. For Belgium and the Netherlands, the meeting came too late to help in providing political support for their national measures. Two Belgian mine-hunters together with the Zinnia and two Dutch frigates had sailed a few days earlier. The meeting nevertheless served to give its blessing to the measures already taken and agreed a common understanding of the purpose of the mission as well as a framework for coordination on the spot. Compared to 1987, the situation was different, because many non-WEU countries were ready to participate and the US was leader of the coalition. The ministers reaffirmed their determination to continue to take all measures necessary to comply with the embargo of Iraq and called on the Security Council to apply any further useful measures to this end. This appeal was inspired by a difference of opinion on the possibility to use force in implementing the embargo. The UK representative and I had argued that we had the right to search ships without any further UNSC resolution, but the Spanish Defence Minister, Serra, wanted a supplementary resolution authorising the use of force. Chevènement was on the British side and announced that French inspection teams would be armed. As a possible compromise he suggested instituting two layers of inspection with varying degrees of intrusion. Asked by the press whether the use of force would be possible, I stuck out my neck and said: "In principle, yes."

France was prepared to go quite far in organising a joint operation and proposed to rotate tactical control over all WEU ships but, as in 1987, the UK was opposed. Building on the experience from 1987-88, an ad hoc group of foreign and defence ministry representatives was instructed to ensure the most effective coordination in the capitals and in the region. Again, contact points were nominated in the ministries of defence. In addition, France saw the way clear to reactivate an old idea, supported by Belgium, to call a meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) on 27 August. On that occasion, where several Chiefs of Naval Staff were representing their countries, important guidelines for coordination were adopted. In principle, the three-tier level of 1987 was reinstated but now with a permanent coordination unit in Paris for the points of contact. On substance they went much further and included:

- definition and performance of mission;
- definition of areas of action;
- coordination of deployments (performed by a French rear admiral on the spot);
- exchange of information;

- mutual protection of shipping in the area; and
- logistic and operational support.

The WEU presence in the Gulf was made more visible at the naval conference held in Bahrain on 8-9 September, where the WEU presidency acted as co-chairman, together with representatives of the US and Arab states concerned. While WEU action remained limited to the naval field, it was quite significant, especially in comparison with the efforts of other countries. At the height of the embargo operation, 39 ships from WEU countries, now also including Portuguese and Spanish vessels, were present in the region and carried out roughly three quarters of all control measures. My efforts to extend them to land and air forces were less successful. At a second ministerial meeting on 18 September, ministers agreed to this and decided "to identify the forms that these new deployments will take, to seek to ensure that they are complementary, to harmonise the missions of member states' forces and to pool their logistic support capabilities as required". Cooperation had started on air and sea transport from home countries and escort of shipping in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. In practice, however, only the British and French provided land and air forces and the Italians air forces, and did not require much, if any, coordination among themselves. They preferred to deal directly with the headquarters of General Schwarzkopf, which from a military point of view was understandable. Germany, like Japan, made an important financial contribution but still could not supply forces on account of its assumed constitutional constraints. It supplied a good number of Fuchs armoured chemical warfare detection vehicles which could have been very important if Iraq had resorted to the use of chemical weapons.

No observers were invited to the September meeting, a decision that was particularly regretted by Turkey. I had asked the US embassy which assets were in short-supply, but a statement was not necessary as Tom King for the UK pointed to the real problems of logistics at crowded airports in Saudi Arabia. He listed deficiencies in air transport, air-to-air refuelling, chemical decontamination and engineering equipment. He was also concerned about protecting shipping against terrorist activities. De Michelis wanted measures against countries not applying the embargo, such as the closure of our airspace to their carriers. Genscher was prepared to say so publicly and we included it in the communiqué. My own intervention started on an upbeat note: never since World War II had we seen such a high degree of solidarity in a common action. Yet, I felt that the most dangerous scenario currently was an Iraqi action against Jordan. How could we deter that? Equally, I advocated a study of the impact of the Gulf crisis on our positions in East-West arms control negotiations and our approach to European security in general. The future course of events with its prolonged use of air power and the massive application of force would make it even more necessary to draw lessons. The joint specific guidelines

for coordinated action by WEU countries to enforce the naval embargo authorised intimidating manoeuvres and the firing of warning shots. In the event that a vessel failed to stop, further measures should be taken, in accordance with the specific circumstances, to halt the suspect ship. The degree of force to be used to that end remained the responsibility of the authorities of each participating country. In case of a hostile act the principles of self-defence as defined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter would apply, which were extended to the naval forces of WEU countries and to merchant ships escorted or located within immediate range of each naval unit. At the request of France, this provision was also applied to the fleets of the other nations taking part in the embargo against Iraq.

Shortly before hostilities started, the guidelines were adapted to allow participation in direct operations against Iraqi forces, by escorting a carrier task force or an amphibious force or by giving naval gunfire support. Possible support operations included mine countermeasures, protection of mine-hunters, protection of offshore installations and participation in medical or refugee evacuation. Both the UK and France made clear that there was no obligation to assign their forces exclusively to operations carried out under the WEU framework, but if the naval force of a WEU country were put under the tactical command and/or control of a non-WEU country, the WEU coordinating authority would be informed.

UNSC Resolution 678, enabling the use of force, was passed on 29 November 1990 with Secretary of State Baker in the chair. Unless Iraq fully complied with the UN demands on or before 15 January 1991, member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait were authorised "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security to the area". This formula provided the basis for the US-led coalition to execute Operation Desert Storm. On 16 January, intensive aerial bombardments started, culminating in a brief ground action which liberated Kuwait on 27 February. Hostilities were suspended the next day, when Iraq had declared its willingness to comply with Resolution 660, but it took the UNSC another month to set the conditions for a formal ceasefire. Resolution 689 of 3 April instituted a demilitarised zone between Iraq and Kuwait, to be monitored by a UN observer unit (UNIKOM); a UN Special Commission to oversee the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all Iraqi chemical and biological weapons and related capabilities and facilities as well as ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres; an Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission; and a UN Compensation Commission as a subsidiary body of the Security Council.

Alarmed by the news of starving Kurds seeking refuge in the mountains of northern Iraq, the Security Council took an unprecedented step on 5 April in adopting Resolution 688 demanding that Iraq end repression of the civilian population in many parts of the country and insisting that it allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those in

need of assistance. The text was interesting because it reaffirmed "the commitment of all member states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all states in the region", but at the same time condemned "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region". The reference to a threat to peace overruled the principle of non-intervention and gave legitimacy to operation Provide Comfort executed by a number of NATO countries and totalling 30,000 troops. Here the notion of "safe haven" had a concrete meaning: Iraqi forces were prevented from operating to the North of a line on the map and relief goods were provided to the area. In declaring "safe areas" in Bosnia several years later the aspect of protection was to be sorely lacking.

The WEU Ministers of Foreign Affairs held an informal meeting in Luxembourg on 8 April, in the margins of a meeting of the Twelve. They instructed the ad hoc group to meet the next day in Paris, to consider what could be done to assist implementation of the two resolutions. It was agreed to continue with the military points of contact and to indicate what resources could be made available, especially air-drop equipment and large support helicopters to redistribute supplies delivered to airports in Turkey. France took it upon itself to discuss with the Iranian Embassy whether help was needed at entry points into that country. Secondly, the need was stressed for active participation in the Special Commission to supervise the disarmament measures and, thirdly, it was agreed to review the procedures for embargo enforcement at sea which had to be attuned to a selective embargo.

Except for the continuation of the naval embargo, these conclusions did not lead to any particular WEU action. They even seemed a bit inflated by the French presidency. Nevertheless, they served a purpose in increasing the awareness of the member countries that they had to contribute in one way or another towards alleviating the suffering of the Kurdish population. On the wider issue of a new security order in the Middle East, evoked by US Secretary of State Baker, WEU did not play a role. Washington addressed its preliminary thoughts to the European Political Cooperation (EPC), where Jannuzzi tried to develop general principles concerning confidence-building measures and a balance of forces. WEU made use of them later, when we developed the dialogue with the Maghreb countries. The EPC paper also made the point that an economically and politically viable Iraq, keeping its territorial integrity, constituted an important element for a lasting equilibrium. Everybody agreed, but few expected Saddam Hussein to last for years. As he managed to stay in power, there was no chance of the countries in the region taking a lead in developing a constructive relationship. That would have been difficult in any case, for as the US paper reminded us, a free-standing balance of power between Iraq, Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be impossible. The GCC countries

would always need to rely to some extent on outside help to deter their two more powerful neighbours. Nevertheless, their situation would be eased by a force relationship between Iran and Iraq at the lowest possible level. Washington favoured bolstering the international status of the GCC and suggested new multinational links, which might include WEU in addition to the regular meetings already taking place with the European Community. WEU did not follow this up and left the political side of the Gulf crisis to the EPC. In this way, it did not get involved either in the altercations between the Twelve, where Britain and the Netherlands were annoyed by French solo efforts on the diplomatic front and blocked a suggestion to send a European delegation to Baghdad before the dramatic encounter between James Baker and Tariq Aziz had taken place in Geneva on 9 January.²⁴

The Kuwaiti operation was significant as a model for possible future action. It was not a NATO operation, but an ad hoc coalition led by the US. It used NATO procedures and rules of engagement and the movement of the US V Corps was greatly facilitated by NATO practice, taking it out of Germany as a Reforger exercise in reverse. Of course, there was much consultation in NATO on the political side as well, but there the case for the Alliance had to rest. We should be grateful to the UK, French and Italian forces which were prepared to incur losses, thereby stressing solidarity with their US ally. But we should be equally grateful that the US managed to keep their casualties so low that transatlantic recriminations did not resurface.

On the legal side, the operation demonstrated the likely basis for future action: not a precise mandate by the UN Security Council, let alone a UN operation, but an "enabling" resolution calling upon member states to use all necessary means to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Subsequently, the same method was used for Haiti and Bosnia. Such a resolution was sufficient mandate for the members to organise themselves in the organisations to which they belonged (Article 48 of the United Nations Charter), either NATO or WEU, or in an ad hoc coalition. The US would have been prepared to act on the basis of Article 51, the right of individual and collective self-defence, but did not have to push their case when they obtained the enabling resolution. Article 51 remains an important potential basis for future action but is limited on the political side by the wish of public opinion to obtain some UN mandate, and by legal argument that it could apply only as long as the Security Council had not dealt with the matter.

The Kuwait crisis showed me that it was possible to agree on a specific foreign policy objective without having overall consensus on a common foreign policy in its entirety. Everybody shared the aim of expelling Saddam Hussein and restoring Kuwaiti independence. On wider aspects of policy towards the Middle East in general and towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, there were diverging views. The same was likely to happen if the war aims had been extended. It is the task of diplomacy to find agreement on specific

issues. Common analysis and planning will help, but without them joint action might nevertheless be possible.

In the autumn of 1990, writing in *Survival*, I drew some preliminary conclusions.²⁵ First, I was impressed by the US capability to move strong forces over long distances and I wondered what effect that would have on American willingness to station them overseas. On this I was partially right for V Corps never returned to Germany. Yet, the commitment to maintain forces in Europe was kept at 100,000 by President Clinton, which was less than a third of what it was in earlier days, but sufficient for their new role in a changing Europe. From their side, European governments had become more relaxed about the use of American forces based on their territory for purposes outside Europe. Previously, they had been ambiguous about it, because it might have implied agreement with their mission and weakened defences in Central Europe at the same time. Obviously, the improved state of East-West relations and the consensus in the UN contributed to reducing previous sensitivities. Secondly, I felt that the importance of mobile and flexible forces had been confirmed once again, which would have an impact on arms control negotiations and strengthen the argument against including naval forces in the CFE framework. And finally, the crisis had shown that in spite of the momentous changes in Europe, the scenario of one country overrunning another could not be discounted. In fact, the end of polarisation in East-West relations could unleash regional conflicts which no longer risked escalating to the level of the superpowers. Other ways would have to be found to exercise a police function in international relations. All member countries were evaluating their experience, France probably most of all. In terms of domestic politics, President Mitterrand had handled the war rather skilfully. His adversaries, ranging from the extreme right to the Communists and the Socialist faction of Chevènement, were confounded by the success of the military coalition against Iraq, the reasonably prominent role of France's armed forces, and the popular support for the President's course. On the military side, however, serious problems had to be overcome. The aircraft carriers were not used at all, probably because of the obsolescence of the Crusader aircraft. The "Clemenceau" transported a combat helicopter regiment and some trucks to Saudi Arabia, then returned to Toulon, leading the critics to sneer that the *porte-avion* had become a *porte-camion*. The air force Jaguars had not been modernised, which limited their possibilities for ground support, and the light Daguet division could not be used for frontal assaults against Iraqi armoured units. It performed its flanking manoeuvre brilliantly, but was not tested by a fighting enemy. The lessons learned pointed in the direction of more professional forces, because conscripts could not be used against their will; more long-range logistical support; and even more imperatively, improved intelligence, communications and information systems. These conclusions would greatly influence the programmes France sought to foster through WEU.

Of course, they had wider application as well. The war was a failure of deterrence as well as of the evaluation of intelligence. Satellite systems had proven their value in detecting missile launches, but were not sufficient for locating their delivery systems. Rapid transport of Patriots had given Israel the moral support needed to keep it out of the war, but had also underlined its dependence upon US systems.

From the point of view of the WEU Secretariat, the functioning of an ad hoc group was not ideal. Its meetings usually took place in the presidency's capital and were chaired by the presidency. The Secretariat was represented but could do little else than write the minutes of the meeting. Yet, I could hardly complain as my own compatriots had set a precedent in 1987 and the size of the Secretariat was so small that the person following the Kuwait operation was also the secretary of the Defence Representatives Group.

Notes

22. Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty*, Pan Books, London, 1994, p. 544. Speaking in Bruges on 20 September 1988, Mrs Thatcher warned against any development of WEU resulting from Franco-German initiatives.

23. *Survival*, November/December 1990, Vol. XXXII, No. 6.

24. The WEU Institute of Security Studies brought together analyses of the different national experiences in member countries in *Western Europe and the Gulf*, edited by Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, Paris, 1992.

25. *Survival*, November/December 1990, Vol. XXXII, No. 6.

Chapter Four The Role and Place of WEU

As the Intergovernmental Conference of 1990-91, which was to result in the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, got under way, I contemplated the best way for WEU to contribute. Several possibilities came to mind. First, a WEU input into the negotiations, but at that time there was no link with the European Community and it was unclear whether and how such a contribution would be taken into consideration by the IGC. The second was an autonomous "reflection" within WEU about its own role and place. The third option was a formal approach towards treaty revision. The Brussels Treaty was concluded for a period of fifty years, ending in 1998. But if nobody gave notice of one year of his intention to quit, WEU would continue without change. Nevertheless, 1998 could be an appropriate date to adapt the treaty to new circumstances. Deputy Secretary-General Holthoff did not want to consider the last option, but in spite of his opposition I asked Messineo, our legal expert, for an analytical paper, for my own use.

The first time the Council discussed the question was on 26 September 1990. The Italians announced that in the Twelve they had introduced a so-called non-paper - a diplomatic way of saying that the document was only a basis for discussion - which suggested full transfer of WEU to the future European Union. Asked by the UK how European defence would fit into transatlantic relations, Ambassador Biancheri replied that this went beyond the remit of the IGC, but that he saw a devolution of collective defence issues to NATO and a distinction between the discussion of broad security issues and detailed defence planning. The foreign ministers of the Twelve would meet in Asolo (Italy) in October to address the matter of priority issues for Europe. The Belgian foreign minister had already expressed support for the idea of merger and Spain was also sympathetic. It referred to the Hague Platform, which declared that an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.

The same day, the question of treaty revision was on the agenda. I proposed to have at least a first round before the IGC, so that we would know what issues would be involved. France wanted "parallelism" with the discussions on a new European security architecture and the Netherlands argued that those discussions had to be clarified considerably before changes in the treaty could be considered. The UK had no objection to a

general exchange of views, but saw a distinction between a housekeeping exercise to remove obsolete clauses and a more radical review.

The foreign ministers of the Twelve met informally at Asolo on 6-7 October to discuss the preparation of the IGC. Several participants found the meeting disappointing. Chairman De Michelis had earlier proposed to incorporate all security aspects into the CFSP and to transfer the competences of WEU to the European Union. He was supported by his Belgian colleague, Eyskens, albeit in attenuated form; a transitory period would be necessary but in the meantime the two institutions should come closer together. Spain and Portugal also were sympathetic but the UK, Denmark and Ireland had strong reservations. Germany was curiously silent and France surprised the meeting by advocating maintaining national foreign policies; only very essential and common interests, identified as such by the European Council, should be the subject of a common foreign policy. The Netherlands wanted to maintain WEU as it was, eventually associating the Central European countries with it. On the CFSP, Van den Broek could agree to a pragmatic approach concentrating on specific subjects, later to be known as the Asolo List and confirmed by the European Council in Rome in December. The most interesting intervention came from Delors who strongly pleaded in favour of maintaining a single community containing all different aspects on the basis of the same criteria and the same institutional principles. On security he asked three questions: Do we have essential common interests and are we prepared to defend them? Are security and defence integral parts of the Union? Do we have the means to realise our objectives? Personally, he answered in the affirmative, but at least the EU should discuss these questions. Institutionally, Delors favoured a Political Secretariat within the Council Secretariat but with high-level participation by the Commission (at the level of Political Director). This secretariat should be the only preparatory body for decisions made by the General Affairs Council on the basis of options and guidelines from the European Council. On WEU, he thought it difficult to transfer its competences to the EU, but personally he would be sympathetic towards inclusion of an Article V-type commitment in the future EU treaty.

The Permanent Council took up the matter again on 31 October. Ambassador Biancheri reported on the European Council in Rome, which, with a UK reservation, had formulated the objective of a common foreign and security policy and with regard to security wanted "to go beyond the present limits". Minister De Michelis had reduced his original ambitions and now saw the merger of EU and WEU only as a long-term prospect. Italy would not proceed hastily, but saw possibilities in the fields of industrial cooperation, weapons and technology transfer and peacekeeping operations. The next day I called my staff together to see where WEU could become more operational. In the Gulf I had seen how several countries had used their lack of operational capabilities as an excuse for not doing more, especially on ground forces. If Europe was deficient, it was not in numbers,

but in the flexibility of troops to operate outside the NATO area, the lack of long-range transport and of real-time intelligence directly available to the commander in the field. Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, whose functions included Chairman of the Space Group, emphasised the emerging field of verification, where the WEU countries were organising joint inspection teams and considered the pooling of inspection quotas. Verification would apply at three levels: on land in pursuance of the CFE Treaty, in the air with the Open Skies provisions, and in space with future European capabilities. For the rest he saw a caucus function for the crystallisation of national positions, perhaps with an occasional input into NATO consultations. Would that be enough to create a European identity, Richard Tibbels asked, and should we not attempt to create a continuous and consistent European attitude in NATO? We concluded that in the IGC nobody considered the inclusion of defence proper in the EU, but a number of related issues such as arms production, proliferation and peacekeeping might be incorporated into the future common foreign policy.

Belgium and Italy were keenest on the merger of EU and WEU. France accepted it as a long-term goal. The Netherlands, Portugal and the UK had reservations and, among the Twelve, Denmark and Ireland would be difficult. Germany took a long-term approach by establishing an EU competence in the field of security and furthering a cautious rapprochement between EU and WEU. Our task seemed to be the progressive introduction of security policies in step with developments towards a European Union, in accordance with reforms in NATO, while keeping in touch with the evolution of pan-European structures. There was no need to create new institutions; we should, rather, make better use of existing ones, but in doing so we always met the problem of membership.

Not all European members of NATO belonged to the EU and not all EU partners were members of WEU. Part of the problem could be mitigated by having the European Council also meet as a WEU body or declaring its decisions and guidelines relevant to WEU. After all, if the Twelve agreed it implied that also the Nine of WEU were in agreement. In addition, we envisaged links between the date and place of EU and WEU ministerial meetings, joint meetings of working groups (especially the ad hoc groups on crisis situations), links at parliamentary level between the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly and contacts with the General Affairs Council and the European Commission on arms production, single market aspects and export controls. In presenting our ideas, we should make clear that other options would not be open because they would imply the loss of vital aspects of the WEU Treaty. Even if the EU would still need NATO for collective defence, it would be a negative sign if WEU were to drop its more constraining Article V. European integration should point to greater solidarity, not less.

All my senior colleagues in the Secretariat were fascinated by the opportunity to influence the debate on the IGC and formulated their

thoughts in writing. Jacomet argued that, given time, a merger between EU and WEU would be both unavoidable and necessary. He saw a parallel with the functioning of the internal market: it would be difficult to fix internal rules without defining a common policy with regard to the rest of the world. Military integration would be possible only if the European security identity corresponded to a geopolitical conception of Europe. Consequently, we should work on the harmonisation of military policies, a common position on the stationing of forces, both national and multinational, on the territory of member countries and a new contract with the US and Canada including a significant European contribution to the common defence. Jacomet also attached considerable importance to what he called "strategic solidarities" on the periphery of Europe, particularly with Turkey, the neutral countries, the new democracies and the Mediterranean.

Tibbels argued that our main task would be to strike the right balance between greater European responsibility for its own defence, which would require a greater degree of autonomy, and the need to retain effective military structures which reflected both US and European interests. Therefore, it would not suffice to either discuss all defence and security issues within EPC or to move towards a caucus of all European members of NATO. A strengthened WEU seemed the right forum to act as a bridge between European integration and NATO. In order to function more effectively some means would be needed to ensure a continuous and consistent European approach on Alliance matters through regular meetings of NATO ambassadors of the WEU countries and designation of WEU liaison officers in their delegations. He also foresaw occasional meetings of a "super" Enlarged WEU Council comprising NATO and WEU ambassadors, political directors, high-ranking defence ministry officials and SWG representatives. On the EU side, he suggested meetings of the WEU heads of government following a European Council to take action to follow up political positions taken by the Twelve.

Reflecting on these contributions, Holthoff felt that we should refrain from offering models, but rather spell out the conditions which any European security structure should safeguard. Basically, these were: to develop a security policy in step with further integration towards a European Union; to ensure that this would be in accordance with the further development of the Alliance; and to take into account the pan-European security interests and the cooperative structures related to them. As practical steps (which we should not advocate ourselves at present) he suggested the deletion of Article 30 of the Single Act, which would establish a general assumption in favour of the CFSP. Some subjects might be difficult to tackle, but nothing should be out of bounds in principle. Holthoff also favoured synchronisation of meetings of the European Council and WEU ministers and of the lower levels of both institutions.

In a final session we drafted the text of our paper on the basis of a summary by Tibbels. I decided to leave out the reference to back-to-back

meetings of heads of government of EU and WEU. The relationship with the European Council was likely to be the most sensitive issue and I did not want to formalise it too much. We kept the point of synchronisation of other meetings. Equally, I dropped the suggestion of a "super" Enlarged Council as I found it too unwieldy for effective reflection and decision-making. In the final stages of our preparation we received an input from the WEU Institute for Security Studies in a perceptive note by its deputy director, Nicole Gnesotto, entitled "Which security dimension for the Twelve?". Written for a seminar on 13 November 1990, it would appear as Cahiers de Chaillot No. 1 in March 1991 under the more provocative title "European Defence. Why not the Twelve?". Her analysis of current paradoxes encapsulated our dilemmas: In the traditional East-West context the disappearance of an immediate Soviet threat had made security essentially a political concept, but in North-South relations the Kuwait crisis had emphasised the military aspects of security. The second ambivalence was what Nicole called the tendency of "collective unanimity" to attribute security competences to a panoply of international organisations - UN, CSCE, NATO, the Twelve and WEU - but to renationalise their defence policies in terms of unilateral cuts of forces and budgets. Most countries hesitated in choosing among the different options and accumulated their priorities. Everything had become ambiguous: the USSR had become both pitiful and menacing, partner and adversary. NATO was in decline but renewable. Europe would either dilute or impose itself and the out-of-area aspect insinuated itself more and more into European affairs, both as a menace and an opportunity. As a result, no single security structure seemed able to take all these variables into account and a co-existence of institutions therefore seemed necessary. The existing texts on political cooperation were found to be wanting in that they did not set clear objectives. The Single Act of Luxembourg only talked about "together implementing a European foreign policy" and the member states were ready to coordinate the political and economic aspects of security more than before. The Franco-German initiative of 10 April went a little further in proposing to define and implement a CFSP and the European Council of Dublin of June 1990 decided to convene an IGC on 14 December 1990, with the objective of transforming the whole of the relations between member states in a European Union possessing the necessary means of action.

If the objective was to soften the collective defence aspect and to stress the political concertation, it would not be necessary to incorporate WEU into the EU. In fact, in doing so the loss of the military assistance clause would be immense in terms of solidarity and political vision. But an amendment to the Single Act could extend its scope to security in general. If, on the other hand, the Twelve wished to sign a mutual defence pact, they should confirm the WEU Treaty and have it signed by Denmark, Greece and Ireland. Would that be possible? And if so, it would require a negotiation between the Twelve and NATO, especially in view of Article IV

of the Modified Brussels Treaty committing WEU to seek the advice of the NATO military authorities. Nicole Gnesotto saw three options: A rebuilding of a Euro-Atlantic system on a completely new basis; limiting the EU in its security dimension; or adopting a gradual approach, recognising the common defence as the final objective, which would only be achieved at another IGC, the date of which could be determined in 1992. The latter, preferred, option would for the time being separate defence from security, but would not prevent the Twelve from taking any initiatives. She admitted that a council of defence ministers was not yet on, but envisaged mixed councils, perhaps also including finance ministers on certain subjects, such as comparing defence budgets. I had sympathy for her third option, but was sceptical about the mixed councils. My experience with jumbo councils of the EC had not been positive and, in any case, I saw little use in convening them as long as their objective had not been clarified.

I forwarded our brainchild on 22 November as a personal reflection. It was a risky undertaking, for it would undercut my credibility if it did not strike the right balance. My deputy had favoured a more cautious approach, but fortunately it appeared to be well on target. It was one of the occasions during my term of office where I felt that if the Secretary-General did not take an initiative, nobody else would. In this case that did not prove to be true, for a few weeks later a Franco-German paper was launched in which Kohl and Mitterrand formulated proposals for the IGC, but it did not deal fully with WEU. In any case, after their initiative, a paper of my own would no longer have been appropriate.

The title of the paper was "Personal Reflections of the Secretary-General on the Future of European Security and Defence Cooperation". It started out by sketching the three complementary levels around which Europe's security would be organised in the years to come: a European level currently based on WEU and the Twelve of the EC; an Atlantic level based on NATO, the only organisation binding North America to the defence of Europe; and a pan-European level based on the CSCE which would operate most effectively on the level of principles and prevention and could not provide the firm defence guarantees for the whole of Europe which existed in the Washington and Brussels treaties. An Atlantic Alliance with effective defence arrangements would remain imperative, both as a stabilising factor on the continent of Europe where the Soviet Union or Russia retained the largest military capabilities and as a forum where North America and Western Europe could discuss common security issues. However, this dual role did not lessen the urgency for a radical reappraisal of Alliance organisation and structures. It should define the respective roles of American and European forces and assign to the Europeans a significantly more important part. In a situation where, by 1994, all Soviet forces would have withdrawn to their own territory, a twofold risk would need to be avoided: firstly, a renationalisation of European defence policies and unilateral, uncoordinated reductions and, secondly, a situation in which the US would

see no further justification for keeping any forces in Europe, thereby weakening its commitment to the defence of Europe.

On the European side, the paper stated that whilst all EC member states may be able to accept that, in the long term, a European Union should provide itself with the means necessary to defend its interests, this was clearly not the case in the short term. A gradual approach therefore suggested itself. A number of small steps could be envisaged to bring defence industrial and technological cooperation, export control and non-proliferation within the Community's competence, but it would be difficult to separate broader security issues from defence policy. At the present stage, I felt that a move to discuss all defence and security questions within European Political Cooperation would be a step back, both in terms of the Community's development and in terms of the structures which existed in WEU. The Western European Union possessed a number of institutional advantages, which could allow it to act as a bridge between the process of European integration and the Atlantic Alliance:

- A. It is an organisation, autonomous from the Atlantic Alliance, based on a Treaty which affirms the member countries' intention progressively to achieve European integration. This objective was confirmed in the Platform on European Security Interests and subsequently in the Protocol of Accession of Portugal and Spain, which was ratified by all the Parliaments of the Nine. These two documents moreover explicitly state that "the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence".
- B. It is the only European organisation based on a mutual defence commitment (Article V of the WEU Treaty).
- C. It brings together both Foreign and Defence Ministers.
- D. Its Treaty places no geographical restrictions on its competences, which has enabled it to play an operational role in the Gulf (Article VIII.3).
- E. It contains a clause committing the member countries to work in close cooperation with NATO.
- F. It is backed by a permanent, international Secretariat.

Our task was therefore to identify practical ways in which WEU could play a more effective role. The objective vis-à-vis the EC should be to demonstrate more clearly, by developing its contacts and actions, that it represents the defence dimension of the European integration process. The objective vis-à-vis the Alliance should be to ensure that a continuous and coherent European approach is developed in order to influence the

Alliance's evolution, strengthen the European component and define the respective roles of the US and Europe in a new "transatlantic security contract". In introducing European contributions or positions into Alliance debates, it will be essential to ensure that such positions are sufficiently flexible to take account of the interests of, and arguments put forward by, other Allies. In the same way, positions tabled by those allies should be open to adaptation in the light of European positions.

Moreover, the more WEU could successfully take on operational responsibilities (in "out of Europe" crises such as the Gulf, observation satellites or arms control verification) the more its credibility would be raised and the more effective this bridge function would become. In this context, thought should also be given to ways in which, in future crises, European coordinated action could be set up more quickly.

The main institutional innovation proposed was to place WEU under the European Council with the aim of enabling the Heads of State and Government of the Twelve to discuss all aspects of Europe's security and defence without there being any "taboo" subjects. This would make clearer the long-term commitment to a European Union, including a defence dimension, without prejudicing either the existing WEU structures or the structures of the Twelve. WEU ministerials could be held immediately after meetings of the EC General Affairs Council/EPC ministerial meetings and joint meetings of EC/EPC and WEU bodies could be held to prepare such back-to-back meetings. Also greater contacts should be established between the respective presidencies and secretariats.

Practical steps vis-à-vis the Alliance could include the introduction of WEU contributions into Alliance debate by the Permanent Representative of the country holding the WEU presidency as well as regular information on WEU activities and explanation of common WEU positions. Secondly, concertation should take place between the Permanent Representatives of WEU countries to NATO on those items on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council which had specific European aspects: this concertation should take place with the appropriate degree of transparency with regard to other allies. Finally, liaison officers should be designated in member countries' delegations to NATO and contacts between the two secretariats should be intensified.

These proposals obviously raised important questions concerning the relationship of WEU with non-member countries in both the EU and NATO. The paper pointed out that any premature enlargement of WEU for the sake of symmetry should be avoided before the inter-relationship between NATO, EC and WEU had been established more clearly. The highly sensitive subject of observers to WEU ministerial meetings could perhaps be bypassed for the other EC countries if the proposed EC-WEU relationship were sufficiently close through the back-to-back sessions, joint meetings of officials, exchange of telegrams and secretariat contacts. For other European NATO countries, a first step could be to intensify the information mecha-

nism currently enjoyed by Turkey and Greece and to offer similar mechanisms to Norway and Ireland. In the future WEU could start to define the content of security contracts designed to reinforce its relationship with those NATO countries which had a specific and major role in their collective defence due to their strategic positions (such as Norway and Turkey). The NATO commitments could be supplemented with further specific assistance and security cooperation.

The next point was formulated only as a question, not a recommendation. Did WEU need to be based alongside the main NATO and EC institutions in Brussels in order to function effectively? Any solution involving a move to Brussels had to ensure that WEU retain its own clear identity. This would imply some form of permanent representation and secretariat, otherwise the Council would not be able "to exercise its function continuously" as stipulated in Article VIII, 2 of the treaty. Appointing either the Permanent Representatives to NATO or EC would risk submerging WEU's identity, but nothing should prevent member countries from making use of their NATO and EC delegations in the work of WEU. The paper added that the experience of reactivation had shown that the involvement of senior officials from capitals responsible for politico-military affairs was essential for results to be achieved.

After circulating my note I asked Franco Destefanis, the number three in the Secretariat, to send a copy to Gianni Jannuzzi, the director of the EPC Secretariat. He wrote back to let us know that he accepted all our ideas, which he thought in line with the views emerging during the preparations for the IGC. The same went for my assessment of the situation, except for the last sentence of paragraph 9, where I had said that any move to discuss and define security questions within EPC would be a step back. My reasoning was that it would be difficult to obtain the agreement of all EC countries - especially Ireland - and that WEU had moved on to include the defence ministers. A gradual approach therefore suggested itself. On substance, Jannuzzi agreed that Ireland would be unlikely to agree to joint meetings and doubted the possibility of placing WEU under the European Council. On the representation in WEU, he questioned whether a permanent council would be really necessary and preferred a Political Committee type of solution with, if necessary, a role for the bilateral ambassadors. Jannuzzi pointed out that Greece was keen to include a mutual defence guarantee in the EU and thought that it would be possible to find arrangements to reassure Turkey during the transition phase, before Turkish entry into the EC. That was the only point we disagreed on, as I saw little prospect of a rapid Turkish accession to the European Union.

The EPC Secretariat had also prepared a note on the implications of a common security policy, which advocated the incorporation within the Union of certain "forward-looking" security competences, such as a common, coordinated or parallel participation in UN peacekeeping operations or other military actions taken under the authority of the UN

Security Council; similar participation in disarmament and security arrangements agreed in the CSCE framework; and the development of common policies in the fields of transfer of military technology, control of arms exports and non-proliferation. On the relationship between the EU and WEU, the paper made the important point that it might be possible to ensure general political convergence without formal mutual involvement. The members of WEU, all being members of the EU, would be committed on their own account to situating their common actions within the framework of the foreign policies defined by the European Union. Such a relationship would not engage the responsibility of the other EU members who did not participate in WEU, except insofar as would be implied by a general spirit of European cooperation. In other words, in practice WEU activities would be dependent on EU policies, but not vice-versa. This relationship could be expressed in a separate commitment by WEU to place its actions in the framework of the policies of the Union.

Around the same time, Spain made a contribution to the IGC group, stating that the common security policy should include the common defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty and advocating close contacts and synchronisation of meetings of EU and WEU. EU members not belonging to WEU and the European Commission should be invited as observers and EU/WEU representatives in other security organisations should convene in informal caucuses. The future CFSP was conceived as a common policy and national policies should be compatible with this common policy.

The first reactions to my paper came at the Enlarged Council of 30 November. The French political director, Dufourcq - a colleague of mine when we were both *correspondant européen* for European Political Cooperation affairs in our respective capitals during the early seventies - was very positive and could accept my paper. He agreed with a role for WEU at the confluence of European and Atlantic activities and argued that only WEU could give substance to the European pillar of NATO. Procedurally, he preferred to agree certain basic principles first, anchor WEU in the European Union and afterwards discuss practical arrangements such as the composition of the Council. As he told me personally, he favoured a Council made up of Political Directors with a permanent group made up of deputy Permanent Representatives to the European Union in Brussels. This was the first recognition of the need to move to the Belgian capital, a point made previously by the UK delegation. To be taken seriously, WEU had to be close to NATO and to the European institutions. John Weston, the UK Political Director, also took a positive attitude. He saw the Alliance developing in a binary shape - European and American - but did not believe the EU had a role for hard defence issues. Those subjects the Union should subcontract to WEU, which should be more specific on its link with NATO through Article IV, the provision that WEU would rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. On behalf of Germany, Rolf Hofstetter was more cautious. He found the

notion of bridging between the EU and NATO interesting as WEU was both a European body and suited to keeping essential links with NATO. Collocation in Brussels now seemed possible. The Netherlands' Political Director, Peter van Walsum, thought that a consensus existed on keeping the Alliance, but not on the reasons why. For him, the US was not only in Europe to defend us against the Soviet Union, so more should be said on this. In any case, I could be satisfied with the first round, which took place a few days before the General Affairs Council in Brussels would discuss the IGC on 4 December. A day earlier I addressed the WEU Assembly and outlined my approach. I also used my presence in Paris to talk to Hubert Védrine, Advisor to President Mitterrand and to the State Secretary for European Affairs, Elisabeth Guigou. Both recognised that the IGC had hardly touched on security questions. Mrs Guigou was interested in whether the Danish social democrats would move in a European direction. Védrine told me that Mitterrand had no firm view on the IGC and saw the role of WEU as primarily "out-of-area". As early as December 1989, at their breakfast during the European Council in Strasbourg, Mitterrand had told Kohl that he would like to withdraw French forces from Germany before German public opinion turned against them and German citizens started throwing stones. Asked whether they might stay if a new basis could be found, Védrine answered affirmatively, but not very concretely. He did not give me any indication of moving towards a concept of multinational forces. Waiting to be received by him, I saw Joachim Bitterlich from the German Chancellor's office shuffling in and out with draft papers. Two days later I saw what they had been working on: Kohl and Mitterrand sent a joint letter to Prime Minister Andreotti, who would chair the European Council in Rome on 15-16 December 1990, which would formally open the IGC.

The letter covered many aspects, and contained several formulations which would find their way to future texts, but also some soft language. Considerable attention was paid to the role of the European Council itself, which for the effectiveness of the Union should get a larger role. It would exercise the function of arbiter and guarantor and of promoter of a coherent deepening of the integration. It would decide on the opening of new domains of cooperation and establish the orientations and essential guidelines in the principal domains of action of the Union, particularly for its foreign policy and its common security policy. In the European Council, qualified majority should be the rule for Community matters. Exceptions should apply only in a limited number of areas and in cases which were to be listed exhaustively in the treaty. The CFSP would be destined to extend to all areas. The European Council should define the priority areas for common action: for example, the relations with the USSR and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the implementation of the conclusions of the CSCE summit and their follow-up, the disarmament negotiations and the relations with the states bordering on the Mediterranean. In this way, political cooperation could evolve towards a genuine common foreign

policy. Moreover, the Political Union should include a genuine common security policy, which in time would lead to a common defence. The two leaders proposed that the conference would study how WEU and the Political Union could establish a clear organic relationship and how consequently WEU - made more operational - could form part of the Political Union and formulate on its account a policy of common security. The links between WEU and the member states of the Community which did not belong to it could progressively be reinforced. The cooperation between WEU and the European members of the Alliance would also be developed. The structure of decision-making would rest on the General Affairs Council which would deal with the Community aspects and implement the foreign and security policies defined by the European Council. These decisions should in principle be taken unanimously, it being understood that abstention would not present an obstacle. The treaty would foresee the possibility of majority voting on certain decisions, either on its entry into force or after a specific period. The European Council could also decide that implementing arrangements would be subject to majority decisions. The reference to NATO allies was a bit meagre in saying only that the obligations taken towards them should be respected.

1. Progress in Paris

The ordinary ministerial session of WEU took place on 10 December in Paris, but the discussion on the future of WEU was restricted to a brainstorming session only. Defence Minister Chevènement had taken the initiative to invite his colleagues to dinner the previous evening. During the Netherlands presidency of 1987-88, I had done the same for a breakfast session before the start of the meeting, but a dinner was a first for WEU. I had the impression that Chevènement was looking for a conceptual discussion on how French and NATO doctrines could be made complementary. He attached importance to the CHODs meeting and suggested that they could start discussing the concept of a Rapid Deployment Force, even though a formal decision creating it had not yet been taken. Part of the meeting, however, was taken up by questions for clarification of the Kohl-Mitterrand letter and a political discussion of the role of WEU. The Netherlands Minister Ter Beek saw WEU as a bridge between NATO and EC/EPC which should be developed pragmatically: NATO remained essential for European security, but if European Union was achieved, it should also cover defence. For Belgium, Minister Coëme would like to convene the Ministers of Defence of the twelve EC members and make separate arrangements with other countries, like Turkey. Rognoni for Italy supported an informal meeting, but this obviously was a bridge too far for Minister Stoltenberg, who wanted to await changes in NATO before creating a new group. He thought that we could come to conclusions on a stronger role of WEU only if we arrived at a convincing definition of the European

pillar of NATO. Chevènement responded by doubting whether the US did have the same position as Europe towards the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Arab world, which in turn solicited Dutch and Spanish rebuttals. Serra agreed with me that we had to be ready with a definition of the new role of WEU by 1994, when all Soviet forces would have left Eastern Europe, and he supported a discussion of WEU multinational forces. Chevènement said that the time for a European command had not yet come, but he admitted the need for increased coordination. In addition to meetings of the CHODs, he suggested to convene the service chiefs separately, which was agreed in principle but never materialised. On the transfer of WEU from London to Brussels he needed further reflection. His position was summarised in three points: remain vigilant in the East-West context, be ready for "out-of-Europe" action and be willing to engage in concrete activities, such as verification and space.

In the plenary session, Roland Dumas asked his colleagues to combine their interventions on the role of WEU and the Gulf crisis as the meeting had to be short. Prime Minister Rocard would inaugurate the WEU Institute for Security Studies around noon, and the meeting would be concluded with a luncheon at the Quai d'Orsay. On substance, Dumas was very complimentary about my paper, which he regarded as an *excellent travail de synthèse*. His own view was that WEU had a role to play on behalf of the European Union and that Europe should play a stronger role in NATO, but both aspects should be seen as complementary. Without successful European integration the future of NATO risked being in danger as well. Minister De Michelis found it impossible to draw a clear dividing line between security and defence. That was why he favoured a merger between EU and WEU, but that did not mean that the instrument of WEU should disappear completely. It could remain as a kind of specialised agency of the future European Union.

Hans van den Broek called my paper "stimulating" and discussed some of its practical aspects, such as organising back-to-back meetings EU-WEU, going to Brussels and appointing the NATO Permanent Representatives also to WEU. His intervention was more positive than I had expected, for on entering the room he had told me to be very negative about the Kohl-Mitterrand letter which, if implemented, would mark the end of NATO. In his intervention he supported the notion of WEU as a bridge between EU and NATO as well as the idea of pooling national forces in a multinational European "rapid action" force to enhance our visibility. Defence Minister Ter Beek picked up the Assembly suggestion for a WEU naval on-call force to operate out-of-area. It would depend on the nature of the crisis under whose command they would come, in other words he accepted the concept of double-hatting of forces.

The Belgian Ministers Eyskens and Coëme wanted a higher European profile in NATO. Coëme suggested that the Permanent Representatives of WEU countries in NATO informally develop European views before

important NATO meetings, as had been done for the London summit. Eyskens did not favour extended NATO action beyond the treaty area. He discussed the membership issue and believed that EU membership was essential for joining WEU but that not every member of the Union had to belong to WEU. His country had tabled a document on *passerelles*, a beginning of symbiosis, for the IGC.

Douglas Hurd, like his Dutch colleague, emphasised that NATO should remain the main forum for defence, but within NATO a stronger European identity should develop. He made the conceptual point that mutual defence commitments must be kept firmly linked to the means of implementing them, i.e. WEU and NATO. That evening in Berlin, he made a speech to the Berliner Pressekonferenz stressing that there was scope for revitalising WEU and giving a more European character to the new force structures of NATO. A rapid reaction force with a strong European component could be made available at short notice for any part of the NATO area "and elements of such a force could have a potential role, under the auspices of WEU, outside Europe". In a gesture to France he added that the fundamental changes necessary in NATO should occur in a way which would "enable France to move exactly in harmony and in line with Germany, Britain and the other Allies".

Minister Genscher concentrated his intervention on the problem of stability in Eastern Europe and the possibility of disintegration of the Soviet Union with the risk of a mass population exodus. NATO should be strengthened by the creation of a European pillar, but the growing European identity should not lead to "a widening of the Atlantic". His colleague Stoltenberg was more precise in adding that a reform of existing institutions should be discussed first before a new body was established, such as a conference of defence ministers of EC member states. This referred to the discussion among the defence ministers at dinner the previous evening.

My intervention could be brief as I had submitted my reflections in writing. They also had emphasised the "bridge" function. Today I wanted to make the point that we did not have all that much time. In 1994, Europe would be in an entirely different position after the withdrawal of all Soviet forces and by then we should have developed a new rationale for our defence effort and a new basis for the US presence in Europe, a kind of transatlantic contract. Multinational forces seemed to be the answer for European cooperation, which had the positive side-effect of doing away with the problem of the status of stationed forces in arms control negotiations.

At lunch, the foreign ministers talked mainly about the membership question. Dumas was prepared to take Denmark and Greece into WEU. De Michelis agreed, but Van den Broek warned that the position of Turkey had become even more important during the Gulf crisis, whereupon Genscher asked why Greece and Turkey could not both enter. On behalf of the UK - Douglas Hurd had left - John Goulden argued that we should accept some untidiness for the time being and took up my point to offer information

arrangements to Denmark and Norway and apply them liberally to Greece and Turkey. However, for the moment no new members should be admitted. I left the Quai d'Orsay feeling that a solution to the membership problem would come only at the end of the IGC and that in the meantime we should concentrate on substance. Clearly, if not all European members of NATO would be somehow involved in WEU, we could hardly claim to be the European pillar of NATO. On the problem of Ireland and future neutrals or non-NATO members in the EC, I picked up a remark of Marc Eyskens, that WEU in introducing positions into NATO consultations could always clarify to what extent they were shared by the EC members who did not belong to the Alliance. That assumed, of course, that those countries would not be able to veto a WEU position but could join a consensus.

The European Council of 14-15 December 1990 in Rome made some progress on the foreign and security policy. The IGC should pay particular attention to the objectives of the Union, the scope of its policies and the means to implement them. The institutional framework should include one centre for decisions: the Council, one secretariat, a reinforced role for the European Commission via a non-exclusive right of initiative, appropriate procedures for consultation and information of the European Parliament, arrangements allowing the Union to speak with one voice internationally, especially in international organisations and with third countries. Decision-making should be by consensus for general directives. Non-participation in the vote or abstention would not form an obstacle to a unanimous decision. For the execution of policies, which had already been approved, the possibility would exist of qualified majority voting.

With respect to common security, the role of the Union would gradually be extended, in a first phase especially for subjects under discussion in international organisations: arms control, disarmament and related subjects; CSCE matters; certain UN questions including peacekeeping; economic and technological cooperation in the armaments field; coordination of arms export policies and non-proliferation. The future role of the Union in defence matters should be envisaged without diminishing the existing commitments and taking into consideration the importance of maintaining and strengthening the Atlantic relations and respecting the traditional policies of other member states. Equally, the idea should be discussed of a mutual assistance clause as well as proposals made by several members concerning the future of WEU.

The North Atlantic Council session of 17-18 December 1990 coined the phrase "interlocking institutions" as the best way towards security and cooperation in the Europe of tomorrow and recognition of a European security identity. The communiqué stated that the adaptation of our Alliance to new circumstances would include enhancing the role of the European Allies with a view to ensuring a full and equitable sharing of leadership and responsibilities between Europe and North America. Paragraph 5 continued:

All Allies agree that the foundation of European stability and security will continue to be a strong and viable North Atlantic Alliance which requires the continuing active political engagement and significant military presence of the North American democracies in Europe. A European security identity and defence role, reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also help to strengthen Atlantic solidarity. In this context, and as this process evolves, we will consider how the political and military structures of the Alliance must be adapted accordingly.

After our ministerial session I requested delegations to submit position papers which could be incorporated into a consolidated document prepared by the Secretariat. A UK "non-paper" attempted to distinguish more clearly between a security policy and a defence policy. To the security field belonged arms control, exports of sensitive materials and other steps to prevent proliferation, exports of armaments more generally, peacekeeping, especially in areas where UN mandates existed, and counter-terrorism. Defence - the planning, organisation, command, control and commitment of military forces - was described as a central component in an overall security policy. NATO should remain the main forum for planning and consultation in defence matters affecting the Alliance as a whole. Western defence should remain a collective defence based on a single defence structure. But in defence, as in the broader realm of security, a stronger European identity was also necessary. Account should be taken of "the fact that defence guarantees must be related to a reciprocal ability to defend, resting on firm military arrangements and the necessary political will".

Among the proposals were two particularly important ones. Firstly, the ability to act separately where a specifically European response was called for (particularly beyond the NATO area); and secondly, the development of the European elements of the Alliance's reformed collective structure in a way which made them capable of separate action if necessary (as the US elements were), especially outside Europe. An intriguing paragraph suggested that the WEU Permanent Council could have military advice available to it, which was later explained to me as coming from the Military Representatives to NATO of the WEU states. This was written in the context of the ongoing adaptation of NATO command arrangements in ways which could accommodate a European caucus based on WEU. John Goulden added orally that, next to an active caucus in NATO, military advice also would come from the capitals and ultimately from the European commanders charged with WEU missions. His key distinction was that WEU would not have an autonomous role in areas where NATO was the key instrument, such as an attack on our territory or balancing Soviet power - but that the European role could become dominant in the staff structure of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). WEU itself would come to the fore when

NATO was not the chosen instrument, which would be the case out-of-area but could also apply in dealing with Eastern Europe. His remarks were interesting in two ways: they grasped the importance of the RRF, to which later the UK would make the largest contribution and obtain the command; and they appreciated the possibility of WEU action in Eastern Europe not formally under NATO, a notion which many others had not yet accepted and, as we shall see, did not particularly appeal to Washington. Other points in the British contribution concerned the presence of the Secretary-General of WEU at meetings of EC foreign ministers, when the agenda made this desirable, and more frequent meetings of the political directors to provide a parallel forum to the Political Committee in the EPC. The UK also provided some options for treaty amendment including:

- a declaration that WEU is an integral part of the European construction process (perhaps a reference to the Hague Platform's commitment "to build a European Union");
- a decision to drop the qualification "political and economic" before "aspects of security" from the definition of the Twelve's role in Article 30, paragraph 6(a) of the Single European Act;
- an undertaking that those member states who had mutual defence commitments under the WEU and NATO treaties would pursue cooperation in the field of defence within these organisations;
- a provision that where discussion or implementation by EC member states of common or coordinated policies raised defence issues, those issues will be taken forward in WEU.

In early February, Italy introduced a paper on the CFSP in the IGC, which did not break much new ground. It defined the competence of the European Council as developing gradually, progressively, and covering without prior exclusion the themes or sectors, the priorities and the areas of application of the CFSP on the basis of the general interests common to the Union and its member states. WEU should be strengthened and progressively integrated into the Union and a merger could take place in 1998. To this end, WEU should be placed "under the authority and under the aegis" of the European Council. At about the same time, Germany tabled a paper on security policy cooperation within the framework of the CFSP of the future Political Union, which was based on earlier Franco-German contributions, but also incorporated substantial parts of my paper. Procedurally, it was somewhat strange, as we were trying to arrive at a consensus document for WEU ministers, but I could hardly object as both German and French delegates to the Special Working Group had complimented me on asking the right questions and were prepared to use my draft as the basis for further work. The German document proposed that the European Council be given the power to decide which specific security policy topics should become matters for the common policy. The obligation to provide aid and assistance

under the Brussels Treaty should be preserved for as long as no corresponding commitment existed among the member states of the Political Union. After a certain time, but at the latest in 1996, it should be considered whether amendment of the WEU Treaty provisions was called for. Germany also thought it advisable to transfer the organs of WEU to Brussels.

Between the ministerials of 10 December and 22 February, the SWG discussed my paper three times and their deputies met once in between to suggest drafting changes. Most notable was a British effort to achieve equidistance as far as our relations with EU and NATO were concerned and to apply identical procedures for synchronisation of meetings, contacts between the secretariats and other practical measures. The Netherlands was against the role of the European Council in defence matters, which was related to their opposition to the Franco-German proposals to shift the entire CFSP on to the European Council. The Hague also did not want a European caucus in NATO and was not content with my wording that this would be done when necessary and on items on the agenda which were of particular interest to WEU. At the final meeting, Guelluy attempted to defuse the question of moving WEU to Brussels by suggesting that SWG and DRG would move first and Council and Secretariat later. John Goulden, always his most effective counterpart, objected that such small steps were prejudicial to further progress. The Dutch and Portuguese agreed that without a transfer to Brussels the whole exercise would become much less interesting. Hofstetter also agreed, but could not help saying to Goulden that insisting on equidistance would also be prejudicial.

The paper which was finally submitted to the ministers had undergone many drafting changes, but was still recognisable compared with my original reflections. In several places it had been firmed up in the light of the European Council and NATO ministerials of December. An important change was made regarding WEU inputs into Alliance consultations. The final sentence of paragraph 11 now read "It will remain essential to ensure that all Allies are willing to take account of each others' points of view before final positions are reached in Alliance consultations." This was meant to deal with the GATT trauma in Washington, where European positions were regarded as inflexible. Trade negotiations dealing with competition were a different matter from Alliance consultations based on solidarity and cooperation. There, willingness to listen to good arguments - in both directions across the Atlantic - was essential. The paper also made clear that ultimately decisions would be taken in NATO. The idea of liaison officers was dropped and the concluding paragraphs on relations with non-member countries in EU and NATO and on representation in the WEU Council were amended considerably. An enlargement of certain ministerial meetings to include other or all European Partners and Allies could be considered. And in terms of increasing the effectiveness of WEU's work, it would be desirable for member countries to appoint comparable officials to the Permanent Council of WEU.



The author with French Foreign Minister Dumas and French Defence Minister Chévenement at a press conference during the French presidency of WEU. (Photo: SIRPA/ECPA France)

The ministerial meeting of 22 February 1991 took an unexpected turn. In the long series of interventions the only point of difference seemed to be whether the link with the European Union should be stronger or weaker. Eyskens wanted it stronger, under the aegis of the European Council, which the UK did not accept. Douglas Hurd could agree to my idea that WEU could receive guidelines from the European Council just as, in his view, guidelines could also come from NATO. Guidelines was a better term than "under the aegis" which suggested a vertical relationship of subordination. The UK did not believe that either the European Council or NATO should mandate WEU on defence issues. The Italian State Secretary Vitalone favoured an explicit statement that WEU would perform its role under the authority, or at least the auspices of the European Council and Minister Ordonez of Spain took the same view. The strongest opposition, as expected, came from Hans van den Broek. The Netherlands had serious misgivings about the European Council giving guidelines to WEU since this would grant a right of veto to neutral countries such as Ireland and possibly others in an enlarged Union. More generally, he felt that the text in paragraph 13(a) prejudged the debate within the IGC on decision-making structures, as to him it implied that the whole of defence would be part of the CFSP. He proposed an amendment to leave the role of the European Council open. In my statement at the end of the round I tried to allay his

preoccupation by stressing that no non-WEU member would have a right of veto on WEU activities. If the European Council agreed on guidelines the WEU members had participated in that decision during the deliberations and would have no difficulty in applying them. If there was no agreement there would be no guidelines and WEU would be free to determine its own course. My reply did not convince my compatriot, who wanted his objection formulated in a footnote to the paper. He also objected to the draft communiqué prepared by the French presidency. Dumas turned to me for advice and in a split second I remembered that Guelluy earlier had considered separate publication of the paper. So I advised the chairman to drop the communiqué and publish the paper as the presidency's conclusions with a brief introduction and the necessary footnotes. Dumas quickly proposed to do so and nobody had time to protest.²⁶ The outcome was a first in diplomatic procedure, by publishing a document on which no full consensus had been reached. The Presidency stated that the document was originally prepared by the Secretary-General and was discussed by the SWG under his chairmanship, resulting in a version on which all member states reached near-consensus. Discussions should be pursued on this basis. This decision also circumvented the discussion we had had in the working group about the status of the paper. Should it remain an internal document - originally favoured by most countries - or an input into IGC and NATO? By making it public that question no longer arose.

2. US Reactions

To me personally the outcome of the Paris meeting was quite gratifying, especially since two days before the meeting the State Department in Washington had carried out a pre-emptive strike in what came to be known as the "Bartholomew Telegram". Several ministers referred to the American preoccupations and Dumas concluded that a special effort should be made to convince Washington that NATO would benefit from a stronger European pillar. The telegram probably had the most effect on the Dutch position and hardened Van den Broek in his opposition. So soon after the Gulf war nobody wanted to create new problems with the US and in this respect considerable momentum was lost. It would take till the end of the year to reach consensus on the role of WEU. I regarded the American objections as exaggerated and unwarranted, especially after my own efforts to keep them informed about our activities. During a visit to Washington to attend the annual conference held by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission and the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis,²⁷ I was received by Secretaries Baker and Cheney and in the White House by David Gompert. Of course, the Gulf crisis was on everybody's mind and the two Secretaries told me that they were in no hurry to commence ground operations and would start them only when they were sure that casualties could be kept to a minimum. I also had the opportunity to explain to them the concept of WEU

functioning as a bridge between NATO and the process of European integration and gave them on a personal basis my own views on possibilities for double-hatting of some military commanders in the European theatre, NATO hats for collective defence and European hats for other contingencies. The meeting with Jim Baker, a classmate during the two years I studied at Princeton, took the form of a brainstorming session together with his senior assistants Kimmet, Bartholomew and Dobbins. They all told me that my explanation came at a most opportune moment as they would shortly have to determine positions in the NATO review and relations with Europe in general.

I got an inkling of US views in the speech Dobbins made to the conference. He asked three questions: how are we defining "European" in terms of European security and US involvement, could we terminate the "sterile" debate on out-of-area as the distinction had become meaningless, and what did Article 5 really mean today against, for example, a ballistic missile attack on a member country and what kind of responses would be required? The Kuwait crisis had flared up at a time when US forces were still on a Cold War high and, in addition, the victims of aggression were able to fund their own liberation. Yet, the crisis had also shown that the US had capabilities that could not be substituted by other countries in terms of intelligence, communications, strategic lift and long-range force projection. Finally, after the Gulf war, the US would be the only country with recent command experience above the division level. Dobbins was positive about WEU because it had a clear link with NATO, had an acknowledged role outside Europe and would enable Europe to become a stronger partner. But he put three conditions on future developments: ultimate decisions had to be reached in NATO, although he admitted the desirability of some caucusing in WEU; new structures should not duplicate or weaken existing NATO arrangements and we should not experiment with proven defence structures; progress should be compatible with the development of the new strategy of NATO, which he expected to be one of reconstitution against a newly emerging threat.

David Gompert in the White House was the most reluctant about a specific WEU role and did not want to see it as a bloc within NATO. In an alliance all members should participate on an equal basis. He admitted being influenced by unpleasant experience in the GATT Round, but also claimed that in the CSCE and Stockholm negotiations the US had encountered difficulties because the Europeans had stuck rigorously to previously determined positions and had shown little willingness to take the views of their Allies into account. More conceptually, Gompert argued that partnership in leadership, which President Bush continued to propagate, would include some kind of burden-sharing between the US and Europe. Out-of-area, he hoped Europe would acquire a greater capability to project forces and to sustain them, but in case of a threat to vital interests, acting together would be better than acting separately. He could envisage cases in

which Europe would take the lead, but in any case a mechanism was needed for coordinating Western action, i.e. a combination of NATO and WEU structures.

The Bartholomew Telegram, which was staffed by Dobbins, was the not atypical result of inter-agency discussions on a general US approach to a developing European security identity. It accumulated negative points in rejecting possible arguments and lost its balance. The full text is reproduced as Annex II, so it is not necessary to quote extensively here.²⁸



The author meets US Secretary of State Eagleburger at the December 1992 NAC. Between them stands Ambassador Bartholomew, who in a previous capacity gave his name to the controversial 1991 State Department telegram. (Photo: NATO)

The prevailing sense of the cable was fear of the US and NATO being marginalised. For that reason, concern was expressed over proposals that WEU should be subordinated to the European Council, thereby developing a European security component solely within the EC. While the US could accept some relationship between WEU and EC, it felt that defence and security dimensions should not extend beyond those states that had undertaken mutual defence commitments within the Atlantic Alliance. And whatever European security identity would be developed, it should provide a place for all European allies who wished to participate. The US did not want a role that was simply a counterbalance to the Soviets as that would atrophy its connection to European security. Equally, WEU missions in Eastern Europe outside the NATO context struck the US as unrealistic in

practice and a potentially dangerous signal to the USSR. In the light of later developments in Bosnia, it is worth mentioning the next paragraph, which stated that it was difficult to imagine military operations a European pillar would become involved in which the US would not also consider of central importance. Out-of-area was another matter. There, a different basis for transatlantic collaboration based on NATO-WEU linkage was possible, as well as WEU leadership vis-à-vis the political and security problems of North Africa. One of the few positive points in the telegram was that its description of the core functions of NATO tallied very well with my own paper.

One deception was quickly followed by another as, at the first Permanent Council after the ministerial, held on 27 February 1991, the French representative, Ambassador Dorin, criticised my remarks in Washington. I was particularly annoyed that he made a formal statement in plenary without giving me any warning at the preceding restricted meeting in my office, where I had announced my decision to appoint Paolo Casardi as Political Director. We had agreed to discuss such questions among ambassadors only. At the suggestion of Ambassador Richthofen some months earlier, we had agreed that I would circulate my travel programme so that any country could suggest points to keep in mind during my contacts. Now Dorin said that my official visits should be the subject of concertation with the WEU countries, more on the principle of going than on their substance. He mentioned as examples my talks with Cheney on multinational forces and my contacts with Wörner about organising an informal meeting between the two Permanent Councils on the day of our annual visit to SHAPE. I knew that in French eyes the latter was only a displacement on a personal basis of some Council members, but I wondered why this was stated again a week after the French minister had confirmed that the European pillar would strengthen the Alliance. I reacted very strongly, perhaps too strongly, by saying that I took his statement as contrary to our agreed procedures and a lack of confidence in me personally. Dorin was somewhat shaken by my blast on one of the first Council meetings he attended and wrote me a nice personal note afterwards. Nevertheless, I thought his intervention unwarranted because none of his examples concerned official visits and on both I had reported fully to the Council, on the Washington talks even in writing. I thought of telephoning Dumas to clarify the matter but refrained, as obviously he had not been involved in sending the instruction and I had no interest in choking relations with the official levels at the Quai d'Orsay.

A third disappointment came on 8 April when the French presidency suddenly arranged a meeting of the nine WEU foreign ministers in the margins of an EC session in Luxembourg. The purpose was to review the situation in Iraq and relief operations to the Kurds. The Greek and Danish foreign ministers were present as observers and the Turkish ambassador was summoned from Brussels, but the Secretary-General was not informed and

heard about the meeting only afterwards. The British and Dutch were not happy about this precedent which bypassed the defence ministers, but Paris had scored a point in emphasising the connection between WEU and political cooperation.

France remained adamant on the informal meeting between the two councils at the invitation of Manfred Wörner. On 13 May, the members of the NATO and WEU Councils drank tea together after our visit to SHAPE, but it was a Fifteen + Eight framework as the French ambassadors on both sides did not participate. It was a useful occasion to explain our work to the non-member countries and I was grateful to Wörner, who always had an open mind on the European pillar of the Alliance. We repeated it a year later, more formally around the Council table. By then, the two French ambassadors were present.

3. Baker's Five Points

In April the public debate was joined by Hans Binnendijk, an American expert on security questions and at that time Deputy Director of the IISS in London.²⁹ He saw the Bartholomew Telegram as a clear message that the US had changed its signals on European defence integration from green to amber. In his view, there should not be a merger between the EC and WEU, nor should WEU take direct orders from the EC. The "phoenix-like WEU" would lose its critical function of bridging differences between NATO and the EC if it was absorbed by one side. If the organisations remained separate, the EC could more easily expand eastward to integrate Central Europe, and WEU could expand to include other European members of NATO. European defence competence should be vested in the EC and, according to Binnendijk, the US would welcome coordinated WEU positions in NATO, but not on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. WEU should limit its capabilities to the non-NATO area and the use of WEU military forces should require some degree of consent from the NATO Council, because of the need for NATO airlift, logistics, intelligence and communications. The US certainly would want a say if WEU would act in Eastern Europe. His final points were that the US should not be excluded from multinational task forces, but that NATO's strategic review should make the Alliance a more attractive home for the European defence identity and France more comfortable with NATO. His article was perceptive, but had not grasped fully the European wish to engage in a comprehensive integration which would include the security dimension.

Late April, Guelluy and I visited Washington. It was a French idea following up the point made by Dumas that we should step up our information effort with regard to the US. Guelluy had travelled with me to the Visegrad countries on our fact-finding missions and apparently appreciated the way in which I conducted those visits. Once, earlier on, we had had a minor clash when he attempted to take over the lead in an SWG

meeting, but he was very positive towards my paper on the role of WEU and we developed an excellent working relationship. In Washington, we were given Secretary Baker's Five Points on the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which were the last remnants of the Bartholomew Telegram; these were handed over in European capitals on April 16, 1991. They read as follows:

As the NATO strategy review and the EC debate over EPU continue, the US will measure proposals for a European security/defence identity against the following principles:

- The US is ready to support arrangements which our European allies decide are needed for the expression of a common European foreign, security and defense policy.
- To ensure this development will strengthen the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO should remain the principal venue for consultation and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty, wherever such policies originate.
- NATO should maintain an effective integrated military structure to provide for collective defense.
- We also support the willingness of European allies to improve Europe's ability to protect vital interests and uphold the rule of law beyond Europe itself.
- To minimise the potential for divisiveness within NATO, we encourage European allies to open their common defense policy deliberations to all European members of NATO.

At the White House, the National Security Advisor, General Scowcroft, was fully supportive of European integration but his concern was to see that it did not adversely affect NATO or marginalise the US in Europe. In his view, the American presence in Europe was not just a response to a simple defence need, but was more fundamentally linked with membership of a single transatlantic community. Mr Gompert pointed out that the 20 February memorandum had been designed to forestall any misunderstandings which might have arisen had the US remained silent in the European debate, but this démarche was not to be taken as a desire to slow down European integration. He mentioned possible situations in which it would be inappropriate for NATO to act, even in Europe. WEU might intervene in such cases, but the decision should be taken by common consent. European action in the Gulf was considered a very positive precedent and could be extended to a Europeanisation of the Sinai Observation Force, the provision of aid to Kurdish refugees or certain contacts with Iran. Washington had also warmed to the idea of multinational forces and was considering the level to which US forces might be broken down in order to integrate with multi-

national forces. Some coherence of US forces in Europe had to be maintained, however. On the whole, we were reassured about the way the Administration was thinking and especially in the Pentagon we found no renewed anxiety over the development of a European security identity.

4. Practical Measures

Early 1991, we had a heavy agenda. Ambassador Holthoff was chairing the Space Group with the aim of establishing a satellite centre to train photo interpreters and be responsive to verification needs, while simultaneously defining the requirements for studies with regard to the medium- and long-term cooperation on space. This led to the decision at the Vianden ministerial to set up a WEU Satellite Centre as a WEU subsidiary body for an experimental period of three years. As a follow-up to the February meeting we were discussing practical steps to improve our links with the EC and NATO, assuming that a more conceptual definition would have to wait for the Maastricht European Council. But prior to that, ministers would still meet several times to prepare for this decision. Parallel to this, WEU had to be made more operational if it was to be taken seriously. And finally, the topical questions of the Gulf and Yugoslavia were important items on every agenda.

On practical measures, a Franco-German paper was circulated to the working group on 4 April, followed by a British contribution on 15 April. The former analysed in detail the synchronisation of meetings of bodies of WEU and of the Political Union. At the level of Political Directors it was thought appropriate to have joint or consecutive meetings with the WEU Enlarged Council following the "Twelve-Nine + Three-Nine" formula. This meant that CFSP matters would be discussed at Twelve (without prejudicing the future role of the European Council); other security issues pertaining more to defence would be dealt with at Nine plus those of the three non-WEU members willing to take part and the European Commission would be present; defence policy and strictly military matters, including future military capabilities, would be handled at Nine. The same arrangement could be extended to certain working groups which might have to be restructured and a group on security questions to be set up within the Union. The Secretariats-General of the Union and WEU should establish an institutional working relationship associating the WEU Secretariat with all meetings of the Twelve dealing with security matters and allowing the CFSP Council secretariat to take part in Nine + Three meetings "and even meetings of the Nine". A detailed timetable was submitted with the aim of achieving synchronisation of EU and WEU presidencies as of 1 January 1992, except for the EU presidencies of Denmark, Greece and Ireland. For the first time, France agreed to the move of the WEU Secretariat to Brussels. Germany had been able to persuade Paris with the following ingenious formula:

In implementing the measures to link WEU with Political Union, the WEU Secretariat-General should be transferred to Brussels, to establish an institutional link between the secretariats of WEU and the Union.

Concerning relations with NATO, the paper opted for concertation at the level of WEU member states' Permanent Representatives to NATO, or even at ministerial level, in order to prepare for meetings of the Sixteen discussing questions of particular concern to the Nine, and to consider their results. If required by the subject at issue, these meetings should also be attended by representatives of European allies that were not members of WEU. The country holding the WEU presidency could introduce common positions or contributions of WEU countries into the process of Alliance consultations and would be responsible for keeping the North Atlantic Council regularly informed of WEU activities. Periodic meetings between the Secretaries-General would supplement this exchange of information. The move to Brussels was also favoured in this context but in considerably weaker terms than in relation to the EU:

The transfer of the WEU Secretariat to Brussels would also facilitate the process of two-way information, communication and concertation.

The UK paper followed another approach. It wanted to reach agreement on the operational functions of WEU before settling the practical measures linking WEU with EU and NATO. Its closely argued analysis of WEU links with the EU still contains much of the current UK position. London wanted WEU to remain distinct from the EU and NATO and to serve as a bridge between the two. Security policy coordination among the Twelve should be intensified but kept separate from cooperation on defence in WEU and NATO (though there might well be some duplication of discussion in all three bodies on certain issues such as CSCE). Only those countries participating in collective defence organisations should be in a position to participate in the defence policy-making of these organisations, and the link between WEU and EU should not exclude links with other European Allies. On 26 February, the UK had tabled a draft text for the CFSP treaty in the IGC which provided that whenever, in the formulation or implementation of CFSP, an issue relating to defence arose, European consultation or practical cooperation should be carried forward in WEU. The UK had accepted my proposal that the conclusions of the European Council on the principles and orientations of a common security policy would also serve as a guideline for cooperation in WEU, for it reflected the political reality that all nine members of WEU were also members of the Twelve and therefore participated in the CFSP. But the essence of our task would be to achieve as close a relationship as possible without subordina-

ting WEU to the EU or to NATO. The UK did not want to put artificial constraints on the deliberations in the European Council. In any case, its discussions on defence issues were likely to be general and to flow from considerations of foreign policy matters in general. If a major defence issue arose, such as the sending of European forces out-of-area, a separate meeting should be arranged of WEU heads of government or ministers. It would not be acceptable to London if countries outside WEU or NATO sought through the channel of the European Council to influence the defence policy of those organisations. In practice, it had never been necessary to call a meeting of WEU heads of government, but the option of occasional meetings should be retained, either in the margins of a European Council or of a NATO summit, in order to underline the status of WEU as a distinct organisation reporting to its own heads of government. During the preparations for the 1996-97 IGC, the same idea of back-to-back meetings of heads of government of EU and WEU surfaced in the proposals of UK Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind.

Part of the practical arrangements was the future role of the Permanent Council of WEU. In London, the ambassadors to the Court of St James's doubled up as permanent representatives. They were very senior in their own diplomatic service but usually did not possess the politico-military background necessary for WEU. Nevertheless, most of them enjoyed the multilateral experience and some of them had previous experience as political director. In practice, they acted more as a board of administration than a body making security policy and left much of the substantive work to people coming from capitals to participate in the various working groups. I enjoyed these meetings with people who at home were close to their ministers and made it a point to chair the SWG and DRG personally. In Brussels the situation was likely to be different and several options presented themselves. Before my arrival in WEU several delegations - including the Dutch and the French - had toyed with the idea of replacing the London Council by high officials coming from capitals. This solution failed to charm me as it would have removed all permanence from the system and make it difficult to react swiftly to a crisis. In addition, it would become very hard to conduct personal bilateral contacts with the delegations in preparation of sensitive issues. Some mixture of permanent representatives and attendance from capitals seemed preferable. In a paper circulated to permanent representatives on 4 April 1991 I considered it important that they would first discuss the role of the Permanent Council, in the context of a transfer to Brussels, before national decisions on representation were taken. I submitted two alternatives: the Council could either assume a leading role in the substantive discussions on the politico-military issues dealt with by WEU or continue to carry out its present role as general manager and overseer of the various aspects of our work. I was in favour of the latter option, provided WEU would also become the forum for meetings of Permanent Representatives to NATO and, separately, of Permanent

Representatives to the EU whenever European security interests made such meetings desirable. As WEU became more operational, meetings of military advisors could also be considered. Combined with much closer relations between the WEU Secretariat and the secretariats of NATO and the EU Council of Ministers, WEU would be able to give a European impetus to the activities of both NATO and EU. Such a practical approach would enable member countries to appoint either their bilateral Ambassadors to Belgium, or a special ambassador as permanent representative to the WEU Council. Member countries could then make use, as appropriate, of their staff in their NATO and Political Union delegations and in their bilateral embassies to form their delegations to WEU.

On 23 April, I convened an informal meeting of the Permanent Representatives in my office in order to ascertain their personal views. I explained my concern to defuse the issue of representation by ensuring that both the ambassadors to NATO and EU could meet in a WEU context without either one necessarily being appointed to the WEU Council. I also pointed out that the WEU Council differed from the Political Committee in having several institutional and administrative responsibilities such as budgetary matters, including the future institute and satellite centre, and relations with the WEU Assembly. Understandably, the ambassadors found it difficult to anticipate the institutional arrangements emanating from the IGC, but their views helped to clarify matters. The French ambassador stressed that the transfer to Brussels was not yet *acquis* but preferred a unity of representation in order to maintain WEU's cohesion. The Italian Ambassador, Biancheri, believed that the rationale of moving to Brussels - greater efficiency - should imply a more substantial role for the Council, under which it would be able to inject a political impetus into the work of the organisation; he advocated a "Third Man" approach to the question of representation, i.e. neither the NATO nor the EU Permanent Representative. The Belgian Ambassador suggested homogeneity of representation and favoured the appointment of the Deputy Political Directors to the WEU Council, given their role in EPC and their proximity to ministers. The Netherlands Ambassador recognised that the "Third Man" approach had some logic to it but had a clear preference for the NATO Permanent Representative, since both NATO and WEU were defence organisations. Portugal believed that the NATO ambassador would be the most qualified, but for political reasons the "Third Man" option would be the better solution. He felt that the WEU Council should have a role similar to the NATO Council and feared that otherwise the military organs of WEU would report directly to their ministers instead of via the Council. Spain saw little need in moving to Brussels unless a more operational Council was set up. In line with his lack of enthusiasm for a speedy transfer, De la Morena suggested upgrading the Council whilst it was still in London. Early July, Spain was to circulate a paper arguing that the move to Brussels be delayed, leaving Council and Secretariat in London till 1996. At that time, two years

before the Modified Brussels Treaty was due to come up for review, we should take stock of experience gained with WEU managing defence on behalf of the EU. In any case, Spain was against appointing the NATO ambassador as that would indicate that WEU was only a sub-group of NATO. Ambassador Richthofen showed a preference for appointing the NATO PermRep as he would be most knowledgeable about his government's security policy. Having a third multilateral ambassador in Brussels would not be possible for Germany both in terms of rank and for financial reasons. The UK representative, Jeremy Greenstock, advocated a genuine steering role for the Permanent Council as well as a strong connection with NATO through the double-hatting of permanent representatives. On the one hand, WEU would receive its political directives from the Twelve, translated to the Nine, but on the other there was a need for thorough expertise in defence and military matters, which were the main area of WEU's work. He dismissed the argument of additional work on the budget and relations with the Assembly. Any competent civil servant could deal with those and Greenstock failed to see how a separate ambassador would find a full-time job at WEU. Moreover, everybody was stressing that a stronger European defence identity must not harm NATO, so what better way of demonstrating this than appointing the NATO PermRep to the WEU Council. Only Biancheri reacted to this view by pointing out the risk of confusion caused by such double-hatting, given the overlap in the work of the two organisations.

Summing up, I concluded that everybody wanted a homogeneous solution, but of a different nature. I shared the doubt whether a separate WEU ambassador would have a full-time job, but my main point remained that WEU should carry out its bridge function in both directions: WEU should "insert" a European dimension into NATO and a defence dimension into the European Union. This dual task would be greatly facilitated by the move to Brussels and the possibility of back-to-back meetings with NATO and CFSP. I asked those who favoured appointing the NATO PermRep how WEU would then impact on the European Union. That was where we left it. We agreed that it had been a useful exchange of views, but that further discussion should await more clarification on WEU's place in the new security architecture. In the end, when WEU finally moved to Brussels in January 1993, most positions remained unchanged and the composition of the WEU Council was far from homogeneous. The Netherlands, Portugal and the UK double-hatted their NATO PermRep; Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain appointed special ambassadors, the Luxembourg was non-resident and doubled up as Chef de Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The only country changing its mind was Germany, which appointed its bilateral ambassador to Belgium, but taking care that he was an expert in politico-military matters.

5. A More Operational Role

Making WEU more operational was the subject of papers from the UK and the Netherlands. The two countries which had conceptual problems with the role of WEU in European integration were the most constructive on the operational side. The UK paper now openly wrote that "the purpose of WEU discussions should be to coordinate European views in preparation for open consultations within the Alliance. This could include the definition and introduction of WEU contributions into Alliance debates". There would be considerable overlap between the day-to-day agenda of WEU and that of NATO. For practical reasons, therefore, it would be desirable that WEU's agenda and meeting schedule, at both ministerial and permanent representative levels, should be harmonised with those of the Alliance. There should be maximum transparency between NATO and WEU in all aspects of their work, so that all Allies could "take account of each other's point of view before final positions were reached". A WEU force could have a role:

- as a European contribution to peacekeeping operations;
- in response to a threat to the interests of WEU members outside the NATO area; and
- in cases of regional instability in Central or Eastern Europe.

In the last case, the paper argued that because of possible implications of any military action in this area for the security of all Allies, decisions should be made in the Alliance on how to respond. "In some circumstances it might be appropriate for a response to be undertaken under WEU auspices through the deployment of a WEU force." Such a European Reaction Force (ERF) would need to send a clear signal of European resolve and therefore be credible in military terms. Political control would rest with WEU ministers and on a day-to-day basis with the Permanent Council. The ERF would need a capacity for joint planning and exercises and command structures adaptable to the operation envisaged. A permanent planning cell would be required for contingency plans and exercises, possibly collocated with the planning staff for the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, and arrangements should be made for designating an ERF commander, who could be double- or triple-hatted with national or NATO functions or both. Military advice could best be provided by the Chiefs of Defence Staff and NATO Military Representatives of the WEU nations, meeting as a WEU Military Committee and, where appropriate, synchronised with the meetings of the NATO Military Committee. The paper concluded that these proposals should help strengthen the European pillar by developing WEU's defence role and providing effective and specifically European forces, with an independent capability for action.

The Netherlands' paper covered the same ground but went further in detail and was later revised in the light of comments made in the DRG. It

started out by recalling WEU Assembly Recommendation 493 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait, which proposed to examine the creation of a WEU naval on-call force for external operations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European rapid action force. The first question concerning the nature of non-NATO contingencies was answered as contingencies not calling for collective defence action. The decision to create an ERF should be based on the understanding that such a force would only be used in response to a threat to the interests of WEU members outside the NATO area. In cases of regional instability in Central and Eastern Europe, agreement should be reached in the Alliance on how to respond. A second question concerned the possible tasks of an ERF. Here the paper provided useful language which ultimately would find its way to the Petersberg missions defined in June 1992. It wrote that "in principle these could range from peacekeeping and crisis management to peace-enforcement and other combat operations", but that apart from these military tasks the ERF could also be used for humanitarian relief operations; for instance, its logistic capability could prove useful in case of natural disasters. Crisis management was defined as the attempt to control events and to cope with a crisis situation with the required preparedness in order to scale down hostilities. Peace-enforcement would require an operational capability to fight a limited war. A WEU Reaction Force should first provide for the capability of a rapid response to threats not countered by NATO with sufficient strength and combat power to prevent a crisis from developing into armed conflict, or to contain a crisis that already had led to hostilities. Secondly, such a force should contribute to the termination of these conflicts in accordance with agreed political objectives. The third point dealt with the composition of the force: to be effective it should include land, air and maritime elements and a balance had to be struck between the capacity for rapid deployment and sufficient combat power. Although an armed conflict could be limited in scope, a high level of violence with sophisticated weapon systems could never be excluded, due to the ongoing proliferation of modern technologies. Finally, as far as participation was concerned, it seemed to the Netherlands that not all WEU countries would necessarily participate in the force, or in all its operations. A minimum of political and financial solidarity, however, would be essential. As to the probable area of operations, it was assumed that threats arising within the vicinity of Western Europe would be of more significance than those in more remote parts, but in any case operations outside the NATO area would require specific arrangements for the transport, command, control, communications, intelligence, strategic surveillance and logistics. This was even more important as the deployment of the NATO RRF was only foreseen within Allied Command Europe (ACE). It was recommended that WEU should concentrate on these additional requirements first, taking full advantage of existing NATO possibilities and linking up with the NATO force planning cycle. A military coordination cell in the

WEU Secretariat should formulate these requirements as well as specific contingencies and provide for the linkage with the NATO force planning system and with nations not participating therein. Next to it there should be a small WEU operational planning staff and arrangements to set up a joint operational command in case of actual deployment. The paper did not deem it feasible nor cost-effective to establish a standing headquarters, but opted for designating personnel and equipment to WEU operations, double-hatting them with NATO and/or national functions.

Both the UK and Netherlands' papers were available when the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff met in Paris on 10 April 1991. There had been an ad hoc meeting after the invasion of Kuwait but there some of the CHODs had delegated their Chief of Naval Staff as WEU involvement was likely to concentrate on embargo operations. So this meeting was a first and a success for the Belgian and French Chiefs of Defence Staff who had been pushing for it for some time. Germany had given up its earlier reluctance. The Secretary-General was invited to attend. After the meeting, a very brief press release was issued, focusing on the Iraqi conflict and assistance to the Kurdish population in the north. The French presidency drafted its conclusions cautiously in the conditional, saying that similar meetings at the level of the service chiefs could be envisaged and that, to the extent WEU would be called to develop itself, the CHODs considered that it would be fitting to create a permanent military planning cell within the secretariat to follow up these activities. They also underlined the importance of new threats, particularly ballistic missiles, and of interoperability of armaments; it could be useful to exchange views on the technical-military aspects of long-term requirements and possible ways of solving them. The CHODs recommended establishing secure fax communications between them, and conducting a study on long-range transport and stressed the importance of satellite reconnaissance for crisis management.

The meeting was made most interesting by the presence of the French Chief of Defence, General Schmitt, who did not participate in the NATO Military Committee meetings at Chief of Staff level. A courteous chairman who chose his words carefully, he explained that, for France, the concept of integration remained a sensitive issue, also in a European context. At an earlier discussion, he had asked me whether multinational formations were really necessary if nations had interoperable forces consisting of professionals and if these were readily available. Today he admitted the need for interoperable communications and exercises to test their cooperation. However, as Pierre Joxe had just succeeded Chevènement as minister for defence, he needed political directives to go further. The German Admiral Wellershoff agreed with him that we did not need a command structure for every contingency, but his point seemed inspired by the wish to avoid duplication with NATO. He stressed the need for flexibility, as in practice future operations were likely to be conducted by NATO minus some or by WEU plus some. The Belgian General Charlier and the British Field Marshall

Vincent supported me when I said that the experience in the Gulf was no proof that we did not need command arrangements. In fact, some had used their absence as an excuse for not contributing ground forces. Vincent added that, in future crises, we needed to act more swiftly than in the Gulf; he advocated a minimum framework to allow for joint training which could be built upon in a crisis, avoiding unduly rigid arrangements. The discussion focused on the introduction of the Netherlands paper introduced by General Graaff and supported by Vincent. The reaction forces of NATO and WEU would be complementary, so "double earmarking" would be the most economical. Two sets of forces would clearly not be feasible. As a European force would require support in transport and intelligence, it would be in our interest to harmonise WEU activities with NATO. Europe needed to be able to act independently, but not in isolation. Charlier agreed, but felt that some elements of planning and command needed to be separate and visible. Schmitt voiced the traditional French reluctance to establish a liaison with SHAPE. Why not with the Military Committee and, if with SHAPE, why not also with SACLANT in view of the largely naval activities of WEU so far? The Italian General, Corcione, who introduced a paper on risks out of Europe, felt that we should look into the links with NATO in more detail as European structures did not yet exist. The Spaniard wanted to wait for political guidelines and stressed that the Gulf operation was the first time his country had participated in international crisis management. The Portuguese thought it premature to discuss multinational forces.

The meeting was a success by virtue of its open and informal discussion, much more thorough than the rather formal occasions of the NATO Military Committee (MC). Admiral Wellershoff agreed to inform the MC the next day to demonstrate everybody's wish for full transparency. As always he had been constructive and did not raise the question asked by his subordinates at the DRG, namely whether the WEU Treaty really allowed out-of-area operations. Nobody else doubted our ability to do so under Article VIII - consultation with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability - but the Germans periodically stated that there was no express mandate in the treaty. In the December 1990 session of the WEU Assembly the German member Scheer had asked the same question. Even Genscher once made this point to me, which I attributed to uneasiness about the German constitutional obstacle to sending forces out-of-area, apart from his general reluctance to contemplate the use of military force anywhere.

Back in London, my colleagues in the Secretariat and I agreed that much would depend on the ability of France to commit itself to operational planning and some kind of integration at a European level. Otherwise the other members would see little value added in WEU to what they could do in NATO. During the two subsequent meetings of the SWG/DRG we tried to clarify this point, but Guelluy could not enlighten us much. He needed

a *finalité politique* before France could move on the operational point, but could not say what such a move would entail. Instead, he switched to the question whether the Nine would be ready to speak with one voice in NATO on important subjects. In WEU he could join a discussion on what we needed if tomorrow a new crisis erupted, not on the organisation of a rapid reaction force. Hofstetter for Germany liked my distinction between institutional and operational arrangements, but also thought it premature to define a detailed mandate for a WEU reaction force. This led Champenois of Belgium to ask ironically what use our agreement on *passerelles* with NATO and EU would be if we would never undertake any operation. In his opinion, Baker's Five Points constituted an acceptable basis for a division of labour, with one addition: in a crisis in Eastern Europe requiring a kind of international police action, NATO and WEU would be in a comparable position. In fact, some scenarios would make European action more likely. This coincided with my own view that if a crisis started in the North NATO would be immediately involved, but that, after Soviet withdrawal from the central region, every crisis there would start out-of-area in NATO terms. Therefore, NATO would not be engaged immediately, although any crisis involving the Soviet Union directly should be handled through NATO.

The only institutional point in the UK paper was the creation of a WEU Military Committee. I could see the advantage of the NATO Military Representatives advising their ambassadors, but I wondered whether WEU should mirror NATO completely. We were emphasising the changed political circumstances in Europe which necessitated a joint politico-military approach and not separate ones like in NATO. The WEU Council and working groups had followed that approach successfully. In fact, the continuous involvement of Defence Ministers and their advisors was one of the main values added by WEU. Moreover, I had always questioned the validity of the independent military advice emanating from the Military Committee. In practice, most CHODs would not take separate positions from their ministers, who were politically responsible. Independent advice, less coloured by political considerations, came from the NATO commanders, not from the Military Committee. Consequently, WEU would do well to organise its military advice differently.

6. NATO Moves on

Considerable momentum was lost by the French inability to move. In the meantime NATO made progress on its new strategic concept as well as on the formation of a multinational rapid reaction corps. The London Declaration of 6 July 1990 had announced in paragraph 14 that, as Soviet troops would be leaving Eastern Europe and a CFE treaty would be implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy would change fundamentally. Its forces would be highly mobile and versatile, so that Allied leaders would have maximum flexibility in deciding how to

respond to a crisis and it would rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units. Apparently, France had expected that a new strategy would first be formulated before the force structure was adapted, which would have given it time for bilateral contacts to work out a new, diminished role for SHAPE. As usual, this assumption did not lack the proverbial French logic, but the speed of events and the risk of further nationalisation of defence policies made NATO adopt a parallel approach. The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) issued a communiqué on 29 May 1991 agreeing the basis for a new force structure consisting of Main Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and Augmentation Forces including multinational forces of all types: land, air and maritime. A Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied Command Europe would be created, under UK command with a multinational headquarters. At SHAPE, a multinational Reaction Force Planning Staff would be established to develop and coordinate plans for all ACE Reaction Forces.

I was not privy to the bilateral consultations which had been conducted by Paris, but I knew that the French were surprised and angry about the speed with which these decisions were taken. They were not the only ones: in Germany there were second thoughts about the British domination of the ARRC and the fact that the UK land forces would all go to this new formation and no longer participate in the Main Defence Forces. A secondary cause of irritation was the deal Baker and Genscher had done in Washington on 10 May 1991, on a liaison function for NATO with the Central and Eastern European states and a strengthening of the CSCE. Their statement also contained a reference to the European security identity and defence role mentioned in the NATO communiqué of the previous December. Secretary Baker affirmed that the US was "ready to support arrangements the European Allies decide are needed for the expression of a common European foreign, security and defence policy". Minister Genscher affirmed "that the Atlantic Alliance as a whole should be enhanced by strengthening the role of and giving added responsibility to the Europeans in the context of security and defence policy, and that in that respect a European security and defence identity should be reflected in the development of a European pillar within the Alliance". They also agreed that NATO should maintain an effective integrated military structure to provide for collective defence and that appropriate arrangements should be instituted, so that all European members of NATO could participate in some appropriate manner in the development of a European pillar. This was another expression of the consistent concern in Washington that Turkey might be excluded from European initiatives. Whatever the cause, French irritation threatened to damage the NATO ministerial in Copenhagen on 6-7 June. In order to clarify the situation, Jacques Poos and Roland Dumas, having the presidency of the Twelve and WEU respectively, arranged a meeting in Paris on 4 June to which Wörner and myself as well as Robert Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly, and some of our collaborators

were invited. Wörner did not understand the French surprise reaction: they should have been informed through their observer on the Military Committee and, in any case, France itself already possessed a *Force d'Action Rapide*. The Strategic Concept was now in its sixth revised version and hopefully would be adopted at a summit meeting in November devoted to the overall transformation of the Alliance. Wörner had nothing against WEU and could not imagine that it would be embarrassed by these developments. The ARRC did not exclude anybody, but decisions had been necessary if force planning was to continue. Poos outlined his efforts to fulfil the mandate given by the European Council in Rome. Luxembourg had tabled a text in the IGC stating that the European Council could discuss security questions and its conclusions could be implemented, in all or in part, by WEU. Ireland would maintain its special position and, in 1996, a review conference would determine whether further steps would be possible. For the moment, the discussion centred on the question of whether the European defence identity was autonomous or should be seen only in the NATO framework.

My own intervention stressed the dual role of WEU, in NATO and in the future European Union. As such, the metaphor of a bridge was inadequate because WEU would be more than a go-between and exercise some specific functions, particularly in situations where NATO would not be willing to act. In its contacts with Eastern Europe WEU could be more selective than NATO. Towards the French I said that it was not my impression that NATO was trying to master every crisis in Europe. Dumas seemed relatively content with the way the meeting went, but stated that France would not join a NATO RRC, although - on an ad hoc basis - he did not exclude participation in a joint command for a specific operation.

The Copenhagen meeting went well and did not show any signs of the previous tension. In a separate statement the core functions of the Alliance were defined:

1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe (...) in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or the use of force;
2. To serve as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultation on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern;
3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state;
4. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

According to my information the last point originally figured at the top of the list but worded as "balancing" the Soviet Union. It was reformulated after the German ambassador had objected to mentioning the USSR by name. To me the sentence was somewhat paradoxical as I remembered an NPG in London in November 1976 when the German ambassador, Pauls, had strongly resisted anything resembling a separate European balance as distinct from a global one. But that was at a time when the issue of decoupling in nuclear deterrence had the upper hand. Today that no longer was our primary concern.

The Copenhagen meeting seemed to resolve the debate on the European security identity. Ministers stated that they would "develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European Security and Defence Identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the Alliance". There would be a need to establish appropriate links and consultation procedures between them, in order to ensure that the allies not currently participating in the development of a European identity should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. In a separate statement on partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Alliance came as close as possible to issuing a security guarantee to the new democracies:

Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Our common security can best be safeguarded through the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE are key elements.

The notion of "interlocking institutions" already present in the December communiqué was overdoing it a bit, as it assumed a rather precise division of labour among the various institutions. As this did not materialise, the high-sounding expression came to be ridiculed by pointing out that there was more "interblocking" than cooperation among them. The communiqué contained another phrase, taken from the Baker-Genscher statement of May, which subsequently would be often repeated:

The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

The formulation was taken directly from Baker's Five Points except for the "wherever such policies originate". It was most helpful in clarifying European attitudes towards NATO even though literally it was a tautology: it was agreed to do in the Alliance what countries had committed themselves to doing in the Alliance. In any case, everybody was happy about the outcome. At the Enlarged Council meeting of 10 June, Guelluy thought that henceforth nobody could talk about possible dangers of the ESDI for the Alliance; the European identity had become *incontournable*.

7. Ministerial Meeting at Vianden

Following the success of the 22 February document, I had drafted another paper to focus ministerial debate at the Vianden ministerial session on 27 June 1991, just before the European Council in Luxembourg. That session was another example of synchronisation of meetings and the UK was not amused, but let it pass with a request for time to raise possible objections. In the new paper I wrote that two questions had characterised the debate so far: first, are Europeans prepared to make a fundamental political choice that security and defence should form part of their progress towards Union; and, second, how in practice can a European defence role be developed in a way which reinforces the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance? In attempting to answer these questions I wrote that the main aim of WEU's relationship with the EU should be to ensure that Europeans speak with a coherent voice across the whole range of foreign, security and defence policy issues and that they have the military arrangements necessary to back up that voice. A treaty-based relationship should include the provision that the members of WEU will strive within that framework to enhance cooperation on security and defence issues. In this perspective, WEU formed an integral part of the European integration process. With regard to the Alliance, WEU members should now consider how to give effect to WEU's objective of expressing a more coherent European voice in a re-invigorated Alliance. The formulation and presentation of collective WEU contributions into Alliance consultations would be a key component of making WEU operational in the politico-military field. In other words, making WEU more operational should have a political and a military component. For a military operational role, two approaches had been identified. One which could be dubbed the "complementary" approach was advanced by the countries proposing a European Reaction Force: defence of NATO territory would be for NATO, European activity outside the NATO area would be for WEU with full consultation in the Alliance and, if Central and Eastern Europe were involved, with the backing of other Allies. The question remaining here was how a WEU capability could be seen as a contribution to the progressive integration of Europe if it had no direct role to play in the defence of Europe? The other, "compatible" approach would envisage a collective European contribution to Alliance force structures.

Here the obvious question remained whether this would require separate command arrangements for defence in Europe and how they would relate to Alliance structures. In discussing these two options, I advocated not foreclosing any options for the future whilst at the same time ensuring the necessary complementarity with the Alliance as agreed in Copenhagen. In the Enlarged Council, Greenstock succeeded in diminishing the difference between the two options, which led to the addition that they did not seem to be mutually exclusive. He based his remark on a quote from Dumas in Copenhagen that Europe needed a defence dimension but that was for the future. If so, there would be little difference between compatibility and complementarity. I did not take issue with him as the main purpose of the paper was to focus ministerial attention on what I regarded to be important questions. The result of our discussion was that again the paper would remain the responsibility of the Secretary-General.

At Vianden, ministers addressed a whole range of issues. On CSCE they endorsed a Belgian and Netherlands proposal to set up a "troika" of past, present and future presidencies. On Yugoslavia, they issued a statement urgently appealing to all the political authorities to avoid all confrontation, to refrain from the use of force and to resume the dialogue with a view to securing the unity of the state. They authorised fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and Romania and welcomed the request of Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh for a contact with WEU. On this point Genscher again argued in favour of an identical approach to all Central and Eastern European democracies as in NATO. This was contrary to the preparatory discussions where the advantages of WEU for a differentiated approach had been stressed, but I managed to divert his query by suggesting a mandate to the working group to examine it.

In operational terms, the meeting was marked by the fact that it gave the go-ahead for a WEU satellite data interpretation centre for an experimental three-year period. Up till the very last moment, it had remained uncertain whether the UK would agree to establishing the centre, as it constituted a low UK priority, given that the British acquired their data directly from the US.

On the role and place of WEU, the communiqué was positive in both directions. Repeating wording from the Hague Platform about the incompleteness of the European construction as long as it did not include security and defence, Ministers agreed that WEU should be developed in this phase of the European integration process as its defence component. A genuine ESDI would be reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance; this would reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance and would require, at each stage, appropriate practical arrangements to ensure transparency and complementarity. This would also call for appropriate procedures for cooperation with other allies. In general, ministers noted the need for the European and Atlantic debates to proceed in parallel. During the discussion, Genscher - speaking on behalf of the

incoming presidency - announced that he would convene a special session in the Autumn to discuss the issue further. He referred to my paper and said that he could agree to parts of it, but was not specific. Germany could agree to the mandate for the DRG but did not regard this as a mandate for the creation of a European reaction force, only for studying it.

The other interventions were along familiar lines, except for the Spanish. Ordonez stressed the general "vocation" of WEU and did not wish to clip its wings from the outset by designating geographical areas for its activities. The Spanish State Secretary for Defence added the proposal that a standing military committee should be established, made up of the military attachés in London. In my concluding statement, I made a plea for moving to Brussels. I found it very difficult for WEU fully to play its role vis-à-vis both the EU and NATO if it remained geographically distant, and I hoped that problems of representation would not delay the move. If WEU had to prepare inputs into NATO consultations, that could only be done in Brussels. There the debate ended. Nobody had answered my questions, but there was a promise of in-depth discussion in October. The DRG was tasked to study the military implications of WEU taking on a more operational role, which included possible tasks and resulting requirements and the need for coordination and planning structures.

The meeting in Vianden was the last under the French presidency, and it was Germany that briefed the WEU Assembly. Minister Genscher and State Secretary Hennig received the parliamentarians in the beautifully renovated Petersberg Castle and gave them the full treatment. Genscher was at his best in explaining his political approach. After the ending of the Cold War new problems emerged in which the EC not only represented an element of stability itself, but could also radiate stability externally. The process of European integration should acquire a political dimension and ultimately also a defence dimension, both with a federal - i.e. decentralised - structure. Fighting over the word "federalism" was useless as it was interpreted differently, but to him European structures should be federal within the EC and confederal outside it. At the pan-European level, he saw structures based on a wide concept of security, which included political and economic aspects. After the recent agreements in NATO it was now necessary to define the European defence dimension more clearly in the IGC, and he appealed to the parliamentarians to help this process at home. For he had come to the conclusion that the major objection to a defence identity did not come from the non-WEU members of the EC but from within the organisation. Germany was prepared to move into the most advanced stage of European integration and was ready to match any other country in this regard. Genscher asked his partners to accept this offer. He found it illogical if countries which were afraid of Germany growing too large also rejected further integration. Equally, it was difficult to envisage a common foreign policy at Twelve but a different defence policy at Nine. Decisions of the European Council should also apply as guidelines to WEU.

It might be wise to limit current deliberations to opening up the prospect of a defence policy in the future Union. On membership, he had no final opinion. Norway could join WEU when it entered the EC, but for Turkey the situation was more complicated as it was unlikely to join the EC soon. Therefore, he could envisage association but, almost as an afterthought, did not exclude membership altogether.

8. Space Activities

In 1989, WEU formed an ad hoc group on Space, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General, to consider European requirements and capabilities for earth observation. At the time, the aspect of verification of arms control agreements took first place as European interests would not always coincide with those of the US and some independent means of intelligence-gathering was desirable. The WEU Assembly had played an active role in forming a political consensus on this need and, in the years to come, would continue to pursue it, both for satellite observation and ballistic missile defence. Two avenues of approach presented themselves: to concentrate on the acquisition of European satellites, which even under the best of circumstances would be a lengthy process, or to start with the training of satellite photo-interpreters on the basis of material purchased from others. In fact, both avenues were explored, but the creation of a training centre proceeded more speedily. The ministerial meeting at Vianden in June 1991 took a positive decision and provided enough money to run it for an experimental period of three years. It was established at Torrejón, an airbase vacated by an American F-16 wing. Apart from training, the Centre was tasked to compile and process accessible data and make it available to member states, particularly within the framework of the verification of arms control agreements, crisis monitoring and environmental monitoring. A British expert, Barry Blaydes, was appointed as its first director, to be succeeded in 1995 by a Frenchman, Bernard Molard. He made a good start in a fine building, but was somewhat frustrated by the limited use member countries made of the services he could offer. Germany came first in asking for preparatory studies whenever its teams conducted inspections in the context of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. During the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the Centre - of its own accord - monitored the situation, particularly when WEU was organising the embargo against Serbia on the Danube. It provided an interesting example of what satellite imagery is able to do, when it discovered inconsistencies in Serbian behaviour towards Bosnia. President Milosevic had promised not to supply the Bosnian Serbs any more and indeed little traffic passed the Drina bridges. But careful study of satellite pictures showed that the water table in the river had been lowered and trucks were fording it at shallow places. We were not allowed to publicise our findings but they certainly helped member countries to check on the veracity of statements made by the

various parties, most of which were outright lies. On environmental monitoring, the Centre offered to provide information to the Italian government when bad flooding occurred in 1993 but, for reasons unknown to me, this was not taken up.

During the Lisbon ministerial of 1995, the Centre acquired permanent status as a subsidiary body of WEU. Earlier it had concluded an agreement with the Helios countries to obtain access to the imagery of this French-led venture. On European requirements for satellites the outcome was less positive. A "study management team" under Italian chairmanship and meeting in Paris identified three options in 1995:

1. To develop an independent WEU system;
2. To devise a system that would take advantage of existing efforts, mainly Helios, and from 2001 onwards, Helios II; or
3. To continue the activities of the Satellite Centre as pursued to date, i.e. image acquisition and processing.

The first option would be costly and the third one politically unsatisfactory. The second would depend on German willingness to join the Helios consortium and on Italy and Spain to rejoin it for future development. In spite of some internal hiccups concerning the size of its defence budget, German participation now seems to be assured. In time it would be an example of the most likely form of European cooperation: an overall framework in which all European members of NATO are participating, but limiting concrete programmes to those able and willing to make a concrete contribution. The Madrid Council of November 1995 instructed the Space Group to study a WEU ground segment in addition to existing national capabilities. The original rationale for the centre still seems valid. Verification of arms control agreements will require complementary arrangements in space, in the air - such as the "Open Skies" initiative often discussed in the SWG and actively supported - and on the ground. In future developments, the Centre could play a role as ground station for an early warning system against the launch of ballistic missiles or perform other functions in the field of nuclear disarmament or the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban. In military operations, the commander has a crucial need for real-time intelligence, which at the present time is only available through US channels. Here, too, we can expect complementarity between space and aerial reconnaissance, especially as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are improving their capabilities. Particularly in a peacekeeping environment, UAVs will be useful because their vulnerability will not be as inhibiting as in a hostile environment. But even in a war situation the battlefield commander would be happy to have drones available exclusively to him, rather than having to compete for time on a satellite.

The Satellite Centre is one of the major innovations in the development of European defence capabilities. Nowhere else does such a multinational

capability exist. In terms of procuring satellite imagery the Centre cast its net very wide. No better proof of the changed security environment could be given than the agreement signed with Russia in 1995 and the contacts established with the Ukrainian Space Agency in 1996. Most imagery, however, is bought from Spot, but also from the Canadian Radarsat and the Indian IRS. The first images from Helios arrived at the Centre in May 1996. Clearly, Europe will have to limit its ambitions in the field of space, but more can be done. Cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) was hampered in the past by the exclusively civilian character of the ESA charter but it now seems possible. Arms control verification always seemed compatible but, with the enlargement of the EU, resistance to more military applications is likely to dwindle. For WEU it seems appropriate to tailor its reconnaissance requirements to the scenarios it could become involved in, particularly on the periphery of the European Union.

The other side of the coin would be protection against incoming ballistic missiles. The use of Scuds by Iraq against Israel and the extraordinary difficulty of locating the launchers made the issue topical again. In October 1992 the SWG agreed to a French proposal to convene a group of experts to study the implications of the US project for a General Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). Lever for the UK warned against giving the impression that WEU was pre-empting NATO, but ultimately did not object to discussing the threat against Europe and possible responses. We agreed that among the three levels of threat - exo-atmospheric long-distance, endo-atmospheric and cruise missiles - we should concentrate on the second, because a larger number of countries was likely to possess them in the future and countermeasures seemed feasible. To me the long-term question concerned the future of nuclear deterrence if another step was taken to neutralise nuclear weapons, but more immediately what the effect in Europe would be of a situation where we would not have some protection but others did. Secondly, for Europe ATBM would have to be integrated into the overall air defence system.

Early February 1993, at the annual Wehrkunde meeting Les Aspin, US Secretary of Defense, told me that he would give priority to a theatre capability. Under those circumstances an option paper for the creation of a sea-based ATBM system would be interesting for Europe. This paper was given to me by Ambassador Cooper, who was in charge of GPALS, and quietly pushed by the US MilRep to NATO, Admiral Smith. Both of them spoke on the subject during the NATO Workshop in Budapest in June 1993. Cooper thought that Europe should concentrate on missiles, rather than sensors which were already being developed in the US. An update of the Patriot system would cost \$14 billion. An alert system discovering launches of ballistic missiles could be developed for a mere \$3 billion. Those figures did not reinforce the argument on priorities and made sensors look like an affordable option. That was also the conclusion of a seminar which the WEU Assembly organised in Rome in April 1993: we had to start with a

warning system. There the matter rested. The Clinton administration did not pursue the initiative actively, which was an argument for the UK to wait and see. For the others the absence of an urgent threat weakened their interest and diplomatic activity turned to a Missile Technology Control Regime prohibiting the sale of missiles and their know-how to potential rogue states. Another item on the arms control agenda could be the internationalisation of the INF agreement to prohibit intermediate-range missiles throughout the world. Only recently the Times reported a German plan for a mobile missile shield against the "Club Mad" - Iran, Iraq, Libya - combining the Patriot, Roland and Hawk systems.³⁰ The WEU Assembly kept up its interest and in December 1997 adopted a report by Mr Atkinson advocating an alert system consisting of two geo-stationary satellites. He also stressed the importance of the MEADS project - medium-range extended air defence system - and encouraged France to rejoin and the UK to participate.

Notes

26. Paragraph 13(a) read: "As part of Political Union, Heads of State and Government meeting in the European Council would be able to discuss all aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, without there being any 'taboo' subjects. The conclusions of the European Council on the principles and orientation of the CFSP would serve as a guideline for cooperation under the Brussels Treaty; in particular, where coordination in the defence field is necessary, this would be taken forward within WEU."

The footnote was formulated as follows: "Several delegations wish to include an explicit reference to WEU being placed under the aegis of the European Council or even under its direct authority. One delegation does not wish to prejudge the discussions within the IGC on the institutional arrangements for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Political Union and therefore wish to delete this subparagraph."

27. Sixth International Roundtable Conference on "Change in Europe and the Emergence of New Strategic Priorities: Restructuring Security Arrangements for the 1990s", 24-25 January 1991. The conference report noted: "The WEU was identified by both Europeans and American participants as the most appropriate organisation within which to build a stronger, more cohesive European security policy". The report also referred to my idea of double- or triple-hatted commanders and forces (p. 6).

28. The telegram was raised by President Mitterrand at his meeting with President Bush, but Bush feigned ignorance of its contents. For that reason, responsibility had been tagged on to Reginald Bartholomew.

29. "How NATO + EC + WEU Can Equal Security for Europeans", *International Herald Tribune*, 2 April 1991.

30. *The Times*, London, 23 July 1997.

Chapter Five New Proposals

After Vianden, I suggested in a meeting of the SWG on 18 July 1991 to concentrate on possible WEU inputs, not only into Alliance consultations but also into the Twelve. Both Guelluy and Goulden reacted positively. If we could go forward on a broad range of subjects, everybody would find something of interest. WEU would be better placed than the Twelve to discuss the "harder" aspects of security such as arms control, non-proliferation and post-Helsinki subjects. Their positive response was prompted by a substantial discussion we had had earlier in the meeting on the follow-up of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, known as CFE Ia. Washington had surprised its allies by proposing an initial manpower level of no less than 250,000. This would safeguard reinforcements brought in to man the equipment allowed under the limitations of the treaty, but represented about double the force level envisaged in practice. Also, it was higher than the 225,000 discussed in Ottawa two years earlier and disturbed the scheme in which ceilings should be discussed only in a final third phase of the negotiations. Nobody on our side wished to start earlier on debating the size of the US force presence in Europe. The subject seemed fitting for a joint position in NATO. A European subject we also discussed was a draft letter for Genscher to send to his Soviet colleague on "Open Skies".

When we returned from the summer vacation there was a feeling of uncertainty about the preparations for Maastricht. In the SWG of 16 September, we were facing a dilemma: if there was little substance on defence, how far could we go with practical steps such as a European Reaction Force (ERF)? Hofstetter felt that we should contribute a text on the European defence identity and also make WEU more operational. But the Maastricht Treaty could not create an ERF; that should take place in an evolutionary process. Germany had no objection in principle to the creation of a WEU planning staff. Migliorini pointed out that in February ministers had already approved the practical steps outlined in my paper. Goulden agreed to harvest everything that was possible and supported a planning cell; if some had problems we would agree that it was not necessary for everybody to take part.

On 4 October, I received the text of an Anglo-Italian declaration on European security and defence. At first glance those two seemed strange

bedfellows and their joint move seemed inspired by the desire not to leave the field entirely to the French and the Germans. Whatever its motivation, the declaration was interesting and marked the farthest point London ever went in the direction of a European identity, thus opening the way towards a compromise. Both countries obtained some support from each other for previously held positions but also gave up something. Under the heading "Complementarity in Decision-Making", the paper stated:

WEU members will consult with other Allies in an open spirit, drawing on positions agreed among themselves. On other issues relating to the European defence identity - for example collective action to protect European interests outside the NATO area - decisions will be made in WEU in close consultation with other Allies.

This was followed by a separate paragraph saying that a special relationship of association should be envisaged for other European partners and allies and liaison arrangements for other European countries where appropriate. In order to give initial practical content to the European defence identity, members of WEU should develop a European Reaction Force, capable of responding flexibly in a range of possible circumstances outside the NATO area, for example in response to threats to the interests of WEU members or in peacekeeping operations. Such a force would be autonomous, separate from the NATO structure, and would have its own peacetime planning cell to develop contingency plans and organise exercises. But there should be coordination with other members of the Alliance, so that the force could deploy alongside forces of other allies.

WEU was defined in two complementary directions: "as the defence component of the Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance". And in order to better perform these functions WEU ministerial organs should be transferred to Brussels. The role of WEU should be reviewed in 1998, i.e. at the end of the 50-year period since the signing of the Brussels Treaty. On the sensitive issue of guidelines from the EU and NATO, the Anglo-Italian declaration provided new language in its paragraph 10:

... the WEU will take account, in its activities, of the decisions of the European Council in the context of the CFSP, and of the positions adopted in the context of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with each body.

In the SWG of 16 October, Guelluy said that he had no problem with this formulation, but Klaiber, who had taken the place of Hofstetter during his illness, found it too weak. The Secretariat had circulated a new paper with the suggestion to prepare a WEU annex to the Union treaty and listing a number of questions, but these were overtaken by the proposals for

political union made two days earlier by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand, complete with treaty language. Among the stated objectives of the Union was the implementation of a CFSP "which will in time include a common defence". The decisions and measures of the Union in the field of security and defence could be elaborated and implemented "entirely or partially" by WEU, which is an integral part of the process of European Union. The obligations under NATO and WEU would not be affected and the new provisions would not form an obstacle to closer cooperation between two or more states bilaterally within the framework of WEU and NATO. The present dispositions would be reviewed not later than 1996. The Franco-German text also included a list of priority areas for the CFSP and essential elements for a separate WEU declaration in connection with the relevant articles of the Union treaty. The latter included the creation of a group for planning and military coordination and the constitution of military units answerable to (*relevant de*) WEU. With regard to NATO, the paper proposed regular coordination among WEU members with the objective of a common position on all the essential questions within the Alliance. For the representation in WEU, a formula should be developed of "double-hatting" of the representatives to NATO and the Community. Members of NATO not belonging to the EC would be offered association by organising, in particular, consultations to the extent their interests were affected. A postscript added to the text stated that the Franco-German military cooperation would be strengthened beyond the existing brigade and that these units thus could become the nucleus of a European Corps, which could include units of other WEU members. This new structure could become the model for closer military cooperation among WEU members.

The proposal was the result of long deliberations both in Bonn and in Paris on the need for multinational forces. In NATO the announcement met with largely negative reactions as it could weaken the military integration, certainly as long as the availability of the Eurocorps for collective defence had not been defined. My own view was more positive. Franco-German military cooperation crowned the rapprochement of the two countries after the last war and the new corps would provide a new basis for the stationing of French forces in Germany, acceptable to Bonn because German forces in the headquarters at Strasbourg would bring the necessary reciprocity. My own concern was of a different nature: the creation of the Eurocorps could become a third layer of defence cooperation - NATO, WEU and the Eurocorps - without a clear place in the structure of WEU as a whole and perhaps even with its own decision-making procedures. The role of the Franco-German defence council could point in this direction. Ultimately, WEU decided to have other units answerable to it and the Eurocorps became one FAWEU among many. When Belgium joined, to be followed by Luxembourg and Spain, its relationship with NATO was clarified satisfactorily.

On the same day as the Franco-German text was issued, the Nether-

lands presidency of the Twelve distributed a long COREU telegram analysing the evolving European identity in the field of security and defence. In trying to establish common ground among the different inputs, The Hague asked three questions: should there be an explicit statement that the development of the common security policy would be a gradual process, and was there agreement on the prospect of defining in time a common defence policy. This question was not extended to common defence as such, but the paper also asked whether the Union or the European Council should be competent to take decisions on defence immediately after the treaty had entered into force.

These new and important contributions led me to adapt my paper again and to shorten my introductory note for the extraordinary ministerial meeting of 29 October to three questions:

- Would the long-term objective be a common European defence or a common defence policy?
- What would be the difference for WEU between orientations coming from the Union and from the Alliance?
- Should the presidency of WEU and EU be harmonised and if so, would the period of six months be too short?

The second question was prompted by a positive remark made by Guelluy during the previous SWG on the place where decisions on collective defence should be taken. He had argued that not only should we avoid giving the impression that this would be done independently from the framework of the Alliance, but also that WEU would not be involved when its own defence was at stake. The point was also important for the UK, which continued to advocate a balanced relationship with NATO and EU and saw a role for WEU in implementing guidelines coming from both directions. For the time being, I did not talk about the European Council but about orientations coming from the Union as the Netherlands found this more agreeable. Some progress had been made at the last SWG when Spain had agreed to the move to Brussels, but on the other hand France had shown irritation on account of a Baker-Genscher statement on relations with the new democracies, which would lay the basis for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council offered at the NATO summit in Rome on 7-8 November 1991. Building on the notion of regular diplomatic liaison mentioned at the London summit, it envisaged more use of these arrangements at ambassadorial level and also at ministerial level for consultation and crisis management. In Guelluy's eyes this would change the character of NATO.³¹ France could not be against deepening the dialogue with the countries to the East but warned that this could dilute the defence commitments in the Alliance. Goulden had cut this discussion short by remarking that no hope should be given of eventual membership of the new democracies in NATO or WEU.

The special ministerial meeting on the role of WEU took place at the Petersberg on 29 October and produced a thorough discussion. Minister Dumas thought that after a year of talks we had reached agreement on the principle of a defence dimension in the European framework (but still had a difference on whether the aim should be a policy or a common defence); on the strengthening of the operational role of WEU, which should now be elaborated; and on the different character of relations with EU and NATO. If WEU functioned as the military dimension of the EU, that in itself would entail a special relationship, which had already been demonstrated in practice during the crises in the Gulf and in Yugoslavia; and everybody wanted to maintain NATO, which would also be strengthened to the extent the Europeans would shoulder more responsibilities.

The Belgian ministers were positive about the dual role of WEU. Eyskens supported a WEU Annex to the Maastricht Treaty and felt that in time the EU should be given its own defence. Belgium favoured a gradual approach to the operational role of WEU, including some re-balancing in a context of loyalty towards the Alliance. Coëme said that NATO consultations should not prevent a process of European reflection and that WEU should not be subordinated to another organisation.

Douglas Hurd also favoured a separate WEU declaration, which he regarded as essential for the underpinning of its role. To him, the most important outstanding problem was the nature of the links with NATO and EU. He accepted that they were not identical, but they should be balanced. Equidistance remained his aim. WEU was autonomous, but its links with NATO should be close and organic. For the defence of our soil WEU in theory could take responsibility, but we had opted for doing this through NATO. In short, the primacy of NATO might be a good phrase in this context. UK Defence Secretary, Tom King, also emphasised the complementarity with NATO, especially for out-of-area operations, and he warned against separate structures or forces. On this point he wondered whether the proposed Franco-German unit would be the best model for a European Reaction Force and preferred the UK/Netherlands amphibious force as a successful example.

For the Netherlands, Van den Broek also argued in favour of a separate WEU declaration, because the definition of its relationship to NATO did not lend itself to the Union Treaty as it went beyond the competence of the Twelve. On the question of guidelines, he could live with my latest suggestion stating that WEU would take as its orientation the decisions of the Union on CFSP and the positions taken in the Alliance, taking account of the different character of its relations with each of these bodies - a minor adaptation of the Anglo-Italian declaration. Netherlands Defence Minister, Ter Beek, hoped that before our next meeting France and Germany would indicate how others could contribute to their proposed European Corps.

Jacques Poos stated that, at Maastricht, security and defence should be firmly incorporated into the *acquis communautaire* and supported a

European Reaction Force double-hatted with NATO. The Portuguese and Spanish ministers largely supported my paper with an emphasis on practical measures. Taking up Van den Broek's point, I said that the Nine of WEU certainly could not dictate to the Twelve, but that the Twelve might not go far enough on security and defence. Perhaps we should leave the long-term aim to the Twelve and concentrate on the operational points for WEU. Hurd would be ready to accept my paper on a provisional basis on 19 November, when we had our regular session, but Genscher was more formalistic and said that decisions on the Union Treaty could only be taken at Maastricht. Dumas followed a similar line in saying that it was difficult to agree an annex on WEU if he did not know the contents of the treaty. The link with NATO could only be resolved at the highest level as far as France was concerned. Genscher at first toyed with the idea of a WEU meeting after Maastricht, but softened his position when Van den Broek said that Maastricht would not be able to make progress if WEU had not decided on its relationship with NATO. Genscher then agreed that WEU would do as much preparatory work as possible and concluded that nobody wanted to postpone the November meeting.

After the session, I flew to Rome in the special plane of Minister De Michelis and had the opportunity to have a long talk with him. He was confident that the Anglo-Italian declaration would provide the compromise in Maastricht. We should not go beyond the objective of a common European defence *policy* (not a European defence) and make a distinction between decisions by the European Union and positions of the Alliance. The UK should drop the word "organic" in describing the relationship with NATO. On membership he told me that London would no longer insist on full membership for Norway and Turkey and would be satisfied with some form of association. De Michelis regarded European integration as an "auto-catalytic" process in which progress in one field led to progress in others. According to him the presence of the presidency in Madrid for the conference on the Middle East was already an example that a common foreign policy existed, albeit on this point to the chagrin of France. In Rome, I was received by Prime Minister Andreotti who talked positively about WEU, but also emphasised the importance of not antagonising the US. He was obviously preoccupied by the NATO summit which would be held in Rome on 7-8 November 1991.

1. NATO's New Strategic Concept

The Rome summit of NATO adopted a lengthy declaration on peace and cooperation, statements on developments in the Soviet Union and on the situation in Yugoslavia and, most important of all, the new Strategic Concept. The declaration reaffirmed what the foreign ministers had already stated in Copenhagen earlier in the year in terms of the core functions of the Alliance. Instead of the twin principles of defence and détente which had

governed Alliance policy since the Harmel Report, security policy could now be based on three reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The enhancement of the role and responsibility of the European members was described as "an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance". These two processes were "mutually reinforcing" and as they advanced, practical arrangements would be developed to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the ESDI, as it emerged in the Twelve and WEU, and the Alliance. Satisfaction was expressed about the way in which WEU had kept the other allies informed. The new Strategic Concept should facilitate the necessary complementarity, but the text also made clear that the Alliance intended to preserve the operational coherence we now had and on which our defence depended. Its paragraph 7 concluded:

We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the Alliance and with the European Political Union.

The Strategic Concept emphasised that the remaining risks to Allied security were multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which made them hard to predict and assess. They would be less likely to result from calculated aggression against Allied territory, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that might arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties - including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes - faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the text was still very much oriented towards collective defence and constituted an uneasy compromise to cover the new realities. It continued to emphasise that the security of all allies was indivisible, although this referred primarily to cases of aggression against any of them. For example, the role of ground forces was deemed essential to hold or regain territory, also a collective defence task. To deal with the new risks and the corresponding crisis management needs, the Concept did not do much more than state a requirement for enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation. The dilemma was encapsulated in the words of a British minister at a WEU session, that strategy without a threat was like playing tennis without a ball. He was only partly right, for in a climate of uncertainty and unpredictability it still made sense to plan for scenarios and new missions. WEU would start doing that six months later. In the Strategic Concept multinational forces were discussed enthusiastically. They would enhance Alliance cohesion, reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. But again, they were put in the context of collective defence arrangements, while in fact their value would be most significant in peace support operations outside the treaty area, requiring

cohesion and solidarity of the participants, but not the large number of forces needed for defensive operations. In collective defence multinationality should not be pushed below the army corps level, but in peace operations requiring the intervention of military forces it should. For WEU, the Strategic Concept was satisfactory by its specific reference in paragraph 52 to the integrated and multinational European structures as they were further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, which would also increasingly have an important role to play in enhancing the allies' ability to work together in the common defence.

The Rome Declaration also took what it called a qualitative step forward in the relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It proposed annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), periodic meetings at ambassadorial level and even regular meetings with the Military Committee. Extending the hand of friendship, "outreach" became an additional dimension of Alliance activity, leading to the Partnership for Peace in 1994, the enlargement discussions, a new relationship with Russia and Ukraine and a transformation of the NACC into the European-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

2. Final Preparations

On 18 November 1991, WEU ministers again met in Bonn. The foreign ministers of the Twelve had made some progress during their "conclave" in preparing Maastricht on institutional points for the EU, such as the increase of German members of the European Parliament to 99 and apparently also on a European Commission with only one member per country. The debate had at times been rather sharp. Elleman-Jensen had said that the pressure for majority voting was directed against Denmark, Greece and the UK and that France would never allow itself to be outvoted. Hans van den Broek had asked Dumas and Genscher to explain the difference between a common European defence and a defence policy, to which Dumas had replied that he was not in school. The Irish minister, Collins, had been more negative on the draft texts than expected. The upshot was that on security there still was a deadlock. The NATO summit in Rome fortunately had developed some useful language which encouraged me to make a final attempt at listing the points of agreement as I saw them emerging:

1. Political Union will, sooner or later, have a common defence policy.
2. As we develop this European security identity and defence role, it will be compatible with the common defence policy we already have in our Alliance.
3. This will be a gradual process involving successive stages.
4. It is in this context that WEU's role will be developed as the defence component of the Union and as the means to strengthen the European

pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

5. WEU has therefore been entrusted with the task of formulating the common European defence policy and of carrying forward its concrete implementation by the further development of its operational role.
6. This requires WEU to develop close relations with both Political Union and NATO, but these relations are of a different nature.
7. A whole series of more practical measures will be taken to create these closer links with the Union and with the Alliance.
8. As a consequence of agreement on these basic principles and as a way of facilitating the strengthening of WEU's role, the WEU Council and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels.
9. A review of WEU's role and its relationships with the Union and with NATO should take place towards the end of the 1990s.

This meeting was the normal half-yearly one and the crisis in Yugoslavia took up a fair amount of time. On the preparation of Maastricht, Dumas had said at the beginning that today no progress would be possible. Ordonez and De Michelis were absent and there was no willingness to convene a drafting group. Opening the discussion, Genscher mentioned three important outstanding questions: the relationship with NATO, membership and the operational role of WEU. German Defence Minister, Stoltenberg, thought that after Maastricht a positive decision could be taken on strengthening the military component of the Secretariat and Tom King was ready to consider this. For the Netherlands, Ter Beek urged that a start be made on implementing the "complementarity" between WEU and NATO and asked for a final report on the operational role for the Spring ministerial session. Dumas then recognised that the discussion on the role of WEU had shown some flexibility, which made him believe that agreement at Maastricht would be possible. To him, a common defence should have a structure, which was WEU. Its link with the Union should therefore be close and organic, but not exclusive. The relationship with NATO was also important, but different in nature. Douglas Hurd saw the procedural side more difficult than the substance. If we had no draft for the WEU declaration there would be no treaty which could rally sufficient support. Therefore, there was a need for parallel work. Genscher's conclusion was to ask the SWG to make a last effort and to report to the second and final conclave of the Twelve on 2 December.

On membership, ministers came to the conclusion that the time for a comprehensive decision was not yet ripe and should be tackled after Maastricht. Genscher hoped that it would be possible then to formulate objective criteria. Van den Broek argued that the automatic military assistance clause of WEU should not apply between NATO allies, as it would potentially create serious problems between Greece and Turkey. He recalled an earlier Spanish idea to propose association for all European NATO members, but for EC partners with the added prospect of full

membership.

The meeting of the SWG took place on 27 November but was not very productive. Some old brackets were removed from the text but new ones appeared. France did not want to treat the relations with EU and NATO in the same paragraph, whereupon the UK introduced identical wording for both links. The word "organic" reappeared, which we had tried to avoid earlier on. We produced a new paper but I doubted whether it was an improvement.

The political situation changed when the Financial Times reported that Greece would block any Union treaty if it was not allowed to enter WEU. I had the opportunity to put this question to Prime Minister Mitsotakis when he addressed the WEU Assembly on 2 December. At a luncheon given by Assembly President Pontillon he told me that Greece was not in the habit of linking issues, but also had the right to join WEU. That afternoon he repeated this claim in the plenary. It would have a profound effect on the discussion at Maastricht as the original tactics of postponing decisions on membership no longer appeared feasible. Two days later, Genscher addressed the Assembly and was asked by a Greek deputy whether EC members who also belonged to NATO could join WEU. His answer was both clever and surprising for it approached the question from a different angle than intended: he said that he did not immediately see the necessity of all WEU members belonging to NATO. There might be an advantage in non-NATO countries joining in European defence policy. Sir Geoffrey (later Lord) Finsberg was quick to ask whether he also meant countries not belonging to the European Community, but could not draw Genscher in on that. He simply replied that those questions would be clearer after Maastricht.

3. At Maastricht

For me, work at Maastricht started with a meeting of the political directors of the WEU countries chaired by Chrobog, the German Political Director. He introduced a new paper on the role of WEU based on a draft for Article D (later to become Article J) and a separate paper on membership. The debate largely was between Dejammet and Appleyard with Chrobog alternating pressure on his French and British colleagues. We owed it to his perseverance and the pressure of time that ultimately a text was produced which could be presented to ministers. But that would require another session early in the morning of 10 December. On the first day the burden was more on Dejammet, who had moved backwards on several points. We understood that he preferred a common defence over a common defence policy, but did not comprehend why he reintroduced the notion that implementation would be entrusted to WEU "in whole or in part". That would create the impression that there would be another European level of action next to WEU and revive my concern about the Eurocorps. Equally,

we were surprised when he proposed to scratch the words "WEU will install close relations with the European Union" and to proceed directly to the practical measures. The UK insisted on a review article, but now France was difficult. Germany made an important move by changing the place of forces coming under WEU from the list of items to be studied - such as enhanced armaments cooperation with the aim of creating an armaments agency and the development of the WEU Institute for Security Studies into an academy - to the points on which the operational role would be strengthened in particular. Chrobog explained that he was able to do so in the light of the Franco-German initiative for a Eurocorps, but that did not make it easier for the UK, which had lost much of its earlier enthusiasm for a European Reaction Force. Nevertheless, this discussion ended with the UK lifting all its square brackets and France maintaining several.

On membership, the UK and the Netherlands were in a minority. Presumed Greek linkage between agreement to the Maastricht Treaty and admittance to WEU had concentrated the minds, but did not change the basic attitudes. Most regarded full Greek membership as a logical consequence of belonging to the EU. From London, Holthoff phoned to tell me about a message from the US embassy stating a clear preference for all European allies being able to join WEU. If that were not possible, enlargement should be deferred pending arrangements between NATO and WEU satisfactory to the European allies. Presumably the WEU countries had received similar messages, but nobody talked about them openly. Germany started out with a proposal that member states of the EU would be invited to join WEU as full members. Other European members of NATO would be offered the opportunity to become associate members or observers. WEU should be ready to conclude the relevant treaties before 31 December 1992. The UK was clearly opposed as this text did not pay sufficient attention to Turkey. The Netherlands wanted to make clear that, among NATO allies, WEU's Article V should be waived. They also pointed out the necessity of concluding all arrangements about membership or association at the same time, in order to avoid vetoes from any new members on other aspects. In any case, Article XI of the Brussels Treaty stipulated that any accession would take place "on conditions to be agreed", a point also made by Belgium. Chrobog then asked whether we could say that only members of the EU could join WEU, to which Kröner for the Netherlands responded by approaching it from the other end: members of the EU would be invited to become full members of WEU. All agreed except the UK which proposed a new version:

Applications for membership from EC member states which are also NATO members will be considered in conjunction with arrangements to enable non-EC members of the Alliance to participate fully in the work and the deliberations of WEU.

The next morning Appleyard stuck to his text. It would not be possible to admit Greece without dealing also with Turkey. Van Walsum was now in the Netherlands seat and informed us that Prime Minister Mitsotakis yesterday had not hinted at any linkage and had only talked about his wish to become a member because Greece needed protection. The Netherlands therefore resisted any automaticity and wanted to maintain an element of conditionality in making the offer of membership. Although not stated explicitly during the discussions, the nightmare scenario of some was a situation in which Greece, having obtained the automatic military assistance clause, would take some provocative action which would oblige Turkey to respond militarily. Under those circumstances, the extension of Article V would destabilise the situation and extend commitments which nobody wanted to contemplate.

After lunch the foreign ministers of the WEU countries were to meet. When I led the political directors to the conference room we passed the wide corridor in which the twelve ministers were finishing their lunch. Genscher got up and with a wide gesture invited everybody to the WEU meeting. Some embarrassed glances shot across the lobby but nobody protested. As a result, all twelve foreign ministers took a seat in the room as well as Commissioner Frans Andriessen, Günter Burghardt from the Commission and Pierre Champenois as head of the EPC Secretariat. In discussing our draft, Dumas maintained the French points but fairly weakly as it would ultimately be the European Council which would decide. Genscher used the same argument, speculating, I suppose, on the unlikely situation that the heads of government would spend much time on these issues. One of the proposals by Dumas was to include in paragraph 3 the words "The European Union can request WEU" in the Union Treaty. When Dumas only got support from Portugal for his "in whole or in part", which Eyskens thought superfluous and Genscher proposed deleting, France amended the paragraph instead to include "and in accordance with the guidelines fixed by the Union". This was also referred to the European Council.

Douglas Hurd made an attempt to relegate the point of Forces Answerable to WEU to the study items, but met resistance from De Michelis, who pointed out that the Anglo-Italian declaration favoured a European Reaction Force. Hans van den Broek said that he did not want an obligation to join such forces, whereupon Genscher suggested saying that it applied to those willing to participate. I explained that already some preparatory work had been done in the DRG, so that a mere reference to study would be seen as a step back. Hurd then agreed, but made the operational decisions somewhat less concrete by inserting "by examining and defining" before "appropriate missions, structures and means". This would not hamper our work.

On enlargement, two versions were on the table. Van den Broek started off by saying that we never really had debated the membership

question, but that he was in favour of association without voting rights for the non-EU members of NATO on condition that Article V would not apply against allies. The date for finalising membership by the end of 1992 was an objective and not a commitment, which would also depend on the attitude taken during the negotiations by the countries seeking membership. Genscher made the point that Article V had worked for many years when WEU did not have any forces. In any case, assistance could never be given to an aggressor and a fight between NATO allies was difficult to imagine. De Michelis and Deus Pinheiro were prepared to add something on the contents of associate membership, which prompted Genscher to suggest "associate membership in a way which will give them the possibility of participating in the activities of WEU". Hurd grasped the opportunity for a deal saving the essence of the earlier British amendment and agreed, subject to reading "participating fully in the activities". Genscher accepted it and only Westendorp asked what the difference would be between full and associate membership. Nobody felt inclined to answer. The next issue was the paragraph declaring Article V non-applicable between allies. Dumas had called it a "juridical monster" and Genscher regarded it as a treaty change which did not belong in a declaration. Hurd and Van den Broek finally agreed to drop the entire paragraph but announced that they would revert to it as a condition to be agreed under Article XI. The Greek Minister, Samaras, who had followed the discussion intently, asked for the floor to say that the paragraph on links with NATO should allow for a distinction between "participate" and "fully participate". He saw a situation developing in which Greece would be in a two-speed position and warned that he could not come home with such a result. Genscher tried to accommodate him by pointing at the serious commitment to elaborate everything within a year but did not close the debate entirely: perhaps the membership issue would come up again in the European Council. Hans van den Broek found it necessary to repeat that this was a subject for WEU and not for the Council, whereupon Genscher used his earlier reply that he could only report to the heads of government what had been agreed among ministers here.

The text was the best possible outcome. The Greeks had something tangible to take home in spite of Samaras' mutterings. By being present he had seen that there was widespread support for meaningful association of Norway and Turkey and that the issue of the automatic assistance clause would come back in the course of the enlargement negotiations. And Douglas Hurd had obtained full participation for Turkey in WEU activities, which it was not able to get in the European Union. French officials were less happy with the result, which in their view was blurring the European vocation of WEU, but Dumas had not objected to the compromise. Both texts passed the European Council unscathed and seemed a good basis for substantial progress. The Secretariat could move from London to Brussels.

The Maastricht Treaty itself was a success inasmuch as it concluded a

lengthy and difficult IGC, but the final outcome was uneven.³² The criteria and timetable for monetary union were well-prepared and represented an unprecedented consensus on economic and financial objectives and the discipline needed to reach them. Socialist governments accepted the medicine needed to make their economies healthy again and the Southern members did not oppose goals which they would find very difficult to meet. Everybody realised that without strict discipline the German voter could not be persuaded to give up his cherished Deutsch mark. The discussions at Maastricht improved the outcome on EMU in two ways. A final date was inserted for the entry into force and a general opt-out clause was rejected. On the Social Charter, the UK was allowed a permanent opt-out, which was an unhappy precedent and a blemish on European solidarity. On the Political Union the outcome was not very tangible. The deepening envisaged as a necessity before the next enlargement with the EFTA countries did not materialise. The European Parliament obtained a concession on co-decision, which they would exploit to the full. The relationship between the three pillars remained unclear. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was hustled into existence, but amounted to little more than the former European Political Cooperation plus some joint actions added on to it. It should include "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". The debate on the two alternatives was resolved by including both, but the result was a double conditional. Article J.4 continued by saying "the Union requests the Western European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications". Close reading of the word "requests" could give the impression that the Union had given a permanent mandate to WEU, but this was not the interpretation followed subsequently. In fact, the Union only once requested WEU to take action - the organisation of a police contingent to support the work of the EU administrator in Mostar - but paradoxically this did not concern an action having defence or military implications. Paragraph 3 stated that issues having defence implications would not be subject to the procedures in Article J.3, which included the possibility of majority voting. In practice, this would be interpreted extensively to cover everything connected with military operations. The next paragraph dealt with the respect for obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty and compatibility with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. So there would be a CFSP of the Union and a common security and defence policy within the Alliance, hardly the epitome of clarity. Paragraph 5 opened the possibility for closer cooperation between two or more member states, in WEU or in the Alliance, a clear reference to the Eurocorps. Finally, the article could be revised on the basis of a report to be provided in 1996 in conjunction with the possibility of reviewing the WEU Treaty in 1998 at the end of its 50-year period.

4. Decisions at the Petersberg

In London the SWG and DRG met on 16 December, to discuss the follow-up to Maastricht. Basically, we had three areas to consider: the practical measures with regard to the transfer to Brussels, the composition of the Council and the relationship with EU and NATO; the enlargement with full members, observers and associate members; and the operational aspects. Klaiber proposed that Minister Genscher would write to the other EU and NATO countries, drawing their attention to the possibilities for participation open to them and that the Permanent Council and the Council Working Group (CWG) would assume responsibility for the negotiations. Nobody had a problem with that and subsequently Genscher wrote a very short letter to the six countries concerned. As was to be expected, the UK and the Netherlands repeated their point that the automatic military assistance clause should not apply to possible conflicts among members of the Alliance and that this should be a condition to be agreed upon. Equally, clarification was sought of the "possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU" for the associate members.

The other points were more delicate. Guelluy was very constructive in the beginning by saying that Maastricht was a balanced compromise which should be applied as quickly as possible, but also wanted to distinguish between what could be done now and what should await ratification. In the course of the meeting his position hardened. Four points were important to him: with the transfer to Brussels the whole structure of WEU should be reviewed; if the Maastricht Treaty was not ratified the WEU declaration could not be implemented either; the composition of the WEU Council should be agreed in advance of the move; and there should be clarity about the inputs into NATO consultation. As usual, Goulden made the most substantive rebuttal. The declaration had been agreed by ministers and should be implemented. Once in Brussels, WEU would get a new momentum but there should not be agreement on a rigid formula for representation in the Council. Like the others he advocated a Council in Brussels which would deal with substantive matters and not limit itself to management issues. Consequently, there would be less need for people coming from capitals as in SWG and DRG. Synchronisation of meetings should only be decided when really useful and the same applied to caucusing before NATO meetings. Sometimes it would be vital, sometimes not useful and in any case should be done by the people who also would be present in the wider meeting. Harmonisation of presidencies would only be a matter for the long term. Goulden was not attracted by the notion that only the Presidency could act as spokesman for WEU. His more conceptual point was that as common positions both in CFSP and in WEU would be possible only if there was agreement on substance, there was a trade-off between content and procedure. If the procedure was too rigid, there would be few common positions, hence the need for some flexibility.

After these interventions, I revived my earlier suggestions to have NATO and EU permanent representatives meet in a WEU setting whenever appropriate and have the presidencies of EU and WEU work closely together by forming a "duo" on security matters. Both points met with some interest, but would in later months be overtaken by events. Jean de Ruyt, for Belgium, remarked correctly that the old EPC structure with a Political Committee would remain and that the idea of a COREPER III for the CFSP had been shelved. Consequently, CFSP would be handled from capitals and in Brussels the WEU Council would not find a comparable body. In addition, he pointed out that the Asolo list of subjects for the CFSP had virtually been abandoned. Like his Dutch colleague, Herman Schaper, he questioned where arms control questions should be discussed. They figured in the Asolo list, but the Maastricht Treaty seemed to exclude common positions, by excluding defence questions from the procedures of the CFSP. Gouliden took the view that "hard" questions of arms control should preferably be dealt with by WEU and Guelluy did not contradict him.

As far as a date for the move to Brussels was concerned, Klaiber mentioned 1 January 1993, Schaper thought that September 1992 might be possible and Aguirre for Spain also wanted to have a precise date as soon as possible. De Ruyt did not want to press the case for his own capital too hard and asked whether a gradual move would be possible. After the meeting his government took quick action and invited me to Brussels in early January 1992 to inspect a building which they were preparing to take over from the Société Generale. Before going there I had to make an assessment of our future housing requirements. The DRG had only just started discussing the planning cell. The German presidency had given some thought to it and came up with a double proposal: to reinforce the military expertise in the Secretariat with one or two officers to staff the DRG and ad hoc groups and to form a multinational Planning Cell to define options and tasks for WEU missions and to assemble force packages. The Planning Cell should report to Council and CHODs, maintain close links with NATO planners and organise exercises for the force packages envisaged. Ultimately, the DRG could turn into a committee of military representatives, which on behalf of the CHODs could give guidelines to the Planning Cell. The work which the Joint Contingency Planning Staff had recently done in Metz on the Yugoslav crisis was mentioned as an example of the kind of work the Planning Cell could undertake. As to its size, Italy wanted a body in which every country could participate. The UK, Belgium and the Netherlands thought of a smaller group. I suggested a small group in Brussels plus periodic meetings with additional experts from capitals. The most concrete suggestion came from the UK representative, who proposed a Planning Cell of six officers with among them a colonel as director. With those scanty details I proceeded to Brussels. Assuming that it would be difficult to obtain authorisation for more than six to eight officers I gave my personal opinion that the building would be suitable to accommodate Secretariat and

Planning Cell, but that fairly substantial modifications would be necessary to provide conference facilities. For once I underestimated the propensity of the member countries to spend money, for both Council and DRG questioned whether the building would be large enough. Under the German proposals the Planning Cell establishment had grown to 38 people, who clearly could not be accommodated in the proposed building. At first, the Belgian government was not pleased with our reaction, but managed to use the building for a government department. We widened our selection and opted for a nice modern and well-equipped building on the Rue de la Régence which would shortly be vacated by Euroclear, a clearing house for securities. At German insistence the Petersberg Declaration had instructed the Permanent Council and Secretary-General to expedite the necessary arrangements, so that the transfer could become effective as of January 1993. I wanted to stick closely to that date for the move, even though the new conference room would not be ready by that time. In September, I managed to get approval for holding the first Council meeting in Brussels on 19 January. Two weeks later the Italian presidency questioned whether we should postpone it, but I held firm; only by being on the spot could we properly supervise the refurbishment of the building, and our substantive work could not really take on a new dimension while we were still in London. In the end, the Planning Cell started its build-up phase already in October in temporary facilities generously made available by the Belgian École Militaire and was the first to move in as soon as its floor in the new building was ready for occupation at the beginning of the year.

The enlargement of WEU with associate members and observers provided a formidable challenge. It was the first time that a security organisation had considered forms of participation which did not amount to full membership. NATO had considered this option a year earlier, but rejected association because of the difficulty of defining its relationship to collective defence. Personally, I continued to wonder whether that decision was a wise one and the subsequent debate on extending full membership of the Alliance underlined my doubts. But for WEU, with its dual role with regard to the EU and NATO, associate membership would be a prerequisite for being able to constitute a European pillar in the Alliance and for incorporating armaments cooperation into WEU.

The first time the Permanent Council discussed enlargement, positions were wide apart. The Secretariat had prepared a paper listing the issues requiring a negotiating position. On 15 January 1992, Jeremy Greenstock for the UK advocated extension of Article V to associate members, who should accept it and be covered by it. Richthofen did not think this possible as it would require an entirely new treaty with ratification in all countries concerned. Moreover, Germany saw EU membership as a requirement for WEU membership. The French representative wanted to draft a new political declaration on the "acquis" of WEU. He did not oppose the exclusion of an appeal to Article V among NATO allies, provided it was not directed against

a particular country (i.e. Greece). France also wanted to give some substance to the position of observers to encourage them to become full members. The Belgian Ambassador, Dehennin, took exactly the opposite view and wanted to keep the observership as modest as possible in order to make full membership more attractive. The Netherlands sought to define associate membership by listing what would not apply, such as formal decision-making, the budget and personnel in the Secretariat. Portugal wanted the associates to be as close to the full members as possible and expected that the protocol of association would require ratification. Spain argued that formal decisions could be taken only by full members; therefore, it would not be necessary to change the treaty and the arrangement could be applied immediately after signing.

The next time, on 5 February we came closer together on the basis of an informal *feuille libre* from the Secretariat. The Netherlands Ambassador, Hoekman, said very firmly that either Article V should be excluded among NATO allies or it should be extended to the associate partners and subsequently there was only discussion on how to formulate the exclusion. Dorin for France made a useful distinction that the associates could participate in consensus-building but could not block the outcome. Less welcome was his suggestion that meetings could start between the full members and then be opened up to include the associates. Most others thought that this fell short of full participation. Luxembourg felt that it should remain possible for the full members to meet separately on issues such as enlargement and relations with the EU. The Spanish Ambassador, De la Morena, reported a lobby action by his Greek colleague to issue a declaration that no WEU country would support aggressive action against a NATO country. This would fit in with the emerging consensus that the issue of security guarantees could best be solved by a political declaration. Following a discussion in the CWG, the Secretariat proposed some ideas for consideration on 12 February. Members and associate members would solemnly declare that they would settle their international differences, including their mutual differences, by peaceful means; that they would refrain from resorting to the threat or use of force; and that the commitment of solidarity and collective defence which bound them together within the Alliance and within WEU were "complementary and may not be invoked the one separately from the other in their mutual relations".

In a subsequent SWG, the arguments were repeated. Goulden explained that, with the disappearance of the massive external threat from the Soviet Union, bilateral conflicts among allies had become less improbable and that with the creation of Forces Answerable to WEU the question of Article V had to be settled. Guelluy repeated that the normal Council should include full members only, but next to it an enlarged meeting was possible. France modified its position in the Council of 26 May by admitting the permanent presence of the associates and observers in all Council meetings, but proposing that restricted sessions of full members could be

convened at the request of three countries. This proposal was the result of some discussions in the margins of our meetings. Article VIII provided the right of a single member to call for a meeting of the Council, but henceforth this would normally imply a session of the Enlarged Council. If a single country could also call a restricted meeting, it was feared that Greece - after becoming a full member - would repeatedly do so, thus excluding Turkey. We were making some progress, but Richthofen thought we should conclude soon and in mid-March asked for a session of ambassadors only in my office to deliver a pep talk to his colleagues on behalf of the German presidency. After that, the SWG still needed several sessions to reach a compromise but every time further progress was made. The right to call a restricted meeting was given to a majority of the full members or to half of them if that included the country holding the presidency. The Working Group on Space would be restricted to full members for the duration of the three-year experimental period of the Satellite Centre. The associate members would have access to the Planning Cell through liaison officers, but would not participate in the regular staffing. By mid-May the draft texts were ready for submission to ministers.

The final issue was the entry into force. As the status of associate member or observer did not affect the core obligations under the WEU Treaty, we had reached the conclusion that ratification would only be necessary for the accession of Greece as a full member. That would require time in the nine parliaments of member countries during which we would apply the new arrangements *de facto* and, after the signing of the protocol of accession, would grant Greece the status of "active observer". Equally, the arrangements for associates and observers would be applied provisionally during the ratification of the Greek accession. In this way, all three categories would formally enter into force at the same time. In practice, this grey period would last quite long as the last ratification was not deposited until 1995 by the Netherlands, where Parliament showed little enthusiasm in the light of Greek behaviour towards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The prolonged transitional period had a positive effect on Turkish acceptance of associate membership. At first, the government in Ankara did not dare submit the agreement to parliamentary approval, as the opposition would have gained support in its claim for full equality with all allies. As Norway and Iceland accepted associate membership, the debate died down and in the end the Turkish government joined without submitting the text for ratification or formal parliamentary approval.

In the meantime, we had also progressed in defining a relationship with the new democracies in Central Europe. In 1991, the new incoming presidency carried through a decision on the outstanding issue of a WEU fact-finding mission to the countries of Central Europe. The idea originated in Luxembourg during my visit in February, but the reception in WEU was cool. The Belgian presidency saw no potential purpose in going there and feared that we would create the impression of taking subscriptions for

membership. The Italian State Secretary, Vitalone, had argued at the May Ministerial that WEU should not move faster in its approach to Central Europe than the other organisations. The French had appeared lukewarm at first but saw an opportunity for raising the profile of their presidency. Guelluy used the argument that when Wörner was going to Moscow without a mandate from the North Atlantic Council, there could be no objection to the Secretary-General and a representative from the presidency going to Central Europe with a mandate from the WEU Council. As there were no objections any longer we were authorised to travel to the three Visegrad countries, to be followed, during the German presidency, by Bulgaria and Romania and on a separate trip by the three Baltic countries. An Italian suggestion to include Belgrade in our itinerary was not taken up. The purpose of our visit was to explain the work and position of WEU and to hear the security concerns and attitudes towards European cooperation of our hosts. As a first concrete step the WEU Institute for Security Studies organised a seminar to which the politico-military experts from WEU and Visegrad countries were invited, an informal seminar of officials, which proved to be an important step in the evolution towards the creation of a forum of consultation and ultimately the status of associate partner for those countries of Central Europe which had signed the so-called Europe Agreements with the European Union. The Institute was an excellent intermediary for it avoided the despatch of formal delegations and there was no immediate need for institutionalising what was still a delicate process of probing for increased dialogue and cooperation. John Roper chaired these seminars with flair and managed to get everyone to participate actively in the discussions. During its presidency Germany wanted to do more at a higher level. Originally, Bonn contemplated calling a special ministerial meeting in early May, but had to abandon that idea because the Visegrad Three had already taken up the available date for a meeting among themselves. Then Germany proposed to tag a meeting with the Eight onto the regular meeting at the Petersberg scheduled for 19 June, and to prepare a declaration. There was not much time to do so and nobody had a clear idea about the substance of the new relationship.

In the SWG of 19 May, I started by asking what our objectives were. In preparatory contacts some had wanted to create the status of special guest; others wished to differentiate among the Eight on the basis of whether or not they had concluded an association agreement with the EU; the possibility of creating a troika for these contacts had been mentioned and what about relations with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe? Summing up the discussion, I concluded that after the enlargement of CSCE and NACC, we recognised the desirability of an inner circle as far as European integration was concerned. In institutional terms we saw enough substance for a yearly ministerial session plus four meetings at ambassadorial level. It would not be opportune to include differentiation in our declaration, but in practice this could happen afterwards. There was support for

a troika arrangement if implemented pragmatically. A point of difference concerned the name. Consultation Council seemed somewhat less than the Cooperation Council of NATO, and Italy especially had some doubts. In the end, it became "Forum of Consultation". Our initiative towards the Central European countries figured prominently at the first joint meeting between the WEU Council and the North Atlantic Council on 21 May 1992. The year before, Manfred Wörner had organised an informal tea-meeting after our annual visit to SHAPE. It had to be informal, because the French ambassador did not attend.

This time everybody was present and a verbatim record was kept. US Ambassador Taft was critical of insufficient transparency of WEU initiatives on CFE and Open Skies (which surprised me), but his main question concerned possible WEU security guarantees to Central European countries which were not members of NATO. He had heard about discussions of an associate membership. John Weston, the UK ambassador to NATO, followed this up by asking what importance was being attached to the fact that, up to that point, all full members of WEU had been members of the Alliance and whether we agreed that WEU member states would defend themselves through NATO. In my reply I could not affirm the "Cahen doctrine"³³ about criteria for WEU membership and limited myself to saying that at Maastricht full membership of WEU was envisaged for full members of the European Union and in principle also for future full members of the EC. In practice, however, we were all aware of the fact that such enlargement would not be for tomorrow. Weston was not content and repeated his question, but I could not satisfy him. In return, I wondered what the meaning of Article V of NATO would be in future.

On 19 June 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council adopted the Petersberg Declaration which, in its third part, spelled out the relations with other European member states of the EU or NATO. Among the fundamental principles governing the relations between full and associate members were listed the settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means and refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force. They also stressed that "the security guarantees and defence commitments in the Treaties which bind the Member States within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between Member States of either of the two organisations". Members of the EU which had accepted the invitation to become observers could attend the meetings of the Council, could be invited to meetings of working groups and could be invited to speak, on request. Other European member states of the Alliance which had accepted the invitation to become associate members could participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council, its working groups and the subsidiary bodies, subject to the following provisions:

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- at the request of a majority of the member States, or of half of the member States including the Presidency, participation may be restricted to full members;
- they will be able to be associated to the Planning Cell through a permanent liaison arrangement;
- they will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong (a reference to the IEPG, WvE);
- they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member States;
- they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member States; they will be able to participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member States, or half of the member States including the Presidency, decide otherwise;
- they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces;
- they will accept in full the substance of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which will form part of the association document;
- they will be connected to the member States' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;
- they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the Organisation's budgets.

The second important part of the Petersberg Declaration was the section on strengthening WEU's operational role. The Defence Representatives Group (DRG) had worked hard on elaborating the decisions taken at Maastricht and the CHODs and myself were received by Chancellor Kohl, who expressed the hope that the Planning Cell would start working before the end of the year. He also tried to reassure those sceptical of the Franco-German* military cooperation by saying that the Eurocorps was not envisaged to include units from all WEU countries. This position would also be taken by the French delegation and culminated in the speech of Defence Minister Joxe to the WEU Assembly on 3 June 1992, when he said that the Eurocorps did not have the "vocation" to constitute a European army. It would be one Force Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) among several and would not constitute a third institutional layer next to WEU and NATO. The same day his German colleague Volker Rühe declared that WEU was the "political roof" over the Eurocorps. I still had some difficulty with the notion that the Eurocorps might be open to non-members of WEU and mentioned this to Foreign Minister Kinkel before the start of the Petersberg meeting. The question did not arise and in the Declaration WEU members declared "that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted

under the authority of WEU". These units would be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions - in this case after consultation with NATO - and would be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis. All WEU member states would soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available for its various possible tasks.

The formulation of the missions was more difficult. I was keen to make sure that WEU would not be restricted to traditional peacekeeping, but remain capable of proper military activities under whatever name. I expected problems with the German constitutional difficulty to send forces outside of the NATO area, but was pleasantly surprised that the German delegates to the DRG had no negative instructions. The same issue played a role in their bilateral discussions on the Eurocorps and formulations agreed there would also be acceptable for WEU. Defence Minister Rühe said to the Assembly in May that Germany would not be able to participate in all missions of the Eurocorps, but that Europe's credibility would suffer if that inability would last forever. In the end, the Declaration met the German problem by stipulating in paragraph II, 3 that "Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decisions of member States in accordance with their national constitutions". This cleared the way for specifying the new missions in the following paragraph:

Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article V of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The reference to combat forces was a great success for the German presidency and for Klaus Klaiber in particular. In my view it made clear that their task could include coercive measures. The inclusion of the word "peacemaking" was interpreted as peace-enforcement, in line with the jargon used at the time. It was used because Germany found it difficult to accept an earlier version: "tasks of combat forces in crisis management, limited armed conflict and armed conflict". Unfortunately, the Agenda for Peace which appeared around the same time gave quite a different meaning to peacemaking as a diplomatic effort to foster a peace agreement. Clearly, combat forces have no role in this. Nevertheless, the Amsterdam Treaty did not correct the terminology and continued to describe the third Petersberg mission as peacemaking.

At the Petersberg, the eight foreign ministers of the Forum countries

attended the luncheon, which concentrated on the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh and the presence of Russian forces in the Baltic republics. The feeling was that the decision to withdraw had not been definitely taken in Moscow, so that all opportunities should be seized to convince Russia that this would be a test-case for normalising relations with the West. The argument that there was insufficient housing in Russia to accommodate the returning forces was seen as a pretext, particularly since the troops were rotated regularly. Kinkel pointed to the paragraph in the draft Petersburg declaration which recalled that the presence of foreign forces on the territory of a sovereign state required the explicit consent of that state and stressed the importance of rapidly establishing timetables for the withdrawal from the Baltic states. He would repeat this at the press conference and was prepared to mention it at the CSCE summit in Helsinki and the forthcoming G-7 meeting.

In the plenary, the Czechoslovak Minister, Dienstbier, who held the presidency of the CSCE, called WEU the most hesitating partner in establishing contacts with Central and Eastern Europe. He believed that WEU could act within CSCE just as NATO and could propose concrete actions. He noted that, in spite of all the talk, the shaping of an interlocking system was unlikely to get much emphasis in Helsinki. He himself did not want to choose between NATO and WEU, but regarded security at the regional level as the main issue for the years to come. The Polish minister Skubizewski welcomed the declaration that WEU would be available to support UN and CSCE actions. His Romanian colleague Nastase was particularly happy about the equal treatment given to all eight participants, after some doubts earlier on. He was especially interested in joint training for peacekeeping operations. The Estonian Minister, Velliste, was afraid that the bilateral negotiations with Russia were coming to a dead end and was thinking of an international mediator. Looking through the room, I was very pleased with the active participation of our consultation partners. That was what I had been hoping for: that they would explain their security concerns and see that they were taken seriously. Things had moved very fast also in civilian-military relations. Of the eight defence ministers, only the Romanian was a general.

The declaration issued stated that the focus of consultation would be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and "Open Skies" treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions would be of particular interest to the participants. Foreign and defence ministers would meet once a year and a forum of consultation would be established at ambassadorial level, meeting at least twice a year at the seat of the WEU Council. Special mention was made of the growing cooperation between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the corresponding bodies in the partner countries. At the suggestion of Dienstbier, I was charged with informing the ambassa-

dors in London of European countries not present at the session. He rightly assumed that our meetings would be closely watched by non-participants, as it was more restricted than CSCE and NACC and could give rise to some anxiety among those countries not present.

The interest of the press was considerable and, on the whole, positive. "WEU to be given military units for peacekeeping role" was the headline of a balanced article in the Financial Times by Robert Mauthner. Quoting Douglas Hurd's remark that imposing a political solution by force was excluded, both in practice and in theory, he concluded that member states continued to disagree on the precise circumstances in which troops would be made available. Malcom Rifkind as Defence Secretary had assumed parenthood for double-hatting arrangements for multinational forces. *Die Welt* wrote "Ein Papiertiger lebt auf" and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* "WEU will die europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft ausbauen - Kampfeinsätze im Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen". *Le Figaro* carried the headline "L'UEO renforce sa capacité d'intervention militaire", *Le Monde* "Les Etats membres s'engagent à mettre à la disposition de l'UEO des unités militaires" and *Libération* "Maastricht sort l'Union de l'Europe occidentale de sa léthargie militaire". Both German Ministers said that, for the time being, their country could only contemplate participation in "blue helmet" operations, but they expressed themselves in favour of a constitutional change enabling Germany to exercise all rights and duties under the United Nations Charter.

5. Further Implementation

While the creation of the Planning Cell moved expeditiously and the CHODs took little time in appointing Italian Lieutenant General Caltabiano as director and French Brigadier General Roux as his deputy, it was much harder to get some military personnel within the Secretariat. The Budget Committee questioned the need for military expertise separate from the Planning Cell and was extremely cautious in granting new posts in view of the new requirements in Brussels. Ambassador Holthoff was frequently exasperated when chairing the meetings but step-by-step managed to increase our establishment. For military advice the French delegation came to my assistance by offering the services of Colonel Gourmelen, which I accepted with relief. Apart from the Yugoslav crisis we had much work to do on defining the way WEU would handle a crisis, politically and militarily. For a while Germany considered a similar gesture but did not deliver. In the CWG, some delegations questioned whether such arrangements should be allowed outside the regular budget, but ultimately acquiesced, as they were not prepared to raise the budget to allow normal recruitment.

The location of the Planning Cell was a point of discussion. The UK wanted to put it in or close to SHAPE. The Live Oak building, where the

Berlin contingency planning took place but which was now empty, was suggested. I felt strongly that the Planning Cell should be together with the Secretariat. If, as I assumed, it would remain small, it would be lost on its own. More importantly, it should be close to the political side of our work and provide military advice to the Secretariat, but also to the Presidency. The Petersberg Declaration settled the matter by stating that the Planning Cell "will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels". With some forty officers, the Planning Cell would almost be as numerous as the entire Secretariat staff but, based on my experience as Minister of Defence, I was confident that they could make a loyal and significant contribution to our work. That was why I allocated an entire floor in the Brussels building to the Planning Cell and managed to give General Caltabiano a seat at the table in the Council chamber. My deputy had less affinity with the military, which sometimes led to ruffled feathers, particularly at meetings of the Council Working Group, which I then had to smoothen. I wanted to involve them as much as possible in our work and frequently consulted both General Caltabiano and his brilliant deputy, Brigadier General Roux, in a brain-storming fashion. Later I learned that the best thing I did for their morale was inviting General Caltabiano to give a short summary of the situation in the former Yugoslavia during the ministerial meeting in Rome on 20 November 1992.

The speed with which the Planning Cell was established was short of a miracle and a great achievement of the two generals, given the different conceptual attitudes regarding its role. Originally, France thought of a body which would not be staffed exclusively with military personnel, while Italy was keenest on maintaining a direct link between the CHODs and their representatives. At Petersberg, the responsibility of the Planning Cell was defined as:

- preparing contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices;
- preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communications arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
- keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations.

In May 1993, when its terms of reference were formally adopted, the first element was further defined:

- prepare generic plans to be adapted, in time of crisis, in contingency plans;
- prepare contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices and keep them up-to-date.

I was not happy about the reference to generic plans, which I feared would remain too vague to be practicable, but at that time Germany had problems with the concrete nature of contingency plans.³⁴

In the beginning, few had confidence in the role of the Planning Cell, also in capitals. NATO regarded it to be too small to undertake any serious work. When queries were addressed to member states, very few if any responded, for example when the Planning Cell was working on an evacuation plan from an African city. Yet, the result of their work was applauded. The principle applied within the Planning Cell was to be as objective as possible and to elaborate on different options. Nobody could obstruct the work for national reasons. Of course, ultimately consensus should be achieved on the outcome, but that should take place in the Council and not within the Planning Cell itself. In that way, we could avoid a weakness inherent in the NATO Military Committee, where the military advice had already been scrutinised by national representatives before it reached the Council. Independent military advice is a scarce commodity in international organisations. In my experience, the major NATO commands came close to it, although the presence of US officers in the top echelons of the chain of command sometimes gave their advice an American slant.

In spite of their supposed scepticism, the national ministries of defence sent excellent people to the Planning Cell. At colonel level, Spain got the planning section, Germany operations, Portugal communications, the Netherlands logistics, the UK coordination with NATO and Belgium administration and contacts with the host country. Thanks to Caltabiano and Roux, they came together very well and started working as a team in a surprisingly short period of time. Their only disappointment came when the Council proved reluctant to make proper use of the Planning Cell.

Among the successes of the Planning Cell I count their role, primarily informal, in working out the military side of the compromise on the Sharp Guard operation in the Adriatic. After I had secured political approval from the French and British foreign ministers for working under the united command of NATO but with joint political supervision of the two permanent councils, a Military Committee (Adriatic) was created for discussing any military coordination problems. In practice, this committee did not meet frequently, which chagrined the French, but then there were not many issues to discuss.

Another duty well performed was the definition of the role in WEU of the Eurocorps formed by France and Germany. The announcement of its formation came unexpectedly, as a postscript to the bilateral summit meeting of Kohl and Mitterrand on 14 October 1991. The US were taken by surprise and feared the worst about German attitudes towards NATO. In the WEU Permanent Council the UK, with some support from the Netherlands and Portugal, did not agree to noting the Eurocorps as a positive development in the next WEU ministerial communiqué. A working group chaired by the Planning Cell made an analysis of the Franco-German

initiative and worked out a text which passed the Permanent Council without much difficulties and was endorsed by Ministers in Rome on 19 May 1993 in taking note "to the effect that they consider that the European Corps forms part of units designated as 'Forces Answerable to WEU'".

Disappointments came with the Danube and Mostar operations and, later, with the refusal of the Council to take action in the area of the Great Lakes and in Albania. These are discussed in greater detail in other chapters. In summary, Germany did not want to give the impression that the Danube embargo was a military operation and therefore objected to a role for the Planning Cell. On Mostar, the UK was the most difficult and did not want to see WEU go ahead when there was no NATO action on the ground. In the first Rwanda crisis, France ineptly tried to obtain WEU support for its own actions and managed to alienate its potential partners. On Albania, Germany and the UK were quick to announce that they saw no role for WEU. In retrospect, none of the member states was without blame for making things difficult. What I regretted most was the continued battle between France and the UK, which was a continuation of what was happening in NATO. The French delegation, especially at the level of the CWG, showed the defensive mentality of their position in Europe, and often introduced an unpleasant note into the debate. They resisted any mandate allowing the Planning Cell to work together with their NATO colleagues. NATO was not very helpful either, by imprudently quoting remarks of Planning Cell officers as the official line of WEU. It also took far too long - till 6 May 1996 - to arrive at an agreement releasing NATO classified material to WEU and even after its conclusion three years later it did not amount to very much.

The Preliminary Conclusions on a common European defence policy adopted in November 1994 gave priority to humanitarian, rescue and evacuation operations, but also called for a more systematic approach to identifying and meeting contingencies for European military deployments. The Planning Cell "should address the mechanisms for identifying the necessary assets and capabilities as well as possible shortages." Paragraph 27 said that generic planning should provide a better insight into the needs and requirements. "A generic plan, based on precise data and a plausible scenario, should contain the necessary detailed specifications and/or assumptions of capabilities, such as the size and composition of the force (including support capabilities), reaction time and command and control arrangements". The work of the Planning Cell should result in "realistic force packages for a range of options, which would allow for quick implementation in case of (an emerging) crisis".

The role of the CHODs themselves was not clearly defined. The problem boiled down to the question of how and when to render military advice. At their meeting in Bonn on 27 January 1992, Admiral Lanxade thought it premature to discuss a WEU Military Committee. In crisis management outside the NATO area, the political aspects would prevail and

it would be difficult to achieve a consensus on the military aspects before national governments had taken a position. He therefore preferred to wait until the role of the WEU Council as a joint politico-military body had been defined. Opinion remained divided. The Netherlands could accept a WEU Military Committee with double-hatted MilReps and back-to-back meetings at the CHOD level when they came to NATO. The Military Committee could give guidance to the Planning Cell, which in future should not come from the Defence Representatives Group. Italy was in favour of mirroring the NATO structure and using the MilReps, but General Charlier for Belgium opposed it and stressed the need for high-level advice in a coordinated politico-military manner. Personally, I agreed with him but did not press my views. Some of the CHODs already had a dim view of my presence, which was unique for WEU. In NATO, the Secretary-General did not attend the Military Committee at CHOD level.

The discussion continued at the next session on 20 May 1992. Vice-Admiral Bathurst for the UK now clearly rejected a permanent military committee. The Chairman of the CHODs should report to his Minister of Defence, who in turn could report to the ministerial WEU Council. General Corcione for Italy maintained his preference for a separate structure. To him, the permanent representative was primarily a man from the foreign affairs ministry. The Netherlands and Belgium saw a role for a military advisor next to their PermRep, during sessions of the permanent WEU Council, but differed on his identity. The Netherlands wanted to double-hat him with the NATO Military Committee, Belgium was in favour of a separate officer. General Naumann inclined to joint politico-military advice and suggested that the Secretary-General could call on the military advisors whenever he needed a military view. Originally, he had thought it sufficient to convene the CHODs only once a year, but in his summary accepted two meetings, each prior to the regular ministerial session. They would attend the ministerials as advisors to the ministers and together they would supervise the professional quality of the work of the Planning Cell. The role of the military representation in Brussels would be further developed. In the first part of the Petersberg Declaration, the twice-yearly meetings of the CHODs were confirmed. Further meetings could take place on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary. Ministers also agreed that, following the transfer to Brussels "national delegations could be reinforced with military delegates to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to the Planning Cell and to monitor the professional standards of the Planning Cell's work". This text did not really settle the issue, except for the name of the military officer involved in WEU matters. Henceforth, he was designated as Military Delegate or MilDel, to distinguish him from the MilReps in NATO even though, in practice, all except the Belgian and French were double-hatted. In practice, the military delegate would act as advisor to his Permanent Representative and sit beside him during meetings of the WEU Council. Over time, the MilDels would meet

more frequently to consider military aspects of questions on the Council's agenda. Their task seemed to be taken over by a Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG) established in 1996, which also assumed the functions of the ad hoc groups for crisis management, when in 1997 a different course was taken and a Military Committee was established.

Notes

31. The statement was explained in the Congressional-Executive dialogue on NATO's future in Washington on 8 October 1991. Stephen Flanagan of the State Department's policy planning staff told us that the arrangements should apply to all Central and Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, but their intensity could vary. At dinner the previous evening, Wörner had explained to me his vision of NATO as the security arm in a pan-European context; in the long term, he thought full membership by Central Europeans would be possible. My own concern was that NATO would be diluted to become a second CSCE.

32. An excellent article on the Maastricht negotiations appeared in *Survival*, Autumn 1992, "European Security, a common European defence?," by Anand Menon, Anthony Forster and William Wallace, pp. 98-118.

33. See Chapter 2, p. 14.

34. See also Section 2 of Chapter 9 on the elaboration of Combined Joint Task Forces.

Chapter Six Differentiated Membership

Maastricht had instructed us to conclude the differentiated membership arrangements before the end of 1992. In the Permanent Council, Jeremy Greenstock for the UK argued that the best solution for the associate members would be to accept Article V and be covered by it. Germany, however, found it difficult to extend the automatic military assistance clause; to them the difference between full and associate members was the inability of the latter to block WEU decisions, but they could associate themselves with these decisions. In the SWG, Klaiber preferred not to mention Article V at all in the definition of associate membership, but Goulden pointed out that, with the disappearance of the common external threat, bilateral conflicts could acquire a higher probability. As WEU was developing its own forces, the possibility of their use against NATO Allies had to be excluded. Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal agreed with him, the latter pleading that we should not make it impossible for Turkey to accept associate membership. Guelluy personally was unhappy about the creation of the new status, for it would detract from the emphasis on European integration. He tried to help by suggesting a general formula about the link between NATO and WEU. His own focus was different, for he sought to preserve the special position of full members by limiting presence in the Permanent Council to them; the working groups could meet in the enlarged configuration. The UK and others found this incompatible with the full participation promised at Maastricht. Then the debate shifted to the question of how many members were needed to call a restricted meeting of full members only. Most felt that it would be sufficient to stipulate that decisions would be taken only by the full members and that they could do so in the presence of the associates and observers. Nevertheless, it was admitted that there might be circumstances under which the full members would wish to meet alone. What procedure should be applied to call such a meeting? Under Article VIII, 3 of the WEU Treaty any member could convene a session of the Council, but if in future this would apply to restricted meetings a single country could cause the exclusion of Turkey, Norway and Iceland from the deliberations. Clearly, this was not the intention of the Maastricht Declaration. Yet, it was not easy to find an acceptable quorum. At one stage, France suggested a request by three members, but in the end

we agreed on a majority of the member states or, in case of an even number of members, half of them including the country holding the presidency. During my tenure as Secretary-General the nine full members did meet separately, but not very often. The Mostar operation and the experimental phase of the Space Group were conducted at nine. The other meetings generally included the associate members and observers. Ireland joined as observer after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.

After the Ministers at the Petersberg Meeting had approved our approach to the differentiation of membership, we could start negotiations with the countries concerned. The Permanent Council decided not to start these discussions with tabling formal texts, but with an exploratory discussion. In the course of subsequent meetings we would introduce proposals for agreement on the full membership of Greece and on the status of associate members and observers. The Presidency had passed to Italy, which organised a special meeting of the Enlarged Council chaired by Political Director Vanni d'Archirafi on 16 July 1992. The Greek Political Director Lyberopoulos confirmed the wish of his country to become a full member. In London Ambassador Papoulias had asked me whether the associate members should not make a more formal commitment to the various parts of the Petersberg declaration, but the point was not pressed in the negotiations. His Irish colleague Barrington stated the opposite, but following the positive outcome of the referendum on Maastricht Ireland saw advantages in taking up observership; this interest was derived from the provision that the EU could request WEU to elaborate and implement certain decisions. For Denmark Niels Egelund told us that he would listen carefully, but would not be able to enter into negotiations. In the meantime he assumed that the invitation to join would remain open, to which Vanni replied that we had to wait with open arms. The Norwegian Kolby referred to a useful briefing of foreign minister Stoltenberg by Genscher, but did not give an indication of his country's attitude. The Turkish delegation consisted of two ambassadors Unsal and Eralp. The latter had told me before the meeting that until the last minute it had been touch-and-go as to whether they would be able to attend or not. Their statement contained disappointment that not all members of NATO were treated equally and stressed that Turkey played a strategic role in three regions, Europe, Middle East and Black Sea. Nevertheless they saw today's meeting as a milestone on the road towards full integration into Europe. At this stage the delegation would ask some questions and discuss parameters, but their objective remained full membership. For Iceland Mr. Pálsson declared that he was ready to discuss associate membership, but also made clear that his country would not enter the EU and regarded NATO as the main forum for the discussion of security questions. My own intervention stressed that today both the European pillar of NATO and the defence component of the EU were taking shape and I explained how the involvement of defence ministers was a major value added. With goodwill on all sides, our negotiations could be terminated

before the end of the year, so that the new statuses could take effect together with the expected entry into force of the European Union and the internal market.

After a break, we continued with the three potential associate members. Turkey proved to be well prepared and listed a host of questions. How to give a legal basis to the status? The equal basis of participation IEPG and Eurogroup should be maintained. Could Turkey participate in the pre-planning stage of operations and how could it commit forces? Would it participate in a joint headquarter and what would be the position if Turkish bases were used? In this connection a simple liaison with the Planning Cell would not suffice. And what about the possibility of exclusion from certain meetings. Would there be predetermined subjects and who would be able to call a meeting. Would the associate members receive all documents, also from the restricted meetings? And what would be their status in the WEU Assembly? Obviously we were not able to answer all these questions. On the formal point we could say that we envisaged an exchange of letters, but the other issues should be clarified later. Vanni repeatedly underlined the "full participation" agreed in Maastricht and suggested that further negotiations should be conducted in London in the framework of the Special Working Group. Iceland added some questions on the criteria for allocating financial contributions and on participation in WEU caucuses in NATO and in the meetings with the Central European countries. The subsequent meeting with Greece, Denmark and Ireland only discussed some practical issues. I noted that the inclusion of IEPG and Eurogroup into WEU would pose a problem for Ireland.

During September we elaborated an Association Document. Thus we were able to keep the initiative when Ambassador Eralp introduced a paper of his own. He wanted a formal text which could be approved by parliament, because it had security implications and without ratification no manoeuvre on Turkish soil would be possible. In response Klaiber pointed out that a middle way would have to be found as many members did not want a formal treaty text. Frank Majoor for the Netherlands was helpful in remarking that even a political document was likely to be put before parliament and Klaiber admitted that Germany would follow that course. The Norwegian and Icelandic delegates equally expected parliamentary approval to be sought, if not ratification. Klaiber and Migliorini pleaded with Eralp to take the WEU draft as the basis for further discussion which would apply to all three associate members and not to insist on a separate bilateral agreement. After the meeting I asked the WEU members to make clear in Ankara that our proposal was the maximum possible and a clear improvement over anything the European Union could offer in terms of participation. Nevertheless, we had to reflect on what we should do if Turkey was attacked by a third party on account of its participation in a WEU operation. In that case, it seemed to me, we had to offer mutual protection but not of a general Article V guarantee.

The discussions on the EU side sprang no surprises. Greece was able to accept the entire *acquis* including the Hague Platform and Maastricht and agreed with our treaty proposal for full membership. Denmark was considering observer status, but would not decide before the publication of its white paper early October. The Irish Director for Security Policy, Townsend, envisaged a step by step process: first acceptance of the observer document, but postpone active participation in meetings till after the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty. All together it seemed possible to complete the negotiations at a ceremonial session combined with the ministerial meeting in Rome on 20 November only Turkish approval remained uncertain.

In October I paid a visit to Reykjavik to deliver a speech at the Association for Western Co-operation. The purpose was to acquaint the opinion leaders with WEU before the government would announce an official position on our negotiations. Prime Minister Oddson and Foreign Minister Hannibalson hosted a luncheon and the meeting was well attended. The final session of the SWG took place on 5 November. Turkey had tabled a new version, which was still not acceptable to the WEU members. Ambassador Eralp displayed formidable negotiating skills and managed to obtain several concessions on points important to him. These would be formulated in agreed minutes. Paradoxically, the final hurdles were not caused by Turkey, but by Norway and Iceland which wanted additional references to the Rome declaration on peace and cooperation of the CSCE and to the fact that they were not parties to the Brussels Treaty. Iceland made a point of replacing the words "share the conviction" of further European integration by "support the determination" and inserting a formula that the document of association would not change the obligations under the Washington treaty. We managed to accommodate all these points and the subsequent ministerial meeting in Rome went smoothly. The Norwegian minister announced that his parliament just had approved the request for membership of the European Union.

The agreed minutes in connection with the Document on Associate Membership made the following points:

- As associate members are not part to the modified Brussels Treaty their acceptance in full of the relevant part of the Petersberg Declaration is not related to Art.X of the Treaty dealing with the reference of disputes to the International Court of Justice.
- The statement that associate members will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces "may cover the provision of logistical and other facilities of a significant nature". The arrangements for the conduct of these operations will be established on a case-by-case basis by the participating States.

- The right to speak brings with it the possibility to present proposals.
- Full participation will include participation in caucuses subject to the same rules as for the meetings of the WEU Council.
- The provisions of associate membership are without prejudice to the rights and obligations deriving from existing treaties or agreements.
- The Council will take fully into consideration associate members' security interests.
- The document on associate membership cannot be modified without the assent of associate members.

In addition the Presidency issued a number of declarations stating that arrangements for a permanent liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell would be worked out with Turkey and any other of the associate members who so wish; that there will be full transparency among the full and associate members and that "timely information on restricted sessions will be given to that effect"; and in reply to an Icelandic question that the reference to existing Treaties includes the Washington Treaty.

In Rome I had envisaged to start the new format of Council meetings - every other week at 18 - after our move to Brussels. The London ambassadors wanted to apply it right away and we met in the enlarged composition on 8 December. From then on, it became an established and, with one exception, uncontested procedure.

Chapter Seven

The Yugoslav Crisis

During the life of President Tito, experts on Yugoslavia agreed on the risk of the Federation disintegrating after his death. When he actually departed in 1980, the expected explosion did not come and the international community did not take any preventive measures. On the contrary, Yugoslavia seemed well-poised economically to survive the collapse of communism and to make the transition to some form of market economy. When I dealt with European affairs in the Netherlands government the main wish from Belgrade seemed to be an increase in their quota for the export of "baby-beef". Important changes in the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the Kuwait war lulled the international community into acquiescing in the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia, most clearly expressed in the abrogation of autonomy for Kosovo by the Serbian government of Milosevic in 1988. Fear of Serbian domination spread in the other republics and federal structures ground to a halt.

My own awareness of the looming crisis was enhanced by the warnings expressed at some of the conferences I attended. My notes refer to a perceptive remark by Pierre Hassner in June 1989, that for all practical purposes Yugoslavia had ceased to exist and that there was an urgent need for more crisis management. About the same time, Arnold Horelick from RAND expressed great concern over the course of events. In January 1990, François Heisbourg at IISS reckoned on a political collapse which could lead to either a military takeover or complete disintegration. Later that month, the Slovenian and Croatian delegations left the 14th Special Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and in Kosovo 40,000 Albanians took to the streets, demanding the lifting of emergency measures and proclaiming the Albanian Republic of Kosovo. The Assembly of Serbia considered this an illegal act and retaliated by dissolving the Assembly of Kosovo. Shortly thereafter, the Serbian population of the Krajina in Croatia held a referendum voting heavily in favour of autonomy for the region. During 1990, all the republics held elections which showed strong nationalist sentiments everywhere. Nevertheless, there seemed willingness to hold Yugoslavia together in some loose form. In April 1991, the six presidents agreed that by the end of May all republics should hold referenda, on whether Yugoslavia should be a confederation of sovereign

republics (as proposed by Slovenia and Croatia) or a democratic federation (as proposed by Serbia and Montenegro). By then the first instances of armed confrontation between Serbs and Croats had already occurred, leading the European Community to issue a declaration supporting all efforts to solve the crisis through dialogue and calling on all sides to refrain from the use of force. The EC considered that "a united and democratic Yugoslavia has the best chance of being harmoniously integrated in the new Europe".³⁵ Subsequently, Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jacques Santer, and Commission President, Jacques Delors, traveled to Belgrade in May and offered the carrot of substantial economic aid in return for market economy, a peaceful dialogue on a constitutional solution and the installation of Stipe Mesic as chairman of the collective presidency. Their message was clear: Yugoslavia should remain a single state. In her interesting book, "Balkan Tragedy", Susan Woodward commented that little regard was given to the consequences these conditions would have for the internal political conflict: economic reform and its financially centralising effect was at the heart of their quarrels; the rapid pace of democratisation would favour nationalists; minority rights were now largely outside federal competence; and the demand for the country remaining united would bolster Serbian claims.³⁶ US Secretary of State, James Baker, had a similar effect on his stopover in Belgrade on 21 June, on his way from the Berlin CSCE meeting to Albania to celebrate the restoration of diplomatic relations. In his memoirs he sounds tougher than he appeared to the outside world at that time. His statement that unilateral secession was illegal and illegitimate was heavily criticised by Slovenes and Croats as a green light to the army, but in his shuttle among the six presidents, Baker firmly told Milosevic that his use of force would break up the Union; as a result Serbia would become an international outcast within Europe for a generation or more. The shape of the Union - federal, confederal or whatever - was up to them, but any split along ethnic lines would only lead to bloodshed and the denial of minority rights.³⁷ He also declared his support for the Izetbegovic-Gligorov "Platform Concerning the Future of the Yugoslav Community" which combined sovereignty for the republics with a continuation of Yugoslavia including a common defence and financial integration.

It is not my intention to give a detailed account of the Yugoslav crisis.³⁸ Most of it developed without my active involvement as WEU was to become only a minor player. I want, however, to bear witness to my strongly-held feeling from the very beginning that Europe had to act much more resolutely than it did. There was a real chance of stopping or at least mitigating the process of escalation, which was later to envelop first Croatia and then Bosnia in a whirlwind of violence. At least in the beginning that violence was the product of fear and distrust rather than of hatred and a robust force of interposition could have reassured the population. My nightmare was a sequence of events, starting with Croat-Serbian fighting in Slavonia and Krajina, then the collapse of Bosnia, followed by a revolt of

the Albanians in Kosovo, inevitably leading to an explosion of Macedonia and resulting in a European war in the Balkans. Perhaps not directly, but through intermediaries, like in the Spanish civil war, and in any case producing instability in Southeastern Europe for years to come. At one time, WEU seemed close to supporting Lord Carrington by military means, but the whole exercise probably was little more than a shadow-play. Very few countries were prepared to do something tangible. Most were more than willing to explain that Bosnia would be a quagmire from which it would be very difficult to extricate our forces or that an international mandate was necessary but lacking. Recently, my feeling that the chances of successful interposition were much greater was confirmed by an unlikely witness, President Karadzic of the Bosnian Serbs. In a BBC documentary he said that early on in the conflict an international force of 10,000 men could have paralysed his operations easily. Among the more reliable sources I quote General Jean Cot, who commanded UNPROFOR from July 1993 till March 1994. This outspoken French general, who was relieved from his command at the request of the UN Secretary-General for publicly criticising the lengthy chain of command to New York, wrote:

With many others I am convinced that one would have stopped the Serbs in October 1991 with three ships, three dozen aircraft and three thousand men engaged in Dubrovnik and Vukovar to mark unequivocally the determination of the European community".³⁹

Western Europe had the capabilities to act, but did not want to use them. The constraints in terms of strategic lift and real-time intelligence would not have been a seriously limiting factor in the unsophisticated conditions of the Yugoslav war. In any case, most of the damage was done by astute use of Serbian artillery, causing people to take flight. And when finally we decided to send military personnel, we accompanied their mission by statements that they would never do anything of a military nature. We practised anti-deterrence after years of a Cold War in which deterrence was the mainstay of our strategy. We did not heed the old wisdom that in diplomacy there is little use in saying what you are not going to do. It is far more important to state clearly what you will do, and then do it when necessary. The long series of declarations and communiqués makes uneasy reading.

On 19 June 1991, the CSCE meeting in Berlin expressed support for the democratic development, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, based on economic reforms, full application of human rights in all parts, including the rights of minorities, and a peaceful solution of the present crisis. Subsequently, the CSCE would no longer play a substantive role in Yugoslavia. At first, it still provided a useful function through its missions in Kosovo and Sanjak, but these had to be withdrawn when Serbia and

Montenegro were suspended from membership of the organisation on 12 May 1992. Only after the Dayton Agreement would the OSCE return to the scene by organising the elections in Bosnia.

The regular WEU ministerial meeting at Vianden on 27 June issued a separate statement expressing deep concern at the current turn of events in Yugoslavia and regretting all the recent unilateral decisions which made dialogue more difficult. They urgently appealed to all the political authorities in Yugoslavia to avoid all confrontation, to refrain from the use of force and to resume the dialogue with a view to securing the unity of the state. They hoped that the election of the new head of the collegiate presidency could take place without delay so as to ensure the normal functioning of the federal institutions and called on all CSCE states to encourage a negotiated solution, having due regard to all the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

Towards the end of June, Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence. On 27 June, fighting started in Slovenia but within two weeks the Federal Army decided to withdraw. The next day, the EC agreed to send its troika and to freeze all economic assistance. John Roper, who always tried to make the WEU Institute for Security Studies relevant to our work, wrote a note on the possible role of military observers in preventing escalation. To his and my disappointment, the incoming German presidency of WEU did not want the note to be circulated. On 5 July, the foreign ministers of the Twelve declared that only the peoples of Yugoslavia should decide the future of their country. The troika arrived at Brioni on 7 July and seemed to have some success leading Jacques Poos to his much publicised premature proclamation of "Europe's finest hour". The two republics were prepared to postpone their independence for three months and the parties agreed to accept monitors from the European Community. Instead of turning to WEU for implementing this mission, the Netherlands presidency of the EC decided to organise the monitors themselves and obtained CSCE endorsement. The reason given was that their task was not to be a military one, although, in practice, the monitors would be military personnel in white uniforms without insignia - irreverently described as ice-cream vendors. Obviously, Hans van den Broek had no desire to involve WEU in the middle of the debate on its role in the future Political Union. The paradoxical result was that, when we were discussing a role for WEU in East-West arms control verification, the Twelve were setting up a parallel organisation for monitoring cease-fires in Yugoslavia. Late August, this was followed up by the proposal to convene a peace conference in The Hague and to establish an arbitration commission consisting of five members of constitutional courts of EC countries. The conference would be chaired by Lord Carrington and adopt mechanisms to ensure a peaceful fulfilment of the opposing aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples on the basis of the following principles:

1. No unilateral change of borders by the use of force;

2. The protection of human rights of all peoples;
3. Full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations.

In spite of these vague formulations some progress was made and on 17 September Lord Carrington signed a cease-fire statement with presidents Tudjman and Milosevic and General Kadijevic at Igalo. It was the first of a series of 14 cease-fires mediated by the EC but broken soon afterwards.

After Brioni, the Netherlands presidency of the EC attempted to draw some conclusions from the mixture of contradictory elements. The joint declaration had stated that a new situation had arisen, which pointed at the impossibility of leaving the constitutional structure intact. It was equally difficult to imagine that Yugoslavia could peacefully dissolve into six independent republics within their present borders; the Serbs would not tolerate the emergence of an independent Croatia with 11 per cent Serbs within its border. A loosely structured federation would be unlikely to assuage these Serbian concerns either, because it would not be able to provide solid guarantees for minorities. To the Netherlands, all this pointed in the direction of a voluntary redrawing of internal borders.⁴⁰ The other partners rejected this suggestion immediately, out of the legitimate fear that it would open a Pandora's box. At the same time, a redrawing of borders along ethnic lines was not deemed consistent with a modern approach to security in the new Europe. In the words of Dienstbier, borders should not be changed, they should disappear. As a result, the EC assumed that the existing republics could become independent, if they so wished, and looked for ways to make the resulting minority problems manageable. This attitude implied recognition and therefore the quarrel of December was no longer about the principle, but about the timing, when not all conditions had been met.

The first time WEU had a serious discussion on Yugoslavia was at the SWG meeting on 16 September. A few days earlier I had attended the annual IISS conference in Zürich, where the US Ambassador, Zimmerman, had explained that the problem in Yugoslavia was nationalism. Serbian nationalism was worst because it was expansionist. The US had never been in favour of unconditional unity, but felt that a breakup would rapidly lead to massive violence. He was afraid that the disintegration of federal authority would enhance the role of the army and give it a new task in preserving internal security. The independence of Slovenia should be accepted, but we should try to keep the rest together in some kind of loose federation with autonomy for the national groups and no acquiescence in territorial conquest.

In those days, much was made of the difficulties any military presence in Yugoslavia would encounter. Hitler was said to have needed astronomical figures of soldiers to keep the country under control. I have always doubted that comparison. Certainly, the terrain favoured partisan activity, but even so, the Wehrmacht managed to keep the vital North-South railway

link open virtually every day of the year. Calculations based on the war diaries of the German high command did not impress me much either.⁴¹ In Serbia and Croatia they had some 36,000 men if all units were fully manned, in Bosnia 16,000 Germans plus Bulgarian and Croat divisions, and in Albania 12,000 men. Even if we include Croat and other units the total forces would not have exceeded 100,000. More important than a numerical comparison, however, would be the difference in mission. A multinational force would have the role of interposition, to prevent further escalation and a change of the status quo. In doing so, it could count on the open or tacit support of a considerable part of the population.

In the SWG, Hofstetter was in favour of massive contingents of monitors to emphasise our refusal to recognise any change of borders by force. At that time, the number of monitors was insufficient to deal with all the regions in trouble. Germany supported the Dutch head of the monitors, Ambassador Wijnaendts, who had advocated that monitors would stay after having dealt with a violation in order to avoid repetition. Herman Schaper talked in the same vein. Minister Van den Broek had told his Croat colleague that the EC did not consider a military intervention and that there was a limit of 100 monitors. Lord Carrington had great difficulty in preventing the Croats from abandoning their Brioni promises. The Hague was also in favour of extending the monitor missions to Bosnia, but did not see any role for WEU, or so he thought. Goulden had prepared a pre-contingency study of relevant factors if a political decision were to be taken to intervene militarily. Peacekeeping would be entirely different from the monitoring under civilian guise and CSCE mandate. Based on the experience in Cyprus, a force of some 30,000 men would be needed.

We moved on to the next item when I was called away to receive a telephone call from Van den Broek. He was rather excited after a heated discussion with Genscher. Hans had called him to complain about two German monitors who had refused to proceed to the place indicated because they found it too dangerous. When Genscher was not prepared to give them precise instructions Van den Broek had turned the tables on him and requested a special ministerial meeting of WEU. I could tell Schaper that the situation had changed. Two days later the WEU Council had an informal breakfast at the German Embassy. Richthofen informed us that Genscher had agreed to convene the ministers the next day, following a meeting of the Twelve. I noted that the British press, unaware of the background, now regarded Germany as the strongest proponent of the despatch of military units. The French Ambassador, Dorin, said that his country was prepared to participate if others joined as well. On the crisis itself, Paris had changed its position: it put less emphasis on keeping Yugoslavia together and now supported an orderly process of self-determination.

The ministerial took place in Brussels on 18 September at 9 p.m., following a meeting of the Twelve. Five countries attended as observers,

including Turkey. When I came in, Genscher told me dismissively that nothing would come out of the session, but at the end we almost had a decision to involve WEU, or did we? He immediately gave the floor to Van den Broek to report on the briefing just received from Lord Carrington. It was still too early to say whether the cease-fire would hold. A hostile situation on the ground would make a continuation of the monitor mission unfeasible. Already the conclusion should be drawn that they could not fulfil their task. As they could not verify what was happening they lacked the stabilising effect intended by their mission. Instead, their own safety was at stake and a Danish monitor had been hit in the leg. The Netherlands had circulated a WEU telegram to seek clarification of possibilities to reinforce the monitors and to investigate the political desirability and feasibility of mounting a peacekeeping operation. He added again that no military intervention was contemplated and that any reinforcement should depend on two conditions: that the cease-fire held and that all parties agreed to the new mission.

After this introduction, Genscher took over and stated that a WEU action would not be "*aus eigenem Antrieb*" - of its own accord - but at the request of the Twelve who had a mandate from the CSCE. We should try to get more specific support from the CSCE and the UN Security Council, but should first determine what was needed. Subsequently, we should determine whether to use the available capacities - with benediction from CSCE and UN - which would give an entirely new dimension to WEU. Genscher added that Poland and Czechoslovakia, which already participated in the monitors, were keen to join in but this could be decided later. Finally, he proposed convening an ad hoc group on Yugoslavia, following the example of the two Gulf operations, consisting of representatives from both foreign and defence ministries.

The Netherlands Minister of Defence immediately gave a positive reaction and was prepared to contribute a substantial unit at short notice, which after the meeting he specified as a battalion. The force should have a clear mandate and rules of engagement, but not enter into peace-enforcement. It could help negotiate local protocols, arrange the return of the units to their barracks and offer its services to accompany their withdrawal. The Belgian Defence Minister, Coëme, also was prepared to contribute, provided Genscher's two conditions were met. If we wanted to extend preventive action to Bosnia, he only saw a need to increase the number of monitors. The UK Minister of State, Archie Hamilton, sounded the most negative by saying that the fact that the monitors could not function as intended did not imply that we should send a peacekeeping force. A cautious note was also struck by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Giray. He pointed out that none of the parties to the conflict alone was responsible for the present situation and that whatever the outcome, the republics would have to continue living side by side. We should not encourage separatism by the despatch of troops which would freeze the

situation. Giray was also sceptical about peacekeeping under present circumstances. The Spanish Defence Minister, Vargas, wanted the ad hoc group to meet as soon as possible and Genscher convened it in Bonn for 23 September. Both the Netherlands and Germany would keep NATO informed. No communiqué was issued.

The report of the ad hoc group was presented to another extraordinary session in Brussels on 30 September by the German political director. It contained four options:

1. Logistic underpinning of the monitors to give them more flexibility;
2. Escort and protection of the monitors by armed military force (3,000-5,000);
3. Peacekeeping force in support of the monitors (+ 10,000);
4. Expanded peacekeeping option (+ 20,000).

The emphasis of the report was on peacekeeping, not peace-enforcement, and on the need for the force to be multinational. The report did not prejudice the political decision to be taken by the ministers. Again, the two Dutch ministers were the most positive and accepted the third option. Van den Broek reported a deteriorating situation in Slavonia where the Yugoslav National Army had cancelled the agreement with Ambassador Wijnaendts and was moving forward. Ter Beek advocated a stronger presence on the spot, which would provide flexibility and quick reaction, and questioned the logic of the two conditions: if the cease-fire held there would be reluctance to upgrade our presence because the need to do so would become less obvious, and if the cease-fire were broken the conditions would not be met. The Belgian ministers preferred option 2, which could evolve into number 3, the difference not being very great. Douglas Hurd expressed serious reservations about the line of thought in the report. We should avoid open-ended commitments which would inevitably escalate. Experience had shown how difficult it was to extricate oneself once committed. A decision on a military role in Yugoslavia should not be regarded as a virility test for Europe and he saw no need just "to do something". The UK was prepared to accept option 1 for further study, but would oppose any hypothetical decision. In answer to the question of how to take a decision, he thought that it could be taken by WEU after consultation with the NATO allies and subsequently examined and endorsed by the Twelve. The UN Security Council Resolution 713 had been passed unanimously showing the strong support for the Twelve existing in New York. Tom King added that option 3 would be the most dangerous as flexible movement would be very risky; protecting monitors under crossfire did not make much sense.

Dumas and Joxe took a more conceptual approach. To achieve a solution, our aim should be to make the peace conference as substantial and effective as possible. Secondly, we needed support from the UN Security Council, which had just endorsed collective efforts "in particular of

assistance and support to the cease-fire observers". The Belgrade government had accepted this text (but, as Minister Ordonez had heard from foreign minister Lonczar, strongly opposed the presence of foreign military forces). And thirdly, we needed a capability on the ground. Not too much time should be spent on the name - Dumas suggested "accompanying mission" or "assistance mission" - but rather on command arrangements, logistics and financing and on the application of the arms embargo. Joxe was prepared to contribute to the operation, but regretted that we had lost time by not discussing these questions earlier.

De Michelis, supported by Poos, believed that Yugoslav consent to our action could be obtained through negotiations, but he also emphasised the need for swift action. As in principle a cease-fire was in place, we had the agreement of the parties to monitor it, so now we should be clear about what we thought necessary and then negotiate it. Rognoni wanted to increase the number of monitors from 80 to 200 and accepted option 2. Options number 3 and 4 amounted to peace-enforcement.

Genscher had no easy task in summing up. His first try contained five points:

- The conflict should be resolved in the peace conference started and continued by the EU. There, WEU had no role;
- The decision whether and how military forces would be deployed was for WEU to take but after reporting to the Twelve;
- The ad hoc group would continue its work, notably on national contributions and financial arrangements;
- The implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 713 required further study as to a possible contribution by WEU;
- The ad hoc group could form sub-groups if so desired.

Concerning the options, several opinions had been expressed which were related to the conditions governing a possible deployment. Genscher therefore favoured giving WEU a precise mandate only after the conditions had been met and clarified. Who would decide whether the conditions had been met? Clearly, WEU was competent for its own purposes, but politically it would be inconceivable that they would decide differently from the Twelve. The problem of what to do when the Yugoslav republics declared themselves independent would be a matter for the Twelve.

Van den Broek pointed out that in the recent past there had been moments at which the conditions had been met, but we were not ready. Therefore, we should take a decision in principle to send forces which would be firmed up as soon as the conditions were ripe. Genscher picked this up and suggested that Lord Carrington would phone him as soon as he thought a cease-fire should be supported somewhere. Then Germany would convene the Ministerial Council immediately. Most ministers agreed but it took Genscher some time to get the UK on board. Hurd finally agreed to a

formulation that ministers would meet urgently "to take the relevant decisions" after Genscher had assured him that the decision could also be negative. The meeting was urgent but the outcome remained open.

The result of the meeting was more positive than expected, although much had been put in the hands of Lord Carrington, who personally was not keen on a military operation. I once heard him remark that he did not think Bosnia worth the life of a single British soldier, a variation on Bismarck who had said the same about the bones of a Pommeranian grenadier. Genscher had performed his duties as chairman admirably, regardless of what his personal inclination might have been. Nationally, he was in a difficult position, as there was no chance of a German contribution to any action of a military nature in Yugoslavia. For that reason the follow-up of the ministerial was entrusted to the French as far as military planning was concerned. They chaired a "joint contingency study group" meeting in Metz for several days in October to work out the different options. Their work did not lead to any more discussion on WEU action as the focus of a possible solution was shifting away from Europe towards the UN. The ministerial session of 29 October took note of the report of the study group and accepted without discussion a proposal by Minister Joxe to continue its work. But on 11 November, the Enlarged Council decided not to reconvene the group unless warranted by new developments arising from the decision to impose an economic blockade. The regular Ministerial Council of 18 November did not revive the issue but instead mentioned its preparedness in the establishment of humanitarian corridors. In 1992-93 our ad hoc group on Yugoslavia again felt the need of military analysis and used a Contingency Planning Group.

The Conference on Yugoslavia considered proposals from Lord Carrington on 18 October and 5 November 1991 with some modifications in between. They awarded sovereignty and independence to the former federal units with the possibility of free association among them and the establishment of a mechanism for the protection of human rights. A special status would be provided to territories where members of a national or ethnic group constituted the majority of the population (including the Serbs in Croatia). These proposals were rejected by President Milosevic on the grounds that they would abolish Yugoslavia. On 23 October, Carrington omitted the reference to Serbs in Croatia and on 30 October he added a proposal for long-term demilitarisation of the territories. The fourth version included the possibility of creating a common state by the republics that wished to remain within it.⁴² This document was rejected by four of the SFRY republics because it no longer referred to the principle of self-determination of nations. On 9 November the SFRY presidency urgently requested that a UN peacekeeping force be sent to Croatia, where violence was escalating around Vukovar, Dubrovnik and other towns.

The situation on the ground became rather unclear as, increasingly, media reports became unreliable. All parties used them in their propaganda.

A striking example was Croatian reporting of heavy damage in the old city of Dubrovnik. Visiting the new situation centre in the Italian foreign ministry on 30 October, I saw a message from the Italian ambassador that there was shelling but not of the old parts. Nevertheless, our failure to draw the line at Dubrovnik and to act against the indiscriminate use of artillery led to further aggression. In December, Maastricht produced the European Union and the CFSP. Its first test was the German forcing of recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, following pleas from the Vatican and Austria. Several countries doubted the wisdom of doing so before Zagreb had given better guarantees to the Serbian minority, but nobody wanted to divide the Twelve so soon after Maastricht. Dumas and Van den Broek pointed to the Badinter Report, which had not yet qualified Croatia, but they did not insist and on 16 December 1991, the UK was not represented at ministerial level. Recognition without active support proved to be a major error as it pushed the Serbs to occupy all areas inhabited by their kin.

At the CHODs meeting of 27 January 1992, Admiral Lanxade made an attempt to rescue some form of European role in Yugoslavia. He argued that obviously CSCE was still too young to take effective action and that a leading role by the UN had to be accepted. But he would find it odd if the UN would use large numbers of non-European forces. In order to maintain some European identity, he advocated "concertation" on European contributions and coordination of the command arrangements among them. Unfortunately, Germany was excluded for constitutional reasons, as was Italy on account of the UN's wide interpretation in refusing units from countries bordering on the conflict. Yet, it was difficult to manage without an Italian contribution. Lanxade got little response from his colleagues; only an implicitly negative remark from Field Marshall Vincent that a peacekeeping force would remove incentives for the parties to seek a settlement.

In the Permanent Council, Yugoslavia figured among the topical issues on which information was exchanged, but these discussions were short and not action-oriented. I noted the concern expressed about developments in Krajina and a statement in recognition of Bosnia on 8 April. The Portuguese ambassador reported that the Twelve had reached this decision as nothing would be gained by postponement. The parties simply refused to negotiate. He also told us that sanctions against Serbia would be lifted.

Again the discussion in the CHODs was more substantial than in the Council and again Lanxade took the lead. At their meeting on 20 May, he said that the situation in Bosnia was out of control, but relatively calm outside it. France now had an infantry battalion and a logistic battalion on the spot. His Portuguese colleague, Soares-Carneiro reported that the EC monitors had to be withdrawn because the situation was too confused to allow them to function effectively. Admiral Bathurst, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff in the UK, announced that he would set up a headquarters team with the emphasis on liaison with the UN. He was weary of the

resource implications of possible peace-enforcement missions and regarded writing rules of engagement for them a nightmare. The Dutch chief pointed out that the difference between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement was often very slight as one peasant with a gun could hold up an entire convoy. General Naumann agreed with him. Operation Comfort in northern Iraq had also demonstrated how thin the line was. To him the essential point was that if soldiers had to use their weapons a clear mandate was necessary, and he asked me to convey to the Council that there was an urgent need to clarify their mission, especially in Bosnia.

As usual, the WEU Assembly met during the first week of June and the two German ministers spoke on behalf of the presidency. Klaus Kinkel had a noncommittal prepared text but in response to questions went further on Yugoslavia. He did not exclude the use of military force as *ultima ratio* if everything else failed. Volker Rühle spoke the next day and expressed the hope that before the end of the year the Bundestag would have an agreement on the dispatch of blue helmets. For combat functions, however, more time would be needed. Questioned on Yugoslavia, he said that Europe had not exerted sufficient pressure but also added that German troops would never go there. Priority now lay with the implementation of sanctions and the enforcement of the embargo.

On the political level, attention focused on the role of NATO and WEU in supporting initiatives from the UN and CSCE. It was still the time of interlocking institutions and concepts of one organisation addressing requests to others. The outcome of this debate was different in NATO and WEU. The NATO Ministerial in Oslo on 4 June 1992 declared under the heading CSCE in paragraph 11:

The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. We have asked the Council in Permanent Session to address, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, the practical options and modalities by which such support might be provided. This will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these operations.

My conclusion was two-fold: NATO was focusing on CSCE and left room for WEU. On the UN, there was only an anodine paragraph welcoming the fact that allies participated in UN peacekeeping and other efforts. There seemed to be scope, therefore, for WEU widening its role and including support for UN action. The Petersberg Declaration of 19 June, in

its section I "On WEU and European Security", followed the NATO text very closely but expanded it as well:

As WEU develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict prevention and crisis management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council.

The addition would become important within a few weeks when the UNSC declared a general embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and WEU, immediately followed by NATO, decided to mount a naval operation to enforce it in the Adriatic. NATO followed suit because it did not want to be absent from a crisis management operation so close to its treaty area, but the political preparation for it was not fully adequate. The counter-argument that France did not allow NATO to move further may hold some water but is not completely convincing.

Petersberg also issued a declaration on the Yugoslav crisis, which stressed the importance of establishing a security zone in and around Sarajevo as envisaged in UNSC Resolution 758 and declared that WEU would be "prepared within the bounds of its possibilities to contribute towards effective implementation of UNSC resolutions in connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia". Ministers also expressed their determination to implement comprehensively the sanctions contained in Resolution 757 and charged the ad hoc group to examine WEU's possibilities to contribute to the implementation of these resolutions. Before the meeting, there had been some discussion on whether it should be the ad hoc group or a separate mandate to military experts. I had persuaded Kinkel that in the politico-military approach of WEU the former option was the best and this passed without difficulty. Kinkel had greeted me by saying that I had made courageous statements on the need for stronger action by WEU. Perhaps it was tongue-in-cheek, but in any case he did not criticise me like his political director had done by instructing Richthofen to complain about my alleged statements. During the plenary, Joxe reminded his colleagues that it had been a year since they last spoke of Yugoslavia. At that time nobody thought that so close to our own countries we would see so much hate and so many casualties. In Kosovo and Macedonia it could become even worse. Therefore, it was necessary to send more forces and France was prepared to do so, as it was prepared to do to free Sarajevo airport. Deus Pinheiro said that the Twelve had decided on a dual-track approach with the UN for cease-fire monitoring and peacekeeping and the EC for mediating a political solution. Douglas Hurd spoke in the same vein. Sanctions were now in place with a UN sanctions committee to supervise them. For the moment he had no indication that the port of Bar in Montenegro was used

for breaking the sanctions. In general, Hurd felt that military deployment under the wrong circumstances would only increase the problem.

1. Arms Embargo in the Adriatic

The next time ministers met was in the margins of the CSCE Helsinki summit on 10 July 1992. The ad hoc group had met in Rome on 3 July and proposed to start monitoring the embargo in the Adriatic, an operation WEU had gained some experience with. The operation should involve the participation of at least five or six ships, four maritime patrol aircraft, one support ship and ground-based helicopters. The surveillance would be conducted under Italian coordination in the Otranto channel and off the Montenegrin coast, following consultation with UNPROFOR. These WEU operations would be open to the participation of other allies and coordinated in cooperation with NATO. Ministers adopted decisions to this effect and also asked the ad hoc group to explore options for ground transport through humanitarian corridors and to list logistical and other means that partners would be willing to make available. Moreover, any operation establishing humanitarian corridors would have to be coordinated with the UN, in particular for the aspects concerning protection.



The Italian replenishment ship Stromboli refuels the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate Kortenaer during the arms embargo operation Sharp Fence in the Adriatic. (Photo: Netherlands Ministry of Defence) René van Bakel)



Royal Netherlands Marines "fast-rope" from a helicopter during a boarding action in the Adriatic. (Photo: Fotosectie AMIDKM)

The WEU meeting ended under circumstances surpassing even the most daring theatrical plot. We had been able to reserve the room for the ministerial only for one hour at 7.45 in the morning, after which it would be needed by the CSCE. As we were exceeding the allotted time, the noise level in the corridor was increasing and some people impatiently peeked around the doors. We were still not quite finished with our communiqué when the doors were flung open and President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl walked in, arm in arm. Our brand-new Italian chairman hurriedly concluded the meeting and we quickly vacated our seats. Helsinki provided the first occasion on which two heads of state or government had honoured us with their presence! Helsinki also became the scene of some WEU-NATO competition as later that day the NATO Council met to agree on a NATO maritime operation drawing on STANAVFORMED to monitor compliance with the UN embargo. The brief statement issued, however, kept competition to a minimum by adding that the operation would be conducted in


THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

coordination and cooperation with the operation decided by WEU and that practical details and modalities would be worked out by the military authorities of both organisations.

That kind of cooperation was easier said than done, because WEU had no military authorities as such. Fortunately, Italy provided the solution. An Italian admiral was COMNAVSOUTH in the NATO hierarchy and WEU had given the Italian presidency the mandate to coordinate our operation through the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian fleet (CINCNV). Thus coordination between NATO's Maritime Monitor and WEU's Sharp Fence became an inter-Italian affair, which proceeded smoothly, our flotillas rotating between the Otranto Channel and the Montenegrin coast. In November WEU ministers approved the joint planning directives developed by our Ad Hoc Group, complete with rules of engagement and guidelines for challenging and inspecting merchant shipping. Ultimately, NATO and WEU came under the NATO command of AFSOUTH when the UN declared a full economic blockade on Serbia and Montenegro in UNSC Resolution 820 on 17 April 1993. Admiral Boorda, then CINCSOUTH, had convinced me of the need for unity of command under the new circumstances. The Yugoslav navy might try to use force to break the embargo. Sitting next to him at lunch during the annual SHAPEX meeting at Mons, he pointed out the risk of losing lives if our command arrangements were not "seamless". Enforcing a blockade would be a different kettle of fish from the previous arms embargo. I took his warning to heart, but a solution proved technically difficult. At first our Planning Cell thought of giving NATO the operational control and WEU the operational tactical control, but the non-WEU countries refused to accept that. Another solution could be the double-hatting of the Italian national command CINCNV, with a NATO and WEU role, but that hardly seemed efficient. At the beginning of the WEU ministerial in Rome on 19 May 1993, I used a spare moment in the garden of Villa Madama, while waiting for the arrival of the Belgian delegation, to put the problem to Minister Juppé. I explained that we had two alternatives: either developing a complicated command arrangement for the two separate operations, which would probably not satisfy anybody, or accepting unity of command under NATO, but entrusting the political supervision over both forces to the NATO and WEU Permanent Councils jointly. Juppé needed little time to agree to the latter option which would provide political visibility to WEU. Crossing the garden, I made the same point to Douglas Hurd, who was equally pleased, albeit for different reasons. To him the use of the NATO command structure was the attractive element. From there on, things moved quickly. At first there seemed to be a hitch in NATO with the combined concept of operations as the US military wanted to put the Military Committee in the structure. Thanks to the UK Permanent Representative, John Weston, this problem was overcome by constituting a joint Military Committee (Adriatic) of NATO MilReps and WEU MilDels; in most cases these two were the same officers wearing two

hats. Only Belgium and France had different arrangements. On 7 June 1993 Lieutenant-General J.K. Dangerfield, Director of the International Military Staff, and Lieutenant-General Marcello Caltabiano addressed a joint letter to Manfred Wörner and myself enclosing a Concept of Operations for approval by the Joint NATO/WEU Council. The next day a joint session of the two Councils approved the concept and operational control of the combined NATO/WEU Task Force was delegated through SACEUR to COMNAV-SOUTH. Further joint sessions would be convened if necessary to issue additional political guidance for the operation in the Adriatic. Operation Sharp Guard started on 15 June 1993, taking over from Sharp Fence, which had been implemented since 22 November 1992. Italy continued its coordinating role under the ensuing Luxembourg and Netherlands presidencies.

The integration of the flotillas went even further than I expected. When WEU had installed its own cell in the Naples headquarters all ships were divided among three task forces, one at each of the operational locations and one in port in Italy. Our arrangements were put to a serious test only once when Yugoslav naval patrol boats with the shutters of their rocket launchers open, came so close to a Royal Netherlands Navy frigate that they almost collided in attempting to guide an oil tanker through the embargo. This piece of brinkmanship failed and was not repeated.



Operation Sharp Guard: RNIN frigate van Kinsbergen prevents the oil tanker Lido II from reaching the Montenegrin coast and breaking the economic blockade. (Photo: Fotosectie AMIDKM)

2. Blockade on the Danube

The Italian presidency was active also in organising the blockade on the Danube. At the first Council meeting in Brussels on 19 January, I raised the possibility of a WEU action on the Danube. The EC/CSCE Sanctions Assistance Mission in Romania had reported that between 30 October and 16 November 1992 6 vessels and 14 barges were identified in suspected breach of the sanctions. A further 19 vessels (9 Serbian-, 9 Ukrainian- and 1 Russian-flagged) had refused to comply with monitoring requests and had also to be assumed to be in breach. The WEU ad hoc group had told me that Romania and Bulgaria might need assistance, including extra motor launches and communications equipment, if they were to police the river effectively. So far, no suspect traffic had transited the Hungarian stretches of the river. Ambassador Biering of Denmark, the country holding the EC presidency, admitted that the river constituted the main loophole in the blockade and told us that the EC was considering the appointment of a sanctions coordinator. Ambassador Weston felt that the Danube embargo was a matter for the EC and that WEU should concentrate on how a safe area around Sarajevo could be supported. A week later he was still negative, but subsequently changed his mind and supported reinforcement of the embargo on the Danube.



WEU police team completes inspection on the Danube. (Photo: Netherlands Ministry of Defence)

The Italian presidency was in touch with the riparian states: Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, and reported that Bucharest was in favour of controls at the mouth of the river. During the Council meeting of 23 February, I received a statement by the spokesman of the Russian foreign ministry which had already reacted to the possibility of a WEU operation. It read:

Any action involving military ships of the WEU countries in the Black Sea and the adjoining basin of the Danube or any other similar activity must be preliminarily agreed with Russia, a Black Sea power having interests in this region and a member country of corresponding regimes in its waters.

We did not comment on this statement, as WEU based itself on Resolution 820 of the UN Security Council. In addition, the Portuguese ambassador pointed out that we should not get involved in a dispute between Russia and Ukraine concerning rights on the Danube. Nevertheless, it made clear that we might have difficulty in obtaining the blessing of the CSCE for our operation. Nor was it easy to reach agreement with the three riparian countries. Bulgaria and Romania were reluctant to do the patrols themselves, but also were not keen to delegate them entirely to us. The newly appointed CSCE sanctions coordinator, Ambassador Napolitano, came to brief the Council on what he was doing in the countries bordering on Serbia, from which it became clear that Macedonia and the Danube were the major leaks. His Sanctions Assistance Mission had no formal status and rendered assistance to the country concerned based on a Memorandum of Understanding with the CSCE. Nevertheless, they made history by making sanctions work. Their personnel consisted of customs officers, who did not board any vessels on the Danube. After meeting with him the Council decided to ask the ad hoc group to work out an operational model for our own action. It was not our intention to set up a military operation, which would have excluded German participation, but also would have been difficult to accept for the riparian countries. Instead, we would use police and customs officers assisting the country concerned and thus working under their authority, but having command of the fast patrol boats supplied by us. German sensitivity even went so far as to want to exclude the Planning Cell from organising the operation, even though from its inception we had taken care not to call it a military planning cell. In practice, of course, virtually all its personnel were military officers. The director of the Planning Cell was most unhappy about this attitude, but there was little we could do about it except wait for it to soften.

The riparian states continuously emphasised the substantial losses they suffered from the embargo, for which they were never compensated. Article 52 of the UN Charter opened the possibility for such compensation but this has so far remained a dead letter. The other aspect which struck me in contacts with the Hungarians and Bulgarians in particular was their worry

about Serbian reprisals. For that reason, Bulgaria wanted their checkpoint to be not too close to the Serbian border. Equally, the possible use of force remained a delicate issue which was never completely resolved. Our personnel ultimately were allowed to carry their own weapons on board for self-defence. Several countries had intimated that their participation would depend on their officers being allowed to do so. We had some leverage as the participation of all three countries - all candidates for entry into the European Union - would be seen as a demonstration of their solidarity, even if it implied economic sacrifice.

The offer of a joint operation was made during an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council in Luxembourg on 5 April 1993, prior to a session of the Twelve. Taking up a useful British suggestion, we had invited the three riparian states to be present. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Spain indicated their willingness to contribute. Although Minister Colombo did not give any clarification as to the size of the operation, I felt free to tell the press that we reckoned on 8-10 patrol boats and about 250 personnel. The *nihil obstat* of the CSCE took some more time. On 31 March, Russia had put forward some conditions: formal approval by the WEU ministers and the riparian states and informing Russia about the details of the operation, especially on the nature of the cooperation with the riparian states. During our Ministerial the Swedish ambassador, on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, read out a text in which the CSCE took note with appreciation of our initiative. Formal endorsement might follow later but was not thought necessary by us. It would take till June before the Russian delegation in Vienna was prepared to recommend such endorsement to Moscow.⁴³ By then, the operation had started. The memoranda with Bulgaria and Romania were signed during the Ministerial in Rome on 20 May and the operation started the following Monday. Hungary had already signed earlier.

The main base for our force of police and customs officers would be at Calafat in Romania under Italian command. The deputy commander, a German, would man the post at Mohacs in Hungary. They would operate with some ten police vessels with personnel from almost all WEU countries in cooperation with local authorities. Visiting both places, I witnessed the positive way in which the operation was conducted, and how it often had a synergetic effect on the various local police and customs services which had never operated jointly before. Later, when I heard of smuggling of oil drums across the river Bunes between Albania and Montenegro, I thought of repeating the blockade action over there. Nothing came of it, because the Netherlands presidency did not want to push it and the Albanian authorities showed no enthusiasm when I visited them in the autumn of 1994. As early as November 1992, however, Albania had agreed access to its territorial waters for NATO and WEU ships engaged in the Sharp Fence embargo.

3. Other Tasks for WEU?

In the meantime, the former Yugoslavia had become a standing item on our agenda. On 13 August 1992, the Security Council, increasingly irritated by the frustration of the humanitarian assistance programme by the Bosnian Serbs, adopted Resolution 770, opening the possibility of taking enforcement measures for the delivery of relief goods. It was a resolution of the "enabling" kind employed in the Kuwait crisis, calling upon states "to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate "the delivery (...) of humanitarian assistance". This potentially far-reaching decision was not followed up in subsequent resolutions, which reverted to protective support on the basis of peacekeeping rules of engagement. Somehow people in New York - and not only there - did not realise that the problem in Bosnia was not so much a humanitarian one as a question of the use of force to establish the credibility of the international community. Unfortunately, in UN peacekeeping history it had become the rule not to use force at all. WEU took the resolution seriously and convened an extraordinary ministerial meeting in London on 28 August, following the Conference on former Yugoslavia, which established the key principles of any future settlement: no territorial gains by force, the return of all refugees, an end to the siege of cities, controls of heavy weapons and free passage for humanitarian convoys. The WEU communiqué dealt with the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the supervision of heavy weapons and the strengthening of the embargo. Intended to give as strong a signal as possible in support of the London conference, ministers endorsed the protection of humanitarian convoys by military escorts. This should be organised by the UN but member states of WEU had "the collective will to contribute by military, logistic, financial and other means". WEU members were also willing to contribute supervision operations under the overall responsibility of the UN and in coordination with the CSCE and other organisations.

The Security Council adopted another enabling resolution in October 1992, establishing a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Resolution 781 was motivated as a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities, but also as an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance (thus linking it to Resolution 770). It called upon states to take all measures necessary to provide assistance to UNPROFOR, based on technical monitoring. Here, NATO came in and provided AWACS aircraft in operation Sky Monitor, relaying information to UNPROFOR. Early November, Hungary allowed these aircraft to use its airspace. After much debate, Resolution 816 of 31 March 1993 authorised the use of force in the event of further violations and operation Deny Flight started on 12 April 1993. NATO had to cooperate closely with UNPROFOR and exchanged liaison officers. Its mission was subject to severe constraints, and firing at Serbian aircraft was permitted only as a measure of last resort.

Our ad hoc group and the Contingency Planning Group (CPG) found their work rather difficult. It was satisfying that among the eight countries invited by the UN to contribute forces six were WEU members (the others being Canada and Denmark) but Italy had been excluded for being a neighbouring country. Another problem concerned the fact that the UN did not distinguish between the surveillance of heavy weapons and convoy protection and did not recognise the need for intelligence in peacekeeping operations. The CPG made an interesting study in pursuance of UNSC Resolution 787 paragraph 14, where the Secretary-General had been invited to study the possibility of and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes. Three different levels of security were identified:

- a. *Safe haven*: an area which is organised to provide full protection to the civilian population against aggression, acts of terrorism, intimidation and any kind of hostile action from outside and inside the area;
- b. *Safe area*: where the civilian population is offered a certain degree of security by military forces which have the mandate to defend it against hostile action and acts of terrorism;
- c. *Relief zone*: where the presence of already deployed UN troops may provide a certain degree of security to the civilian population without these troops having a specific mission for their protection.

The conclusion reached by the CPG was that in all three scenarios the UNPROFOR mandate would have to be adapted and additional troops would have to be provided. For safe havens, which would require a demilitarised zone with a 25-km radius around them, the estimate was from corps to division-size units, for safe areas from division to brigade-size and for relief zones battalion-size units. Obviously, the first two cases would need several months to implement and if they had to be enforced, more forces would be needed. After our move to Brussels in January 1993, attention shifted to the protection of safe areas. Weston for the UK was quite blunt in only considering Sarajevo, other safe areas being impracticable. Klaiber for Germany said that if military support for the peace plan was necessary, it should come via NATO under the auspices of the UN or the CSCE. The Italian presidency saw a division of labour with NATO which would deal with the no-fly zone over Bosnia and WEU for embargo enforcement and safe areas and the Council agreed to give a further mandate to the CPG. A tentative conclusion reached by Italy was an additional requirement of 10,000-20,000 men to protect Sarajevo as an open city. The CPG continued working on this and reported late February a requirement of three brigades with 15,000 men for the inner circle and an expanded outer circle of 30 km, more than envisaged in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) but necessary to keep Serbian artillery out of range. A WEU coordination for Sarajevo could deal with one segment of the mosaic

proposed in the VOPP.

Before these estimates were discussed in the Council, NATO held an extraordinary ministerial session to meet with the new US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. He had just met his Russian counterpart, Kozyrev, in Geneva and agreed on a Clinton-Yeltsin summit for 4 April 1993. On Yugoslavia, he spoke of the risks of letting the conflict rage and the need to break the cycle of violence. The US wanted a settlement, building on the Vance-Owen proposals, but Christopher evaded any clarification of the changes he wanted to be made. It also would be premature to define the nature of the US contribution. That would depend on what would be needed at the time to support implementation of what was finally agreed. But he did not exclude ground forces from the outset. Hurd and Dumas both made the point that the action in Bosnia should remain under the UN. Hurd added that other countries such as Russia and Sweden should be involved and Dumas proposed a joint NATO-WEU council meeting to agree common support for the UN. Peter Kooijmans, the new Netherlands foreign minister, picked up that idea for further consideration. That was the most concrete point in a fairly disappointing session. Christopher had shown initial interest in involvement, but not too much, and nobody had said much about his point that Europe should play a major role. At lunch the conversation focused on the need for more contacts with Ukraine, which felt neglected. I was given the opportunity to say a few words about what WEU was trying to do with the Forum of Consultation and our contingency planning for a protected area in Sarajevo. I also asked Christopher to give his view on the emergence of a European pillar of the Alliance, but there was no time for a reply.

At the beginning of the meeting, when greeting the ministers, Klaus Kinkel - with his customary direct approach - said to me "I have been shooting at you", referring to press reports about my pleas for more decisive action. I replied that he had done so carefully enough by prefacing his remarks by saying that "if it were true that the Secretary-General advocated autonomous action, Germany would be against it". That had not been my purpose and I had only posed the question in a farewell press conference in London in December what we should do if the UN proved unable to act effectively. I had spoken of the need to attain our stated objectives even if that meant lowering them. But it was true that I had added that the application of Article 51 of the Charter on the inherent right of self-defence should also be examined. I never made myself popular when raising that question. Nevertheless, I believed it to be a direct consequence of recognition of a new state that an appeal for help should be considered in all its aspects. Yet, I had to realise that there was no support for this view in the Council.

The WEU Council took up our contingency plan on 2 March 1993 and generally endorsed it. The UK Military Delegate pointed out that logistics and communications would require more personnel as well as the corralling

of the heavy weapons. In the early stages there would be an additional requirement for close air support and artillery. The Council was about to submit these planning data to the UN when the Netherlands broke the silence procedure. It wanted to avoid the same allies submitting different plans and therefore WEU should make an input into NATO which could then work it into a single submission. On embargo enforcement WEU could report autonomously. France made the obvious remark that NATO was not our preordained interface with the UN, but did not object to my proposal to wait until the end of the week for any NATO comment which could then be attached to our submission. Belgium thought it important that WEU had come up with support for a concrete plan; the original impulse had come from the Twelve, but WEU had been able to define it in detail. We saw the creation of a safe area as a partial implementation of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The situation changed when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the VOPP in their referendum of 16-17 May. At the WEU ministerial meeting in Rome on 19 May 1993 ministers still reiterated their full support for early implementation of the plan. They agreed to keep up the pressure, in cooperation with the US and Russia, to make the Serbs accept the VOPP and noted that no option, military or other, was excluded. Their communiqué also contained an interesting political definition of the purpose of the measures taken as bringing about a political solution to the ongoing conflict and to ensure the physical and political survival of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In reality, the emphasis shifted away from a possible European role. After several days of discussions, the foreign ministers of the US, UK, France, Russia and Spain (being on the Security Council and a force contributor as well) adopted in Washington a Joint Action Programme for peace in Bosnia. It was a US counter-move to the proposal by Kozyrev to have a joint meeting of the Security Council with Western foreign ministers in New York, which Christopher refused to join. The 13-point action programme was outside UN auspices and called for the deployment of international observers on the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, deployment of UNPROFOR in safe areas, strict observance of the embargo until the fulfilment of the relevant UNSC resolutions, establishment of an international tribunal for war criminals, the possibility of sanctions against Croatia, increase of monitors in Kosovo and the deployment of UNPROFOR to Macedonia. In return for agreement on this programme, Christopher reiterated President Clinton's commitment to send US troops to Bosnia in the event of a peace agreement, but after the negative vote of the Bosnian Serbs the chances of such an agreement had become dim. Within days of the vote, on 4 June, UNSC Resolution 836 authorised the use of air power to defend the safe areas. Close air support by NATO planes would protect UNPROFOR personnel and air strikes were threatened in retaliation for any shelling of the safe areas. The UNPROFOR mandate was extended to deter attack on the safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and

Srebrenica and to allow some key points on the ground to be occupied. UNPROFOR was authorised:

acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardment against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys.

The Security Council also decided that "Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, may take under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power in and around the safe areas to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate". As it turned out, this formulation would give rise to considerable difficulties between the UN - especially its special representative, Akashi, appointed in December 1993 - and NATO, but on close reading of the text one could not help feeling that its interpretation by Western governments had been unnecessarily limited and that it could have allowed more freedom of action. The steady ratcheting-up of air power created problems between the US and the European allies who had troops on the ground. In addition, pressure for the assertive use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs was at odds with the institution of UN peacekeeping with its principles of neutrality and consent. In my view, these actions were necessary, but the international community was unable to fit them into a conceptual framework dealing with situations where no peace existed and traditional peacekeeping would be inadequate. In the end, this dichotomy led to the admission by Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali that the UN would not be able to conduct peace-enforcement missions, leaving that responsibility to others.

In practice, the air strikes amounted to very little and only became an effective means of bombing the Bosnian Serbs to the conference table in 1995. The NATO operation, Deny Flight, was successful in excluding Serbian air power from the conflict. On 28 February 1994, it shot down four out of six small Galeb aircraft, which apparently were testing Western determination, but did not prevent fairly intensive helicopter traffic. On the ground little changed, but there was no more talk of a WEU role in Sarajevo. Our planning work was transmitted to New York and that was the last I heard of it. Early August 1993 the report of the co-chairman of the ICFY to the Security Council followed up the idea of Vance and Owen to make Sarajevo an "open city" under UN auspices. Later, our attention shifted to Mostar, when the European Union decided to appoint Hans Koschnick as its administrator and requested WEU to provide a police detachment to try to bring Croats and Muslims to work together again. It is

a moot question what would have happened if all parties had accepted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The UN might have looked very foolish, for there were no assured force contributions to implement it. In a seminar of the privately organised NATO Workshop in Budapest, Marrack Goulding made the same point.⁴⁴ In charge of peacekeeping operations at the UN before he was promoted to Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, he gave a sobering assessment of the potential of the UN to do more. Only a minority of crises was ripe for peacekeeping treatment, especially those where there was no aggressor identified and the number of casualties remained small. The UN had taken a calculated gamble in Croatia and the outcome had not been positive: the status quo was being confirmed, the UN commitment was becoming open-ended and the refugees were unable to return to their homes. In Bosnia, the UNSC had authorised deployment knowing full well that the parties were not willing to cooperate, but what else could one have done? No country had the political will for massive intervention, but no one wanted to stand aside either, as the UN had done during the Iran-Iraq war. So Goulding concluded that an untidy effort at peacekeeping was the only alternative. On cooperation between NATO and the UN, he compared the reticence in the UN to a failed courtship ending in an arranged betrothal, with Lord Owen acting as matchmaker. The UN Secretary-General had written to his NATO counterpart that he understood that NATO was planning to do certain things, to which Wörner replied what was happening. But in New York, the image of NATO was coloured by the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm, where the US and the UK had prevented UN discussion when the coalition was acting. There was also a certain fear of being taken over by NATO, which outgunned the UN Secretariat in experts and, finally, there was a difficult command problem because the UN did not want to delegate to others the command over its blue berets, with their UN head-gear and insignia. For the CSCE, it would be easier as it included every country in Europe and had declared itself a regional organisation under the UN Charter.

Goulding recognised that an enabling resolution calling upon an international organisation or member states in general to use all necessary means, as in the case of Korea, Kuwait, Somalia and later Haiti, would be the most straightforward, but again there was a strong predilection in New York to do things under the aegis of the UN as much as possible. He could imagine the UNSC accepting or taking note of an offer by NATO or WEU, rather than issuing a request. He also believed it possible that the UNSC could retain political control over an operation carried out by NATO, allowing other countries to join in, and to have a clear line with the civilian authorities on the spot, through the representative of the UN Secretary-General. As later experience showed, that would be very difficult. In a complicated situation any dual-key system would be difficult to operate and would detract from the ability to act quickly. But to me the main problem with a supervisory UN role was its inability to anticipate events. The UNSC

found it very difficult to take preventive action and normally took action only when a conflict had broken out and then concentrated on a cease-fire. Preventive deployment in Macedonia was an exception, undertaken in the context of UNPROFOR and a real contribution to stability-building. In general, the UNSC developed its objectives and strategy with each successive resolution, every text being a compromise in itself, while a military operation needs a clear mandate and goals from the outset. Therefore, my own preference was an enabling resolution of the UNSC addressed to member states, who could then organise themselves in the organisations to which they belonged. Article 48 of the UN Charter provided explicitly that decisions of the Security Council "shall be carried out by the members of the United Nations directly or through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members". If the UN was unhappy about the lack of reporting on the actual operation - as in the Kuwait crisis - it could include the obligation to report periodically in the enabling resolution. In fact, this was done in the case of Haiti in July 1994. I found the insistence on a UN mandate, even for peacekeeping, a bit odd, given the willingness of WEU member states some years earlier to commit troops if a cease-fire was in place and holding and the parties to the conflict agreed. This insistence was strongest in Germany even though at that time it felt unable to join in an operation. For peace-enforcement some mandate would be necessary to provide legitimacy to the operation, but it should be the barest minimum in view of the fact that the UN would be unlikely to manage the operation itself or make an outright request to a regional organisation.

During the NATO ministerial in Athens in June 1993, Wörner reported on the letter he had received from Goudding's successor, Kofi Annan, proposing that any action undertaken by member states under Resolution 836 in response to the request by the UNSC would be executed under the control of NATO. But the authority to initiate a request for air strikes would rest with the UN and the UN force commander must have direct and constant communications with the designated NATO commander. The constraining effect of this policy statement was balanced somewhat by the request on behalf of UNPROFOR to deploy forward air controllers able to ask for air strikes. The chairman of the Military Committee responded favourably to this request but needed some time to form the teams and train them. Back in Brussels, our Planning Cell looked into the matter and expressed some doubt about the existence of sufficient planning for air support in emergencies. It also posed the question of how non-NATO forces should deal with this problem, to which France suggested the possibility of WEU providing forward air controllers to them. Nothing came of that.

The NATO Ministerial also showed the first sign of uneasiness among the countries providing troops about the tendency of a smaller group to bypass existing institutions and to manage the operation in a restricted ad hoc framework. The Dutch foreign minister expressed his disappointment

about the way the Joint Action Programme had been established. That sentiment only increased when the Contact Group for Bosnia was created a year later in April 1994 and included Germany, which had no forces on the ground but was expected to have leverage on Croatia, but excluded Italy which was the main operating base for the naval embargo as well as for air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. These developments confirmed my conclusion that if international organisations proved to be ineffective, they would be bypassed by ad hoc expediency. In both cases, the action taken was probably more effective than muddling through as before, but it certainly detracted from the credibility of all international organisations involved. Moreover, I had some doubts about the wisdom of bringing in Russian troops. It would be difficult to exert pressure on the Serbs against the wishes of Moscow, but having had a major interest in keeping Soviet forces out of Yugoslavia for decades, I found the sudden enthusiasm for bringing Russians in somewhat exaggerated. I could not help feeling that the major argument was the need to find sufficient manpower to implement a peace plan and did not understand why Russia was brought in without much discussion, but Italy remained excluded.

4. Police at Mostar

In July 1993, Luxembourg took the presidency of WEU. In his introductory statement, modestly called a working method instead of a programme, Ambassador Linster devoted great attention to our activities in former Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ On the Danube, the embargo worked well despite some communications problems with the headquarters in Calafat, Romania. Near Mostar a contraband engine had been confiscated and on 9 July the Sanctions Liaison Group would meet; the WEU commander, Colonel Pistone, would attend as a member of the Luxembourg delegation. For Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, NATO and WEU would undertake a joint demarche in New York to strengthen the Rules of Engagement as soon as it had been approved by the Military Committee Adriatic. This referred to clarifying situations of hostile intent on the side of the Serbian navy warranting a military response. The most interesting part of his statement was the suggestion to study a possible WEU role in the coordination of forces sent to former Yugoslavia. He had given a paper to the Planning Cell about a multinational WEU unit of battalion-size to show European solidarity and to allow the smaller countries to participate. The immediate UK reaction was negative. Ambassador Weston doubted whether anybody would be willing to commit more ground forces and his military delegate, General Jones, argued that multinational forces should not be constituted below the brigade level. I tried to save the Luxembourg suggestion by pointing out that the European Council in June had endorsed the aim of a contribution of 7,500 men. There was still a gap of some 1,500 men. The Netherlands had offered an additional logistic unit to the UN, albeit without

reference to WEU. So an additional strong battalion would make up the target figure. The discussion remained inconclusive. Italy wanted to explore implementation of the decision of the European Council to do more for the safe areas. France could agree to a study, but warned against complicated new operations. We did not get further than a request to UNPROFOR what its priorities were. The Council ended on a sombre note from the Belgian ambassador, reporting from the Twelve, that Belgrade refused to prolong the memorandum of understanding with the CSCE authorising the presence of observers in Kosovo.

During that month, a political solution seemed to come closer. Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman met in Geneva and agreed that the only solution would be the establishment of three republics within a confederation. On 30 July, all three parties accepted this at the Geneva negotiations and their military commanders signed a cease-fire agreement at Sarajevo. Yet again, there was no implementation. The Croats did not withdraw from the Maslenica area and its strategic bridge and the Serbs took control of two important mountains around Sarajevo. The negotiations continued and, in early September at WEU, the Luxembourg presidency again was fairly optimistic about a positive outcome. Following a proposal in the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, the Twelve were discussing their participation by assuming the administration of the Mostar district, where Croats and Muslims had been engaged in heavy fighting. Although it was unclear whether the two sides would ultimately agree to this after their rejection in August on whether the EU or WEU would play the primary role in implementing the administration, I concluded that our planning for Sarajevo had been overtaken and that we should either concentrate on Mostar or on a Muslim corridor to the sea at Ploce, or both. The WEU Council had a difficult discussion on whether the Planning Cell could start working on the Mostar contingency, but finally agreed that it could "reflect on questions and issues which might arise if and when the EC accept a mandate on Mostar". I managed to avoid a limitation of the mandate to military aspects with the argument that such constraints would be illogical as NATO was already undertaking military planning for Bosnia as a whole. Since the instruction to the Planning Cell was provisional anyway, it would be preferable to keep it general. If there was a role for WEU it should be for tasks not falling under UNPROFOR and not being performed by NATO. That proved to be a wise decision, because it would still take many months before the Mostar mission materialised. The negotiations on Bosnia continued in see-saw fashion and promising moments alternated with awful setbacks. On 20 September, all actors in the conflict met on the British aircraft carrier "Invincible" for a final harmonisation of the Geneva peace plan, but the Muslims were clearly unhappy about the outcome. By making acceptance conditional on the Serbs giving up the territories taken over by force, the Bosnian Assembly for all practical purposes rejected the plan.

On 5 October, the General Affairs Council requested WEU to examine

the support it could give in terms of the organisation of a police force in Mostar and the improvement of certain vital logistical functions, in particular in the medical field. The situation was exacerbated by news of Croats killing Muslims just before the European Council met to endorse the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union on 29 October 1993. On Yugoslavia the statement emanating from Brussels failed to grasp the nettle by merely repeating the call for an immediate resumption of negotiations and abstention from any act of hostility. There was no willingness to take any new measures. In the same vein the General Affairs Council of 9 November agreed on a "joint action" under the new CFSP, but it only amounted to a continuation of the humanitarian support operations and did not contain a request to WEU. There was a general reference to the preservation of corridors for the transports and a readiness to increase funds for UNHCR.

The ministers of the Twelve met in Luxembourg on 22 November, followed by a session of the WEU Council. The Twelve offered Serbia a gradual suspension of the sanctions against them in exchange for territorial concessions by the Bosnian Serbs. At the luncheon between the sessions it was explained to me that the sanctions on oil and coal would remain, pending implementation of the peace agreements. Willy Claes, who had presided over the morning meeting, outlined an ambitious three-phase approach. First, in Geneva a conference of all political and military leaders to reach, *inter alia*, a *modus vivendi* for the Krajina and to agree on some confidence-building measures. Secondly, a "London II" conference to confirm the agreements internationally and to lay the basis for a settlement of questions outside Bosnia, such as Kosovo. Finally, a "London III" for a final settlement, arms control measures and a plan for reconstruction. To my surprise, it appeared that the Twelve had invited the generals in charge of the UN operations, Cot and Briquemont, and had asked them to plan alternative routes for the humanitarian convoys. Nobody from WEU had been invited, not even from our Planning Cell which had been dealing with the Yugoslav crisis for some time. I was particularly disappointed as this happened during the Belgian presidency of the EU, a country which had always supported closer links between the European Union and WEU and had just steered a paper on practical measures for these contacts through the European Council. In practice, this episode marked the end of WEU involvement in the general management of the Yugoslav crisis. We continued our missions in the Adriatic and on the Danube and prepared the police contingent for Hans Koschnick as EU administrator of Mostar, but discussion in the Council rarely went beyond the factual execution of these missions. The WEU ministerial communiqué of 22 November referred to Mostar, but apart from the embargo operations was quite flat:

Ministers reaffirmed that WEU is prepared to contribute where it can to the humanitarian efforts, to the implementation of a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina and in support of a possible

role of the European Union in Mostar.

The NATO ministerial session of 2 December devoted only limited time to the former Yugoslavia. In his general remarks, Douglas Hurd stressed the need to keep up the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. In his view Izetbegovic was not asking more than he had done at the meeting on the "Invincible". The Canadian Minister, Ouellet, said that the 2,400 troops his country had in the area would only be involved in peacekeeping and not in the use of force. Manfred Wörner was satisfied about the implementation of the embargo in the Adriatic but felt unhappy about the "no-fly zone" operations over Bosnia. These were not effective against Serbian helicopters, which threatened to erode their credibility. He was in contact with UNPROFOR about the military significance of these violations. Looking forward, he emphasised the need for containment of the crisis; some measure of arms control would have to be introduced, perhaps linked with the carrot of a partial lifting of the embargo. Willy Claes sketched the phased approach he had explained to us in Luxembourg, but added his concern about the extreme position of Milosevic. According to the Serbian president, the only questions needing settlement were an arrangement for Sarajevo and an outlet to the Adriatic for Bosnia. With humanitarian convoys coming from Belgrade there would be no need to open the airport at Tuzla! Like Hurd, Claes also was more positive about Izetbegovic, who no longer insisted on demilitarisation of the Serbian and Croat parts of Bosnia, but on the condition that NATO would remain for five years to monitor implementation of a peace agreement. Mrs Ogata had reached an agreement with the military commanders allowing UNPROFOR to accompany the convoys and to use force against local obstacles. This had to be implemented now, which would require more troops. So far, only the Netherlands were ready to make an additional contribution.

In January 1994, the NATO summit devoted more attention to the crisis. The relevant interventions of the Heads of State and Government are given in our narrative on the summit in section 8.1. Over dinner, the Heads of State and Government further discussed Bosnia and the possible use of force. Mrs Brundtland for Norway had asked for clarification as to who would decide on the use of air strikes. In the plenary, Wörner stated that UNPROFOR had to ask for air strikes for its own protection. NATO could not initiate that. But in its plan for the creation of safe areas, the Council or individual member states would be able to ask for air strikes. He added that air power would not be able to achieve all of our objectives, such as being allowed to rotate forces in the enclave of Srebrenica or the opening of Tuzla airport. The question came up again when discussing the communiqué as Canada was extremely reluctant to mention any use of force. In the end, there was agreement on readiness to carry out air strikes and "in this context" UNPROFOR was urged to draw up plans urgently to ensure that the blocked isolation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica could

take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla could be opened for humanitarian relief purposes. No great commitment for effective action. When the meeting broke up, I overheard President Clinton saying to Wörner that there was still a lot of confusion over Bosnia. He was quite right.

The European Union made no progress during the first months of the incoming Greek presidency, which was bedeviled by their problems in recognising Macedonia. The ministerial session of 7 February 1994 did not decide anything and referred the question of air strikes through to NATO. Things had become somewhat easier as the US and France now saw eye to eye, no longer requiring the UK as principal go-between. To my surprise NATO issued a declaration on Bosnia concentrating on Sarajevo but omitting any reference to Srebrenica and Tuzla. At the WEU Council of 15 February, I enquired why these areas which had been the focus of discussion at the summit no longer received attention. After the meeting, Veenendaal explained to me that progress had been made on the two but not on Sarajevo. For a moment, attention shifted to the Deny Flight operation when four Galeb aircraft were shot down. Karadzic admitted that they were Serbian and engaged in the bombing of a Muslim ammunition factory near Vitez. Discussing this in the WEU Council, I was authorised to say to the press that we regarded the shooting-down as a legitimate action against a violation of UNSC Resolution 816. Nevertheless, the same optimistic opinion was voiced by Admiral Lanxade at the CHODs meeting of 29 March. General Ari van der Vlis, the Netherlands' Chief of Defence Staff reported on his helicopter flight to Srebrenica, the first to be allowed in six months, and described the enclave as a prison holding 60,000 Muslims without water or electricity, with a lifeline of 60 km and depending on Serbian goodwill. At that meeting my optimism about Franco-American relations was tempered by Lanxade's criticism of the way the US had handled the meeting of force contributors at Aviano. US Secretary of Defence Perry had invited only those countries supplying aircraft and had taken the chair without any prior consultation. Moreover, he had to be persuaded that UNPROFOR should be represented at the meeting. At the CHODs meeting, I learned that Turkey had been invited to join UNPROFOR. Their representative had the courtesy to assure his Greek colleague that care would be taken to avoid any spillover from their presence to areas outside Bosnia.

On the Sharp Guard operation in the Adriatic, Admiral Lanxade appealed to his colleagues to make personnel available for the WEU cell in the Naples headquarters. France had agreed to the compromise on the command arrangements in order to avoid duplication, but on the condition that WEU would continue to be able to make inputs at the command level. The same applied to regular meetings of the Military Committee (Adriatic) which was to provide the necessary visibility for WEU in Brussels, a point also made regularly by Ambassador Guéhenno in the WEU Council. We managed to provide continuity and the cell did useful work in the overall

planning of the operation. Gradually, the WEU ships no longer appeared as a separate flotilla but rotated in the three task forces: near the coast, in the Otranto Channel and in port.

My notes of that period constantly reported glimmers of hope that finally a settlement might be around the corner. In retrospect they demonstrated how naïve Western statesmen were in their perception of the statements and promises made. Representatives from Central Europe usually had a more realistic assessment. On 8 March, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Jszensky, paid a visit to the Council to explain his interest in the new status of association we were discussing. He explained that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was useful, but did not do justice to the new democracies of Central Europe who "felt somewhat uneasy with people whose background we know". On Yugoslavia he was quite clear: the violence could not be stopped without a credible deterrent. There was nothing wrong with the Carrington plan except that the will to implement it was sorely lacking. The murderers should receive clear signals that there would be retaliation if they continued. That was the only language they understood. Two days later I attended a symposium in Ljubljana and was received by President Kucan. He recalled how Hans van den Broek at the Brioni conference left the room for a moment after another seesaw of agreement yes, agreement no and sighed "what a people, what a country". And indeed, the history of the Balkans could best be described as a period of war interrupted by four periods of peace. Only when imposed from the outside had there been peace, which lasted as long as the external circumstances did not change materially. Today again peace would have to be imposed. The Bosnian conflict was not a civil war from the beginning, but caused by Serbian nationalism conducted from Belgrade. Military intervention could have stopped it, when the Serbian army was still unsure of itself. President Tudjman should have negotiated directly with Milosevic and Izetbegovic, even though Karadzic became increasingly difficult. Kucan regretted that Tudjman had described the Croat-Muslim federation as the definitive boundary between two civilisations, but explained it out of fear for a revival of Yalta. There Yugoslavia had been divided along the Drina. Today Russian troops were present to the west of the river and could expand their zone of influence. Personally, the president did not think that the present Russian Federation would have the same interests as the Soviet Union or Czarist Russia before it: an outlet to the Adriatic, pan-Slavism and the orthodox religion. At the moment, the opportunity afforded to play a role in European security seemed more important. Kucan noted that Russia had entered the peace effort before the NATO ultimatum expired, thus relieving both NATO and the Serbs. Whatever their motives, Russia was now involved and would not withdraw. For Slovenia it was important to be excluded from the UN arms embargo, not so much because it needed weapons, but to break the link with the former Yugoslavia. For the same reason Slovenia wanted to join the Partnership for Peace.

The day of the Jszensky visit I received a call from Kofi Annan in New York asking for help in reinforcing UNPROFOR with 10,000 men, 550 police officers and 150 military observers. I promised to convey his message to the Council. Apart from our plans for a police contingent in Mostar, I could point only to the Netherlands' increase and Polish willingness to enlarge their contingent in Croatia, which might free other forces for Bosnia. Asked whether an Italian contribution could now be envisaged, Annan replied negatively: the situation had not yet been clarified. I appreciated his call to WEU, which was a follow-up to my informal visit to New York in January, but it also showed how hard-pressed he was to muster any support he could get. Taking his request to the Council, I was happy to note that, apart from the Netherlands, France, Spain and the UK had also decided to increase their force contributions.

Another area where WEU might have been of some use was arms control. All along I had emphasised that apart from the immediate crisis in Bosnia we had a long-term problem of stability in the Balkans aggravated by the military capabilities of Serbia. Most of the countries in the region were inhibited in their action by fear of Serbian military power. John Roper shared my concern and had commissioned a study on arms control. In the Council of 15 February, he reported that Lord Owen had asked the WEU Institute to write a paper on regional security, to be ready in about six weeks. Fortunately, the Council did not object as long as the study did not bind WEU to its conclusions. Obviously, disarmament in the Balkans would have to be different from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. There was no polarised situation between two blocs which lent itself to a relatively simple concept of rough parity in offensive capabilities. Equally, we had to take into consideration what had already been done in CSCE. Over a year ago Hungary had tabled a proposal including a "regional table" as a new instrument for dealing with the problems of Central Europe and the Balkans. Roper managed to conclude his report before the end of April. Done at the request of Lord Owen and his co-chairman Thorvald Stoltenberg for the Conference on Former Yugoslavia, he gave it the title "Regional stability measures in the Balkans after a political settlement in the former Yugoslavia". Its main thrust was to work in two phases, first a period of "controlled superiority" followed by a phase of "reduced superiority". The lifting of sanctions should be used to obtain leverage on the process. The report was for official use only at the discretion of Lord Owen, but all 24 countries around the WEU table received a copy.

In the meantime, preparations for the Mostar operation were making progress, largely due to good cooperation between the German presidency of the EU and the Luxembourg presidency of WEU. By the end of March, the EU exploratory mission to Mostar finally left, having been postponed two weeks earlier at the request of Croatia. The Luxembourgers included General Roux from the Planning Cell in their delegation negotiating with the parties in Mostar, both on the spot and in Brussels. This worked so well that

the Bosnians remarked that they had not known that the Luxembourg army had any general.⁴⁶ Roux managed to arrange a meeting of the Croat and Muslim police chiefs on the demarcation line, and his suggestions for clearing up rubble and refuse seemed to get a favourable reception. At that time, relations between Muslims and the nearby Serbs also seemed reasonable and even included the notification of Serb artillery positions. Back in Brussels the Mostar working group of WEU did not wish to discuss the report of the mission, apparently because it advocated a larger effort at reconstruction. The underlying reason, however, was a British refusal to envisage a WEU mission when there was no comparable NATO activity on the ground. Sir John Weston subsequently blocked continued participation of General Roux in the advance party.

On 18 April the appointment of Hans Koschnick as administrator was confirmed by the EU and WEU was requested to give concrete form to its study of an international police element. In doing so, our Council expressed a preference for the (third) option "to supervise and control the police, including their training". The advance party thought of a police contingent of 300-400 men, which was later scaled down to 182 men. In the memorandum of understanding, the WEU presence was part of the EU's and would also be financed by the Union. After some initial difficulties Denmark had agreed to a single MOU on condition that it would also be signed by WEU. At an informal breakfast meeting with the ambassadors of the nine full members, we agreed to restrict the mission to the Nine for the time being. At a later stage it would be extended to others. It proved difficult to organise the mission. By September, when a rocket was fired at Koschnick's office, only 27 policemen were on the spot. By mid-October there were 65 and four countries had not yet appointed a point of contact. The UK found it difficult to participate as its policemen were not used to carrying arms and contributed administrative personnel only. Our Planning Cell was concerned about the arrangements for evacuation, particularly if UNPROFOR was leaving as a result of a lifting of the arms embargo. General Lara, the Spanish military adviser to Koschnick on behalf of WEU, and Sir Martin Garrod, Chief of Staff of the administrator, did not see eye to eye on this. At a briefing of the Council, the former thought the mission should leave if UNPROFOR departed, but the latter reckoned with the possibility of staying. Another important element of concern was the close proximity of Serbian forces, only 2 km away from the edge of the Mostar district. Contacts with the Serbs had indicated that they would respect the EU mission, but only if the international border was not touched by the other parties.

The only occasion on which I was invited to attend the General Affairs Council of the EU was on 16 May, when Koschnick was introduced to the ministers. I made a brief statement saying that this was the first time the EU had requested WEU to take action. For our joint credibility it would be very important to make it a success, but to do so would require closer contacts, particularly on the criteria for the possible lifting of sanctions. Koschnick's

statement inspired confidence. If anybody could succeed, it would be him. He had his feet firmly on the ground and kept his mission to a minimum number. When he left his post in 1996 it must have been a great disappointment to him that he had not been able to bring Croats and Muslims to work together, but at least, apart from an incident in 1997, they were no longer killing each other. On the police side it remained difficult to bring the two sides together, but that was to be expected, because all over Bosnia policemen had been involved in the fighting and thereby had become part of the problem of living together again.

From the institutional point of view, EU decision-making was far from impeccable. For a long time the only basis for the operation was the joint action of 8 November 1993 to provide humanitarian aid. On 16 May 1994 it was adapted to cover the cost of the Mostar operation, leaving only a small sum for proper humanitarian assistance elsewhere in Bosnia. Originally, it had been envisaged to split the cost between the Community budget and the member states, but on 6 February 1995 a total amount of 80 million Ecu was reserved for Mostar, coming entirely from the common budget. Not until 12 December 1994 did any decision in the Official Journal provide any rationale for changing the scope of the joint action by confirming that the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the parties on 5 July defined its conditions of application. A fortiori the role of WEU did not appear anywhere. The specification of the total amount only mentioned 9 million Ecu for strengthening the municipal administration (including the unified police force). Much of the vagueness could be explained by the quarrel, largely between the UK and the other EU members, whether the CFSP could be financed out of the common budget (which would give the European Parliament a say in these matters). As a result, the only way out was to bring the operation under humanitarian aid, for which the EU had a budget line. Apparently for the same reason the CFSP Council of 18 April did not talk of a joint action but of a "common effort", reminiscent of the European Political Cooperation of earlier days.⁴⁷

5. Transatlantic Trouble

For a long time, the Yugoslav crisis was a low point in transatlantic relations, though this was not so much caused by the absence of US forces on the ground. The US did not like to operate under foreign command and was even more unlikely to do so at a time of difficult relations with the United Nations.⁴⁸ No, the problems arose from different attitudes to the underlying causes of the conflict and what to do about them. Mediation efforts by the EU were thwarted by the US, covertly or openly, by giving the Muslims the impression that they could hold out for a better deal. The only actions where the US participated actively and effectively were the naval embargo in the Adriatic and the Deny Flight operation over Bosnia. In 1994 Washington, urged on by Congress, advocated a "lift and strike" policy to

apply force on the Serbs. Lifting the arms embargo on the Croats and Muslims and hitting offensive Serb positions was expected to level the force relationships on the ground and to bring them to accept a compromise solution after all their dithering. On the European side there was clear opposition to both. Allied air strikes were not compatible with maintaining peacekeeping forces on the ground, as was demonstrated by the Serb hostage-taking after the air strikes of 10 and 11 April near Gorazde. The arguments against a partial lifting of the arms embargo were several. On 5 February 1994, I had tried to list them at the Wehrkunde meeting, an event at which the Americans were well represented. It would increase the level of violence, introduce more sophisticated weapons, the ground forces would have to leave, it would end the peace efforts, the enclaves would be overrun because air power could not save them, and other countries like Russia might lift the economic sanctions on Serbia. In short, the risk of escalation towards a European war would again increase. We Europeans were not so much concerned by American isolationism but rather by growing unilateralism and we feared that in Bosnia the US were demonstrating that unilateralism on an issue which they did not regard as a vital interest. If continued that would have a profound impact on the European perception of American leadership. On other occasions I repeated these arguments which, as far as I was aware, represented a consensus among European leaders. The worst moment came in November 1994, when the US instructed its vessels in the Adriatic no longer to cooperate in implementing the arms embargo against Bosnia and Croatia. It was so bad because it was the first occasion on which the political underpinning of a combined military operation fell away. The "Economist" asked whether this would be the first formal parting of the ways between the US and Europe.⁴⁹ In our thinking on CJTF, we had always assumed that there would be political consensus about the objectives, but differing degrees of willingness to participate in the implementation. Here disagreement about the aims would lead to a disruption of the operation. The US decision came shortly before the WEU ministerial at Noordwijk on 14 November 1994 and cast a shadow over our proceedings. Defence Minister Voorhoeve advocated a cool approach: out of the 18 ships in Sharp Guard there were only two US vessels, which happened not to be on station for a period of ten days; there was time for reflection. As it was my last address to the Council, I took more time in analysing the situation. In the former Yugoslavia we were engaged in a complicated operation involving humanitarian relief, mediation to arrive at a peaceful settlement, peacekeeping, the application of sanctions and the use of force either for protecting our forces on the ground and safe areas or to prevent escalation. We had not done very well in bringing these different strands together in a common approach by Europeans, Americans and Russians. Yet, any hope of a peaceful settlement depended on it. I repeated the arguments against lifting the arms embargo. Sharp Guard had started with separate flotillas which were put under joint

command when the arms embargo was extended to an economic blockade. NATO-WEU cooperation had gone well through the use of joint council meetings, the Military Committee (Adriatic) and the installation of a WEU cell in Naples. The US action changed the enforcement of the arms embargo, where we would miss US intelligence and boarding parties, but did not affect the blockade. I assumed that it would be possible to redeploy Sharp Guard in such a way as to put American ships on blockade duty; perhaps the rules of engagement had to be adapted. US personnel was likely to remain on duty in the headquarters, but if necessary the WEU cell could take on additional duties. The whole episode had demonstrated to me that the CJTF proposals should be clarified soon. If we had done so earlier we would have been better equipped to deal with a situation where the US did not participate in an operation and the Europeans had to take on wider responsibilities.

Willy Claes told us that he would leave for the US in two days' time to discuss how the political control over the operation could be maintained. President Clinton had already mitigated the impact of the lifting of the embargo by signing a waiver for US personnel in headquarters allowing them to give priority to NATO instructions over national ones; equally, it seemed possible to maintain intelligence and data links with ships in Sharp Guard. In any case, intelligence was a national activity. Turkey assumed that its decision would not be different from that of the US, as it felt a moral obligation towards the Bosnian people. The other ministers were clearly perturbed. Solana feared that the US decision would give a signal to the Muslims that a military solution was possible. Juppé expected the task of the blue helmets to become even more difficult. If more steps were taken towards lifting the embargo, the evacuation of our ground forces needed to be prepared seriously. He also questioned whether it would be possible to continue the Contact Group.

The Noordwijk Declaration contained clear language. Lifting the arms embargo would cause the conflict to escalate further, pose grave risks to the civilian population and to organisations in the field, leading to a situation in which UN forces had to withdraw. Ministers took note with regret of the US measures to modify its participation with respect to the enforcement of the arms embargo and stressed "the importance that the US in NATO structures will continue to observe fully the mandatory provisions of all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions". Ministers reiterated their intention to continue to implement fully the enforcement of all embargoes. Turkey wished to dissociate itself from these paragraphs. Fortunately, it proved possible in the following weeks to limit the impact of the US decision on Sharp Guard. It had been taken in response to domestic pressure and the effects in the Adriatic could be kept to a minimum. The political effects remained serious and would only disappear after the US had brokered the Dayton Agreement.

Near the end of 1994, there was much talk of withdrawing UNPRO-

FOR because the increased fighting made it impossible to execute its mandate. In December, Boutros Ghali reported that such a withdrawal would be extremely difficult and would be achieved only "by the temporary introduction of a significant number of highly combat-capable ground forces provided by member states outside the United Nations framework".⁵⁰ NATO's Permanent Council requested SACEUR to finalise planning for a withdrawal. US Defense Secretary Perry had agreed in principle to contribute ground forces as a cover for a safe departure, but stressed that American policy aimed at keeping the UN in Bosnia for fear of a further spill-over of the conflict. In January, Willy Claes stated that NATO would refuse all responsibility for a withdrawal operation "unless it is given explicit and totally unambiguous command". This would mean abandoning the dual-key arrangement with the UN, leaving only a consultative role to the UN Secretary-General's representative Akashi. Formalising high-level talks between the UN and NATO, Boutros Ghali on 10 February 1995 asked that NATO prepare plans enabling it to assist in the extrication of UNPROFOR, should withdrawal become unavoidable.⁵¹ NATO conducted a computer exercise and provisionally approved OPPLAN 40104 on 28 June 1995.

The mood changed when, at the end of May, in retaliation for air strikes against Pale, the Bosnian Serbs for the third time took UN soldiers hostage and chained them to possible military targets. President Chirac considered this humiliation unacceptable and called upon Western leaders no longer to acquiesce in these provocations. His call led to the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).

It is debatable whether the RRF still represented peacekeeping or should be regarded as peace-enforcement. The proposal made by France, the Netherlands and the UK on 3 June 1995 stated that the force would be an integral part of the existing UN peacekeeping operation and would be available to UN military commanders for the defence of UN personnel; the tasks assigned to it would be determined by the UN commanders on the ground. Its purpose would be to give them a capacity "between strong protest and air strikes". The three countries intended the RRF to have a deterrent effect without changing the UN role to peace-enforcement; the status of UNPROFOR and its impartiality would be unaffected. Welcoming the well-armed and mobile forces, Boutros Ghali saw their value in their ability to respond promptly to threats to UN personnel. "It would thus reduce the risk that increasing casualties and harassment might cause troop-contributing governments and the Security Council to consider withdrawal".⁵² In fact, at that time many suspected that the RRF was primarily intended to make withdrawal possible without considerable loss of life. In any case, the Serbs were not impressed. They were even encouraged by the removal of UNPROFOR troops from all weapons collection points around Sarajevo on 18 June and by the fall of the "safe areas" of Srebrenica and Zepa in July. In a presidential statement, the Security Council demanded the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb forces and NATO issued a strong warning

against an attack on Gorazde: "The planning provides for NATO and the UN to take the necessary decisions to launch significant air strikes ... such operations, once they are launched, will not lightly be discontinued". It took another mortar attack near the Markale market in Sarajevo on 28 August for NATO to swing into action. In order to prevent renewed hostage-taking, the last British troops had secretly been removed from Gorazde before Operation "Deliberate Force" started on 30 August. On 27 August, the dual-key system had been streamlined: requests for air support no longer needed to pass through Brussels and New York and were delegated to General Janvier, who could deal directly with CINCSOUTH, Admiral Leighton Smith, thus bypassing Akashi. The UN report still referred to "close air support to defend United Nations peacekeepers", but the size of the operation (with some 3,400 sorties against 23 military targets, such as air defence systems, artillery positions, ammunition stores and command posts) clearly exceeded that purpose.⁵³ NATO headquarters described the operation as being conducted under NATO command, with guidance from the North Atlantic Council and with NATO rules of engagement. Yet, UNPROFOR Commander, General Bernard Janvier, formulated the demands to General Mladic to desist from attacks on Sarajevo or other safe areas, to withdraw heavy weapons from a 20 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo, to allow complete freedom of movement for UN forces and NGOs and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport.

In this new context, the RRF became most useful in the Sarajevo area by exerting pressure on the ground and using its mortar location equipment to establish the sites of Serbian forces. All this was done without a change in the formal mandate but, in practice, the role of the RRF had become peace-enforcement. Events on the ground and in Brussels were outpacing the UN machinery in New York and there nobody seemed to mind. Boutros Ghali had accepted the fact that enforcement action went beyond the means of the UN. Given the political will to take more effective action, the resolutions with their "all necessary means" clauses lent themselves to a more extensive interpretation than applied earlier.

This political will to use force among the key European contributors, prompted by President Chirac, regrettably did not give a role to WEU but nevertheless helped bring about a change of attitude in Washington. The Clinton Administration concluded that their willingness to carry out the evacuation of UNPROFOR with a force of some 25,000 men could better be turned into positive assistance to make a political settlement credible. Evacuation, even with US assistance, would have led to serious recriminations across the Atlantic. It would have left the conflict wide open to increased violence and further escalation. It also might have occurred to some in Washington that, if a settlement became a realistic possibility, the US should not continue to be absent from the scene. The time was ripe for an agreement. The parties were increasingly weary of the war, the Croats were finally able to assert themselves on the ground and Milosevic was

disenchanted with the Bosnian Serbs. This in no way detracts from the tremendous efforts of the Holbrook team in Dayton in knocking heads together till a compromise was reached. It confirmed that the parties, if left alone, would not make it and that a settlement had to be largely imposed from the outside. In fact, all drafts of possible solutions had been prepared by outsiders. In consequence, a continuing foreign presence on the spot was needed to make the agreement stick. That was done admirably by IFOR and SFOR. Again the paradox was striking: when there was no peace the forces present were insufficient in numbers and equipment, but after the peace agreement they were numerous and armed to the teeth.

The Common Concept on European Security, adopted by the 27 WEU countries on 14 November 1995, contained substantial paragraphs on the experience drawn from the conflict in former Yugoslavia. This came at a time when the Dayton conference was still in progress. The upshot was a need for closer relationships between EU and WEU and between WEU and NATO. On the operational side there must be a clear channel of communications between the WEU Council and WEU forces, and arrangements were needed for ensuring efficient coordination between the military and civilian elements of the operation, especially when the latter were provided by another organisation such as the UN.

The operation in the Adriatic came to an end when the sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro were lifted, following the elections in Bosnia. In their Ostend Declaration of 19 November 1996, WEU ministers paid tribute to the thousands of servicemen and -women who played their part in ensuring its success. About the same time the WEU police element in Mostar had completed its tasks of monitoring, advice and training of the unified police force in Mostar. The Netherlands had provided the head of mission throughout the operation.

My compatriot Professor Bart Tromp has written about the triple betrayal in the Balkans: the persistent lying of the parties in their external contacts, the sacrifice of their citizens in the name of a sick nationalism, and - in the West - a mistrust by governments of their citizens who might clamour for decisive action but turn against their leaders when the first body bags were brought home. Betrayal seems a strong term for that assessment, which had proved true in Somalia. My own irritation was not about betrayal but about hypocrisy, best described in "Yes, Prime Minister" as the formula for crisis management: first say that nothing will happen, then add that something could happen but we should stay out of it. In a third phase we say that perhaps we should do something, but unfortunately there is nothing that could be done. Finally, we admit that perhaps something could have been done, but now it is too late to do it.⁵⁴

The terminology in the Yugoslav crisis has been most unfortunate. UNPROFOR was a protection force which did not protect anybody and in Bosnia started out as a strictly humanitarian operation. The protected areas (UNPA) covered Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia, formalising a status quo

which was unacceptable to Zagreb and leaving room for a Serbian movement towards independence. The "safe areas" declared for the Muslim enclaves in Bosnia were a complete misnomer, inasmuch as they did not provide any safety for the population. In his "Balkan Odyssey" Lord Owen narrates how the idea originated in November 1992 with the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Sommaruga, who wanted to accommodate vulnerable groups within Bosnia. Owen was opposed from the beginning, because if Muslims pushed out of their homes could go into official safe areas, it would flash a green light to the Serbs that they could continue their "ethnic cleansing". To Mladic, his book said, safe areas were alright as a place to dump Muslims, but if they became the focus of Muslim military activity they just would be regarded as another target, as he was to show over Srebrenica.⁵⁵ In spite of these protestations, the UN Security Council in Resolution 819 of 16 April 1993 declared Srebrenica and its surroundings a safe area and in Resolution 824 of 6 May 1993 did the same for Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. The latter text was an initiative of the non-aligned countries and, according to Lord Owen, "decided against the weight of professional advice".⁵⁶ These two resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but in the context of Resolution 815, which referred to the security of UN personnel and was not taken as being an enforcement action. UNSC Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993 referred to Chapter VII without any qualifications. Lord Owen has called it the most irresponsible decision taken during his time as co-chairman, because the Council, with the support of the Joint Action Program, embarked upon the path of enforcement with no intention of backing it up with the necessary resources.⁵⁷ The inconsistency of the safe area policy was demonstrated most painfully in Bihac, where the Muslims first managed to expand their enclave, but then were beaten severely by Serb forces; in the end five armies were fighting over a safe area. The outcome in Srebrenica was even more dramatic, where the Serbs were allowed first to reduce the enclave progressively and finally to overrun it completely.

Notes

35. "Declaration on Yugoslavia" of 26 March 1991. The Santer-Delors visit took place on 29-30 May.
36. Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 160.
37. James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992*, Putnam, New York, 1995, pp. 480-481.
38. A useful, although not fully complete, chronology of events from January 1990-October 1995 has been compiled by Brana Markovic: *The Yugoslav Crisis and the World*, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 1996.
39. My translation from General Cot's article "Dayton ou la porte étroite: genèse et avenir d'un désastre" in *Dernière Guerre Balkanique?*, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense, l'Harmattan, 1996, p. 121. In the same volume, the French diplomat Georges-Marie Chenu called the European Community Monitor Mission "borgne et sourde d'une oreille" ("half-blind and deaf in one ear"), p. 40.
40. COREU telegram of 13 July 1991, quoted in full in Lord David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, Indigo edition, Casell, London, 1996, pp. 32-34. Lord Owen believed that to have stuck unyieldingly to the internal borders before there was any question of recognition of the republics "was a folly far greater than that of premature recognition itself. The refusal to make them negotiable greatly hampered the EC's attempt at crisis management." See also p. 375.
41. "Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1944-1945", Teilband I, Prof. Dr. Percy E. Schramm.
42. Woodward, op. cit., p. 309.
43. On 23 June 1993, the CSCE committee of senior officials endorsed the following text by consensus: "endorses the efforts of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania together with the WEU countries as their further contribution to the full implementation on the Danube of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in accordance with Resolution 820 of the UN Security Council".
44. 3-6 June 1993. The record of the workshop was published by the Center for Strategic Decision Research in Menlo Park, California, under the title "After the Cold War: Adapting to the New Reality in Central and Eastern Europe". The statement by Goulding contained the following sentence: "I believe strongly that in the future, the Security Council should think very hard before putting United Nations troops on the ground in the middle of continuing warfare, without giving them the mandate and armament to impose their will militarily if they are challenged."

45. WEU Council of 6 July 1993.
46. In fact, the Luxembourg armed forces are commanded by a colonel.
47. I am indebted to Hatte H. van der Woude for her thesis "Le titre V et sa mise en application. Une analyse du processus de décision pour l'administration de Mostar par l'Union Européenne", Amsterdam University, August 1995.
48. Presidential Decision Directive 28, signed by President Clinton in 1993, did not exclude placing US forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander. But the greater the US military role, the less likely this would be. "Any large-scale participation of US forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under US command and operational control or through competent regional organisations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions."
49. *The Economist*, London, 19 November 1994.
50. Document S/1994/1067.
51. See Dick A. Leurdijk, *The United Nations and NATO in former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996. Limits to Diplomacy and Force*, Netherlands Atlantic Commission and Netherlands Institute for International Relations (Clingendael), 1997, pp. 65-66.
52. Letter of the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN Security Council, 9 June 1995, Document S/1995/470.
53. Leurdijk, op. cit., pp. 77-79. In his justification, Willy Claes referred to "UNSC Resolution 838 and in accordance with the NAC's decisions of 25 July and 1 August, which were endorsed by the UN Secretary-General".
54. Bart Tromp, *Verraad op de Balkan, een Kroniek*, Aspekt, Nieuwegein, 1996. His quote from *Yes, Prime Minister* by Jonathan Lyon and Anthony Jay is from Volume I (1986), BBC Books, 1987, p. 177.
55. Lord David Owen, op. cit., pp. 69 and 82.
56. Op. cit., p. 170.
57. Op. cit., p. 190.

Chapter Eight

The Move to Brussels

The year 1993 started with the move from London to Brussels. The building was far from ready, but was large enough to allow for some makeshift arrangements. Part of our time was taken up by sometimes tedious discussions on the shape of the Council chamber, the offices allotted to delegations and other organisational matters. It was not before November that we could formally inaugurate our new premises. Apart from our continuing concern about the Yugoslav crisis we concentrated on the working arrangements with NATO and the European Union, our own operational capabilities, the relationship with the new democracies of Central Europe and - later in the year - on our input into the NATO summit of January 1994.

The first question we had to settle was the way we would go about our business. In London, the Permanent Council had agreed to weekly meetings on Tuesday mornings subject to confirmation by their successors in Brussels. That was not a foregone conclusion, as nothing procedural would prove easy in Brussels. The Permanent Representatives who were double-hatted with NATO objected that they had their luncheons on Tuesday, where they discussed informally and often in a brainstorming manner upcoming policy issues before they appeared on the formal agenda. Yet, I knew from my own experience that NATO ambassadors did not meet on Tuesday mornings as that time was reserved for the Political Committee. I attached some importance to WEU meeting prior to the North Atlantic Council's sessions on Wednesday, which would demonstrate our function as a European pillar and would allow for immediate reporting by the WEU presidency. On Thursday mornings the NATO Military Committee met, requiring the presence of our Military Delegates, most of whom were double-hatted. For a while it was impossible to agree on a fixed time for our Council and at the insistence of the UK and the Netherlands we had to convene a meeting on a Thursday afternoon. The issue was settled only after I had solicited the help of Manfred Wörner, who gladly agreed to liberate Tuesday mornings for the NATO ambassadors to go to WEU. The second practical question was whether to meet weekly or only every other week. I had assumed that the Council, which wanted to become the major policy body of WEU, would wish to meet every week, but the same two countries wondered

whether there would be sufficient business to conduct. That argument fizzled out when we had great difficulty in completing our agenda in several successive meetings, and we agreed the face-saving formula that we would not call meetings when the agenda did not warrant them. During my two years in Brussels I tried to make the Council meetings as substantial as possible, by raising questions going beyond the prepared agenda. Especially in the beginning, this seemed important to me to avoid WEU business becoming exclusively a bottom-up affair, without political guidance from the top. WEU did not have the informal luncheons where ambassadors were personally involved in an early stage of reflection and as a result we ran the risk that the Council Working Group (CWG) or other preparatory bodies were groping for direction. On several occasions I felt unhappy about documents emanating from the CWG, because they did not fit into a coherent political pattern and coordination with my deputy was not fully effective. To remedy that situation I organised some informal sessions and luncheons, but they did not match the intensive and systematic contacts among NATO ambassadors. The WEU Council had great difficulty in building an *esprit de corps*, which was exacerbated by its heterogeneous composition.



The author with NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner at the first joint NATO-WEU Council meeting on 8 June 1993. (Photo: NATO)

Relations with NATO developed much better than with the EU. Soon after our arrival Wörner and I had a joint session with our staffs and agreed on a liaison group chaired by NATO Assistant Secretary-General Von Moltke

and WEU Political Director Casardi. They met every three to four weeks and provided for an important channel of information and communication between the two secretariats. Member countries had a great advantage through their respective diplomatic reporting channels to stay informed of what was happening in the other organisation. The secretariats had a continuing problem of staying up to date with developments. The WEU Presidency could help us in our daily contacts to prepare for meetings; they also provided briefings on WEU activities as a standing item on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council. But there was no similar arrangement for NATO briefings in our sessions. At the highest level, there was full transparency. Manfred Wörner was invited to our ministerial meetings and I attended the NAC at ministerial and summit level.

With the European Union it was far more difficult. I personally attended the General Affairs Council only once when they were discussing Yugoslavia. I was invited to make statements at the CSCE and the conference on the Stability Pact but not asked to participate in EU discussions, even if they dealt with military matters. At first, the delayed entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty was used as an excuse. It is true that Ireland only started attending our Permanent Council as an observer after November 1993, but I doubt whether they would have objected to my presence. In any case, after the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union there was no improvement. The Political Committee of the Twelve did not develop a reflex, when discussing crisis management, whether there could be a role for WEU. Equally, our relationship with the European Commission was constrained by the fact that several countries did not want a role for the Commission in security questions. After some haggling the Commissioner concerned and the head of the Secretariat for European Political Cooperation (later CFSP), could attend as members of the delegation of the country holding the presidency of the Twelve, but that never satisfied the Commission. I had periodic contacts with Delors and Van den Broek, but was bound by the wording of the WEU Declaration at Maastricht which talked about cooperation with the EU Council Secretariat, but provided for the Commission only that it would be regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted. The full paragraph reads:

Arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the Common Foreign and Security Policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union.

On the operational side we made progress, at least on paper. Thanks to the conceptual thinking and perseverance of Colonel Gourmelen, we managed to get agreement on two documents in the Defence Representatives Group by mid-March. One on the organisation and functioning of

WEU in times of crisis and one on the command and control of WEU operations. The upshot was that the Planning Cell, as its name indicated, would plan the various operations but not execute them. Command would be planned and given to an operation commander, preferably using an existing national or multinational headquarters, and a field commander on the spot. Officers of the Planning Cell could advise the commanders when they got organised, but would not be responsible for the implementation of their plans. Two problems remained open. First, how the commanders would communicate with the WEU Council, which had no situation centre, no duty officer and nobody except the Secretary-General able to take responsibility for any instructions. In the early days, the Presidency mainly provided the function of interface with the Council and quietly settled many operational details, but organisationally this remained unsettled until in 1996 a point of contact within the Secretariat was arranged and a Situation Centre authorised.

The other problem concerned the contents of the plans. My ideal, as explained in many speeches, was a three-phased approach. First, an inventory of what would be needed for the various Petersberg missions in different parts of the world. Second, a round of member countries to see what they might contribute to these scenarios and third the composition of force packages on the basis of the information obtained and further discussions with the potential contributors. The force packages should also deal with arrangements for command, transport, logistics and communications. It sounded simple, but the reality was more complicated. Countries found it very difficult to define clearly which forces would in fact be made available to WEU. Most of them told the Planning Cell that in principle their entire forces could become FAWEU, which made its task very difficult. The next problem arose from the nations' reluctance to provide more information on their force structure than given in NATO's annual Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). We pointed out that the DPQ did not contain specific questions on capabilities for humanitarian, medical and peacekeeping operations, but it still proved very difficult to obtain further details. The most common answer was that these capabilities were subsumed in larger formations which reported to NATO. Finally, we had a political problem in drawing up contingency plans. Especially during the period prior to the Karlsruhe verdict on peacekeeping, Germany was negative on drafting scenarios which, if leaked, would cause embarrassment in the Bundestag. France was in favour of earmarking specific units for various contingencies. The UK saw the need for some detail in the planning but not for specifying particular units; that could be decided by the contributing country which had given a generic commitment of, say, a tank battalion or a field hospital. The debate on generic versus contingency planning has, as far as I know, never been fully concluded. In my time, I tried to bridge it by suggesting generic scenarios, i.e. not mentioning the area of operation by name but describing it in terms of location and distance, force capabilities of the

parties concerned and other characteristics. Unfortunately, the discussions with NATO did not go far enough to clarify the cases in which the US would prefer not to participate and therefore required European-led operations.



WEU-NATO crisis management in action during joint Council meeting. From left to right: Amadeo de Franchis, NATO Deputy Secretary-General; Holger Pfeiffer, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Policy and Planning; Hermann von Rihthofen, German Permanent Representative to NATO and WEU; US Vice-Admiral Norman Ray. (Photo: NATO)

When it became clear that NATO would convene a summit meeting, where the European defence identity would figure prominently, we discussed how WEU could make its contribution. At first, several countries, including France and Spain, favoured a separate paper which could figure on the agenda, but in the end we decided on conveying our ideas through our own communiqué after the ministerial meeting of 22 November. Thus, the Europeans would clarify their position well in advance of the summit without trying to dictate the course of deliberations in NATO. We started our discussions with a brainstorming session among the Permanent Representatives in September, followed by several meetings of the SWG. At that time, many ideas were floating around. The Clinton Administration was more relaxed about an ESDI and had coined the phrase of "separable but not separate" forces to underline the cohesion of NATO even if some forces

were being used outside its own framework. Intellectually, I had some difficulty with the slogan, because after the "separable" had been implemented the forces concerned would be "separate", but it was useful in implying the return of the forces to NATO after an ad hoc operation had been completed. The NATO summit would also be important in that it would come soon after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, which undoubtedly would raise questions about the future of the CFSP and a common defence policy. Finally, both NATO and the EU were engaged in a new debate on enlargement. The EU was concluding so-called Europe Agreements of association with the prospect of full membership. The European Council of Copenhagen in June had accepted that the associated states might become full members of the EU and would be offered a "structured relationship ... within the framework of a reinforced and extended multilateral dialogue and concertation on matters of common interest." It had also adopted as a joint action the proposal of French Prime Minister Balladur, to work towards a European Stability Pact, establishing good-neighbourly relations among the new democracies before they could enter the European Union. WEU had included nine countries in its Forum of Consultation and held periodic meetings with their ambassadors in Brussels. NATO, like the CSCE, had adopted a comprehensive approach and included all former adversaries and all republics of the former Soviet Union in its North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). As a result, NATO not only had to deal with Asian countries, but was also confronted with demands for a differentiated approach from the Central European States. Hungary had little in common with Tadjikistan and like its neighbours increasingly pressed for full membership. Yet, the comprehensive approach seemed hardly compatible with selective enlargement. Everybody was searching for ways to enhance relations in a meaningful manner.

1. The NATO Summit

The debate about our input into the NATO summit of 1994 reopened many of the old issues from the period prior to Maastricht, because again we dealt with our own future. The Luxembourg presidency had written a very cautious paper from which I tried to extract the major issues:

- the importance of the transatlantic link and how the WEU could strengthen it;
- the commitment of the Europeans to make, at least in relative terms, a larger contribution to the Alliance force structures and the ensuing reform of those structures;
- how to plan a concept for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement and to ensure effective WEU participation;
- enlargement of NATO, EU and WEU and their interaction;
- the longer-term relationship in the light of the 1996 IGC.

Ambassador Von Stein told us that Kinkel toyed with the idea of a new charter for the Alliance, including an invitation to all members of the EU to join NATO. In this way, the European identity within NATO could become more visible. But Germany remained sceptical about a division of labour between NATO and WEU. Guéhenno saw a need for the US Administration to be able to present to Congress a confirmation of the transatlantic link. On enlargement of NATO France had serious reservations; perhaps an increased role for the NACC was possible, but differentiation was rejected as it would lead to a three-speed NATO. Turkey made the obvious remark that if the Central Europeans were invited to join the EU, why not also the European members of NATO. Denmark advocated synchronisation of the enlargement processes of NATO and WEU, and the Netherlands had a preference for a European role within the NATO structure, possibly accompanied by a European caucus in NATO. John Roper pointed out that the State Department was asking for European ideas now. On enlargement they did not want to move too quickly and did not support the recent RAND paper by Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee⁵⁸ advocating early admission of a number of Central European countries. My own view was that we should concentrate on what we could do ourselves in operations where the US was not substantially participating and on how the Europeans could impact on NATO consultations. Already before Maastricht we had been talking about European inputs, but they never materialised. Paul Lever for the UK asked whether the Planning Cell could indicate concrete possibilities for operations which WEU could undertake, either alone or with some assistance from NATO assets. On enlargement he saw a dilemma in Washington. On the one hand they were reluctant to differentiate among NACC members, but on the other they felt that enlargement of the EU would be too slow to accommodate the need for assurances of the Central Europeans. In any case, the US had difficulty in mechanically following up EU enlargement with admission to NATO. WEU should not try to influence that discussion and should limit itself to our view of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Others found that too restrictive in the light of our role on behalf of the European Union. France, in particular, argued that we should not create a duplicate organisation parallel to NATO, but that Europeans could do more, using NATO structures and assets when available and useful, but not limited to NATO operations. Barry DeLongchamps was fairly concrete in advocating better cooperation between the various rapid reaction forces and in the development of new operational capabilities. In crises not involving the collective defence commitment it would be uncertain whether all Allies would be prepared to contribute equally. If the US were reluctant to do so, we had a planning and a consultation problem. WEU should be able to count on headquarters support for which planning should take place. France could envisage some sharing of headquarters with NATO, but for certain operations European capabilities - either national or multinational - could be used. Finally, he repeated my old question of how WEU should establish

common positions for introduction into NATO consultations.

Paul Lever followed another line of argument. The European Union was committed to further European security, as a broad concept involving political and economic aspects as well. A defence policy was still to be developed but, in any case, defence was about the possible use of military forces. The question whether the Europeans would ever conduct major military operations without US agreement or US action against European wishes he regarded as theoretical, but if Europe wanted to pursue the notion of "separable but not separate forces" it needed to provide a sufficient European core. WEU had undertaken some operations which involved military forces, especially naval forces, but others had been on the borderline between civil and military tasks. Perhaps it would be convenient for WEU to conduct para-military operations, but that remained to be decided. In this context the UK made clear that it did not see WEU as a forum for general political consultations nor as the overall operational arm of the European Union. Jean de Ruyt for Belgium put it differently: the European Union would direct the overall process of crisis management, but hopefully would transfer the implementation to WEU, which remained autonomous, but would fit into a framework of European structures.

We also had a discussion about what constituted NATO assets. I counted the headquarters and communication systems, the air defence system with its assigned forces, the AWACS aircraft and the standing naval forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Other assets most needed by WEU, such as long-range transport and real-time intelligence were US-owned and would not automatically become available under a NATO-WEU arrangement. Another question related to the continued presence in the headquarters of personnel from countries not participating in the actual operation. We assumed that it would be possible to keep them on, but we could not be sure. Later on, when the CJTF concept was further developed this assumption was confirmed, which considerably enhanced the credibility of the concept.

Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) was a product of imaginative American thinking about the requirements of the post-Cold War era. "Combined" meant multinational and "Joint" was inter-service. One of the brains behind the concept was Admiral Paul David Miller, who published his thoughts just before retiring as SACLANT in October 1994.⁵⁹ He regarded CJTF as both a process and a structure necessary to operate in an environment which would be increasingly multi-service, multi-agency and multinational. His focus obviously was to adapt NATO to new circumstances. He argued that NATO was restrained by a Cold War legacy of prescribed boundaries, and limited by a defensive mindset. Multilateral responses to humanitarian crises or regional conflicts were characterised by an ad hoc pooling of forces from nations willing to participate and, not surprisingly, problems arose. A CJTF would have the best chances of success if it was formed around the nucleus of a pre-selected and pre-trained

command element. Thus, the first step in developing it should be the selection of a pool of senior commanders and staff officers who would be groomed to form the command element of individual task forces. A key notion was centralised planning but decentralised execution. In NATO that could mean calling forward national contributions to the extent their governments would be politically prepared to make them available. Admiral Miller used the transformation of his US command as an example. As Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) he had been put in charge of most of the forces based in the continental United States. His position was no longer reserved for the US Navy and, in fact, his successor would be a general of the US Marine Corps, John Sheehan. USACOM, as it was to be called, was able to provide operational linkages across the four services and to form "employment packages" for any category of mission. Paul Miller impressed me by his dynamism and forward thinking. Shortly before my own departure as Secretary-General, I attended his retirement ceremony in Norfolk. On the European Security and Defence Identity he was prepared to go quite far, as long as duplication of effort and command arrangements could be avoided. His monograph suggested two geographic Major NATO Commanders (MNCs): a US-Canada Group at SACLANC and a Western European Group at SHAPE. The NATO headquarters in Brussels would continue to serve as the political and military centre of the Alliance, and the MNCs would operate jointly for Alliance-wide challenges and separately for region-specific issues. His successor, General Sheehan, went a step further in suggesting a Resource Command, but his ideas, too, were considered unduly radical.

In Luxembourg in November 1993, the WEU ministerial communiqué talked loftily of the definition of a global concept of security which could now be given concrete form in accordance with the aims and conditions of the Maastricht Treaty. The development of WEU's operational capabilities would enable European partners and Allies more effectively to shoulder their defence response capabilities. Ministers reaffirmed the fundamental importance for European security and stability of a strong transatlantic partnership and welcomed the continued engagement of North American Allies in Europe, through their full and active participation in the Atlantic Alliance, including the presence of substantial military forces. They also reaffirmed their belief that the development of the ESDI would be an essential component of a new and strengthened transatlantic partnership and contribute to the adaptation of the Alliance to the new challenges. In more concrete terms:

- Ministers reaffirmed their decision to intensify their coordination on Alliance issues representing an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance.

- In future crises, WEU and NATO should hold consultations, including as necessary through joint Council meetings on whether and how they might cooperate.
- Ministers looked to the NATO summit to endorse the principle that WEU should be able to use not only European Allies' forces and resources but also collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance, such as communication systems, command facilities and headquarters.



The author at a North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in December 1993 with Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana, who later became Secretary-General of NATO. (Photo: NATO)

At the beginning of the session, Manfred Wörner had said that a greater European role was a pre-condition for NATO's vitality, but also that transatlantic relations were in a rather critical state, requiring utmost care. He underlined the need to come to a clear understanding on future NATO-WEU relations based on the necessity of consultations in the Alliance. A lack of consultation would do harm to the US commitment, but a willingness to consult would make sense only if WEU positions remained flexible from the outset. On practical cooperation, the Combined Joint Task Force concept, which had not yet been decided, would enhance NATO's own capability for crisis management, but could also provide for the needs of WEU. Finally, Wörner pleaded for compatible views on the future enlargement of both organisations.

On all these points the Luxembourg communiqué provided sufficient substance to enter the meeting of the NAC at foreign ministers' level on 2

December, which preceded the NATO summit. After a brief plenary session ministers went into restricted session in which Wörner immediately gave me the floor to explain the position of WEU as developed ten days earlier. In doing so, my main point was that making available NATO assets to our operations would be the only way to avoid duplication of command and other arrangements in WEU. Warren Christopher responded positively. The US fully supported a strong European security and defence identity which he saw as a logical consequence of the process of European integration. NATO should offer the use of its common assets based on the principle of "separable but not separate". The NATO consultation process should continue to generate views on all topical security issues, but he did not regard them as implying a possible veto on the use of Alliance assets. A decision by the NAC was necessary to safeguard the cohesion of Alliance defences, but CJTF would be tailored for actions by both NATO and WEU. Most of the other ministers made only passing reference to the ESDI, except for Poos as Chairman-in-Office of WEU and Juppé. Poos used my terminology of WEU as the "operational arm" of the European Union. The French minister made certain that his colleagues understood the intention of the WEU communiqué as a contribution to the forthcoming NATO texts. WEU surfaced briefly again when Wörner spoke in somewhat veiled terms about the need for consultation before taking initiatives on important but not yet agreed issues. Juppé thought that Wörner meant work at WEU and stated that we did not need prior agreement in NATO before WEU had an internal discussion on a particular subject. Poos added that WEU could take autonomous decisions but before doing so should consult with NATO through its Presidency at the two secretariats. Wörner then hastened to add that he had not meant WEU as such but certain initiatives by individual countries. Apparently, he meant the Franco-German talks in Warsaw, but did not say so and the discussion passed on to additional funding for the Partnership for Peace programme.

The NATO discussion was primarily devoted to relations with Central and Eastern Europe and the possibility of enlargement. Christopher wanted the summit to make clear that the Alliance was open to new members but also that actual extension would be an evolutionary process. Kinkel felt that we should honour our frequent past appeals to the Central Europeans to join the Western organisation and could not leave them in mid-air, even if some of their security concerns were somewhat exaggerated. Hurd was cautious on granting them a right of consultation, as this was bound to create further expectations. Claes and Poos wanted to concentrate for the time being on making PfP as substantial as possible, thus avoiding the need for an early decision on enlargement. Wörner was concerned about an expected Russian initiative to make the NACC independent from NATO, especially on military matters and peacekeeping, and sought guidance. Kinkel wanted to reply immediately that it was a bad idea, cutting the lifeline of NACC but Juppé advised listening to the Russian rationale first.

Christopher was cautious about terminating any discussion with the Russians in view of their coming elections, but Kooijmans doubted whether the Central Europeans would be as cautious about rejecting the Russian ideas. Wörner left it there. He had alerted ministers about the issue and knew enough about their basically negative reactions. I do not know what he told the Russians, but their position shifted to strengthening the CSCE and creating some kind of European Security Council.

While the NAC was positive on the European identity it failed to make progress on peacekeeping. The subject was delegated to a working group but was never substantially discussed among ministers. France maintained its opposition to a permanent NATO representation in the CSCE and did not accept a NATO nameplate at the table in Vienna. That position would have been difficult to maintain as the ministerial conference just concluded in Rome had as usual invited the Secretaries-General of NATO, WEU and the Council of Europe to attend and to address them. But nobody wanted to fight over this point when more important issues were discussed in preparation for the summit. Moreover, in CSCE the principles governing peacekeeping had been sufficiently defined and approved by ministers. In shorthand, they included respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, consent of the parties, impartiality, a multinational character, a clear mandate, transparency, an integral link to a political process of conflict resolution and a plan for orderly withdrawal. While useful in themselves, a lingering doubt remained about their applicability to Russian actions in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Nobody wished to give Moscow any special rights there, but the enthusiasm about sending forces there was equally negative. The best option seemed to be to try to combine a CSCE monitor mission with a Russian force of interposition, enabling the West to express an opinion about the conduct of the operation.

On 14 December, we played host to a Joint Council meeting with NATO. Wörner was ill and replaced by his deputy Amadeo de Franchis. A short word of welcome was filmed by the media. These sessions were important as a demonstration of transparency towards the US and Canada, but also to underline that WEU counted all European members of NATO around its table and therefore could represent the European pillar of the Alliance. The most substantial contributions came from the two German ambassadors, Hartmann in WEU, also bilateral ambassador to Belgium, and Richthofen in NATO. Hartmann advocated closer consultation to agree in an early stage of a crisis who was able and willing to act. If WEU was engaged in peacekeeping, perhaps together with some countries of Central Europe, it should keep NATO continually informed. Richthofen continued and said that the Alliance should be open to new members, but that he did not envisage that the summit would mention any candidates by name, nor set precise criteria for entry. Guéhenno for France found it difficult to make a precise list of European and American responsibilities, but warned against treating WEU only as a subsidiary of NATO. The CJTF concept could make

a positive contribution to NATO-WEU relations, but needed clarification. WEU could not be a solution of last resort either and had some capabilities of its own, such as the Planning Cell and the Eurocorps, which needed to be taken into consideration as well. The Canadian PermRep, Bartleman, explained that his country wanted to remain "in the loop" when European security was discussed. He supported shared use of NATO assets, but wanted further study, especially of the financial aspects. Mevik, for Norway, favoured an inclusive approach to Central Europe covering the three Baltic countries. John Weston spoke out against any fetishism relating to existing texts. The WEU Luxembourg declaration was excellent, but did not have to be used verbatim by the summit. Equally, the UK supported an enhanced status for the Central Europeans, but other things should be made to work as well: WEU had to feed positions into NATO, to consider military options, elaborate the use of NATO assets and develop the role of the associate members.

Ambassador Hunter repeated Secretary Christopher's point that there should not be a veto in NATO on European operations, but nevertheless a NATO decision was needed when its assets were to be used. This use would come as the result of consultations within the Alliance rather than through unilateral WEU decisions. On the part of the Luxembourg Declaration calling on WEU to "introduce joint positions agreed there into the process of consultation in the Alliance" Hunter made an important remark. The US supported the right of its members to consult among themselves, but for NATO to remain effective there need be timely and open discussions of security issues in Alliance fora. NATO consultations should not be delayed because WEU had not yet held consultations or had not yet been able to reach a consensus. The US also would expect that common WEU positions would not be so rigid that they could not be open to further development or modification in the course of discussions within the Alliance. Two important points, which fitted in very well with my own views over the past years. Somewhat surprisingly for a country which was only an observer in WEU, Danish Ambassador Ole Bierring, was very positive on Joint Council meetings and wanted to make them a routine feature. He also envisaged joint sessions at committee level and proposed that their decision sheets be exchanged, as a first step towards closer cooperation.

The NATO summit started on 10 January with a speech by Secretary-General Wörner in plenary. About WEU he said, speaking in French:

With a stronger Europe and a European Union capable to act, the responsibilities could be more equally shared between the members of the Alliance without compromising the role of NATO as principal instrument of European security.




The author "meets the press" on entering NATO headquarters for the NATO summit on 10 January 1994. (Photo: NATO)

In restricted session the first speaker was President Mitterrand, who put his prepared statement aside and recalled how for many years European security had been a matter of "we and us" but now had become a matter of "we and the others". He had no problem with approving the prepared texts, but they had to be completed by concrete action. Mitterrand understood that NATO was moving outside its traditional frontiers, but wanted to know by July what that meant and the same went for CJTF. He called WEU "a beginning of an identity" which could offer a special status of association to those countries which had concluded a Europe Agreement with the EU. On Yugoslavia he saw an urgent need to protect our forces, 6,000 of which were French and sighed that, over there, apparently everybody preferred death to living.

Clinton started out by saying that the security of the North Atlantic region was vital to the security of the US, at which moment Christopher gave a big yawn. The President saw creeping instability as the new threat and if we did not meet the new challenges then, once on the road, we would face the old challenges again. Here a distinguished-looking black American butler brought him a big mug of coffee. He continued to argue that our approach to the East should be one of "we are committed to your destiny and will work towards your success". Why should we draw a new line if our best future was a democratic Russia and a democratic Ukraine? Do not foreclose that possibility. Partnership for Peace would not answer all the questions but would give us the time to reach out and to build a future which would break completely with the past. To Europe the US pledged to

maintain roughly 100,000 military personnel. Its new security environment required new responses and the US Administration supported the Maastricht Treaty, the move towards CFSP, the reinforcement of WEU and making NATO assets available to WEU for actions in which the US would not be involved. On Yugoslavia, Clinton was prepared to talk about hard decisions. He was ready to support a role for NATO in a peace settlement freely arrived at by the parties, but the forces should clearly be under NATO command. NATO's credibility was at stake and if we did not uphold it, we would notice the consequences in other fields as well.



Plenary session in progress at the NATO summit of January 1994. From left to right: US Secretary of State Christopher (behind him US Ambassador Hunter); President Clinton; NATO Assistant Secretaries-General Beard, Admiral van Foreest and Tony Craig; the author; NATO Deputy Secretary-General de Franchis; NATO Secretary-General Wörner; NATO Assistant Secretary-General von Moltke. (Photo: NATO)

Kohl and Major came next, both agreeing that NATO could not yet state a date for enlargement, after which Clinton got another mug of coffee and soon thereafter a glass of water, and Christopher gave an even more telling yawn. My comic sense was provoked heavily that day by seeing very tired foreign ministers everywhere. When the Italian Prime Minister, Ciampi, spoke his Foreign Minister, Andreatta, was fast asleep. Obviously, they were not accustomed to keeping quiet at NATO meetings. Very few speeches referred to the notion of "separable but not separate forces". I noted only the Danish and Portuguese prime ministers doing so. Kohl made an explicit statement that in future WEU had the possibility to take actions of its own which could include the use of NATO resources. He welcomed the continued presence of US forces in Europe and the support of European integration, an objective which the US had always pursued. Major asked more questions than he gave answers, including how NATO should organise itself for new missions and adjust to the emerging ESDI. On Yugoslavia he questioned what more we could do to exert pressure on all parties to reach a political settlement, how we could get our convoys through and how long we could sustain our efforts. The Canadian Prime Minister, Chrétien, signalled the problem that our troops were being endangered without Canada having the opportunity to defend them. In this no-peace situation we were sliding into the role of an "armed Red Cross". The Belgian Prime Minister, Dehaene, did not see a military solution in Bosnia, but was prepared to raise the pressure by considering air strikes and strengthening the sanctions. For Turkey Mrs Çiller was much more critical and reproached her colleagues that their collective will had failed. Today we had new games to which the old rules applied no longer. The Netherlands Prime Minister, Lubbers, took this up by comparing the past to a chess-board with predictability. He also went back to the Four Freedoms enunciated by President Roosevelt, which included the freedom from fear. His country was prepared to accept the consequences of its presence in Bosnia and to do more than we were doing today. Clearly, it was no longer a peacekeeping operation, but the important thing was to deliver what we had promised, which was more than only protecting our own forces.

The summit declaration was not a masterpiece of drafting. It talked about strengthening the European pillar in five different paragraphs. Nevertheless, I regarded it as close to a revolution in NATO-WEU relations. The Alliance's "organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this (strengthening)". "In future contingencies, NATO and WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies." And "we therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy ... Better European coordination and planning will also strengthen the European pillar and the Alliance itself." Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are

further developed "will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence and other tasks". The declaration endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. "The Council, with the advice of the NATO military authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU."

The text contained some ingenious wording, such as the word consultations in the NAC when NATO assets would be made available, thus avoiding the word "decision", which would have cast doubt on their availability in practice. Equally interesting was the link made between WEU and the CFSP. Literally, there was a dichotomy, for not all participants in the CFSP were European Allies. It was also doubtful whether all members of WEU really regarded their action as emanating from the CFSP, but nobody had raised objections when the summit declaration was drafted. In any case, the text was an argument for those who advocated a merger of WEU and EU. The outcome also seemed to be progress in the direction of the double-hatting of headquarters, not only of forces. I knew that some military commanders had doubts about this, as it might obscure the chain of command, but to me it had always seemed the best way to avoid duplication and waste of money. The big disappointment about the declaration was its very slow implementation. It would take till June 1996 to carry CJTF forward and even then some doubt lingered on. President Mitterrand was not able to move substantially, because he did not want to be seen as re-entering NATO through the backdoor. In SHAPE the US commanders were equally reluctant for fear of losing all control over their assets once these were made available to others. Fresh progress would be made only after France had reviewed its relationship with NATO.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) invitation issued by the summit was to prove a great success. It was uniform in form but different in practice, tailor-made for each individual partner. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual state, the programme would work towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations, and others as might be agreed. This list came very close to resembling the WEU Petersberg missions, but omitted peace-enforcement. I was somewhat sceptical about the emphasis on peacekeeping in all international organisations dealing with security. It was getting very crowded in this field, while it was much more urgent to be able to deal with crises where there was no peace. But the objectives of PfP would be useful for everybody, regardless of whether or not they would ultimately become full members of NATO. This was most obvious to the

Ukraine, but also to others. It was a pity that PfP was not allowed to develop on its own and was overtaken so quickly by the renewed debate on full membership, creating again the dividing lines which PfP aimed to avoid. Of course, PfP remained a Sixteen + One relationship for each individual partner, but also involved consultations "if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security". Multilateral discussions would continue to take place in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, but under PfP any partner could ask for consultations without the involvement of a threatening neighbour.

Throughout the West we faced the dilemma of wanting to bring Russia into the transatlantic concert of nations, whilst at the same time containing her. As long as the Soviet succession was still in suspense there was a case for a combination between cooperation and containment, saving Russia from her own temptations. Overt containment would provoke Russian reaction and covert measures would lead to inconsistencies with the professed absence of threats and enemies. In any case, containment would not work well against intra-state repression. Part of the problem was the psychological trauma of the Russian mind, used to thinking in terms of power and the shift in the correlation of forces and now confronted with independent and potentially hostile republics of the former Soviet Union instead of the glacis of the Warsaw Pact. At a Dolder meeting in Zürich soon after the summit we discussed the alternatives. US National Security Adviser, Tony Lake, had published his advocacy of the enlargement of just democracy, but democracy was no guarantee against fervent nationalism. A division into spheres of influence would be unjust to those influenced and very difficult in a period of flux and transition. Multilateralism would give expression to everybody but left open the question of effectiveness. The world had become safer, but not to all and after a strategy of deterrence there was now a need for stabilisation and nation-building. Obviously, that could not be done by NATO alone.

2. Elaborating Combined Joint Task Forces

After the NATO summit the immediate task for the WEU Council was to develop machinery for the follow-up on Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The Luxembourg presidency suggested a second Council Working Group, which looked like the politico-military working group suggested earlier by the UK, but rejected by the Council. Germany and Italy had been opposed because they wanted to maintain the ad hoc groups for crisis management, bringing people from capitals and allowing a larger role for the Presidency. In the end, the politico-military group was created for the specific purpose of the CJTF. Much later, at the Ministerial in Lisbon on 15 May 1995, it would be given a wider remit. The DRG representation was considered to be at too low a level and the MiDels were exclusively military. In order to avoid sensitivities on the side of the military delegates

or their deputies, who did not want to be relegated to the level of the CWG, I tried to chair the group myself as often as possible. Early March the Council had authorised us to evaluate in-depth, and in relation to possible operations of WEU acting as ESDI, its operational needs, in order to list the capacities and means needed from NATO. The actual wording of the mandate was even more complicated. Progress was difficult as France disputed the proposal from the Secretariat to establish direct contact with SHAPE. Papers from the UK and Belgium, later merged, provided a good basis for substantial work. We also made a comprehensive list of all NATO assets, many of which did not qualify for a CJTF. Obviously, the headquarters, communications, and AWACS aircraft would be most useful in addition to US assets in the fields of real-time intelligence and long-range transport. As to the headquarters the UK assumed that personnel in a CJTF staff should stay on also if their country of origin did not participate in the operation, but France wanted to leave this for a later discussion. During the CHODs meeting in Luxembourg on 29 April, Admiral Lanxade told me that he did not see many cases where CJTF might be useful, because NATO planning made them far too large and also because the composition did not match the participating nations. Two weeks later I asked SACEUR, who paid me a courtesy visit, about the size of his planned units. General Joulwan complained about the lack of guidance he received from the North Atlantic Council. Therefore, he had focused on an operation of 50,000 men as the one he had planned for Bosnia but did not materialise. In concrete terms he reckoned on 2,000 men in the CJTF staff, including some 800 communications staff and 400 support staff. My own advice was to work on modules which could be separated according to the needs of the operation, but Joulwan hesitated. If he provided a headquarters element he wanted it to function well and the present headquarters for Deny Flight at Vicenza was too chaotic to serve as an example.

By the end of April we had managed to find an arrangement through which the NATO International Staff and the International Military Staff could brief our politico-military group about their work. They made the obvious point that CJTF should not detract from the collective defence capability and should proceed from existing resources and added that it should strengthen the links with WEU and involve all Allies. In the interim report for the Spring ministerial meeting, four options would be listed for the headquarters function:

- establish a new headquarters exclusively for CJTF;
- nominate an established headquarters for the most demanding scenario;
- nominate an established headquarters for a representative scenario;
- adopt a modular approach for a general scenario which would require additional training.

Our visitors confirmed that they were looking at the headquarters for a corps formation, i.e. more than one division, supported by air and naval operations, in a distant area where no host nation support would be available. This resulted in fairly large numbers. The challenge for the NATO planners was more in the "Combined" (multinational) than in the "Joint" (inter-service) aspect of the operation. Multinational operations outside our own territory would pose new problems which were quite different from traditional planning for collective defence. In answer to questions they confirmed that for smaller operations a modular approach would be feasible. In summarising the discussion, I listed the following questions:

- what kind of scenarios did we envisage?
- what assets are involved?
- when would WEU need these assets?
- how would NATO make them available? WEU would need a reasonable probability that the assets would become available as planned.
- what interface between NATO and WEU?
- what joint planning for developing scenarios and their implementation?
- which reciprocal representation in committees?

In the meantime, the DRG had discussed a paper by the Planning Cell on filling the strategic gap in command and control between the WEU Council and the operation commander. Five possible options emerged:

1. the Council Working Group together with the (augmented) Planning Cell;
2. the Ministry of Defence of the nation providing the operational headquarters (OHQ);
3. augmenting this Ministry of Defence with a WEU politico-military group in the chain of command;
4. modifying the OHQ by capping it with a strategic commander and a politico-military group;
5. work with an ad hoc group as before.

None of the options was fully adequate. The ad hoc group did not sit continuously and could not provide for the day-to-day contacts with the OHQ. The Presidency could do so from its capital, but that left the Council out of the loop. The same applied to option 3. The Planning Cell had no task once the operation was under way except an advisory role to the Secretary-General and, if so desired, to the Council; it had prepared the directives and proposed the OHQ and at best delegated some officers to the OHQ. Option 2 would be useful for an advisory function. At the next session of the DRG Germany proposed a group in Brussels consisting of the deputy permanent representatives and the military delegates assisted by the Planning Cell, meeting four times a year and as often as necessary during

a crisis. This did not solve the crucial question how the WEU Council would communicate with the OHQ or for smaller operations directly with the force commander. During my tenure the last substantial discussion of the issue took place at the CHODs meeting in The Hague on 3 November 1994. Together with the Netherlands presidency I had formulated three questions. The first one asked whether there was a military need for more coordination. This question was necessary as Belgium had taken the view that our existing document about the designation of operation and field commanders was sufficient. Both General Naumann and Field Marshall Inge stated clearly that ad hoc arrangements were insufficient for a complicated operation. As a result General Van den Breemen could conclude that there was a definite military need for an interface between the Council and the operation commander. The second point was that this interface should be of a combined politico-military nature, and the third was that it should have a permanent structure, which had to be made operational as the situation required. Admiral Lanxade suggested a mandate by the Council to a limited group consisting of the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of the presidency country and the Director of the Planning Cell, but it was obvious that no consensus existed yet. The problem was not solved for some time and was terminated at least provisionally in 1996 by the appointment of a contact point in the Secretariat who could always be reached by the operation commander.

The question of the nature of WEU planning proved almost as cumbersome. The Planning Cell drew up some lists of requirements for humanitarian, evacuation and peacekeeping operations but never reached the stage of force packages. It also made a generic plan for an observer mission, which elicited little response. Only Germany commented that in this case there was a need for a lead-nation to take charge. In October 1994, the Planning Cell produced a Strategic Mobility Study analysing the requirements for moving a division-size force for peacekeeping or peacemaking, or a brigade-size force for evacuation over distances varying from 3,500 to 6,000 or 8,500 km. Its conclusion was that the operation was feasible, but that the cost would be reduced significantly if the Future Large Aircraft would be available for the transport. The planning debate was overshadowed by the CJTF initiative and by an Italian proposal to establish a rapid reaction force for humanitarian intervention.

At the G-7 summit in Naples in July 1994, Italy had proposed a task force for rapid intervention, whenever an unarmed population was put in danger. The idea was consistent with the Petersberg missions, but it was difficult to see what we could do in addition to the work already in hand. The immediate reason for the initiative was the massacre in Rwanda, but its rationale extended to natural and ecological disasters as well as man-made catastrophes. The Planning Cell was asked to elaborate specific contingency plans for intervention in geographical sectors where crises with humanitarian implications would seem likely. It made the best of it and

requested details of national planning in Somalia in order to draft a generic plan for humanitarian action under military protection. At the same time it worked on evacuation planning, which had to be implemented at even shorter notice than a humanitarian operation. General Roux defined the timespan as the period between the departure of the last civilian aircraft and the beginning of large-scale fighting. For most distant operations there would be a need for a forward operating base from which the operation could be mounted. Again we touched on the problem of whether to plan for specific areas or in more generic terms with parameters for distance and access. It seemed best to limit any contingency plan to the generic plan plus a decision about the participating countries, the size of the operation and the relevant technical aspects. In this limited form, Council approval might be more easily forthcoming. Germany, where the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe had just allowed (on 12 July) the participation of the Bundeswehr in NATO and WEU operations aimed at implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, was more positive and could agree with planning on a sub-regional basis. After the summer vacation we made some progress and agreed on the pre-identification of national capabilities for humanitarian intervention, thus circumventing the resistance to the earmarking of specific units.

On CJTF, the ministerial communiqué at the Kirchberg in Luxembourg on 9 May 1994 contained the following paragraph:

Ministers underlined the importance of coordination with the Alliance on the implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate military capabilities so as to ensure their effective use where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under its command.

The last few words were the most important. If an operation was conducted under WEU auspices and NATO assets were made available they would come under WEU command. We assumed that if the US was prepared to participate in an operation it would be conducted by NATO, but if not it should be European-led.

During the North Atlantic Council meeting in Istanbul on 9 June 1994, Foreign Minister Juppé accepted three objectives for the CJTF report for the December session. It should give NATO more flexibility since the structures for collective defence were not automatically applicable to other missions; it should take the emerging ESDI into consideration and it should improve cooperation between NATO and WEU. Following this statement, work in our politico-military group proceeded smoothly and its paper on "criteria and modalities for effective use by WEU of CJTFs" was approved the day before the Joint WEU-NATO Council meeting on 29 June. We assumed that each NATO CJTF headquarters would comprise a small nucleus which, when detached under WEU command, would be augmented to reflect

national force contributions. The decision to operate a CJTF under WEU command would be the result of a WEU Council decision to make use of this asset in carrying out an operation, and of a NAC decision following consultations with WEU (if necessary through joint council meetings) to make it available to WEU for this specific operation. Overall control of the CJTF headquarters would remain with the WEU Council through the operation commander. WEU would use the already existing, preplanned and standardised rules and procedures available in NATO and NATO would be informed on a regular basis of the progress of the operation. In case of a substantive change in the objectives or conditions of the operation, NATO would be consulted. In WEU terminology a CJTF headquarters would be a force headquarters, reporting to the WEU operation commander, who would provide information to the NATO military authorities and develop close coordination concerning support arrangements. We assumed that personnel in the core staff not belonging to WEU countries would remain in the CJTF although it should be possible to decide on an ad hoc basis on changes, especially in the command functions. Associate members of WEU would be able to participate, on the same footing as member states, in decisions on the headquarters and forces concerned as well as in their composition and the political control of the operation. Allowance should be made for the participation of associate partners in actual peacekeeping operations and exercises. Consequently, the WEU force could be made up of or be supported by:

- Forces Answerable to WEU
- NATO and/or WEU collective assets
- other NATO-assigned assets
- other national contributions from WEU or non-WEU states.

The concluding paragraph stated that, to facilitate timely transfer agreements would have to be drawn up in advance with NATO defining the political and practical modalities connected with this process.

At the Joint Council of 29 June, I summarised our paper. On the whole, the reception was positive, except for Turkey which feared that associate members were given the same treatment as associate partners, *quod non*. It was a first input from the European side and not our last word. Several ambassadors underlined the necessity of our politico-military group and NATO's Provisional Planning Contingency Group working closely together on the remaining questions. US Ambassador Hunter thought the paper helpful but in general wanted more transparency before decisions were taken; he was in favour of regular joint council meetings.

The Pol-Mil Group, which met on the first day of the Netherlands presidency, concluded that the Joint Council had gone well and that we were on the right track. In NATO there were still differences concerning the concept of CJTF, primarily on the role of the Military Committee and

SACEUR. People still found it difficult to think outside traditional structures, but as the Netherlands suggested, it might be possible to draw upon certain aspects of the integrated military framework and not necessarily at the top level. For the time being, however, we had to wait for a reaction from NATO. The meeting of the Pol-Mil Group also had to deal with a left-over from mid-May when the Netherlands had taken a tough stance on parallelism in our contacts with NATO and the EU and had blocked a paper on the links with the EU until the contacts with NATO had also been improved, including the question of reciprocal presence. The UK had supported a proposal to give a mandate to the CWG, but France found it strange to hold up a paper on EU because one wanted to change an already existing document on NATO. Hartmann for Germany had reacted particularly strongly and accused the Netherlands of a one-sided interpretation of Maastricht; he did not agree with the need for strict parallelism and rejected delegation of this issue to the CWG. Nobody else supported the Netherlands. Nevertheless, it proved possible in subsequent meetings to draft a simple mandate to provide a detailed inventory of relations between WEU and NATO and to make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of our relations with NATO. On 1 July France took a constructive line in favour of joint meetings between our Pol-Mil Group and the PPCG of NATO. The UK agreed but saw these meetings covering a wider field than CJTF; they suggested a role for the Presidency in keeping the Secretariats on both sides fully informed and also made the point that each organisation should be able to meet on its own. This was picked up by France, which added that in WEU we should be able to talk *entre nous*; observers from NATO could be present, but not if they wrote formal reports to the Sixteen. In some cases our observers in NATO meetings could make inputs on the basis of agreed positions but at the Council level this should be done by the representative of the country having the WEU presidency. Hartmann was in favour of complete reciprocity of observers, but I cautioned against that. It should be possible for WEU to meet on its own. Veenendaal believed that NATO would understand that position. He thought the best solution would be a formula allowing cross-representation on issues of common interests, unless a specific exception was made.

The outcome of this discussion was a proposal by Presidency and Secretariat to establish a regular frequency of joint sessions of the two Councils at the end of each quarter. This would avoid the quarrel of timing which had bothered us in the past: neither organisation wanted a situation in which it was seen to be influenced by the other in its decision-making. A regular exchange of classified information should be established as soon as the WEU-NATO security agreement had been concluded. This materialised only in May 1996. Such an agreement would facilitate cooperation particularly in the exchange and intelligence fields. And the frequency of SACEUR's briefings to the WEU Council should be increased

to once per presidency. The chairman of the Military Committee should be invited on an ad hoc basis.

In addition to our general paper on CJTF which had been handed over in the Joint Council, we had also given NATO our list of NATO assets in a meeting of the liaison group. We only needed a general indication whether in principle these assets could be made available. Modalities and costs could be discussed later. Our own work should now focus on the cases in which WEU would need additional assets. I requested the Planning Cell to do so on the basis of a couple of scenarios. The MilDels had mentioned the Purple Nova exercises which already contained a number of different cases. Germany objected that these were focusing only on the command and control aspects and, as far as WEU was concerned, on the lack of an interface between Council and operation commander. Nevertheless, I thought we could screen the Purple Nova experience to form an opinion on what WEU would need most. The UK made the useful suggestion to develop standing agreements for access to NATO assets. This could be done without a precise definition in advance of what was needed and filled in when it was decided to commence a WEU operation. In this manner considerable time could be saved.

A breakthrough on CJTF only came at the Berlin meeting of the NAC on 3 June 1995. The French government, under President Chirac, had changed its position fundamentally and accepted the utility of the NATO command structure for crisis management. Already under President Mitterrand, the French Defence Minister was unhappy about being the only one in the Alliance not able to participate in the discussion how to conduct the new missions. During the Kuwait war France had realised the impossibility of conducting distant operations on its own. The extent of its turnaround is still not fully clear but could be considerable. Paris seemed to abandon the notion of a European caucus within NATO and instead concentrated on "Europeanising" the military command. SACEUR himself could remain an American general because of his role in tying US nuclear and conventional power to European security, but below him most major positions should be filled by Europeans.

On 5 December 1995, France had announced in the NAC that it would resume its role in the appropriate NATO military bodies which did not encroach on its sovereignty - meetings of defence ministers and the Military Committee. In an article in *NATO Review*, which appeared before the Berlin meeting,⁶⁰ the French Defence Minister, Charles Millon, had explained his views on reinforcing the political control and the European dimension within the Alliance. On the one hand he argued that the political scheme for European integration necessarily meant that security and defence matters would increasingly be dealt with at European Union level. This should, however, not find expression in a binary Alliance, but in future the Europeans must be able to prepare and undertake to commit a European force, supported where necessary by the resources and structures existing

within NATO. Therefore, the Europeanisation of the Alliance had to be effective not only when an operation was actually mounted, but also in time of peace. "The NATO chain of command must be able to function in a European mode to ensure that, when the time comes, we are in a position to use the means necessary for the command of an operation under European control." Millon envisaged different types of CJTFs, structured around a NATO, European or national nucleus (which would give a role to the European multinational forces such as the Eurocorps).

In restructuring the NATO command structure the bone of contention became CINCSOUTH, hitherto always a US admiral. France did not claim the job for itself but for Europe. It was supported by the German Defence Minister as to the principle, although Germany had no stationed forces in the southern region. In the new streamlined military organisation there would be two major subordinate commands under SACEUR, one for the north under German command as AFCENT had been in the past. The dividing line between North and South would run through the middle of France, which therefore would be represented in both commands and presumably rotate for the top job in the South. The other Allies tried to stay away from the Franco-American dispute, for it was difficult to take sides. On the one hand, everybody was prepared to see France occupy important posts in the chain of command, but AFSOUTH seemed a doubtful choice. In the South the US presence had been the glue which kept the Alliance together. Not so much because of the US Sixth Fleet, which came under the American hat of CINCSOUTH anyway and could have functioned as well under his deputy or directly under SACEUR. It was particularly the politico-military role of CINCSOUTH which kept the Greeks and Turks from escalating their problems and it would be difficult to see a European playing that role as effectively.

The Berlin communiqué put the CJTF firmly in the centre of NATO's approach for assembling forces for contingency operations and organising their command within the Alliance. Flexible arrangements would be developed to allow for a variety of missions, taking into account national decisions on participation in each operation. A new concept was coined to describe NATO's ability to mount non-Article 5 operations: the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions. Its exact meaning was not immediately clear as the same paragraph also took the contingency of WEU-led operations a step further. Paragraph 7 contained the following wording:

Further, the Alliance will support the development of ESDI within NATO by conducting at the request of, and in coordination with the WEU, military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions identified by the WEU. On the basis of political guidance to be provided by the WEU Council and the North Atlantic Council, such planning would, at a minimum:

- prepare relevant information on objectives, scope and participation for illustrative WEU missions;
- identify requirements for planning and exercising of command elements and forces for illustrative WEU-led operations;
- develop appropriate plans for submission through the Military Committee and North Atlantic Council to the WEU for review and approval.

NATO and WEU should agree on arrangements for implementing such plans. The NAC will approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, keep itself informed on their use through monitoring with the advice of the NATO military authorities and through regular consultations with the WEU Council, and keep their use under review.

The Permanent Council was tasked to develop arrangements for the identification and release for use by WEU of NATO assets and for the conduct of consultations with the NAC and the use of NATO assets and capabilities, including NATO monitoring of the assets. It still sounded very complicated and obviously much remained to be done. The political deadlock appeared broken, but that had also seemed to be the case two and a half years earlier at the NATO summit. By mentioning WEU 29 times, the Berlin communiqué seemed to put old quarrels behind us, but it was a bit too much of a good thing. Was it too Machiavellian to suppose that in doing so the US and the UK wanted to make sure that WEU would remain as it was and not merge with the EU? Because Berlin made sense only if WEU maintained an autonomous character.

WEU was not slow in picking up this mandate and started work on illustrative mission scenarios. Out of some twenty possible missions, six were forwarded to NATO for further planning by the Combined Joint Planning Staff at SHAPE. These mission scenarios were still of a generic nature, not specifying any country or area by name, but only giving some general characteristics of location, distance and terrain. They concerned conflict prevention, including monitoring, protection of humanitarian corridors, enforcement of sanctions and embargoes, containment, and interposition of forces. In addition, WEU produced a more detailed document on "practical arrangements for evacuation operations".

Part of the problem before Berlin was not so much US concern about monitoring the use of NATO assets, but the Turkish wish to make sure the assets would not be used in operations in which they were not allowed to participate. The Petersberg Declaration had opened up the possibility of the associate members of WEU associating themselves with the decisions taken by member states; "they will be able to participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise". This was the same formula as

used to convene a meeting of the WEU Council restricted to the full members only. Turkey had seen that this had happened in connection with the Space Group - albeit only in the experimental phase, already started before Maastricht - in the Mostar operation and in the first discussion on the crisis in Rwanda. Now they were showing that their cooperation would be needed in the NAC on any decision making NATO assets available to WEU and, if they were not able to join on equal terms in the operation, their consent would not be forthcoming. Turkey also waved its veto card over NATO enlargement if it were not allowed to enter the European Union.

It proved difficult to solve the Turkish problem. The Belgian presidency was unable to find a formula for Turkish participation which was acceptable to Greece and, as a result, Ankara continued to block an agreement between WEU and NATO. By the end of March the deadlock continued and was exacerbated by a statement of the leaders of the European People's Party against Turkish membership of the European Union. The chairman of this group in the European Parliament, the former Prime Minister of Belgium, Wilfried Martens, tried to soften the impact by advocating a "real partnership", but also wrote that Turkey should understand that membership now would make the completion of European integration impossible.⁶¹ The informal "Gymnich"-type meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers at Apeldoorn on 16 March acted to stem further escalation and authorised Minister Van Mierlo to confirm the European vocation of Turkey and to ask the European Commission to present proposals for developing the cooperation with Ankara. It took the permanent WEU Council till 15 April to agree a compromise stipulating that the European NATO members would be able to participate fully in EU decisions concerning missions requiring the use of Alliance assets (but not for operations which would not involve those resources).

In a perceptive article, Paul Cornish asked whether the French wish at Berlin to describe ESDI as a "permanent and visible" part of NATO was all that was left of the Europeanist approach to security. As NATO had moved out-of-area, a division of labour with WEU no longer could be along the lines of collective defence for NATO and non-Article V for WEU. Instead, it could only be within the area of non-Article V with NATO dealing with hard missions including fighting potential, leaving softer missions to WEU. Cornish wrote:

The CJTF scheme is clever and complex, making it politically difficult to explain and project, and in any case seems as much about restraining a European defence identity as enabling one. ESDI within NATO is an imaginative compromise, but it is also a shadowy, remote intellectual construct for which public interest and loyalty may be hard to generate.⁶²

He may well be right, but the basic question will remain how

Europeans will organise themselves for operations in which the US for some reason does not want to participate with substantial forces. In other words, will it be possible to provide the political underpinning of European-led operations through NATO consultations or through a European framework, either CFSP or WEU?

In my opinion it was illogical of the US to stress the importance of the ESDI but resist any European caucus in NATO. If Europe has to assume certain responsibilities and engage in European-led operations, it should also be able to formulate views on its objectives and strategy. That should be done in a spirit of complete transparency and willingness to adapt initial positions to sound arguments advanced by others, especially the US. But the present state of play looks much like the "have your cake and eat it" metaphor: although NATO does not want to conduct the operation on its own, the North Atlantic Council will remain in firm control of the assets made available and will even supervise much of the planning for the operation. ESDI is in danger of becoming an exclusively military device which leaves everything as it is, but gives the final authority over European-led operations to a European Deputy SACEUR. To be effective, it will have to be complemented on the side of political consultations. Unfortunately, the prolonged discussions have taken away much of the earlier enthusiasm for CJTF and it has become increasingly doubtful whether they will ever be used. As long as the deadlock over the return of France to the military command structure continues little progress seems possible. But even apart from this complication prospects seem murky. NATO is still thinking in terms of large operations, which Europeans would not wish to undertake without US participation, and has little affinity with the smaller ones. Operations such as the blockade on the Danube or the police contingent in Mostar could be managed without any NATO assets.⁶³ For that reason, the initial planning work at NATO was not a success, either too small or too large an operation for a CJTF, and an intermediate scenario had to be added. The French countermove to Berlin was the development of the "lead-nation" concept and during their Presidency an exercise was organised using a French headquarters as the basis for the command structure.

3. Relations with the European Union

At Petersberg, WEU ministers also adopted a report on practical measures to develop the relations with EU and NATO. The Permanent Council was asked to propose to the Council of the Twelve and to the North Atlantic Council concrete measures aimed at the development of close cooperation between the respective secretariats. With the EU this resulted in Annex IV of Chapter IV of the Document on the Implementation of the Treaty on European Union. It was approved by the extraordinary European Council of 29 October 1993 and by the WEU Ministerial Council on 22 November. The Annex elaborated somewhat on the Maastricht

declaration by giving examples of actions undertaken by WEU. It also added that while normally implying the use of military personnel, these may include the use of other means. The examples given were situations in which:

- the security interests of the Union are directly concerned;
- the Union is politically and economically involved in a specific crisis or conflict and acknowledges that additional WEU support is necessary (military observers, cease-fire, peacekeeping, sanctions monitoring and peace-enforcement);
- the Union is asked by the UN/CSCE to make a contribution and it concludes that WEU, in a cohesive division of labour, could make a specific contribution; or
- humanitarian efforts need logistic support.

Special attention would be required when the request to the WEU would be part of a broader action which the Union itself would continue to conduct. "In this case mutual information and consultation procedures will ensure the coherence of the action as a whole, whilst ensuring that WEU take in an autonomous way the operational decisions, including military planning, rules of engagement, command structures, deployment and withdrawal." From the date of entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the presidency of WEU would inform CFSP bodies of ongoing work within WEU which is relevant to the Union and the presidency of the EU Council would inform on a regular basis competent WEU bodies, in particular in areas where WEU could be invited to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union. The EU suggested that WEU reduce its presidency's term of office to six months. The Secretaries-General would keep each other fully informed and exchange written material in the relevant areas covering documents as well as exchanges over the WEUCOM and COREU networks. Their collaboration included cross-participation of collaborators in relevant meetings "according to decisions taken on a case-by-case basis, after consultation of the two presidencies at the appropriate level". Agendas would be exchanged in advance. The collaborators in question would be seated in the delegation of the presidency-in-office of the organisation they represented. The presidency delegation would also include representation of the European Commission whenever WEU was dealing with matters relating to the Commission's responsibilities under the treaty. The WEU Secretariat would forward written material in which the Commission had an interest "by virtue of its responsibilities in implementing policies of the European Union". Presidencies and secretariats would consult on dates and venues of meetings with a view to establishing the greatest possible synchronisation.

Pending the installation of a new COREU system the Belgian foreign ministry would ensure the electronic distribution of the relevant telegrams

to WEU. The exchanges were intended to keep each Secretariat adequately informed and not as a means to circulate documents of one organisation to the member states of the other. A problem arose over the lack of a screening system for personnel handling classified information in the EU Council Secretariat and the Commission. WEU had to be strict with its classified documents if it wanted to be on the receiving end of NATO papers. As a result, WEU could inform them only on a case-by-case basis. Apart from that, the arrangements were excellent, at least on paper. The provisions on cross-participation largely remained a dead letter during my tenure in office, except at the ministerial level. There, Commissioner Van den Broek and senior members of his staff attended as part of the delegation of the EU presidency.

Coordination was particularly important with the new ad hoc working group on security created during the UK presidency of the EU with Jeremy Greenstock as its first chairman. As he was also the UK Permanent Representative to WEU we were kept well-informed. Their first report was approved at the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992. The following January the group was instructed by the Political Committee to analyse European security interests in the new strategic context, in order to develop some common security principles on which the future CFSP would be based. This report was submitted to ministers of the Twelve on 8 June 1993. In addition, the Political Committee adopted a document on "mutually reinforcing institutions" on 11 April and another on "implications of the Mediterranean situation for European security" on 11 July 1993. I could not help feeling that a great deal of work was duplicated, but at least WEU was asked to comment. Rightly so, because the contents were more relevant to WEU than to the European Union. The paper on security interests listed risks and uncertainties that might prove detrimental to:

- A. The territorial integrity and political independence of the future Union and its member states. Risks in this area include the possibility of spill-over from local conflicts, threats of terrorism or, in the most extreme cases, threats from weapons of mass destruction.
- B. The economic stability throughout the future Union and its member states. Risks in this area include conflicts having detrimental effects on markets or lines of transport and supplies.
- C. The ecological basis of the future Union. Risks in this area encompass environmental problems, including unsatisfactory nuclear safety.
- D. The democratic fabric of the future Union, including the culture, identity and political stability of member states. Risks in this area could include populist reactions to uncontrolled or unlimited immigration.

Most of the following analysis was a statement of the obvious, but some passages are worth mentioning. European security interests could not be defined in isolation but were closely related to broader European and

Atlantic interests in international security. Among the aims of the CFSP was the promotion of social and economic stability, including regional and subregional integration. Measures available to the future Union were:

- provision of good offices;
- calls for conciliation and arbitration;
- application of political and economic pressure on one or more parties;
- support for peacekeeping operations decided by the UN or the OSCE.

More recently, the Security Working Group of the CFSP has eclipsed the Special Working Group of WEU. As they were staffed by the same people there was no need for duplication. Nevertheless, with the SWG WEU lost an opportunity for conceptual discussions, which in theory could be held in the Council, but in practice did not materialise.

4. Mediterranean Aspects

The CFSP paper of 1993 on the Mediterranean analysed the various conflicts and tensions in the region but concluded that while limited forms of confrontation could not be ruled out, the present state of the Union's relations did not make a wider conflict likely. Nevertheless, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was an issue of primary importance to European security. The work of WEU in the area was described as follows:

The WEU already monitors the situation in the area through its Mediterranean group and has initiated a dialogue on security issues with some North African countries. Moreover, it has developed plans for the operation of a WEU maritime force and has agreed that such an initiative should be further developed. In this connection, Italy, supported by France and Spain, has taken the initiative of developing a multinational ground force aimed at enhancing the operational significance of the air-maritime initiative which could play a role in the Mediterranean in close coordination and cooperation with NATO.

Among possible measures to be taken by the EU figured "the promotion of economic development of the region as the cornerstone of its good neighbourliness policy, the policy itself being also motivated by security concerns. New joint cooperation initiatives aimed at reducing emigration through on-site job creation should be considered. Close cooperation in the field of immigration and adequate contingency plans in case of unexpected massive immigration should be developed. Coordination for the eventual rescue of EU citizens should be envisaged through WEU. In addition, terrorism and narcotics traffic could have security implications for the Union.

The WEU Council had created a Mediterranean Subgroup as early as November 1986 under the Luxembourg presidency, which reported on naval developments in the Mediterranean and the implications for European security of the proliferation of ballistic missiles. In October 1990, the WEU Institute for Security Studies organised a seminar on the North-South dimension of European security as one of its first activities. Another one was held in Madrid in July 1991 to be followed by many more. The WEU Assembly regularly devoted reports to Mediterranean security questions. The Ministerial Council in Paris on 13 December 1990 instructed the Subgroup to draw up a list of principles likely to contribute to a resolution of the security issues in the Mediterranean. A year later, in Bonn in November 1991, the Subgroup was asked to address in its further studies the question of developing contacts between WEU and the Maghreb states. This led to informal contacts between the WEU Presidency and Secretariat and the London embassies of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in September 1992. These contacts were resumed in Brussels with the respective embassies and extended to Mauritania. Libya was excluded. The Subgroup was upgraded to a fully-fledged Mediterranean Working Group (MWG) directly responsible to the Council. On 19 May 1993, the Rome Ministerial Council mandated us to propose periodic meetings on a twice-yearly basis. On several occasions senior officials from the North African countries came over to attend these sessions and their ministers came to call on the Secretary-General. On 9 May 1994, in Luxembourg, Ministers agreed to expand the dialogue to Egypt and gradually to other non-WEU Mediterranean states.

From our side we conducted the dialogue on the basis of seven principles; nothing spectacular, but an attempt to draw our interlocutors into a discussion of their own security policy. That was not easy because they had a tendency to talk in generalities about relations with Europe rather than engage in a conceptual security discussion about the region. Their countries were faced with potentially hostile neighbours and their military also had a role in internal security. The dialogue had to be conducted bilaterally with each of the countries because our exclusion of Libya made a multilateral framework with the Maghreb countries impossible. The principles were listed as follows:

- *Dialogue*: Dialogue contributes to stability in the region, since it constitutes in itself a factor promoting stability and confidence. Defining a framework for a regular dialogue on security questions in the region would help to create a forum in which the States in the region could express their legitimate security concerns.
- *Transparency*: This idea reflects the concern to improve mutual awareness of military activities and doctrines in the region.
- *Confidence*: Measures might be envisaged along the lines of certain

mechanisms of proven value that have been set up under the CSCE.

- *Conflict prevention*: The aim is to promote exchanges of information on all questions relating to defence and security, with a view to developing, where possible common security perceptions concerning the region.
- *Sufficiency*: The conventional armed forces of States in the region should be established at levels not disproportionate to the real defence needs of those States.
- *Peaceful settlement of conflicts*: This principle arises from the duty upon States not to resort to the threat or use of force in violation of the United Nations Charter.
- *Non-proliferation of arms*: The aim is to forestall risks arising from the proliferation of weapons in the region, particularly weapons of mass destruction, as well as the risks associated with the spread of ballistic missiles that might have nuclear, bacteriological or chemical warheads, and those risks arising from the spread of technical skills and expertise in every form.

In spite of their general character, I learned much in our discussions. The ambassadors accredited to the European Union as well as to Belgium were senior in their foreign service and gave interesting perspectives on the region, and often also on their neighbours. Occasionally, a minister or special representative came to visit us at the WEU headquarters. When Egypt came in another dimension was added, for Ambassador Chabane had very clear ideas about cooperation with WEU. I am afraid we often had to disappoint him.

At a joint meeting of the SWG and DRG the Secretariat was asked to identify the defence and military implications of the CFSP documents and to draw up practical conclusions for the future work of WEU. As the papers ranged from non-proliferation to crisis management I also asked the delegations for their inputs. The UK took the lead on security interests. The Secretariat focused on Central Europe and the Mediterranean. The British paper made the important point that understanding when and how specific defence and military instruments have a role to play would be vital to the future development of an effective common European defence policy. The mobilisation of the most appropriate levers in a given situation would not always be straightforward. Some defence and military problems, such as non-proliferation, were not primarily or most effectively dealt with through the direct application of military instruments. Conversely, the deployment of military assets might be required in support of commitments which were not primarily military in nature, such as humanitarian missions, disaster

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package of confidence-building measures, but the Charter would have to wait for better days.

At the WEU ministerial meeting in Paris on 13 May 1997, the countries participating in the European Rapid Operation Force (EUROFOR, consisting of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) declared their willingness to cooperate with the Mediterranean countries engaged in the dialogue with WEU. Their declaration contained the following paragraph:

The aim of this programme is to promote stability throughout the Mediterranean Basin. The setting up of transparency- and confidence-building mechanisms should enable the gradual establishment of a genuine security partnership between the riparian states of the Mediterranean and, in this framework, to prepare and facilitate participation of those countries' forces, in conjunction with EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, in some operations provided for in the Petersberg Declaration.

This offer was prompted to a certain extent by the negative reaction of the Arab League to the creation of EUROFOR without prior consultation with the Arab countries, but so far little concrete has happened.

Notes

58. Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and Stephen F. Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4, September-October 1993, pp. 28-40. The same authors followed up their argument in "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps", in *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 7-33.

59. Paul David Miller, "Retaining Alliance Relevance. NATO and the Combined Joint Task Force Concept", National Security Paper 15, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Mass., 1994, 81 pp.

60. *NATO Review*, May 1996, No. 3.

61. "Grundlegende Vorbehalte gegen eine EU-Mitgliedschaft", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 March 1997.

62. Paul Cornish, "European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO", *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4, October 1996, pp. 751-769.

63. The Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation of 8 July 1997 mentioned provisional terms of reference for Deputy SACEUR covering his ESDI-related responsibilities. It also noted Canada's desire to participate "when its interests make it desirable and under modalities to be developed".

64. Paragraph 20 of the Preliminary Conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy, Noordwijk, 14 November 1994.

Chapter Nine

Massacre in Rwanda

The explosion of violence in April 1994 was not the first time Rwanda had caught the headlines for the cruelty of its ethnic conflict. Some saw it coming again, but in WEU we never discussed it. After our arrival in Brussels, the UK suggested that priority be given to evacuation of our own citizens in planning for the Petersberg missions. We made some progress but the Franco-Belgian action to evacuate Western nationals from Kigali did not make use of WEU. The rapid escalation of the crisis and the murder of twelve Belgian paratroopers was given as an explanation for the need for quick action by the two countries most directly concerned. Nevertheless, it was a missed opportunity. We could have organised the transport, but as Jean de Ruyt correctly remarked, in the absence of concrete plans we could have done little else without complicating the situation. In this case, bilateral action was the most efficient.

In mid-May, the Security Council authorised a peacekeeping mission of 5,000 men, to be contributed by African states, and appealed to the European countries to facilitate the operation by supplying transport and communication and road-building equipment. During the WEU Council of 17 May, I requested the military delegates to keep the Planning Cell informed about any action their governments might take in pursuit of this resolution. As the situation deteriorated, France called a special session of the WEU Council, but wanted it convened among the Nine full members only. I failed to see the need for a restricted session, but France obviously wanted to make the point regardless of the merits of the case. For some time they had argued that the full members should get more visibility and that formally they constituted the WEU Council as defined in the Treaty. On this occasion, France had wanted a meeting at Twelve, but that format was unknown to us. As chairman, I thought our procedural arrangements were clear. The Petersberg documents provided for a restricted meeting if a majority of the full members wanted to convene it, or half the members including the presidency. As we were at Nine, I asked whether five members were in favour of holding a restricted meeting. To my surprise, Ambassador Guéhenno argued against a vote because Petersberg had not yet entered into force and therefore the associate members and Greece were still only active observers. I rejected that argument: we had been applying

all the arrangements of the Petersberg provisionally for some considerable time and if we started making exceptions we risked unravelling the whole framework. Guéhenno did not insist and I proceeded with a *tour de table*. Italy and Germany deemed the matter urgent and had no objection to discussing it at Nine. Spain also. Belgium and Luxembourg agreed for this particular meeting without prejudice to the involvement of the associate members and observers when Petersberg missions were discussed in future. The Netherlands, Portugal and the UK wanted to meet at 15, but there was a clear majority for a restricted meeting. John Weston was very angry and called it an extremely bad precedent which, if continued, would influence the position of the UK towards WEU. It would be wrong to pursue a procedural device to separate WEU into the Nine and the 24 (with the associate partners) and to diminish the status of the associate members. The UK therefore regarded the subsequent meeting as incomplete. I took note of his statement.

On substance Guéhenno called the situation in Rwanda dramatic. A full WEU action would take too much time, but if some WEU countries could join the African peace force, much further killing could be prevented. Sensing the soured atmosphere he added that France had wished to start procedurally at Nine but was open for later participation of the associate members and observers. He proposed to make the Planning Cell our point of contact and to mandate it to monitor the situation. Italy regarded the UN as the principal actor and any WEU action should support it; Europe itself should not become too conspicuous. Veenendaal for the Netherlands welcomed the French initiative, but hoped further discussion would be at 15. He saw two possibilities; either UNAMIR in the UN context or a separate WEU action, for which we might need a separate request from the Security Council. In any case, our action should not interfere with UNAMIR or a possible Arusha initiative. He was prepared to coordinate contributions through WEU, but the Netherlands had decided not to send ground forces because the cooperation of the parties to the conflict was in doubt. Belgium remained very cautious, but was in favour of WEU coordination; Brussels had supplied some equipment to the African countries. Germany noted that in this case the initiative did not come from the EU but from the WEU and needed special underpinning. The UK had the impression that France was going beyond UNSC Resolution 925 and asked whether our troops would come under UN authority. London would contribute 50 Bedford trucks for relief transport. Spain wanted any action to be in the framework of the UN, for the legitimisation emanated from there. Italy added that they did not exclude a contribution. In his reply Guéhenno confirmed that France aimed at an interim solution to cover the six to eight weeks needed for the deployment of UNAMIR. According to his information, Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali was happy with this initiative.

In my summary I concluded that we agreed on the urgency of action, which should be conducted under the auspices of the UN. We were not

aiming at a WEU operation but at the coordination of the contributions of member countries. The French initiative aimed at a short-term interim measure until UNAMIR was ready. The Planning Cell was mandated to monitor the situation and serve as contact point; members were asked to inform it of their contributions and how their action officers could be reached.

A week later, in the WEU Council of 24 June, France reported the start of Operation Turquoise following UNSC Resolution 929, authorising a multinational operation for a period of two months. Its purpose was not to act as an interposition force, but to protect zones away from the frontline where people were being massacred, mainly by Hutu militia. The discussion continued on 28 June in a Council at 24 with a briefing by General Janvier of the newly established staff for operational planning near Paris. He, too, emphasised that France wanted to be neutral with regard to the FPR which had been opposed to the intervention. His country would have 2,500 men in Rwanda with light armour and four aircraft. Senegal sent 50 men and expected to contribute a total of 300. Italy and France had sent a joint mission to explore the possibility of escorting humanitarian aid convoys. Romania was sending a medical team of 20 men in response to a request from New York.

Thereafter, Rwanda figured on every Council agenda till the summer recess. Both France and the Planning Cell reported on the situation but no force contributions were forthcoming. By the end of July, the forces of the FPR controlled the whole of the country except a safe humanitarian zone in the southeast which France had managed to get accepted by the parties. On 28 June, General De Lambert reported to the Council that, thanks to an early intervention, 1.5 million refugees had remained in Rwanda, who otherwise would have fled to Bukavu in Zaire. Another 1.5 million had camped around Lake Kivu, requiring water, food and medical care. Among the WEU countries, Germany had made available one Boeing 707, two Transall aircraft and a financial contribution of DM 20 million; Spain two C-130 aircraft and a medical team; the Netherlands two F-27 aircraft and 50 trucks; Portugal a C-130 for two weeks; the UK \$17 million for humanitarian NGOs. Operation Turquoise came to an end on 22 August and handed over to UNAMIR II. UNHCR had requested contributions to their package of road servicing and road security but none of our countries was prepared to participate. There was willingness, however, to "adopt" African countries participating in UNAMIR. The Netherlands would help to equip Zambia and Belgium did the same with Malawi. WEU did not have to be involved as the countries concerned preferred to deal directly with UNHCR and New York. The best we could say of our involvement was that to a certain extent WEU had acted as a catalyst by continuously listing the most urgent needs in the area. France deserved credit for its early action, but could have brought others along if it had played things differently. Operation Turquoise undoubtedly saved many lives, but even more important was its demonstra-

tion that an early operation in a confused situation can have a stabilising effect, even with limited numbers. Turquoise was a name appropriate to the needs of our time: a mixture of green and blue emphasised the peaceful purpose of the force, but also its readiness to use force if the people in their safe humanitarian zone were threatened. Many countries reacted rather scathingly to the French action, qualifying it as the pursuit of French interests in Africa, but the fact remains that only France was willing to act and did so quickly enough to make an impact.

In 1995, Rwanda disappeared from the news, but the situation for the Rwandan refugees hardly changed. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) drew attention to the atmosphere of violence among the camp population, members of the former government having regained power over the refugees and stopping them from repatriation.⁶⁵ On the other side of the border, the new Tutsi-dominated government in Kigali increased the problem by its attempt to speed up repatriation, forcibly closing the camp of displaced persons at Kibeho. MSF criticised UNAMIR's incapacity to protect the displaced and asked for the dispatch of human rights monitors to the camps. Apart from this problem, the situation in the eastern Kivu province of Zaire worsened on account of tensions between the Banyamulenge of Tutsi origin (led by Désiré Kabila) and the rest of the local population. Hutu fighters from the camps joined the Zairean army in an attempt to force the Banyamulenge to regroup in camps. Caught in between the violence, the remainder of the refugees from Rwanda first disappeared into the bush, then massively started to return home. Their situation was appalling, but humanitarian assistance had become virtually impossible. In the autumn of 1996, a fresh disaster unrolled itself. On 5 November, a meeting of African heads of state proposed to the UN to form a "neutral force" to enable the most essential humanitarian aid to go through. Their aim was a classic UN force with command and control emanating from New York and not a construction like IFOR or Operation Turquoise.⁶⁶ The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1078 on 9 November, asking member states to lay the basis for a Multi-National Force (MNF), but did not yet provide a formal mandate. Canada took the initiative to approach a number of potential candidates and informed the UN Secretary-General that the formation of a MNF was feasible. The next day, on 15 November, the Security Council passed Resolution 1080, mandating a MNF under Chapter VII of the UN Charter until 31 March 1997. All necessary means could be used to support the effective rendering of humanitarian aid to the refugees in Eastern Zaire and their voluntary, orderly repatriation.

In the European Union the Council adopted a joint action for the area of the Great Lakes on 22 November, largely devoted to its humanitarian aid. Support for African participation in the MNF was left to voluntary contributions by the member states. A separate decision under the same joint action requested WEU to examine in what way it could contribute to an optimum use of the available operational resources. This request took into consider-

ation that the implementation of the joint action had implications for the domain of defence and could compel the deployment of military assets, for which reason a request had to be made to WEU. Denmark did not wish to participate in the request but, in accordance with the decision of the Edinburgh European Council, would not prevent the development of closer cooperation between the member states. Its position, therefore, did not hinder the adoption of the decision.⁶⁷ The reaction by WEU was not impressive, much to the regret of the Belgian presidency. There was no direct reply to the EU request. Instead the ministerial session at Ostend issued a separate declaration on the situation in the Great Lakes region on 19 November 1996. This text agreed that WEU's efforts would be fully compatible with planning efforts already underway for the launching of the MNF, but in reality this concerned only the study of possible assistance with the delivery of EU humanitarian aid to the theatre, assistance to contingents from African nations in the field of training and keeping under review possible logistic support. The latter included de-mining, medical and engineering support.

Canada organised a military planners conference in Stuttgart on 22-24 November, which developed four options:

- A. Continuing the limited military presence through a small team of observers;
- B. Establishing a MNF headquarters to support the humanitarian assistance and to determine the numbers of refugees and their location;
- C. Providing military assistance to aid and voluntary repatriation in a non-hostile environment; and
- D. Option C, but in a possibly hostile environment.

Subsequently, a Steering Group selected option B-plus, a headquarters for improved reconnaissance and the preparation of food-droppings. Participation in the headquarters would come from Canada (with General Basil as the commander), the US, the UK, France, Ireland and probably others. The entire project was dropped, however, when the refugees en masse returned home to Rwanda, fearful of being slaughtered in the camps by any of the warring factions. With the benefit of hindsight two things have become clear. UNAMIR was reduced at a time when a modest increase might have prevented further genocide. And secondly, the West insufficiently understood that in the Great Lakes crisis four conflicts were raging in one. The first was a continuation of the civil war in Burundi. The second a renewal of civil war in Rwanda. Uganda was at the centre of the third conflict encouraged by the Kinshasa government of Mobutu in league with Khartoum. The fourth was the unexpected strength gained by Kabila, earlier regarded as a tool of General Kagame in Kigali, and his victory march to Kinshasa, supported in its final phase by Zairean elements from the Angolan army.⁶⁸ It represented a complete upheaval which also had its reper-

cussions in Congo-Brazzaville and will need considerable time to settle.

WEU organised a fact-finding mission to Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania to see how African peacekeeping capabilities could be reinforced. Contacts were established with the Organisation of African Unity and during the EU/SADC conference at Windhoek in October 1996 a briefing was given on WEU's endeavours. On substance, however, there were deep divisions on policy between Britain and France on whom to support in the Great Lakes area. Germany made it quite clear that it would not go beyond support for OAU action and its defence minister did not make himself popular in France by saying that the Eurocorps was no *Afrika Korps*.

Notes

65. See "International Peacekeeping", August-September 1995, note by Bettina Freise, p. 120.

66. Letter by the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation to the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament, 11 November 1996, doc. 25098, no. 3.

67. This was a rare case of constructive abstention in the CFSP. The other example was a similar Danish statement on the joint action concerning anti-personnel mines adopted on 1 October 1996.

68. See Gérard Prunier, "The Great Lakes Crisis", *Current History*, Vol. 96, No. 610, May 1997.

Chapter Ten

Formulating a Common European Defence Policy

Already before the start of their presidency the Netherlands announced their intention to focus on elaborating elements of the common defence policy, contained in the Maastricht Treaty. Two and a half years had elapsed since its signing but little attempt had been made to expand on the concept. The Kirchberg Declaration of 9 May had tasked the Permanent Council to begin work (paragraph 5). The Hague wanted to start with the substance and to leave the institutional aspects for later, probably for the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. They intended to make a tour of capitals and to have two rounds of discussion in the SWG before tabling the paper in the Council. In June we had an informal luncheon of the ambassadors at the Greek residence. Several showed a preference for a brainstorming session, or scene-setting start in the Council. Generally, I favoured such an approach, which involved the ambassadors personally in a conceptual discussion. Far too often they came in only at the end of a process to approve what had been negotiated at lower levels. This time, however, it was clear that the Dutch wanted to proceed carefully and to build up their paper step-by-step. A discussion in the Council could lead to formal positions being taken too early, which would make agreement more difficult.

The Netherlands initiative was welcome but unexpected. My country had always been grouped with the UK and Portugal as the champions of the NATO angle of European security. In terms of defence their attitude could be characterised as saying that Europe already had a defence policy and that was NATO. For that reason the Maastricht texts had made a common European defence subject to two conditions: the *eventual* framing of a common defence policy, which *might* in time lead to a common defence. Yet, increasingly we felt the need to define more closely what the role of WEU was in elaborating and implementing decisions and actions of the Union which might have defence implications. Frank Majoor, head of the Atlantic Cooperation and Security Department at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, introduced the first draft of "An approach to the formulation of a common European defence policy" in the Special Working Group on 13 July 1993. He made clear that it was intended to be open-ended (other issues could be added) and specifically directed towards WEU.

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The paper was not intended to develop a defence policy within the framework of CFSP. The sense of that distinction escaped me, because I did not see a WEU defence policy separate from a subsequent EU-CFSP defence policy. The thought seemed a left-over from earlier Dutch opposition to include defence in the European Union and disappeared in later versions. German Ambassador Klaiber had made the point that defence policy was an aspect of security policy. The draft paper did not give a definition of the common European defence policy (CEDP) as such, but stated that it should contribute to furthering the objectives of the CFSP.

John Roper had a try at a simple definition by suggesting "a common policy with respect to the use of the armed forces of the member states". At the Institute he had already taken the lead by starting a study together with the European Strategy Group (ESG).⁶⁹

Having been a member of the ESG for a long time, I attended the discussions but did not make a written contribution. Its report did not aim at agreed conclusions on every point but the questions raised needed to be answered if progress was to be made. One of the conclusions which was unanimous, and which supported my line of argument was that the implication of the language of Maastricht should be rejected, that the processes of developing a CFSP and a CEDP must be sequential. Instead, the process of developing the structure and context of a common defence policy must begin now and evolve in parallel with the CFSP. Roper also used definitions of "common defence" as "the organisation of (the activities of) the armed forces of the member states in common". Obviously, the longer version, including the words "activities of", was softer than the shorter definition. The SWG chewed over the definition of the CEDP to make it responsive to the new emphasis on crisis management and peacekeeping. The final version appeared in the Preliminary Conclusions adopted by the Ministers at Noordwijk as follows:

Being an element of security policy in a wider sense, the common European defence policy is directed towards the reduction of risks and uncertainties that might threaten the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union and its member states, and towards contributing to the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter. (...)

A common European defence policy should enhance security and stability by ensuring a commensurate European participation in collective defence, and by an active engagement in conflict prevention and crisis management in Europe and elsewhere, in accordance with Europe's importance.

At its start, the discussion in the SWG threatened to get bogged down over methodology. The first draft had discussed consecutively the European, the transatlantic and the Central and Eastern European dimensions. Barry Delongchamps for France saw only one perspective, that of Maastricht, which included a defence policy compatible with that of the Alliance because NATO and Europe had common strategic interests. Jean de Ruyt for Belgium also thought that a CEDP was wider than a contribution to NATO. Logan for the UK was not difficult: he would be quite happy with a single perspective of a CEDP compatible with that of the Alliance. On substance Italy and Germany wanted to include a reference to nuclear policy. My staff pointed out that in the Petersberg Declaration the member states had declared that they were prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their *conventional* armed forces,⁷⁰ but this of course did not preclude a political statement. In the end, the Preliminary Conclusions in paragraph 6 included the sentence that Europeans had a major responsibility with regard to defence in both the conventional and nuclear field, followed by references to the Ottawa Declaration of 1974, the Hague Platform of 1987 and the Alliance's new Strategic Concept of 1991 which recognised that the independent nuclear forces of the UK and France had a deterrent role of their own and contributed to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

For Italy, Trezza warned against an academic approach. Things happened which were not foreseen, such as our civilian action on the Danube. Together with the other Southern members he wanted a section on the Mediterranean. Turkey advocated a functional approach, defining risks, resources, constraints and a division of labour. The paper did go in this direction. For the way ahead, it suggested a definition of common interests by formulating a set of elements which could play a role in decision-making process, such as the extent to which national interests were at stake, including the security of citizens of WEU states. Such a general set would also facilitate the task of the Planning Cell. In the Preliminary Conclusions this came to read differently, in that it was linked with the analyses of the new CFSP working group on security. These should be complemented by a military analysis, to be prepared by WEU taking account of risk analyses carried out in NATO. The document continued:

The analyses will provide insight in the relationship between security concerns and defence issues and what role defence instruments can play vis-à-vis the range of other instruments, notably economic and diplomatic, available to Western European governments, including through the European Union.

In concrete terms the document was only a beginning and largely a stock-taking exercise. Some useful things were said about the relationship with NATO: the Alliance could benefit from a more balanced sharing of

risks, responsibilities and burdens, through the development of WEU's operational role (paragraph 16); and WEU should examine developments in the transatlantic partnership which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance (paragraph 24). WEU should strengthen its operational capabilities, developing the military and operational aspects of security, such as (paragraph 25):

- institutional aspects of defence;
- exercise, preparation and inter-operability of forces;
- generic and contingency planning;
- anti-missile defence in Europe;
- defence intelligence in Europe (including the space component); and
- mechanisms for burden-sharing and the pooling of resources.

A reference was made to complementing capacities in the area of intelligence and crisis management, for instance with a situation centre and an intelligence section of the Planning Cell, which were already under study. A new element was the paragraph (number 34) on mechanisms for implementing the principle of European solidarity, or even European burden-sharing, through:

- rotation of forces, especially when nations found it difficult to sustain their contribution over a longer period;
- pooling of capabilities and resources, such as transport aircraft, simulation equipment, special munitions and space parts;
- an operational budget and fixed contribution keys;
- task specialisation.

Finally, the document devoted its last but substantial paragraph 36 to the necessary development of a European armaments policy as part of a common European defence policy. Issues to be addressed included the promotion of harmonised requirements and standardised equipment, the reduction of duplicative national research, the creation of conditions for an integrated, rationalised and competitive European defence industry and the identification of conditions and measures which could improve market conditions for a more competitive approach to European (including intra-European) defence procurement, and a study of the possible harmonisation of national practices in the field of export control.

As usual, there had been a discussion as to whether the Preliminary Conclusions should be published. They had been explained to and discussed with the associate partners, so nothing stood in the way of publication. For a moment, France toyed with the idea of a shorter public document but did not follow up on it. In the final Council meeting before Noordwijk, Denmark raised a problem with regard to paragraph 6 of the

Declaration where Ministers considered that all four categories of participants should now reflect in common on the new security conditions, with the argument that security was the domain of the CFSP. The UK did not like the paragraph either, but more because of the final sentence where the Permanent Council would be instructed "to initiate reflection in this area, including the proposal put forward by France to draft a White Paper on European security". At ministerial level the points were not repeated and the paragraph remained unscathed. Under my successor, the point was taken up and concluded a year later at the Madrid meeting of 14 November 1995, with an elaborate document "European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries". By that time Austria, Finland and Sweden had joined WEU as observers. The document started with a chapter on "the new European security conditions: challenges and risks", including a *tour d'horizon* of the security environment in various parts of the world, followed by a chapter on "contributions of WEU countries to European security: enhancing capabilities in the field of crisis prevention and management". The latter contained sections on available capabilities, existing gaps and deficiencies, the experience drawn from the conflict in former Yugoslavia and - most importantly - necessary responses such as strengthening WEU's politico-military structures and reinforcing European assets and capabilities. The most concrete points, though not spectacular, concerned the enhancement of interoperability between national forces and the setting up of an intelligence section, already approved at the Lisbon meeting on 15 May, capable of supporting WEU in crisis situations. It was an important effort to involve all 27 countries in the production of a conceptual document, but the exercise did not bring the formulation of a common defence policy any nearer. The same conclusion applied to the WEU contribution to the EU Intergovernmental Conference of 1996, also agreed to in Madrid and discussed in Section 2 of Chapter 12, because it contained three different options and no consensus on any one of them.

Subsequent ministerial declarations did focus on WEU's operational developments, including the three successive phases of exercise WEU CRISEX 95-96, the last one taking place in December 1996. In this way, scenarios for WEU operations could be tested realistically. Experience thus gained would also be useful in drawing up the illustrative scenarios needed to develop the CJTF concept for making available NATO assets for WEU operations. Another useful initiative was to ask the Planning Cell to draw up a generic plan for peacekeeping, although the question remained whether it would be concrete enough for practical use. The name was not so important, as long as it included the possibility of applying military force. The fundamental problem with the emphasis on operational improvement was whether this would really enhance the chances of WEU forces ever being used in a concrete contingency, if the planning remained generic and without close links with the emerging CFSP.

Notes

69. The study appeared in the spring of 1995 under the title *Towards a Common Defence Policy*, edited by Laurence Martin and John Roper.

70. Petersberg Declaration, Section II, Paragraph 2.

Chapter Eleven

Drawing in Central Europe

We made it a point to convene the first Forum meeting at ambassadorial level while we were still in London. The meeting took place on 14 October 1992 and largely had an informative character. There was plenty to tell them, about the Yugoslav crisis, the Rome ministerial where the enlargement procedure would be concluded for Greece as full member and for the associate members and observers, and our move to Belgium. A substantial dialogue started only after we had arrived in Brussels where the ambassadors were more familiar with security questions. At the extraordinary ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 5 April 1993 devoted to sanctions implementation on the Danube, representatives from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania attended as observers. It was not easy to arrange the embargo operation with them, but without an institutional link with WEU it would have been far more difficult. Participation in the operation now became a demonstration of their willingness to join European institutions and to make the necessary sacrifices. In doing so they also showed that four meetings a year at ambassadorial level would not be enough to conduct that kind of operation.

When the SWG met after the summer holidays on 15 September, the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, had just given a speech favouring association of the Central Europeans with WEU. This was a step ahead of what most other countries were thinking and also a departure from the paper we had just received from Germany, which was discussing "an association-type of agreement". I asked Klaiber to clarify his position and he frankly informed us that he had proposed the "association-type" but had been overruled, because the simple word association would be much clearer and sound better. In the group there was little enthusiasm for creating yet another category of participation in WEU. The word association had already been used when we made the non-EU European members of NATO "associate members" of WEU. Above all, what could we offer on substance? Paul Lever for the UK put it best when asking whether we would give them a seat at the table or a case-by-case involvement and to whom the enhanced relationship would apply. The prevailing view was that we should rather improve what we were doing already, rather than taking new institutional steps.

Diplomatic realities would prove to be different. On 11 November the German and French ministers would have tripartite discussions in Warsaw and again spoke of association. Subsequently, Juppé and Kinkel sent a joint letter to the Council proposing a status of association which should allow the country concerned to participate broadly - in French *largement* - in the activities of WEU. Their motivation was to give a strong signal to those countries which had a Europe Agreement with the EU and to draw them into security discussions. From the letter it appeared that the new status would be somewhat less than that of the associate members (who, according to Maastricht, were able to participate "fully" in our activities) but nevertheless would allow for substantial participation. The letter caused some irritation in the Council. Weston asked acidly whether an open season had been declared for initiatives without prior consultation; Norway and Turkey were afraid of erosion of their position; Belgium wondered what the relationship was with the Balladur plan for a stability pact and its conditions for entry into the EU; and Italy repeated the need for defining the substance of the new status. Nevertheless, everybody accepted that something should be done. My own preoccupation was to avoid new divisions among the nine Forum countries. As the proposal extended to countries having signed a Europe Agreement, we would have a problem with the Baltic countries which were still negotiating them. A separate status would be the wrong signal towards Russia at a time of great uncertainty and upheaval in Moscow. We should, therefore, extend the proposal to those countries who were expected to conclude Europe Agreements shortly. My other question concerned the future status of the Forum of Consultation: would it continue or be put in the refrigerator? On the title our Political Director, Paolo Casardi, had a brainwave sitting behind me and murmured "associate partner", but it took us some more months to agree on that name. The Permanent Council was not in the mood to give its blessing to France and Germany.

At the Ministerial Kinkel wisely pre-empted feelings of irritation by saying "tongue-in-cheek" at lunch that something as terrible as France and Germany had done should never happen again. He had thought that the feeling of disappointment in Central Europe about NATO should be countered by opening a "waiting room" in WEU. Juppé took a leaf from the songs of Edith Piaf and said "*Je ne regrette rien*"; it was important to give a signal to the new democracies in addition to the Balladur plan, Partnership for Peace and the link with the European Union. But neither responded to my question whether the new status would imply participation in normal Council meetings. Although there was no longer any animosity among the ministers, they were not prepared to mention a status of association in their communiqué as proposed by Juppé. The Luxembourg draft had suggested the wording "to be included in a shared security environment". Several ministers regarded that as too vague. John Weston tried his hand at "in an enhanced security relationship". Finally, there was agreement on requesting

the Permanent Council:

to reflect on an enhanced status and its contents, including the Franco-German proposal of 12 November, for those Consultation Partners who had already concluded or would conclude a Europe Agreement with the European Union. The Permanent Council should thus identify ways and modalities to allow those countries to participate to a larger extent in the activities of WEU and to be involved in initiatives and missions as envisaged in the Petersberg Declaration.

Much of our work up to the May session was taken up by defining this new status. To be meaningful it should bring something which did not yet exist in NATO and EU, i.e. participation in Council sessions. But it should not come too close to the position of the associate members, who made it possible for WEU to speak on behalf of the European pillar of the Alliance. Some delegations had a suspicion of that being the objective of the French insistence on the word "association". Our first discussion took place on 6 January when we decided to organise a session with the Forum countries to listen to their ideas. Poland had already prepared a "Food for Thought" paper on the subject. The UK and Italy had taken a parallel initiative in the European Union through a joint letter from Hurd and Andreatta proposing closer links for the Central European countries with the CFSP. Obviously, they did not want to leave the field entirely to their French and German colleagues. Their suggestions led to a structured political dialogue under the "Europe Agreements". In the meantime, Prime Minister Balladur had launched his idea for a stability pact emphasising good-neighbourly relations as a condition for future membership of the EU. In short: activity all around. In WEU, the clearest position was taken by Germany which, from the beginning, suggested alternating meetings of the Council and some working groups at Fifteen and Twenty-four as well as participation in the Petersberg missions. The Baltic countries could take part on an ad hoc basis pending clarification of their status with regard to the European Union. Italy and Spain took a more purist attitude, wanting to give the enhanced status only to countries which had concluded Europe Agreements with the EU. Italy would persevere in this attitude right up to the May Ministerial. Their tough attitude could partly be explained by their pique at being left out of the Franco-German initiative and at French attempts to replace the Italian Political Director in the WEU Secretariat. This attitude brought little by way of return as the next step was a paper prepared by Germany and France but now also including the UK. Those three countries did not see eye to eye on all issues but the direction was clear. The Baltic countries should come in from the beginning, with Germany keeping open the possibility of the formal status being given only after the signing of a "Europe Agreement". In the SWG France at first wanted to maintain the Forum together with the

enhanced status, but later agreed to suspend it. If all Nine accepted the new status and if it meant something substantial the Forum would become an empty shell. It could become a means of contact with other countries, but nobody wanted to create a new waiting room or a fifth category of participants in WEU. Later on I received proposals from Ukraine to this effect but we opted for a different solution. We would organise trilateral meetings with Russia and Ukraine attended by their representative, the presidency and the Secretary-General. The UK for some time held out against the name "association" because of its repercussion on the associate members, but gave in when their position was strengthened by their officers being brought into the Planning Cell; the associate partners would only have a liaison arrangement. A UK suggestion to change the name of associate members to associate allies was not taken up. Personally I regarded "member" as stronger than "ally", but obviously the latter word had a NATO implication. The discussion also dwelt on the question of complete openness. The paper by the three member countries mentioned the option of an Enlarged Council at Twenty-four and a Council Minus at Fifteen (and maintaining the possibility of meetings restricted to full members). On reflection France distanced itself from the terminology as legally there was only one Council, i.e. of the full members, taking decisions. France agreed that participation in Council sessions would be the essential new element in the new status, distinguishing it positively from the arrangements in the EU and NATO, but now jumped to the other extreme by proposing that all Council meetings would be held at Twenty-four unless decided otherwise. Again, this went too far for several other countries because it would reduce the profile of our associate members. By the end of January we still did not have consensus on full openness, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain having some reservations. There was agreement, however, on at least partial participation in the Council, the CWG and SWG and the Open Skies Group. The "when not" still needed clarification. Mid-February 1994, Minister Poos received a letter from Commissioner Van den Broek expressing concern that work about enlargement in the EU and WEU did not proceed sufficiently in parallel. Especially the opening up of the WEU Council to the new partners went further than formulas studied in the EU. Of course he was right, but that made the WEU initiative innovative and interesting to the Central Europeans.

Another complication was the effect of the new status on the observers. If the associate partners, who were not yet members of the EU, would get more than the observers, who already belonged to the EU, this could become an element of distortion. The Austrian Ambassador, Hochleitner, in particular was unhappy about this prospect for his country, which was about to join the EU but unlikely to request full membership of WEU. He had a point, but I could not get excited about it as the observers had it in their power to become full members if they so wished. Moreover, they were able to participate in all meetings at Fifteen, an option which was unlikely to be

granted to the Central Europeans. A final issue was the date of entry into force of the new status. The Petersberg decisions on associate members and observers would formally enter into force only after the ratification by all of the Greek accession as full member. It seemed logical to do the same for the new status, but to apply it in practice as soon as possible.

In the meeting with the ambassadors of the Forum of Consultation countries many questions had been asked about which meetings they would be able to attend, on which subjects, and how they would relate to future operational activities. The Nine worked together on the Polish paper and in March came up with several concrete points. They made clear that they were interested in a substantial and not merely formal relationship. On terminology the Nine followed the Polish preference for the label "associate countries" in line with the terminology of the European Union, but prefaced this by considering terminology a secondary issue. Another way to distinguish the new status from the associate membership could be to use the term "associate partners". They had no objections to offering the Baltic states the same status, provided it would not negatively affect its content. They also had a clear preference for a signed political document and not for a legal document and assumed that it would be a collective instrument and not a series of individual arrangements.

With each successive Council meeting we made some progress, but it was not easy. The Council Working Group did useful work on drafting but towards the end the Council needed some lengthy sessions to get the document ready. In March, Juppé and Kinkel sent letters to their colleagues saying that exclusion of the Baltic countries from the enhanced status would not be acceptable. On openness the Netherlands suggested the compromise of alternating Council meetings at Fifteen and Twenty-four, which was accepted by Germany and later became the mainstay of our proposal. The "Document on a Status of Association" accepted in Luxembourg on 9 May did not spell this out, but used the general wording "they may participate in the meetings of the Council ..." The limitation of their attendance was contained in a "Modalities Paper" which would not be published but be made available on request. The reason behind this peculiar arrangement was the general wish to make the political signal towards the new democracies as strong as possible and not obscure it by a mass of detail. The fact that we appeared to do more than we actually promised was made palatable, however, by allowing participation in the regular Council, albeit every other week. Here WEU had taken a lead over NATO and the EU which had created special bodies to discuss with the new democracies.

The Modalities document stated that, in principle, half of the meetings of the Permanent Council would take place with the participation of the associate partners. The partners would participate in the CWG when it prepared for Council meetings which they were to attend and they might propose items for discussion at Council meetings through the Presidency and Secretariat. Their participation in other working groups would be


decided on an ad hoc basis, but they would be given as much information as possible on WEU's activities. In pursuance of the possibility offered in the main political document to associate themselves with Petersberg missions, the partners were invited to provide details of forces which they considered suitable for these operations. These details would be held by the Planning Cell alongside the list of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU).



Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. (Photo: NATO)

The new status gave rise to questions from both the US and the Russian Federation. On 25 April 1994, I visited Moscow and was received by Foreign Minister Kozyrev. I was able to explain the role and activities of WEU including the enhanced status for the Forum of Consultation. Kozyrev, who was accompanied by four assistants and a small group of journalists, said that the activities of the European institutions were increasing and should find new patterns. Russia was interested in a substantive partnership which eliminated the barriers of the past and did not create new ones. Hearing about the new associate partnership he said: "We, too, have to

think about an appropriate relationship." Russia was interested in strengthening its relations "in a proper form, depending on each institution." Obviously for the benefit of the press he mentioned the need for conversion of the defence industry and expressed the hope that Russia would be able to tender for Western defence contracts and to work jointly with our defence industries. He also showed a particular interest in the commercial contacts envisaged by the WEU Satellite Centre. The most important aspect of our short discussion was that Kozyrev did not in any way react negatively to the plans WEU had for bringing in the Central European countries. I did not ask him for a reaction, but if he so wished he could have commented on my exposé. As far as our relations with Russia were concerned, I said that after the May ministerial there would be scope for enhanced contacts but then in a bilateral and not a multilateral framework.



The author with UK Secretary of State Douglas Hurd and UK Permanent Representative Sir John Weston at the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 9 June 1994. (Photo: NATO)

My discussion with Kozyrev was resumed at the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). At dinner in the splendid Dolma-bahce Palace he was surprised to see me in a NATO environment. I explained that the Secretaries-General of NATO and WEU attended the other organisation's ministerial meetings. The next day he explained his concept of European partnership to the plenary. He saw a central role for the CSCE and for the NACC in the coordination of politico-military activities. Therefore, the NACC should become more independent, not exclusively based on NATO, and equipped with a small secretariat. The


NACC should also implement the Partnership for Peace. Given the increasing cost of peacekeeping Russia had to bear on the territory of the former Soviet Union he called on the international community for help by sending observers and providing technical assistance. For this purpose a special working group on peacekeeping could be created. He would come to Brussels to sign the framework document for PiP as soon as the preliminary negotiations had been completed but he could not come twice and therefore wanted to combine it with the inauguration of the individual partnership programme reflecting Russia's role in European security. He agreed with Klaus Kinkel that we should not establish a fixed hierarchy between the institutions but rather a flexible arrangement in which the CSCE could play a leading role. The CSCE was best placed because it had the widest membership and competence and would be able to deal with the problem of aggressive nationalism. After this constructive speech it came as a disappointment that first Kozyrev and after his departure Ambassador Afanasievsky raised so many objections to the draft communiqué that the meeting was considerably prolonged. They objected to passages on CFE, to a paragraph on Nagorno-Karabakh which made no reference to Russian mediation and to a paragraph on WEU which in its final form read:

10. We welcome the adoption of a status of association with WEU for the countries of Central Europe which have been partners in the Forum of Consultation. This initiative is fully complementary to the cooperation within the framework of the Alliance, particularly the Partnership for Peace.

Chairman Sergio Balanzino had proposed omitting all passages between brackets, which apparently had been suggested in the drafting committee by Russia. But this led to a wording on CFE which referred only to ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and full compliance with all its provisions. Russia had the opposite aim of obtaining some flexibility in its application, especially in the Caucasus. After lunch I had the opportunity to ask Kozyrev whether he had a problem with WEU. He answered no, but he had been surprised to find a paragraph on its enlargement. He did not see why he should welcome this; perhaps he could take note, but if so there should also be a reference to the extension of the Commonwealth of Independent States. More important, however, was a positive reference to "all mediation efforts" in the text on Nagorno-Karabakh; he could not come home without it. In the end, the perseverance of Balanzino produced compromises on every point in an increasingly tedious battle among ambassadors, many of the ministers having left. It took most of the afternoon and left an unpleasant taste in our mouths. I got the impression that Afanassievsky had instructions to show that without attention to the Russian points in future there would not be any communiqué. Or did he want to show Russian discontent about the NAC communiqué of the previous day?

Although unpleasant, and at times impossible, I could not help but admire his diplomatic skills and calm reasoning against the onslaught of everybody else. He showed his mettle as Stalin's interpreter. At one point he went too far and said that the atmosphere of Istanbul, which had one of the largest bazaars in the world, was permeating our meeting. Equally composed, Balanzino immediately retorted: "You bring a wind that does not come from a bazaar but from very cold places." In the end, the paragraph on WEU remained with a "take note" instead of "welcome" and a second sentence changed into:

This initiative, for those who participate, is designed to contribute to security and stability in the whole of Europe and as such is fully complementary to the cooperation within the framework of the Alliance, particularly the Partnership for Peace.



Family portrait at the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 9 June 1994 with NATO Deputy Secretary-General Balanzino in the middle. (Photo: NATO)

It was my first and last meeting of the NACC. I returned with mixed feelings. This certainly had not been an occasion of cooperation and I wondered what its future would be.

The reaction of the United States to the status of associate partner also brought an element of surprise. US Permanent Representative to NATO, Hunter, reacted to the weekly briefing in the Permanent Council by the WEU presidency on May 4, a few days before our Ministerial. Apparently, he felt that there had been insufficient transparency about our formulation

of the enhanced status for the Forum countries and he asked some questions. Did WEU regard its focus on the Central European states as compatible with the NATO summit's emphasis on an inclusive non-discriminating approach to the new democracies in the East? Did we have a read-out on Russian views, especially as Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov had told the US that Russia's plan to join PfP could be affected by the WEU initiative? Would the associate partners have the right to consult with the WEU Council in the event of a threat to peace under the Brussels Treaty? And finally, the most important question, unveiling American sensitivities best, might WEU extend full membership to the new partners before they became EU members, and would that be affected by NATO membership for some Central European states that were not yet EU members?

Ambassador Hunter did not send me a copy of his questions, but I came to know about them as the Luxembourg Presidency consulted the WEU Council on a reply. I was most surprised about the alleged statement of Mamedov as I had had the opportunity to discuss the matter with him directly when he came to see me on 14 April. He was one of the more talkative Russians and it had not been easy to interrupt his eloquence, but he had shown himself very positive towards WEU and did not raise any objections to our plans with the Forum countries. On the contrary, he was looking forward to a structured bilateral dialogue with WEU, including practical issues such as space and Open Skies. He was also positive on PfP and said that Defence Minister Grachev might come to sign it and not Kozyrev. That might have been the planning in Moscow to save Kozyrev from another attack on his alleged pro-Western policies, but in the end he did come for the signing.

Another indication that Russia did not worry about our associate partner initiative came from Germany. Minister Kinkel had told Kozyrev after our Kirchberg meeting that the new status was no backdoor entry to NATO membership, to which Kozyrev had said that he approached it with great tranquility; Russia was big enough to live with it. His spokesman, however, had reacted more negatively to the Kirchberg Declaration.

Ambassador Hunter's questions were answered bilaterally by the Luxembourg Presidency, which also informed the Canadians. The question came up again during the Joint Council with NATO on 29 June where we introduced our CJTF paper. Ambassador Linster summarised our replies and I reported on my contacts with Kozyrev. Hunter repeated that there could be no question of backdoor guarantees; these questions had to be discussed in NATO. Several ambassadors helped me in alleviating his anxiety. Migliorini said that there would be no question of a separate track on collective defence guarantees. Casanova and Hartmann emphasised the compatibility of our political signal with PfP and Weston added that, during the signing of the framework document, Kozyrev did not give the impression of being concerned about the associate partnership measures in WEU.

Leaving the meeting I had hoped that nobody else would raise the question with Kozyrev. With so much prodding he might get concerned!

On 26-27 May 1994, I was present at the Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe. It was the outcome of the initiative of Prime Minister Balladur to make clear to the new democracies of Central Europe that their chances of joining the European Union would be conditioned by the resolution of their minority and border problems in a spirit of good neighbourliness. At first, the initiative was welcomed only half-heartedly. It was compared to the earlier *confederation* proposals of President Mitterrand, which had flopped because it was too obvious an attempt to provide alternatives to full membership of the Union. Only Hungary, with its minorities in all neighbouring countries, was enthusiastic about the new plan. Gradually, however, the Twelve warmed to the idea and took it over as an initiative of the EU as a whole. The European Council in Brussels in December 1993 approved a draft which was elaborated by a working group under Ambassador Thuysbaert and later completed under the chairmanship of Ambassador Stathatos. Thuysbaert came to WEU to brief the Council on the progress made. The original Balladur memorandum had devoted a paragraph to WEU, suggesting it to study the admission as associate members those countries which had signed a "Europe agreement" with the EU and to develop military cooperation with them, particularly in the field of peacekeeping. The question was asked whether rapidly available units could be designated in advance. Of course, the designation "associate member" raised eyebrows in the Council, but the overall intent fitted in with our own attempts to draw the Central Europeans closer to WEU. A more serious objection to the first memorandum concerned the paragraph on the consolidation of frontiers which said that, without taking sides a priori, minor rectifications of borders could not be excluded, which could subsequently be consecrated by the Conference, thus giving them a collective guarantee. This suggestion met with the same negative response as the Netherlands' ideas on former Yugoslavia in July 1991. Borders should not be touched and minority problems should not be solved by changing the borders. France did not insist and later drafts only talked about the inviolability of frontiers.

The original objective of the Pact was to stabilise the Central European countries with a "vocation" to join the EU, but others should be invited as well: the US and Canada as participants in the European equilibrium and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova as countries having border problems with Central Europe or minorities from that region. The concluding document of 1994 developed the concept of regional negotiation tables foreseen in the 1992 Helsinki Document, and created two round tables, which could be chaired by the EU, one for the Baltic region and one for the other Central and Eastern European countries. The Baltic round table "should discuss general political issues of the region and should promote regional cooperation relating to, for example, integration of populations of

foreign origin, national minorities, language training, ombudsman, transborder activities and maritime cooperation, cooperation among regions of neighbouring countries". The final conference would be held a year later, which would entrust the Pact of Stability to the CSCE. This was realised in March 1995.

My own intervention pointed out that enhancing security and stability had been one of WEU's priority tasks over recent years and that the establishment of the WEU Forum of Consultation in June 1992, followed by the creation of a new status of Associate Partners a few weeks before the present conference, were precisely aimed at this objective. It was in the logic of the European construction that, as these countries moved closer to the EU, their links with WEU as the Union's defence component should likewise be strengthened. Viewed from this angle it should be clear that this new status was not directed against anyone. We looked forward to a close bilateral relationship with all other countries involved in European security. I allowed myself to make a remark which I had often made in preceding years when people talked too easily of stability: I emphasised that stability was not a simple concept and that we were often more aware of instability than stability. Stability was easy to recognise, but difficult to define. Yet, it had to be our primary objective, also for countries which had a more or less homogeneous population.

The US statement by Peter Tarnof, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said little about the substance of the pact, but showed unexpected enthusiasm for the CSCE. Minister Jeszensky made a declaration of interpretation, naming subsidiarity and decentralisation as principles for the treatment of minorities, Kozyrev did not give a clear indication whether Russia would join the round table on the Baltic. In the evening we were received at the Elysée, where President Mitterrand delivered a philosophical homily about European affairs, sitting behind a desk. He thought that a pact was better than a treaty, because the latter could have the connotation of winners and losers.

The last time I discussed enlargement with US representatives was after the SACLANT transfer of command ceremony in Norfolk, Virginia, where Admiral Miller handed over to General Sheehan on 31 October 1994. Secretary of Defense Perry organised a short working luncheon with NATO Secretary-General Claes and myself, Secretary of Defence Rifkind, Generals Shalikashvili and Joulwan and some others. He informed us that, during the NATO ministerials of December, Secretary Christopher and himself would propose to discuss during 1995 the process of how other nations might enter the Alliance, but would consider it premature to define to whom or when this should apply. Instead criteria for membership should be defined. Rifkind, being the only other defence minister, spoke first. To him, reforms in the candidate countries were the most important point, including reform of their military structures. He also pleaded not to take Partnership for Peace as a secondary programme and was unhappy about some denigrating

statements from US officials. Perry agreed and wanted to push PfP as much as possible, including the funding. Shalikashvili added that, for all practical purposes, PfP already amounted to a non-Article V-type of membership of the Alliance. My own comment was that the value of criteria for membership tended to remain ambiguous. In the end, it was a political decision which should not be made difficult by everybody arguing that his country fulfilled all criteria. Perry then moved away from criteria and talked of a process which should be linked with that of European integration. He added that it would not be conceivable to the US to have WEU members which would not be members of NATO. I did not contradict him, but said that would also depend on the willingness of NATO to take in all the countries which would join the EU. That was a point which stuck with Willy Claes. In later conferences I heard him admit the problem arising from the enlargement of the EU with new members which NATO could not or did not want to admit. Would that prevent them from being fully involved in a European security and defence policy?

After the Kirchberg ministerial, we immediately applied the new status. The first session "at 24" was on 7 June, which also happened to be the 900th meeting of the WEU Council. From there on we used this format every other week, arranging the agenda in such a way that it would provide maximum interest to our new partners. Yugoslavia always figured prominently, but also Baltic relations with Russia. We added monthly thematic reflections and had interesting discussions on Ukraine, Russia, the future of CSCE and the situation in the Balkans, with substantial inputs from the partners. I tried to prepare myself well for those discussions so that I could stimulate debate by asking questions or linking it to developments in other organisations. The Council table could seat 24 delegations but we installed an electronic device to register who was asking for the floor. We also made it a point to seat all the delegations in alphabetical order and not according to their category of participation. Technically we managed without any difficulty. We still had a problem with the working groups and the format of the ministerial sessions. When the Netherlands announced their paper "An approach to the formulation of a common European defence policy" France wanted to deal with it at 24, but most of the others found defence policy the wrong subject with which to start our work with the associate partners. In the end it was decided to have a few rounds in the SWG at 15 and then, in November, open the working group to the 24. France also wanted to conduct the Ministerial at Noordwijk entirely at 24, which would leave out the 15 altogether. This was resolved by having a short meeting at 15 before lunch after the defence ministers had concluded their WEAG meeting on armaments cooperation. Lunch and afternoon session would be at 24.

Looking back on the new status, I regarded it as one of the most tangible results of my tenure as Secretary-General. It seemed the appropriate response to changed circumstances, where security would be furthered

more through participation than through formal guarantees. For some considerable time WEU would be ahead on this in comparison with NATO and the EU. I always rejected the criticism that WEU would be weakened by the four different categories of participants. Only in this way could we combine the dual task of becoming the security dimension of the EU and the European pillar of NATO and at the same time have a dynamic approach towards enlargement. In a no-threat situation, stability in Central Europe would be our principal concern and stability could be promoted on a broad front of activity. We had the added advantage that Russia had no problems with EU and WEU enlargement. They probably did not like it, because ultimately it would result in new dividing lines as well, but they could not reject the logic of integration. Moreover, Russia too would benefit from enhanced relations with the EU, albeit not as a future member. Their tranquillity about an extension of WEU might have been inspired by a low opinion of European capabilities and willingness to act. Moscow was primarily concerned by American power coming close to its Western borders. Whatever the reason, WEU had a unique opportunity to apply the promotion of security through participation. In spite of what many Central Europeans proclaimed there was no real security vacuum. Of course, nobody knew how Russia would develop or whether a new security system for the whole of Europe would really take shape. All the talk about a new security architecture did not help much as nobody knew what it meant. It only became a catchword because it sounded so constructive. As time progressed and Russia had great difficulty in dealing with problems on its periphery, anxiety about military intervention outside its borders did subside. Propagating the concept of former Soviet territory as "the near abroad" where Russia would have special interests scared its neighbours again, but fortunately little more has been heard of the term. Also, Russia needed time to adjust to the downsizing of the former Soviet Union and to digest psychologically that at the end of the Cold War their superpower status, derived from their military arsenal, was eclipsing and economic reform needed priority. For that reason I was not enthusiastic about early NATO enlargement. It would give the impression that the security dimension was still so important that it merited being advanced on its own. It would also make it much more difficult to develop the new relationships we all professed to espouse. Of course, I recognised the wish of the Central Europeans to belong to as many Western organisations as possible including those where the US played a major role. I also understood their concern, in the words of Czech Ambassador Lukas, about the extremely low degree of predictability stemming from the absence of basic consensus on the future role of Russia in international relations. Therefore, I always urged everybody, Russians included, to define their foreign policy interests as a precondition for international understanding. Agreement might not always follow, not least because foreign policy was increasingly acquiring a domestic component connected with other issues, but nevertheless

understanding what motivates the other side remains the basis of diplomacy. In Russia an attempt had been made by members of their Security Council, chaired by Sergei Karaganov, but unfortunately the debate was overshadowed by the excitement over NATO expansion. In any case, it was an almost impossible task because, as Guéhenno said on another occasion, it is difficult to be clear if you do not have an idea about yourself. The process of finding a new identity would take a long time, but should not be impeded by unnecessary complications. I regarded early NATO enlargement as one of them.

Relations with Russia and Ukraine followed the tripartite model developed for Austria and Slovenia before these countries became observer and associate partner, respectively. Their ambassadors in Brussels met periodically with the Secretary-General and a representative of the Presidency. With Russia an agreement was concluded for the delivery of satellite imagery to the Satellite Centre. With Ukraine a kind of framework agreement was signed to make long-haul aircraft available to WEU, which would be followed up with bilateral agreements in a concrete operation. A Russian reaction to a similar offer is still awaited.

Chapter Twelve Departure and Subsequent Developments

My term of office would end in May 1994. After the summer holiday of 1993, I told Ambassador Linster of Luxembourg that I would be prepared to stay on till the end of 1996, at which time the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference was expected. Having arrived in Brussels only in January 1993, I felt that WEU had not yet fully settled down and I preferred to hand over to a successor when the future of WEU had been further defined. In addition, an extension of my tenure would cover the period till my retirement at 65 and avoid the problem of interim employment. Manfred Wörner's term of office had been extended for three years, in spite of an earlier decision to limit the NATO term to four years with a possible extension of one year. Soon it became clear that London was opposed to extending my term. John Weston did not say so outright, but told me that his government wanted to stick to the five-year period. Peter Kooijmans, who had succeeded Hans van den Broek as Netherlands Foreign Minister, told me that I would not get any support from Douglas Hurd. That did not come as a great surprise, although our personal relationship had always been good. I had known Douglas from the time when we were both dealing with European affairs in our respective governments. I may have offended him in 1992 by a story in the Financial Times quoting me as saying that the EC - of which he held the presidency - had accomplished nothing in Yugoslavia. I had apologised for this in a letter to Jeremy Greenstock, the UK representative to the WEU Council, saying that I had referred only to the military side of the conflict and not to the considerable humanitarian efforts. In any case, I knew that the UK was not enamoured of my active propagation of WEU and was closely monitoring my activities abroad. It was a greater disappointment when Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the French Ambassador, told me in the nicest of words that Paris had greatly appreciated the work I had done, but felt that the next phase should be left to a new man. Then the process of searching for a successor started. Marc Eyskens was proposed by Belgium, but withdrew when Willy Claes became Secretary-General of NATO. In Luxembourg, there were rumours that Jacques Poos might be interested if the elections turned out badly. Italy came with Rognoni, a former Defence Minister, but his advanced age was

considered a drawback. As time was running out, without a consensus in view, Minister Poos managed to obtain an extension of my term with six months in the margins of an EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 28 March 1994. He immediately informed me by telephone. New candidates were asked to come forward. Italy now proposed its Ambassador to NATO, Jannuzzi, who had been the first director of the secretariat of the European Political Cooperation. Spain proposed the former president of the European Parliament, Enrique Baron, and Portugal José Cutileiro, who had given his name to a plan for Bosnia as assistant to Lord Carrington during the Portuguese presidency. In the past, decisions had been reached by consensus, but Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Mierlo suggested to select my successor by a simple majority vote of the nine full members. In theory, a tie could have resulted if every candidate obtained three votes, but that did not happen. A poll was taken on Thursday 10 November and Cutileiro obtained five votes. A Dutch suggestion to allow some time for a hand-over was declined and the Permanent Council said goodbye to me the next day. It all happened a bit too quickly for me, and I was at a loss for words. I said that I had to collect my thoughts over the weekend and would respond at the ministerial meeting at Noordwijk on Monday. I only expressed the hope that my successor would be spared the tendency towards micro-management by the Council, especially in personnel matters, because it made running an international secretariat virtually impossible. At Noordwijk, Netherlands Defence Minister, Joris Voorhoeve, bestowed the second highest civilian order upon me, after which I briefly addressed the Ministers. Later I received a Grand Cross from Belgium after an audience with King Albert II and from Luxembourg in a cordial ceremony in the office of Jacques Poos. Among his colleagues the Luxembourg minister always had supported me most.

After the Noordwijk meeting, work of a conceptual nature continued. During the Portuguese Presidency a document was drawn up containing a common reflection on the new European security conditions, in order to identify both common interests and potential risks. The paper was drafted at 27 and, during the subsequent Spanish Presidency, turned into a 39-page long document entitled "European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries" issued in Madrid on 14 November 1995. At Noordwijk, France had put forward a proposal to draft a White Paper on European security. Originally, the French idea was to make a summary of the various national White Papers recently issued. The Common Concept did not quite fit that description, but nevertheless was an important effort, first because a clear conception of shared security interests would be a necessary precondition for a common military action and, second because it was done with all 27 countries around the WEU table. Thus, it demonstrated in practice the notion of "security through participation" by drawing in the associate partners and the new members of the EU, who had never taken part in this kind of security discussion before.

The paper turned out to be a mixture of a rewrite of both the Hague Platform of 1987 and the anodyne EPC declaration on European identity of 1973. Its first chapter dealt with the common security interests of Europe, including the new risks, and an analysis of the European security environment attempting to define the relations with other parts of the world, far away and nearby. The second chapter dealt with the contribution WEU countries could make to European security by enhancing capabilities in the field of crisis prevention and management. The common values and interests were divided into three broad categories:

1. Democratic values and human rights, the defence of peace, international order and the rule of law.
2. Europe's worldwide economic interests, including the maintenance of communications within its territory, access to technology and the supply of energy and raw materials. Partnership agreements with Russia and Ukraine, as well as new forms of cooperation with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, were mentioned as helping to prevent economic imbalances from becoming threats to the security of our continent.
3. The security of European citizens in the world.

The new risks were listed under four headings:

1. Potential armed conflict.
2. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
3. International terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and uncontrolled and illegal immigration.
4. Environmental risks.

The *tour d'horizon* of the European security environment included the following passage in the section on Russia:

79. However, there are risks. Serious violations of human rights have occurred during the Chechen crisis. The crisis illustrates the dangers of internal instability and the possible threat to regional security. The sheer size of Russia's conventional forces and its extensive nuclear arsenal makes democratic control over its armed forces and full compliance with its arms control and disarmament obligations all the more indispensable. Europe had a vital interest in the fulfilment by Russia and other CIS states of their obligations in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields and supports further development of disarmament measures. A lack of effective controls over civil and military fissile material adds to the danger of proliferation.

On the Commonwealth of Independent States it stated:

85. The attachment of the twelve newly independent states to the CIS framework varies, and some have publicly distanced themselves from certain areas of CIS cooperation. Within the CIS, Russia continues to have a predominant position. Although there are now hundreds of CIS agreements, many have not been implemented. It remains unclear how far the CIS will develop institutionally in the future. To the extent that the CIS framework is based on voluntary relations and a genuine pursuit of mutual interests, a further development of the CIS in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, could contribute to the stability of the area. It is important for Europe to continue to support the sovereignty and independence of individual CIS member states.

The section on the role of nuclear forces in deterrence caused a problem with the new members of the EU, who had formerly based their policy on neutrality. It was possible only to repeat quotes from the Alliance's Strategic Concept and the Preliminary Conclusions of Noordwijk. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden recalled in a footnote that they were not party to the decisions referred to in this paragraph. Considerable attention was given to the experience drawn from the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The two most relevant paragraphs are quoted in full:

174. On the political front, experiences in former Yugoslavia can be useful for future WEU operations:

- The political aims of the mission must be set out clearly from the start; the mission should be reviewed continually to ensure that tasks are not gradually taken on in theatre which deviate from the overall political aim.
- Adequate capabilities and an effective decision-making structure to undertake the Petersberg tasks must be available to WEU.
- The need for closer relations between the EU and WEU. Besides the institutional questions being discussed in preparation of the IGC, WEU needs to develop mechanisms for close consultation between the two bodies on both political and operational matters. This will be particularly important for WEU missions of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction which, like Mostar, are likely to involve overall political guidance by the EU, if not actual participation by civilian agencies coordinated by the EU.
- The need for closer relations between WEU and NATO.

- The need for a clear understanding of the respective roles of other Organisations involved (for instance, UN or OSCE), in response to a crisis and for closer coordination of their responses.

175. In operational terms, WEU countries need to build on this experience to enhance capabilities in the following fields:

- There must be a clear channel of communication between the WEU Council and WEU forces. Experience indicates that, besides the role of liaison played thus far by the WEU Presidency, there needs to be a proper channel of communication linking WEU elements involved in an operation and the WEU Council.
- For each WEU operation, there must be a single chain of command for all WEU military forces involved, in order to avoid confusion and delay in carrying out tasks.
- Arrangements need to be devised for ensuring efficient coordination in the theatre of operations between the military and civilian elements of an operation, in particular where the civilian elements are provided by another organisation such as WEU.
- The need for WEU to establish or to have access to an adequate observation capability and to develop an intelligence processing capability which are decisive for the conduct of operations in complex, shifting politico-military environments.
- The need to have transport capabilities available permitting the rapid projection of forces and their deployment to the theatre of operations as required. In this field, Europeans currently call upon other countries or the international market for heavy airlift.

Decisions of the Lisbon Ministerial of 15 May 1995 included the establishment of the Politico-Military Group (which had already been working on CJTF) and the approval of a Situation Centre for WEU and an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell. The member states of the Eurocorps had agreed to carry out the exercise WEU-CRISEX 95-96 and proposed to use it for verification of WEU procedures. Later on, this exercise was extended over three phases and included WEU in its entirety. The scenario was based on a UN mandate to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid, but - ominous detail concerning the link with CFSP - not requested by the European Union. The Satellite Centre at Torrejón was made a permanent body at the end of its experimental phase. New Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) were formed in EUROFOR and EURO-MARFOR by France, Italy and Spain, to which Portugal later acceded.⁷¹

Austria, Finland and Sweden announced their participation in the police contingent in support of the EU administrator in Mostar. A document was approved on "Emergency Responses to Humanitarian Crises: A Role for a WEU Humanitarian Task Force" which included the interfaces with civilian agencies. The Portuguese Presidency ended with a seminar at Sintra on the "WEU Contribution to the Future European Security and Defence Architecture".

The Madrid meeting adopted the Common Concept, which has been described earlier. It also invited Greece to join the Space Group and the associate partners to participate in exercise CRISEX 95-96. The declaration referred to an exchange of letters between Minister Solana as Chairman-in-Office of WEU and Minister Kozyrev, about WEU's relationship with Russia. This formalised regular contacts between the Presidency, Secretary-General and a representative of Russia. Of equal importance to the Common Concept was the approval of the WEU contribution to the European Intergovernmental Conference of 1996, which we shall discuss in detail later.

The Birmingham Declaration of 7 May 1996 welcomed the beginning of the supply of Helios imagery to the Satellite Centre and the agreement with Russia on the provision of its imagery. Ministers agreed on measures to implement the WEU exercise policy, including the establishment of an annual WEU exercise planning conference. Following a UK Eurolift initiative, they approved a concept for strategic mobility to facilitate the conduct of Petersberg missions. Ministers agreed that the observer countries should be able to participate more fully in Petersberg missions and - last but not least - decided to send a fact-finding mission to Africa.

At Ostend on 19 November, Ministers adopted proposals for WEU to assist humanitarian landmine clearance operations, taking into account the EU's joint actions on anti-personnel mines which envisaged a potential role for WEU. This role would be essentially to coordinate national offers, to act as a forum for WEU nations to assemble a coherent package of military assistance, to develop local training capabilities and to disseminate information on detection and clearance of landmines. The Ostend Declaration welcomed the elaboration, as a first step, of profiles for illustrative WEU missions drawn from the spectrum of Petersberg tasks for which the WEU deems it necessary to call upon NATO assets and capabilities. These profiles had been transmitted to NATO, which would now conduct military planning for these missions in coordination with WEU. At last real work on CJTF had begun. It would include the elaboration of a framework agreement on modalities for the transfer of NATO assets and capabilities for use by WEU. An interesting addition was the wish of WEU to become actively involved in the Alliance's defence planning process. This could become a new way of associating France with NATO's defence planning, in which they did not participate nationally. As a first concrete step WEU decided to make an input into the 1997 NATO ministerial guidance for the planning

process. Finally, a new WEU subsidiary body was created known as the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO). The EUCLID Research Cell would move to step 2, with the legal capacity to place contracts; it would initially be the executive body of the WEAO, as a precursor to the European Armaments Agency.

1. The Intergovernmental Conference

At Maastricht, both the EU and WEU decided to re-examine the provisions on security policy in 1996. For the EU this was done in Article J.4 sub 6, which stated that the provisions of this article might be revised on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the WEU Council to the European Council, which should include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then. WEU took this up in paragraph 8 of its own declaration, stating that WEU would re-examine the present provisions in 1996 and adding that this re-examination would extend to the relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.

In 1995, the institutions of the European Union presented reports evaluating their experience with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The European Commission⁷² was critical: success had been "variable" and the start of the CFSP "laborious". Originally, Joint Actions had been considered the key instrument, supported by Common Positions, but no clear distinction had been followed in practice. Consequently, confusion reigned as to the role of the different instruments. Sometimes Joint Actions were limited to ad hoc diplomatic or administrative steps, while Common Positions ranged from fundamental orientations to concrete measures. In day-to-day work the old method of the EPC of issuing declarations on topical issues was continued, although these were not foreseen in the Treaty. The Commission noted a serious deficiency in the absence of any treaty provisions to resolve problems between the two pillars. Examples were: the Joint Action on dual-use goods, which had a large impact on the first pillar, was decided by unanimity and subject to an obscure and partly non-Community legal regime; and the financing of Joint Actions through the Community budget, which created new conflicts of procedure. The Commission was also critical of the conduct of the Presidency, which often tended to promote national policies instead of Union interests, and of the representation of the Union through a troika of changing composition. The report concluded that there was a need for a better capability for common analysis, improved decision-making and a clearer way to represent the Union abroad.

In my view, two connected points should be added.⁷³ The Treaty on European Union did not define either security or defence or their relationship. Maastricht was an improvement over the Single Act of Luxembourg, in going beyond the political and economic aspects of security and including in the CFSP all questions related to the security of the Union.

However, issues having defence implications were excluded from the procedures set out in Article J.3. At the time of Maastricht we thought that this referred to the possibility of qualified majority voting (QMV), but in practice it was given an extensive interpretation: the CFSP Council would refrain from considering any Joint Action which contained a military element. The second point concerned the word "defence implications". Nothing WEU did was defence in the traditional sense of protecting national independence and territorial integrity. The WEU Treaty had its important automatic military assistance clause, but the implementation of collective defence, to the extent that it was still a priority, would be left to NATO. After the end of the Cold War, we concentrated on the role of our military forces in peace-support operations outside our borders. Their purpose would be to support wider political objectives through their presence, comparable to the role national police play in their own society. Therefore, the wording "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union, which have defence implications" should be amended to define WEU as the operational or at least the military dimension of the EU.

At Maastricht, two methods were envisaged to alleviate the problem of unanimity in the CFSP. The Council could decide that for the follow-up of a Joint Action - itself being agreed upon unanimously - qualified majority voting would be applied. The other possibility, opened up in a declaration (Declaration 27) annexed to the Treaty, would be constructive abstention, i.e. acquiescing in the decision even though not fully agreeing with it. The first option had never been used, the second only once. No wonder, therefore, that formulas have been proposed to avoid the Union grinding to a halt. The best way would be a system in which a small minority could not stop a qualified majority from going forward. Preferably, all implementation of Joint Actions should be governed by QMV, but this might make it difficult to start any new Joint Action. Therefore, it would be necessary to add the proviso that those voting against would not be bound to participate in the implementation of the decision. This would make the policy less "common", but it should nevertheless be carried out on behalf of the EU as a whole and, where appropriate, be financed by the Union budget. This might raise the old question of invoking a "vital interest" to block a decision. In any case, a vote should not be called hastily and members should be able to explain fully why they consider the proposed action inimical to their interests. European solidarity also requires that partners show some understanding for each other's positions. Other proposals, such as the country having to justify its interest, followed by a vote either in the Council or in the European Parliament, all run into the problem that a country wants to be the final judge of its own interests. Procedural solutions, therefore, have limited value, although the obligation to explain why a vital interest is invoked, might have some deterrent effect. Anyway, it would seem wrong to resort to a consensus-minus-one formula, which would amount to ganging up against a single country. This method was provided

for in the OSCE for grave violations of human rights and applied against Yugoslavia. Within the EU it would be far better to have a more institutional approach based on QMV. Should a country find itself in a minority of one, the pressure to acquiesce should be great enough and, hopefully, develop into a unwritten convention. Applying QMV would cover this case anyway, without singling out anyone.

2. The WEU Input: Three Options

The incoming Spanish Presidency - simultaneously of the EU and WEU - had the triple task of chairing the Reflection Group of the EU, preparing a WEU input for the IGC and finalising the Common Concept on European security at 27. The Reflection Group, chaired by Carlos Westendorp, agreed that the Atlantic Alliance would be an essential element of collective security in Europe. As the European pillar of NATO, WEU should progressively shape the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). As defence remained in the domain of national sovereignty, it should be governed by consensus at the international level. An element of flexibility, however, should be introduced with the rule that no country could be obliged to participate in a military action of the Union, but equally that no one would be able to prevent a majority undertaking such action. Any state declining to participate should nevertheless show solidarity with the action taken, both financially and politically. On the subject of a merger of WEU with the EU, opinion remained divided. Those countries not belonging to WEU as full members did not regard it as feasible on account of their special position. Yet, a majority of full members found it a logical consequence of the objectives of the Maastricht Treaty: a defence dimension of the Union with a guarantee of mutual assistance would be the expression of a wider solidarity going beyond the economic aspects. Some wished to establish a precise timetable, others merely wanted to examine the question. Intermediate solutions steered between the current autonomy of WEU and full integration, either by establishing some subordination of WEU to the European Union or by a binding agreement through which WEU would implement the decisions of the EU having defence implications. In October 1995 a Franco-German group of parliamentarians firmly supported a "dynamic convergence" leading to the integration of WEU into the EU in the foreseeable future.

The WEU contribution to the IGC was published at the Madrid ministerial on 14 December 1995. It started out with an evaluation of the Maastricht provisions on the relations with the EU and NATO and on the operational role of WEU. With regard to the European Union, the important observation was made that WEU's task to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union implied in particular the existence of an EU-WEU crisis management mechanism, but this had yet to be developed. Therefore, crisis management exercises were needed to define flexible

procedures which would allow for a truly operational WEU response. On NATO two points deserve mentioning in particular: the first relates to considering possibilities for more frequent introduction of joint positions into the Alliance consultation process. The second concerned the distribution of tasks and stated that "an informal view is emerging according to which entrusting an operation to NATO or to WEU will often depend on whether the North American Allies participate or not". On the operational side, greater coordination through WEU of the contributions that European countries make or will make on an individual basis to UN missions could ensure a higher political visibility of the organisation. The paper also quantified the scope of future missions by saying that, in its present state, WEU should aim for being able to plan and control a Petersberg operation at up to army corps level, taking into account factors such as complexity, intensity and duration.

For the purpose of contributing directly to the IGC, the second part of the paper was most relevant, dealing with the future framework of European security and defence. The IGC would need to harness to best effect the diverse contributions to security and defence that European nations were able to make. Whatever course the institutional development of the EU and WEU might follow, the possibility for participation by WEU associate members, observers and associate partners in the ESDI must be maintained and further developed. Equally, the European institution responsible for defence must continue to act as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. So far, there was agreed language. On the future institutional development of the ESDI there was no consensus and the best the paper could do was to identify three broad options.

Option A. Reinforced Partnership between an Autonomous WEU and the European Union. WEU would be preserved as an autonomous organisation with its own separate Treaty base and the Modified Brussels Treaty would remain in force and unaltered after 1998. The basic rule for decision-making on matters with defence implications should be consensus, both in the CFSP and in the WEU framework. There would be no participation of the European Commission and Parliament. Existing WEU bodies would be preserved, but the reinforced partnership would find its expression at the highest political level by the creation of a WEU Summit, meeting as necessary back-to-back with the European Council. The European Council, to which the WEU Secretary-General might be invited when it discussed issues affecting the CFSP, could make proposals to the WEU body. For its part, the WEU Summit would have responsibility for formulating general guidelines on collective European military action. At lower levels the WEU Ministerial Council could meet back-to-back with the EU General Affairs Council, meetings could take place between the Political Committee of the CFSP and the WEU Permanent Council, and EU-WEU task forces could be established for the duration of individual operations.

This option reflected the UK position as set out in their memorandum

of 2 March 1995. It gave priority to further increasing WEU's capability to carry out the tasks set out in the Petersberg Declaration, rather than to effect changes to the legal and institutional framework. The idea of WEU Summits was not new. The Netherlands had toyed with the idea during 1991, when it was in a difficult position with their refusal to recognise a role for the European Council in defence matters. Later the French Defence Minister, Léotard, suggested it in a speech to a conference organised by the European Movement in Paris on 3 March 1994. But I understood his suggestion to imply a single meeting to establish a European rapid reaction force and European command arrangements. Asked to give my opinion prior to his speech, I replied that summits were only useful when they could decide something concrete, which required adequate preparation. The UK proposal did not get any support. Everybody regarded it as cumbersome and an artificial device to keep the EU and WEU separate. Thinking prior to and during Maastricht had gone in the opposite direction of having the European Council discuss any question, without any taboos, as I had suggested in my personal reflections. The only countries which obviously would benefit would be the associate members, who could not participate in the meetings of the European Council.

Option B. Intermediate Options towards an EU-WEU Institutional Convergence. These would be characterised by the establishment of firm juridical and/or political commitments between the two organisations and would be feasible only if the blocking of decisions by non-full members would be made politically difficult. Constructive abstentionism along the lines of Declaration 27 of Maastricht would be the lightest form, still leaving considerable discretion to the state concerned. It read:

The Conference agrees that, with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision, when a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision.

An additional step in the same direction, mentioned in the paper, would be a specific comment not to block the adoption of decisions having defence implications (and therefore addressed to WEU) for which a qualified majority exists. Similarly, countries not participating in an operation - requested by the EU and implemented by a "coalition of the willing" within the WEU framework - could voluntarily abstain from blocking a consensus on follow-up operational decisions, taken in the context of an ongoing operation.

Under this broad option three modalities could be identified, depending on the form of the commitments entered into:

1. *General European Council guidelines.* The European Council would have responsibility for formulating general guidelines also on questions having defence implications. Such guidelines would be addressed to WEU,

which would undertake a political commitment to follow them in order to ensure consistent European action in crisis management. This model came closest to what I had in mind in drafting the February 1991 paper. It also fitted the German system of *Richtlinienkompetenz*. A weak point remained the continued use of the term "defence implications" instead of a wider term connoting military or operational aspects.

2. *EU instructions to WEU*. In Article J.4 (2) of the Treaty on European Union the word "requests" would be replaced by "instructs". WEU would make clear that it regards itself as the EU's implementing body. Consistent with this approach would be the possibility to take decisions concerning Joint Actions with defence implications: their implementation could be left to "coalitions of the willing". In my view, this option would be less useful. Recent experience with "interlocking" of this kind has not been positive. It would be more important to make the decisions of the European Council applicable to other fora made up of the same member states, than to devise complex and unnecessary cross-linkages between them.

3. *A legally binding link between the EU and WEU*. An agreement would close a legal loophole between WEU and the EU; the Modified Brussels Treaty does not take the existence of the EU into consideration, for the simple reason that in 1954 the Union did not yet exist. This option would make little difference with full merger with the EU.

Option C. Integration of WEU into the EU. This would seem the ultimate objective of the Maastricht Treaty, albeit through a gradual process involving successive phases. In the legal sphere, the Modified Brussels Treaty would disappear, the signatory states availing themselves of the denunciation possibility, after 1998, provided for in Article XII. In return the EU would have to establish a framework for defence/military issues to carry out the work previously done by WEU. Arrangements would have to be made for continuing the participation of associate members and partners. Present WEU relations with NATO would be replaced by a direct relationship between EU and the Alliance. Under this option two modalities could be taken into consideration.

1. *European defence within the CFSP*. The relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty could be incorporated into a review of the present Article J.4 of the EU. In particular, these would include the collective defence commitment in Article V, relations with NATO in Article IV and with the UN in Article VI. If deemed necessary the commitment not to enter into alliances directed against another contracting party of Article VII could be included, as well as provisions covering the Petersberg tasks. The paper said that those members which could not or would not desire to participate in a collective defence commitment could be exempted from that particular arrangement; an opting-out similar to the one already applied to monetary policy. The functions of the Permanent Council and the working groups could be taken over by CFSP organs, but for defence issues the dual format of the Ministerial Council, including defence ministers, could usefully be

applied.

2. *Adoption of a defence protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU)*. Defence would be placed within the EU framework in a way that no country would be compelled to either assume a collective defence commitment or to resort expressly to an opting-out. A dual mechanism would be employed:

- To include in the revised TEU provisions for a common European defence policy, in which all members participate.
- To incorporate, as an annex to the TEU, a protocol for collective defence, open to all EU member states.

The present full members of WEU would be expected to accede and other EU members could "opt in", but for them the mutual defence commitment would be optional. The only complication would be accession of members not belonging to NATO. On this, the paper said that a drifting apart of defence commitments of the members of the EU and NATO must be avoided, as it would weaken the transatlantic security link.

In its conclusions the WEU contribution to the IGC stated that the different modalities under options B and C could either be considered separately or as successive phases of a sequential approach. Whatever the option envisaged, and without prejudging the IGC, all WEU members reaffirmed their agreement to proceed without delay with the strengthening of the relationship, both operational and institutional, between the European Union and WEU. The aim was to achieve greater coherence than at present of European action in the security and defence field, including through an effective and expeditious implementation of EU decisions with defence implications.

The WEU input into the IGC had considerable conceptual merit but no conclusion. The different options were clearly spelled out, including their implications. The analysis did not enter into the arguments pro and con, as the alternatives were argued by different member states, but the implications were clear. In reality, another option would catch the limelight. During the ministerial meeting of the Fifteen in Cork, Finland and Sweden introduced a memorandum proposing inclusion of the Petersberg missions in the TEU, but not the collective defence commitment of Article V. To all intents and purposes this resembled option C.2, without the unnecessary reference to a protocol on common defence. Clearly, the Article V commitment should be maintained, primarily because abandoning it would be a step back for European solidarity and for the prospect of an ever closer Union.

3. The Dublin European Council

On 5 December 1996, the Irish Presidency of the EU tabled a 141-page sketch for a draft revision of the treaties under the title "The European

Union Today and Tomorrow". It not only provided an analysis of the various positions taken in the IGC so far, but also tried to suggest treaty language on most issues. On some difficult questions, such as the composition of the European Commission, voting rights, new powers for the European Parliament and a flexibility clause, Ireland refrained from making concrete proposals.

On CFSP the sketch proposed to stress the role of the European Council in determining the principles of CFSP and the general and strategic guidelines for all of its areas. The Secretary-General of the Council would get a new status and visibility by contributing to the preparation and implementation of policy measures. At the request of the Presidency, he could assume tasks related to the external representation of the Union, including the conduct of a political dialogue with third parties. This constituted the outcome of the discussion on a "Mr or Mrs CFSP". It remains to be seen whether this compromise will be sufficient: as long as the new function, which includes a new unit for analysis and planning, does not have the right to present options to the Council, it will be of little use. An interesting suggestion earlier on was to combine the new post with that of Secretary-General of WEU, thus having maximum scope in preparing politico-military options. The new planning unit would consist of personnel from the Council Secretariat, member states, the Commission and WEU, but its impact remained doubtful. The Political Committee of the CFSP should meet weekly.

The Irish proposals contained a modification of the troika formula, by having the delegation to diplomatic meetings with third countries led by the Presidency, supported by the Secretary-General of the Council, the Commission and if necessary the incoming Presidency. The draft for a solidarity clause remained meagre and did not say more than that the member states would cooperate to reinforce and develop their mutual political solidarity. It fell short in providing an implicit basis for action if the independence of territorial integrity of members was threatened, without constituting a formal security guarantee. Joint Actions would include a definition of their objectives, as well as the means made available by the Union to react in situations requiring an operational action in areas where member states had important interests. For decision-making unanimity would remain, but a member state could make a formal statement of abstention. Through this it would not be obliged to apply the decision, but nevertheless would accept it as binding for the Union. Other decisions would be taken by qualified majority voting. If a member state invoked a vital interest against such a decision, no vote could be taken and, if a qualified majority so decided, the question could be put before the European Council which would decide by consensus.

On security and defence the Irish concluded that the political will seemed to exist to include the Petersberg missions in the TEU. The double conditional of Maastricht would be softened by replacing it by the gradual

definition of a common defence policy in the perspective of a common defence. In the relationship with WEU it was proposed to say that WEU was an integral part of the development of the Union and, consequently, the Union aimed at close institutional relations with WEU. Instead of the word "requests" it was suggested to state that the Union would avail itself of WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union having defence implications. Apparently, the Irish presidency believed this to be an improvement, but its value remained doubtful. In case of such a request, all members of the Union would be entitled to participate fully in these missions. All contributing member states would be able to participate fully and on the basis of equality in the planning and decision-making processes of WEU, insofar as they relate to the national contributions of those members. In a comment on this proposal, the point was made that the rights of EU member states which were not full members of WEU should probably be clarified in a separate declaration involving WEU. This would follow the example of the WEU declaration at Maastricht. Finally, the sketch proposed a change in Article J.4.3 that the Council would decide by unanimity on questions which have military or defence implications. This would eliminate the uncertainty over whether Joint Actions could include military aspects.

Before the European Council, at the Franco-German Nuremberg summit of 9 December 1996, President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl agreed a common concept on security and defence, but kept it secret for almost two months.⁷⁴ Apparently, they did not want to present their partners with another bilateral document before the IGC had moved ahead, although the Franco-German differences on the stability pact for the monetary union might have had something to do with it. The French socialist opposition seized upon its secrecy to criticise the agreement. Their German colleagues made much of the risk of being dragged into a nuclear partnership with France, which was not warranted by the facts: the paper said only that the two countries were "ready to engage in a dialogue concerning the function of nuclear deterrence in the context of the European defence policy". It had always been a European wish to have an opportunity to discuss the assumptions underlying French nuclear policy. After Prime Minister Juppé's statement that the French nuclear capability served a European purpose as well, the Nuremberg wording did not say more than that, eventually, a European defence policy has to clarify the role of nuclear weapons, which seems obvious.

The document was striking because of its bilateral approach to security and defence. Its professed aim was to give a new impulse in both a European and an Atlantic perspective, but in its common strategic approach and specific directives to the groups for military cooperation and armaments cooperation under the bilateral Council for Defence and Security the two countries went further than the timid progress made in the multinational organisations. Many of the provisions overlapped or duplicated wording used by the EU, NATO or WEU before, several sounded more like good

intentions than concrete agreements but, nevertheless, the concept made many points which would merit inclusion in the IGC. Ideally, they should have figured in the White Book on European security proposed by France in 1994, but watered down in the Common Reflection published in Madrid in 1995. The concept was based on four elements: the definition of common objectives; an analysis of the present security environment; a common approach for the strategy and missions of the armed forces; and common directives for military cooperation, including the formation of common military capabilities, and for an armaments policy.

On objectives, the paper stated that progress in European integration had reinforced the political, economic, commercial and social links to such an extent that the security interests of the two countries had become inseparable. Apart from ensuring their territorial integrity, their contribution to collective defence organisations and to international peace and security, a separate objective referred to the preservation of stability of the European continent and its adjacent zones as well as the areas essential to its economic activity and free trade. On risks, the point was made that in Eastern Europe, for a long time to come, a disproportionately large military arsenal would continue to exist. Moreover, disagreements on borders, national minorities or ethnic rivalries were likely to spread and give rise to conflicts which could concern the two countries directly. Outside Europe, the hegemonic ambitions of regional powers and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represented supplementary risks. As a result of this analysis, the common security no longer needed to be directed against a clearly identifiable military threat, but towards risk prevention and crisis management. The Alliance was termed an indispensable guarantee for stability and security in Europe. A following sentence read:

We intend to renovate the Alliance, so that it remains an effective military instrument in the new strategic context, the transatlantic link remains assured on the basis of a lasting partnership with the United States of America, and the European security and defence identity and the capability of the Europeans to act in an independent manner of solidarity are ensured.

To this end, a common European defence policy⁷⁵ should be promoted under the aegis of the European Council. Ultimately, WEU should be incorporated into the EU, and the Europeans should be able to conduct an operation - using Alliance assets if necessary - under their own responsibility. Developing a common strategic approach with particular importance attached to conflict prevention implied the establishment of means of strategic intelligence in order to have an autonomous crisis evaluation capability. The directives for the defence staffs included drawing conclusions from joint studies for the military capabilities needed in future, which could be grouped in 3 categories: autonomous, shared or dependent upon other

parties. The national armaments directors should take these requirements into account when determining their research and the industrial sectors deserving priority in the armaments field. The specific directive for military cooperation included an intensification in common training programmes to substitute for the decrease in personal contacts resulting from the rapidly diminishing volume of French forces stationed in Germany and of the small number of German military personnel destined to work in France. Particular attention was given to joint training and support for the common air force projects, such as the Tigre and NH90 helicopters and the future large aircraft. Within the Common Foreign and Security Policy rules should be developed for competition and trade within the European Union and for export to third countries.⁷⁶

In the run-up to the European Council of Amsterdam, six countries (the original EEC six minus the Netherlands with the addition of Spain) tabled a paper for the phased integration of WEU into the EU. One day before the 40th anniversary of the Community, on 24 March 1997, their Foreign Ministers proposed three phases, but without any precise dates for their implementation. The first phase would commence on the same date as the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. It would contain arrangements for practical cooperation, harmonised presidencies, preparation for double-hatting the new Secretary-General of the EU with the Secretary-General of WEU and the drafting of a White Paper for CFSP and WEU. During a second phase the WEU Secretariat would be incorporated into the EU Secretariat, the EU would be able to use directly the WEU Planning Cell and Satellite Centre, and the EU Council - meeting in a composition of Foreign and Defence Ministers - would take over the deciding authority in relation to military actions. In the third and final phase, the merger would be complete, the automatic military assistance clause would be incorporated into the EU Treaty or in an additional protocol and the Brussels Treaty would cease to exist. In all phases the rights of the associate members and partners would be fully taken into consideration.

The proposal drew strong opposition from the observer countries, but also from the US. Ambassador Hunter was quoted as saying that the merger would not add anything to Europe's defence capability or the willingness to use it.⁷⁷ He had a point there when, during the EU anniversary celebrations in Rome, the Foreign Ministers failed to agree on a modest intervention force in Albania. More conceptually, Washington made much of a virtual backdoor entry into NATO of neutral or candidate countries: any European security guarantees could be met only by the Alliance backed by US military power. It was the old argument which made much more of the automatic assurance of the WEU Treaty than was warranted by its organisational structure and formal link-up with NATO.

The WEU ministerial under the French presidency was held on 13 May, just over a month before the Amsterdam summit, so the Paris Declaration had little to say on the architectural side. Unlike at Maastricht,

there would not be a simultaneous WEU declaration responding to EU passages on security. French Defence Minister Millon talked to the press about three avenues for developing WEU: reinforcing its military capabilities by means of a military committee, more coherence of the activities at 18 (full members, observers and associate members) and more political legitimacy through guidelines issued by the European Council.

A more interesting activity was a flow-chart with description of the *modus operandi* between the EU and WEU, in case WEU was requested to take action under Article J.4.2 of the Maastricht Treaty. The document was the result of joint meetings of the PMG and the Security Working Group of the CFSP under the co-chairmanship of Felix Paganon - Political Director in the WEU Secretariat - and Frank Majoor for the Netherlands presidency of the EU. The meetings took place in the CFSP building. Their outcome was submitted to a seminar in the WEU building in Paris and the conclusions were formulated by the Netherlands and French presidencies at the final session of the seminar. The informal character of the proceedings did not prevent the final result from being noted by the WEU ministerial in Paris and by the CFSP ministers on 26 June.⁷⁸ In this way it became possible to discuss decision-making without having to engage immediately in conceptual drafting. Each step in the process was identified and described objectively without adding value-judgments. One analytical point of general interest concerned three possible scenarios, each based on the assumption of an EU initiative:

- both WEU and the EU are present in theatre and the WEU operation is closely interwoven with the EU action;
- both the EU and WEU are present, but each has its own separate tasks in theatre;
- only WEU is present in theatre.

The seminar concluded that during a developing crisis contacts between the EU and WEU should take place as early as possible and that a request to WEU to elaborate and implement decisions should be regarded as a continuous process, not a one-time message. Contacts prior to the request could include military advice relevant to the formulation of the requests. In any case, the need for clear procedures for determining who does what and when, should be matched with sufficient flexibility to be able to cope with different missions under varying circumstances and changing participants. The flow-chart will have to be revised in the light of the Amsterdam Treaty and in particular the creation of a new planning and analysis unit.

The Paris ministerial also approved WEU's contribution to the 1997 NATO Ministerial Guidance, which will set the parameters for the next defence planning cycle. The Declaration stated that WEU is better prepared to take on operational responsibilities, and mentioned the adoption of a

document on the framework concept. This concerns a special case of autonomous WEU operations and is a variant of the "lead nation" concept, designed to enable a European headquarters to be established, using existing national or multinational assets, in situations of extreme urgency. Ministers also noted the summary document "Reflections on European security interests on the eve of the 21st century" drawn up at 18 and welcomed the completion of phase III of the exercise CRISEX in December 1996. In this exercise, the Eurocorps was directly involved as a multinational FAWEU. They also welcomed Canada's interest in taking part in WEU operations carried out with the use of Alliance assets and capabilities where there is a common interest.

4. Chaos in Albania

The collapse of authority in Albania caught everybody by surprise. Political discontent was growing since the parliamentary election of May-June 1996 had been marred by irregularities, but no measure of analysis and planning could have reckoned with such a degree of disorder after the collapse of the pyramid investment schemes most Albanians had been lured into. Mandated by the General Affairs Council on 24-25 February 1997, a mission by the Netherlands presidency of the European Union and the European Commission visited Tirana and Foreign Minister Van Mierlo followed on 7 March. A day later former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky arrived as personal representative of the Danish OSCE Chairman-in-Office.

The EU missions adopted a dual approach by trying to persuade all parties to avoid further violence, but also insisting on the need for a perspective of democratic legitimacy. The Vranitzky mission was more effective and brought President Berisha around to agreeing to the formation of a government of national unity and the announcement of early elections. Returning to Vienna, Vranitzky proposed to the OSCE Council the despatch of a stabilisation force of about 4,000 troops and policemen. Neither NATO nor WEU responded positively. The NATO Council meeting of 13 March did not contemplate intervention and limited itself to giving support to the OSCE and the EU in their efforts at resolving the crisis. The next day the WEU Council issued a similar statement. On 16 March the informal CFSP ministerial meeting at Apeldoorn decided to send another high-level mission to Tirana to examine together with the Albanian authorities ways in which the EU could help reestablish security in the country, particularly by sending civilian and military advisors. The mission was led by the Netherlands ambassador De Marchant et d'Ansembourg and included representatives of the Commission, the OSCE, the WEU Planning Cell, the Council of Europe, Greece and Italy as neighbouring countries, and the UK. On 24 March the General Affairs Council decided to send an advisory mission, but its mandate and structure would be defined only later, after discussion in the various fora. Three elements were being considered:

1. Humanitarian emergency aid, with the EU in the lead, strengthening the capacity of the Albanian police with possibly a coordinating role of the EU/WEU, in cooperation with the Council of Europe. For structural aid, close cooperation was envisaged with the IMF and the World Bank;
2. Democratisation, human rights and elections, with a strong role for OSCE and the Council of Europe; and
3. A Multi-National Protection Force (MNPF).

After an unsuccessful attempt to convene a special session of the WEU Council, Italy took the lead in assembling the MNPF as a "coalition of the willing". Its Permanent Representative at the United Nations in New York, Ambassador Fulci, managed to obtain a UNSC mandate, virtually on a single day, Good Friday 28 March. Resolution 1011 defined the mission as:

To facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and help to create a secure environment for the missions of international organisations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.

The mandate was for three months, but was later extended by two months. The composition of the force included 1,500-2,000 Italians, 1,000 French, 800 Greeks, 500 Spaniards, 500 Turks, 400 Romanians, 120 Austrians and 60 Danes. It took some time before Operation Alba ("dawn" in Italian) got underway. On 15 April, the first troops landed at Dürres and took up key positions without difficulty. All parties had clamoured for an international presence to stem further violence; the mere fact of a multinational force would already have a stabilising influence. Its effect went far beyond its official mandate, which was to accompany humanitarian convoys. But the need for humanitarian assistance was far less than originally assumed. The most important aspect of MNPF was its visibility. As in Bosnia with IFOR the sight of military vehicles patrolling reassured the population and nobody dared to challenge them. Italy earned the gratitude of the international community by its speedy action which stemmed the tide of disintegration. Its political director shaped the Political Steering Committee into an ad hoc Council resembling WEU or CFSP. Consisting of the political directors of the participating countries and meeting weekly, it was a new flexible form of political supervision by the countries directly concerned. Italy served to establish and maintain contact with the Albanian authorities and to act as interlocutor with the UN Security Council. The meetings took place in Rome under the chairmanship of the Italian political director with his French colleague as deputy, France having the largest contingent on the ground. Observers were invited from OSCE, EU, WEU, NATO and the ICRC.

In all respects the Albanian crisis was quite different from former

Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, many feared for the safety of the MNPF troops. Hungary and Bulgaria withdrew earlier announcements of contributions, because of insufficient safety guarantees. In addition to the surprise element, for the Bosnian experience discouraged new commitments everywhere. For NATO, and particularly for the US, the lack of enthusiasm was understandable, for WEU it was a missed opportunity. Secretary-General Cutileiro said that no request had been made to WEU, but that the organisation was ready to act and did not exclude some action in future. The Planning Cell would need little time to draw up an operational plan.⁷⁹ His answers fell short in explaining why WEU, actually under French presidency, remained inactive. There had been no request to WEU, but neither had there been a proposal in the WEU Council to assume responsibility, like earlier on the Danube. Out of the eight participants in the MNPF, four were full members of WEU, while the others represented the categories of observers, associate members and associate partners. It would have been an ideal test for the capability of Europe to act in a contingency where the US preferred to remain absent. One explanation was that Paris gave priority to its dispute with the US over CINCSOUTH and did not want to appear keen to advocate a non-NATO operation. Another excuse, that the EUROFOR headquarters in Florence would be operational only in October 1997, was not fully convincing either. Whatever the reason, the outcome was another ad hoc arrangement, bypassing what had been built up in and between the various security organisations. Of course, there had been contacts. The Security Council found it easier to mandate the MNPF after it had been blessed by the EU and the OSCE. The emphasis on the Council of Europe was a new element in a still unclear pattern. The joint mission was another interesting device, but the question remains how final responsibilities will be apportioned.

In the end, WEU acquired some role in Albania, albeit a small one. On 24 June, an agreement was signed in Tirana regarding the status of the Multinational Advising Police Element (MAPE). The mission consisting of a dozen police officers who would give advice with regard to police issues, particularly on matters of organisation and logistics, but also on the restoration of public order and on border control. At first MAPE could only function in Tirana, but after the election of a new government in July 1997 and the improvement in the overall security situation the mission started to have a positive effect. An office was opened within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and some hundred police officers followed a "train-the-trainers" course. On 16 September the WEU Council meeting at 28 decided to extend the mission till 12 April 1998 and to increase its strength to sixty police officers. Depending on available personnel it could grow further to ninety persons to conduct three-months training courses and to visit police posts throughout the country to evaluate their functioning. Germany and France each offered fifteen officers, Italy ten and several other countries smaller numbers. Italy also concluded a bilateral agreement to help reorganise the Albanian armed forces. NATO would help under its

Partnership for Peace programme.

5. The Treaty of Amsterdam

In spite of pessimistic forecasts, the 1996-97 IGC terminated with the Treaty of Amsterdam at the end of the Netherlands presidency. Changes of government in the UK and France did not delay the outcome, but the Socialist victory in France shifted the focus away from institutional issues and towards the Stability Pact for monetary union. It also made the locomotive of Franco-German leadership splutter and on his own Chancellor Kohl did not manage to mediate breakthroughs. The outcome was not spectacular, but nobody was completely dissatisfied. The European Parliament expressed approval and had reason to do so for, paradoxically, it had come out best of the negotiations: more majority voting (including the important area of research), more co-decision and a streamlined procedure. The original objectives of filling in the CFSP, giving substance to the Political Union and preparing the EU for enlargement, however, were not fully realised. Germany no longer pressed explicitly for Political Union, France gave up its pet project of an independent "Mr CFSP" and the problems concerning the composition of the Commission and a reweighing of votes in the Council were postponed to a later date when enlargement would actually take place. The substantive issues of enlargement, a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural funds, never figured on the IGC agenda.

Article J of the Maastricht Treaty on the CFSP was substantially revised. The competence of the European Council to issue guidelines - a long-standing German objective - was incorporated both for the CFSP and WEU. Following a French proposal, a hierarchy was introduced of principles and guidelines, common strategies, joint actions and common positions. The European Council will define the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP, including for matters with defence implications (Article J.3). Common strategies will apply to areas where the member states have important interests in common; they will be recommended by the Council and be implemented by adopting joint actions and common positions. Common strategies will set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the member states. Joint actions will address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. Common positions will define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature.

The reference to WEU, formerly in Article J.4, became Article J.7. It is reproduced at annex, together with the Declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit, which will draw its personnel from the EU General Secretariat, the member states, the Commission and WEU. The tasks envisaged for a Mr or Ms CFSP were given to the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers. The protocol on Article J.7 agreed that

"the European Union shall draw up, together with the WEU, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them, within a year from the entry into force of this Protocol". This period seems long, in view of the fact that such practical measures were already agreed upon in 1993 with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, but were never put into practice. This delay is not necessary for "the early adoption of appropriate arrangements for the security clearance of the personnel of the General Secretariat of the Council", which was agreed in a separate declaration. More importantly, the new version not only repeated that WEU was an integral part of the development of the Union, but added "providing the Union with access to an operational capability" notably in the context of Petersberg missions, and continued: "It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in this Article". This clarification removed a possible ambiguity between the Maastricht Treaty and the accompanying WEU declaration. The WEU text stating that "it will formulate a common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation" had led some to fear the emergence of two different defence policies, one from WEU and one eventually framed by the EU. After Amsterdam that interpretation would no longer be possible.

The Netherlands presidency left the discussion on the position of WEU till rather late. They had not associated themselves with the initiative of the six countries in favour of a timetable for a merger with the EU. The official pretext was the impartiality of the presidency but, although accepting the logic of an ultimate merger, the Netherlands were lukewarm at best about early realisation. A week before Amsterdam, meetings were organised between the political directors of the six, the UK and the Netherlands to see what might be possible. These meetings did not enter into drafting negotiations, but laid the basis for a Netherlands' proposal made at Amsterdam on Monday morning. On Tuesday, the Foreign Ministers discussed the question at lunch. The Netherlands had used the Maastricht formula "which might in time lead to integration", but this was changed into "with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union". The UK had preferred a text without any reference to a merger, or a separate declaration by those who favoured integration. Through astute negotiating tactics the UK managed to dominate the discussions in the Political Committee, constantly proposing new formulations. As a result of this "who drafts, wins" approach, the reference to NATO moved up to Article J.7.1 and the substance of a European defence policy was reduced to crisis management. The peculiar wording of Maastricht about "defence implications" was maintained, however, instead of replacing it by "military" or "operational" as I had repeatedly advocated. The "requests WEU" was changed into "The Union will avail itself of the WEU", which might imply a closer link. Article J.7.2 and the mention of it in the first paragraph made clear that questions referred to in this article include the Petersberg missions. In listing them, the anomaly of "peacemaking" was also main-

tained while it should have been changed into peace-enforcement. In 1992, the jargon of the UN had defined peacemaking as a diplomatic effort and not as an activity of combat forces. In return for the emphasis on crisis management, the UK accepted dropping one of the two conditionals in the framing of a common defence policy, which now reads "... including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide". As a result, the framing of the policy was agreed, its result of a common defence not yet.

The upshot of these changes was that neither the adoption of a common defence nor the merger of WEU and the EU would require another IGC. It would be sufficient for the European Council to recommend to the member states to take such a decision, in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The inclusion of the Petersberg missions in the Union treaty puts all fifteen members at the same level and removes the inequality between the ten full members of WEU and the five observers in this respect. It will make it easier for the former neutral countries to join in peace operations. Subparagraph 3 makes clear that all members will be entitled to participate fully in these tasks, when the EU avails itself of WEU to elaborate them.

It could be argued that, for all practical purposes, WEU and the EU have been integrated. The Petersberg missions are the bread and butter of WEU and the collective defence dimension was never developed independently from NATO. Even the protagonists of an EU-WEU merger did not envisage to include the automatic military assistance clause in the Treaty on European Union. It would have been preserved in a separate protocol among the present members of WEU as an element of their solidarity. Its implementation was always envisaged through NATO. In theory, after Amsterdam WEU could still act on its own if the European Union did not decide to take action and to avail itself of the services of WEU. That, however, seemed a remote possibility.

Finally, Amsterdam provided a reference to defence equipment cooperation: "The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate by cooperation between them in the field of armaments." That was not very much, given the plight of European defence industry and its struggle for survival. Nevertheless, it was the first peg provided by the EU to hang future initiatives on.

Old hands in European integration would have some difficulty with the inclusion of a "vital interest" clause in the second and third pillar. In Articles J.13.2 and K.12.2 almost identical passages have been included which are reminiscent of the so-called Luxembourg compromise:

If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision (or in K "the granting of an authorisation") to be taken by

qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

In defence of this provision it has been said that this formula is an improvement over Luxembourg in that the vital interest has to be explained and that the reference to the European Council is likely to lead to a decision. Equally, it is true that the article refers to the adoption of joint actions, which previously had been subject to unanimity. So the clause might be a necessary safety valve, but the experience with recognition of FYROM does not augur well. Another novelty is that for their adoption decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 member states. It remains to be seen how this constraint on majority voting will work out in practice. In any case, it will not apply to decisions having military or defence implications, which continue to require unanimity. To many that seemed logical, but it was not. Given the fact that no one would be obliged to join an operation against his will, continuation of the consensus principle seemed no longer necessary. A coalition of the willing within the EU should have been made possible. In its absence the willing will organise their action outside the framework of the EU and, as in the case of Albania, also outside WEU. Before Amsterdam much was made of flexibility or reinforced cooperation first suggested in September 1994 by Schäuble and Lamers of the German CDU. It gradually dwindled into a severely constrained procedure. In the period of testing out the Amsterdam provisions it might serve as a deterrent against uncooperative attitudes in voting, but seems unlikely to be applied soon.

WEU responded to Amsterdam by adopting the "Western European Union declaration on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance", to be attached to the final act of the Intergovernmental Conference. Meeting at 18, including the observers and associate members, Foreign Ministers for the first time came together in the WEU building for a few minutes on 22 July 1997. Their press release pointed out:

that WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union, providing the Union with access to an operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg tasks, and is an essential element of the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Atlantic Alliance.

When the Union avails itself of WEU, WEU will elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications.

Cooperation between WEU and NATO will continue to evolve,

also taking account of the adaptation of the Alliance.

WEU will develop its role as the European politico-military body for crisis management, contribute to the progressive framing of a common defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.

The declaration followed the example of Maastricht to reciprocate the new role of WEU in a formal document of its own. It took a little longer to agree the text, largely because its dual direction - towards the EU and the Alliance - made a declaration issued at 18 the most appropriate format. The full text of the declaration, which includes quotes from Articles J3.1 and J7, is reproduced as Annex V.

The regular autumn meeting of WEU ministers was held at Erfurt on 18 November 1997. Their declaration concluded that the Amsterdam Treaty, with the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks, had confirmed that the EU's range of responses - which includes the economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian - is complemented by access to WEU's politico-military crisis management capability. Institutionally, the most important change was on the military side. The semi-annual meetings of the CHODs were transformed into a Military Committee (chaired by the Chief of Defence of the country holding the Presidency); their Military Delegates in WEU would be presided by a permanent chairman. Coinciding with the rotation of the director of the Planning Cell in 1998 the three-star function would go to the chairman and the current deputy director would take charge of the Planning Cell. These arrangements mirror the NATO system more closely. Arguments in favour are that the CHODs should be more involved as they will be responsible for making available the necessary forces and that for most countries the MilDel to WEU and the MilRep to NATO are the same person. Nevertheless, care will have to be taken to preserve the specific character of WEU as a politico-military organisation. Obviously, senior military officers do not enjoy sitting silently next to their ambassadors, but two separate circuits should be avoided. In NATO the Military Committee heads the integrated military structure. The Petersberg missions need more flexibility. For that reason, the Planning Cell reported directly to the Council, although the CHODs had the task to monitor its professional standards. In future a closer link with the MilDels seems likely.

The Erfurt declaration also noted the newest additions to the growing array of multinational forces: the staff of the First German-Netherlands Corps (basically a "Main Defence Force" in the NATO system) was nominated as a headquarters answerable to WEU; Italy and Spain had decided to establish an amphibious force - SIAF - which would be declared answerable to WEU, but could be employed in the framework of NATO as well. Finally, Erfurt completed the process of involving observers and associates as much as

possible in actual operations. The observer countries, being members of the EU, could participate in all operations initiated by the European Union. Erfurt took this a step further by agreeing that once the full members had decided to embark upon an operation, the observers and associate members could join. In deciding this, the formula enabling exclusion of an associate member by a majority vote of the full members was abandoned. It was maintained only for calling a restricted meeting of the Permanent Council.

Erfurt followed a new format for the meeting: a morning at 18, luncheon at 28, followed by separate meetings of the foreign and defence ministers at 28 and closed with a joint plenary session. In drafting the declaration France attempted to formalise constructive abstention in WEU as a corollary to the Treaty of Amsterdam, but nobody else saw the need; WEU had always followed the practice that it was not necessary for everybody to join in the implementation of an operation.

The WEU Assembly, in a report by Mr Blaauw, echoed the call of its President, Mr De Puig, to convene a Council meeting at heads of state and government level on the anniversary of the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1998.⁸⁰ A number of issues needed early attention, in particular formal arrangements between EU and WEU, the provision of a sound legal basis for the full participation in WEU's activities by the associate and observer countries, an opinion on the need to revise the Modified Brussels Treaty and clarification of the approach to ESDI. On the latter point the report recommended:

to establish WEU as the caucus in which the European common political will required to make ESDI a political and military reality is to be achieved and expressed, and take concrete steps to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union.

6. NATO Enlarges

In the US, early support for NATO enlargement was based on a growing anti-Russian mood. Originally, the Pentagon was opposed, because new commitments - some involving land-locked countries - would be difficult to implement and would weaken the existing integrated command structure. The State Department was divided. With the arrival of Richard Holbrooke at State, the protagonists won their case. Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott was believed to be reluctant. In the end, as always, the White House decided and President Clinton used it to attract voters of Polish descent during his re-election campaign. His final commitment came in a speech in Detroit on 23 October 1996, when he mentioned April 1999 (the date of NATO's 50th anniversary) as the date for welcoming the first new members from Central Europe. As the Madrid summit of July 1997 was approaching, where the first batch of new entrants should be determined, the American

debate heated up, with respected experts and politicians like George Kennan, Michael Mandelbaum and Senator Joseph Biden weighing in against enlargement. The most persuasive argument was sketched out earlier by Senator Sam Nunn, encapsulating the basic dilemma in two questions:⁸¹

Are we really going to be able to convince the Eastern Europeans that we are protecting them from their historical threats, while we convince the Russians that NATO's enlargement has nothing to do with Russia as a potential military threat?

Are we really going to be able to convince Ukraine and the Baltic countries that they are somehow more secure when NATO expands eastward, but draws protective lines short of their borders and places them in what Russians are bound to perceive as a buffer zone?

When NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), I predicted - wrongly in the end - that this would militate against enlargement, because it would become too difficult to choose among the NACC members. The "Study on NATO Enlargement" released on 28 September 1995 provided the rationale. The peacetime stationing of other Allies' forces on their territory "should neither be a condition for membership nor be foreclosed as an option" and "there is no a priori requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members", but new member states were expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. The enlargement of NATO was described as a process parallel with, and complementary to, that of the European Union. Nevertheless, each organisation would proceed autonomously, according to its respective internal dynamics and processes. "This means that they are unlikely to proceed at precisely the same pace." So far, so good. The part of the rhetoric surrounding the debate which I found irritating was the slogan that no new dividing lines should be created. Clearly, there would be a division between the "ins" and the "outs" and Russia would perceive enlargement as American power moving up to its Western borders. That feeling would be difficult to dispel, especially as Russia increasingly felt itself isolated and without allies in a difficult world. It would not be easy to take the Russians out of their new "encirclement" complex, to which they would see added a *Versailler Diktat* in their present state of weakness. This was the background against which Yeltsin and his managers talked about a "Cold Peace" setting in. NATO enlargement encouraged the wrong debate in Moscow, putting security on top of the agenda, while economic reform should have priority. Pushing enlargement as a major issue of Western foreign policy, once again boosted the importance of geopolitics in Russian thinking. As a result, the political élite and the security establishment were firmly united

in their opposition to NATO's expansion. This debate also ran the risk of devaluing the proposed charter for relations between NATO and Russia, if it was seen as a means of buying acquiescence in enlargement. In the negotiations with NATO, Moscow raised two demands which the West was unwilling to grant: a legally binding treaty, formalising the special role of Russia, instead of the political nature of the charter proposed by NATO; and the creation of a directorate in OSCE including Russia. The latter point was a modification of Kozyrev's earlier proposal of a European Security Council, operating as the executive of the OSCE, but maintaining the consensus principle. Apparently, this change was induced by the example of the Contact Group for Bosnia, which had given Russia new visibility and respectability. Meeting these demands even partially would have raised questions about the future role of NATO as well as whether the price paid for NATO enlargement was not going to be too high.⁸² Yet, the stakes for reaching some accommodation were high. For the US, the future of START II, the ratification of which was held up in the Duma. For NATO in general, maintaining elements of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; the Treaty was concluded on the basis of rough parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but a new conceptual framework would be difficult to find between an isolated Russia and an expanding NATO.

After lengthy negotiations in which Secretary-General Solana was personally involved - in itself a unique development in NATO history - the "Founding Act" on mutual relations, cooperation and security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997, well before the Madrid summit would decide on new members. Although Russia is unlikely ever to fully accept NATO enlargement, it had realised the impossibility of preventing it and took what was available: a promise of an enduring partnership; a Permanent Joint Council for consultation coordination and "to the maximum extent possible where appropriate for joint decisions and joint action"; a reiteration that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so"; no nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of the new members; a shared objective of concluding an adaptation agreement to the CFE Treaty, aimed at a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment; and a statement that NATO would "carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary inter-operability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks". Reinforcements may take place when necessary for defence against aggressions and missions in support of peace. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.



NATO-Russia summit in Paris on 27 May 1997. From left to right (first row): President Demirel of Turkey; US President Clinton; President Yeltsin of Russia; President Chirac of France; NATO Secretary-General Solana; German Chancellor Kohl. (Photo: NATO)

Apart from its peculiar title of "Founding Act", the document was straightforward and a reasonable success for both sides. Assuming frequent meetings of the Joint Council, it will change life in NATO headquarters with dozens of Russian diplomats and officers roaming through the building. Obviously, it will depend on the implementation whether relations with Russia have really been put on a new basis, sufficient to make Russia permanently acquiesce in the enlargement process. Clearly, Russia gained in obtaining an accommodation with immediate effect, while enlargement would not be implemented before April 1999 at the earliest. At first, there was a real fear that the usefulness of the new relationship would be seriously affected by Russian resentment. That seems less likely now. Equally, the risk of NATO conceding too much has been avoided. The only doubts remain on what NATO could do inside the new member countries. Some integrated command structures will be possible, but the extent of the "adequate infrastructure" remains unclear.

The highlight of the Madrid summit was the decision to open talks for accession with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Pressure from a majority of European members to include Romania and Slovenia was cut short by President Clinton a few weeks before the meeting, when he declared that the first batch of new members should be limited to the three countries. It was a clear case of American leadership, another version of *Roma locuta, causa finita*. From the start, European enthusiasm had been

muted, most politicians counting on a much slower process. The only outspoken partisan of enlargement was the German Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe, ever since taking position in his Alastair Buchan Lecture at the IISS in London in 1992. As a positive decision was approaching, most Europeans saw no reason to oppose it: if the US was prepared to extend its commitments, why shouldn't Europe? But why exclude Romania, which possessed substantial military capabilities and has just seen truly democratic elections? The argument that new entrants should not only be consumers of security, but should also be able to contribute positively, obviously took second place to the wish to present enlargement as a process, not limited to a single group. With more countries in the first batch those remaining outside would be less confident of ever coming in. As it went, the nine unsuccessful applicants got the assurance that the Alliance expected to extend further invitations in coming years and that no European democratic country would be excluded from consideration. How serious this promise will be in reality will depend on the ratification debates in member countries, but also on the development of the new relationship with Russia. If, indeed, the Founding Act produces the expected results and Moscow learns to appreciate its merits, the psychological reaction against NATO expansion might soften.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace were brought within a flexible framework governed by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, meeting in different formats: in plenary to address political and security-related issues of common concern; in a limited format of open-ended groups to focus on functional matters, or, on an ad hoc basis, on appropriate regional matters; in another limited format between the Alliance and groups of Partners participating in a peace support operation or in the Planning and Review Process; in an individual format between the Alliance and one Partner.

Last but not least, a Charter on a distinctive partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed. It did not fully match the earlier Founding Act with Russia. The Charter listed a full range of consultations on scientific subjects, but did not create a Permanent Joint Council. Instead, there would be NATO-Ukraine meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council or with appropriate committees at intervals to be mutually agreed, and a NATO-Ukraine Commission would meet at least twice a year.

Regrettably, progress on the internal reform of the Alliance remained incomplete. In December 1997 the number of NATO commands was drastically reduced to one third, but the continuing controversy with Paris over a European commander of AFSOUTH prevented France from returning to the military side of the Alliance. On ESDI the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation reaffirmed full support by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations and continued:

With this in mind, the Alliance is building ESDI, grounded on solid military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permitting the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.

At the beginning of 1998 further enlargement remained uncertain. Nothing has been done to firm up the possibility of a second batch being decided in 1999. In fact, the entire question of whether there would be a new round was ambiguous. Under those circumstances Partnership for Peace was likely to acquire a renewed significance, because there the ominous questions of "ins" and "outs" do not play a role.

Notes

71. When the four countries announced in November 1996 that EUROFOR would consist of 15,000 men, primarily for peacekeeping, with its headquarters in Florence, President Kadhafi of Libya called it a declaration of war. AFP, 11 November 1996.
72. "Report on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union", 10 May 1995, document IP/95/465.
73. See also my monograph, *The Security Agenda for 1996. Background and Proposals*, CEPS Paper No. 64, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, October 1995.
74. The full French text was published in *Le Monde* of 30 January 1997.
75. The wording departed from a "common European defence policy", used in WEU, which allowed for a wider interpretation than collective defence.
76. The directives for the armaments directors are further discussed in the next chapter.
77. Tom Buerkle, "Make the EU a Defense Alliance? Debate Deepens Security Policy Rifts", *International Herald Tribune*, 31 March 1997.
78. CM/97/25 of 12 May 1997, unclassified, released at 18.
79. *Defense News*, 7-13 April 1997.
80. Document 1581 of 16 October 1997, "WEU's Role in the Organisation of European Security after the Decisions taken by the European Union in Amsterdam and by NATO in Madrid" and Recommendation 618.
81. "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World", address at the SACLANT Seminar 1995, 22 June 1995, Norfolk, Va.
82. See Lothar Rühl, "Die NATO-Erweiterung - im Osten nichts Neues. Gefahren einer Überkompensation für russisches Einlenken", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 11 February 1997, p. 9.

Chapter Thirteen

Defence Equipment Cooperation

European cooperation in the field of defence equipment has not been a success story. The European Defence Community envisaged an armaments agency with far-reaching powers. The Standing Armaments Committee of WEU remained strictly intergovernmental. In February 1958, the French, Italian and German governments informed NATO and WEU of their decision to set up a three-power steering committee to select types of weapons for which they were prepared to undertake joint study, research and production. France would provide a technical testing centre for the new organisation and a missile training centre for the Alliance. A few months later, they offered a list of projects to all their NATO and WEU partners which included the development of a 30-tonne tank, standardisation of tactical vehicles, development of tactical support aircraft, anti-tank guided weapons, joint production of the US Hawk surface-to-air guided missile and cooperation in its further development, development of weapons against very low-flying targets and of a ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead with a range of some 2,800 km. Some projects came to fruition, such as the Jaguar and Transall aircraft and the Roland missile, but the proposed organisation did not take off.

A more systematic approach was attempted in 1968 with the establishment of the Eurogroup. This initiative of Denis Healey, then UK Secretary of State for Defence, had a double purpose: to show to the US that the European defence effort was more substantial than they gave us credit for, and to promote inter-European cooperation on defence production. Until 1975, armaments cooperation was handled by the EURONAD subgroup, consisting of national armaments directors. France refused to join because it regarded the Eurogroup as affiliated too closely with NATO. Yet, equipment cooperation without France made little sense. In 1975, the German and Netherlands Ministers of Defence, Leber and Vredeling, managed to draw France into the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and in 1976 EURONAD was suspended. The high hopes for the IEPG were not realised either. The Dutch tried to create a systematic approach based on making replacement schedules compatible in terms of timing and requirements. In practice, however, some five concrete projects were selected, only one of which was successful. The tripartite mine-hunter

built by Belgium, France and the Netherlands in identical configuration came to fruition, but the initiative had already been taken before the start of IEPG. Another activity concentrated on the two-way street between the US and Europe, leading to a series of bilateral memoranda of understanding to facilitate access to the US market. The most tangible result of IEPG was the creation of the EUCLID programme for pre-competitive research, comparable to EUREKA in the civilian field.

In the run-up to Maastricht interest in promoting defence production on a European scale also increased. The meeting of the European Council in Rome on 14-15 December 1990 identified economic and technological cooperation in the armaments field and coordination of arms export policy among the issues in the security and defence field to which the IGC should give particular attention. In its section on the operational role of WEU, the WEU Declaration of Maastricht included "enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency" in the proposals which would be examined further. This proposal was part of the joint initiative launched by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl on 4 October 1991.

The two countries followed it up by a joint statement at the NADs meeting, proposing incorporation of the IEPG into WEU. They were convinced that enhanced armaments cooperation could not be achieved by a proliferation of bodies. As WEU would be the focal point for creating a European security and defence identity, of which armaments would be an integral part, the best way to avoid duplication would be to make IEPG the armaments body of WEU. The offer of associate membership to the NATO Allies not belonging to the EU had paved the way. The joint statement proposed the creation of a working group at WEU to examine the financial, legal and organisational requirements. Reactions were generally favourable. Norway stated that it had already responded positively to the WEU invitation to become an associate member. However, it expected all rights and voting so far enjoyed in the IEPG to be maintained, so that it could become a fully-fledged member of the armaments part of WEU. In this connection they felt that the proposed working group should be a joint one between IEPG and WEU, which seemed reasonable. Turkey was negative, and objected to the idea of IEPG serving under WEU. Their main concern was that full membership of IEPG but not of WEU would cause a double standard of implementation. When I heard about this Turkish position, I made it a point to explain to their ambassador in London that the proposal presented a unique opportunity for full participation in an important part of the future WEU. Only through building on their associate membership could they participate in the process of European integration in a way which was not open to them in the European Union. Ultimately, Turkey went along with the merger, but continued to seek full membership of WEU. The Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 contained a paragraph welcoming the decision of IEPG ministers at Oslo on 6 March to analyse the future role

of IEPG in the new European security structure. WEU and IEPG experts should carry out an initial examination of the role and functions of a possible European Armaments Agency. That sounded very cautious, but nevertheless the merger soon gathered momentum.

At their meeting in Bonn on 4 December 1992, Defence Ministers of the thirteen nations agreed to transfer the IEPG functions to WEU, in accordance with six basic principles:

- a. All IEPG members should be entitled to participate fully, and with the same rights and responsibilities, in any armaments cooperation forum.
- b. There should be no duplication in this field.
- c. The IEPG should continue to operate until any replacement forum was operational.
- d. Any armaments cooperation should take over, as a starting point, the agreed policies of the IEPG and maintain existing links with NATO.
- e. Armaments cooperation activities in Europe should be managed by the National Armaments Directors of all current IEPG members, who will be accountable to the Defence Ministers of those member governments.
- f. The existing basic structure of the IEPG should, initially, be incorporated into any armaments cooperation structure and the existing linkage between IEPG and EDIG should be maintained. EDIG was the European Defence Industries Group founded in 1990 to serve as channel of communication between the industry and IEPG.

These principles very much gave the impression that the merger with WEU would be only in name and for the rest everything would remain as it was. An additional problem was that the IEPG chair would be taken over by Denmark which, being only an observer at WEU, had a domestic political problem in emphasising its role. This was most evident in the question of relocating the IEPG to Brussels. The IEPG had established a small secretariat, consisting of five officers, in Lisbon, in order to demonstrate interest in the members with less-developed defence industries. Its functions were largely administrative, except for a study on national production capabilities. Clearly, it would not make sense to concentrate most of the meetings in Brussels and leave the secretariat in Lisbon. Portugal indicated its willingness to agree to the transfer, but Denmark was less keen. Although the Danes cooperated in the decision to move the secretariat to Brussels, taken by Ministers in Rome on 19 May 1993,⁸³ they preferred to keep it separate from the WEU Secretariat. In discussions with me, much was made of legal problems. Copenhagen seemed to think that if WEU concluded agreements, they would bind only the full members. The issue came to a head during the NADs meeting of 27 October 1993, which we hosted at WEU. It was the very first meeting in our new Council chamber. After the opening, I took the floor and explained that I could see no legal

problems whatsoever in including the armaments section in the WEU Secretariat. With a simple amendment to the Staff Rules it would be possible to recruit personnel from all 13 WEAG member countries to the armaments section. The Belgian delegation confirmed this and went a step further: if this did not happen, the armaments personnel would not be granted international status. Denmark admitted that incorporation into the WEU Secretariat would be the most natural solution, but requested for the forbearance of its partners in asking for a move limited to co-location only. Denmark was particularly negative on a possible role of the WEU Council in WEAG matters. The discussion took up the whole morning and finally the Danish General, Frandsen, was prepared to go along, if the decision did not include the words collocation or integration. A Dutch suggestion was accepted to say simply that an armaments secretariat would be established within the WEU framework. At lunch the timetable was agreed: start in Brussels on 1 April 1994 and wind up in Lisbon by the end of that month. The size of the section was reduced to two officers (grade A4 and A2/A3) and one secretary. Frandsen made a final point: the section should remain separate in the establishment plan and not come under the Political Director of WEU.

On 22 November 1993, Ministers agreed to establish an Armaments Secretariat within WEU. Its terms of reference stated that it would be established as a section of the WEU Secretariat-General and work under the authority of the NADs. It would assist the WEAG chair on behalf of the NADs in the execution of armaments cooperation and the implementation of agreed policies. That would be the situation on paper, but as soon as the officers were recruited we would house them on the same corridor as the Political Division, because it was important to include them fully in our activities. During the remainder of my term, I had regular contacts with them. Nevertheless, the coherence between armaments cooperation and the other activities of WEU remained a point of concern.

Another area to be integrated in WEU were the remaining activities of the Eurogroup following the consensus among ministers that WEU would be the best vehicle for their continuation. These were divided among a number of groups, reporting to a ministerial session the day before the meetings of NATO's Defence Planning Committee. In my experience, having chaired the Eurogroup for a year and a half when I was Defence Minister, the most interesting part of the work was the dinner on the eve of the DPC, limited to ministers and permanent representatives, to compare notes on the agenda of the following day. An important activity was the publicity effort in the US and Canada with speaking tours and occasionally a seminar on Capitol Hill. This merited being preserved, although we had an everlasting problem in getting the opinion-makers interested in attending. Later the name was changed to Transatlantic Forum, tasked with providing information to public opinion in North America, organising a European seminar and an annual conference in Washington. For the five subgroups

we had to make up our mind - together with France, which had not joined the Eurogroup - whether to draw them into WEU or to ask NATO to absorb them. The latter was the case for EUROMED and EUROTRAIN, but WEU had an interest in EUROCOM, EUROLOG (later changed into the Western European Logistics Group - WELG) and EUROLONGTERM. The long-term planning especially seemed important to me, as it would potentially provide the underpinning for both our operational capabilities and our armaments cooperation. However, this would require a higher level of participation and an arrangement for feeding their conclusions into other activities of WEU. A peculiarity of some military cooperation was evident here: the participants were quite enthusiastic about their work, but nobody was made aware of the results. In my experience this was the case with FINABEL, a meeting of Army Chiefs of Staff, but EUROLONGTERM was not far behind.

Ministers increasingly devoted attention to the WEAG in the declarations issued after their meetings. At Noordwijk in November 1994, they agreed to establish a Research Cell to support the EUCLID programme. They accepted a German proposal to set up an informal group of experts of the EU and WEU to study the options for a European Armaments Policy, but reached a negative conclusion on a European Armaments Agency: conditions did not currently exist for the creation of an agency conducting the full range of procurement activities on behalf of member states. They were positive, however, about a Franco-German initiative to create a new armaments cooperation structure as a subsidiary body under the Brussels Treaty. Ministers Léotard and Rühle were prepared to put their bilateral cooperation within the WEU framework and suggested that their colleagues do likewise. The scope of this initiative would remain unclear for some considerable time. It would take till 12 November 1996 before the Joint Armaments Cooperation Structure was signed by France, Germany, Italy and the UK, to be known under its French acronym OCCAR.

In 1995 in Madrid, Ministers endorsed a strengthening of the dialogue between WEAG and the operational users, so that armaments cooperation could more closely rely on common military requirements. The Secretary-General recommended giving EUROLONGTERM a role in this area, under responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff. Work on a Charter and a general Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for a European Armaments Agency had not been completed and "substantial difficulties remain to be solved".

The Birmingham Declaration had little to say on armaments cooperation but the Ostend Declaration of 19 November 1996 was quite substantial again. A new WEU subsidiary body called the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) with a Charter and a MOU was created. The EUCLID Research Cell would move to Step 2 with effect from 1 April 1997 with the legal capacity to place contracts. This Research Cell would initially be the executive body of the WEAO, as a precursor to the European Armaments Agency. Its first contracts were placed with a Thomson-CSF, DASA and GEC-Marconi consortium for developing modern radar technol-

ogy. Ministers also signed the Memorandum of Understanding for THALES (Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defence European Science) which provided for implementing government-funded joint research programmes and information exchanges. The results would be available to support technology developments in key areas of interest to defence agencies and industries with the aim of enhancing European defence technology and improving the commonality and interoperability between equipment operated by their defence forces. Ministers debated the harmonisation of operational requirements in a comprehensive manner. Their declaration stated that it included the relationship between WEAG and EUROLONGTERM, the European defence technological and industrial base, the evaluation and monitoring of key technologies for European technological independence, contacts with the EU on matters of mutual interest, the role of WEAG in armaments activities and a European armaments partnership. This was the first time a signal had been given to underline the crucial importance of maintaining a defence industrial base in Europe. My own hope had been that the IGC would also take this up as a vital interest for the European Union. The Westendorp Report made a reference, but in the negotiations it did not figure prominently, if at all. The other significant implication of the comprehensive approach would be its reach beyond the competence of the armaments directors. To be successful it would have to be put in a wider political context, which was available in WEU from the time the IEPG was absorbed, but never fully used.

The Ostend Declaration noted the increase in the number of EUCLID Implementing Agreements signed and the significant reductions in delays in the EUCLID procedure. A new procedure had been added - EUROFINDER - allowing industry itself to make proposals for research and technology projects for inclusion in the EUCLID programme.

The Franco-German common concept on security and defence of December 1996 contained directives for the cooperation and policy in the field of armaments. They aimed at a common investment policy in testing and evaluation centres and in technology in general, and at the development of a European armaments policy. The latter should create a European armaments market and the conditions for a European choice in production and acquisition of armaments. This was considered essential for the armed forces of European states, but did not renounce non-European competition as long as it observed the principle of reciprocity in allowing access to foreign producers. A subgroup was created for programming and planning in order to formulate common requirements for the two armed forces. It was not clear how this work would relate to a similar mandate given to the Chiefs of Defence Staff. Conversely, it seemed odd that these directives extended to the organisation of territorial defence, the coordination of air transport capabilities, rescue capabilities and special forces, all of which belonged to the operational domain.

As mentioned in Section 5 of the preceding chapter, the Treaty of

Amsterdam provided only a weak reference to cooperation in the field of armaments in the context of a progressive framing of common defence policy. That came as a severe disappointment to the European defence industry, but also to the European Commission which, in May 1996, had issued a communication on the challenges facing the European defence-related industry, "a contribution for action at European level". Not to be deterred, Commissioner Bangemann in September 1997 addressed a further communication to the Council and the European Parliament entitled "The Aerospace Industry Faced with the Global Challenge". He drew the conclusion that in many sectors it would only be possible for one entity to remain viable in Europe.

This would apply in particular to the production of airframes where, according to many commentators there would probably only be room for one major civil-military producer. But such a suggestion would not necessarily give rise to competition problems as long as there was a fully functioning global market with strong foreign competitors. The message was clear, even though the example went too far. It should have been limited to air frames for civilian and military transport aircraft, fighters being an area of its own with close links to missile and other high tech areas and therefore a specific field of consolidation. Nevertheless, the plea for European transnational restructuring was most opportune and was rapidly followed on 12 November 1997 by the adoption of a strategy document by the European Commission developed by Bangemann and Van den Broek. The Council was requested to adopt a draft "common position" with intra-community transfers, public procurement and common customs duties as priority areas. The accompanying action plan embodied a short timescale, with the first set of measures to be undertaken in 1998. It also included the rationalisation of standards, a review of the dual-use regulation, drafting a white paper on EU armaments exports and a benchmarking exercise in the field of defence industries. The document quoted figures showing that the EU countries imported six times more defence-related goods from the US than they exported. The dispersed nature of European industry was demonstrated by the fact that the eight major European defence companies in 1996 had a turnover of \$60 billion, whereas the three top US firms had sales of \$90 billion. Overcoming previous acrimonious debates about the competence of the Commission in this field France, Germany and the UK took up the challenge and addressed an appeal to their aerospace and defence electronics industries to present within three months plans for a far-reaching clustering of their activities.⁸⁴ In the meantime, the aerospace industries of the three countries have agreed a set of ten principles for their cooperation, which made clear that a restructuring is not only an industrial matter. Governments, too, have a role to play in terms of regulations, channelling research money and the privatisation of industry.

After Ostend most of the momentum in WEU came from OCCAR, which in principle was open to others on condition that they participate

significantly in a cooperative programme. The group aimed at doing away with arrangements of *juste retour* in a single programme but equalising work shares on a multi-project basis. In so doing it could become the nucleus of an armaments agency going beyond the research phase pursued by EUCLID and WEAO. To be effective, it should be taken upstream to shape common requirements. But strong headwinds developed, particularly from the smaller countries which would not be able to participate sufficiently in OCCAR programmes. The Netherlands wanted to join the four of OCCAR with its wheeled armoured reconnaissance vehicle developed in cooperation with Germany. Some compromise would be required if OCCAR was to obtain legal personality necessary to conclude contracts, which would only be possible by being declared a subsidiary body of WEU, like WEAO. The legal picture was obscured by comments by a French expert, Mr. Henri Adam, questioning the ability of WEU to grant legal personality to a subsidiary body which contained additional members not being High Contracting Parties to the WEU treaty. He was right that the arrangement was without precedent, but the transformation of the IEPG into the WEAG could only have been effected on the basis of equal rights of all 13 members. They have been included in the WEAO by an exchange of letters formalising the consensus of the 10 full members of WEU. In any case, at their meeting at Erfurt on 18 November 1997 ministers were not impressed and asked for a master plan and a timetable to guide further steps aiming at a European armaments agency as a means to better coordinate European efforts. They also agreed modalities for Austria, Finland and Sweden to participate in all WEAG meetings and to open up possibilities for interested Associate Partners to join the panels and subgroups on a case-by-case basis. Their communique stated that all important organisational means for the effective functioning of WEAG were in place. The text showed a greater sense of urgency, including the need for timely indications on common requirements to industry, but one could not help feeling that the comprehensive approach needed for the survival of the European defence industry was still lacking. In my view it required a much more determined effort at consolidation across borders, redirecting the flow of research money towards cooperative projects (including demonstrator projects which do not necessarily lead to series production), the removal of obstacles to intra-European competition and above all strict observance of agreed requirements and specifications. Ideally, Europe should develop the equivalent of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which guides the sequence research-development-demonstration of major projects. Hopefully the increasing number of multinational units will become a powerful incentive for standardisation of their equipment. The approval of a "Joint Logistic Support Concept for WEU" was a step in the right direction. In 1998, care will have to be taken that the new initiatives in EU and WEU reinforce each other and do not lead to unnecessary bickering about competences.

Notes

83. In Rome, Ministers also approved the new name: Western European Armaments Group (WEAG).

84. Commission document ip 97/983 of 12 November 1997 and statements issued in the three capitals on 9 December 1997.

Chapter Fourteen The Future Scope of European Security

In 1998, the United States is triumphant. It is the only superpower left, its economy is buoyant and its President has confidently embarked on a second term with a new zeal for foreign affairs. Although the country might still be reluctant to assume new commitments, it is a far cry from the introverted attitude of four or five years ago. At the beginning of the Clinton administration, the emphasis on economic problems had pushed foreign affairs to the background. Even as perceptive a member of the White House staff as J. J. Walker had publicly contemplated a total US military withdrawal from Europe. In 1993, a RAND study suggested the formation of four task forces, led by European pilot nations, with the UK forces as a mobile reserve. Equally, Secretary of State Christopher seemed masterful in dodging new obligations. Today, the risk lies more in the US getting so far ahead of the other powers, both technologically and militarily, that their allies can no longer keep up to the degree that combined operations become difficult to execute. Unilateral action might become more appealing if others are unable to contribute much more than as being lukewarm partners. On the other hand, multinational cooperation will remain an important argument in obtaining political support in Congress, as shown by the operations in Kuwait and Haiti. There, relatively small contributions by others were important in forging US domestic consensus. For the Europeans, multinational operations are necessary for risk-sharing and avoiding individual exposure; for the US it avoids go-it-alone decisions and enables it to show leadership, either in NATO or in ad hoc coalitions.

As a concomitant of the triumphant mood, the word "leadership" returned to the political lexicon. But leadership for what? Earlier, the US national interest had been defined in very narrow terms, which was not compatible with an ambition to continue to lead the Western world. US Presidential Decision Directive 25 of 5 May 1994 on multilateral peace operations had reflected American disillusionment with UN peacekeeping after the traumatic experience in Somalia. It made US participation conditional upon clear objectives, the means to accomplish the mission, realistic criteria for ending the operation and, in the case of traditional peacekeeping, the consent of the parties to the conflict and a cease-fire. Criticism of PDD 25 pointed out that understandable anxiety to fix an end-

point to an operation and to limit casualties could actually encourage local leaders to be obstinate, knowing that they could outlast an embattled peacekeeping force.⁸⁵ In addition, it was all very well to insist that both US and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective, but would it be possible to give clearer substantive indications on when US participation might be forthcoming? A renewed definition of interests was called for and, before the 1996 presidential elections, a group chaired by Robert Ellsworth, General Andrew Goodpaster and Rita Hauser took up the challenge.⁸⁶ They came up with vital interests ("blue chips"), extremely important interests ("red chips"), important interests ("white chips") and less important or secondary interests ("translucent chips"). US vital interests were seen as:

1. Prevent, deter and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons attacks on the United States.
2. Prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemony in Europe or Asia.
3. Prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on US borders or in control of the seas.
4. Prevent catastrophic collapse of major global systems: trade, financial markets, supply of energy, and environmental.
5. Ensure the survival of US allies.

Among the 11 red chips figured as item 8 "to maintain a lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies (including information and computers). Instrumentally, these extremely important interests were to promote strong US-European and US-Japanese strategic partnerships.

If these conclusions are taken up in official policy, Europe cannot complain. This method of ranking national interests has also been used in European studies, notably the French White Paper of 1994 and the publication by the European Strategy Group "Towards a Common Defence Policy".⁸⁷ In the latter study Major-General (ret.) Luc Stainier distinguished:

1. Vital interests: survival.
2. Essential interests, consisting of two main types:
 - a. The collective security, peace and stability of Europe as a whole;
 - b. Economic interests.
3. General interests, such as values and a just and stable international order.

In determining whether the interests at risk in a given crisis would justify military action, the following criteria should be applied:

1. The type of security interests at risk.
2. The gravity of the crisis.
3. Its distance from Europe.

4. The estimated casualties.
5. The reaction to the crisis in the media and public opinion.
6. The attitude of the great powers and the international community.
7. The likely duration of the operation.
8. The chances of success.
9. The estimated cost.
10. Links with parallel political action.

The Netherlands government took the definition of criteria for participation in peace support operations a step further.⁸⁸ It did not want to formulate an exhaustive list of criteria which, if all were not met, could unduly lead to a negative decision, but rather points which had to be taken into consideration in the process of decision-making. These points were:

1. The dispatch of Netherlands military personnel takes place on the basis of Netherlands interests and/or the promotion of international law and order.
2. It should be in accordance with international law and preferably be based on a mandate from an international organisation.
3. Factors of importance should be solidarity, credibility and a fair distribution of responsibilities, risks and burdens.
4. A multinational approach is to be preferred.
5. The despatch is not an automatic process but requires a case-by-case political decision of the government.
6. Political objectives should be translated into clear military instructions.
7. These political and military objectives should be reasonably attainable.
8. Burden-sharing in the implementation of international operations is desirable.
9. Overstretch of the armed forces has to be avoided.
10. Netherlands units will have to operate within a clear command structure of an international organisation.
11. The risks incurred by the personnel involved have to be assessed carefully and their equipment, armament and mobility will have to be adequate for the task.
12. Rules of engagement need to be formulated unambiguously.
13. The financing of the national participation has to be guaranteed.
14. Every pledge for participation has to be limited in time.

In discussing them with Parliament they were condensed into basically three criteria: the specific Netherlands interest in joining the operation, its military feasibility and widespread support by public opinion.

All these points form a useful checklist when determining whether a country should join a multinational operation. They do not touch upon the object of the intervention, which in any case will be the determining factor in the political decision to participate. Neither do they deal with the difficult

question how quickly an operation should be started. The application of military force should not always be regarded as a measure of last resort. Nor do the criteria differentiate between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. As we have seen, only a minority of conflicts are ripe for a peacekeeping treatment. They do not particularly require the use of the military, but soldiers can do these tasks better than anybody else. If the parties agree, the problem of legitimacy does not occur and a UN mandate would not be essential except, of course, when the operation is run and financed from New York. For peace-enforcement, with its stronger possibility of casualties, international consensus behind the intervention needs to be much stronger and over time will require a definition of the security interests of the European Union as such. Also the requirements for intelligence, communications and joint operations including air forces will be greater, which in practice can be met only by the involvement of some of the larger countries. The dividing line between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement will not be as clear as governments committing troops would like. The conflict might flare up again or escalate and peacekeepers might be difficult to extricate, both militarily and politically. Nevertheless, some operations will start as peace-enforcement from the outset, raising issues which presumably have been clarified already in a peacekeeping situation. These refer to the recognisable identity of the parties to the conflict, their equipment, the existence of a clear frontline and the possibility of establishing lines of communications with the parties, either at central or regional level. Enforcement action will require a wide spectrum of military capabilities, including logistics, comparable to combat operations.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping, with the agreement of the parties, was all that could be expected from the United Nations. We owe the concept to Lester Pearson, who thought of it as freezing a situation in order to allow a political settlement to emerge. But without a follow-up it would also leave the bad elements in place. The UN could act against aggression in Korea because the Soviet seat on the Security Council was not occupied. It took some enforcement action in the Congo, particularly directed against the mercenaries in Katanga, because there was agreement between the permanent members of the Council on this post-colonial issue. It would take till the flagrant Iraqi aggression against Kuwait before the Council passed a resolution enabling another US-led coalition to expel the invader. During the Cold War that would have been difficult, as shown by the passive attitude of the UN during the Iran-Iraq war. Peacekeeping was also predicated on the assumption that the parties to the conflict had an interest in ending it and that, at best, neutral mediation would be necessary to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement. Pressure, if exerted, took the form of diplomatic moves and economic sanctions. Militarily, peacekeeping was a decentralised and static operation with little role for the force commander. Recent experience in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda indicates that the international community will increasingly have to impose settlements,

enforce ceasefires and protect civilians in safe areas or relief convoys despatched to keep them alive. Its task will not be to engage in large-scale fighting, but to act internationally in the same way as the policeman acts nationally: his presence alone is normally sufficient to maintain the peace, but if necessary to enforce the law or separate those fighting he is able to act decisively and effectively. His appearance on the scene might bring the parties to their senses and stop the violence. This raises the question of the legitimacy and justification of coercion in an international context.

1. Justified Coercion?⁸⁹

In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis, the plight of the Kurdish population in the mountains of northern Iraq prompted the creation of "safe havens" and started the debate on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. The concept was initiated by the French human rights specialist and politician, Bernard Kouchner, to allow non-governmental organisations to conduct relief operations, if necessary against the wish of the government exercising sovereignty over the area concerned. It led to an interesting debate on the relationship between the principle in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, preventing the UN from intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, and the duties imposed on all members to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in Articles 55 and 56, especially in situations of mass murder and genocide. That debate has not been concluded and the matter remains fraught with difficulties. The value of NGOs lies particularly in their non-political nature and their impartiality. Consequently, they prefer to work without being associated with pressure being put on one of the parties. Conversely, the nominal government is likely to consider the relief offered as support for the enemy or a rebel movement. As a result, some international protection for the NGO might be necessary.

The legal base for the safe havens in northern Iraq rested on Security Council Resolution 688 which, however, did not provide explicitly for military enforcement action. The argument is not that important, because the Western powers could also have derived legitimacy from the fact that Iraq had been branded a threat to peace and security, which overrides the prohibition of domestic interference.⁹⁰ When intervention was authorised in Somalia, the state had ceased to function, making the argument for humanitarian intervention quite strong. The Bosnian case was the most complex. As we have discussed in Chapter 7, the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia started out as a humanitarian relief operation, but gradually acquired a wider scope. In fact, it could be argued that humanitarian aid without effective political action would only prolong violence and suffering, feeding those who would be the next victims.

On the human rights side the international community has made some conceptual progress. In the European context, the Helsinki process was

instrumental in making human rights a legitimate subject of diplomatic discussions, which the Soviets always disputed prior to the Final Act of 1975. The Moscow Document of the CSCE Human Dimension Conference in 1991 took this a step further by emphasising:

... that the commitments undertaken in the field of the Human Dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not exclusively belong to the internal affairs of the state concerned.

This statement was repeated in paragraph 8 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration of 1992. A similar provision was included in June 1993 in the Declaration of the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights attended by 171 countries.

Of necessity, the decision to intervene will have to be selective and responses will not always be consistent. Richard N. Haass saw three purposes of direct military involvement in the internal affairs of another state:

- *Humanitarian*: providing protection and other basic needs, often through the establishment of safe havens (which he intended to keep people alive until the political situation changed, but not to change that situation directly);
- *Nation-building*: recasting the institutions of the society; and
- *Peacemaking*: which, contrary to the Agenda for Peace, was defined as tilting the military balance in favour of one or another contender.

In his view, three factors ought to shape the decision to act: the actual or potential scale of the problem, the existence of any non-humanitarian interests, and the availability of military options that provide relief at acceptable cost and that promise better results at no greater cost than alternative measures. Haass also made the valuable point that direct military intervention is virtually irrelevant when it comes to affecting the course of internal politics once they reach revolution.⁹¹

The European Parliament took up the problem of non-intervention at the request of the Socialist group after the US action in Panama in 1990. The Bertens Report of 1994⁹² concluded that the use of force to protect human rights might be justified, subject to the following conditions:

- An exceptional and extreme case of human rights violation in a state where those in power cannot be persuaded by means other than military.
- The UN system was not able (in time) to react effectively.
- All other possible and reasonable means have been exhausted.
- Protection of human rights is the primary purpose and motives of

political or economic self-interest do not play a role.

- The intervention remains limited to its specific purposes and has only minimal effects for the authority of the state concerned.
- The use of force is proportional and temporary.
- The intervention is reported to the UN and not condemned by it.
- It does not result in greater loss of life or suffering than it is intended to prevent.

Experts on international law and the United Nations might have some difficulty with these criteria. They obviously left more room for evaluation and assessment than is desirable in a legal system. Nevertheless, they represented the most far-reaching attempt to define and constrain humanitarian intervention.

In attempting to define justifiable coercive acts by states, Ernst B. Haas distinguishes between enabling and substantive criteria.⁹³ According to his enabling criteria, coercive measures must be multilaterally authorised and pass the test of probable effectiveness. If there is a good chance that the measures will be abused, they should not be authorised. As to substantive criteria, the following situations would permit multilateral coercive action in order to preserve or restore peace:

1. To prevent and punish aggression by one state against another.
2. In a civil war, to reimpose peace terms on one party that has reneged, provided the terms originally resulted from UN peacemaking.
3. To act against violations of international agreements banning the possession or manufacture of, or trade in, weapons of mass destruction.
4. To enforce agreements banning or limiting trade in conventional arms, including trade in dual-use goods and forbidden technology.
5. To prevent an event certified by experts as an immediate impending ecological catastrophe.
6. To prevent genocide.
7. To protect an established democratic polity from anti-democratic, armed challenges, but not to protect a dubious or fictitious one.
8. To prevent and alleviate famine and mass epidemics.

It has been pointed out⁹⁴ that the substantive criteria may clash with the enabling criterion of efficiency. Yet, in today's world the issue of efficacy has become of great practical importance: what are the chances of getting what type of coalition together for what purpose? Equally important, the situations mentioned above could also lend themselves to other measures of a non-coercive nature, including the whole spectrum of preventive action. Among the eight situations listed, clearly number 7 will be the most difficult to measure. There are degrees of democratisation. Nevertheless, in Haiti, the UN was prepared to restore democracy, even though it had never taken hold previously.

This list demonstrates the changed nature of security, which no longer exclusively focuses on its traditional core element, the defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity. New elements come to the fore in an interdependent world, such as arms proliferation, environmental degradation and, above all, human rights. Preference given, both in Africa and in Europe, to the inviolability of borders over self-determination, made the position of minorities a crucial issue and started a new debate over collective and individual rights. The instruments available to protect the new spectrum of interests also have increased, thereby enlarging the spectrum of measures that traditionally would have been considered to constitute intervention. Some of them are not dramatically new. In the past, acts that the more powerful states regarded as belonging to the normal arsenal of foreign policy would also have been censured as intervention or undue pressure by the weaker ones. Today, the difference lies in the multilateralisation of many of the interests pursued because of the realisation that they transcend the responsibilities and capabilities of individual countries.

The instruments available to the international community can be classified along a range of declining intensity of response.⁹⁵

1. Collective defence against aggression committed either against a member of an alliance or a third country. In the former case, alliance commitments and plans are activated; in the latter, the assistance will have to be organised on an ad hoc basis.
2. Collective or individual action legitimated by an enabling resolution of the UN Security Council. This might include collective military intervention in intra-state conflicts.
3. Deploying peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the UN, a regional organisation or an ad hoc arrangement. An example of the third category is the M.F.O. in Sinai.
4. Preventive deployment in areas of instability.
5. Sanctions authorised by the UN, OSCE or the European Union such as an economic blockade, arms embargo, suspension of membership and various selective measures of isolation in international relations.
6. Resolutions by the Security Council, OSCE or any regional organisation asking for a fact-finding mission and/or offering mediation and conciliation. A newcomer in this category is the mission of preventive diplomacy of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities.
7. A UN General Assembly resolution condemning a particular government or promoting a desired outcome. In a European context, the declarations under the Common Foreign and Security Policy apply, as well as the ministerial communiqués of NATO and WEU and the resolutions of the European Parliament, Council of Europe and WEU Assembly.
8. Extending recognition to a party in an intra-state conflict.
9. Ad hoc ministerial meeting at the UN, NATO, EU or WEU to deal with

an emerging crisis.

10. Offering parties positive incentives to conform to a proposed outcome of a conflict.
11. No collective response, but leaving scope for national actions or declarations.

With all these options, several aspects should be kept in mind. In practical politics it is not so much a question of which norms apply, as who will enforce them. It is the art of diplomacy to find sufficient common interest to organise a joint action. In order to be successful in future, much more discussion, planning and consultation will be needed within and between the existing international organisations. Having decided upon a common action, it will be equally important to manage it well, applying proper procedures to allow the multitude of decisions to be taken in time. The second point concerns the danger of the intervention remaining ineffective. We can never be certain of a positive result of the use of military power in bringing the social forces towards a political settlement. This uncertainty will always induce opposition to undertaking the operation from the start. Interestingly enough, however, in the present environment the idealists have become the hawks, willing to use force, while the self-styled *Realpolitiker* are the doves. Although probably never completely without effect, the failures in Somalia and Bosnia detract from the credibility of existing institutions and lead to initiatives to bypass them. In the former Yugoslavia fear of being attacked by the Serbs imprisoned the West in self-imposed limitations. The emergence of a Contact Group for Bosnia might have been a necessary expedient at a time of impasse, but in the end cannot but weaken the international organisations involved in managing the crisis. Much more important is the question what type of forces are needed to fulfil these missions and how they should be equipped and trained. Their additional tasks are not oriented towards winning a war and often require delicate judgment and restraint. One area which in particular will require further development concerns the rules of international humanitarian law. The International Committee of the Red Cross has drafted guidelines for UN forces, emphasising the distinction between civilians and combatant, methods of warfare, the treatment of detained persons and civilians, and the protection of the wounded as well as relief personnel, but so far met with an unsatisfactory response in New York.

2. European Security Interests

Of all the regions in the world, Europe has developed the highest degree of institutionalised security cooperation. Too many organisations with partially overlapping terms of reference are active in this field. If one could start all over from scratch, nobody would think of designing the present patchwork. Yet, no single organisation can handle the entire European

security process. Each of the existing organisations has something to contribute. The problem is not that each can claim a certain specificity, but rather their tendency to focus on organisational and procedural matters. How to deal with each other became more important than the substantial problems requiring multinational action.

Since 1989, the perception of security interests has changed considerably. Collective defence no longer being the overriding priority, it became more difficult to formulate national and Alliance-wide defence needs. The challenge contained in NATO's force proposals to do more than originally intended lost much of its rationale in a no-threat environment. At first, the answer seemed to be an emphasis on reconstitution, i.e. building up US forces, but also mobilising European forces, rapidly enough to deal with renewed aggressive Soviet intentions. After all, the Soviet Union remained the largest military power in Europe with a vast nuclear arsenal and its federal structure was in a persistent crisis. In Central Europe we were facing uncertain political developments, more specifically in the Balkans. In a paper presented in June 1990, I wrote that the worst of all possible scenarios - the "Balkanisation" of Central Europe and the "Lebanonisation" of the USSR - could not be excluded yet.⁹⁶ But reconstitution lost much credibility when warning time of a re-emerging Soviet threat became longer and longer and was counted in terms of years, while previously it had been a matter of days or even hours. Moreover, reconstitution needed fewer standing forces than most wanted to maintain in Germany and the US force presence in Europe went down, first to 195,000 under President Bush and later to 100,000 under President Clinton.

In the absence of a clear enemy NATO no longer talked in terms of threat but about risks and instabilities in the new security environment. Quite true, but how to quantify the military requirements to deal with these instabilities? Modern society does not have a complete answer to the new problems of terrorism, drugs, organised crime and religious fundamentalism but, clearly, these instabilities do not require a primarily military response. The same applies to ecological disasters, like the meltdown of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. Behind those horrors looms the possibility of a combination of them. Drugs trafficking and organised crime are already coming hand in hand. Terrorists possessing weapons of mass destruction are on the horizon as we have witnessed after poisonous gas was used in the Tokyo subway.

Military measures could play a role in ethnic and religious conflicts, which preoccupy us most in the Balkans, and in the worldwide threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In every case the use of military capabilities will not aim at military solutions, but at supporting political objectives which make it possible to restore peace. Again, their deterrent role will be first and foremost, but to be credible the actual use of force should not be shunned. Earlier in this chapter, I have compared this task in intra-state conflicts with the function of the international policeman

to prevent a relapse into violence through his presence, but made credible by his ability to use force if necessary. This is not a plea for more police operations on the model of Mostar, useful as they might be under specific circumstances, but a conclusion drawn from the experience of recent operations. In many cases proper military units, trained on the full range of their profession, will be needed to deter and deal with the risk of escalation. But it is quite clear that close coordination between the civilian and the military side of the operation has become a priority item.

The international community has not yet fully adjusted to the new situation. The use of the military is not seen in the Clausewitzian sense of the continuation of diplomacy by other means. Now no longer as war, but in a conditioned enforcement mode. No longer to defeat an enemy, but to restore international order. Gustav Däniker, the Swiss expert on strategy, has described the new role of the Guardian Soldier as protecting militarily, but being capable of aid and rescue operations with the same energy and competence as combat missions. His definition of protection encompasses all the law enforcement functions below the threshold of war with which the police are unable to cope.⁹⁷ In future, soldiers will have to operate in a new environment: front lines will be unclear, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants will be fuzzy, the belligerents may be quite young and poorly organised and hostage-taking becomes a hazard difficult to cope with. France and the UK have practised that role in their colonial empires and determined its scope unilaterally. Most other countries have no history of intervention. To them, the role of the military was the defence of their independence and territorial integrity, first individually, later collectively. The UN system was based on an uneasy compromise between respect for national sovereignty and responsibility for peace and security given to a Security Council dependent upon consensus among its permanent members. During the Cold War peacekeeping with the agreement of the parties concerned, and subject to weak mandates, was the only feasible activity. Many neutral countries excelled in its implementation, which involved lightly armed infantry units with logistic and transport support. Only recently, attention focused on requirements for embargo and enforcement action. NATO had a tendency to think in terms of large, Corps-scale operations, while WEU - apart from naval embargoes - dealt with very small actions, involving less than 300 personnel on the Danube, less than 200 police in Mostar. In the past NATO was effective by posing as a heavy-weight boxer and never had to strike a blow. In future we need more of a judo expert setting off balance a culprit with proportional force. More attention will have to be devoted to the rapid despatch of battalion-size units with a lean support structure. Present multinational operations are too expensive.

With the continuation of the NATO operation in Bosnia, SFOR having succeeded IFOR, the Alliance was safe for another year and a half. There will be a need for a continued presence also after the middle of 1998 to

maintain order, and hopefully the US can be persuaded once again to stay, at a further reduced level of participation. The crucial question then will be what level of American involvement will be sufficient to maintain SFOR as a NATO operation, or whether it will have to be turned into a European-led action. Clearly, some European countries would be reluctant to do so and would be tempted to pull out as well. The old saying of not changing horses in mid-stream seems particularly appropriate in Bosnia. Changing the NATO label on SFOR could only undermine its credibility, even if the number of forces would not be substantially diminished.



Units of the Netherlands airmobile brigade at Jayce, Bosnia. (Photo: AVD-KM, Peter van Bastelaar)

Of course, Bosnia is not the only story. Albania barely survived as a state in March 1997, and all political forces clamoured for an international presence. In spite of all rhetoric in NATO and WEU about the new mission of peacekeeping, neither organisation was able to organise a multinational force and it was left to Italy to lead a coalition of the willing. Other parts of the former Yugoslavia might turn critical, too, especially Kosovo and Macedonia in its wake. The OSCE has played an important mediating role in Albania and could again have a stabilising role in Kosovo. In Macedonia, UNPREDEP will continue to be invaluable in its role of preventive deployment, unique in UN history. Ultimately, confidence-building and arms control will have to be spread over the entire Balkans to promote stability in an historically unstable region. For the European Union, the

south-eastern part of our continent will remain an important security interest, which will continue to necessitate force deployments of some kind to function as a stabiliser or an international policeman.

There are other security interests on our periphery, but these are less likely to require the deployment of ground forces. A possible exception could be a European contribution to the supervision of a demilitarised zone on the Golan Heights in the context of an arrangement between Israel and Syria. Such a role would alleviate the burden on the US, but would be envisaged by Israel only if proposed as an addition to an American presence. Further implosion of the situation in Algeria could lead to problems on its borders with Morocco and Tunisia, not least because of streams of refugees. So far, the situation has been judged too delicate for any serious contingency planning in a multilateral framework.

Turning East, our main geopolitical interest lies in maintaining an independent Ukraine, able to emerge from its economic depression. Should Ukraine drift again under the influence of Moscow, the new democracies of Central Europe would be more entitled to stress their security concerns than they are today. The new NATO-Ukraine Charter has recognised that "an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole" but, obviously, the realisation of that objective will take much more than the security dimension alone. Ukrainian viability will depend upon a concerted effort of economic support and reform, in which the European Union should play a major role.

3. Conclusions

Western leaders are most forthright and venturesome in symbolic acts, declaratory policy and the drafting of architectural plans.⁹⁸

At the time of finishing the manuscript of this book, more than eight years have elapsed since I took office as Secretary-General of WEU. How does the record look? The organisation acquired a higher profile. Most people in the security community have become familiar with it. The Secretariat grew in numbers, but remains small in comparison to other organisations. The Institute for Security Studies, the Satellite Centre and the Planning Cell were created. The notion of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) was developed and tested in exercises. During the Kuwait crisis WEU carried out most of the embargo operations and in the Yugoslav crisis it again participated in the embargo, which turned into a blockade, and organised the control on the Danube and the police contingent of the EU administration of Mostar. Operation Sharp Guard was a novelty in the relationship with NATO, in accepting unity of command under NATO, but with joint NATO-WEU political supervision. It did not act in Somalia or

Rwanda and came very late into Albania, with a team to provide advice to the local police. Conceptually, the role and place of WEU was largely defined at Maastricht, but its implementation remained inadequate. Amsterdam brought WEU somewhat closer to the EU and mentioned a merger as a future possibility. In practice, however, the EU requested WEU only twice to take some action: in Mostar and - without response - during the crisis in the Great Lakes region in 1996. Amsterdam also maintained the reference to "defence implications", while in fact WEU has not dealt with collective defence at all, and concentrated on crisis management outside the area covered by the guarantees of the Brussels and Washington Treaties. Given that the Petersberg missions were transferred to the EU Treaty, it would have been better to describe WEU as the military, or even operational dimension of European integration.

The political side was the most innovative, prompted by the fact that, in Tom King's words, the future was not what it used to be. In 1989 WEU looked like a hard core of EC members willing to deepen their cooperation in the field of defence. The original seven members also were the countries willing to assume nuclear responsibilities. After Maastricht observers and associate members were brought in, thus gathering all members of the EU and all European Allies around the table of the Permanent Council. In 1994, half its meetings were opened to the associate partners, inviting those countries which had signed - or were about to sign - a Europe Agreement with the EU. Differentiated membership has been criticised as a dispersed effort, but was an appropriate response to the actual state of European affairs. Security through participation was the best way to give early substance to the promise of future membership. The new democracies of Central Europe have reacted well to this new opportunity, by doing much to resolve differences with their neighbours and by participation in the Bosnian and Albanian operations. As a result, the differences between full members, observers and associates are being blurred. Many things are being done at 28, including the discussion on relations with Russia and Ukraine and the development of an exercise policy. Ability and willingness to join in an operation will matter most. Increasing numbers with up to 55 ministers around the table made open discussion impossible, but that problem is shared by all European organisations.

Frustration abounded by the lack of will of the member countries to live up to their words. I am not one of those who bandy about the lack of political will as the main cause for the absence of effective European action. Political will does not exist in a vacuum, but has to rest on a common appreciation of national interests. In itself it was not surprising that in the post-Cold War situation perceptions of new threats started to diverge. But the inconsistency of national positions in different international organisations was indefensible. Repeatedly, countries advocated in the EU or in WEU to have recourse to the UN or OSCE, but subsequently made it impossible for these organisations to adopt the relevant measures. The same happened in

the relationship between WEU and NATO. The anomalies were too marked to be ascribed to bureaucratic errors or sloppy execution of instructions.

From the beginning of my term, I stressed the complementary levels on which European defence and security should be buttressed: the UN, the OSCE, NATO and EU/WEU. It looked like a neat conceptual framework, with each body having its competence clearly defined and willing to cooperate with the others towards common goals. In practice, little came of it. The larger institutions were reluctant to delegate missions to smaller bodies, because they preferred to do them on their own and feared loss of influence over their implementation. The UN wanted to maintain its hold over peacekeeping and did not envisage shared operations involving blue helmets. Peace enforcement was a different matter. There, the Security Council virtually abandoned its primary responsibility for peace and security and had to leave enforcement action to a US-led coalition in the Kuwait crisis and to NATO in Bosnia. It had to content itself with an "enabling" resolution calling upon member states to use all necessary means to achieve a stated objective, thus providing legitimacy for the countries willing to act to organise themselves. In any event, for enforcement action micro-management from New York would not be feasible. The way the Security Council works, defining its aims and strategy with each successive resolution, is not appropriate for the conduct of operations with combat forces. Those will require a clear objective from the outset, the definition of constraints which are not constantly altered and the flexibility to respond to changes in the actual situation in the field. Today, most countries are almost paralysed by the need for legitimacy and insist on mandates even where they would not seem indispensable. In former Yugoslavia Article 51, with its inherent right of self-defence, either individually or collectively could have been invoked after the constituent republics had been recognised. In other cases the enabling resolutions with their authorisation of "all necessary means" could have been the basis for much more prompt and decisive intervention. In practice, many countries took refuge behind their devotion to mandates from the international community as a whole, in order to avoid having to act forcefully. Someday this question of mandates for regional peace operations will have to be resolved. If we have to rely on either consensus in OSCE or a veto-bound UN Security Council all our efforts will remain dependent upon fair weather in East-West relations. In the case of the Dayton Agreement, the UNSC was not involved at all and only gave its blessing when everything was finished. In similar fashion, the OSCE endorsed the monitor mission of the European Community in former Yugoslavia and took note with appreciation of the WEU blockade on the Danube. This made certain that Russia would not obstruct the missions, but did not amount to an OSCE request to other organisations. On the contrary, it noted actions offered and organised by others, thereby providing added respectability as well as a framework in which all OSCE member states could be kept informed. Moreover, Western willingness to provide such

information was closely connected with their wish to have Russia do the same in operations on CIS territory.

In 1992, the Western countries were thinking in terms of the UN and the OSCE requesting NATO or WEU to undertake missions on their behalf. In previous chapters we have demonstrated the inadequacy of the "interlocking organisations" concept. Mutually reinforcing institutions was a more realistic aim, but even that remained largely rhetoric. As the enlargement processes continue, both in NATO and the EU, and NACC has been succeeded by the European-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the relationship with the OSCE will again be tested. Apart from some of the mini-states in the OSCE, the membership will be almost identical, but the EAPC is under the auspices of NATO, while the OSCE is not. Politically, the OSCE is the only organisation in which the US and Russia have equal status, but that is also the reason why Washington will always give preference to structures linked with NATO and keep the OSCE on a short leash. Its interest in the OSCE lies in its possibility to monitor developments in the area of the former Soviet Union. Consequently, NATO and particularly the US will have a preference to conduct peace operations in the context of the EAPC. Some have even suggested that the successor to SFOR could come under the EAPC as the body providing the mandate. At the 1997 OSCE meeting in Copenhagen, the Netherlands proposed the same for Nagorno-Karabakh.

These suggestions come at a time when the OSCE has raised its effectiveness. It has done better than the critics of the consensus-principles expected. Consensus-minus-one has been formalised for instances of grave human rights violations. Yugoslavia was suspended from membership for that reason, and Serbia will now have to apply again, just as the other successor states have done. More important, because of their wider application, are the non-consensual measures developed under the authority of the Chairman-in-Office. Several OSCE missions - including those of Gonzalez to Belgrade and of Vranitzky to Albania - have been decided by the Chairman, albeit after consultation with major players functioning as "Friends of the Chairman-in-Office". In this way, an informal executive committee has taken shape. The other point concerns the distinction between crisis prevention, for which the OSCE is best suited, and crisis management, which is usually attributed to NATO or WEU. The difference is not as clear as sometimes assumed, for crisis management is not only a question of military measures, and the presence of a mission for fact-finding, conciliation or negotiation can have a positive effect in preventing escalation and finding the basis for a political settlement.

Institutionally, the future of the OSCE is ambiguous. A visitor to its Vienna offices is confronted by requirements for more personnel and finance. The international secretariat gradually has increased in size, but remains modest. Further strengthening met with US objections. Admittedly, Washington was also instrumental in giving the OSCE the task of organising

the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections, but it made sure that a US diplomat would be in charge. On the parliamentary side, the duplication between NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe has become the most obvious and the case for merging the three assemblies could already be made today.

By declaring itself a regional organisation under the UN, the OSCE established its position under the UN Charter, but also lost its ability to decide enforcement action without the authority of the UN Security Council. Not that the likelihood of OSCE enforcement was very high. A regional organisation essentially based on the consensus principle has less capacity of decision than the Security Council. In 1992 the German Planning Staff was studying whether the old Soviet idea of a European Security Council could be turned to our own advantage, possibly with a Court of Justice added to it, but in the West nobody else showed sympathy for the idea. There was no merit in a European body - acting either with consensus or a veto arrangement - giving Russia another opportunity to stall action. Under those circumstances the Kinkel-Kooijmans initiative of "OSCE First" was more realistic. During the consultations every organisation would be holding during an emerging crisis, the chances of organising an OSCE action could be rapidly ascertained. If unpromising, other alternatives could be explored. The ambitious project of a security model for the 21st century did not go far during the Lisbon summit of December 1996. To all practical purposes, the declaration equated the model with the present network of existing organisations and their mutual linkages. In future we will face the dilemma that the UN would like to make more use of regional organisations, but collective defence organisations should not move under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The basis for their cooperation with the UN rests on Article 48 in Chapter VII.

The Dayton Agreement has tasked the OSCE with organising elections in Bosnia. As a result, the new emphasis on elections has caused a certain myopia in Vienna when discussing Bosnia. Elections were important as a starting point of democratic processes and should not be equated with respect for human rights, but if they confirm the ethnic cleansing and harden ethnic divides they do not make living together any easier. The greatest hope of improvement of the situation rested in new leaders coming forward to replace the mediocre and parochial leadership of the war.

A Platform for Co-operative Security was created to define modalities for cooperation between the OSCE and other security organisations. The Lisbon Declaration reaffirmed some important points: the inherent right of every participating state to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance; no State, organisation or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability or regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence; and "we shall ensure that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a participating state is in conformity with international law, the freely expressed consent of the host state, or a relevant decision of the UN

Security Council." Based on the ten Helsinki principles of 1975, a Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security has been adopted in 1994. It grew out of a French project to draft a pan-European security treaty which was rejected by a large majority of NATO members and downsized to a politically binding code. The final outcome has been criticised for not offering a systematic listing of the security rights and duties of participating states in the post-Cold War era and, when doing so for a limited number of cases, for formulating them "in extremely cautious language accentuated by crippling caveats".⁹⁹ The regular ministerial conference in Copenhagen in December 1997 was not a great success. Moscow wanted to retreat from the principle of freedom to join alliances and Washington objected to a clause about peacekeeping operations. The Danish presidency managed to salvage the objective of a new comprehensive document, but there was no agreement on its name - Document or Charter -, the timetable for agreeing it and its binding character. All this leads to the conclusion that principles and prevention will continue to be the main focus for OSCE, which includes the High Commissioner for National Minorities and some ad hoc missions, but no major peacekeeping operations. If that is so, the process of codifying values should be accompanied by some early-warning procedures for situations where these values are threatened.

NATO

In the early 1990s, many doubted whether, to use Sir John Gouliden's words, the Alliance was capable of making the heroic adaptations that were necessary to adjust to the tectonic changes of that period.¹⁰⁰ Today it is busier than ever, with new issues, enlargement, Bosnia, internal reform and its relationships with Russia and with the European Security and Defence Identity. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, much has been said about making NATO more political. That seemed appropriate under circumstances which made the multinational layer-cake defence system in Germany superfluous. But one of the paradoxes of history since 1989 has been that the debate in NATO has become more military instead of more political, both on the issue of enlargement and on internal reforms. During the years of deterrence NATO never fired a shot in anger, but in the new Europe the military profession has become more dangerous. Peace support operations are highly political in nature, but the forces involved have a clear military function as well. The Alliance still has to provide a clear answer to the question of what its purpose will be in a changed European environment. The Bosnian crisis has left it off the hook for a while. IFOR and SFOR were efficient operations, which encountered fewer problems than anticipated, because they were implemented decisively. Both operations had wide participation from third countries and NATO membership was not a condition for joining. Should SFOR be discontinued in the middle of 1998, the debate about purpose and direction of the Alliance will start all over again and it will take

little perspicacity to see that the Emperor is scantily clad. In spite of all rhetoric, peacekeeping in the traditional sense is not for NATO and certainly not for the US. Peace enforcement might be, but then again the question arises in what scenarios the US would be prepared to join. All this reinforces my persistent argument that much more attention should be given to European inputs into NATO consultations in a way acceptable to the US. As Washington does not like a European caucus inside NATO, there is a niche for WEU. Some have thought of a direct link between EU/CFSP and NATO, but that seems less logical as long as WEU has not been absorbed into the European Union. It would imply another inter-institutional linkage, which for the EU would be even more difficult than for WEU. Moreover, the five member states of the EU with observer status in WEU would not be keen on such an arrangement. As long as NATO and the EU differ in their European membership, WEU will have a role to "lubricate" their relationship.¹⁰¹ Simultaneously, the EU should develop closer relations with the United States, but then directly and not through the narrower avenue of NATO. The Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 did not amount to much, but the new Transatlantic Agenda agreed in Madrid in December 1995 together with a Joint EU-US Action Plan was more substantial. No new institutional structures were added except a EU-US Senior Level Group of high officials to prepare the half-yearly summit meetings. The Agenda was comprehensive and ranged from the promotion of peace, stability, democracy and development to global challenges, the promotion of world trade and bridge-building across the Atlantic.

The question is not whether NATO should be maintained. Today, everybody sees the value of the Alliance in drawing the US into collective defence and, whenever it is willing, into peace operations. No, the problem lies in the high profile of NATO and the enhanced influence of a renewed American activism in foreign policy. Some suspected Washington of pushing NATO enlargement in order to remain ahead of the EU and enhance its leadership in Central Europe. President Clinton certainly surprised most European Allies when he accelerated enlargement by giving it a precise timetable. His push obviously was well received in the candidate countries, who wanted to join as many Western organisations as possible and saw earlier opportunities in NATO than in the European Union. Enlargement was a clear case of US leadership overcoming reluctant European Allies. It was a success, also in managing the new relationship with Russia and Ukraine, but primarily in terms of institution-building.

As national parliaments are expected to start the ratification process of the protocols with the three new members in 1998, questions will be asked about the nature of the commitments, the cost and the European contribution. All three could have an erosive effect on the posture of the Alliance. In each parliament questions will be asked as to what should be done in the event that the independence or democratic form of government of new members were threatened. Two answers are possible. The first is that we

live in a no-threat, no-enemy situation, so that the Article V commitment is unlikely to be activated. Then the next question will be why, under those circumstances, NATO enlargement is so urgent that it cannot wait for EU enlargement and for further development of the Partnership for Peace cooperation with all participants. Talk about the need for stability or the existence of a power vacuum does not match fully the no-threat argument. While NATO emphasises its new role in its contacts with Russia, the truth is that the Central European countries are primarily interested in its old role of collective defence and deterrence. Even the present members are ambiguous on this score. In Berlin in 1996, the "newness" of NATO was the main reason why the drafting took so long. While Spain championed the new missions to make its full participation in the command structures politically defensible at home, the US did not want to create the impression of a great transformation doing away with all the achievements of the past.

The second possible, but devastating, answer would be that Article V does not mean what we thought it meant, i.e. a fully-fledged security guarantee. During the Cold War, most of us did not doubt American willingness to follow-up the deterrent role of its nuclear weapons with actual war-fighting, provided the Europeans shared a reasonable part of the burden. Today, security no longer is as indivisible as during the Cold War, when literally we had to stand together or hang separately. When there no longer is a massive threat involving everybody, and potential conflicts are likely to be of a regional nature, responses in Allied capitals are prone to vary. This is another reason to engage in solidarity-building through European integration in order to restore the element of indivisibility in our security policy.

Calculations of the cost of NATO enlargement seemed highly exaggerated. To me, they were never a valid argument against expansion. The only tangible requirement would be a connection to the NATO-wide communication system and some of the military networks, a link-up with the air defence system and some infrastructural works to show that membership means more than paper guarantees only. These projects could be spread over time and adjusted to the speed of national modernisation programmes, which themselves will not be financed out of the NATO budget. Few European countries are keen on making large financial contributions. Another variant of the contribution issue might be a new burden-sharing debate on worldwide responsibilities. Several European countries are sensitive to the need of showing solidarity on issues close to the heart of the Americans. For that reasons, they participated in the Haiti operation and in maritime patrols against drugs trafficking. Yet, European actions under American leadership in other continents do not seem probable and NATO should not develop that ambition.

The crucial question of which organisation does what and when, has not been clarified much. A favourite catchword in my speeches was the notion of a new "transatlantic bargain" to define the respective roles of the

US and Europe within the Alliance. We should talk about functions rather than figures, because the numbers game was a slippery slope which could only take us downward. Agreement on functions, not necessarily in treaty form, would introduce a new element of obligation in the defence planning process. The US should focus on the multiplier effect embodied in their contribution of capabilities which the Europeans would not have for a long time to come. For Europe it should mean the ability and willingness to use their multinational formations for the new missions. I made the point most strongly at Wehrkunde in February 1993 and was encouraged to hear Les Aspin talk at dinner about a new covenant. I had taken the expression from a book by Harlan Cleveland in 1970, who was the US Permanent Representative to NATO when I was in the Netherlands delegation. To him the bargain meant a permanent process of negotiation across the Atlantic. To me in 1992 it was an attempt to keep NATO relevant under changed circumstances by redefining responsibilities in as concrete a manner as possible. Stanley R. Sloan, probably the most perceptive expert on NATO matters in the US, argued in the same vein, more recently in the NATO Review of March 1996. For both of us, the bargain dealt with European security, not with burden-sharing on a world scale, as later advocated by RAND and, more specifically on the greater Middle East, by Blackwill and Stürmer in *Allies Divided*.¹⁰² The latter study warned that, despite shared vital interests in the region, on virtually every issue the US and the EU held different views. Over time, this could be damaging to both sides and undermine the transatlantic relationship so much that the West would be unable to cooperate in other regions as well. In the same book Richard L. Kugler called for eight European divisions for Middle Eastern contingencies, but François Heisbourg concluded that at best four might be forthcoming. The warning was appropriate, but the solution not easy. To accusations of bickering and policy paralysis the Europeans reply that the US are reaping a disproportionate share of international prestige and are unduly influenced by domestic policy considerations.

The issue of a new bargain was overtaken by the more activist turn in US foreign policy, but may surge again. Seen from Europe, US objectives remain ambiguous: the US seems to be willing to continue its role in European security, but it should not cost too much. On Capitol Hill money has become a determining factor, even if it follows directly from US-led policies like NATO enlargement. Yet, Washington does not like to leave responsibilities solely to others and, as far as its military presence is concerned, prefers to maintain a combat capability in Europe. On our side we welcome this and fully accept the importance of US involvement in everything related to Russia's role in European security. A major difference, however, will remain in the fact that the US has a global strategic view of the world, while the CFSP does not, at least not yet. This is most evident in the approaches towards the strategic interest in a secular Turkey between the Arab world, Russia and the CIS, and Europe at a time in which new

sources of oil and gas are becoming available.

When WEU was still in London, we received NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Von Moltke, in September 1992 to discuss the interface between NATO and WEU. His main concern was the nature of WEU inputs into NATO consultations: would it be contributions to an ongoing discussion or final positions? My paper on the role of WEU had emphasised the need for flexible positions and a willingness to listen to good arguments from the other Allies. Yet, this was going to be a constantly recurring preoccupation. On substance, Von Moltke was very forthcoming and envisaged a clear division of labour in Bosnia, with NATO concentrating on controlling the heavy weapons and WEU on convoy protection. Coordination of separate actions in the field seemed easier than the tricky problem of caucusing, which was never resolved satisfactorily.

In March 1993, I attended an interesting seminar on European-American relations organised by CEPS and the US Missions in Brussels. Alexander Vershbow, then Deputy PermRep to NATO, agreed that outside Article V the readiness of member countries to get involved would vary. He found it healthy if different options were developed, following which consultations should establish who would be in the best position to act. He saw no need for a prior decision by NATO that it would not mount an operation itself. Jim Dobbins attempted a division of labour: when the US would be fully engaged there should be joint decisions, and consultation in cases where there was less insistence on NATO being the key forum. There should be some element of certainty in the various scenarios and he wanted to encourage WEU to act below a certain threshold. RAND president James Thomson with his customary directness criticised the Europeans for talking little about real defence issues: they dropped more communiqués than bombs. In my own view the case for a NATO command would be weaker if the US was only available for quick, decisive actions than in cases of a sustained substantive participation. In any case, we should avoid a situation in which every crisis presented a choice between inaction and large-scale military intervention.

Our brainstorming did not affect the American objection to a European caucus within NATO; it wanted to participate from the outset in consultations, which might sooner or later involve the deployment of American forces. Pushed on this issue in 1997, Ambassador Hunter admitted the possibility of two centres of decision-making, NATO and EU/WEU, but did not explain how these should interrelate.¹⁰³ Some arrangements were created when WEU came to Brussels, but these concerned the desire for openness and transparency and were not designed to harmonise views or to coordinate actions. The country holding the WEU presidency informed the North Atlantic Council about our activities. There was a liaison group headed by the two Political Directors. With Operation Sharp Guard, Joint NATO-WEU Council meetings were held regularly, but their proceedings were of a formal nature. Equally, the US took a formal approach in talking

about a right to be asked first to participate in an operation, with a corresponding right of first refusal. That was not the issue, however. All Europeans would be happy with American participation. The question was how to ascertain rapidly who would be prepared to join. As analysed by Vershbow, the most likely situation in an emerging crisis would be that all relevant organisations would consult on the action to be taken. In the course of these consultations, the countries able and willing to commit forces would be identified and, as a result, the organisation most suitable to take responsibility would become apparent. In the NATO-WEU context, the choice would be determined by US willingness to participate. Consequently, the decision-making process should not be retarded by formal requests of one organisation to the other.

The US will have to make up its mind as to what kind of Europe it wants. My own view has always been that American interest in Europe will be sustained only if Europe assumes larger responsibilities. If not, Washington will not only have difficulty in maintaining its military presence in Europe (although 100,000 troops seems a bearable commitment), but also drift to dealing directly with Russia when it emerges from its present muddle. During the Kuwait crisis, President Bush talked much about partnerships with Europe and Japan. Today, leadership has again won the upper hand over partnership. Many Europeans are quite happy with that leadership, which lets them off the hook in terms of military operations but, after the NATO summit in Madrid, also for early decisions on EU enlargement.

As matters now stand the ESDI does not exist in any practical terms. It is supposed to be developed within NATO, but is prevented from acquiring a political dimension and therefore relegated to a command arrangement. Deputy SACEUR will take over the command of European-led operations, albeit under the authority of the WEU Council, but it remains unclear how he will compose his staff when acting as a CJTF commander. NATO assets will be made available, but only after a formal decision of the NATO Council. The problem of Turkey has been resolved by agreeing to the participation of all European Allies, if they were so to choose, in WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing for such operations. But without a political component ESDI will not be much more than an operational gimmick, born out of NATO's rib, but with little backing of a common European position. Ruggie was right in signalling the dilemma: if ESDI remains permanently subordinate to NATO and the EU is obliged to accommodate differential zones of security while helping to protect new members, the EU's own evolution would be severely truncated.¹⁰⁴ But if the EU were to activate its collective defence commitment through WEU it would compete with and threaten to undermine the transatlantic security ties. One of the points of this book has been to bridge that dilemma, at least for the foreseeable future. We want to keep the US involved in European security and to maintain the collective defence

commitments, even if they are less urgent than during the Cold War. But the priority of WEU as an organisation is not to mount a collective defence capability. On the contrary, collective defence will be conducted through NATO and WEU will focus on operations underpinning the political objectives of the CFSP. Here lies the problem of using NATO assets. If the US - or other non-WEU members of the Alliance - disagree with those objectives, there will be no operation. Will that be a sufficient basis for the Europeans to avoid building up a greater capacity to act? In any case, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of a US veto being part of a permanent solution for ESDI.

To what extent the CJTF concept will work remains to be seen. An exercise - Allied Effort 1997 - was held in the training grounds of Münsterlager in November 1997 and a NATO-WEU exercise is planned for the year 2000. Originally, CJTF was focused on both flexibility within NATO and operations led by WEU or an ad hoc coalition. Today, it centres much more on internal NATO reform. Outside the Alliance it will be used only in contingencies in which the US does not want to participate substantially and which are too big for existing European capabilities for action. For the Danube and Mostar operations WEU could manage with its own resources and, as European multinational formations take shape, their capacity for crisis management will also increase. Of course, WEU will not have real-time intelligence or strategic lift capabilities comparable to those of the US but, again, these will not be indispensable in all potential missions. If they are deemed necessary, NATO procedures will have to be sufficiently flexible to make their availability probable. Complete certainty cannot be demanded, because actual deployment for crisis management will always be subject to national political decisions, both in NATO and in WEU. Nevertheless, joint planning will have to be sufficiently realistic to warrant a reasonable expectation that the assets concerned will be forthcoming. If not, the pressure for duplication of headquarters and communication arrangements and the creation of additional European resources will mount again.

The building blocks for peace operations have taken shape. The formation of multinational forces has been one of the most important changes over the past seven years. Multinationality always was a guiding element of NATO strategy, but the level of national contributions was at the Army Corps level. Lowering it met with considerable resistance, because it would reduce military efficiency. Countries wanted to maintain their corps', because at lower levels there would be no opportunity to practice the strategy of warfare. For this reason, it was important to have multinationality in the corps headquarters. For actual operations, however, national contributions seldom reached the size of a division. More often nations sent battalions, which had to be shaped into ad hoc arrangements. Some forces, like UNPREDEP in Macedonia, are composed of even smaller formations. In SFOR some battalion-size units take in small detachments from non-

NATO countries. NATO's Strategic Concept of December 1991 distinguished defence forces in main defence forces, reaction forces and rapid deployment forces. It also packed the requirements of the post-Cold War period into the need for flexibility and mobility, which was conceptually justified, but did not provide a quantifiable yardstick for force planning. Other ways have to be developed to introduce objective requirements and a fresh way of showing commitment. One avenue of approach could be to build more multinational forces, which would provide a new underpinning for lasting participation. Once a country had accepted a role in such a formation, it would be obliged to devote sufficient resources to its implementation, thus re-introducing a stable element in national planning. My pleas for more multinationality at lower levels have been answered. Today, we have a plethora of multinational units, in NATO the ARRC, the Multinational Division Central Europe, the UK-Netherlands Amphibious Force, all the Army Corps' in Germany except the one in the eastern part, the combined Belgian-Netherlands navy command, and in WEU the Eurocorps, EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force and several cooperative arrangements such as between the French and UK air forces. The number has grown so rapidly that some coordination is called for and on the WEU side a better link between the Council and the various FAWEU. Nevertheless, the concept has caught on. The next step will be the inclusion of units of the Central European partners. Multinationality is bound to get prominence in the revision of NATO's Strategic Concept, which has become necessary after the new relationship with Russia was established. All future interventions will be in a multinational context, but national planning has not yet been adjusted to this new reality and the need for complementarity and specialisation. In that review, the task of the Main Defence Forces will have to be more flexibly defined, as otherwise their availability for crisis management operations would be unduly limited. In the present strategic environment the assignment of forces to a single task no longer seems warranted. This will pose a problem to countries with conscript armies, which will not be available for force projection outside the defence of their own territory and independence. A partial remedy might be found in stressing the voluntary element for assignment of conscripts to forces earmarked for peace operations. Draft periods having been reduced, however, their availability for sophisticated operations might be insufficient. Therefore, some professionalisation of rapid reaction forces seems inescapable.

Summing up the NATO perspective, we first have to admit the continued vitality of the organisation, with a well-oiled bureaucracy and military structure, clear standard operating procedures and rules of engagement and sufficient continuity in leadership through an influential Secretary-General working in close cooperation with the US as the main guarantor of collective defence. For the US, the Alliance remains the main vehicle of dealing with Europe. The opposite is also true. NATO provides

a means of influencing US policy for the Europeans, but in the end American leadership will prevail. NATO developed as a community of values, although during the Cold War collective defence took priority over other aspects. Today, everybody professes to share these values, which presents a problem when deciding future membership. My own preference would be for overlapping membership for future members of NATO and the European Union. This might be difficult for the Baltic countries, unless Russia manages to overcome its gut reactions against NATO enlargement. Further enlargement beyond the present associate partners of WEU will be difficult. If everybody joins, including one day even Russia, nobody would get any protection, to quote Kissinger. NATO might then develop into an institution for cooperative security, very much like the OSCE and without a collective defence dimension. That might be the trend of the no-threat, no-enemy era in Europe, but would not be compatible with maintaining an integrated military command system, always regarded as the mainstay of NATO. The original members of the Alliance would not be happy to see the collective defence insurance slipping away, even if it has less prominence after the ending of the Cold War. Washington so far has refused to say that Russia would never be able to join NATO, which might be attributed to the old wisdom of never saying never in politics. Saying so would antagonise Moscow unnecessarily, but if the option remained, the Europeans would have to take the European Security and Defence Identity more seriously than they are actually doing. The chances are that a positive development of US-Russian relations will gradually lead to a slackening of the ties binding the NATO Allies together, giving them less substance and more of a formal character.

Peacekeeping alone will not sustain the viability of NATO. Nor will collective security or cooperative measures be a substitute for Alliance commitment and solidarity. Ambitious goals abound, but without serious thinking of what they might entail and no strenuous efforts to reach them. If we divide international organisations into action organisations and framework organisations, a reformed NATO might be able to perform both functions separately. If successful, it would square the circle of the US wanting both to exert leadership and to see the Europeans assume larger responsibilities, while the Europeans in their drive towards Union cannot forever exclude defence and security from their process of integration. Anne Deighton was right in saying that the great security conundrums of the Cold War remain much the same, paradoxical as it may seem: what will keep the US in Europe and on what terms will it stay?¹⁰⁵

During my term, WEU came close to discussing items on the NATO agenda. At various times, Germany, France and the UK expressed themselves in favour, but the only concrete example (apart from some inputs on arms control in 1990) were the preparation of the 1994 NATO summit and the WEU paper on CJTF of June 1994. The UK lost interest after the NATO summit. The only WEU activity it pushed was the evacuation

mission for African contingencies. Gradually, in the course of the Intergovernmental Conference, London championed an autonomous WEU, but never wanted to use it for crisis management. France was favourable, but adopted a formalistic attitude wanting final approved positions, not flexible inputs in a process of ongoing consultations. When France, under President Chirac, contemplated a return to the NATO command structure, the emphasis on WEU positions slackened. French attitudes became increasingly enigmatic. On the one hand, Paris continued to clamour for European positions; on the other, they seemed to prefer bilateral dealings with the US which often optimised their influence. Step-by-step, Germany enhanced its ability to participate in operations outside the NATO area, culminating in the presence of the Franco-German brigade in Sarajevo, but Bonn never pushed for European stands in NATO. It seemed quite content with the treatment of ESDI as a command problem.



Chancellor Kohl and Defence Minister Rühe with German forces in Bosnia in 1997, thought impossible four years earlier. (Photo: Reuter)

WEU and the EU

The saddest story concerns the link between WEU and CFSP. Contrary to our hopes at Maastricht, the European Union did not develop the habit of regarding WEU as its military or even operational dimension. I was invited only once to attend a General Affairs Council, when it discussed Yugoslavia. As far as I know, my successor has never attended. In terms of

security the CFSP was a complete failure. There have been only two requests to WEU: one concerning the police action in Mostar and the other to give advice on possible measures in the second Rwanda crisis. The former went well, but had nothing to do with defence or military operations; the latter was not answered before a change in the situation on the spot removed the urgency of the request.

Merger of WEU with the EU should be the logical consequence of the perspectives created at Maastricht, both of a European defence policy and of a CFSP asserting Europe's identity on the international scene. Yet, from the outset it was unlikely to happen at the 1996-1997 IGC. The difficulties underlying the Maastricht compromise were still bedeviling close cooperation between EU and WEU. I had always argued that WEU should recognise that the decisions and orientations of the European Council are of direct application to WEU. Decisions taken unanimously in the European Council by definition carried the approval of the full members of WEU and it would be odd to require a parallel circuit for agreement on political objectives. Here, the British suggestion of back-to-back meetings of the European Council and of Heads of State and Government of the WEU countries made little sense. In proposing it, London lost some of its reputed pragmatism and came up with an institutional gimmick to codify separation instead of cooperation. WEU summits could serve a purpose if observer countries had frustrated a decision by the European Council, which was regarded as vitally important by the full members of WEU. So far, WEU operations have been approved by the WEU Council, meeting at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers, and it is not immediately evident that they should be moved to a higher level. Were this warranted, a back-to-back format would be most unattractive, for it would demonstrate a dramatic split in the political appreciation of the EU members. Admittedly, the British proposal would bring in the heads of government of the associate members and presumably also of the associate partners of WEU, which would enable Turkey to be present and to play a role at the highest level. From the EU side, however, such a large side-show would detract from the primary purpose of the European Council to allow for informal and thorough discussion on the future orientation of European policies and to decide on thorny issues which could not be resolved at lower levels. Moreover, the contingency of disagreement in the European Council could be met by inserting a flexibility clause or regulating constructive abstention along the lines agreed in Amsterdam for the CFSP, which would not permit a small minority to block the majority in its wish to deepen their cooperation or to take specific action on a certain issue. This would be very important for future crisis management, which in all probability will not include all members - of the EU nor of WEU - in the deployment of forces. Since the mine-clearance operation of 1987, WEU has accepted a separation between the definition of the political objective by consensus and its implementation. No country would be obliged to participate in a military operation; the

degree of its involvement would be a matter of sovereign decision. Consequently, planning for multinational operations will have to reckon with the possibility of national contributions not being made available when the envisaged crisis actually erupts. This presents both a drawback and an advantage. The downside obviously concerns the military commander, who remains uncertain about the forces ultimately becoming available to him; he has to include both flexibility and redundancy in his planning. The positive aspect is that the need for unanimity for crisis management operations could be scaled down. If we talk about defence it seems quite logical that decisions should be taken collectively and unanimously. But if we are dealing with peace support operations, and if it is clear that no country will be obliged to contribute forces against its wish, there is no reason to insist on unanimity. In the end, only the willing and able will participate in the operation and they should not be obstructed by countries which are not considering any contribution to the operation. There is no reason to demand more unanimity for the deployment of forces in crisis management than for other decisions in the CFSP, if the possibility exists to opt out.

On the practical side, the separate circuits of the EU and WEU for planning, consultation, decision-making and implementation should be brought more closely together. In the Treaty of Amsterdam the principle of creating an analytical and planning unit has been agreed, which could make use of the resources in the Commission, Council Secretariat and WEU. Its value would increase, if it could present options on its own account, not subject to the agreement of the Presidency of the day. The head of the unit could also preside over the Political Committee of the CFSP, thus giving it more continuity. Ultimately this person, whether called Mr or Mrs CFSP or not, could also act as Secretary-General of WEU, and through this personal union bring WEU into the orbit of the CFSP. This might not be as far-fetched as it seems, particularly after the Petersberg missions have been included in the new Treaty on European Union. In that case, much of the political consultations would be transferred to the CFSP and WEU would become largely an executive body. The composition of the planning unit is still under discussion. According to the treaty it could start work before ratification, but currently the debate seems to be back at square one, asking fundamental questions about the precise functions of the High Representative, whether he will be responsible for CFSP across the board or only on the basis of specific mandates, whether the new unit will only work for him or for the Council in general and, finally, whether he will have executive tasks, which was not explicitly foreseen in the texts of Amsterdam. The EU Council secretariat was thinking of a relatively small unit with some twenty people divided over three sections, rapid reaction, long-range planning in cooperation with the various institutes, and short-term policy papers, all coming under a director-general linked to the High Representative. Personnel should be recruited from the Council CFSP unit, the Commission and WEU. For WEU the liaison function with its Planning Cell, Satellite

Centre and Institute of Security Studies seems the most important, for detaching people from its tiny secretariat for a substantial period would be of questionable value. The new unit should develop synergies and not become another separate body. Apart from these questions more thought should be given to the instrument of Special Representatives for specific issues, which was used for Bosnia, the Middle East and Cyprus and would merit better support from Brussels.

The proposal to transfer the Petersberg missions to the EU was made by Finland and Sweden in the course of the Intergovernmental Conference. It had considerable merit, provided it covered all the missions, including peace enforcement. Without the latter, it would be meaningless. After the experience in Bosnia, no country would engage in modern peacekeeping without some element of enforcement action being envisaged as a possible implication. For traditional peacekeeping, i.e. with the consent of the parties to the conflict, European forces are too sophisticated. Politically, their role would be passive and uninteresting. The inclusion of the Petersberg missions in the Amsterdam Treaty removed an important area of differentiation, enabling all fifteen EU members to cooperate on an equal basis. The experience of the former neutrals in peacekeeping operations of the UN could be fully exploited. It also was a step in the right direction of developing a common defence policy. The former neutrals should have some time to adjust, which they are doing fairly rapidly. In Austria the discussion about NATO membership has started. In Finland a note to Parliament said that the country could not be neutral in the event of threats or aggression against EU member states.¹⁰⁶ The old problem of the applicability of the guidelines from the European Council no longer exists and in case of disagreement at 15 WEU could still decide autonomously to take action. Only two hitches remain: the automatic defence assistance clause and the relationship with NATO. Dropping Article V altogether would be a retrograde step, losing the perspective of solidarity. It should be retained, either as a separate protocol signed by the current 10 full members of WEU and open to other present and future members of the EU, or by simply continuing the present WEU Treaty. As long as after 1998 nobody gives notice of one year of the intention to leave, the Modified Brussels Treaty will continue to run even after the expiry of the 50 years for which it was concluded.

Not surprisingly, at first the Scandinavian proposal was rejected by the UK, which wanted to maintain the status quo with a separate and autonomous WEU. One of their arguments was that the US would be less ready to make NATO assets available to a CFSP-initiated operation than to WEU. This would be an extension of the line of thinking that WEU could only have NATO countries as full members, for otherwise the US might be brought into conflicts without having been involved in the political consultations from the outset. If true, it would not hold water, for as early as 1993 Washington was thinking of making assets available, not only to

WEU, but also to an ad hoc coalition including non-NATO members. The problem of the link with NATO could be more serious, but if most of the political functions of WEU are taken over by the CFSP (which then would also have to include meetings of defence ministers, when discussing peace support operations) the representative in NATO of the country holding the EU presidency could perform the same functions of information which at present are performed by the WEU presidency. Special arrangements would be necessary only during periods when the EU presidency is held by a non-NATO country and recently these have been made in a timetable for the synchronisation of the two presidencies. The WEU Planning Cell would continue working as before, including keeping its contacts with the NATO military authorities. The only institution which would lose much of its purpose would be the WEU Assembly. Today, they still are the only parliamentary body, based on a treaty, competent to discuss defence matters, but that status would dwindle when the bread-and-butter issues of WEU are transferred to the CFSP. As a transitional measure, some accommodation with the European Parliament might be possible. The reports of the WEU Assembly are of high quality and provide useful information and a basis for discussion on many politico-military subjects. This expertise will have to be maintained. As early as 1989 the European Parliament has discussed the improvement of links with the WEU Assembly. Some argued that the WEU parliamentarians could be selected from the European Parliament, others wanted to add an equal number of Euro-parliamentarians to the WEU Assembly. In practice, the EP developed the habit of sending a delegation to the plenary sessions of their WEU colleagues. The level of interest of the WEU parliamentarians in politico-military matters varied considerably, because by treaty they also covered the Assembly of the Council of Europe. On a personal basis, I have suggested to ask the parliamentarians and their alternates to make a choice: one opting for Strasbourg, the other for Paris. This could be done by the assemblies themselves, but the parliamentarians preferred to wait for changes in the treaties.

The incorporation of the Petersberg missions into the Treaty on European Union might also provide an answer for those future members of the EU which are not, or not yet, members of NATO. Their position differs from that of the present WEU observers who, for various reasons, do not wish to become full members. Denmark has obtained a permanent opt-out from European defence cooperation, which it wants to pursue only in the NATO framework. The others maintain a stance of neutrality or non-alignment, difficult as it might be to explain to outsiders. The clearest policy among the former neutrals is that of Sweden, which does not want to join military alliances. The new democracies of Central Europe would wish to join Western security institutions as soon as possible and with as many security guarantees as possible. As explained earlier, our main avenue of approach should be to forge security through participation. Partnership for

Peace provided excellent and concrete programmes for cooperation. WEU moved ahead of NATO and the EU, by opening its regular Council meetings at permanent and ministerial level to the associate partners. When entering the Union, they will become part of the process of broad solidarity-building. That solidarity should include an element of security. For that reason, I have advocated the inclusion of a solidarity clause, following the example of NATO's foreign ministers in 1991, stating that the independence and democratic form of government of the countries in Central Europe was of direct and material concern to the Alliance as a whole. The OSCE meeting in Budapest on 6 December 1994 gave some sort of security commitment in Article 5 of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, on which the participating states declared:

They are determined to act in solidarity if OSCE norms and commitments are violated and to facilitate concerted responses to security challenges that they may face as a result. They will consult promptly in conformity with their OSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realising its individual or collective self-defence. They will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of their common values.

Wording similar to the NATO formula should have been included in the Union treaty, both for its present and future members. That would not have been a formal security guarantee, but would have come close to it and expressed the needs of our times. As things went in Amsterdam, Article J.1 sub 2 only stipulated that the Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity.

Having said that, the question remains whether ultimately the new EU members can be denied full membership of WEU as long as they have not been able to join NATO. Today, this seems common wisdom in all three organisations, but I doubt whether it will be tenable in the longer run. I accept that today it is anathema to US policy. The considerations of the Bartholomew Telegram might have mellowed, but still prevail in their essentials. The US wants to remain involved in European security deliberations from their outset and to avoid being confronted with the mess Europeans have managed to create on several occasions in the course of this century. This applies in particular where Russia is concerned. Yet, most people realise that NATO enlargement is unlikely to cover everybody who wishes to enter. Madrid created new expectations of a second wave of entrants with the announcement of a review in 1999. How realistic these hopes will be remains to be seen. Particularly for the Baltic the political and military problems are considerable. This has led the European Strategy Group to develop the concept of a European security space extending beyond NATO and the European Union.¹⁰⁷ It applied the metaphor of the

concentric circles used by Jacques Delors in describing the relations of the EU with the outside world, to the area of security. Its main aim was to provide those who may never become part of the EU/WEU core with stable positions within a wider framework of mutual assurance. The study also considered the possibility of abandoning the practice of joint NATO/WEU membership for some future members of the European Union. Karl Kaiser made the point most explicitly and argued that the very idea of a separate military action by European members of NATO never arose and would have been contrary to their NATO commitment. He continued:

But the present circumstances of dramatically reduced and multifaceted threats restore the WEU military capability, since many contingencies could be handled by WEU alone, in particular if the build-up of a Common European Defence Policy and Common European Defence, as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty, were actively pursued and if present objections of some countries to the idea of a merger of the EU and WEU could be overcome. Membership of a revitalised WEU without NATO membership is now an available option that makes military and political sense.

The problem will become most acute when the EU enlarges with countries which are not or not yet members of NATO, which may be the case for Baltic countries fairly soon. Kaiser was right in saying that WEU renounced its own military option when the danger of Soviet aggression required a full NATO commitment to collective defence backed up by the American nuclear posture. In 1954 Article IV was inserted in the Modified Brussels Treaty to make clear that WEU would be guided by the advice from the NATO military authorities. This was meant for collective defence, because at the time no other type of military operations was envisaged. Today, that is still valid, perhaps even more so than in the past. France and Spain are leaving no doubt that collective defence will be carried out through NATO. Nobody contemplates dealing with a resurgent Russian expansionism without American involvement. Historically and politically, it would be odd if the collective defence commitment of an organisation which in reality only deals with peace operations would become an obstacle to its enlargement. To solve this problem in a way acceptable to Washington, three options are conceivable. First, admitting new EU members to WEU, but suspending Article V till they have joined NATO as well. Second, a redefinition of the WEU-NATO relationship confirming Article IV, so that WEU will not engage in collective defence without the advice of NATO. Third, inclusion of the Petersberg missions in the Treaty on European Union and leaving the automatic military assistance clause to a separate protocol for those members which also belong to NATO. As we have seen, the Amsterdam Treaty has incorporated the Petersberg missions, thereby taking the first half of the third option. For the time being, that

might be sufficient and allow the Baltic region to adjust to the implications of the various enlargement processes. The present situation might be too anomalous to lend itself to neat architectural solutions. But conceptually I saw no problem in WEU speaking in NATO also on behalf of countries which would not be full members of the Alliance. I contested the argument that WEU could not be the European pillar of NATO if part of the pillar was not part of NATO. If that situation arose it would be because NATO could not absorb all future members of the EU, and flexible arrangements would be called for.

The peculiar mix of national positions in northern Europe received surprisingly little attention during the enlargement debate. Should the military dimension receive priority and be advanced through NATO before the process of solidarity on the broad front of EU activities has taken shape? In other words, should the security element continue to be separated from political and economic integration, entailing divided loyalties for European citizens, who would find it difficult to see why security guarantees are given to Poland or the Czech Republic, while Finland or Sweden are in no hurry to seek them? Some Europeans might even welcome NATO enlargement for diminishing the pressure for admission to the EU, even though Union membership is the only way to promote real stability in Central Europe. It is regrettable that the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU have not been coordinated more closely, for if they go well the Baltic Sea will become a *Mare Nostrum* for European integration.

What Future for WEU at Fifty?

Since its inception WEU has been a reserve organisation, available to perform functions which nobody else was willing to assume. When European integration firmed up its political finality and included the security aspects in its intergovernmental cooperation, WEU was a logical choice for a transitional mechanism. During the Cold War a separate security identity made little sense, hence the peculiar differentiation in the 1980s between political and economic aspects of security, which were covered by the European Political Cooperation, and the military aspects which were left to NATO. The clearest niche for WEU was in the 1987-1992 period, when NATO was still precluded from operating out-of-area and Europe could not escape assuming larger responsibilities, first in ensuring free passage through international waters, later in the Kuwait crisis. That changed when NATO concluded it had to play a role in Yugoslavia or risk irrelevance in the new security environment and Manfred Wörner was able to declare the out-of-area impediment "out of date".¹⁰⁸ During the 1990s it became crowded in the area of peacekeeping and, consequently, the ambition of a European Security and Defence Identity became more difficult to substantiate. At the moment, it looks swamped by NATO. By making ESDI primarily a command arrangement without a clear political component, NATO with its

experienced military structure obviously carries the advantage. Nevertheless, a fully-fledged European Union will be incomplete without a security dimension. The Hague Platform of 1987 already stated this obvious truth. Without it the EU will not be able to develop a policy enabling the Union to act when necessary. The French more than others have grasped the necessity of possessing some power if one is to be respected. During the Gulf crisis it became clear that member countries were hiding behind the excuse of insufficient capabilities in order to avoid involvement. Therefore, it was important to make WEU more operational, using NATO assets whenever necessary. Implementation of the Petersberg decisions concerning FAWEU, the Planning Cell and the three missions would have provided sufficient operational means. Instead, the further refinement of these capabilities was constantly on the agenda, while the chances of ever using them diminished. All security organisations had a tendency, to quote the Economist, to perfect their fire engines without ever riding them out to quell a fire.

WEU suffered from two directions. Some of its critics argued that it never had amounted to anything substantial, others that it was going to duplicate NATO. The notion of double-hatting seemed to be the answer. Member nations possessed sufficient assets, but they should be organised politically and militarily to be rapidly available in a crisis to the organisation best placed to carry out the action. A cause of disappointment was the unwillingness of the member countries to use WEU as a forum to coordinate contributions to operations carried out by other organisations. Somalia was a case where countries preferred to deal directly with the UN: if WEU had been used, the German logistic unit could have been deployed properly instead of having to wait for an Asian brigade which never appeared. Similarly, the initiatives by the Netherlands and Denmark to improve standby arrangements for the UN would be more efficient if channelled through WEU. An ideal way of cooperation between the various security organisations would be for NATO and WEU not to wait for requests from the UN or the OSCE (which anyway are unlikely to be forthcoming), but to indicate early on in a crisis which role or contribution they could envisage for themselves. In this way, the crucial question of who will do what could be clarified sooner. So far, we have talked too much about the things we could not do, while not doing what we would be able to do.

Different metaphors have been used to describe the role of WEU, most often that of a bridge between NATO and the European Union. While using it myself I also found it wanting, because conceptually WEU was part of the European riverside. Recently, the French Foreign Minister in the outgoing Juppé government used another structural comparison: a hinge between the Alliance and the EU. From the former it should attract its full operational dimension, from the latter its political legitimacy.¹⁰⁹ That legitimacy has been enhanced by the Treaty of Amsterdam recognising the competence of the European Council to issue guidelines which would also bind WEU.

Before Amsterdam, I had mentioned the possibility of a fourth pillar in the structure of the EU, next to the CFSP and also under the authority of the European Council. It would not be possible to simply merge WEU with the CFSP. Since 1984, the presence of defence ministers and the evolution of a joint politico-military structure had been a major value added by WEU, which would require institutional changes in the way the CFSP would deal with security issues. The second reason was the differentiated membership of the WEU Council. Presumably, the associate partners will join the EU sooner or later, but for the associate members - Iceland, Norway and Turkey - that is less evident. Step-by-step they have improved their status in WEU as we made the offer of full participation a reality. The more the EU shows flexibility in involving them in the CFSP and WEU, the less these countries will pose a problem in the Alliance when the European identity is discussed. Whether a fourth pillar or not, the WEU Council will maintain a role in requesting assets from NATO and transforming the political decisions of the EU/CFSP into a military operation.

In the final analysis, the success of the ESDI will depend on the reform of NATO. Without fuller acceptance by the Alliance the European security dimension will not be able to develop. The opposite is true as well. Without a proper ESDI the Alliance will not amount to much either. The first time a reference was made to the European identity was in the WEU communiqué of the Brussels meeting of 23 April 1990. Prior to that, the emphasis was on a better European contribution to NATO. During the two Gulf crises there was no question of a go-it-alone European action, but of a constructive participation in a common endeavour led by the Americans. Yugoslavia was different, because there was no agreement on the political objectives to be achieved, culminating in US withdrawal from enforcing the arms embargo in November 1994. Let us hope that will be an exception. I still hope that on most crises Europe and America think alike and agreement on political objectives should be possible. The difference will rest in the willingness to make an effort to realise them. Since the NATO summit of 1994, the US propensity to consider separate European operations has declined. Equally, their latent distrust of European behaviour did not diminish, although it was directed more at the EU for its *Eurobabble* than at WEU. The experience with immutable European positions as shown during the Uruguay Round lingered on. How serious it would be in foreign policy issues where cooperation is more important than competition is a matter of dispute. First, Europe will be limited in its actions by its lowest common denominator, which seems to preclude any rash adventures. Second, the Berlin Declaration will remain the guideline for all Allies, and the more Atlanticist among the Europeans will make certain that this will be preserved. Third, the argument that through the EU the neutral countries could assert their views and have an impact on NATO is disingenuous, for in matters of peace operations our common goal is to draw them in. On collective defence matters they do not wish and will not have any influence. WEU will have

to reflect this limitation when making inputs into the NATO defence planning process even if maximum transparency is applied. Over time the former neutral countries will have to accept the common defence policy of the EU. By then, their rejection of NATO might have mellowed, but in the meantime it would be useful for everybody to have them participate in as many activities as possible. That is also the aim of the Partnership for Peace. On substance the agenda of WEU has changed considerably. Less of the conceptual discussions which I enjoyed so much. Hardly anything on arms control, which in 1989 seemed a fertile ground for European ideas. The emphasis shifted to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which was handled well by NATO with an important role given to France. The debate on nuclear weapons in Europe was already finishing when I came to WEU and only figured marginally in the narrative of this book. Our priority was the conventional side and the availability of multinational forces equipped and trained for the new missions in the changing European security environment.

Among the member countries, editorial comment on WEU has been most negative in the Netherlands and the UK. Dutch newspapers compared WEU to a paper tiger or a body with milk teeth. In line with the sceptical journalism in fashion in my country, my efforts were described with some ironic compassion transforming the acronym of WEU to read *Willem's Eigen Unie* in Dutch (Willem's Own Union). In the UK the press was inevitably influenced by the largely negative attitude of the establishment, sometimes even embarrassing to Whitehall. During the British presidency of WEU, in May 1996 the Commons Defence Committee dismissed WEU as insignificant: there was almost nothing WEU did that could not better be done by NATO. The Committee rightly recognised that WEU's most useful role was to provide a structure within which Europeans can conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian operations when the US is not interested, but felt that much remained to be done if it was to be a bridge between the EU and NATO. In any case, the new missions should preferably be performed under a new name. *Jane's International Defence Review* took their criticism a step further in an editorial "Let The WEU Die In Peace", which advocated terminating the organisation in 1998. Curiously enough, the steps taken by France and Germany to establish a common procurement agency and the Eurocorps were seen as the potential beginning of an effective common defence structure.¹¹⁰

This book did not intend to scrutinise the growing volume of scholarly analysis of WEU and its activities.¹¹¹ I found an American partisan in John Gerard Ruggie, whose article "Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO's Future" stressed that eastward expansion should be more of a European-led process.¹¹² At this place I only take issue with a conceptual point made by Simon Duke in his essay "The Second Death (or the Second Coming) of the WEU".¹¹³ He saw some striking similarities between the current attempts to breathe life in the CFSP and its defence component, and

the 1950-1954 debate on the European Defence Community. He is probably right in questioning the will of the Europeans to make a common defence in both instances. Equally, after the ending of the Cold War, the larger powers tended to fall back on traditional policies, and even to resume pre-World War II attitudes. But that is not the point of the course of European integration. In 1950-1954 an attempt was made to make a quantum leap in organising a common defence as one of the catalysts of integration. It was discriminating against Germany and as such could not have lasted. But it was also strongly pushed by the US, particularly by John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. In spite of the fact that the Berlin communiqué of NATO of 1996 mentioned WEU 29 times, today the US are at best lukewarm about a European defence identity, because they fear European inflexibility and perhaps even irresponsible policies over which Washington will have little control. Yet, the process of integration has scored amazing successes, despite the criticism of daily events. Monetary union is bound to give it another push, well beyond the significance of the creation of the internal market, which it completes, but surpasses by entering the field of harmonisation of economic policy. Sooner or later, a common foreign and security policy will have to be developed. Even today, the network of policies towards Central and Eastern Europe is the most important contribution to stability in that historically volatile region. The economic weight of the EU is bound to have an impact on the political side as well, even more so as in a no-threat environment economic factors grow in relative importance.

What does this mean for the future of WEU? My joking remark that I was the only Secretary-General envisaging the merger of his organisation with another (although probably under my successor) is unlikely to materialise soon. The President of the WEU Assembly, Lluís de Puig, has called for a summit meeting of WEU heads of government in March 1998, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the organisation. The summit should specify the new role the governments intend to assign to WEU and the resources needed to carry it out effectively.¹¹⁴ That date was probably too early, for by then the ratification process of the Amsterdam Treaty would not have been completed. In any case, his call went unheeded and at Erfurt ministers requested the Permanent Council to organise a conference focusing on "the perspectives for WEU's future development in the light of its historic role in overcoming conflict potential in post-war Europe". This book might help to clarify some of the outstanding issues. The wording of Amsterdam gives little hope for much progress during the next few years, not even for improvement of day-to-day practical contacts, but perhaps the atmosphere of cooperation will be better. I cannot but agree with Philip Gordon that WEU has become more capable, but is unlikely to come out of NATO's shadow.¹¹⁵ Therefore, no illusions should be harboured of Europe already possessing a security system of its own, with the US only in a supporting role. What is lacking is not the capability, at least not for the

likely contingencies over the next decade. Europe misses the ability to identify common interests in a sufficiently clear and rapid fashion to underpin combined operations. The General Affairs Council rarely gives a signal what overall collective role they are willing to back up with effective action. Most of its statements remain of the declaratory kind and there is little strategic vision. WEU, like the CFSP, does not possess the initiating element which the European Commission provides under the Treaty of Rome. That does not mean that the procedures of the first pillar with their emphasis on legal implications are appropriate to foreign and security policy. Intergovernmental cooperation can only function if there is sufficient agreement between the larger countries to provide collective leadership. But one may be forgiven for questioning the effectiveness of the cumbersome procedures established in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Today, we may be a bit closer to consensus than during the years immediately preceding Amsterdam. On substance, there is more agreement on foreign policy and the UK has shed its European paranoia. Conversely, at Amsterdam the traditional Franco-German engine was not in the lead and the two drivers may not be looking in the same direction. Nevertheless, France deserves credit for making large, and often the largest, contributions to peace operations. Unfortunately, a French return into the integrated military structure of NATO has receded into the background, taking the constructive realisation of an ESDI with it into the shadows. Even if French participation had the objective of a fundamental change in the organisation, it remains the missing link in the adaptation of the Alliance and we should hope for a clarification of French policy. At present it has lost influence on both fronts. Germany step-by-step has liberated itself from its presumed constitutional handcuffs and is assuming a larger role. Conceptually and practically, Bonn has been able to maintain its balancing act between European and Atlanticist pulls and to continue its attempts to strengthen all international organisations simultaneously. Whether it will be able to continue this position will depend on moderation of the US in transatlantic relations in general and on the possibility of realising the objectives of monetary union in relative harmony with France. To me it came as a disappointment that Genscher, who had stood at the cradle of revitalisation in 1984, subsequently took little interest in WEU. To be fair, many countries have changed their views in the course of the last eight years. And many advocated policies - like formulating common European views on items on the NATO agenda - which they did implement.

I am not as alarmed by the reduction of defence budgets as some of my colleagues. It is true that only France and the UK maintain a percentage of about 3 per cent of GDP for defence. Germany has fallen below 2 per cent, as have Belgium and Italy. Still the Europeans have many more soldiers under arms than the US does. My concern is more about the way the remaining money will be spent. Shall we have effective, all-round capabilities for European intervention or continue to focus on the defence

of borders which are no longer threatened? Priorities will have to be governed by the new reality that the high-probability crises of the future do not need large forces, only the low-probability ones do. There is very little coordination of the approach to the new missions and of what they will require in terms of personnel and equipment. Only France has quantified its long-term plan for intervention forces, envisaging 30,000 men for a major operation by the year 2015 and an additional 5,000 for a secondary mission. The participation of WEU in the NATO planning cycle is a positive development, provided WEU is capable of setting targets and does not content itself with collecting data of forces made available by member countries. The essence of planning is the determination where scarce assets should go. In an integrated framework this should be adjusted to what one intends to do together with others. Equally, the generic planning undertaken by the Planning Cell of WEU has introduced a new dimension into NATO planning which so far had been primarily concerned with specific operations. Nevertheless, ESDI cannot survive on generic planning alone.

As analysed before, the niche for WEU did not expand, probably even diminish. Nevertheless, a series of contingencies remains, where NATO, or more particularly the US, might be reluctant to become engaged:¹¹⁶ humanitarian missions which do not require massive forces nor high-tech capabilities or rapid evacuation, but also peace operations of a protracted nature where the emerging concept of limitation of American involvement is likely to put a heavier burden on others.¹¹⁷ WEU also has acquired considerable experience in naval mine-clearance and embargo enforcement operations. Finally, there might be missions in which the US would be wise to abstain, especially on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Those will also be the most delicate, for the US will want to remain in close touch with everything involving Russia. Yet, the NATO label would be anathema to Moscow.

The European Union will require a minimum of autonomy when it comes to strategic analysis, and for issues concerning predominantly European interests also a capability for decision-making and action. Institutionally, effective crisis management will depend on the ability to monitor the situation closely, to respond immediately to new developments and to remain in constant touch with the other international actors. The CFSP machinery has not yet been geared to this need for continuity. Politically, the missions of the future have become "missions of choice", which require the underpinning of common interests. Decisions will have to be taken in full transparency with regard to the other members of the Alliance, but Europe has to be able to determine its own course and destiny. European integration has always been characterised by some ambiguity about its final shape and form. Nevertheless, great progress has been achieved. Part of it was the result of the formulation of goals which took clearer shape only as time progressed. In that respect, the process of integration has been both top-down and bottom-up and is likely to continue

that way. Ultimately, the will to act will depend on the degree of solidarity developing in the European Union. That is also the reason why WEU will have to become part of the structure of the Union, which is providing a solid basis for that solidarity on a broad front of activities. Many problems in the world require close cooperation between Europe and America, but the Atlantic Alliance will not be able to match the sense of commitment the European Union is striving for.

Notes

85. Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping", *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 1994. He also mentions a little-noted UNSC presidential statement of 3 May 1994 - two days before PDD 25 - listing six factors: the existence of a threat to international peace and security; whether regional bodies are ready to assist with peacekeeping; the existence of a cease-fire; a clear political goal that can be reflected in the mandate; a precise mandate; and reasonable assurances about the safety of UN personnel.

86. The Commission on America's National Interests, July 1996, Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

87. WEU Institute of Security Studies, Paris, March 1995. The same subject was elaborated in the Clingendael paper, *Political-Military Cooperation in an Enlarging Europe* by G.C. de Nooy, A. van Staden and M. Wohlfeld, The Hague, May 1997.

88. The letter to Parliament of 28 June 1995 on this subject was influenced by the difficulties experienced by the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica, but was sent before the enclave was overrun by Bosnian Serbs on 11 July 1995.

89. This section is taken from the chapter "Changing Norms of Intervention" in my CEPS monograph, op. cit., pp. 16-19.

90. See Caroline Thomas, "Human Rights and Intervention: A Case for Caution", and comments by Kevin Boyle in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 15-33.

91. Richard N. Haass, "Military Force: A User's Guide", *Foreign Policy*, No. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 21-37.

92. Report RR/250/250385 of 8 April 1994.

93. Ernst B. Haas, "Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes towards the Definition of Justifiable Intervention", in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kayser (eds.), *Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention*, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, p. 81.

94. See Stanley Hoffman, in Reed and Kayser, op. cit., p. 89.
95. I am indebted to Robert Pastor for his matrix containing a redefinition of security on the horizontal axis and a range of options on the vertical axis. See Reed and Kayser, op. cit., p. 139. For the purposes of my study, the available options listed by him have been further refined.
96. "The Present Condition of Security: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union - A WEU Perspective", NATO workshop on political-military decision-making, Sintra, 11-14 June 1990. The paper was annexed to Information Letter to the Assembly No. 10, C(91) 93.
97. UNIDIR Research Paper No. 36, *The Guardian Soldier: On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces*, United Nations, 1995.
98. Michael Brenner (ed.), *NATO and Collective Security*, MacMillan, London, p. 20.
99. Victor-Yves Ghebali in *Cooperative Security, the OSCE and Its Code of Conduct*, edited by Gerd de Nooy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 8. In 1997, a follow-up conference was held where several delegations suggested using the inter-state standards in the security model.
100. Speech for the Royal United Services Institute for Defence, London, annexed to WEU Press Review of 7 October 1996.
101. Paul Cornish, op. cit., p. 768.
102. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (eds.), *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, September 1997. Stanley R. Sloan formulated his earlier concept in *NATO's Future. Towards a new Transatlantic Bargain*, MacMillan, 1986, 241 pp. He suggested European security assessments identifying threats to European interests and possible responses, including diplomatic and economic measures.
103. Robert E. Hunter, "The US and Europe - A Parting of the Ways or New Commitments?", in *CJTF - A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy?*, edited by Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson, RUSI Whitehall Papers 40, 1997, pp. 68-77.
104. John G. Ruggie, "Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO's Future", in *The Washington Quarterly*, 20 (1996) 1, p. 115.
105. Anne Deighton (ed.), *Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration*, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1997, p. 169.

106. Ambassador Sverker Aström, *A Larger EU - A More Secure Europe. Study of the Consequences for Security of EU Enlargement*, Government Official Reports 1997, 143, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author assumes that this would also be the position of the Swedish government, p. 72.
107. *The European Security Space, Working Papers by the European Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for Security Studies*, edited by Guido Lenzi and Laurence Martin, 1996.
108. During the Cold War, the geographical limitation of NATO helped the Alliance to politically skirt divisive disputes over developments in the Third World. For the first 20 years, it was useful to the US which did not have to show solidarity with the Europeans over the decolonisation issues. Later on, it was the turn of the Europeans to distance themselves from initiatives by the Alliance leader. Except for France and the UK, the Europeans showed great concern to avoid "guilt by association" with US policies. After the traumatic Vietnam experience, the pendulum swung back to the middle, because of growing European fears that without some showing of solidarity the US might feel overextended and unsupported and would move towards an isolationist position. WEU action in the Gulf was influenced by this consideration, reinforced by the awareness that European interests in the flow of oil and free passage through international waters were even greater than for the US. See Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of the Alliance. NATO Out-of-area Problems since 1949*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, pp. 312-315 and 319.
109. Hervé de Charette before the WEU Assembly, 3 December 1996.
110. *Jane's International Defence Review*, Issue No. 4 (April) 1996. The editorial by Clifford Beal provoked comments by José Cutileiro and Sir Dudley Smith in Issue No. 6, correcting its inaccuracies.
111. The practice of the WEU Institute of Security Studies to limit the stay of its research fellows is the source of a growing body of well informed social scientists in all member countries, increased by fellowships to visiting scholars from Central European countries. In addition, several scholars and practitioners have done useful work: Patrice van Ackere in France; Eric Remacle in Belgium; Alyson Bailes, Anne Deighton, Trevor Taylor and G. Wyn Rees in the UK; Peter Schmidt in Germany; and Jaroslaw Gryc and Włodzimierz Aniol in Poland. The Turkish scholar Gülnur Aybet wrote a full-length book on *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-1991*, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1997.
112. Ruggie, op. cit., pp. 109-124.
113. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34 (June 1996) No. 2, pp. 167-190.
114. Press release 108/97 of the Assembly of Western European Union. The President also suggested deciding what remit the new WEU Military Committee would have, but that seems to have been resolved at the Erfurt ministerial session.

115. Anne Deighton (ed.), op. cit., p. 103. I do not agree with his point that a subset of NATO is unlikely to coincide with the 10 members of WEU. In my view, the pattern of tomorrow will be coalitions of the willing, which may be organised either outside or inside NATO or WEU.

116. See Trevor Taylor's perceptive contribution "Challenges for Western European Union Operations", in Anne Deighton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 146-149.

117. See Gerd de Nooy (ed.), *The Role of European Ground and Air Forces after the Cold War*, Kluwer Law International, 1997, p. 216. De Nooy sees limitations in all areas of security: endurance, risk, contribution and responsibility.

The Modified Brussels Treaty (23 October 1954)

Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as amended by the "Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty"

[The High Contracting Parties]

Resolved:

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organise and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their

economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected throughout the Council referred to in Article VIII, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialised agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialised agencies.

They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

Article IV

In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

Article V

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed

attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Article VI

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article VII

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

Article VIII

1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organisations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.
2. This Council shall be known as the 'Council of Western European Union'; it shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. IV.

3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.
4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Article IX

The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Article X

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, by referring them to the Court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that Party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that Party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the High Contracting Parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any Party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

Article XI

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.

Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian government.

The Belgian government will inform each of the High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

Article XII

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian government.

It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian government.

The Belgian government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

Annex II
The Bartholomew Telegram (20 February 1991)

General US Approach to Developing a European Security Identity

In Secretary Baker's interventions at the December 1990 NAC, he set out Washington's approach and concerns on developing a European security identity within the Alliance. We support such an identity, provided it strengthens the Atlantic Alliance.

As the Secretary noted at the NAC "the United States has long supported a strengthened European role within the Alliance. So we welcome the prospect of sustaining the transatlantic partnership on security affairs with a more confident and united Europe - a partnership consonant with the North Atlantic Treaty. We know that the common values that bind us offer greater cohesion than any external threat. Indeed, I believe a stronger European identity within the Alliance is all the more important given the changing security agenda. We would be especially interested in how a European defense identity might help meet those challenges ... upon which NATO traditionally has not acted. In this respect, we have noted with particular interest suggestions that the WEU - an organisation that has twice responded to threats in the Gulf region - might form the basis of such an identity."

This process of developing a European security identity is particularly complex given the larger context of evolving public attitudes; in particular, the US public's views of burden-sharing in the Gulf and European views of the dramatically changed security environment and the IGC on EPU. In light of rapidly changing circumstances we all need to be particularly careful to avoid taking positions or making decisions that have unintended consequences. Given the changing situation in the Soviet Union, the US role in the Gulf and the debate over responsibility-sharing, and US-EC economic tensions, this is not a time for Europeans to be sending a message however unintended to the US public suggesting that they want to reduce or marginalize the US role in Europe. We know that this is not the intention of our European allies, but we want to stress the danger that positions which seem to emphasise European over transatlantic solidarity or institutional changes which diminish the centrality of the Alliance could pose for American opinion on and support for the transatlantic partnership.

While we understand that the logic behind political integration leads toward a union that ultimately encompasses security affairs, we believe that the primary yardstick against which proposals and institutional innovations need to be measured is whether they actually enhance Alliance defensive capabilities and make Europe more secure. Effectiveness in defense and security terms must continue to be the test by which suggestions for change

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are judged. We must work to maintain the transatlantic security ties we all agree are in our mutual interest. We can speak with the frankness engendered by forty years of our Alliance relationship. In our view, efforts to construct a European pillar by redefining and limiting NATO's role, by weakening its structure, or by creating a monolithic bloc of certain members would be misguided. We would hope such efforts would be resisted firmly.

NATO's Core Functions

On February 15 NAC PermReps had an extensive and constructive exchange on what should constitute the core security functions of NATO for the future. That discussion registered a sense of general agreement among many of the Allied PermReps on basic tasks which NATO must continue to perform, keying off relevant articles of the Washington Treaty. Those functions that would continue to be the sole province of NATO would include:

- to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state from the Soviet Union.
- to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state from countries other than the Soviet Union.
- to preserve the strategic balance within Europe, with special reference to the military power of the Soviet Union.
- to serve, as provided for in Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a trans-atlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developing challenges to members security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts at arms procurement and arms control.

Other core security functions which the PermReps discussed included those for which the Alliance would make an essential but not necessarily exclusive contribution; these would involve areas and issues in which other institutions, such as the EC, CSCE and the WEU, would also have important roles to play:

- to create a security environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
- to assist in promoting a stable security environment in Europe based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

As Ambassador Taft noted at the February 15 discussion, consensus among the members of the Alliance on these core security functions can be a valuable instrument - providing a necessary conceptual foundation for more effective consideration not only of how NATO can best be organized to perform these tasks in light of changing circumstances but also of how NATO and other institutions, such as a more coherent European security identity, will be able to relate to each other in the most constructive manner. For that reason, we would hope that allies would bring to their discussions of a European Security/Defense Identity within the WEU and IGC this sense of emerging agreement on Alliance core security functions as reflected in their PermReps' February 15 comments.

The Relationship between the WEU and EC

The WEU's relationship with NATO is being discussed in the NATO strategy review. A parallel discussion on the WEU's relationship with the EC is taking place in the IGC on EPU as part of the effort to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These questions have serious implications for US policy and our relationship to NATO.

- We have an important stake in the ideas in the February 4 Franco-German proposal submitted to the EC's IGC regarding ties between the WEU and EC. In particular, we are concerned over the proposals that the WEU should be subordinated to the European Council, thereby developing a European security component - solely within the EC - that could lead to NATO's marginalization.

- In that the EC is clearly not "within the Alliance", subordinating the WEU to it would accentuate the separation and independence of the European pillar from the Alliance. We do not see how this could help but weaken the integrity of our common transatlantic security and defense which has proved successful and, in our view, will remain crucial.

- The EC, especially as it evolves, clearly has decision-making capacity. To the degree it becomes involved in matters of NATO's responsibility, avoidance of bloc positions may become impossible.

- Such an arrangement could give non-NATO members - initially only Ireland but potentially others - a voice in NATO Councils via the WEU.

- The reverse would also tend to be the case - that NATO would assume an implicit or indirect security commitment through EC influence over the WEU for states which, while not NATO members, were part of the "European Union" and might call upon WEU forces.

- We have no objection in principle to the concept that the WEU should have some relationship to the EC. We feel, however that defense and security dimensions of European union should not extend beyond those states that have undertaken mutual defense commitments within the Atlantic Alliance.

- Furthermore, whatever European security identity is developed should provide a place for all European allies who wish to participate.

Role of the WEU in Developing a European Security Identity

In discussions at NATO, some have suggested that the WEU - as the European security identity - might assume distinct functions in Europe which would duplicate NATO's functions.

- First, we believe the search for military roles and missions for the WEU should not compete with NATO's roles and missions.

- * We see this in discussions over whether Article V would be invoked against threats to NATO territory from, for example Maghreb countries. We believe it is essential to avoid introducing ambiguity about whether NATO in its entirety would stand behind a threatened member.

- * We see it in the notion of independent European military action in Eastern Europe. We believe it would be a mistake to introduce the perception that the US might take less interest than WEU members in the security of Eastern Europe.

- We understand the political problems of developing a "European Defense Identity" which has no apparent European role, but we believe the solution must not come at the expense of NATO. The further one goes in this direction (even if only in words, let alone actions), the more one accentuates the separateness of Europe and America in security and defense.

- We feel it is not productive to stress the separateness of US and European security. This divisive tendency could undermine forty years of effort in building and maintaining Alliance solidarity.

- The objective of a European pillar should not be to relieve NATO of its responsibilities in this area, nor carve out new defense missions in Europe.

- Some are making the dangerous suggestion that the NATO defense commitment is a sequential, building block process - i.e. national, European, then transatlantic. This implies the US role is simply a counterbalance to the Soviets. This view will produce an atrophied US connection to European

security - an unsustainable position. This will also imply that the US has no say in crisis decision-making and conflicts that might later involve US forces.

- Another version of this concept - the suggestion that NATO would provide for the security of Western Europe, while Western Europeans undertook military actions in Eastern Europe outside the NATO context - strikes us as unrealistic in practice, corrosive to the concept of Alliance solidarity in theory, and a potentially dangerous signal to the USSR.

- It is difficult to imagine military operations a European pillar would become involved with that the US would not also consider of central importance.

- "Out-of-area" is another matter. The existing NATO integrated military structure offers advantages for efficient out-of-area employment. Nonetheless, the defensive posture of the Alliance and Charter interpretation have inhibited this functioning optimally in meeting non-European challenges.

- We accept that outside Europe there can be a distinct and obvious role for the WEU and a different basis for transatlantic collaboration based on NATO-WEU linkage. This can be one of the most important lessons to be learned from the Gulf crisis.

- In this regard, while we would not want to introduce doubts about the applicability of NATO obligation in the face of any threat to any allies, we can see some possibility of WEU leadership vis-a-vis the political and security problems of North Africa even though it is contiguous to NATO territory.

Command Structure Changes

The issue of changes to NATO's integrated command structure is being discussed in a preliminary way in NATO's Military Committee. Some have put forward the suggestion that, in light of the new circumstances, NATO command structures should be loosened as a step toward developing a European security identity.

- We are prepared, in the context of decisions on NATO strategy and force structure, to see command arrangements streamlined and to see Europeans assume responsibilities commensurate with their defense commitments to the Alliance.

- We do not accept the proposition put forward by some that a reduced threat environment justifies a looser Alliance military structure.

Maastricht Declarations (10 December 1991)

Declarations Issued on the Occasion of the 46th European Council Meeting and Annexed to the Treaty on European Union on 7 February 1992

I. Declaration

by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are members of the Western European Union and also members of the European Union on

THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WITH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Introduction

1. WEU members agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.
2. WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.

WEU Member States take note of Article J.4 relating to the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union which reads as follows:

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3

4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then.'

A - WEU's relations with European Union

3. The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

To this end, WEU will take the following measures to develop a close working relationship with the Union:

- as appropriate, synchronisation of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonisation of working methods;
- establishment of close cooperation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other;

- consideration of the harmonisation of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies;
- arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the common foreign and security policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union;
- encouragement of closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament.

The WEU Council shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of the European Union, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

B - WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance

- 4. The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance.
- WEU Member States will intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.
- Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronised and working methods harmonised.
- Close cooperation will be established between the Secretariats-General of WEU and NATO.

C - Operational role of WEU

- 5. WEU's operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in

particular:

- WEU planning cell;
- closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the field of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance;
- meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff;
- military units answerable to WEU.

Other proposals will be examined further, including:

- enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency;
- development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and Defence Academy.

Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger operational role will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies.

D - Other measures

6. As a consequence of the measures set out above, and in order to facilitate the strengthening of WEU's role, the seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels.
7. Representation on the WEU Council must be such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Member States may draw on a double-hatting formula, to be worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance and to the European Union.
8. WEU notes that, in accordance with the provisions of Article J.4(6) concerning the common foreign and security policy of the Treaty on European Union, the Union will decide to review the provisions of this Article with a view to furthering the objective to be set by it in accordance with the procedure defined. The WEU will re-examine the present provisions in 1996. The re-examination will take account of the progress and experience acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.

II. Declaration

by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which are members of the Western European Union

'The Member States of WEU welcome the development of the European security and defence identity. They are determined, taking into account the role of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the other European States on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in Europe. In this spirit, they propose the following:

States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers of they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.

The Member States of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corresponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31 December 1992.'

Annex IV

Declaration to the Final Act on the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, Treaty of Amsterdam (17 June 1997), SN/541/97 (C 42) CAB EN 13

The Conference agrees that:

1. A policy planning and early warning Unit, shall be established in the General Secretariat of the Council under the responsibility of its Secretary-General. Appropriate cooperation shall be established with the Commission in order to ensure full coherence with the Union's external economic and development policies.
2. The tasks of the Unit shall include the following:
 - (a) monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP;
 - (b) providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future;
 - (c) providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises;
 - (d) producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council, and which may contain analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.
3. The Unit shall consist of personnel drawn from the General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the WEU.
4. Any Member State or the Commission may make suggestions to the Unit for work to be undertaken.
5. Member States and the Commission shall assist the policy planning process by providing, to the fullest extent possible, relevant information, including confidential information.

Annex V

Declaration of Western European Union on the Role of Western European Union and Its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance 22 July 1997

(Incorporating the relevant parts of the Treaty of Amsterdam)

Introduction

1. The WEU Member States agreed at Maastricht in 1991 on the need to develop a genuine European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and to assume a greater European responsibility for defence matters. In the light of the Treaty of Amsterdam, they reaffirm the importance of continuing and strengthening these efforts. WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union (EU) providing the Union with access to an operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg tasks and is an essential element of the development of the ESDI within the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the Paris Declaration and with the decisions taken by NATO ministers in Berlin.
2. Today the WEU Council brings together all the Member States of the European Union and all the European Members of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with their respective status. The Council also brings together those States with the Central and Eastern European States linked to the European Union by an Association Agreement and that are applicants for accession to both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. WEU is thus establishing itself as a genuine framework for dialogue and cooperation among Europeans on wider European security and defence issues.
3. In this context, WEU takes note of Title V of the Treaty of Amsterdam regarding the EU's common foreign and security policy, in particular Articles J.3.1, J.7 and the Protocol to Article J.7, which reads as follows:

ARTICLE J.3.1

- "1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications."

ARTICLE J.7

- "1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions

relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
3. The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article J.3 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU.

When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all

Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.

Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this paragraph shall be taken without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, third subparagraph.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.
5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be reviewed in accordance with Article N."

PROTOCOL TO ARTICLE J.7

"The High Contracting Parties,

Bearing in mind the need to implement fully the provisions of Article J.7(1), second subparagraph, and (3) of the treaty on European Union,

Bearing in mind that the policy of the Union in accordance with Article J.7 shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework,

Have agreed upon the following provision, which is annexed to the Treaty on European Union.

The European Union shall draw up, together with the Western European Union, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them, within a year from the entry into force of this Protocol."

A. WEU'S RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION: ACCOMPANYING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM

4. In the "Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" of 10 December 1991, WEU Member States set as their objective 'to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union'. They today reaffirm this aim as developed by the Treaty of

Amsterdam.

5. When the Union avails itself of WEU, WEU will elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications.

In elaborating and implementing decisions and actions of the EU for which the Union avails itself of WEU, WEU will act consistently with guidelines established by the European Council.

WEU supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article J.7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

6. WEU confirms that when the European Union avails itself of WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in Article J.7.2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question in accordance with Article J.7.3 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

WEU will develop the role of the Observers in WEU in line with provisions contained in Article J.7.3 and will adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States of the EU contributing to the tasks undertaken by WEU at the request of the EU to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.

7. Consistent with the Protocol of Article J.7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, WEU shall draw up, together with the European Union, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them. In this regard, a range of measures, on some of which work is already in hand in WEU, can be taken forward now, such as:

- arrangements for improving the coordination of the consultation and decision-making processes of the respective Organizations, in particular in crisis situations;
- holding of joint meetings of the relevant bodies of the two Organizations;
- harmonization as much as possible of the sequence of the Presidencies of WEU and the EU, as well as the administrative rules and practices of the two Organizations;
- close coordination of the work of the staff of the Secretariat-General

of the WEU and the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, including through the exchange and secondment of personnel;

- arrangements to allow the relevant bodies of the EU, including its Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, to draw on the resources of WEU's Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Satellite Centre;
- cooperation in the field of armaments, as appropriate, within the framework of the WEAG, as the European forum for armaments cooperation, the EU and WEU in the context of rationalization of the European armaments market and the establishment of a European Armaments Agency;
- practical arrangements for ensuring cooperation with the European Commission reflecting its role in the CFSP as defined in the revised Treaty on European Union;
- improved security arrangements with the European Union.

B. RELATIONS BETWEEN WEU AND NATO IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ESDI WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

8. The Atlantic Alliance continues to be the basis of collective defence under the North Atlantic Treaty. It remains the essential forum for consultation among Allies and the framework in which they agree on policies bearing on their security and defence commitments under the Washington Treaty. The Alliance has embarked on a process of adaptation and reform so that it can more effectively carry out the full range of its missions. This process is aimed at strengthening and renewing the transatlantic partnership, including building an ESI within the Alliance.
9. WEU is an essential element of the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Atlantic Alliance and will accordingly continue its efforts to strengthen institutional and practical cooperation with NATO.
10. In addition to its support for the common defence enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty, WEU takes an active role in conflict prevention and crisis management as provided for in the Petersberg Declaration. In this context, WEU undertakes to perform its role to the full, respecting the full transparency and complementarity between the two Organizations.
11. WEU affirms that this identity will be grounded on sound military

principles and supported by appropriate military planning and will permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of WEU.

12. To this end, WEU will develop its cooperation with NATO, in particular in the following fields:

- Mechanisms for consultation between WEU and NATO in the context of a crisis;
- WEU's active involvement in the NATO defence planning process;
- Operational links between WEU and NATO for the planning, preparation and conduct of operations using NATO assets and capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of WEU, including:
 - * military planning, conducted by NATO in coordination with WEU, and exercises;
 - * a framework agreement on the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities;
 - * liaison between WEU and NATO in the context of European command arrangements.

This cooperation will continue to evolve, also taking account of the adaptation of the Alliance.

C. WEU'S OPERATIONAL ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESDI

13. WEU will develop its role as the European politico-military body for crisis management, by using the assets and capabilities made available by WEU nations on a national or multinational basis, and having recourse, when appropriate, to NATO's assets and capabilities under arrangements being worked out. In this context, WEU will also support the UN and OSCE in their crisis management tasks.

WEU will contribute, in the framework of Article J.7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, to the progressive framing of a common defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.

14. To this end, WEU will take forward work in the following fields:

- WEU has developed crisis management mechanisms and procedures which will be updated as WEU gains experience through exercises and operations. The implementation of Petersberg missions calls for flexible modes of action geared to the diversity of crisis situations and making optimum use of the available capabilities including through recourse to a national headquarters, which might be one provided by a framework nation, or to a multinational headquarters answerable to WEU or to NATO assets and capabilities.
- WEU has already worked out Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy which is an initial contribution on the objectives, scope and means of a common European defence policy.

WEU will continue this work on the basis in particular of the Paris Declaration and taking account of the relevant elements of the decisions of WEU and NATO Summits and Ministerial meetings since Birmingham. It will focus on the following fields:

- * definition of principles for the use of armed forces of the WEU States for WEU Petersberg operations in pursuit of common European security interests;
- * organization of operational means for Petersberg tasks, such as generic and contingency planning and exercising, preparation and interoperability of forces, including through participation in the NATO defence planning process, as appropriate;
- * strategic mobility on the basis of current work;
- * defence intelligence, through its Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Satellite Centre.
- WEU has adopted many measures to strengthen its operational role (Planning Cell, Situation Centre, Satellite Centre). The improvement of the functioning of the military components at WEU Headquarters and the establishment, under the Council's authority, of a military committee will represent a further enhancement of structures which are important for the successful preparation and conduct of WEU operations.
- With the aim of opening participation in all its operations to Associate Members and Observer States, WEU will also examine the necessary modalities to allow Associate Members and Observer

States to participate fully in accordance with their status in all operations undertaken by WEU.

- WEU recalls that Associate Members take part on the same basis as full members in operations to which they contribute, as well as relevant exercises and planning. WEU will also examine the question of participation of the Observers as fully as possible in accordance with their status in planning and decision-taking within WEU in all operations to which they contribute.
- WEU will, in consultation where appropriate with the relevant bodies, examine the possibilities for maximum participation in its activities by Associate Members and Observer States in accordance with their status. It will address in particular activities in the fields of armaments, space and military studies.
- WEU will examine how to strengthen the Associate Partner's participation in an increasing number of activities.

References to a European Identity in Official Statements

References to the general idea of a European identity were made in the reports of the European Political Cooperation of 1970 (Luxembourg), 1973 (Copenhagen) and 1981 (London). The inclusion of the security aspect appears in the Single European Act of 1986 which stated "that closer cooperation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters".

The WEU Platform on European Security Interests of 27 October 1987, which said that "the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence" and declared that "we intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity" (paragraphs 2 and 4).

The North Atlantic Council responded on 11 December 1987 and noted with satisfaction that the WEU ministers in their declaration "underlined a number of basic principles and that they affirmed a positive identity in the field of European security within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, conducive to the strengthening of the transatlantic partnership and of the Alliance as a whole" (paragraph 10).

The NATO summit in Brussels of 29-30 May 1989 stated "Growing European political unity can lead to a reinforced European component of our common security effort and its efficiency" (paragraph 13).

The joint declaration on relations between the US and the European Community of 23 November 1990 affirmed that "the European Community is acquiring its own identity in economic and monetary matters, in foreign policy and in the domain of security".

The communiqué of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on 17-18 December 1990 declared:

A European security and defence role, reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also help to strengthen Atlantic solidarity. In this context, and as this process evolves, we will consider how the political and military structure of the Alliance must be adapted accordingly (paragraph 5).

In Copenhagen the NAC communiqué of 7 June 1991 contained the following passages:

We are agreed in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all its members ... (paragraph 2).

Recognising that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the Alliance (paragraph 3).

The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the NATO summit on 8 November 1991 had a separate section on "European Security Identity and Defence Role", reaffirming the consensus expressed in Copenhagen.

The new Strategic Concept of NATO approved at the Rome summit of 7-8 November 1991 reaffirmed that "the development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole".

The WEU declaration issued at the Maastricht IGC on 10 December 1991 agreed "on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility in defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases" (see Annex III). The North Atlantic Council meeting shortly afterwards in Brussels, on 19 December 1991, welcomed the decisions taken at Maastricht and reproduced them in detail (paragraphs 11-13) under the heading "European Security Identity and Defence Role". The title "A European Security and Defence Identity" appeared in the Final Communiqué of the NAC issued in Oslo on 4 June 1992.

Annex VII

Permanent Representatives to WEU 1989-94 (in reverse chronological order)

Belgium	Jean DE RUYT Herman DEHENNIN Jean-Paul VAN BELLINGHEN
France	Jean-Marie GUEHENNO Richard DUQUE Bernard DORIN Luc DE LA BARRE DE NANTEUIL
Germany	Rüdiger HARTMANN Hans VON STEIN Hermann VON RICHTHOFEN
Greece	C. ELIOPOULOS Adamantios VACALOPOULOS
Italy	Fabio MIGLIORINI G. ATTOLICO Boris BIANCHERI CHIAPPORI
Luxembourg	Roger LINSTER Edouard MOLITOR Jean WAGNER
Netherlands	Lambert VEENENDAAL Adriaan JACOBOWITS DE SZÉGED Joop HOEKMAN Hans JONKMAN
Portugal	José FARIA Antonio VAZ-PEREIRA João HALL THEMIDO
Spain	Luis Javier CASANOVA Felipe DE LA MORENA José J. PUIG DE LA BELLACASA
UK	Sir John WESTON, KCMG Jeremy GREENSTOCK David RATFORD
Associate Members	
Iceland	Sverrir H. GUNNLAUGSSON
Norway	Leif MEVIK
Turkey	Yildirim KESKIN

DEBATING EUROPEAN SECURITY

Observers

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Denmark	Ole BIERRING
Finland	Olli MENNANDER
Ireland	Padraic CRADOCK

Associate Partners

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Czech Republic	Karel LUKAS
Estonia	Clyde KULL
Hungary	György GRANASZTOI
Latvia	Juris KANELS
Lithuania	Dalius CEKUOLIS
	Pranas KURIS
Poland	Andrej KRZECZUNOWICZ
Romania	Constantin ENE
Slovak Republic	Jan LISUCH

Annex VIII Secretaries-General of the BTO (Brussels Treaty Organisation), 1948-1955 and of WEU, 1955-Present

1948-53	E. STAR BUSMANN	Netherlands
1953-55	Dr. M.F. Baron DE SELYS LONGCHAMPS	Belgium
1955-62	L. GOFFIN	Belgium
1962-70	Dr. L.M.J.G. IWEINS D'EECKHOUTTE	Belgium
1970-74	G. HEISBOURG	Luxembourg
1974-77	F.K. VON PLEHWE, Acting SG	Germany
1977-85	E.F.T. LONGERSTAEY	Belgium
1985-89	A. CAHEN	Belgium
1989-94	Dr. W.F. VAN EEKELEN	Netherlands
1994-present	J. CUTILEIRO	Portugal

Annex IX Members of the WEU Special Working Group

Belgium

Pierre CHAMPENOIS succeeded by Jean DE RUYT

France

Philippe GUELLUY succeeded by François BARRY DELONGCHAMPS

Germany

Dr. Rolf HOFSTETTER succeeded by Dr. Klaus KLAIBER

Italy

Fabio MIGLIORINI

Luxembourg

Jean-Jacques WELFRING

Netherlands

Herman SCHAPER succeeded by Frank MAJOOR

Portugal

Dr. Vasco BRAMAO RAMOS

Spain

Carlos MIRANDA succeeded by José CARVAJAL

UK

John GOULDEN succeeded by Paul LEVER and later David LOGAN

Glossary

ACA	Armaments Control Agency
ACE	Allied Command Europe (NATO)
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO command)
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO command)
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO, see also RRC)
AWACS	Airborne Warning And Control System
Benelux	Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (customs union)
CEDP	Common European Defence Policy
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty on)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
CHODs	Chiefs Of Defence Staff
CINCLANT	Commander-In-Chief, Atlantic (US, see also USACOM)
CINCSOUTH	Commander-In-Chief, Southern Europe (NATO)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union)
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
COMNAVSOUTH	Commander Naval Forces, Southern Europe (NATO)
COREPER	Comité des Représentants Permanents (committee of the EU permanent representatives)
COREU	Correspondants Européens (coded telegram network between the EU foreign ministries)
CPG	Contingency Planning Group (WEU)
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (see also OSCE)
CST	Conventional Stability Talks
CWG	Council Working Group (WEU)
DPC	Defence Planning Committee (NATO)
DPQ	Defence Planning Questionnaire (NATO)
DRG	Defence Representatives Group (WEU)
EAPC	European Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Communities
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EDIG	European Defence Industries Group
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPU	European Political Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation

ERF	European Reaction Force (WEU)
ESA	European Space Agency
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESG	European Strategy Group
EU	European Union
EUROFOR	European Rapid Operation Force (WEU)
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Forces of southern members of WEU
EURONAD	European National Armaments Directors
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to WEU
FOFA	Follow-On Forces Attack (US)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDR	German Democratic Republic
ICFY	International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
IFOR	Implementation Force in Bosnia
IFRI	Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference (EU)
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
MAPE	Multinational Advising Police Elements (WEU for Albania)
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MilDel(s)	Military Delegate(s) (WEU)
MilRep(s)	Military Representative(s) (NATO)
MNC	Major NATO Commander
MOU	Memorandum Of Understanding
NAC	North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NADs	National Armaments Directors
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NATO)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group (NATO)
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (see also CSCE)
PermRep(s)	Permanent Representative(s)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PMWG	Politico-Military Working Group (WEU)
PPCG	Provisional Planning Coordination Group (NATO)
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
ROE	Rules Of Engagement
RRC	Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO, see also ARRC)

RRF	Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia
SAC	Standing Armaments Committee
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Command(er) Atlantic (NATO)
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (GDR)
SFOR	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SNF	Short-Range Nuclear Forces
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (FRG)
STANAVFORMED	Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean
START	Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
SWG	Special Working Group (WEU)
TEU	Treaty on European Union
THALES	Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defence European Science
Two + Four	The two Germanies, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States (negotiating on German unification)
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission after the Gulf War (1991)
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (in former Yugoslavia)
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
WEAG/WEAO	Western European Armaments Group/Organisation (WEU)
WELG	Western European Logistics Group
WEU	Western European Union
WEUCOM	Coded telegram network between the WEU foreign ministries
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation ("Warsaw Pact")

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
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He studied Law at the University of Utrecht and Political Science at Princeton University, USA. Having joined the Netherlands foreign service in 1957, he served in New Delhi, London, Accra and with the NATO mission in Paris and later in Brussels. While in London completed his doctoral dissertation *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China* (1964). At the foreign ministry he became the first *correspondant européen* for European Political Cooperation and later head of the NATO department.



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