THE ÅLAND ISLANDS PEACE INSTITUTE

Tarja Väyrynen

New Conflicts and their Peaceful Resolution

Post-Cold War Conflicts, Alternative Means for their Resolution, and the Case of Nagorno-Karabakh

W81
V 32

NEW CONFLICTS AND THEIR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION

Post-Cold War Conflicts, Alternative Means for their Resolution, and the Case of Nagorno-Karabakh

TARJA VÄYRYNEN

87396

The Åland Islands Peace Institute

Published with the support of the Finnish Ministry of Education and the Åland Institute for Higher Education.

Published by Ålands fredsinstitut/ the Åland Islands Peace Institute
P.O. Box 85, FIN-22101 Mariehamn, Finland
☎ +358 (0)18 15570 Fax +358 (0)18 21026
E-mail: peace@peace.aland.fi
Internet: http://www.peace.aland.fi

© Tarja Väyrynen and the Åland Islands Peace Institute
ISBN: 952-5265-01-3
Printing: Åbo Akademis tryckeri 1998
Printed in Finland

Tarja Väyrynen received her Ph.D. in International Conflict Analysis from the University of Kent at Canterbury in 1995. She is presently a Research Fellow at Tampere Peace Research Institute and a part-time teacher in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Tampere. She has published on conflict resolution and ethnopolitical conflict, and works currently on the politics of violent ethnic identification and dialogic communities as a means of conflict management.

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION 7

2. POST-COLD WAR CONFLICTS 11

2.1. Data on post-Cold War conflicts 11
2.2. Clausewitzean war/war machine 14
2.3. Ethnopolitical conflicts 16
2.4. Ethnicity and ethnic relations 23
2.5. Human needs theories as an explanation of ethnopolitical conflicts 26
2.6. Normative issues: identity politics and political community 30
2.7. Nagorno-Karabakh: a post-Clausewitzean ethnopolitical conflict? 35

3. COOPERATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION, THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 39

3.1. Negotiation and mediation 42
3.2. Data on mediation 45
3.3. Third party: roles, functions, qualities and resources 48
3.4. Model for third party consultation 50
3.5. From conflict management to resolution 57
3.6. Conflict prevention 60

4. THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND ITS MANAGEMENT 69

4.1. Historical background: perspectives and events 70
4.2. Cultural and political background 76
4.3. Traditional third party interventions 79
4.4. Organisational mediation: the CSCE/OSCE and the Minsk process 83
4.5. Problem-solving conflict resolution: the 'Partners in Conflict' project 88

5. EPILOGUE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN DIALOGIC COMMUNITIES 93

BIBLIOGRAPHY 95

1. INTRODUCTION

The end of Cold War closed four decades of military confrontation between East and West. Yet the end of this struggle has not brought relief from armed conflicts. Rather, violence has shifted from inter-state relations to inter-community relations. The habits of thought which have guided two generations of political and military leaders as well as scholars and citizens need to be reformed.

What kind of conflicts are there in the turbulent world, which is no longer organised by the bipolar conflict of East and West? The answer generates another question. Do we have the means to resolve these new, post-Cold War, conflicts? Answering the questions requires both an understanding of "post-Clausewitzean ethnopolitical" conflicts and of the peaceful ways to resolve them.

At the centre of ethnopolitical conflicts there are often issues related to identity. Identity-formation in the globalising world is a complex process. Ernesto Laclau's (1996: 46) observation of the terrain into which history has thrown us emphasises the emergence of new actors (subjects) and the death of universal subjectivity. According to him, we are witnessing:

> [...] the multiplication of new – and not so new – identities as a result of the collapse of the places from which the universal subject spoke – explosion of ethnic and national identities in Eastern Europe and in the territories of the former USSR, struggles of immigrant groups in Western Europe, new forms of multicultural protest and self-assertion in the U.S., to which we have to add the gamut of forms of contestation associated with the new social movements.

The emergence of new subjectivities does not necessarily need to be violent. However, in several conjunctures of global and local

political and social practices the process of identification has taken the form of "violent ethnic identification". In other words, ethnicity is often seen to be a point of identification as well as a source of (actual and rhetoric) violent performances.

At the centre of the question "why violent ethnic identification takes place" is the question "why some identities become securitised", i.e. perceived to be threatened in a such manner that the way to maintain – or, rather, to "construct" – the identity becomes to be seen as an issue of survival.

In general, issues become securitised when leaders (whether political, societal, or intellectual) begin to talk about them in terms of existential threats against some valued referent object. Securitisation is, thus, in essence an intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects requiring emergency measures outside the normal bounds of political procedure. (On securitisation see: Buzan, 1997; Neumann, 1997; Wæver et al., 1993) For example, the process of the breakdown of Yugoslavia was a process of securitising collective identities and of perceiving and expressing them in terms of collective survival.

Although we may claim that we have understood some of the processes through which ethnopolitical conflicts take place, there is a feeling that we do not understand the mechanisms of productive conflict management and resolution. For example, John Vasquez (1993: 3) argues that "much has been written on the causes of war; little has been learned about the subject". Marc Ross (1993: 2), on the other hand, claims that our institutional practices for addressing conflicts are often deficient and yielding partial and inadequate solutions, because "theories of conflict tell us too little about how to manage conflicts, while conflict management theories fail to consider many underlying sources of conflict that conflict theories have identified".

The aim of this book is to challenge pessimistic views concerning the possibility of conflict management and resolution. It

seeks to examine both post-Cold War conflicts and their resolution. As such it may work as a conceptual tool for scholars and students as well as for conflict resolution practitioners (e.g. the community of non-governmental organisations) seeking to understand conflict and conflict resolution.

The book clearly advocates a contextual understanding of new conflicts, alternative means of conflict resolution and normative analysis of modern international practices (e.g. nation-state).

The book starts with a discussion on post-Cold War conflicts. Data on conflicts is provided, and their nature as well as underlying normative issues discussed.

The third chapter moves on to the cooperative means of conflict resolution. Third party interventions in the form of mediation and facilitation are focused on. Issues related to conflict management, resolution and prevention are also introduced.

The fourth chapter employs the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as an example of a protracted post-Cold War communal conflict. A variety of conflict resolution attempts are studied and their suitability assessed.

2. POST-COLD WAR CONFLICTS

The context of examining conflicts in this chapter is the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet system between 1989 and 1991. In short, conflict has largely disappeared from inter-state relations in the post-Cold War world. Although the increase in armed inter-community conflicts as compared with inter-state conflicts started after the end of the Second World War, the end of the Cold War seemed to bring a temporary growth in the number of intra-state conflicts.

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War was followed also by a wave of conflict settlements that had been exacerbated by Cold War confrontation. For example, Namibia, South Africa and Cambodia have seen peace processes as a result of declining international tensions.

The aim of this chapter is to examine both quantitatively and qualitatively post-Cold War conflicts, which are also called "post-Clausewitzean" or "new" conflicts. First, data concerning armed conflicts is provided; second, the features of the contemporary conflicts discussed and, third, the discussion is related to a wider theoretical context. Finally, the characteristics of inter-community conflicts are illustrated briefly by introducing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

2.1. Data on post-Cold War conflicts

Contrary to popular belief, the number of armed conflicts has not been continuously rising after the end of the Cold War. The total number of armed conflicts increased particularly in 1992 but was somewhat lower in 1993, thus breaking the trend towards increasing numbers. (Nordlander, 1994: 8; Jung, 1997: 3)

In general, a very slow but steady decline in the number of both major armed conflicts and conflict locations can be observed since 1989 worldwide, although there are significant regional variations. In 1995, 30 "major armed conflicts" (battle-related deaths at least 1,000 during the entire conflict) were waged in 25 locations around the world. The number of major armed conflicts was lower than in 1994 and significantly lower than in 1989 when there were 36 conflicts in 32 locations. In 1996 there were 27 major armed conflicts in 24 locations around the world. (Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 1996: 15; Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 1997: 16, 20)

All major armed conflicts in 1995 were intra-state and all but one of the conflicts recorded for 1996 were internal. However, foreign forces were involved in some intra-state conflicts. For example, in Tajikistan Russian/Commonwealth of Independent States forces were used against the opposition and in Liberia the Economic Organisation of West African States Monitoring-group peace-keeping forces were involved. (ibid.)

Given the fact that armed conflicts of the 1990s are intra-state, non-governmental actors have become prominent actors. For example, during the six years between 1989-94 a total of 232 different parties or clusters of parties have been recorded, of which 68 were states and the remaining 164 non-governmental actors. The range of non-governmental actors varied from the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran to Pakistan-based Mujahideen groups. (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1995: 345)

In the early 1990s the number of conflicts started to decline in Africa, Asia and South America. Subregions such as Southern Africa and South-East Asia began to experience fewer conflicts or less intensive conflicts.

In 1996 Europe experienced the lowest number of conflicts and conflict locations since 1991. Despite several cease-fire agreements in the European conflicts, agreements for conflicts involving Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia and Northern Ireland are still in danger of being challenged or have been challenged as 1997 ends.

Conflicts in the Middle East region show little variation in the number, but many of these conflicts are at a low level of intensity. The exception is the conflict in Turkey between the government and the Kurdish PKK. (Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 1996: 19-21; Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 1997: 20)

According to Ted Gurr (1994: 347), the main issue in the most serious current internal conflicts is the contention for state power among communal groups in the immediate aftermath of state formation, revolution, and efforts to democratise autocratic regimes. The end of the Cold War contributed to the increase of the number of states with such power transitions, which are prone to conflict.

The Uppsala conflict study group (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1995: 345-348) uses a different vocabulary to describe the issues in the major armed conflicts. It claims that the most common conflicts are internal conflicts over government (civil wars) or over territory (state formation conflicts). For example, according to the group, the war in Chechnya was over territory, whereas the Chiapas uprising in Mexico was over government. According to their view, internal conflict about territory has become increasingly important.

The distinction between civil wars and state formation conflicts as presented by the Uppsala group can be challenged by employing the notion of ethnopolitical conflict. The issue will be discussed later (2.3.) when the features of post-Cold War conflicts are described in a more detailed manner.

A difference between the post-Cold War period and previous ones is that there seems to be more territories that no longer are under de facto central government authority, but where independence has not been internationally recognised. Examples include the Transdniestr region in Moldova, Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. (ibid.: 348; Kaldor, 1997: 10-11).

In the cases where the central government authority is not fully in charge of the sovereign territory of the state or where such fundamental institutions as the judicial system and police have ceased

to exist, the terms "failed" or "collapsed" states are used by some scholars. According to I. William Zartman (1995: 1-11), half of the African states are about to fail or have failed. The most recent examples are Somalia and Liberia. Similarly, Angola and Mozambique were at least very near to collapse before the recent developments in their peace processes.

2.2. Clausewitzean war/war machine

As mentioned earlier, the location of violence in the international system has shifted from inter-state relations to inter-community relations. Most, if not all, of the ongoing wars are now internal.

According to some authors (Moskos and Burk, 1994: 149; van Creveld, 1991), the change is of a great significance. We are moving away from the Clausewitzean trinity of the state, the army, and the people. Wars between nations have been replaced by intra-state warfare, in which national boundaries no longer hold a central place.

In a similar vein, a number of writers argue that we have moved from the era of Clausewitzean war to disintegrative, decentralised and fragmentative violence. (Curle, 1993; Joenniemi, 1997; Kaldor, 1997) By Clausewitzean war, they mean wars between states for clearly defined political aims where victory or defeat is absolute. Although the Clausewitzean model may have been a very limited one – few conflicts since 1945 have fully corresponded to it and it existed for a brief period mainly in Europe – new conflicts have, according to these writers, certain shared features that are quite contemporary and post- rather than pre-Clausewitzean.

Clausewitzean war was war between modern states which were characterised by centralised and secularised power within a given territory, together with absolutist notions of sovereignty. (On the genealogy of these state practices see: Bartelson, 1995; Walker, 1993; Weber, 1995)

The key feature of the development of the modern state was its monopolisation of legitimate organised violence, which entailed the elimination of private armies; internal pacification; the emergence of a state system and the rise of regular professional armies. The modern state was, thus, organised on the basis of violence and the containment of violence. The containment of war in time and space, therefore, implied a distinction between war and peace, between outside and inside and between military and civil. War was a rational activity, not confined by "pre-modern" prohibitions. (Kaldor, 1997: 3-7)

In new, post-Clausewitzean, wars the distinction between war and peace is breaking down. Mary Kaldor (1997: 7-19) summarises the characteristics of new conflicts by claiming that new wars tend to be longer, more pervasive and less decisive. The state has lost its monopoly of violence and non-state actors play an important role in wars.

Furthermore, in the case of "collapsed" states, it is difficult to distinguish between state and non-state actors. New wars also have new consequences. The displacement of populations, which is associated with large numbers of refugees, and its counterpart, forcible repatriation, are typical results. Moreover, new conflicts rarely have decisive endings. Even where a cease-fire has been declared periods of low violence tend to follow. Neither war nor peace prevails. Conflicts are, therefore, destructive especially in societal terms.

Kaldor is right in her characterisation of the features of new wars – and, therefore, the use of the term "post-Clausewitzean conflict" is justified, and used in this work as well – but the assumed Clausewitzean model underlining her thinking can be challenged. As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1986: 109-112) argue, the State apparatus never had the war machine, and controlled war through a military institution or army. On the contrary, the war machine had the State. The State apparatus appropriates a war machine and subordinates it to its political aims. It follows, according to them,

that a war machine takes charge of the aim, appropriates the State in turn and assumes increasingly wider political functions.

In Deleuze's and Guattari's account, the war machine is a "nomad invention" which does not have war as its primary object nor a military solution. Neither can it be equated with a military institution or army. Only when the State appropriates the war machine does war become its primary object and a military institution a way to appropriate the machine. War for them is, thus, a wider phenomenon than battle and warfare. It has its own "primordial" essence and logic.

In sum, despite the appeal of the argument that we have moved from Clausewitzean to post-Clausewitzean wars, it is worth considering also a more philosophical argument which examines the war machine in its entirety, distinguishes the war machine from military institutions and armies, and notes the inevitable exteriority of the war machine to the state apparatus. However, as mentioned above, the term "post-Clausewitzean conflict" has a certain heuristic value.

2.3. Ethnopolitical conflicts

Irrespective of our interpretation of the war machine, it seems that post-Cold War conflicts often center around ethnic claims and can, therefore, be called "ethnopolitical" conflicts. Importance is attached to local, "ethnic", concerns. In ethnopolitical conflicts the opposing parties hold irreconcilable visions of such issues as the identity, borders and citizenship of the state. In some cases, conflicts are attempts to redefine or divide the state itself and in others, they are attempts to gain control of the state without questioning the borders of the state. Thus, in ethnopolitical conflicts both territory and governmental control are disputed.

According to Ted Gurr's (1994: 348) characterisation, in ethnopolitical conflicts groups that define themselves using ethnic criteria (e.g. language, religion, assumed shared origin and culture) make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or against other political actors.

Modernisation theory, which most political theorists more or less accepted and adopted thirty years ago, made a prediction about ethnic identities: greater political and economic interaction among people and the growth of communication networks would break down peoples' local identities with their ethnic kindred and replace them with loyalties to larger communities. A counter-argument was presented already in the 1970s by Walker Connor (1994). He argued that the improvements in the quality and quantity of communication and transportation media curtailed the cultural isolation of identity groups. Advances in communication and transportation tend to increase the cultural awareness of the minorities by making their members more aware of the distinction between themselves and others. In other words, the individual becomes more aware of alien identity groups as well as more aware of those who are assumed to share his or her identity. This seems to be the case particulary in the post-Cold War world.

8736

According to Gurr (Gurr and Haxton, 1996), in 1995 there were 268 ethnopolitical groups, which collectively suffered, or benefited from, systematic treatment vis-à-vis other groups in the society and/or were the basis for political mobilisation and action in defense or the promotion of their self-interest. Given the nature of ethnopolitical groups, they are either in conflict or prone to conflict.

There are two major types of ethnopolitical groups: national and minority peoples. Gurr calls national peoples those of people who are regionally concentrated and culturally and linguistically distinctive groups seeking to protect or reestablish some degree of politically separate existence. Minority peoples, on the other hand, have a defined socioeconomic and political status within a larger society and are mainly concerned about protecting or improving their status. (ibid.)

In Gurr's (ibid.; see also: Gurr and Harff, 1994) categorisation national peoples comprise ethno-nationalists, national minorities and indigenous peoples. Ethno-nationalists (37 groups) are most often responsible for ethnic warfare. Their political significance is great and they are likely candidates for new statehood and autonomous regions. They are groups who have a history of organised political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government. Examples are the Corsicans in France, the Abkhaz in Georgia and the Sri Lankan Tamils.

National minorities (44 groups) are heavily concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states. They are peoples who have a history of organised political autonomy and whose kindred control an adjacent state, but who now constitute a minority in the state in which they reside. Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Turks in Bulgaria and Russians in the Baltic States are examples of national minorities. They demand equal rights, recognition of collective cultural and political rights and are, therefore, often perceived as potential separatists.

Indigenous peoples (70 groups) are linked by a global movement for indigenous rights. They are "conquered" descendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs. Although for example Mayas in the Chiapas region became involved in violent rebellion, indigenous peoples most often rely on non-violent political action.

Minority peoples consist of ethnoclasses, communal contenders and religious sects. Ethnoclasses (46 groups) are mainly concerned about political and cultural rights and equalisation of economic opportunities, since they often occupy a distinct social stratum in a society. Turks in Germany, Chinese in Indonesia and African-Americans in the Americas are examples of ethnoclasses. In authoritarian and transitional societies the demands of ethnoclasses for better treatment can take the form of rebellion, communal warfare, and mass slaughter, as in Rwanda and Burundi.

Communal contenders (60 groups) are common in Africa. They hold or seek a share in state power and are either subjects of discrimination or hold political and/or economical advantages. Examples comprise the Kikuyu in Kenya, the Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria and Sunni Arabs in Iraq. Some of these groups rely on electoral strategies, some on communal rioting and terrorism and some engage in protracted communal warfare.

Religious sects (11 groups) are politically significant only in Asia and the Middle East. Most are either Muslim sects or non-Muslims in predominantly Islamic societies who are more or less quiescent targets of discriminatory policies. (ibid.)

The likelihood of ethnopolitical conflict rises in competitive and unequal societies. Thus, the existence of ethnopolitical groups within a state territory does not as such imply the likelihood of conflict. Although states with ethno-nationalists and communal contenders with their aspirations of autonomy and power are prone to conflict, something else in needed for an ethnopolitical conflict to arise. In Gurr's (1994: 348) words:

> Structures established and maintained by dominant groups in stratified societies, and by historical circumstance and mutual consent among groups in unranked societies, contribute to the perpetuation of cultural distinctions. The greater the competition and inequalities among groups in heterogeneous societies, the greater the salience of ethnic identities and the greater the likelihood of open conflict. When open conflict does occur it is likely to intensify, or reify, both perceptions of difference among contending groups and perceptions of common interest with each group. And the longer open conflict persists, and the more intense it becomes, the stronger and more exclusive are group identities.

Ethnopolitical conflicts are not caused by civilisational fault lines or material inequalities. Samuel Huntington's (1993) thesis

that the civilisational and cultural fault lines are becoming more salient is not supported by empirical data. Huntington (1993: 48) argues that "conflicts between groups in different civilisations will be more frequent, more sustained, and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilisation". For him the fundamental sources of future conflicts can be found in cultural factors, thus not in ideology or economy.

Civilisations, which are cultural entities, are distinguished from each other mainly by religion. There are seven or eight major civilisations which include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilisation. Gurr's (1994: 357-358) data on ethnopolitical conflicts does not confirm Huntington's thesis. On the contrary, it demonstrates that civilisational or religious cleavages are not becoming more important as a source of ethnopolitical conflict. From conflicts that began before 1987 it is possible to conclude that ideological, civilisational, and Islamic versus non-Islamic conflicts were substantially more intense than others, but no such difference is evident in recent conflicts.

One of the most pronounced and growing cleavages in the international system is the widening ecological, demographic, and material gap between North and South, rich and poor. The cleavage is pronounced also at the micro, state, level. For example, most African economies are stagnant or in decline and material inequalities continue to increase between urban élites and the rural poor. Furthermore, conflicts in poor and peripheral regions tend to attract fewer international efforts at settlement than those closer to the West. However, according to Gurr (1994: 358-359), material inequalities as such are not a strong force underlying ethnonational conflicts. Indeed, they are an underlying issue in some of them.

Often the most disadvantaged communities have few resources with which to fight protracted conflicts. Thus, despite the fact that conflicts tend to be more numerous and intense in regions and countries where systemic poverty is greatest, contention over material inequalities is a secondary or latent issue in most contemporary ethnopolitical conflicts. (For an opposite argument see: Auvinen, 1998.)

However, when the material and demographic gaps are fueled by ecological factors, the conflict potential may increase. According to Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994: 5-40), environmental scarcities (e.g. the decrease of the area of agricultural land; the depletion and degradation of aquifers, rivers and other water resources; the decline of fisheries and significant future climate change) are contributing to violent conflict in many parts of the developing world in several ways. First, the decreasing supplies of controllable physical environmental resources, such as clean water and agricultural land, provoke conflicts, i.e. resource wars. Homer-Dixon's study shows, for example, that the military coup in Lesotho in 1986 was supported by South Africa partly because of the desire for water. Within months of the coup, the countries signed an agreement on the construction of the Highlands Water Project which met South Africa's needs.

Second, large population movements caused by environmental stress can induce "group-identity conflicts", especially ethnic clashes. The physical, political and economic features of the country affect the strength of the linkages between scarcity, population movements, and conflict. For example, in recent decades huge numbers of people have moved from Bangladesh to India, producing group-identity conflicts in the adjacent Indian states.

Population growth – affecting the use of land and producing environmental scarcity – seems to be a main force behind the migration. The enormous flux of populations has produced pervasive social changes in the receiving regions by altering land distribution, economic relations, and the balance of political power between religious and ethnic groups, which have, in turn, triggered serious inter-group conflicts. (ibid.: 20-23)

Third, severe environmental scarcities simultaneously increase economic deprivation and disturb key social institutions, which

thereby cause, for example, civil strife and insurgencies. Resource degradation and depletion often affect economic productivity in poor countries, and contribute to deprivation. For example, erosion in upland Indonesia is costing the country's agricultural economy nearly half a billion dollars. Large population movements and economic decline as products of environmental scarcity weaken clearly the capacity and legitimacy of the state in some poor countries: they increase financial and political demands on governments.

Furthermore, scarcity contributes to the growth of marginal groups in the society that need help from the government. Since scarcity affects the general productivity of the country, the government is less equipped to deal with growing demands from the marginalised sections of the population. The marginalisation of large sections of the population further erodes the legitimacy of the state. Serious civil strife is not likely to occur unless the structure of political opportunities facing challenger groups keeps them from effectively expressing their grievances peacefully, but offers them openings for violence against authority.

According to Homer-Dixon, for example, the civil strife in the Philippines is motivated by environmental scarcity and economic stress. In other words, the current upland insurgency in the country is motivated by the poverty of landless agricultural labourers and farmers who have been displaced into the remote hills. (ibid.: 23-3; on environmental conflict see also: Dabelko and Dabelko, 1997; "Environmental Scarcity...", 1997; Homer-Dixon, 1991; Molvaer, 1991)

Political transitions are an immediate cause of ethnopolitical conflict, according to Gurr's data (1994: 359-363). Among the power-transition conflicts are the civil wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Azerbaijan, genocidal massacres in Burundi and Rwanda and clan fighting in Somalia. Political transitions can take different forms. Data seems to support the hypothesis that in societies with preexisting communal cleavages, state formation and defeat in war are

both likely to be followed by ultra-nationalism, increased conflict among communal contenders and the victimisation of minorities. Similarly, states that have undergone revolutionary political change are likely to open up opportunities for new contenders and leaders who have the means and inclination to respond violently to internal challengers.

Furthermore, democratisation contributes in complex ways to ethnic and communal conflicts. The general assumption, which is supported by Gurr's findings, is that ethnopolitical conflicts are more numerous and intense in newly democratic or quasi-democratic states than in institutionalised democracies or autocracies. (On democracy and war see also: International Security 1995 and 1996; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995)

2.4. Ethnicity and ethnic relations

In addition to the preconditions for the emergence of ethnopolitical conflicts, ethnicity and ethnic relations need to be studied in order to more fully understand conflicts. There is a variety of approaches which try to explain why ethnic identification takes place. (For good summaries see: Eriksen, 1993; Pieterse, 1996)

For example, according to Michael Hechter (1975), ethnic identification arises from "internal colonialisation" in which some parts of the country exploit others. Ethnic mobilisation is an unavoidable consequence in Hechter's view. According to Paul Brass (1991), on the other hand, ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular élites. This is the case especially in modernising and post-industrial societies undergoing dramatic change.

What, then, is ethnicity? According to the "primordial" view, ethnic identity is simply derived, for example, from language, religion, shared customs and history, i.e. culture. Ethnic identity is thought to be an imperative status, a more or less immutable aspect

of the social person: a person is assumed to be born into an ethnic group and die in it too.

There is another, more fruitful, way to understand ethnicity which is founded on the conviction that "primordial" cultural differences between two groups are not the decisive feature of ethnicity. Rather, for ethnicity to come about, the groups must have a minimum contact with each other, and they must entertain ideas of each other as being culturally different from themselves. Ethnicity is essentially an aspect of a relationship and, thereby, ethnic relations are fluid and negotiable. Ethnicity provides a cultural and social agent with meaning and organisation, and its importance varies from situation to situation. (Barth, 1969; Eriksen, 1993)

If ethnic relations are studied as something given and stable, there is a danger of "ethnic nominalism". (Heisler, 1990: 26-27) Ethnic nominalism encourages the perspective that "ethnics" and ethnic structures of societies are readily recognisable. It leads to the identification of boundaries between individuals and the structural boundaries of groups as real and clear-cut. Furthermore, it imbues modern societies with ethnic dimensions of individual and group life which they may not possess. It follows from ethnic nominalism, according to Heisler (1990: 28), that the nature of ethnic conflict is seldom understood. Virtually never is one whole, organised entity pitted against another in the clear-cut fashion suggested by the simplified understanding of ethnicity and ethnic relations. Instead, in ethnic conflicts claims are made by some political actors in the name of groups, which contributes to the complex phenomena of ethnopolitical conflict.

The importance of ethnicity varies from "pre-modern" to "modern" settings. Heisler (1990: 29-36) suggests four settings within which ethnicity and ethnic relations should be studied. According to his view, in small, primitive societies ethnicity is derived from kinship-type contacts between the members of the society. In these societies socio-cultural incentives, values and sanctions are most relevant in shaping individual identities.

In larger, pre-industrial and plural societies there is marginally more choice regarding ethnic identity than in primitive societies. Ethnicity is defined by the dynamics of inter-group relations, and constitutional, legal and policy measures exert very little influence on the formation of identities.

Nationalism has contributed to transmuting ethnicity from traditional to current Western forms. Post-feudal patterns of organisation have lost their legitimacy, and the ground has been prepared for modern states with universalistic bases of citizenship. Ascriptive bonds shared by the entire society have become the hallmarks of nationality. They differentiate national groups from each other by asserting greater similarities between the members as compared with the differences between them and those outside the nation.

The process of nation-building, and nationalism accompanying it, creates superordinate alternatives to ethnic identity. Citizenship in a national state is one of the primary sources of identity. Although the integrative forces are powerful, ethnic attachments and social structures survive on the peripheries of the national state and continue to structure and organise some aspects of a group's life. (ibid.)

The predominant pattern today concerning ethnic relations in the West is post-nationalist. Economic integration has bound peripheral populations to the centre in most cases. The extension of civil liberties to individuals and civil rights to groups has made accommodation more attractive to minorities. According to Heisler (1990: 36-45), there are, however, factors in post-nationalist societies which point to the continued relevance of ethnicity in the modern West. He (1990: 36) argues that "modern, industrialised societies are often psychologically unsatisfying, inhospitable, or worse"; they "tend to fragment the persona and lead to alienation". Where ethnic focuses for identification exist, people may turn to them for amelioration. Alienation added with rational calculations of self-interest may provide an impetus in the same direction.

Furthermore, although liberal democracy tries to provide the minorities with the possibility to participate in a "normal" fashion, its political processes serve functional and class-based interests much better than those founded on ethnic or regional commonalities. In a similar vein, the modern welfare state unites citizens through material bonds – through the programs, policies, bureaucracies, and macro-economic conditions they share – but not through an identitive or emotional bond. When economies decline, a part of the population tends to become disenchanted and turns to ethnic solidarity as a political medium. (ibid.) It should be kept in mind that the development does not necessarily lead to ethnic conflict. However, it indicates the importance of ethnic ties even in the context of the modern West.

In short, three aspects of ethnicity and ethnic relations should be noted when studying ethnopolitical conflicts. Ethnic identity derives from the everyday life of the social actors. In some contexts and situations ethnicity provides a relevant way to categorise and act in the world. Furthermore, ethnicity can be a tool for both political mobilisation and manipulation: it can be used to create an enemy against which conflict behaviour is legitimated. (On ethnicity and ethnic conflict see also: Enloe, 1980; Esman 1977; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983; Horowitz, 1985; Roosens, 1989; Ryan 1990; Smith 1986 and 1991; Väyrynen, 1998)

2.5. Human needs theories as an explanation of ethnopolitical conflicts

One possible way to approach ethnopolitical conflicts is to study human needs. There is a long tradition of human needs thinking in Western philosophy and social sciences (for a summary see: Lederer, 1980). A starting-point for many theories is biology; needs are assumed to arise from human being's biological nature. It is also argued that since needs are something biological, they are universal.

Several theorists have tried to identify the most fundamental needs and have produced lists which have often only added to the number of needs considered to be essential. There are clearly two categories of needs which theorists have deduced: "physiological" needs which are seen to be vital for living organisms to survive and "psychological" needs which are assumed to contribute to general human welfare.

For example, for Abraham Maslow (1970: 15-36) the theory of human needs is a theory of the ends and ultimate values of an organism. Seen from the point of view of the behavioural sciences, needs are organisers of behaviour. Maslow's well-known hierarchy of needs includes such needs as physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem needs, and a need for self-actualisation. He claims that when the physiological needs are satisfied, higher needs emerge.

An often forgotten element in Maslow's needs theory is that the hierarchy is by no means meant to be rigid. In other words, it allows a range of variations in needs satisfaction. Maslow's views have some direct relevance to conflict analysis, since he (1970: 36) writes: "If it is easy to accept basic needs frustration as one determinant of hostility, it is quite easy to accept the opposite of frustration (i.e., basic need gratification) as an a priori determinant of the opposite of hostility (i.e., friendliness)."

Maslow's theory has been adapted to the theory of conflict and conflict resolution by John Burton (see e.g. 1979; 1982; 1984; 1987; 1990; 1997; see also: Azar, 1990). According to Burton's theory, an ethnopolitical conflict is a conflict caused by an unsatisfied need for identity. In other words, in ethnopolitical conflicts the question is about a drive for (ethnic) identity. It follows, that the study of ethnicity and the drive for ethnic identity should not form a special case in the study of conflicts. It is the denial of human needs – of which ethnic identity is merely one – that finally emerges as the source of conflict, be it domestic, communal, international or inter-state.

How, then, can a need be a source of conflict? Burton argues that

there are fundamental human drives and motivations that cannot be repressed. The drives and motivations are based on universal and genetic basic needs – such as drives for identity, development, meaning and consistency in response – and they direct human behaviour. Burton assumes that human needs will be pursued regardless of consequences.

In every society there are, however, élite groups which gain most through the maintenance of the status quo and, therefore, resist the demands of the needs satisfaction of other groups in the society. Burton calls the phenomenon of resistance "role defense". He assumes that if the institutional values, which often reflect the interests of élites, do not fully allow the satisfaction of human needs of all groups in the society, conflict will emerge. It follows that there can be no long-lasting and authentic social stability unless the basic needs satisfaction of individuals is met.

It should be emphasised that in Burton's view human needs as such do not lead to conflict. Rather, conflict emerges from the frustration caused by unfulfilled needs. Human needs are, thus, seen to be something original and constructive in the sense that they include a potential for a harmonious society. The institutional arrangements of a society may temporarily destroy the originality, and conflict arises. Deviance and dysfunctional violent conflicts are assumed to be symptoms of deeper problems in the society, manifestations of conflicts between human needs and structures. In other words, conflicts are political manifestations of system failures, the failures of a domestic system to provide for the needs of people.

Conflicts, which in Burton's account are always caused by human needs, are often protracted, because their sources are deep-rooted in the lives and ontological being of those concerned. Furthermore, they spill over from domestic to other levels causing regional and international turmoil, as in Turkey's military intervention against the Kurds demonstrates.

On 20 March 1995, Turkey started a military operation against the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party. The offensive extended into the territory of Iraq and involved 35,000 soldiers. Turkey justified the operation by arguing that the Kurdistan Workers Party is using northern Iraq as a springboard in its fight for a homeland in Turkey. (International Herald Tribune, April 8-9, 11, 13 and 18, 1995) Thus, the actions taken by Turkey to deal with internal conflict had an influence on another state, namely, Iraq.

There are, however, severe problems in attempts to explain ethnopolitical conflicts by employing human needs theory. Some of the standard criticism can be summarised in the following manner. It is claimed that all lists intended to identify needs are subjective, and potentially endless. Since there is no empirical evidence to support needs thinking, the lists are bound to remain subjective. Moreover, there cannot ever be any empirical evidence, because the concept of need cannot be operationalised. Since it cannot be operationalised, needs theories cannot be verified.

It is also asked whether we know according to any objective criteria when needs have been satisfied. In other words, there may be different degrees of needs satisfaction. The differentiation of needs from their satisfiers is also unclear, it is said, in many needs theories. Although needs are assumed to be universal, the satisfiers could still be seen to be culturally constituted. (see e.g. Mitchell, 1990; Nudler, 1980)

More fundamentally, Burton's theory, which clearly equalises the social significance of needs, denies the social and political construction and production, if not expression, of human needs. He assumes that needs are universally experienced as such, that is, needs are experienced as such that variations between persons, situations, groups, and even larger social units are of minor empirical significance. Burton does not deny that needs are expressed through different cultures: they may get cultural expressions. These differences are, however, of minor importance from the point of view of the sources of conflict.

A more fruitful way to approach needs is to claim that they are produced in global as well as in local social and political practices. Needs can be defined as a socially constructed reality which is dependent on the context in which they are expressed. Thus, when the word "need" is employed in this work, it does not refer to needs as they are understood in Burton's needs theory, but socially and contextually constructed (intersubjective) reality.

Related to the issue of the social production of needs is the question of identity. As noted, Burton maintains that identity is a need in which behaviour originates. However, identities are structured in accord with the numerous social groups to which we pertain and that pressure us from different directions. There is no single identity, rather, there are multiple identities. Moreover, there is nothing authentic or essential in any identity. Rather, identities are socially and linguistically constructed phenomena. (see e.g. Jabri, 1996) They are constructed in relation to the "Other", in relation to something "out there". (see e.g. Barth, 1969; Todorov, 1992)

In sum, there is no single coherent (e.g. ethnic) identity which could be the source or the aim of behaviour in the manner suggested by Burton's human needs theory. Neither can identity be denied. Its expressions can be suppressed and the ways of confirming it can be banned, but this does not necessarily imply deviant behaviour as Burton argues in his conflict theory.

2.6. Normative issues: identity politics and political community

Several fundamental theoretical and, above all, normative questions arise from ethnopolitical conflicts and their causes. First, the issue of integration and fragmentation as two sides of globalisation emerge. Second, the idea of "identity politics" as it is presented by the ethnopolitical movements comes to the fore. Third, the philosophical question of political community and the practical

question of self-determination derive from "identity politics".

Globalisation, the intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across borders, is a process of long-term structural and normative change. It is a dialectic process: it promotes integration, as in the European Union where the member countries cope with the challenges of a world economy, but also fragmentation, as in Quebec or the former Yugoslavia, where national identities and control weaken.

Globalisation encourages the adoption of universal norms and cultural homogenisation. It encourages, for example, the spread of American culture and modern technology. At the same time, globalisation promotes particularism and cultural differentiation in reaction to these centripetal trends. (see e.g. Appadurai, 1990; Bauman, 1992; Shapiro and Alker, 1996)

It can be argued that ethnopolitical conflicts demonstrate the growing importance of "identity politics" at the global level. The term "identity politics" suggests that identity claims as well as quests for meaning take many forms, e.g. gender, class and ethnicity. The increasing significance of identity politics has different sources. The analysis of the nation conducted by Benedict Anderson points at the meaning of time in the context of capitalism. For Anderson, the nation developed when the conception of homogeneous, empty, time emerged, and when the idea of simultaneity started to mean temporal coincidence by undermining old "Messianic time" (religious time) marked by prefiguring and fulfillment as well as a simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present.

In the emerging modern thinking it became possible to make politically significant connections horizontally, where lots of people can be joined without being at the same place or being in any direct way related to each other. An important factor in creating the new cosmology was the rise of "print capitalism" characterised by the wide availability of the novel and media. Modern cosmology made it possible, according to Anderson (1993: 36), "for rapidly

growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and relate themselves to other, in profoundly new ways". Anderson's reasoning can be applied to explain the emergence of modern ethno-political groups as well as modern identity politics. (see e.g. Connor, 1994)

A symptom of identity politics is the "politics of soil". Pierre Hassner (1993: 49) argues that when nation-states are in crisis, when empires collapse and when alliances wither away the politics of soil emerges. The politics of soil arises from local, parochial, concerns, and it is grounded on an image of community of the small, face-to-face type of group, e.g. the family, tribe and clan. As such it pays little attention to global issues. Although ethnic claims arise from local concerns, they redefine what has previously been considered private, non-public, and non-political as matters of public concerns, as issues of justice, as sites of power which need discursive legitimation. They occupy, thus, the "agonistic" space of public-political life within which one competes for recognition, precedence and acclaim. (Benhabib, 1992: 100)

The politics of soil and the increasing variety of identity claims impose the philosophical and normative problems of the foundation of the human community and society as well as of the inclusive and exclusive nature of communities and societies. All communities and societies have practices and procedures which define who does and does not belong to the "in-group". At the micro-social level, such principles are constitutive of the immediate social institutions and relations. At the macro-level, on the other hand, they are fundamental to belief systems that determine the membership of international societies and civilisations. (Linklater, 1992: 77-82)

The sovereign state has tried to offer the solution for the challenge set forth by the politics of soil and different forms of identity politics. Furthermore, the state has aimed at providing a shared domain of meaning for identity groups located within its sovereign control and territory.

The state, as a system of inclusion and exclusion par excellence, solves the problem of conflicting identity claims by producing precise distinctions between citizens and aliens, by domesticating particular identities and by creating a coherent sovereign identity. Just because it tries to provide the paradigmatic solution for the production of human communality, the sovereign state should be treated essentially, in Andrew Linklater's (1994: 129) words, as a "problematic form of political community" among other possible forms of communities and societies.

A practical issue related to political arrangements which follows from the normative considerations discussed above concerns the right of self-determination of all peoples. The right of self-determination is acknowledged in Wodrow Wilson's "four principles" and declared in the UN Charter as an inalienable right of all peoples. The drafters of the Charter did not refer specifically to a right of national self-determination, preferring instead the more vague, and possibly less emotive, concept of a people and the "principle" of self-determination. However, the concept of people was soon to be interpreted as meaning national and principle as meaning right. (see e.g. Hannum, 1992; Mayall, 1992)

The adoption of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960 by the UN General Assembly further strengthened the interpretation by declaring that "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." (quoted in Hannum, 1992: 34)

In the context of post-1945 decolonisation, it soon became evident that the primary definition of "peoples" was that of non-European inhabitants of former colonies, without further regard for ethnicity, language, religion, or other characteristics of colonised peoples. In other words, territory was to become the determining factor. (ibid.: 27-49; Mayall, 1992: 20-21)

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a resurgence of

nationalism. Since in many cases (in Quebec and Eritrea, as much as Lithuania and Ukraine) nationalists claim to be democratic, the conventional (narrow) interpretation of the principle of national self-determination is under more intense pressure than at any time since the Second World War. The principle of self-determination has, thus, continued to be a major political force both internationally and domestically. Politically, the challenge is to the territorial status quo of the existing states.

Several questions related to the principle of self-determination in the context of post-Cold War "new nationalism" remain unanswered. As James Mayall (1992: 20-21) inquires, if new states are to be created, how are they to establish their legitimacy both in the eyes of internal communities as well as the "international community"? Furthermore, what kind of political and territorial arrangements would provide a satisfactory (legitimate, peaceful and lasting) solution for the claims of national self-determination?

There are also views which broaden the notion of self-determination to cover both external and internal self-determination. As Allan Rosas (1993: 227) notes "the idea of 'internal' self-determination as a principle of public international law is a challenge to the traditional inter-State paradigm, as it may imply a collective human right enjoyed by the population of a State against the 'sovereign' State". For example Rosas would include to the principle of self-determination the right of people (population) of an existing state to exert control over its own constitution and government, in other words, its right to democracy. However, it should be kept in mind that internal self-determination does not need to imply secession.

2.7. Nagorno-Karabakh: a post-Clausewitzean ethnopolitical conflict?

Although all conflicts possess their own distinctive features, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh serves as an interesting case of a post-Cold War conflict. It started before the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet system, but it bears many typical features of the 1990s armed conflicts.

The Transcaucasian region consists of a mix of ethnic populations. Traditional social identities of the "indigenous" community, based on clan, region, urban residence, and even class, gave way under Soviet policies to the formation of a modern, overarching identity developed through new political and cultural institutions inscribed in the national republics.

It can be argued that the Soviet-sponsored political institutions and practices created conditions for the emergence of ethnic-based conflicts under a more liberalised regime. One of the most significant consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies was the upsurge of ethnic and cultural particularism, the drive for political interdependence, and the rise of a variety of popular movements throughout the USSR. As a result, three independent states emerged in Transcaucasus: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous region contested both by Azerbaijan and Armenia, began in February 1988 with a series of strikes and demonstrations organised by the Armenian population of the autonomous region. Armenians – making up almost 77 per cent of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh – complained that they were subject to cultural discrimination by the Azebaijani authorities. They also claimed that the social conditions of the region's economy had been neglected. The main point of the demands was the assertion that the territory is historically a part of Armenia and is a cradle of its national culture. Armenia supported the movements. Strikes and their legitimation in Nagorno-Karabakh contributed to the anti-Armenian riots in Azerbaijan.

Especially since 1991 – after the proclamation of the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, after the autonomous status of the region was abolished by Azerbaijan, and after Armenia was declared independent – the civilian population became the main target of the fighting. The war which followed has caused immense flows of refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh as well as from both Armenia and Azerbaijan and at least twenty thousand deaths.

Although some theorists describe the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as an inter-state conflict, i.e. a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, elements of ethnicity and identity-related issues have played and still play an important role in the conflict. Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh region are all multi-ethnic.

In Gurr's terms, and seen from an Armenian perspective, the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh are ethno-nationalists who seek independence. Seen from the angle of Azerbaijan, Armenians in the region are communal contenders holding political and economic advantages. Furthermore, ethnic relations in the area consist of memories of animosity. For example, the Azeris are culturally and linguistically, but not religiously, similar to the Anatolian Turks of Turkey, who have a long history of animosity with the Armenian population of this region. The 1894-1915 genocide of the Armenian population at the hands of the Anatolian (Ottoman) Turks is deeply embedded in the ethnic identity of the Armenian people. (see e.g. Marshall, 1993: 199)

In addition to the elements related to ethnicity and identity, the conflict bears also similarities with Kaldor's features of post-Clausewitzean wars. The conflict actors are not solely traditional state actors. War has provided both professional military and various voluntary units and militias with influence in the societies. The societies have been militarised, and warfare has become also a source of personal financial (through looting, trade, etc.) and political gain.

The arms arsenals of the Soviet forces have guaranteed endless

flows of arms to the warring parties. The accumulation of arms in the hands of the population and local armed groups has lead to independent decisions on military activities and has, therefore, contributed to the intensification of the conflict, and in some cases the disruption of peaceful negotiations. (see e.g. Popov, 1997)

Ethnic cleansings and ethnic pogroms accompanied by looting, violence and genocide have been typical features of the war. They have created the displacement of 1.3 million people. The conflict has thus caused material, social and psychological destruction at the societal level. Human suffering has been intensified by the fact that the distinction between war and peace has been fragile. Ceasefires in the beginning of the conflict were followed by periodic violence, and even the current situation is unstable. The conflict has been difficult to manage by peaceful means, let alone resolve.

In sum, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be characterised as a protracted communal, post-Clausewitzean and ethnopolitical conflict. It also has an international dimension: the conflict is decisive in the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and, thereby, it is decisive for the future of the whole region. Furthermore, the condition for integrating the Transcaucasian region in the international community lies in the peaceful resolution of the conflict over and in Nagorno-Karabakh.

3. COOPERATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION, THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

There are two orientations of conflict resolution: competitive and cooperative. These orientations can be seen as a continuum with competitive orientations at one end and cooperative at the other. Within the continuum there are such modes of conflict resolution as the use of deadly force (actual or threatened), litigation, adjudication, arbitration, conciliation, traditional mediation, facilitated problem-solving and unfacilitated problem-solving. There are, thus, three procedures for dealing with opposing preferences, namely, struggle, mediation and negotiation. (Deutsch, 1971: 39-49; see also: Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992: 532; Sandole, 1987: 3)

A general taxonomy of ethnic conflict management which relies on both orientations of conflict resolution is suggested by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (1993: 1-39). They categorise eight macro-methods of ethnic conflict regulation. The methods for eliminating differences are: genocide, forced mass-population transfers, partition and/or secession (self-determination) and integration and/or assimilation. The ways for managing differences, on the other hand, are: hegemonic control, arbitration (third-party intervention), cantonisation and/or federalism and consociationalism or power-sharing. The taxonomy is based on the idea that there are two distinct ways to deal with actual or potential ethnic conflicts, namely, there are structural methods for eliminating and managing differences. (On ethnic conflict resolution in general see also: Horowitz, 1985: 563-680; Kaufman, 1996; Montville, 1990; Ryan, 1990: 50-93 and 1996)

Post-Cold War conflicts seem to be difficult to manage and resolve by peaceful means. UN peace-keeping as a means of conflict containment and management is in crisis after such failures as

UNISOM II in Somalia. Similarly, such a powerful mediator as the United States did not manage to mediate a peace treaty between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The unofficial and secret "Oslo Channel" provided by scholars was needed to advance the peace process. Furthermore, a bloody war went on in the former Yugoslavia for several years before the international community and regional organisations overcame their incapability to act in an effective manner. For example, the intermediary activities of the EU failed due to a misinterpretation of the causes and nature of the conflict.

The international community is largely unequipped to deal with ethnopolitical conflicts. In other words, the means of conflict management which may have been applicable in the world of interstate conflicts are not effective in the world of intra-state conflicts. The existing security arrangements are largely based on agreements between states. As Kaldor (1979: 3, 19) states, the Clausewitzean model continues to dominate the thinking of governments and military planners, so that the solution to conflicts is thought to be containment. Conflicts and violence have to be contained "politically", that is, kept out of headlines.

However, even if containment is considered to be a viable means of conflict management, it is difficult to contain post-Clausewitzean conflicts. New wars are transnational by their character: refugees, military and criminal activities and diaspora networks spill over from the community level to the transnational sphere. A great number of actors in current conflicts are non-state actors. Some of them often remain disaffected by containment attempts, and continue the war despite state-originated peace activities. Given the protracted nature of new wars, quick solutions turn out to be difficult. Peace processes last for years, as in Cambodia, which is often thought to be the showcase of a UN-sponsored political settlement. Even in Cambodia problems are far from being settled. (ibid., 19)

Furthermore, ethnopolitical conflicts consist of and centre

around issues which are not easy to negotiate, namely issues related to identity. Identity issues do not yield themselves to instrumentally rational cost-benefit calculations, which are, however, assumed to be the basis for settlement in the traditional conflict management models and methods included in them. For example, official peace negotiations assume coherent parties which are capable of assessing the future costs and benefits of settlement in an instrumental manner. However, as John Dryzek (1990: 53) notes, "there is more to social problem-solving than instrumental action. Important social problems are pervaded by conflicting values [...], which instrumental action cannot resolve." This is exactly the challenge post-Cold War conflict resolution needs to face: how to deal with values instead of instrumental interests.

This chapter focuses on peaceful means of conflict resolution, and especially on the pacific intervention of third parties. Since most of the conflicts experience mediation attempts, mediation is discussed both at the empirical and theoretical levels. A distinction between negotiation and mediation is also made, and factors for successful mediation identified. The roles of the third parties are categorised in order to distinguish different types of cooperative interventions. Problem-solving conflict resolution and facilitative third-party intervention is introduced as an alternative to traditional negotiation and mediation, and its suitability for post-Cold War conflict resolution emphasised. Finally, conflict management is distinguished from conflict resolution, and conflict prevention and early warning are discussed.

3.1. Negotiation and mediation

Negotiation and mediation are peaceful procedures for resolving opposing preferences between parties. Negotiation involves discussions between the parties with the goal of reaching agreement. It brings the parties from the area of struggle to the search for a shared goal. Negotiations, which engage parties in face-to-face bargaining over a negotiating table, are often difficult to arrange in an intense conflict situation. In violent conflicts, the parties are involved in achieving their goals through coercive strategies, and negotiated compromise is seen to be a second best alternative. (On negotiation theory see: Bendahamane and McDonald, 1984, 1986; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Iklé, 1964)

An example of a successful complex negotiation process can be found in South Africa. The following description does not do justice to the complexity of the issues. However, it gives a picture of the multiple actors involved. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) assembled in 1991 with a total of 19 participating delegations. CODESA set up five working groups. The two most important dealt with constitutional principles and how the Constitution-making body should be set up as well as the terms for interim government. Despite a serious deadlock, CODESA managed to achieve some breakthroughs and suggest various fundamental compromises that were part of the final agreement leading to the 1994 democratic elections. The National Party (NP) Government and the African National Congress (ANC) negotiations were going on at the same time. In September 1992 the ANC and the NP signed a Record of Understanding.

The third process was the growing rapport between Buthelezi's Inkatha party and white right-wingers who founded the Concerned South African Groups (Cosag) in order to oppose the NP and ANC agreement and to offer a platform for those in favour of strong federalism. The CODESA was placed by the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum (MNF) which reached a comprehensive solu-

tion in November 1993. The agreement lead to the formation of a Transitional Executive Council which guided the country to elections. (Ohlson, 1995)

Although the South African peace process is often pictured as a negotiation process between the parties in conflict, several mediators intervened. For example, Henry Kissinger and Lord Carrington mediated on Buthelezi's Inkatha party's participation in the elections. In addition to this type of formal mediation attempts, several informal meetings took place too. During the late 1980 a number of conferences for South Africans of different persuasions were convened by third parties, often in other countries. These provided opportunities for many South Africans to hear at first hand the opinions of organisations such as the ANC which had been officially silenced for decades in South Africa. After the change in the situation in South Africa in 1990, several mediating organisations were established and individuals such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu took a facilitative role. (van der Merwe and Meyer, 1993)

What kind of lessons can be learned from the South African experience? First, underlying processes which may appear as negotiating processes are often mediation attempts. Second, in addition to official, high political level intermediary activities, informal mediation is often needed in order, for example, to give voice to silenced parties, to map out issues for official negotiations and to build confidence between the participants.

Third, the South African case is a good example of a peace process which requires negotiations also on the identities of the parties. All of the communities of the country needed to go through a major change in political terms. Political changes involve issues related to the identity of the communities (e.g. black South Africans becoming full citizens, white South Africans loosing their political privileges) which cannot be reduced to instrumental negotiations on material interests.

As argued above, given the difficulty of direct negotiations be-

tween the parties in conflict, mediation takes place often. In mediation one or more outsiders (third parties) assist the parties in their discussion. The idea of mediation is captured in the following definitions which all emphasise different dimensions of intermediary activities. Mediation has been defined as "the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when [...] the former, the latter or both perceive a problem requiring a resolution".

Similarly, it is seen to be "any intermediary activity [...] undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive behaviour". The dynamic nature of mediation is highlighted by stating that it is "the process by which the participants, together or with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs". (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 13)

The practice of settling disputes through intermediaries is not a new one: different cultures at different times have used intermediaries. There is, thus, a great heterogeneity in mediation. For example, in the last decade or so, there has been involvement by such parties as the United Nations (in the Vietnam-Cambodia dispute, the Iraq-Kuwait dispute and the Yugoslav dispute), the pope (in the Beagle Channel dispute), the Organisation of African Unity (in the Tanzania-Uganda dispute), the Organisation of American States (in the Nicaragua dispute), the Arab League and Algeria (in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute) and the United States (in the Middle East). Less formal mediators, such as the Quakers or prominent politicians such as President Carter or Lord Owen have also been active. (ibid.: 12)

The peace process in Angola exemplifies the complexity and variety of mediation attempts. The process has been mediated at least by four different types of mediating bodies since 1989. Zaire's President Mobutu succeeded in bringing the rival leaders together

for the first time in Zaire, in June 1989. Zimbabwe played a regional role in the context of African initiatives through a series of summit meetings in 1989-1990. The period from April 1990 to May 1991 was one of active Portuguese mediation, which resulted in the Bicesse Peace Accords. After the September 1992 general elections UN special representatives Margaret Anstee and Alioune Blondin Beye mediated a new round of peace talks on the war which followed the collapse of the Bicesse Accords. The most recent peace agreement, signed in November 1994, was mediated by Beye. (Anstee, 1993; Hamill, 1994; The Independent, 26 November 1994; Patel, 1993; Simpson, 1994; United Nations, 1994; Venancio and Macmillan, 1993)

3.2. Data on mediation

Given the complex nature of peace processes, including negotiation and mediation, there is very little comprehensive data on them. Furthermore, routine informal, institutional mediations are carried out behind closed doors between various international actors on a daily basis. By studying public sources Bercovitch and Houston (1996: 11-35) identified 241 international disputes (organised military conflicts involving at least one state and resulting in at least 100 fatalities) between 1945 and 1990 among which 137 were mediated. Some disputes were mediated once, others experienced multiple mediations: a search revealed 593 separate mediation cases. In other words, 593 formal or institutionalised, nonviolent, and non-judicial interventions by a third party of some sort occurred in the 137 mediated disputes identified. It is worth noting that the data does not consist of post-Cold War conflicts and, therefore, one needs to be cautious in drawing conclusions from it.

Two general trends can be discerned from the data provided by Bercovitch and Houston. Their data shows that mediation cases have been increasing since 1945. Furthermore, mediation has

been the most often used conflict-management type compared with negotiation, arbitration and multilateral conferences.

There is little or no agreement on which episode constitutes the outcome of mediation. Furthermore, the outcomes may be perceived and defined very differently by an outside observer, by the parties involved, by the international community, or by the mediator himself or herself. Outcomes may be considered successful at one point and unsuccessful a few years later. Bercovitch and Houston (1996: 19) define mediation as successful when it makes a considerable and positive difference to the management of a conflict and the subsequent interaction between the parties. By using these criteria of success, they conclude that 7.8 per cent of mediation attempts produced full settlement. Partial settlement, negotiations and a dialogue between the parties, was the outcome of 20.4 per cent of the cases. Cease-fire was achieved in 16.8 per cent of the cases. After collapsing all three gradations of successful outcomes into one measure they draw the conclusion that there were only 45 per cent of successful cases (267) compared with 55 per cent (325 cases) unsuccessful mediation attempts.

The figures above beg the question which contextual attributes or factors explain successful mediation. Bercovitch and Houston (1996: 20-30) study such attributes as the characteristics of the parties, the nature of the dispute and the mediator, the initiation of mediation, the mediation environment and the strategies of mediation. Their findings suggest that the kind of political system (monarchies, one-party states, military regimes, multi-party democratic states and others) does not greatly affect the chances of mediation success. However, mediation is easier when the parties share a political system or have a basic adherence to the same set of cultural norms and values.

Mediation is also more likely to be successful when adversaries have well-defined and legitimate identities. That has seldom been the case. The failures of mediation in Lebanon, Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia illustrate that when there is fragmentation, disunity and lack of cohesion among the parties, mediation easily becomes meaningless.

The previous relations between parties should be noted when the success of mediation is evaluated. Where the parties' previous relationship has been friendly, the probability of successful mediation is 80 per cent. In other words, the historical context of a dispute and the relationship between the parties exert a strong influence on the likely outcome of conflict management. Bercovitch and Houston (1996: 23) also conclude that mediation is slightly more effective when it follows, rather than precedes, some "test of strength" between the disputants. However, there is a clear and significant relationship between low fatalities and successful mediation. Furthermore, issues of resources and ethnicity have quite high (70 per cent and 66.7 per cent respectively) chances of being mediated successfully compared with the issues of security (23.6 per cent) and sovereignty (36.3 per cent).

According to Bercovitch and Houston (1996: 26-28), one of the most effective resources any international mediator can possess is legitimacy. Mediators with the best success rate are leaders and representatives of regional organisations. They are followed by leaders and representatives of small governments. Representatives of international organisations do not do well in this comparison. Generally, regional organisations (e.g. the Organisation of African Unity, Contadora group) with common ideals, perspectives, and interests appear to offer the best chances for successful outcomes in international mediation, whereas international organisations such as the United Nations have a poor record in the field of mediation.

Despite the fact that some of the figures seem to indicate a clear pattern, one should always read this type of data with caution. The categories employed (e.g. "political systems", "friendly relationships") are determined by the researchers. A different type of categorisation would produce a different picture of mediation success. Some of the categorisations seem to produce controversial results.

Bercovitch and Houston claim that the disunity of the parties makes mediation difficult. They also argue that issues related to ethnicity are relatively easy to mediate. Given the fact that in ethnopolitical conflicts a great number of important actors are fragmented non-state actors for whom issues related to (ethnic) identity are important, Bercovitch's and Houston's findings sound controversial. Moreover, such questions as why mediation failed for a long time in the former Yugoslavia or Northern Ireland remain unanswered by the data provided.

Neither are the cases comprehensive, as Bercovitch and Houston note themselves. Informal mediation attempts are not recorded. Some of them are confidential and others take place at the "grass-roots level", and, therefore, they are not included in the data. It follows that such conclusions suggested by Bercovitch and Houston (1996: 30) as "the likelihood of achieving a successful mediation outcome is 52.3 per cent when directive strategies are employed and only 32.2 per cent when communication-facilitation strategies are used" would read differently if data on informal third party interventions was included.

3.3. Third party: roles, functions, qualities and resources

Despite the difficulties of collecting empirical data on mediation, a way to conceptually understand peaceful conflict resolution is to look at the roles, functions, qualities and resources of the third party. The continuum of the orientations of conflict resolution can be related to third party roles and functions. Roles and functions are then considered to vary from active to passive. The third party can get involved in a conflict actively by using deadly force, whereas the third party facilitative role in the problem-solving workshop can be seen to be passive. Although the dichotomy of active and passive third party roles is entertained by many theorists, a simple postulation of the continuum is highly problematic and has only a

heuristic value. It is problematic, because it does not take into account the context of third party activities. For example, in a stalemate situation good offices carried out by a third party may prove to be extremely "active" action.

James Laue (1987: 26-28) argues that there are five intermediary roles, namely: activist, advocate, mediator, researcher, and enforcer. The roles are founded predominantly on the base and credibility of the intervenor. Thus, such questions as: whom does the intervenor work for, who pays him or her, and, consequently, what are the structured expectations of behaviour of the intervenor in that role, are vital in evaluating intermediary actions.

The role of an activist is characterised by his or her organisational base and relationship with at least one of the parties. The activist works extremely closely with the parties and almost becomes one of them. The role of an advocate, on the other hand, is based on an advocation of certain values and parties within the organisation. The role of a mediator derives from the advocation of processes and interactions, rather than any of the parties per se or of any particular outcomes. Categories of researchers include such professionals as journalists and social science researchers. At the active end of Laue's continuum, the enforcer has formal power to sanction either or all of the parties.

The functions of intermediaries are closely related to roles. In sum, third party functions include the facilitation of communication between the parties and influencing parties towards changing their positions in order to make agreement possible. By clarifying the issues in a conflict, by helping the parties to withdraw from commitments, by reducing the cost of concessions and by offering compromise formulae and substantive proposals, the intermediary provides a framework within which concessions become possible. (Jabri, 1990: 8)

A part of the mediation literature suggests that the qualities of the third party imply the acceptability of intermediary activities. Oran Young (1967: 81-83) lists two basic qualities: impartiality

and independence. He defines both to be perceived qualities. An intermediary is independent when he or she is perceived to be free from attachment to or dependence on a political entity that has a stake in the outcome of the crisis at hand. The question of impartiality as it relates to the issue of acceptance is contested by Saadia Touval. She (1975: 51) claims that the "theory of the impartial intermediary seems to be incompatible with historical evidence of intermediaries who were considered 'biased' by at least one of the parties, but were nevertheless accepted".

Third party attributes and characteristics include such attributes as patience; sincerity; friendliness; sensitivity; the capability to accept others, to be non-judgmental and to control oneself; compassion; and tactfulness. In a similar vein, it is argued that salient third party qualities include a high degree of professionalism and personal expertise, a high level of independence from the case of conflict being considered, and a lack of any formal and recognised political position. (Bercovitch, 1984: 53; Mitchell, 1981: 120)

In terms of resources, on the other hand, it is claimed that the use of resources affects mediation strategy and behaviour as well as the course and likely outcomes of mediation. Resources may include money, status, expertise and prestige. (Bercovitch, 1992: 19-21)

3.4. Model for third party consultation

The third party consultation model – called also "problem-solving workshop conflict resolution" – does not accept the idea of a three-cornered negotiation system, where the "traditional" mediator acts as a third party in the role of activist, advocate, mediator or enforcer as an adequate means for conflict resolution. It is stated that negotiation processes and outcomes reflect the relative power of the parties and, therefore, while there may be a settlement, it is likely to be short-lived as it rests on power relationships remaining static. Furthermore, it is claimed that since ethnopolitical conflicts

include such fundamental issues as identity, alternative means for resolution which are capable of tackling "existential" concerns are needed.

Despite the fact that problem-solving conflict resolution was developed in the Cold War era, it bears relevance to post-Cold War conflict resolution too. The approach deals with several issues which are critical for post-Cold War conflict resolution and, thereby, differs from the thinking of conflict and conflict resolution within the Clausewitzean framework.

Problem-solving conflict resolution does not assume instrumentally rational actors to be the basis of a successful negotiation and mediation process. It allows for a discussion of other issues than instrumentally rational interests during the process. In fact, the approach encourages the parties to examine a wide variety of issues including needs, values and identities. Even historical animosities, enemy and threat images and perceptions are brought into the resolution agenda if the parties themselves wish so. Furthermore, unlike traditional formal negotiations and mediation problem-solving conflict resolution invites a multiplicity of parties to participate: it does not aim at dealing solely with state actors as conventional negotiations and mediation often do. The third party in the resolution process is not an interested activist, advocate mediator or enforcer who imposes his or her own views on a success or failure into the resolution process. Rather, the facilitator remains outside power political considerations.

In practice, problem-solving conflict resolution is a form of international conflict resolution which brings together representatives of nations or ethnic groups in an active conflict. The talks are designed to contribute directly to the resolution of a conflict. Problem-solving conflict resolution takes place in problem-solving workshops which are academically-based unofficial small-group discussions. Workshops bring together representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication. A panel of scholars who facilitate and promote communication between the parties is an es-

sential part of this type of conflict resolution.

As mentioned above, the role of the third party differs from that of the traditional mediator. Unlike many mediators, facilitators do not propose or impose solutions. Rather, the function of the third party in the problem-solving workshop is to create an atmosphere where innovative solutions can emerge out the interaction between the parties themselves. The objective of the workshop is both to create analytical communication and to generate inputs into political processes. Although problem-solving workshop conflict resolution is not meant to be negotiations, it is often a complementary and parallel process to them.

The idea of problem-solving workshops was developed already in the early 1960s when there was an increase of interdisciplinary research in the social sciences. It was believed that it might be possible to have a single theory of inter-personal, inter-group and inter-state behaviour, and that the view of international relations as a struggle for power may be incorrect. The idea of problem-solving workshops was influenced by the development of social casework techniques and the conciliation procedures employed in handling industrial and communal conflicts. It was thought that these methods have in common the absence of enforcement and the encouragement of processes of self-adjustment and, therefore, it was assumed that they might be suitable for international conflict resolution too. (see e.g. Bercovitch, 1984: 59-87; Blake, Shepard and Mouton, 1964; Burton and Dukes, 1990: 54-60; Fisher, 1983: 308-311)

John Burton organised one-week-long problem-solving workshops in 1965 and 1966 which paved the way for other practical attempts. In 1965 there was a meeting between nominees of the governments of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia during the violent Borneo dispute. Similarly, there was a meeting in 1966 between nominees of the Greek President and Turkish Vice-President of Cyprus. Both workshops were guided by a group of scholars facilitating face-to-face interactions between the parties. (Burton, 1984: 160) These were followed by Leonard Doob's two-

week-long Fermeda workshop in 1970, which consisted of academics and civil servants from Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. (Doob, 1970)

Two pilot workshops were conducted at Harvard University in 1971 and in 1972. In the first Palestinians and Israelis met over a weekend with a team of social scientists to discuss the conflict in the Middle East. The second workshop focused on the conflict between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. (Cohen et al., 1977; Kelman and Cohen, 1979: 291) The Stirling workshop which brought together 56 Catholic and Protestant citizens of Belfast in 1972 was conducted by Doob's team. (Doob and Foltz, 1973)

Even this limited sample of pilot workshops demonstrates the variety of international problem-solving workshop attempts. It is easy to recognise differences in the number and level of the participants and in the duration of the workshops. Despite differences, there are some shared features. (For summaries see e.g. Hill, 1982; Kelman, 1990; Kelman, 1992; Mitchell, 1981; Mitchell and Banks, 1996; Väyrynen, 1995)

The goals of the workshop approaches can be partly derived from the general objectives of action research. By creating a framework within which conflicting parties can generate ideas for creative conflict resolution, researchers become involved in an action programme which offers them the opportunity to make observations of continuing processes of conflict and conflict resolution. Although the ultimate goal of third party consultation is often thought to be conflict resolution, there are other objectives too: the workshop is designed to promote analytical communication which can be fed back into a negotiation process. Problem-solving workshops can thus also be seen to be parallel to official diplomacy, "track-two diplomacy", because it supports official diplomacy by offering a framework for the innovative search for solutions. (On second track diplomacy see: Bendahmane and McDonald, 1986; McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987)

Despite problem-solving conflict resolution emphasises the

socio-psychological roots of conflicts, it is important to keep in mind that it does not assume that conflicts are simply the products of misunderstanding and misperceptions. Rather, these are seen to characterise conflicts and to form substantial barriers to their resolution. In order to deal with these barriers, the manipulation of the psychological and physical environments of the problem-solving workshop is thought to be necessary.

The manipulation of the psychological environment is done also through managing the physical environment. Important physical arrangements range from the shape of the table to the location of the workshop. The manipulation is justified by claiming that none of the third party functions or supportive activities can actually be carried out unless the essential physical and social arrangements are present. It is assumed that when the parties are set free from their official and norm-oriented roles by offering them the unofficial, neutral, and relatively isolated setting of the workshop, they will engage in new thinking and behaviour. However, an isolated setting should not provide the parties with an illusory atmosphere of friendship. In other words, the participants are not encouraged to forget that they represent communities engaged in a bitter conflict, because that can be negative for the purposes of conflict resolution.

The principle of symmetry should work in all arrangements of the workshop. Symmetrical arrangements, in an ideal case, imply equality in the number of participants, their institutional links, their manner of recruitment, the conditions they are allowed to impose on their participation, the distances they have to travel, and so on. Although it is not always possible to fully carry out the principle, it can be seen to be actualised satisfactorily when the workshop achieves and maintains credibility in the minds of the participants and the groups they represent. It is emphasised that the identification of the participants is one of the most important and demanding tasks of the facilitator. The task is vital, because the selection is an implicit statement about the parties in and the nature of a

conflict. In addition, the selection of participants is essential, because analytical problem-solving is considered to include intensive work at the level of the perceptions, interactions and behaviour of individuals.

Since the problem-solving workshop is often both process- and content-oriented, the capability of the participants to provide it with reasonable process and content inputs is important. However, opinions vary as to how close the participants should be to the decision-making processes. Some theorists/practitioners state that representatives have to be in a relationship with their principals because that enables the transmission of alterations in perceptions to decision-making structures. Others work with academics and civil servants who work in areas unrelated to foreign policy.

It is generally considered that the mediating body should be a panel of professionally qualified and experienced persons who are not committed to any particular settlement of the conflict, but are "committed to the search for peaceful and just approaches to conflict resolution". (Kelman and Cohen, 1979: 300) Some scholars/practitioners consider it to be preferable that those who comprise the facilitating party do not have a specialised knowledge of the area or the parties involved in the dispute. Others maintain that more extensive knowledge is necessary for the consultant to grasp the nuances of the analysis and to develop credibility with the participants.

The third party facilitates communication between the parties, and draws upon social-scientific knowledge in interpreting communication, in analysing underlying attitudes and issues, and in injecting new concepts and ideas to the problem-solving process. The impartial, neutral, facilitative, non-judgmental and diagnostic third party thus creates an atmosphere where the discussion can be raised to a higher system level from which it can flow back through constructive channels to the dispute in question. Sometimes it is also emphasised that the facilitator should act as a trainer who assists conflicting parties to learn to analyse their views

about the conflict and conflict resolution.

Mitchell (1981: 122-128) summarises the facilitator's four basic functions. One of the most important functions is simply to induce initially, and then sustain, a sufficiently high level of positive motivation on the part of both parties to confront their conflict with a problem-solving attitude. Having established a sufficient level of motivation to participate in a consultative programme, the next function is the improvement of communication between the adversaries. The third key function is to regulate in some manner the interaction between the participants. The final function, which in all consultative techniques is regarded as a central third party activity, is helping the participants to diagnose their conflict. The resources the facilitator possesses derive, thus, from his or her professional knowledge and expertise.

The third party consultation model can be summarised by identifying some of its theoretical roots. Most importantly, the model relies on the cooperative tradition in the study of peace and war and, thus, rejects the power tradition. Although many problem-solving approaches challenge the legal-normative approach to conflict resolution, a strong normative element can be found in them. Their normativity does not arise from international law and its rule-oriented ethics. Rather, it arises from a commitment to peace. This commitment to peace, which is analogous to the commitment of the medical profession to the value of health, leads to a utilitarian, or, rather, instrumental and pragmatic relation to knowledge. In other words, it is thought that knowledge drawn from all social sciences should be fully utilised to deal with the intractable problems of the contemporary world. Knowledge and theory are seen to have an intimate as well as instrumental connection to reality.

3.5. From conflict management to conflict resolution

One of the most recent discussions in the field of conflict analysis concerns the difference between conflict management and resolution. It is argued that management processes can be successful only in cases where the parties in conflict – or rather in dispute – have the same goals and interests. In other words, management problems involve differences in the choice of alternatives: parties differ only in the means to achieve them. Management processes, therefore, include improved communication, problem-solving, and improved personal interactions with relationships that have generally shared goals. Institutional decision-making processes often include means for dispute management. (Burton and Dukes, 1990: 17) For example, a dispute concerning an element of Nordic cooperation in the context of the Nordic Council is likely to be tackled in a management process.

However, the management process may not be enough for conflicts which involve the development and autonomy of identity groups, e.g. ethnopolitical conflicts. Rather, they require resolution processes. Conflict resolution is required, because it is thought to deal with the sources of conflict. There are a variety of practices which aim at conflict resolution. Burton and Dukes (1990: 121-122) list four approaches. First, there are attempts to bring citizens and persons close to decision-makers together in circumstances where there can be confidence-building, increased trust based on better understanding and shared experiences. Second, there are processes which seek to alter the perceptions and behaviour of participants by involving them in introspection. Third, "second track diplomacy" is the parallel process of official negotiations, but is conducted more informally and in a more exploratory way than would be possible officially. Finally, there is analytical problem-solving conflict resolution, which has been discussed earlier.

Underlying the discussion on management and resolution is an

understanding of the sources of conflict. The distinction between conflict management and resolution is particularly advocated by human needs theorists, because for them the ultimate causes of conflict can be found in human drives and needs deriving from them. In short, they hold that conflict management only tackles disputes and manifestations of deeper conflicts. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, deals with the fundamental roots of conflicts, namely universal human needs. Burton and Dukes (1990: 25), for example, consider mediation to be a form of conflict management. They advocate strongly "analytical problem-solving conflict resolution" as a real alternative to more limited management processes.

The appropriateness of conflict management and resolution procedures can be also seen in the light of conflict cycles. A "contingency approach" (Keashly and Fisher, 1996: 235-261) to conflict resolution assumes that social conflict involves a dynamic process in which objective and subjective elements interact over time as the conflict escalates and de-escalates. Objective elements relate to things which are thought to exist independently of the perceptions of the parties, namely resource scarcity. Subjective elements, on the other hand, include misperception, miscommunication and different valuations of objective interests. It is argued that depending on the subjective-objective mix different interventions are appropriate at different stages of a conflict.

In Keashly's and Fisher's (1996: 243) model, the stage of escalation and de-escalation stands out as the critical cue for adopting either management or resolution strategies. There are four stages of conflict escalation: (i) discussion, (ii) polarisation, (iii) segregation, and (iv) destruction. The stages are distinguished by noticeable changes in the nature of communication between the parties, their perceptions and images of each other and their relationship, the overt issues at the fore of the dispute, the perceived possible outcomes, and the preferred strategy for handling the conflict.

The first stage is characterised by discussion and debate, where-

as the second is characterised by a reliance on the interpretation of actions with less direct interchange. At the third stage the parties use threats, and at the fourth they abandon direct communication and start violent attacks on the adversary.

According to Keashly and Fisher (1996: 244-249), at the first stage the key dimension of concern is the quality of communication between the parties. The parties believe that joint gain is possible, but communication difficulties occur. At this stage the conflict management process, including mediation, can be successful. At the second stage, on the other hand, the fundamental concern is misperception and simplified images in the form of negative stereotypes. Keashly and Fisher claim that consultation in parallel with mediation are appropriate ways to deal with the stage. By "consultation" they mean analytical problem-solving which involves the intervention of a skilled and knowledgeable third party who attempts to facilitate creative problem-solving through communication and analysis based on a social-scientific understanding of conflict etiology and processes. Thus, the use of both management and resolution strategies is suggested by Keashly and Fisher.

At the third stage of conflict escalation, defensive competition and hostility become main themes. The conflict is now seen as threat to the identity of the group. In these situations arbitration, involving a legitimate and authoritative third party which provides a binding judgement is an option. According to Keashly and Fisher, power mediation in which the third party has the power to influence the parties toward agreement through inducing costs or providing gains can also produce good results at this phase. Consultation could finally follow power mediation. At the fourth stage, where the parties attempt to destroy each other through the use of a variety of forms of violence, peace-keeping can be added to the list of adequate strategies.

Keashly's and Fisher's thinking departs here from Burton's way of categorising strategies. Burton would claim that especially at

the third and fourth stages consultation (analytical problem-solving) is the main tool, whereas Keashly and Fisher accept parallel strategies and see consultation taking place after mediation attempts.

There are also views which maintain that conflicts are continuously transformed even if efforts to resolve them have not made any visible progress. It is argued that many intractable conflicts of interests or values may find the solution only through the process of transformation. Conflict transformation may happen in several different ways. Internal changes in major parties or the appearance and recognition of new actors may take place (actor transformation). Issue transformation, on the other hand, alters the political agenda of a conflict. It may reduce the relative importance of issues on which antagonism exists and bring to the fore issues on which commonality prevails. The conflict may also be transformed by altering the rules of game (rule transformation). In other words, the parties may redefine the norms which the actors are expected to follow in their mutual relations. The entire structure of interaction may change in a profound manner, for example through a change in the distribution of power among the actors (structural transformation). (Väyrynen, 1991: 1-7)

3.6. Conflict prevention

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's (1992: 66-80) "An Agenda for Peace" draws the attention to conflict prevention. In the Agenda he argues that fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty have sprung up and the cohesion of states is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural, or linguistic strife in the post-Cold-War world. Therefore, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building must support each other.

According to the Secretary-General, preventive diplomacy is

the most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy, because it eases tension before a conflict breaks out. Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence. It also requires early warning based on information gathering and informal and formal fact-finding, and, in some cases, preventive deployment and demilitarised zones.

Similarly, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) stress the importance of acting early and developing effective means to prevent the outbreak and escalation of violent conflicts. They claim that since post-Cold War conflicts cause an enormous amount of human suffering – in the form of civilian casualties, starvation, diseases and streams of refugees – and the risk of escalation tend to be high, prevention is always better than attempting to cure the conflict after it has broken out.

Underlying the discussion on conflict prevention there is an assumption that violence is easier to prevent and resolve at an early phase when issues are still specific and, therefore, more amenable to management, and the number of parties to the conflict is limited. In other words, the reduction of the complexity of the conflict is easier and more cost-effective at an early stage than later. There is also an assumption that the costs of conflicts are much higher than the obvious material damage and human casualties. In order to avoid also the political costs (the demolition of democratic systems and the failure of states), ecological costs (the degradation of the environment), social costs (the separation of families and communities), psychological costs and spiritual costs (the degradation of value systems), "cost-effective" conflict prevention is needed. (Väyrynen, 1997: 1; van Tongeren, 1996: 18)

There are, however, also critical voices. Conflict prevention has been criticised for being both irrelevant and unrealistic. Preventive diplomacy requires prescience, prescription and mobilisation, which cannot be generated in complex post-Cold War emergencies. Furthermore, preventive action is not inexpensive and risk-free. More fundamental issues are also related: conflicts may have

positive functions (e.g. group-binding functions) from the point of view of social actors themselves. The question arises whether the negative functions overcome the positive ones, and whether we can predict that this is going to happen. Making a conflict latent, covering it without tackling the underlying goal incompatibility, needs or values does not necessarily provide a lasting solution.

In practice, preventive diplomacy requires the collection of early warning signals, which hint at the likelihood of conflict. It is often argued that the collection and co-ordination of signals would lead to effective conflict prevention measures. However, in the most recent conflicts the problem has not been the lack of early warning. Rather, the problem has been the inactivity of the international community. For example, the genocide in Rwanda was predicted by several NGOs working in the country. The international community did not react and let the bloodshed take place.

A comprehensive categorisation of preventive tools has been developed by Raimo Väyrynen (1997: 1-5). According to him, preventive actions can be targeted at three phases: they can (i) prevent the outbreak of disputes between the parties, (ii) prevent both the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive forms of warfare and to involve additional actors, and (iii) prevent the re-emergence of disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the society.

Provided that coercive means are considered legitimate in preventive action, conflict prevention can rely on three different types of instruments: (i) political tools which include fact-finding, monitoring, mediation, influence, promises, threats, (ii) economic tools which rely on the manipulation of material costs and benefits by cutting of economic ties, promising their re-establishment, or providing outright rewards, and (iii) military instruments which are based on the use of force or threats.

Preventive diplomacy is founded, according to Väyrynen (1997: 3), on five strategies starting with cooperative strategies and ending with coercive. In reassurance the parties are convinced of the

futility of using power either by verbal appeals or commitments to specific future actions. In inducement positive actions are initiated to stimulate constructive responses. In a deterrence relationship the preventing actor communicates to the target that the violation of a norm would result in major costs. In compellence the behaviour of the parties is altered. Finally, in pre-emption force is used in a manner that aims at limiting the extent of destruction. Strategies can rely on political, economic and military instruments. Political means are the most versatile ones; they can be used in several types of preventive strategies and they address most effectively the causes of violence and its escalation.

The use of military strategies always contains a risk of escalation. Therefore, it should, in Väyrynen's (1997: 4, 14) view, contain pauses and controls which give the target time and opportunities to understand the preventive motives behind the tools used. Clear communication is also needed to communicate the purpose of the use of coercive means. Given the risk of escalation, positive incentives are probably a more effective mode of influence than coercive punishments in the long run. Whichever instruments are used, good co-ordination of both the instruments of prevention and the policies of preventing actors is needed. Conflicts tend to be complex, and since preventive actions have indirect and unintended consequences such co-ordination is required. Co-ordination is, however, not enough. A definition and understanding of the basic parameters of the conflict and a view of how to deal with them are essential for effective prevention.

Two observations arise from the categorisation of preventive diplomacy. First, the phases of conflict suggested form the full conflict cycle. It thus includes in conflict prevention elements which are traditionally considered to be in the sphere of conflict management and resolution. According to the traditional view, only phases (i) and (iii) would be amenable to prevention. By taking such a broad view, Väyrynen's "model" misses some important features of conflict resolution. First, it is not sensible to differences

within conflict resolution attempts. In other words, it dismisses the variety of conflict resolution approaches. Second, and more importantly, it relies heavily on the activity of the third party which imposes something (either positive or negative) upon the "target" parties in a conflict. The "model" therefore makes the parties themselves largely into the passive recipients of preventive actions. Furthermore, the types of strategies suggested by Väyrynen assume that states are the main preventive actors, and thereby reject non-state actors.

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1996) stresses three elements of preventive action: early reaction to signs of trouble, an extended effort to resolve the underlying causes of violence ("root causes"), and a comprehensive, balanced approach to alleviate pressures ("risk factors") that can trigger violent conflict. According to the Commission, there are ways to improve the gathering and processing of intelligence for the purposes of early warning, but the unwillingness of governments to act is the major obstacle. Resolving root causes, on the other hand, including the need to foster a vibrant civil society, is mainly the responsibility of governments. It requires strategies to build intercommunal confidence and overcome deeply held distrust and enmity; to restructure arrangements and institutions that discriminate against certain ethnic groups; to initiate laws and judicial procedures that guarantee equal protection; to found programmes to open up and maintain cross-cultural lines of communication and to create widespread opportunities for economic advancement and political structures that ensure equitable representation. Efforts to alleviate risk factors include, for example, alerting appropriate international bodies and the initiation of formal negotiations, conciliation and mediation when a crisis accelerates.

The Commission advocates "local solutions for local problems" whenever possible. Thus, it differs from the approach suggested by Väyrynen, who sees the local actors mainly as targets of outside action. The Commission believes that the help of the international

community is necessary in conflict prevention, but ultimately it is the responsibility of the people actually involved in conflicts to find non-violent solutions to their disagreements. The Commission's work suggests that governmental and non-governmental efforts should be combined more effectively.

As noted earlier, NGOs are active in the area of preventive action. Due to their close involvement with local communities, NGOs are in a good position to fulfill an early warning function, i.e. in alerting the international community of potential breakdowns in a country's government or in relations among domestic groups. NGOs can play an important role also in human rights monitoring by gathering information, sending out missions etc. Organisations can have a vital task in strengthening the social systems of countries, especially by working closely with civil societies. They can contribute to this goal, for example, by training local leaders in conflict resolution skills or by retraining the military and law-enforcement agencies to complement and support peace processes.

Furthermore, conflict resolution activities can be successfully conducted by NGOs. Bringing representatives of civil societies, of different professions, of the media etc. together for informal conflict resolution workshops and training can work towards conflict resolution at the "grass-roots" level. Finally, the traditional NGO tasks of advocation, lobbying and training can serve as a preventive tool. (van Tongeren, 1996: 19-20; see also: International Alert, 1993; Jones and Prasad, 1997; Rupesinghe, 1993)

How realistic, then, is the prospect of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. As argued earlier, events in the social world are difficult, if not impossible, to predict, because of the contingent nature of the world. However, Gurr's (1994: 367) finding that it takes on average 13 years for an organised ethnopolitical movement to arise from the first signs of protest and discontent suggests that conflict prevention is possible.

Some indicators of potential ethnopolitical conflicts which

could serve as general early warning signs have been drawn from the conflict experiences in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia and Abkhazia. "Background conditions", such as shifting alliances and the degree of democratic experience seem to be important indicators. Also, "intervening conditions", such as the presence of charismatic leadership and differential economic hardship increase the likelihood of ethnopolitical conflict. Attacks by or clashes with the opposition group, the formation of paramilitary units by the communal rivals or the acquisition of arms, the formation of coalitions among regime opponents, and an increase in external support for communal groups seem to lead finally to rapid conflict escalation. (Davies and McDaniel, 1996)

Thus, a skilful reading of early warning signs, especially "background conditions", would help to assess the need for preventive action from outside. Several obstacles may hinder the reading and planned action: the international community is not used to long-term planning, governments in individual states change as well as personnel in NGOs. In those cases where the process of escalation has started, on the other hand, emergency action is needed. However, policy-makers are also often reluctant to take this type of action, especially if interests which they consider to be important are not involved.

The prevention of post-Cold War conflicts would, therefore, require the type of continuity which rarely exists in the international field. Gurr (1994: 367-368) has proposed six general measures for a global preventive strategy to emerge: (i) international law and policies about the rights of communal groups to autonomy need to be clarified, (ii) international law and policies about protecting the rights of communal groups within states should be consistently enforced, (iii) systems should be established for gathering information about and issuing early warning of impending communal conflicts and humanitarian crises, (iv) guidelines and instrumentalities for preventive diplomacy in cases of emerging ethnopolitical conflict need to be established and widely employed, (v) the

peoples and governments of the South need to be actively engaged in identifying and responding to emerging ethnopolitical crises, and (vi) international doctrine, early warnings, and the practice of preventive diplomacy need to be backed up by doctrines of humanitarian intervention.

4. THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND ITS MANAGEMENT

The aim of this part is to use the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to elaborate the theoretical discussion started in the previous parts. The main goal is to examine different types of conflict resolution attempts and their suitability for this particular conflict: traditional mediation, the Minsk process and a problem-solving workshop intervention are examined. The conflict is given a short historical interpretation which demonstrates the importance of the perspectives the parties have on the conflict. The aim is thus not to write a complete history of the case. Rather, the history of the conflict is meant to serve as background for the understanding of its resolution. Similarly, the cultural and political context of the conflict is studied to emphasise the specific characteristics of the conflict.

Despite its specific characteristics the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict bears many similarities with other post-Cold War conflicts as argued earlier and, thus, a limited number of general conclusions concerning post-Cold War conflict resolution can be drawn from the case. Typically, the conflict has proved to be extremely difficult to end although a cease-fire put an end to the major military activities several years ago. The amount of societal and psychological destruction in the region is immense, and it is likely to take decades to rebuild the fragmented societies as is generally the case in protracted communal conflicts.

In terms of security, military security prevails in the area, but societal security is far from being felt by the communities. Unlike the military security of a state, societal security embraces the security of the identities of a community and it arises from a perceived lack of threat by the community members. (On security see: Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver et al., 1993) Seen from the socio-psychological perspective, on the other hand, images, perceptions, thoughts,

fantasies, and feelings – so called mental representations – of past traumas and glories, sometimes hundreds of years old, and mental defences associated with them play a crucial part in successful conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. (On sociological and psychological features see: Aho, 1994; Popov, 1997: 190-192; Volkan 1988; Volkan and Itzkowtz, 1994)

4.1. Historical background: perspectives and events

As emphasised earlier, any history is written from a particular perspective. So is this one. It is the contention of this author, that there is no "objective", "non-partisan", perspective to history. History is, however, important in conflict situations, because the interpretations of history are very much at stake in conflicts, i.e. how to interpret past events are continuously contested during conflicts.

The historical background of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is given here first from two competing perspectives: the history is seen from the Armenian perspective and then from the Azerbaijani angle. Clearly, the main issue seems to be who were the indigenous people of the area of Nagorno-Karabakh (cf. Popov, 1997: 180). Second, a brief chronological summary of the main events in the conflict is given and third, the conflict is placed in larger social, political, cultural and economic contexts. It should be kept in mind that even the importance of the events which are chosen to signify turning-points in the history of the conflict can be contested.

Armenian historians stress the ancient roots of the native Armenian populations of Nagorno-Karabakh. Some hold a view that Armenians were indigenous to the region, and that they established their kingdom by the sixth century B.C. In the early fourth century, Armenia was converted to Christianity. Located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, Armenia was subject to successive invasions and conquests, by the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, the Seljuk Turks in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the Persians in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The Armenians have for long periods been a stateless people whose national identity has been expressed through language, church, and literature. Despite their homelessness, the Armenians underwent a national revival in the mid-nineteenth century. (The following Armenian and Azerbaijani views are derived from: Chorbajian, Donabedian and Mutafian, 1994: 1-48; Nadein-Raevski, 1992: 113-130; Popov, 1997; Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 345-362; Yamskov, 1992: 131-140)

By studying the architecture and culture of Nagorno-Karabakh (or Artsah as it is called both in Armenia and Karabakh according to the ancient Armenian name of the territory) Armenian scholars have found Armenian architecture and the cross stones all over the territory of Artsah. Similarly, the continuity of the Armenian existence in the area is emphasised by pointing out the authority of Armenian princes in Nagorno-Karabakh. By virtue of its inaccessible terrain and its remoteness, the mountainous portions of Karabakh represented a partial exception to the loss of Armenian national independence. Even when all else was lost to conquest, Armenian princes there managed to assert a degree of authority in the region. These princely families in Karabakh survived until the Russian conquest in the early nineteenth century.

In the post-First World War peace settlements two treaties were negotiated by the Allied powers. The one with the Ottoman Empire called for the establishment of an independent Armenian state in parts of the Transcaucasus and eastern Anatolia. The treaty was not enforced, and was a dead letter. In the subsequent treaty signed by Turkey, there was no mention of Armenia by name. The only territorial Armenia was the independent Transcaucasian republic the Armenians had reluctantly proclaimed in 1918. That first Republic of Armenia came under attack by Turkish forces and the Bolsheviks and it surrendered its independence to the latter in late 1920. Thus, Armenian independence lasted from 1918 to 1920.

Azerbaijan's independence also lasted from 1918 to 1920, and it

was during that time that Nagorno-Karabakh first became one of the reasons for the armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. After the establishment of Soviet power in these republics in 1920, Moscow became the indisputable mediator in arguments between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh where the Armenians based their claims on the principle of self-determination, they lost contest to Azerbaijan. The territory of Nagorno-Karabakh was given to Azerbaijan, where it acquired autonomy two years later. Armenian historians seek to prove that the main role in the "annexation" of Karabakh was played by Stalin. Armenian territory was used by the revolutionary leaders of Russia as a pay-off to Turkish revolutionary powers for the "continuation of the World Revolution in the East". Thus, Turkey received such parts of Western Armenia as Kars and Ardahan, while Azerbaijan received Nagorno-Karabakh and Nachichevan.

Azerbaijani historians emphasise the Azerbaijanis' being the heirs to earlier civilisations. Of particular importance in the debate over territorial claims are the Caucasian Albanians; an ancient and no longer extant people who pre-date the time of Christ. These Caucasian Albanians – unrelated to the better-known Adriatic Albanians – lived over much of central and eastern Transcaucasia, including what is now known as Nagorno-Karabakh. They were converted to Christianity in the fourth century by the Armenians and later conquered by Arabs, Islamicised, and eventually assimilated. The cross stones found in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, thus, are not Armenian but of the pre-Christian Albanian period.

The argument about Albanians leads to the conclusion that the Karabakh population has common historical roots: there are no Armenians or Azeris in Karabakh, both are Albanians. Caucasian Albania is the precursor of modern Azerbaijan, and, therefore, it is justified to lay claim to all erstwhile Caucasian Albanian territories, including Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the Middle Ages Karabakh formed a part of Azerbaijani Khanets. When Azerbaijan was annexed by Russia at the beginning of

the nineteenth century, Karabakh was part of it. Similarly, it is argued by Azeri scholars that Nagorno-Karabakh rightfully belongs to Azerbaijan because it was part of the tsarist Elisavetpol guberniia which was consolidated with the Baku guberniia to form Azerbaijan. Later, when Azerbaijan became an independent state, it included Nagorno-Karabakh. An Armenian majority in Karabakh dates only from the Armenian migrations from Iran under the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1825. It is further argued that the Armenians and Azerbaijanis agreed to what was essentially a pact in which the contested territory of Zangezur went to Armenia and the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijanis perceive themselves as victims of a colonial experience at the hands of the Russians. They were exploited in typical imperial fashion: they received low prices for their cotton, fruit, wool, steel, carpets and oil. An argument has been also developed that the Soviet imperium exploited Azerbaijan through Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan was forced, against it wishes, to accept Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous oblast (district) rather than have it incorporated directly into Azerbaijan. Several Azerbaijani villages were excluded from the arrangement to ensure an Armenian majority. Furthermore, Armenian was designated the official language of instruction and daily transactions and the territory's legislature, party organs, as well as the heads and staff of educational and cultural institutions have been overwhelmingly Armenian from the inception.

Armenian sources state that the life of Karabakh Armenians was unbearable under the power of the Azerbaijanis, who tended to take from the region without giving almost anything in return. The Azerbaijani side tries to prove that the Karabakh Armenians living under the power of Baku enjoyed a happy and prosperous life compared with other Azerbaijani citizens. According to the Azerbaijani view, the Armenian community of Azerbaijan had all the necessary opportunities for cultural development. By contrast, Armenian authorities claim that full cultural, social and political

development was not allowed. An important step in the conflict was taken when the Karabakh Armenians appealed to the all-union powers in Moscow. In 1986-87 they collected signatures for a petition in favour of uniting Karabakh with Armenia.

A series of strikes and demonstrations on February 11, 1988 marked the beginning of the current crisis. The Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast (NKAO) protested against the cultural and economic policy of the Azerbaijani authorities in the district. On February 20, the Armenians of the district appealed to the Supreme Soviets of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the USSR to allow them to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia. A couple of days later, two Azerbaijanis were killed in the NKAO, which contributed to the anti-Armenian riots in Sumgait near Baku in Azerbaijan. Several Armenians were killed. The Sumgait riots marked the beginning of a new phase in the crisis, and the feuds between the two peoples worsened. Strikes and demonstrations spread all over Armenia. Violence became a permanent attribute of the conflict. (The following summary of the events is based on: Baranovsky, 1995: 254; Baranovsky, 1996: 265-267; Baranovsky, 1997: 113-115; Dragdze, 1989: 55-57; Landgren, 1992: 550; Nadein-Raevski, 1992: 113-130; Saroyan, 1990: 14-29; UM, 1997: 19-20; Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 345-356)

Mass exoduses followed these violent events. Most of the Azerbaijani population of Armenia fled to Azerbaijan. On the other hand, some 30,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan left their homes at this stage of the conflict. Radical elements began to win support in both republics, and the conflict became more difficult to resolve. The authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh strove further to minimise ties with Azerbaijan.

The Soviet response to the conflict was characterised primarily by inconsistency. Gorbachev had promised a just solution for the Armenians, but stressed later that the existing territorial administrative borders would not be redrawn. Moscow's political manoeuvres and emphasised equidistance between Armenia and

Azerbaijan did not help it to maintain authority, nor did it appease either of the authorities. Despite the lack of legitimacy, Moscow brought troops to Baku in December 1988. "A special form of administration" was established in January 1989 in Nagorno-Karabakh by the Soviet authorities. It meant direct rule from Moscow. The presence of troops only temporarily calmed the atmosphere. Disorder continued in dozens of Armenian and Azerbaijani towns, and during 1989 the crisis developed into an even bloodier conflict.

The bitterness of the conflict led to the rise of nationalism. The nationalist Popular Front of Azerbaijan organised an economic blockade of Armenia, which received some 90% of its imports through Azerbaijan. From the end of 1988, practically no Azerbaijanis remained in Armenia, and the situation of thousands of Armenians remaining in Azerbaijan became insecure. Anti-Armenian sentiments in Azerbaijan were translated into action when pogroms were inflicted upon Armenians in January 1990 in Baku. A state of emergency was declared in Nagorno-Karabakh, and large detachments of troops were brought in. On May 5, 1990 the state of emergency was lifted from NKAO territory. In Armenia the Communists yielded power to the nationalists, and in Azerbaijan the Communists retained power.

On September 2, 1990 the Armenian deputies of NKAO proclaimed the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. In November Azerbaijan abolished the autonomous status of Karabakh, and in December the Armenians there held a referendum and declared themselves an independent republic. The fighting intensified, and the Soviet troops were involved. In Khodzhaly in Azerbaijan a massacre of civilians by Armenian troops took place, and there is evidence that Soviet troops participated in the killings.

By the end of May 1992 the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh was in Armenian hands. Afterwards, Armenian troops captured the Azerbaijani town of Lachin, enabling them to create a direct corridor from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh through Azerbaijani territory.

The fighting spread also to Nachichevan – an autonomous region of Azerbaijan. In summer 1992 Azerbaijan received a large supply of modern arms from Russia, and Azerbaijan recaptured some of the territories it had lost. Following the Armenian military victories, in 1994 almost 20% of the Azerbaijani territory was controlled by the Armenians.

In 1994 large-scale fighting ceased, and political efforts for conflict management were initiated. The cease-fire in the area of the conflict has continued since May 1994. Although there were some sporadic clashes between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops in 1995, the overall military situation is frozen. In 1998 the conflict entered its eleventh year, and the prospects for a political settlement remained unclear. The Karabakh leadership continues to consolidate the enclave's de facto independence and strengthen its armed forces. The Karabakh presidential election was held on 24 November 1996. The positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan remain far apart on such principal issues as: (i) the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh and its relationship to Azerbaijan; (ii) the return of refugees who, according to Azerbaijani estimates, number up to 1 million; (iii) the liberation of the 20 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory occupied by Karabakh forces outside the enclave, such as the Lachin corridor; and (iv) guarantees to Karabakh that there would be no resumption of hostilities.

4.2. Cultural and political background

From its creation, the Soviet federal system fostered national-territorial formations that were thought to contribute to the consolidation of ethnic identity by institutionalising nationality at the level of state. At the level of the national republics, the traditional social identities of the "indigenous" communities gave way under Soviet policies to the formation of modern ethnic identities developed through new political and cultural institutions inscribed in

the national republics. Mark Saroyan (1990: 16) claims that it was those Soviet-sponsored political institutions and practices that created the conditions for the emergence of ethnic-based conflicts under a more liberalised regime.

Thus, during the Soviet period national-cultural autonomies were rejected and national minorities were not encouraged to develop their own native languages and cultures under the slogan of "internationalism". This policy prepared the soil for inter-ethnic conflicts in the regions of the former Soviet Union. Democratisation and glasnost did not only permit open discussions of conflict situations, they provided the possibility for the dissemination of extremely nationalistic propaganda and the tendentious selection of "historical facts". Mutual prejudice and distrust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis were suppressed by the Soviet "nationalities policy" but continued and broke out from time to time in local conflicts. The historical memory of both peoples facilitated the rapid escalation and bitterness of the Karabakh crisis. (Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 357; Yamskov, 1992: 138-139)

Religion is often one of the principal ingredients of nationalistic feeling. From the beginning of the crisis, religion has played a more active role in Armenia than in Azerbaijan. Armenian priests have supported the demand for "reunification" with Karabakh. Mullahs in Azerbaijan, on the other hand, have remained mainly moderate in relation to the conflict. There are claims that Azerbaijan has sought the help of other Islamic countries. However, these countries have remained largely indifferent to the Karabakh conflict. Conflict may, thus, have a religious dimension, but it is not religious in character. (Chorbajian, Donabedian and Mutafian, 1994: 10-11; Trofimov, 1995: 57-59; Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 357-358)

When the conflict is seen from the angle of international relations, it is important to note that there is no American presence in the region. The Bush and Clinton administrations have given the Transcaucasian region very little foreign policy importance. The

United States seems to consider the area to belong to the Russian sphere of influence, and is willing to countenance Russian policies in the region. The Russian presence in the southern Transcaucasus pre-dates the Bolshevik Revolution by a century. Russia retains ambitions in the Transcaucasus, seeking a military presence and influence over foreign policy in the regional states as well as oil and natural gas concessions in Azerbaijan. Caspian oil is one of the key factors governing relations between Baku and Moscow. The Armenians joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) immediately after their independence, whereas the Azerbaijanis were brought into it later. (Chorbajian, Donabedian and Mutafian, 1994: 31-32; Popov, 1997: 199-201; UM, 1997: 12-13)

Azeris are ethnically, culturally and linguistically identified with the Turks. Anatolian Armenians, on the other hand, were massacred during the years 1894-1896 on the order of Ottoman Sultan Hamid II and, according to some estimates, up to 200,000 Armenians were killed. Similarly, in 1915 the Ottoman Turkish leadership ordered and implemented a policy of genocide against the Armenians. Some Azeris have talked of the state's confederation with Turkey. The Turkish presence in the region is, therefore, perceived differently by the parties in the conflict. Turkey maintained full neutrality during the first four years of the conflict. Later on, however, Turkey started to support Azerbaijan. Furthermore, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became a domestic issue in Turkey: statesmen, political parties, and private citizens pressed the government to assist their Turkish brethren. (Chorbajian, Donabedian and Mutafian, 1994: 4-6; Kennedy-Pipe, 1993: 270; Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 359)

A by-product of the pro-Azerbaijani position of Turkey in the conflict was the creation of favourable conditions in its competition with Iran for influence in Azerbaijan. The conflict has also provided new opportunities for Iran too to increase its influence in the region. An affinity exits between Azerbaijan and Iran, based largely to the fact that both embrace the Shi'ite branch of Islam

and share many traditions. Iran is home to a large Azerbaijani minority in the north-west, which has caused some disputes. Despite the religious affinity between Iran and Azerbaijan, Iran has strongly supported Armenia and acted as a counterweight to the Turkish influence. (Chorbajian, Donabedian and Mutafian, 1994: 34-35; UM, 1997: 13-14; Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 359-360)

In sum, the Soviet nationalistic policies created a platform for the new production and return of ethnic, cultural and religious identities during the era of glasnost. The parties in conflict have strong collective memories of "homelands" as well as of regional "friends and enemies" which have been politicised and mobilised during the conflict. Given these socio-psychological elements as well as the complex, protracted and post-Clausewitzean nature of the conflict, traditional means of conflict resolution require parallel, alternative, processes in which these can be dealt with. The following part discusses both traditional and alternative approaches.

4.3. Traditional third party interventions

There have been both military and diplomatic attempts of conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Soviet (and CIS) troops represent military efforts. In short, the CIS has not been able to act as an effective mechanism in the protracted conflict. Furthermore, the troops have been following the politics of "divide and rule", which has undermined their legitimacy. For example, during March 1992 CIS (former Soviet) troops stationed in the region were accused of fighting and supporting both sides in the conflict.

In addition to the military efforts, several mediators have intervened, and several rounds of peace talks have been organised. In 1991 Yeltsin and the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev mediated a cease-fire agreement between the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The agreement failed immediately. In 1990 the leadership of the republics involved was losing control over its

own military units and over the situation in Karabakh. This was one reason for the failure of the mediatory mission initiated by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev. In other words, the initiators took into consideration only the will of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to find a political solution to the conflict. They disregarded the fact that the presidents did not fully control the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and that there were powerful forces on both sides that sought a military solution. Similarly, the mediation efforts by the Ukrainian leaders failed in 1991. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1991; Landgren, 1992: 550; Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 355)

Attempts to arrange a cease-fire between the two countries took place almost monthly throughout 1992, involving at various times Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran and Turkey, as well as representatives from the UN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In early 1992, Iran and Turkey offered mediating assistance. Once the Armenian government rejected Turkey as a mediator due its pro-Azeri position, and Russia demonstrated its inability to influence events, Iran emerged as a natural mediator acceptable to both parties. Given the existing relationship between the mediator and the republics, Iran was perceived to be a neutral intermediary. The Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vellayati negotiated a cease-fire between the two parties, but it was constantly breached. Armenia achieved impressive military successes while Iranian mediation efforts were underway, and this led Azerbaijan to look upon Iran as a biased party. Iran, thus, failed to take advantage of its mediatory role in the conflict. Following an offer of mediation from Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev, negotiations at Foreign Minister level produced a new cease-fire agreement in September 1992. (Amer et al., 1992: 96; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1992; Kennedy-Pipe, 1993: 271; Landgren, 1992: 550; Vaserman and Ginat, 1994: 360)

During 1992 both Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted an invitation to open peace talks in Moscow – without the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh representatives. Also, US Secretary of State James Baker visited the countries and called for peaceful solutions. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali decided to send Cyrus Vance as his personal representative to the area. None of these efforts and calls for peace was successful. (Amer et al., 1992: 96-97)

International efforts to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continued during 1993. Iran continued its intervention to negotiate cease-fires, but its attempts were short-lived. A plan formulated by Russia, Turkey and the United States in 1993 had as its objective the resumption of peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the auspices of the CSCE. The plan was not accepted. A meeting of the leaders of the member countries of the CIS in Moscow provided a forum for talks between the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan and the President and Prime Minister of Armenia, and Russian, Turkish and US officials. The talks ended without an overall agreement. Talks held in Moscow in September 1993 between Azerbaijan and the officials of Nagorno-Karabakh, on the other hand, ended with an agreement to extend a cease-fire. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1993)

A major change in the situation took place in 1994. The ending of large-scale fighting and the activation of political efforts by the parties, with the participation of the CSCE and Russia as mediators, characterised the year. In May 1994, the parties reached agreement in Moscow to observe an informal cease-fire. Russia gave up its earlier aspiration to be the only peace-keeper operating in the Federation of the Soviet Union or for mandating the CIS without being obliged to abide by CSCE norms and procedures. The year 1995 was dominated by CSCE activities, which will be discussed below.

In 1996 Russia searched for more involvement in political settlement, and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov played an important role in mediating between the presidents of

Azerbaijan and Armenia and the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh on the exchange of POWs and hostages. Talks mediated by the OSCE-sponsored Minsk Group continued in 1996 without producing a breakthrough. (Baranovsky, 1995: 245; Baranovsky, 1997: 115; Rotfeld, 1995: 294)

The history of official state-sponsored mediation efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict demonstrates a wide variety of third party interventions. Official representatives from different countries have intervened, often without success. Russia clearly has its own interests in the area and has therefore acted as a third party. It is difficult to judge how the parties in the conflict have perceived the Russian efforts, i.e. has Russia been seen as a neutral mediator.

Iranian mediation forms an interesting case. It is also an interested regional power, whose mediation efforts were, at least for a short period, accepted by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The events of 1992 demonstrate, however, how sensitive these types of perceptions are. Armenian military success led Azerbaijan to reject Iran as an impartial mediator. It should be noted, however, that in some cases partial mediators have acted successfully, and a theoretical argument has been put forward that interested and powerful mediators are most likely to be successful in managing international conflicts.

An important factor effecting the success – or rather non-success – of the mediation attempts in the Karabakh conflict has been the rejection of the representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh from the negotiating table. It was obvious already in 1990 that the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan did not totally control Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet, the participation of the representatives of the region was largely denied. The denial hints at the wish of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis to define the conflict in their own (state-centric) terms. For Azerbaijan the issue of the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an equal negotiating party would have meant acknowledging its special status in relation to Azerbaijan. The situation has, however, changed slightly. As the data demonstrates, for example, in 1996 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov mediated the exchange of POWs and hostages between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh.

4.4. Organisational mediation: the CSCE/OSCE and the Minsk process

In addition to official state-initiated mediation, the CSCE/OSCE has provided an important organisational framework for peace talks. There was general agreement quite early in the conflict between the US and the regional powers as well as the UN that the proper mediator for the conflict should be the CSCE. Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives were brought together for talks in March 1992 in Helsinki. The dialogue started in 1992 came to be known as the "Minsk process". The talks did not produce immediate results. They did, however, establish a dialogue which has continued.

One of the most serious procedural disputes of the conflict has concerned the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to it. Although the OSCE confirmed in 1995 that Nagorno-Karabakh is a party in conflict, Azerbaijan refused to recognise its status. It argued that the conflict is between Armenia and Azerbaijan and that the Armenian and Azeri communities of Karabakh are merely "interested parties". (UM, 1997: 11)

Russia is an original member of the Minsk group, although up to 1995 it pursued its own parallel process of mediation. Italy acted as the chairman of the Minsk process in 1992-93, followed by Sweden in 1993-95. A decision of the CSCE Budapest Summit in December 1994 created a co-chairmanship with Russia for the process. The aim was to end competing mediation efforts with Russia and consolidate the negotiation process. The original members at the CSCE Preparatory Conference in Minsk in 1992 were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech and Slovak Republics, France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey

and the USA. Czechoslovakia was replaced by Slovakia in January 1993, which in turn was replaced by Hungary when it took over the Chairmanship of the CSCE in December 1993. Switzerland was added to the group at the Budapest Summit Meeting. Finland became co-chairman in 1995. Denmark has replaced Hungary as the OSCE chairman-in-office, and Russia and France have worked as chairmen. (Amer et al., 1992: 97; Rotfeld, 1995: 296; UM, 1997: 6-7)

The Minsk process is not just important for the peace process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it represents a vital development in the history of the CSCE/OSCE itself. It has been the first departure from the principle of negotiations open to all participant countries. The process has also contributed to the discussion on the OSCE's crisis management tools and their effectiveness. Another decisive step has been the decision of the Budapest Summit in 1994 on multinational OSCE peace-keeping forces for the Karabakh conflict, which, however, have not been employed. (UM, 1997: 6)

What, then, has the Mink process done if it is looked at from the point of view of mediation? First, it has provided a forum for peace talks: it has provided a setting for negotiation grounds at its best almost on a monthly basis. Since the cease-fire in 1994, the talks have concentrated on achieving a "political agreement". It is assumed that an agreement would end the armed conflict and set the terms for armistice. Second, several written proposals have been made for the parties in the conflict in order to reach a settlement. For example, Finland and Russia presented three proposals for an overall settlement during 1995 and 1996. Third, the process has aimed at bringing all the relevant issues at stake in the conflict to the negotiation table. The Minsk process is thus based on both process and substantial inputs: both procedural and substantial suggestions are provided by the group. Several visits have been paid to the area by the representatives of the CSCE/OSCE. Furthermore, the Minsk Group has held consultations without the conflicting

parties as well as organised bilateral consultations with the parties. In addition to these activities, the group has prepared reports on the Karabakh conflict to both the OSCE and the UN. (UM, 1997: 5-25)

Why has the organisational process not been able to solve the conflict? Multiple reasons can be pointed out. In 1992 there was a general feeling that neither side could win the war – Armenia was exhausted economically because of the blockade, and Azerbaijan suffered heavy military losses to Nagorno-Karabakh units. With the re-opening of the CSCE conference in Rome in February 1993, the chances for an ending to the conflict for the first time seemed to be at hand. However, new Armenian offensives during the spring put an end to the optimism. (Amer et al, 1992: 97)

The Minsk group produced a peace plan in 1993, which was accepted by Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan rejected the plan, insisting on unconditional troop withdrawals from all occupied territories and expressing reluctance to accept the secessionists as a direct party to the conflict. (Baranovsky, 1993: 192) The Russian attitude towards the process has proven to be important too. In the beginning, Russia held an opportunistic attitude towards the CSCE conflict resolution attempts in Nagorno-Karabakh. For several years it was willing to pursue an autonomous role as a mediator, and perceived the Mink Group as an attempt to diminish its independent role. (Rotfeld, 1995: 292)

The CSCE Budapest Summit was seen as a breakthrough in the pursuit of a settlement of the conflict. Russia gave up its aspiration to be the only peace-keeper operating in the region. At the same time, the co-chairmanship of the Minsk process was established with the understanding that one of the chairmen would be a representative of Russia. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the Summit endorsed a future CSCE peace-keeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the issues which still remain open concerning, for example, the return of refugees and the definition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh formed obstacles to a settlement in

1994. Azerbaijan was not ready to recognise the breakaway region as a party to the settlement. The basic problem boiled down to the capability and willingness of the parties involved to reach a political decision on the cessation of the conflict. (Baranovsky, 1995: 254)

Studying the data on mediation collected by Bercovitch and Houston, and comparing it with the Nagorno-Karabakh case gives some insights into the question of the success and failure of mediation. Bercovitch's and Houston's findings show that cease-fires are relatively easy to mediate. However, in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict it took six years until a lasting cease-fire agreement was mediated by Russia. The findings also point out that the history between the relationship of the parties play an important part in the success of mediation: previous hostile relationships make mediation difficult. The Armenian and Azerbaijani relationship is largely dominated by hostile perceptions and negative mental representations – the other party is perceived to be a historical enemy.

It is also argued in Bercovitch's and Houston's study that issues related to sovereignty are relatively difficult to mediate. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict touches many of the difficult issues related to sovereignty. The right of Azerbaijan to maintain its territorial unity in the name of sovereignty, and the aim of Nagorno-Karabakh to gain full territorial sovereignty through independence are at stake in the conflict.

Regional organisations have a high success rate in mediation compared with individual states and the UN, because they are often seen to present regional values and goals, according to Bercovitch's and Houston's data. However, this may not have been the case with the CSCE/OSCE: newly-independent Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the organisation in 1992 and were probably not yet "socialised" to the values and norms created and supported by the organisation. Furthermore, the multiple actors which are often involved in organisational mediation tend to make processes complex: conflicting interests and perceptions are present. Although

the Minsk group may have worked in harmony, the Russian efforts to pursue its own mediation attempts did complicate the process.

A theoretical critique of official state- and organisation-sponsored mediation claims that state and organisational mediation often leaves the most important issues of conflict untouched, namely the issues related to the identity of the parties in the conflict. Given the fact that ethnopolitical conflicts are the most prominent conflict type, issues arising from ethnic identity and from the politicisation and mobilisation of identities should be at the centre of any conflict resolution attempt. This is not the case with official mediation, because it works within the instrumental framework assuming that conflicts are about conflicting interests and, therefore, it leaves such an "existential" issue as identity-construction aside. Furthermore, it is argued that official mediation seldom allows the full identification of relevant parties. The state-centric world view does not encourage the recognition of the role of, for example, civil society in conflict resolution and prevention.

Seen, on the other hand, from the critical point of view of Kaldor's post-Clausewitzean conflicts, negotiation and mediation attempts have failed because they represent "old thinking" in conflict resolution. In Nagorno-Karabakh, violence has not been monopolised solely by state actors. There have been a variety of forces pressing for different solutions to the conflict. Traditional Clausewitzean negotiation and mediation by state-sponsored intervenors aim mainly at containing violence territorially, not resolving the deep causes of conflicts. The rebuilding at the societal level is the main issue of conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, and negotiation and mediation seldom contribute to this goal. Furthermore, official attempts assume instrumentally rational and internally coherent (state) actors, whose cost-benefit-oriented negotiation processes would mark a clear difference between peace and war. This has not been the case in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict where culturally, socially and ethnically different actors have advocated their own needs and values.

4.5. Problem-solving conflict resolution: the "Partners in Conflict" project

The "Partners in Conflict" (Partners in Conflict: Building Bridges to Peace in Transcaucasia and Central Asia) conflict resolution project represents an unofficial mediation and training effort for the conflicts in the Transcaucasian area. It serves as an interesting example of a conflict resolution attempt founded on an "alternative" set of assumptions, and it may serve as a "model" for other attempts to deal with some of the most fundamental issues of post-Cold War conflicts.

In short, the project has brought together members of civil society, mainly scholars, to discuss the conflict in their region, to develop conflict resolution skills and to work on joint book and other practical projects. At the first and second stages participants from Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Azerbaijan and Armenia participated. Later participants from Nagorno-Karabakh were added to the group. The project is conducted by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland at College Park in the United States. The principal funding bodies are the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Eurasia, MacArthur, and Winston Foundations.

At the first and second stages the participants were identified and invited largely by the facilitation team. At the third stage, on the other hand, the participants themselves were encouraged to invite relevant individuals to the workshop. The choice of participants tried to allow the participation of a wide variety of scholars representing different interest groups.

The participants attended an extensive training session at the CIDCM during the fall of 1995. Their four-month stay at the institute engaged them in lectures and group activities intended to provide them with training in conflict resolution skills suitable for their own conflicts. They were encouraged and trained to find ways to involve the civil society of their home communities in

seeking peaceful solutions to tensions in the area. The underlying assumption was that the participants "may come from antagonistic communities, but as scholars they share a common interest and commitment to human rights, democracy and peace". (Sanders and Collier, 1996: 1)

The second phase of the project brought the parties to Jerusalem in 1996 for a week-long workshop. The participants were invited to reflect on their re-entry experiences, i.e. the problems they faced when they returned home from their training session. During their stay in Jerusalem, the participants received lectures on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on different types of autonomy models as forms of conflict resolution and especially on the Åland Islands autonomy as a successful model of conflict prevention.

The talks on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict aimed at providing an example of a protracted communal conflict which bears some similarities as well as great differences with the conflicts in the Transcaucasian region. The participants themselves had expressed an interest in studying autonomy models as a means to resolve and prevent communal conflicts, and the lectures offered them detailed information on various cases. The relevance of autonomy models and ideas were further discussed during a brainstorming session, which gave the participants an opportunity to reflect on the utility of the models. Furthermore, during the workshop in Jerusalem, the participants finalised the preparations for a collaborative book on conflict resolution in the Caucasus, and reported on and planned practical sub-regional trans-border and local conflict resolution activities (e.g. training of the local media, working with refugees, establishing shared conflict management centres). (ibid.: 1-10; author's own notes on the Jerusalem workshop, 1996)

The parties suggested in Jerusalem that the Åland Islands in Finland would provide an ideal setting for further study of the autonomy model, finalising the book project and planning future conflict resolution and training activities for the region. The parties met in August 1997 in Eckerö in the Åland Islands. The Åland Islands

Peace Institute worked as a local organiser of the meeting. This time the original eight members were added with seven others from the area. In Eckerö and Mariehamn the parties deepened their knowledge on the Islands' autonomy and studied the forms of autonomy prevailing in Puerto Rico and Catalonia. They completed the Russian edition of their joint book and worked on its English version. Furthermore, planning for trans-border and local conflict resolution activities in 1998 took place. The workshop also produced a joint statement (proclamation) demonstrating the participants' will to continue conflict resolution efforts, and urging the political leaders in the region to find a political solution to the conflicts. (Author's own notes on the Eckerö workshop, 1997)

What, then, are the underlying "alternative" assumptions underlying this type of unofficial facilitation attempts? The "Partners in Conflict" project shares features both with citizens diplomacy and problem-solving workshop conflict resolution, which were described in the previous chapter, and thereby its strengths derive from these approaches. It aims at working at the level of civil societies, but intends to have politically relevant spill-over effects too. Training in conflict resolution skills is considered to form an important part of conflict resolution at the societal level. It is thought both to emancipate the participants and to give them tools for controlling their environment in an intellectual manner.

The joint book project the participants work on relies on an assumption of functional cooperation. It is expected that practical joint efforts foster further joint attempts in the field of conflict resolution. Similarly, the trans-border conflict resolution activities, including conflict resolution centres, are assumed to function as a starting-point for wider cooperation. This type of functional cooperation is assumed to transcend political struggles and, instead, help to focus on practical problems.

A group of scholars works as a non-interested facilitator without imposing its solutions. In other words, the participants are allowed to set their own agenda to a great extent. Thus, the project clearly

differs from official mediation: mediators, procedures and participants are different from official mediation attempts. It parts company from official mediation also in its goals. The project does not aim at conflict resolution directly: rather, it works at the level of confidence-building between civil societies, while at the same time expecting participants' inputs into policy-making processes. The agenda set largely by the participants allows them to discuss, for example, identity-related issues without pressuring them to instrumentally negotiate on interests.

Seen from the point of view of conflict resolution phases, the facilitators encourage the participants to become aware of and go through the ARI (adversarial-reflexive-invention) stages of conflict resolution. It is assumed that conflict resolution engages the parties first to adversarial framing, when the focus is on the "What?" of the conflict, namely what resources are at stake and what solutions are being sought. The stage is characterised by antagonism. An underlying resonance is then fostered through reflexive reframing, when the questions now become "Who?" and "Why?" At this stage the core identity issues are articulated. This sets the stage for the invention of joint solutions, the "How?" and finally agenda setting, consolidating the "What? Why? Who?" and "How?" of the previous steps. The final stage is sustained through joint action. (Rothman, 1997: 8)

The evaluation of success in unofficial mediation is extremely difficult, since it seldom aims at "direct" conflict management through cease-fire agreements and peace treaties. Rather, it aims at fundamental changes in the perceptions, mental representations and frameworks as well as actions of the parties in a conflict by creating an environment for the analysis of the conflict in question (including its root causes), for the exploration of identity-related issues and for the creation of confidence-building measures both at the levels of civil society and policy-making. As such an environment, it aims at long-term conflict prevention. Despite the difficulty of evaluation, it seems to provide a fruitful means to create

a dialogue between the parties in conflict and to encourage cooperation between different communities. Therefore, it fulfills some of the most crucial requirements needed for the resolution of new post-Clausewitzean conflicts.

5. EPILOGUE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN DIALOGIC COMMUNITIES

It is the contention of this author that ultimately post-Clausewitzean conflict resolution takes place in "dialogic communities". The dialogic community:

> [...] anticipates non-violent strategies of conflict resolution as well as encouraging cooperative and associative methods of problem-solving. It is a matter of political imagination as well as collective fantasy to project institutions, practices and ways of life which promote non-violent conflict resolution strategies and associative problem-solving methods (Benhabib, 1992: 49).

The dialogic community is a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the other party's point of view and the sensitivity to hear their voice, is paramount. The dialogic community in which dialogic relations are established is, thus, broader than dialogic speech in the narrow sense of the word. The aim of dialogue is not consensus or unanimity, but the "anticipated communication with others whom I know I must finally come to some agreement" (ibid: 9). In such a conversation, which Benhabib also calls "enlarged thinking", the identity of the moral self becomes reconceptualised by virtue of the nature of the community.

The aim of the establishment of the dialogic community cannot be the finding of a set of universal moral principles, values, needs or reason. Rather, the emphasis should be on "sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue" (ibid: 38). An inability to come to a shared understanding is not a final

outcome, but indicates that one has been unable to bring the process of understanding to a conclusion. Dialogue is, by its nature, repeatable and, by being repeated, it can be moved forward.

Official and formal negotiations seldom bring about a dialogic framework, for they aim at reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a common interest. Negotiations which rely solely on instrumental bargaining on interests – or rather, interests turned into utilities – do not produce "new subjects" or new points of identification. Neither does the bargaining structure with the manipulative (biased) mediator generate the dialogic community, because the biased third party operates in a context of power politics and, therefore, in a context of cost-benefit calculations. Official negotiations and biased mediation tend to re-enforce existing power networks by appealing to a limited set of negotiable interests and utilities, which necessitates the existence of an assumed coherent and sovereign identity; they necessitate agency entitled to resort instrumental reason and institutions. And by doing this, they reproduce "old Clausewitzean thinking" on conflict resolution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aho, James (1994) *This Thing of Darkness, A Sociology of the Enemy*. Seattle and London: Univeristy of Washington Press.

Amer, Ramses et al. (1992) "Major Armed Conflicts 1992", in *Sipri Yearbook 1992: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 81-118. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, Benedict (1993) *Imagined Communities*. London, New York: Verso.

Anstee, Margaret (1993) "Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy, A Test Case for U.N. Peace-keeping", *International Relations* 11 (6): 495-511.

Appadurai, Arjun (1990) "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy", *Theory, Culture & Society* 7 (2-3): 295-310.

Author's notes on the Jerusalem (May 20-27, 1996) and Eckerö (August 23-30, 1997) workshops.

Auvinen, Juha (1998) "On the Political Economy of African Conflicts", in Maija Airas (ed.) *The Role of the International Cooperation in Conflict Prevention in Africa*, pp. 31-37. Kokkola: KP Paino.

Azar, Edward (1990) *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Baranovsky, Vladimir (1995) "Russia and Its Neighborhood: Conflict Developments and Settlement Efforts", in *Sipri Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 231-264. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baranovsky, Vladimir (1996) "Conflicts In and Around Russia", in *Sipri Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 251-275. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.

Baranovsky, Vladimir (1997) "Russia: Conflicts and Its Security Environment", in *Sipri Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 103-127. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.

Bartelson, Jens (1995) *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barth, Fredrik (1969) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Oslo, Bergen, Tromsø: Universitets Forslaget.

Bauman, Zygmunt (1992) "Soil, Blood and Identity", *The Sociological Review* 40 (4): 675-701.

Bendahmane, Diane and McDonald, John, Jr., (1984) (eds.) *International Negotiation, Art and Science*. Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State.

Bendahmane, Diane and McDonald, John, Jr., (1986) (eds.) *Perspectives on Negotiations, Four Case Studies and Interpretations*. Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State.

Benhabib, Seyla (1992) *Situating the Self*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bercovitch, Jacob (1984) *Social Conflicts and Third Parties, Strategies of Conflict Resolution*. Colorado: Westview Press.

Bercovitch, Jacob (1992) "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations", in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.) *Mediation in International Relations*, pp. 1-29. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Houston, Allison (1996) "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence", in Jacob Bercovitsch (ed.) *Resolving International Conflicts, The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, pp. 11-35. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Blake, Robert, Shepard, Herbert and Mouton, Jane (1964) *Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry*. Houston: Gulf Publishing Company.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) "An Agenda for Peace", in *Sipri Yearbook 1993: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 66-80. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.

Brass, Paul (1991) *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*. New Delhi: Sage.

Burton, John (1979) *Deviance, Terrorism and War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Burton, John (1982) *Dear Survivors*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Burton, John (1984) *Global Conflict, The Domestic Sources of International Crisis*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.

Burton, John (1987) *World Society*. Lanham: University Press of America (originally published: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

Burton, John (1990) *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*. London: Macmillan.

Burton, John (1997) *Violence Explained*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Burton, John and Dukes, Frank (1990) *Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution*. London: Macmillan.

Buzan, Barry (1997) "Rethinking Security after the Cold War", *Cooperation and Conflict* 32 (1): 5-28.

Buzan, Barry and Wæver, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap (1998) *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1996) Second Progress Report, July 1996. Carnegie Corporation: New York.

Carnevale, Peter and Pruitt, Dean (1992) "Negotiation and Mediation", *Annual Review of Psychology* 43: 531-582.

Chorbajian, Levon, Donabedian, Patrick and Mutafian, Claude (1994) *The Caucasian Knot, The History and Geo-politics of Nagorno-Karabakh*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books.

Cohen, Stephen et al. (1977) "Evolving Intergroup Techniques for Conflict Resolution: An Israeli-Palestinian Pilot Workshop", *Journal of Social Issues* 33 (1): 165-189.

Connor, Walker (1994) *Ethnonationalism, The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Curle, Adam (1993) "New Challenges to Citizens Peacemaking", *Global Security Study* 14.

Dabelko, G. D. and Dabelko, D. D. (1997) "Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and Redefinition" in http://www.si.edu/WWICS/PROGRAMS/DIS/ECS/report1/dabelko.htm (15. 11. 1997)

Davies, John and McDaniel, Chad (1996) "Dynamic Data for Early Warning of Ethnopolitical Conflict", paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, San Diego, 16-20 April.

Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix (1986) *Nomadology: The War Machine*. New York: Semiotext(e).

Deutsch, Morton (1971) "Conflict and Its Resolution", in Clagett Smith (ed.) *Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences*, pp. 36-57. London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Doob, Leonard (1970) (ed.) *Resolving Conflict in Africa, The Fermeda Workshop*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Doob, Leonard and Foltz, William (1973) "The Belfast Workshop, An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive Conflict",

Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (3): 489-512.

Dragadze, Tamara (1989) "The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment", *Third World Quarterly* 11 (1): 55-71.

Dryzek, John (1990) *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Enloe, Cynthia (1980) *Ethnic Soldiers*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

"Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: A Debate" (1997), in http://www.si.edu/WWICS/PROGRAMS/DIS/ECS/report2/debate.htm (15. 11. 1997)

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (1993) E*thnicity & Nationalism, Anthropological Perspective*. London, Boulder and Colorado: Pluto Press.

Esman, Milton (1977) (ed.) E*thnic Conflict in the Western World.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Fisher, Ronald (1983) "Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (2): 301-334.

Gellner, Ernest (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gurr, Ted (1994) "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System", *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (3): 347-377.

Gurr, Ted and Harff, Barbara (1994) *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press.

Gurr, Ted and Haxton, Michael (1996) "Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 1990s: Patterns and Trends (Minorities Report (1))", paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, San Diego, 16-20 April.

Hamill, James (1994) "Angola's Road from under the Rubble", *The World Today* 50 (1): 6-11.

Hannum, Hurst (1992) *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Hassner, Pierre (1993) "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order", Survival 35 (2): 49-65.

Hechter, Michael (1975) *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic in British National Development* 1536-1966. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Heisler, Martin (1990) "Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in the Modern West", in Joseph Montville (ed.) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, pp. 21-52. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Hill, Barbara (1982) "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques, From Problem-Solving Workshops to Theory", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26 (1): 109-138.

Hobsbawn, Eric and Ranger, Terence (1983) (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1991) "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict", *International Security* 16: 76-116.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1994) "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict", *International Security* 19 (4): 5-40.

Horowitz, Donald (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.

Huntington, Samuel (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3): 22-49.

Iklé, Fred (1964) *How Nations Negotiate*. New York: Harper & Row.

The Independent, 26 November 1994.

International Alert (1993) "Preventive Diplomacy, Report of a Roundtable on Preventive Diplomacy and the UN's Agenda for Peace". London: International Alert.

International Herald Tribune, April 8-9, 11, 13 and 18, 1995.

International Security (1995) "Correspondence" (B. Russett, C. Layne, D. Spiro and M. Doyle), 19 (4): 164-184.

International Security (1996) "Correspondence" (R. Wolf, E. Weede, A. Enterline, E. Mansfield and J. Snyder), 20 (4): 176-207.

Jabri, Vivienne (1990) *Mediating Conflict, Decision-Making and Western Intervention in Namibia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Jabri, Vivienne (1996) *Discourses on Violence, Conflict Analysis Reconsidered*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Joenniemi, Pertti (1997) "Wild Zones, Black Holes and the Struggle Void of Purpose; Has War Lost Its Name", a paper presented at the 17th IPSA World Congress, Seoul, August 17-21.

Jones, Bruce and Prasad, Satendra (1997) *European Union Development Cooperation in the 21st Century: A Conflict Prevention Perspectives for the Future Lomé Agreements*. International Alert: London.

Jung, Dietrich (1997) "From Inter-State to Intra-State War, Patterns

and Trends in War Development Since 1945", paper presented at the COPRI symposium on "Intra State Conflict: Causes and Peace Strategies", Copenhagen, 3-5 May.

Kaldor, Mary (1997) "Introduction", in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.) *Restructuring the Global Military Sector*, Volume I: New Wars, pp. 3-33. London and Washington: Pinter.

Kaufman, Chaim (1996) "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars", *International Security* 20 (4): 136-175.

Keashly, Loraleigh and Fisher, Ronald (1996) "A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and Practical Considerations" in Jacob Bercovitsch (ed.) *Resolving International Conflicts, The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, pp. 235-262. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1988-1993), CD-ROM.

Kelman, Herbert (1990) "Interactive Problem-Solving: a Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution", in John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.) *Conflict: Readings in Management & Resolution*, pp. 199-215. London: Macmillan.

Kelman, Herbert (1992) "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.) *Mediation in International Relations, Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, pp. 64-96. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press.

Kelman, Herbert and Cohen, Stephen (1979) "Reduction of International Conflict: An Interactional Approach", in William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds.) T*he Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, pp. 288-303. Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline (1993) "The CIS: Sources of Stability and Instability", in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.) *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition*, pp. 258-282. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laclau, Ernesto (1994) "Introduction", in Ernesto Laclau (ed.) *The Making of Political Identities*, pp. 1-10. London, New York: Verso.

Landgren, Signe (1992) "Post-Soviet Threats to Security", in *Sipri Yearbook 1992: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 530-557. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laue, James (1987) "The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Third Party Roles in Conflict", in Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.) *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications*, pp. 17-29. London: Frances Pinter.

Lederer, Katrin (1980) (ed.) *Basic Needs, A Contribution to the Current Debate*. Cambridge, MA.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain; Königstein/Ts: Verlag Anton Hain.

Linklater, Andrew (1992) "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 21 (1): 77-97.

Linklater, Andrew (1994) "Dialogue, Dialectic and Emancipation in International Relations at the End of the Post-War Age", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23 (1): 119-131.

Mansfield, Edward and Snyder, Jack (1995) "Democratization and War", *Foreign Affairs* 74 (3): 79-97.

Marshall, Monty (1993) "States at Risk, Ethnopolitics in the Multinational States of Eastern Europe", in Ted Gurr (ed.) *Minorities at Risk, A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, pp. 173-216. Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Maslow, Abraham (1970) *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper & Row.

Mayall, James (1992) "Nationalism and International Security after the Cold War", *Survival* 34 (1): 19-35.

McDonald, John, Jr. and Bendahmane, Diane (1987) (eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*. Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State.

McGarry, John and O'Leary, Brendan (1993) "Introduction. The Macro-political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict", in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.) *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, pp. 1-39. London, New York: Routledge.

Mitchell, Christopher (1981) *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*. Westmead: Gower.

Mitchell, C. R. (1990) "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions about Basic Human Needs Theory", in John Burton (ed.) *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, pp. 149-176. London: Macmillan.

Mitchell, Christopher and Banks, Michael (1996) *Handbook of Conflict Resolution*. London: Pinter.

Molvaer, Reidulf (1991) "Environmentally Induced Conflicts? A Discussion Based on Studies from the Horn of Africa", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 22: 175-188.

Montville, Joseph (1990) (ed.) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*. Lexington, M.A.: Lexington Books.

Moskos, Charles and Burk, James (1994) "The Postmodern Military", in James Burk (ed.) *The Military in New Times, Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, pp. 141-162. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press.

Nadein-Raevski, V. (1992) "The Azerbaijani Armenian Conflict: Possible Paths towards Resolution", in Kumar Rupesinghe, Peter King and Olga Vorkunova (eds.) *Ethnicity and Conflict in a post-Communist World*, pp. 113-130. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Neumann, Iver B. (1997) "Identity and the Outbreak of War, or Why the Copenhagen School of Security Studies Should Include the Idea of 'Violisation' in Its Framework of Analysis", paper presented at the COPRI Symposium on "Intra State Conflict: Causes and Peace Strategies", Copenhagen, 3-4 May.

Nordlander, Ylva (1994) (ed.), "States in Armed Conflict 1993", Research Report No. 38. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

Nudler, Oscar (1980) "Human Needs: A Sophisticated Holistic Approach", in Katrin Lederer (ed.) *Basic Needs, A Contribution to the Current Debate*, pp. 131-150. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschalager, Gunn & Hain; Königstein/TS: Verlag Antonia Hain.

Ohlson, Thomas (1995) "South Africa: From Apartheid to Multi-Party Democracy", in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 117-145. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Patel, Hasu (1993) "Zimbabwe's Mediation in Mozambique and Angola", in Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.) *Mediation in Southern Africa*, pp. 117-141. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Pieterse, Jan (1996) "Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity Discourse", in Edwin Wilmsen and Patric McAllister (eds.) *The Politics of Difference, Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*, pp. 25-44. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Popov, Arkadii (1997) "Ethnic Wars in the Transcaucasus", in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.) *Restructuring the Global Military Sector*, Volume I: New Wars, pp. 177-206. London and Washington: Pinter.

Roosens, Eugeen (1989) *Creating Ethnic Identity: The Process of Ethnogenesis*. London: Sage.

Rosas, Allan (1983) "Internal Self-Determination", in Christian Tomuschat (ed.) *Modern Law of Self-Determination*, pp. 225-252. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Ross, Marc (1993) *The Management of Conflict, Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Rotfeld, Adam (1995) "Europe: The Multilateral Security Process", in *Sipri Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 265-301. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rothman, Jay (1997) "Action Evaluation and Conflict Resolution Training", an article prepared for The International Journal of Negotiation, in http://www.ARIAassociates:Haverford.edu/web/essaysetc/journal_negotiation.html (12. 12. 1997)

Rupesinghe, Kumar (1993) *Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy*, A discussion paper by Kumar Rupesinghe. London: International Alert.

Ryan, Stephen (1990) *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Ryan, Stephen (1996) "'The Voice of Sanity Getting Hoarse?': Destructive Processes in Violent Ethnic Conflict", in Edwin Wilmsen and Patric McAllister (eds.) *The Politics of Difference*, pp. 144-161. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Sanders, Barri and Collier, Kelly (1996) *Partners in Conflict: Building Bridges to Peace in Transcaucasia Re-entry Workshop*. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland: College Park, Maryland.

Sandole, Dennis (1987) "Introduction", in Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.) *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: From Interpersonal to International Applications*, pp. 3-12. London: Frances Pinter.

Saroyan, Mark (1990) "The 'Karabakh Syndrome' and Azerbaijani Politics", *Problems of Communism* 39: 14-29.

Shapiro, Michael and Alker, Hayward (1996) (eds.) *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.

Simpson, Chris (1994) "Peace or War?", *African Report* 39 (2): 55-57.

Smith, Anthony (1986) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, Anthony (1991) *National Identity*. Reno, Las Vegas, London: Univeristy of Nevada Press.

Sollenberg, Margareta and Wallensteen, Peter (1996) "Major Armed Conflicts", in *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 15-30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sollenberg, Margareta and Wallensteen, Peter (1997) "Major Armed Conflicts", in *Sipri Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, pp. 16-30. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.

Todorov, Tzevetan (1992) *The Conquest of America*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Touval, Saadia (1995) "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations", *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 (1): 51-69.

Trofimov, Dmitry (1995) "Islam in the Political Culture of the Former Soviet Union: Central Asia and Azerbaijan", Hamburger Beiträge zur Friendenforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Heft 93. Hamburg: Institut für Friendenforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universitet Hamburg.

UM (1997) "Finland as a Mediator in the Karabakh Conflict", Report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms. Tarja Halonen to the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament on the activities of Finland as co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Conference, February 11, 1997. Helsinki: Publications of Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

United Nations (1994) "The United Nations and the Situation in Angola, May 1991-June 1994". New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.

Wæver, Ole and Buzan, Barry and Kelstrup, Morten and Lemaitre, Pierre (1993) *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Pinter.

Walker, R. B. J. (1993) *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallensteen, Peter and Sollenberg, Margareta (1995) "After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-94", *Journal of Peace Research* 32: 345-360.

Weber, Cynthia (1995) *Simulating Sovereignty. Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van Creveld, Martin (1991) *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press.

van der Merwe, Hendrik and Meyer, Gabi (1993) "Principles and Practice of Facilitation and Mediation in South Africa", in Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.) *Mediation in Southern Africa*, pp. 163-178. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.

van Tongeren, Paul (1996) "The Role of NGOs in Conflict Prevention", in *Prevention and Management of Conflict, An International Directory*, Dutch Center for Conflict Prevention in cooperation with ACCESS and PIOM (ed.), pp. 18-24. Amsterdam: NCDO.

Vaserman, Arie and Ginat, Rami (1994) "National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17 (4): 345-362.

Vasquez, John (1993) *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Venancio, Moises and Macmillan, Carla (1993) "Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-1991", in Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.) *Mediation in Southern Africa*, pp. 100-116. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Volkan, Vamik (1988) *The Need to have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships*. Northvale: Aronson.

Volkan, Vamik and Itzkowtz, Norman (1994) *Turks and Greeks, Neighbours in Conflict.* Huntingdon: The Eothen Press.

Väyrynen, Raimo (1991) "To Settle or Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts", in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.) *New Directions in Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, pp. 1-25. London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Väyrynen, Raimo (1997) "Toward Effective Conflict Prevention: A Comparison of Different Instruments", *International Journal of Peace Studies* 2 (1): 1-18.

Väyrynen, Tarja (1995) *Sharing Reality: An Insight from Phenomenology to John Burton's Problem-Solving Conflict Resolution*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Canterbury: University of Kent at Canterbury.

Väyrynen, Tarja (1998) "Ethnic Communality and Conflict Resolu-

tion", *Cooperation and Conflict* 33 (1): 59-80.

Yamskov, A. N. (1991) "Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus, The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh", *Theory and Society* 20 (5): 631-660.

Yamskov, Anatoly (1992) "Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus: A Case Study of Nagorno-Karabakh", in Kumar Rupesinghe, Peter King and Olga Vorkunova (eds.) *Ethnicity and Conflict in a post-Communist World*, pp. 131-140. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Young, Oran (1967) *The Intermediaries, Third Parties in International Crises*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, I. William (1995) "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse", in I. William Zartman (ed.) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, pp. 1-11. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner.

Tarja Väyrynen

New Conflicts and their Peaceful Resolution

Post-Cold War Conflicts, Alternative Means for their Resolution, and the Case of Nagorno-Karabakh

The end of Cold War closed four decades of military confrontation between East and West. Yet the end of this struggle has not brought relief from armed conflicts. Rather, violence has shifted from inter-state relations to inter-community relations. We are moving away from the Clausewitzean trinity of the state, the army, and the people. War between nations have been replaced by ethnopolitical warfare, in which national boundaries no longer hold a central place.

It is argued in the book that traditional Clausewitzean state-sponsored negotiation and mediation as a means of conflict resolution aims mainly at containing violence territorially, not solving the deep causes of ethnopolitical conflicts. New thinking and alternative methods are needed for the purposes of conflict management. By studying the theory of conflict resolution and by illuminating the theory with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the book challenges the pessimistic views of the possibility of post-Cold War conflict resolution, and argues that there are models of conflict resolution and conflict prevention which are suitable for the management of ethnopolitical conflicts.

The Åland Islands Peace Institute